

THE
INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
(IX OF 1908)

WITH
EXHAUSTIVE, ANALYTICAL AND CRITICAL COMMENTARIES

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VOLUME III

THE FIRST SCHEDULE

ARTICLES 141 TO 183

APPENDIX AND

GENERAL INDEX

ALL INDIA REPORTER LTD., NAGPUR

1939

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AT THE ALL INDIA REPORTER PRESS
MUMBAI.

CONTENTS

Abbreviations	1951—1952
COMMENTARY on Articles 141 to 183	1953—2630
Schedule II (<i>Repealed</i>)	2631
Schedule III (<i>Repealed</i>)	2632
Appendix: Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1 of 1920	2633—2636
Articles 141 to 183 with synopses in parallel columns	2637—2652
General Index	2653—3064

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COMMENTARY on Articles 141 to 183...		...	1953—2630
Schedule II (<i>Repealed</i>)	2631
Schedule III (<i>Repealed</i>)	2632
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Articles 141 to 183 with synopses in parallel columns	2637—2652
General Index	2653—3064



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ABBREVIATIONS

A I R. 1921 All., Bom., etc.	...	All India Reporter, Allahabad, Bombay, etc., sections of the respective years.
All.	...	Allahabad (I. L. R.)
Agra	...	Agra High Court Reports.
All L. Jour.	...	Allahabad Law Journal.
All W. N.	...	Allahabad Weekly Notes.
Beng. L. R.	...	Bengal Law Reports.
Bom.	...	Bombay (I. L. R.).
Bom. H. C. R.	...	Bombay High Court Reports.
Bom. L. R.	...	Bombay Law Reporter.
Bom P. J.	...	Bombay Printed Judgments.
Bourke.	...	Bourke's Reports.
Bur. L. Jour.	...	Burma Law Journal.
Bur. L. R.	...	Burma Law Reports.
Bur. L. Tim.	...	Burma Law Times.
Cal.	...	Calcutta (I. L. R.).
Cal. L. Jour.	...	Calcutta Law Journal.
Cal. L. R.	...	Calcutta Law Reports.
Cal. W. N.	...	Calcutta Weekly Notes.
C. P. L. R.	...	Central Provinces Law Reports.
Cor.	...	Coryton's Reports.
Cr. C.	...	Criminal Cases.
Cr. L. J.	...	Criminal Law Journal.
E. R.	...	English Reports.
Hay.	...	Hay's Reports.
Hyde.	...	Hyde's Reports.
Ind. App.	...	Law Reports, Indian Appeals.
Ind. Cas.	...	Indian Cases.
Ind. Jur. (N.S.)	...	Indian Jurist (New Series).
Ind. Jur. (O.S.)	...	Indian Jurist (Old Series).
Ind. Rul.	...	Indian Rulings.
Knapp.	...	Knapp's Reports.
Lah.	...	Lahore (I. L. R.).
Lah. L. Jour.	...	Lahore Law Journal.
L. R. A.	...	Law Reporter, Allahabad.
Low. Bur. Rul.	...	Lower Burma Rulings.
Luck.	...	Lucknow (I. L. R.).
L. C.	...	Lucknow Cases.
Mad.	...	Madras (I. L. R.).
Mad. H. C. R.	...	Madras High Court Reports.
Mad. Jur.	...	Madras Jurist.
Mad. L. Jour.	...	Madras Law Journal.
Mad. L. Tim.	...	Madras Law Times.
Mad. L. W.	...	Madras Law Weekly.
Mad. W. N.	...	Madras Weekly Notes.
Marsh.	...	Marshall's Reports.
Moo. Ind. App.	...	Moore's Indian Appeals.

Moo. P. C. C.	... Moore's Privy Council Cases.
Nag. L. Jour.	... Nagpur Law Journal.
Nag. L. R.	... Nagpur Law Reports.
N.W. P. H. C. R.	... North-West Provinces High Court Reports.
Oudh Cas.	... Oudh Cases.
Oudh L. Jour.	... Oudh Law Journal.
Oudh W. N.	... Oudh Weekly Notes.
Pat.	... Patna (I. L. R.).
Pat. H. C. C.	... Patna High Court Cases.
Pat. L. Jour.	... Patna Law Journal.
Pat. L. R.	... Patna Law Reporter.
Pat. L. Tim.	... Patna Law Times.
Pat. L. W.	... Patna Law Weekly.
Pun. L. R.	... Punjab Law Reporter.
Pun. Re.	... Punjab Record.
Pun. W. R.	... Punjab Weekly Reporter.
R. & J.'s.	... Rafique and Jackson's Oudh Privy Council Decisions.
Rang.	... Rangoon (I. L. R.).
R. R.	... Revised Reports.
R S. C.	... Rules of the Supreme Court of England.
Sar.	... Saraswati's Privy Council Judgments.
Shome L. R.	... Shome's Law Reports.
Sind L. R.	... Sind Law Reporter.
Suther.	... Sutherland's Privy Council Judgments.
Suth. W. R.	... Sutherland's Weekly Reporter.
Times L. R.	... Times Law Reports.
U. P. L. R.	... United Provinces Law Reports.
U. P. B. R.	... United Provinces Board of Revenue.
Upp. Bur. Rul.	... Upper Burma Rulings.
Weir.	... Weir's Criminal Rulings.
W. R. (Eng.)	... Weekly Reporter (England).
<hr/>	
C. A.	... Court of Appeal.
Cl.	... Clause.
Cr.	... Criminal.
F. B.	... Full Bench.
F.N.	... Foot-Note.
Jour.	... Journal.
N.	... Note.
C.	... Order.
P.	... Page.
P. C.	... Privy Council.
Pt.	... Point.
R.	... Rule.
S.	... Section.
S. B.	... Special Bench.

THE INDIAN LIMITATION ACT

ACT IX of 1908

Volume III.

THE FIRST SCHEDULE FIRST DIVISION : SUITS (*continued*)

Description of suit.	Period of limitation.	Time from which period begins to run.
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PART VIII.—Twelve Years (continued).

141.* Like suit by a Hindu or Muhammadan entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female.	Twelve years.	When the female dies.
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Article 141

* Act of 1877
Same as above.

Act of 1871

142.—Like suit by a Hindu entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu widow.	Twelve years.	When the widow dies.
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Act of 1859

No corresponding provision.

Article 141

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. "Like suit."
4. "By a Hindu or Muhammadan."
5. "Entitled" means entitled independently of the right of the female.
6. Plaintiff must be entitled to the possession on the death of the female.
7. "On the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female."
 8. Suit by a transferee from a Hindu or Muhammadan entitled etc.
 9. Death, if includes civil death—Effect of surrender by female or re-marriage of widow.
 10. "Hindu or Muhammadan female."
11. "Immoveable property."
12. Suit contemplated is one against a person in possession.
 13. Adverse possession against female—Effect of.
 14. Adverse possession against last male owner.
 15. Alienation or arrangement entered into by female.
 - 15a. Limited owner setting up full title.
16. Suit involving declaration as to adoption by Hindu female.
17. Suit for possession on ground of mistake.
18. Suit for redemption of mortgage made by last male owner where mortgagee has, during widow's lifetime, transferred it to third party.
19. Section 6 and this Article.
20. Onus of proof.
21. Starting point.
22. Local and special law.

Other Topics

Applicability of Article—Essentials	See Note 2, Pt. 8
Article 125 and this Article—Remedies under, are not mutually exclusive ...			See Note 12, Pts 3 to 6
Article 134 and this Article	See Note 18
Articles 118, 119 and this Article	See Note 16
Females inheriting more than one—Starting point	See Note 21, Pt. 4

Time runs against *all* reversioners and not merely against nearest reversioner ...
 See Note 11, Pts. 1, 2
 See Note 21, Pt. 3

1. Legislative changes.

1 There was no Article corresponding to this in the Act of 1859. A suit for possession had, in all cases, to be filed within twelve years of the date when the *cause of action* arose.

2 Article 142 of the Act of 1871 provided that a suit for possession of immovable property by a *Hindu* entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a *Hindu widow* should be brought within a period of twelve years from the time when the widow died.

3. Article 141 of the Act of 1877 enlarged the provision in Article 142 of the Act of 1871 so as to cover a suit by a Muhammadan, and the words "Hindu widow" were substituted by the words "Hindu or Muhammadan female." As to the reason of the addition of the word "Muhammadan" see Note 5 to Article 125 *ante* where also the word "Muhammadan" was added.

4. The Article has been retained in the same form in the present Act.

See the undermentioned cases where the history of the Article has been traced ¹

2. Scope of the Article. — This Article applies to a suit by a Hindu or a Muhammadan for possession of immovable property where such Hindu or Muhammadan has become entitled to such possession on the death of a Hindu or a Muhammadan female. It is restricted to suits by a plaintiff whose title and right, as the heir of the last full owner, to sue for possession, accrues upon the death of a female holding a woman's qualified estate under the Hindu or Muhammadan law.^{1a} Thus a Hindu reversioner would become entitled to the possession of immovable property belonging to the last male owner only on the death of the Hindu female who has succeeded to the last male owner. It is only then that the succession opens out to

Article 141 — Note 1

- 1 6 Ind App 267 : 117 Ind
501 : 51 All 188 (F B),

(1850) 13 Mad 512 (514, 515), *Sambasiva v. Ragava*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 539 (540) : 25 Ind Cas 692, *Venkataramnam v. Venkataramiah*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 756 (757) : 42 Ind Cas 228, *Ramachandra Reddi v. Audemma*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 421 (423, 424, 425) : 119 Ind Cas 57, *Ayyaswami Ayyar v. Mahadeva Ayyar*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 50 (53, 54) : 18 Oudh Cas 289 : 33 Ind Cas 371, *Ghisa Singh v. Gafraj Singh*.

Note 2

1a (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 721 (728) : 3 Pat 880 : 83 Ind Cas 812, *Keshav Prasad Singh v. Madho Prasad Singh*.

him and he becomes entitled to get possession of the property.¹ His cause of action, in fact, is the death of the female.² A suit by him for possession would lie only after the death of the female and not before.³ Such a suit would be governed by this Article.⁴ Similarly, certain classes of Muhammadans, such as the Khojas, Cutchi Memons and Haki Memons, follow the Hindu law with regard to the succession of females and the nature of the estate inherited by them.⁵

1. (1938) A I R 1938 P O 254 (256) : 177 Ind Cas 1 (P C), *Rajalakshmi Dassi v. Bholanath Sen.*
2. (1925) A I R 1925 P C 127 (129) : 21 Nag L R 127 : 88 Ind Cas 343 (P C), *Harigur Kisingor v. Anand Bharathi.* (Reversioner's title accrues only on death of widow.)
(1878) 4 Cal 523 (526) : 3 Cal L R 391, *Prosonna Nath Roy v. Afzolonnessa Begum.*
(1901) 1901 All W N 62 (63), *Shahadat Chaudhri v. Bhagwati Prasad.*
(1936) A I R 1936 Pesh 119 (125), *Ahmad Khan v. Mt. Hayat Bibi.*
(1897) 19 All 357 (371) : 1897 All W N 80, *Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhagauti Prasad.*
(1890) 14 Bom 482 (489), *Cursandas Oorindji v. Fundraiasandas Purshotam.*
(1864) 1 Suth W R 847 (348), *Woomachurn Banerjee v. Haradkun Mozoomdar.*
(1865) 2 Suth W R 197 (200), *Chundro Seekhur Roy v. Nobin Soondur Roy.*
(1867) 8 Suth W R 519 (522, 523), *Ram Sheruk Roy v. Sheo Gorind Sahoo.*
(1868) 10 Suth W R 276 (277), *Suntokhee Thakoor v. Mt. Balasee Koonwur.*
(1869) 11 Suth W R 183 (184) : 2 Beng L R App 39, *Copal Mullick v. Oncoop Chunder Roy.*
(1882) 10 Cal L R 837 (345), *Sheo Narain Singh v. Khurgo Koerry.*
(1879) 1879 Pun Re No. 15, *Mt. Jas Devi v. Shih Dayal.*
(1898) 1898 Pun Re No. 79, *Chiragha v. Mahitaba.*
(1912) 1912 Pun L R No. 198, *Kesho Das v. Nathu Mal.*
(1915) A I R 1915 Lah 353 (354) : 27 Ind Cas 699, *Hakam Singh v. Inder.*
(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 659 (660) : 42 Ind Cas 540, *Venkatramanayya v. Balaswami Pand.*

Kunmuga Velayudham

Ind Cas 44, Wamdeo

v. Bhiwa.

(1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 213 (214) : 22 Oudh Cas 156 : 52 Ind Cas 845, *Achhaibar Singh v. Hargobind Singh.*
(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 164 (166) : 78 Ind Cas 65, *Raj Dulari v. Chandesar Dei.*
(1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 170 (172) : 8 Luck 538 : 150 Ind Cas 346, *Rajeshwar Bali v. Harkishen Bali.*
(1911) 10 Ind Cas 387 (388) : 1911 Pun Re No. 32, *Kahire Khan v. Ghulam Ghouse.*
3. (1907) 14 Bom 489 (490), *Cursandas Oorindji v. Fundraiasandas Purshotam.*

Nauth.

4. (1912) 14 Ind Cas 71 (72) : 1912 Pun Re No. 52, *Nur Ahmad v. Rahim Baksh.*
(1907) 6 Cal L Jour 490 (522), *Roy Radha Kissen v. Nauratan Lall.*
(1892) 1892 Pun Re No. 141, *Budda v. Khan.*

v. Bhagwati Prasad.)

5. (1922) A I R 1922 P C 414 (415) : 47 Bom 146 : 50 Ind App 103 : 72 Ind Cas 202 (P C), *Khatubai v. Md. Hajee Abu.*

A suit by a Muhammadan entitled to succeed to another Muhammadan on the death of a female when such female is by such custom entitled only to a limited estate, would be governed by this Article.⁶

Article 141
Notes
2-3

Since the cause of action is the death of the female, the third column of the Article provides that time will begin to run from such death. This is in accordance with the general principle of the law of limitation that a person can only be considered to be barred, if he has a right and does not exercise that right within the period prescribed, the maxim being *contra non valentem agere nulla currit prescriptio* — Prescription does not run against a party under disability or who is unable to act.⁷

In order to claim the benefit of the Article the plaintiff must prove *firstly*, that there was a qualified estate in a Hindu or a Muhammadan female, *secondly*, that he was entitled to possession after her death as the heir of the last male holder, and *thirdly*, having regard to the existing law, he was entitled to possession on the date of the suit.⁸

3. "Like suit." — These words show that this Article is to be read along with Article 140¹ and, so read, they mean a suit for possession of immovable property.² They cannot be taken to imply that the suit must be in respect of an estate created in the same way as the estate upon which the estate in remainder or reversion is contemplated by Article 140 means, that is to say, by grant or devise or that it must be an estate characterized by the same incidents which attach to such a particular estate.³ As has been seen in the Notes to Article 140 *ante*, the words "reversioner" and "remainderman" in that Article have been used in the technical and strict sense in which they are used in English law and do not include a person like a Hindu reversioner who has only a possibility of reverter to the estate.⁴ In the latter case this Article would apply.⁵

But the principle underlying the two Articles is the same, namely that time runs when the estate opens out for the benefit of the plaintiff, whether he is a remainderman or reversioner in the strict

6. (1930) A I R 1930 P C 35 (36, 38) : 121 Ind Cas 517 : 57 Ind App 29 : 5 Luck 70 (P C), *Roshan Ali Khan v. Ashgar Ali*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 111 (112) : 125 Ind Cas 52, *Lehna v. Nur Ahmad*.

7. (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (189, 190) : 108 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim Khan v. Saadat Ali Khan*.

8. (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 721 (728) : 3 Pat 660 : 83 Ind Cas 812, *Kesho Prasad Singh v. Madho Prasad Singh*.

Note 3

1. (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 52 (53) : 44 Ind Cas 368 : 21 Oudh Cas 1, *Bisheshwar Baksh Singh v. Rameshwar Baksh Singh*.

2. (1921) 64 Ind Cas 462 (464) (All), *Jagran Misran v. Sheo Dulari*.

3. (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 50 (54) : 18 Oudh Cas 289 : 33 Ind Cas 371, *Ghisa Singh v. Gajraj Singh*.

4. (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 721 (727, 728) : 3 Pat 880 : 83 Ind Cas 812, *Keshav Prasad Singh v. Madho Prasad Singh*.

5. (1895) 8 C P L R 102 (105), *Nilkantrao v. Tularam*.

Article 141
Notes
3-4

sense in which the expression is used in English law or whether he is a person who succeeds upon the cessation of the peculiar limited estate under the Hindu law. This Article may, in this sense, be said to be an extension of Article 140 with special reference to persons succeeding to an estate upon the cessation of the peculiar estate of a limited owner under the Hindu law.⁶

A suit for a *declaration* of right to property⁷ or for the construction of a will or codicil^{7a} is not within this Article. Such a suit filed *before* the death of the female is not within this Article, because the plaintiff would not then be entitled to possession of the property. Nor will such a suit lie at all *after* the death of the female inasmuch as the plaintiff, being entitled to the further relief of possession, would be barred by the Proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, from filing a suit for a mere declaration of right.

4. "By a Hindu or Muhammadan," — It has been seen in Note 5 to Article 125 *ante*, which is in *pari materia* with this Article, that the words "by a Hindu or Muhammadan, etc." in that Article refer to cases in which the claim of the Hindu or Muhammadan is based upon his right as a *Hindu or Muhammadan*, that is, to cases where the right arises under the personal law of the parties. It has also been seen in Note 2 to Articles 128 and 129 *ante* that those Articles apply only where the right is claimed, not on the basis of contract, but on the basis of status of the plaintiff under the Hindu law. The same principle of interpretation must, it is conceived, be adopted in this Article also. It has accordingly been held by the Chief Court of the Punjab in *Baldeo Singh v. Mohan Singh*,¹ that the Article did not apply where A, B and C entered into a *compromise* by which they left certain property to D, a Hindu widow (who was not entitled to it as heir), after whose death it was to revert to them, and A, after D's death, sued for possession of his share of the property. Their Lordships observed that the Article applied only to cases where a female had succeeded as *heir* and not by *favour* or in some other capacity. In *Bibi Sahodra v. Rai Jang Bahadur*,² a case decided by the Privy Council in 1881, certain properties had been given to a Hindu widow by a *compromise decree* to belong to her for life and to revert to A after her death. A's heirs instituted a suit for possession of the property within twelve years of the death of the widow but beyond twelve years of the alienation which had been made by her in breach of a

6. (1916) A I R 1916 Bom 300 (301) : 40 Bom 239 : 33 Ind Cas 484, *Jayavant Jwan Rao v. Ramchandra Narayan*.

7. (1930) A I R 1930 Bom 545 (546) : 54 Bom 837 : 127 Ind Cas 897, *Shankar-bhai Dajubhai v. Bai Shiw*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Lah 835 (836) : 165 Ind Cas 149, *Ishar Das v. Ghulam Mohammad*.

7a (1893) 20 Cal 906 (924, 925), *Chulku Lal Roy v. Lolit Mohan Roy*.

Note 4

1. (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 458 (459, 460) : 22 Ind Cas 855.

2. (1881) 8 Cal 224 (229) : 8 Ind App 210 : 6 Ind Jur 108 : 4 Sar 294 (P C).

condition against alienation. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that Articles 142 and 143 of the Act did not apply to the case, but that the suit was within time as the possession of the alienee was not "adverse" to A until the widow's death. Their Lordships did not refer to Article 141, nor was the Article cited at the Bar. The discussion of the question when the possession became *adverse* makes it clear that their Lordships dealt with the case as one coming under Article 144 and not Article 141. See also the undermentioned case.³

It has however been held in several decisions that this Article applies to cases where the female was in possession not as an heir under the Hindu law but under an agreement,⁴ or an award,⁵ or by virtue of having acquired a limited estate by adverse possession,⁶ or by custom,⁷ or in some other way.^{7a} But an examination of the cases will show that the question whether the Article applies to cases where the plaintiff's title is otherwise than under the *personal* law of the parties, was not specifically raised or dealt with. It is submitted that they cannot be accepted as correct in this respect.

The "Hindu or Muhammadan" contemplated by this Article may be a *male or a female*. Thus, a daughter succeeding to a widow must sue for possession within 12 years of the widow's death.⁸ Similarly,

3. (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 226 (229) : 101 Ind Cas 622, *Deoram Gujar v. Bafu Gujar*. (Co-widow in possession of property for life under compromise — Alienation by her — Suit by the other widow after death of the co-widow for possession — Possession regarded *adverse* only from death — Article 141 was not referred to — Article 144 must be taken to have been applied.)
4. (1937) A I R 1937 All 189 (189, 189) : 167 Ind Cas 527, *Sarju Bai v. Chairman, Municipal Board, Jhansi*. (After mother of last male owner, grandmother was the heir, but under an agreement the sister was entitled to take the estate — *Held* Article 141 applied)
- (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 110 (112) : 58 Bom 280 : 149 Ind Cas 674, *Bhagirathi-bai v. Appa Dada*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 702 (701) : 159 Ind Cas 1101, *Hemendra Nath Roy v. Jnanendra Prasanna*.
5. (1934) 8 C P L R 102 (104, 105), *Nalkantao v. Tularam*. (Settlement award)
- (1937) A I R 1937 All 268 (270) : I L R (1937) All 424 : 169 Ind Cas 586, *Rashik Lal Chauhan v. Mt. Radha Dhulayya*.
6. (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 190 (194) : 150 Ind Cas 495 : 9 Luck 484, *Gaya Bakhsh Singh v. Deo Singh*.
7. (1912) 14 Ind Cas 71 (72) : 1912 Pun Re No 52, *Nur Ahmad v. Rahim Bakhsh*.
- (1907) 1907 Pun Re No. 145 . 1907 Pun W R No 185, *Miran Bakhsh v. Ahmad*.
- (1892) 1892 Pun Re No. 31 (F B), *Budhe Khan v. Makhe Khan*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 448 (449) : 1918 Pun Re No. 95 : 47 Ind Cas 977, *Ganesh Ram v. Panju Singh*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 452 (453) : 1914 Pun Re No. 29 : 24 Ind Cas 212, *Bhagat Singh v. Sher Singh*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 4 (9) : 12 Luck 592 : 165 Ind Cas 322, *Irshadulla Khan v. Mt. Fakhrda Degara*.
- 7a. (1920) A I R 1920 O 24 121 (122) : 122 Oudh Re No. 122, *Fakir Khan*. (Life

Article 141
Notes
4-6

it was held that a suit by a sister of the last male owner who succeeded after his mother was governed by this Article.⁹

5. "Entitled" means entitled independently of the right of the female.—The word "entitled" must be understood as meaning "entitled *independently of the right* of the Hindu or Muhammadan female."¹ A Hindu reversioner, for example, becomes entitled to the property as succeeding to the *last male owner* and not to the widow and is therefore a person "entitled to the possession of the property on the death of the Hindu female" within this Article. But the heir of a Hindu or Muhammadan female who is a *full owner* of the property is not a person entitled to the property *independently of the right of the female*, but merely derives his right through her. A suit by such heir for possession of the property inherited by him from the female is, therefore, not one governed by this Article.²

6. Plaintiff must be entitled to possession on the death of the female.—This Article does not apply unless the plaintiff became entitled to possession immediately on the death of the female. Where a Hindu female alienates property by a usufructuary mortgage for necessity, the reversioner would not be entitled to the possession thereof immediately on the death of the female. He would be entitled to it only *after redemption*. A suit, therefore, by the reversioner for possession only, without asking for redemption is not maintainable nor is it governed by Article 141.¹ A suit for redemption would not also be barred under this Article, even though it was filed more than twelve years after the death of the female.² Where a widow has validly let out the property to a tenant-at-will and the reversioner sues for possession after the death of the widow, this

(1916) A I R 1916 All 47 (48) : 33 All 117 : 32 Ind Cas 127, *Ramsingh v. Mt. Bhani*.

9. (1937) A I R 1937 All 188 (189) : 167 Ind Cas 527, *Sarju Bai v. Chairman, Municipal Board, Jhansi*.

Note 5

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 50 (54) : 18 Oudh Cas 289 : 33 Ind Cas 371, *Ghisa Singh v. Gajraj Singh*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 32 (53) : 21 Oudh Cas 1 : 44 Ind Cas 368, *Bisheshar Baksh Singh v. Rameshar Baksh Singh*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 165 (201) : 26 Oudh Cas 133 : 75 Ind Cas 626, *Zarfa-un-nissa v. Shafiq-uz-Zaman*

2. (1888) IO All 343 (346) : 1888 All W N 38, *Hashmat Begam v. Mazhar Hussain*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 50 (54) : 18 Oudh Cas 289 : 33 Ind Cas 371, *Ghisa Singh v. Gajraj Singh*.

us 368, *Bisheshar*

id Cas 626, *Zarfa-*

153, *Malkarjun*

Note 6

1. (1913) 18 Ind Cas 811 (813) (All), *Ganga Sahai v. Kanhaiya Lal*.

2. (1888) 1888 Pun Re No. 10, *Buta Singh v. Jhagra*.

Article will not apply and time will not run from the death of the widow but from the expiry of the tenancy.³

Article 141
Notes
6-7

7. "On the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female." — The plaintiff must be a person who becomes "entitled" in the sense explained in Note 5 *ante*, on the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female. A son adopted by a Hindu widow becomes, under the Hindu law, entitled to the property inherited by the adoptive mother, immediately on adoption and not on her death; consequently, a suit by such adopted son for possession of the property so got by him is not one within this Article.¹ A son adopted by the last male owner himself is entitled to the possession of his property immediately on the death of such owner and not on the death of his widow, and a suit by him for possession would be governed not by this Article but by Article 144, and would be barred after twelve years of the owner's death.²

Where a Hindu widow makes an alienation of her husband's property and subsequently adopts a son to him, the alienation, if it has not been made for necessity, is not binding on the adopted son who can immediately on adoption sue for recovery of such property. The alienation is not good till the lifetime of the adoptive mother so as to enable the adopted son to take advantage of this Article and file a suit within twelve years of her death.³

It may also be stated here that once adverse possession against a widow is not adverse to the son adopted by her subsequently. Possession can be adverse to him only from the date of his adoption.⁴ Where A and B, daughters of X, succeed to X jointly and subsequently A dies, B gets the property by survivorship and cannot be

3. (1907) 1907 Pun L R No. 91 • 1906 Pun Re No. 90 : 1906 Pun W R No. 137, *Ghodu Singh v. Khushal Singh*

Note 7

1. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 469 (472) : 41 Mad 75 : 42 Ind Cas 245 (F B), *Vaidyanatha Sastri v. Savithri Ammal*. (Overruling 26 Mad 143.)
(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (194) : 108 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim Khan v. Saadat Ali Khan*.
(1909) 1 Ind Cas 647 (648) : 33 Bom 88, *Ramkrishna v. Tripurabai*.
(1894) 19 Bom 809 (814, 815), *Moro Narayan v. Balaji Naghunath*.
(1905) 9 Cal W N 795 (801) : 2 Cal L Jour 87, *Harek Chand v. Bejoy Chand*.
2. (1904) 1904 Pun Re No. 3 : 1904 Pun L R No. 43, *Ram Narain v. Maharaaj Narain*.
3. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 469 (472) : 41 Mad 75 : 42 Ind Cas 245 (F B), *Vaidyanatha Sastri v. Savithri Ammal*.
(1909) 1 Ind Cas 647 (648) : 33 Bom 88, *Ramkrishna v. Tripurabai*.
[See also (1907) 1907 All W N 148 (149) : 4 All L Jour 354, *Sahdeo Singh v. Ramnandan Singh*.]
4.

- (1900) 2 Bom L R 411 (414), *Hari Vishal v. Waman Hari*. (19 Bom 809, Followed)
(1888) 13 Bom 276 (279), *Krishnaji Janardhan v. Morbhai*.
(1905) 9 Cal W N 795 (801) : 2 Cal L Jour 87, *Harek Chand v. Bejoy Chand*.

Articles 141
Notes
7—8

said to become entitled to it *on the death of A*. Where therefore *Y* was in adverse possession of the estate inherited by *A* and *B* for more than twelve years, *Y* would get absolute title to the interests of *A* and *B* in the property under Section 28 and *B* cannot, after *A*'s death, contend that as to *A*'s share she got a fresh right to sue for possession.⁵

8. Suit by a transferee from a Hindu or Muhammadan entitled etc. — It would follow from what has been stated already that a suit for possession by a *transferee* from a Hindu or Muhammadan entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female is not one falling within this Article. The transferee would not be entitled by virtue of the personal law governing the parties but by virtue of the right obtained by the *transfer*. The case would be covered by Article 136 *ante* which provides for a suit by a purchaser for possession of property sold when the vendor was out of possession at the date of the sale. The starting point under that Article is the date "when the vendor is first entitled to possession." If the vendor is such a person as is contemplated by Article 141 as a plaintiff, he will become entitled to possession on the death of the female; so that the result will be that even though Article 136 may apply, the starting point will be the death of the female.¹

There have, however, been several cases where this Article has been applied or has been assumed to apply to suits by transferees from reversioners entitled to possession on the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female.² But the question discussed above was not specifically raised in those cases. They cannot be accepted as correct on principle in this respect.

- * 5. (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 234 (234) : 27 Ind Cas 250, *Sachindra Kishore v. Rajani Kanta*.
(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 232 (233) : 27 Ind Cas 83, *Sachindra Kishore v. Rajani Kanta*.

Notes 8

- * 1. (1904) 8 Cal W N 585 (538), *Gadadhar Roy v. Hare Krishna Sarkar*.
(1904) 8 Cal W N 802 (804), *Narmada Debi v. Shosh Bhuyan*.
2. (1912) 14 Ind Cas 71 (72) : 1912 Pun Re No. 52, *Nur Ahmad v. Rahim Baksh*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 709 (710) : 30 Ind Cas 991, *Srinivasa Raya v. Ramappa Hebbara*.
(1898) 20 All 42 (40) : 1897 All W N 105, *Mahomed Ali v. Mahomed Ali*, assumed that Art of other facts by
(1922) A I R 1922 Mac
Ramesh v. Kuru Kotamma. (Do.)
(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 629 (633) : 27 Ind Cas 954, *Mohendra Nath Biswas v. Mt. Shamsunnessa Khatun*. (Do.)
(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 291 (320) : 47 Ind Cas 929, *Sahdeo Narain v. Kusum Kumari*. (Do.)
(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 100 (100) : 61 Ind Cas 100 (100), *Sahdeo Narain v. Kusum Kumari*. (Do.)

(1936)

9. Death, if includes civil death—Effect of surrender by female or re-marriage of widow. — It has been held by the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur¹ and the High Court of Lahore² that the re-marriage of a Hindu widow amounts to her civil death, that Article 141 will cover cases of such civil deaths also and that therefore a suit by the next reversioner for possession of property on the ground of re-marriage of the widow would be governed by Article 141. On the other hand, the High Court of Calcutta has doubted the correctness of this view.³ It is submitted that the view of the Nagpur and Lahore Courts is not correct. It would be straining the language of the Article to read the words "when the female dies" in the third column of the Article as including cases of civil deaths.

Article 141
Note 9

Where a Hindu female owning a limited estate under the Hindu law surrenders her estate to the next reversioner, she effaces herself from the succession as if she had died and the inheritance is accelerated in favour of the next reversioner.⁴ As was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Sitanna v. Viranna*,⁵ "though the doctrine of surrender by a widow has undergone considerable development in recent years, it must be remembered that the basis of it is the effacement of the widow's interest, and not the *ex facie* transfer by which such effacement is brought about. The result is merely that the next heir of the husband steps into the succession in the widow's place." On the view that 'death' within the meaning of this Article does not include civil death, it would follow that the reversioner in whose favour a surrender is made by the female owner becomes entitled to the property, not "on the death of the female"

Note 9

- 1 (1915) A I R 1915 Nag 57 (57) : 11 Nag L R 86 : 29 Ind Cas 612, *Nathu v. Mt. Nas Bahu*.

[See also (1930) A I R 1930 Nag 204 (204) : 27 Nag L R 1 : 123 Ind Cas 906, *Ganpat v. Narayan*. (Nothing was however said about Art. 141 applying to the case)]

2. (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 291 (295) : 120 Ind Cas 610, *Sawai Ram v. Arjun Singh*.

- 3 (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 714 (715) : 117 Ind Cas 703, *Telottama Das v. Madhusudan Giri*.

v. Bhawa.

- (1884) 10 Cal 1102 (1108) (F B), *Nobokishore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy*.

- (1924) A I R 1924 All 166 (167) : 79 Ind Cas 25 : 46 All 59, *Mt Sartaj v. Ramjas* (Reversing A I R 1922 All 401.)

[See also (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 606 (608) : 90 Ind Cas 578, *Sarabjit v. Bhagwat Koers*

(1891) 19 Cal 236 (241, 242) : 19 Ind App 30 : 6 Sar 83 (P C), *Behari Lal v. Madho Lal*.]

5. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 105 (108) : 148 Ind Cas 828 : 61 Ind App 200 : 57 Mad 749 (P C).

Article 141
Note 9

within the meaning of this Article but by reason of the surrender. A suit therefore by the surrenderee for possession of the estate surrendered is not governed by this Article.^{5a}

There is no difference in principle whether the surrenderee is a male or female reversioner,⁶ except that in the latter case the female reversioner takes only a limited estate. Where A, a Hindu widow surrenders her estate in favour of her daughter B, but B dies before A, and the next male reversioner brings the suit for possession of the property, the cause of action would be the death of B and not the death of A.⁷ In *Viranna v. Sitanna*,⁸ where the facts were as stated above, Phillips, J., observed as follows :

"If the widow is effaced, so far as the estate is concerned, there is no ground for holding that her right is revived by the death of her daughter during her lifetime. The effacement is made in order to accelerate succession to her husband's estate. On the surrender therefore the next heir takes the property and when that heir dies, the devolution must continue in favour of the next reversioner and the succession cannot be interrupted by the mere fact that the widow is still alive. After the daughter, the deceased's estate must go to the next reversioner, and it cannot be contended that the widow is in any sense a reversioner."

The judgment of Phillips, J., was affirmed by the Privy Council in *Sitanna v. Viranna*.⁹

The proposition that the surrenderee gets, immediately on the surrender, a right to the possession of the property surrendered, is however subject to one qualification. Where before the surrender the widow or other female has alienated the property, the subsequent surrender does not, under the Hindu law, entitle the reversioners to immediate possession of the portion alienated. They must wait until her death.¹⁰ The reason is that though the alienation is not binding on the reversioner, it is binding on the widow for her life and the alienee is entitled to possession during her lifetime. It follows that a suit by the reversioner against the alienee from the female

5a (1911) 12 Ind Cas 431 (431, 432) (Lah), *Nawaz v. Muhammad Ahsan*. (Case of transfer of right by widow to reversioner—Suit by latter for possession—Article 144 applies)

6. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 105 (106) : 148 Ind Cas 628 : 61 Ind App 200 : 57 Mad 749 (P C), *Sitanna v. Viranna*.

7. (1924) A I R 1924 All 166 (167) : 46 All 59 : 79 Ind Cas 25, *Mt. Sartaji v. Ramfas*.

8. (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 218 (221) : 128 Ind Cas 701.

9. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 105 (106) : 148 Ind Cas 628 : 61 Ind App 200 : 57 Mad 749 (P C).

10. (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 530 (531) : 100 Ind Cas 689, *Ramayya v. Narayya*.
(1927) A I R 1927 All 258 (262) : 100 Ind Cas 764 : 49 All 334, *Lachhmi Chand v. Lachho*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 429 (430, 431) : 100 Ind Cas 590, *Karuppa Pillai v. Irulayee*.

made before the date of the surrender will be governed by this Article.¹¹

Article 141
Notes
9-10

Where a surrender is made by a female *reserving* some property to herself for maintenance, the heir will, as regards such property, be entitled to possession only on the death of the female and a suit by the heir for possession of such property would be governed by this Article.¹²

10. "Hindu or Muhammadan female." — These words do not cover the case of a female who is a *trustee*. Her position as a trustee possesses a distinction from that occupied by her with reference to her husband's estate vesting in her by inheritance beneficially. In *Pydigantam Jaggannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnail*,¹ a temple was dedicated by one J to the public and J acted as trustee thereof during his lifetime. He died childless and his widow who succeeded him as trustee, transferred her right of trusteeship along with certain temple property to the defendant in the year 1885 and subsequently died in 1897. The plaintiffs brought a suit in 1900 for recovery of the office and the land as being trustees in succession to her. The question arose whether Article 121 *ante* or this Article applied to the case. Their Lordships observed:

"Her (the widow's) position as trustee possesses a distinction from that occupied by her with reference to her husband's estate vesting in her by inheritance beneficially, which makes it apparent that the case is not really one within the scope of the said rule. As regards property inherited by a widow beneficially, the reversioner cannot claim relief by way of possession so long as she is alive, and a transfer by her would, at all events, be valid till her death. It is different in both respects here. Her powers of transfer are precisely those of a male trustee. . . . In other words, notwithstanding that the office would not, after the death of the female trustee, descend to her heir, the trust estate during her incumbency for all other purposes resides in her as fully and effectually as it does in a male trustee. The reason for the rule on which Article 141 is founded being thus inapplicable, the adoption of the principle of that rule here would not be warranted."

It was accordingly held that the suit was governed by Article 124 and not this Article. This view was followed by the High Court of Calcutta in the undermentioned case.² See also the undermentioned case³ where the question was raised but not decided.

11 (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 656 (658) : 26 Ind Cas 1, *Singaram Chettiar v. Kalayanasundaram Pillai*.

12 (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 218 (221) : 128 Ind Cas 701, *Yerranna v. Sitanna*. (Affirmed by the Privy Council in A I R 1934 P C 105)

Note 10

1. (1905) 28 Mad 197 (201).

2. (1907) 6 Cal I, Jour 621 (636), *Lalabati Misram v. Bishun Chobey*.

3. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 465 (467) : 30 Ind Cas 962, *Suppa Bhattar v. Suppa Sokkaya Bhattar*.

Article 141
Note 9

within the meaning of this Article but by reason of the surrender. A suit therefore by the surrenderee for possession of the estate surrendered is not governed by this Article.^{5a}

There is no difference in principle whether the surrenderee is a male or female reversioner,⁶ except that in the latter case the female reversioner takes only a limited estate. Where *A*, a Hindu widow surrenders her estate in favour of her daughter *B*, but *B* dies before *A*, and the next male reversioner brings the suit for possession of the property, the cause of action would be the death of *B* and not the death of *A*.⁷ In *Viranna v. Sitanna*,⁸ where the facts were as stated above, Phillips, J., observed as follows :

"If the widow is effaced, so far as the estate is concerned, there is no ground for holding that her right is revived by the death of her daughter during her lifetime. The effacement is made in order to accelerate succession to her husband's estate. On the surrender therefore the next heir takes the property and when that heir dies, the devolution must continue in favour of the next reversioner and the succession cannot be interrupted by the mere fact that the widow is still alive. After the daughter, the deceased's estate must go to the next reversioner, and it cannot be contended that the widow is in any sense a reversioner."

The judgment of Phillips, J., was affirmed by the Privy Council in *Sitanna v. Viranna*.⁹

The proposition that the surrenderee gets, immediately on the surrender, a right to the possession of the property surrendered, is however subject to one qualification. Where before the surrender the widow or other female has alienated the property, the subsequent surrender does not, under the Hindu law, entitle the reversioners to immediate possession of the portion alienated. They must wait until her death.¹⁰ The reason is that though the alienation is not binding on the reversioner, it is binding on the widow for her life and the alienee is entitled to possession during her lifetime. It follows that a suit by the reversioner against the alienee from the female

5a. (1911) 12 Ind Cas 431 (431, 432) (Lah), *Nawas v. Muhammad Ahsan*. (Case of transfer of right by widow to reversioner—Suit by latter for possession—Article 141 applies)

6. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 105 (108) : 148 Ind Cas 828 : 61 Ind App 200 : 57 Mad 749 (P C), *Sitanna v. Viranna*.

7. (1924) A I R 1924 All 166 (167) : 46 All 59 : 79 Ind Cas 25, *Mt. Sartaj v. Ramfas*.

8. (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 218 (221) : 128 Ind Cas 701.

9. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 105 (108) : 148 Ind Cas 828 : 61 Ind App 200 : 57 Mad 749 (P C).

10. (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 530 (531) : 100 Ind Cas 639, *Ramayya v. Narayya*.

(1927) A I R 1927 All 258 (262) : 100 Ind Cas 764 : 49 All 334, *Lachhmi Chand v. Lachho*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 429 (430, 431) : 100 Ind Cas 590, *Karuppa Pillai v. Irulayee*.

made before the date of the surrender will be governed by this Article.¹¹

Article 141
Notes
9—10

Where a surrender is made by a female *reserving* some property to herself for maintenance, the heir will, as regards such property, be entitled to possession only on the death of the female and a suit by the heir for possession of such property would be governed by this Article.¹²

10. "Hindu or Muhammadan female." — These words do not cover the case of a female who is a *trustee*. Her position as a trustee possesses a distinction from that occupied by her with reference to her husband's estate vesting in her by inheritance beneficially. In *Pydigantam Jaggannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnail*,¹ a temple was dedicated by one J to the public and J acted as trustee thereof during his lifetime. He died childless and his widow who succeeded him as trustee, transferred her right of trusteeship along with certain temple property to the defendant in the year 1885 and subsequently died in 1897. The plaintiffs brought a suit in 1900 for recovery of the office and the land as being trustees in succession to her. The question arose whether Article 124 *ante* or this Article applied to the case. Their Lordships observed:

"Her (the widow's) position as trustee possesses a distinction from that occupied by her with reference to her husband's estate vesting in her by inheritance beneficially, which makes it apparent that the case is not really one within the scope of the said rule. As regards property inherited by a widow beneficially, the reversioner cannot claim relief by way of possession so long as she is alive, and a transfer by her would, at all events, be valid till her death. It is different in both respects here. Her powers of transfer are precisely those of a male trustee. . . . In other words, notwithstanding that the office would not, after the death of the female trustee, descend to her heir, the trust estate during her incumbency for all other purposes resides in her as fully and effectually as it does in a male trustee. The reason for the rule on which Article 141 is founded being thus inapplicable, the adoption of the principle of that rule here would not be warranted."

It was accordingly held that the suit was governed by Article 124 and not this Article. This view was followed by the High Court of Calcutta in the undermentioned case.² See also the undermentioned case³ where the question was raised but not decided.

11. (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 656 (658) : 26 Ind Cas 1, *Sangaram Chettiar v. Kaniyanasundaram Pillai*.

12. (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 218 (221) : 128 Ind Cas 701, *Veeranna v. Sitanna*. (Affirmed by the Privy Council in A I R 1934 P C 105.)

Note 10

1. (1905) 28 Mad 197 (201).

2. (1907) 6 Cal L Jour 621 (636), *Lalabati Musrain v. Bishun Chobey*.

3. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 465 (467) : 30 Ind Cas 962, *Suppa Bhattar v. Suppa Sokhaya Bhattar*.

Article 141
Notes
10—11

It has been seen in Note 4 *ante* that this Article applies only to cases where the right of the plaintiff arises under the *personal law* of the parties, i. e. to cases where the plaintiff claims to succeed only in right of heirship under the personal law governing the parties. It follows that the Article is not applicable where the female was in possession, not by reason of her being entitled by law to succeed to a limited estate, but in some other capacity, for example, by contract, or by favour or as a legatee or trespasser. For, in these cases, the plaintiff cannot be said to be entitled to possession solely on the ground of his heirship under the personal law governing the parties.

11. "Immoveable property." — This Article applies only to suits for possession of *immovable property*. It does not apply to suits to recover moveable property to which the plaintiff becomes entitled on the death of a Hindu or Mahomedan female; such a suit will be governed by Article 120.¹ See Note 12 under Article 120 *ante*. It has been held by the Privy Council in *Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvati Bai*² that the right to sue, for the purposes of Article 120, will in such cases arise on the date of the widow's death.

It has been seen in Note 4 to Article 3 and Note 19 to Article 132 that the expression "immoveable property" in this Act must be construed in the sense in which it is defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897. The following interests have been held to be immovable property within this Article:—

1. The interest of a mortgagee of immovable property.³
2. A share in the partnership of a ginning factory.⁴

The following interests are not immovable property within this Article:—

1. A right of *malikana*.⁵
2. Money into which immovable property is converted.⁶

Note 11

1. (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 321 (328) : 49 Cal 45 : 61 Ind Cas 980, *Pramatha Nath Bose v. Bhuban Mohan Bose*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 670 (674) : 55 Cal 903 : 112 Ind Cas 496, *Aurabindo Nath v. Monorama Debi*. (The case is however not correct on another point, namely the effect of the adverse possession against the widow.)
- (1899) 23 Bom 725 (736) : 26 Ind App 71 : 1 Bom L R 607 : 3 Cal W N 621 : 7 Sar 543 (P O), *Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvati Bai*.
2. (1899) 23 Bom 725 (736) : 26 Ind App 71 : 1 Bom L R 607 : 3 Cal W N 621 : 7 Sar 543 (P C)
3. (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 218 (221) : 78 Ind Cas 393, *Jai Indar Bahadur Singh v. Sheo Indar Bahadur Singh*.
4. (1931) A I R 1931 All 225 (227) : 121 Ind Cas 19, *Mt. Basanti Bibi v. Babu Lal Poddar*.
5. (1929) A I R 1929 P C 166 (169) : 56 Ind App 267 : 117 Ind Cas 498 : 51 All 489 (P C), *Mt. Jagabai v. Utsava Lal*.
6. (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 548 (551) : 46 Ind Cas 627, *Radha Kishen v. Nauralan Lal*.
- (1908) 10 Bom L R 210 (230), *Ganpatrao v. Vamanrao*.

12. Suit contemplated is one against a person in possession. — The suit for possession contemplated by this Article is one against a person who is in possession of the property to which the plaintiff has become entitled on the death of a Hindu or a Mahomedan female. If, for example, at the death of the female no one was in possession, but several years later, defendant got into possession, a suit by the person entitled to succeed on the death of the female will not be governed by this Article, time, for such a suit, will run from the date of the defendant's entry into possession, as, up to that date, the plaintiff must be deemed to have been in constructive possession on the principle that possession follows title.¹

A suit by a Hindu reversioner for possession against the alienee from a Hindu female who is dead, is within this Article.² Where a female limited owner makes an alienation which is not binding on the estate, the person who will be entitled to succeed to the property on the death of such female has, in fact, two remedies open to him. He can, during the lifetime of that female, file a suit for declaration that such alienation is void for her lifetime. The Article applicable to such a suit is Article 123 ante. He can, after the death of the female, sue for possession of the property from the alienee in which case this Article will be applicable.³ The two remedies are not, however, mutually exclusive and the failure to pursue the former remedy does not bar the latter. In other words, it is not a condition precedent to the maintainability of the suit for possession after the death of the female that the plaintiff should have sued for, and obtained, a declaration as to the invalidity of the alienation.⁴ The fact that a suit for such a declaration has been allowed to be barred under

Note 12

- 1 (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 504 (505) : 138 Ind Cas 349, *Mahendranath Bagchi v. Taral Chandra*.
- 2 (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 144 (146), *Naba Krishna Roy v. Hem Lal Roy*.
(1905) 33 Cal 257 (261, 269, 272) : 9 Cal W N 636 : 1 Cal L Jour 408, *Harihar Ojha v. Dasarathi Misra*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 289 (289) : 46 Ind Cas 565, *Khan Bahadur v. Ibrahim Khan*.
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 372 (372) (Lah), *Jawala v. Indar*.
(1892) 1892 Pun Re No. 141, *Budda v. Khan* (Article 114 does not apply).
(1892) 1892 Pun Re No. 110, *Hari Kishen Das v. Allah Bakhsh*.
- 3 (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 105 (107) : 168 Ind Cas 326, *Baldeo Das v. Raghunandan Das*.
(1931) A I R 1931 Mad 597 (598) : 133 Ind Cas 773, *Purushotama Ratho v. Brindavana Dass*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 659 (660) : 42 Ind Cas 540, *Yenkatramanayya v. Dejjappa Konde*.
(1866) 10 Suth W R 276 (277), *Suntokhee Thakoor v. Mt Balasee Koonwur*.
4. (1907) 31 Bom 1 (4) : 8 Bom L R 675, *Rakhmabai Pandurang v. Keshav Raghunath*.
(1915) A I R 1915 Bom 242 (243) : 40 Bom 51 : 30 Ind Cas 909, *Mancharam Pranjivandas v. Panubhai Lallubhai*.
(1905) 33 Cal 257 (261, 269, 272) : 9 Cal W N 636 : 1 Cal L Jour 408, *Harihar Ojha v. Dasarathi Misra* (The alienation need not be set aside under Article 91.)

Article 141
Notes
10—11

It has been seen in Note 4 *ante* that this Article applies only to cases where the right of the plaintiff arises under the *personal law* of the parties, i. e. to cases where the plaintiff claims to succeed only in right of heirship under the personal law governing the parties. It follows that the Article is not applicable where the female was in possession, not by reason of her being entitled by law to succeed to a limited estate, but in some other capacity, for example, by contract or by favour or as a legatee or trespasser. For, in these cases, the plaintiff cannot be said to be entitled to possession solely on the ground of his heirship under the personal law governing the parties.

11. "Immoveable property." — This Article applies only to suits for possession of *immovable property*. It does not apply to suits to recover moveable property to which the plaintiff becomes entitled on the death of a Hindu or Mahomedan female; such a suit will be governed by Article 120.¹ See Note 12 under Article 120 *ante*. It has been held by the Privy Council in *Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvati Bai*² that the right to sue, for the purposes of Article 120, will in such cases arise on the date of the widow's death.

It has been seen in Note 4 to Article 3 and Note 19 to Article 132 that the expression "immovable property" in this Act must be construed in the sense in which it is defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897. The following interests have been held to be immovable property within this Article:—

1. The interest of a mortgagee of immovable property.³
2. A share in the partnership of a mining factory.⁴

The following interests are not immovable property within this Article:—

1. A right of *malikana*.⁵
2. Money into which immovable property is converted.⁶

Note 11

- 1 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 321 (329) : 49 Cal 45; 64 Ind Cas 980, *Pramatha Nath Bose v. Bhuvan Mohan Bose*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 670 (674) : 55 Cal 903 : 112 Ind Cas 496, *Aurabindo Nath v. Monorama Deb*. (The case is however not correct on another point, namely the effect of the adverse possession against the widow.)
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- 3 (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 218 (221) : 78 Ind Cas 393, *Jai Indar Bahadur Singh v. Shree Indar Bahadur Singh*.
4. (1931) A I R 1931 All 225 (227) : 124 Ind Cas 19, *Mt. Basanti Bibi v. Babu Lai Poddar*.
5. (1929) A I R 1929 P C 166 (169) : 56 Ind App 267 : 117 Ind Cas 498 : 51 All 439 (P C), *Mt. Jaggobai v. Utsava Lal*.
6. (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 548 (551) : 46 Ind Cas 627, *Radha Kishan v. Nauratan Lal*.
- (1908) 10 Bom L R 210 (230), *Ganpatrao v. Vamanrao*.

12. Suit contemplated is one against a person in possession. — The suit for possession contemplated by this Article is one against a person who is in possession of the property to which the plaintiff has become entitled on the death of a Hindu or a Mahomedan female. If, for example, at the death of the female no one was in possession, but several years later, defendant got into possession, a suit by the person entitled to succeed on the death of the female will not be governed by this Article. Time, for such a suit, will run from the date of the defendant's entry into possession, as, up to that date, the plaintiff must be deemed to have been in constructive possession on the principle that possession follows title.¹

A suit by a Hindu reversioner for possession against the alienee from a Hindu female who is dead, is within this Article.² Where a female limited owner makes an alienation which is not binding on the estate, the person who will be entitled to succeed to the property on the death of such female has, in fact, two remedies open to him. He can, during the lifetime of that female, file a suit for declaration that such alienation is void for her lifetime. The Article applicable to such a suit is Article 125 ante. He can, after the death of the female, sue for possession of the property from the alienee in which case this Article will be applicable.³ The two remedies are not, however, mutually exclusive and the failure to pursue the former remedy does not bar the latter. In other words, it is not a condition precedent to the maintainability of the suit for possession after the death of the female that the plaintiff should have sued for, and obtained, a declaration as to the invalidity of the alienation.⁴ The fact that a suit for such a declaration has been allowed to be barred under

Note 12

- 1 (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 501 (505) : 138 Ind Cas 349, *Mahendranath Bagchi v. Tarak Chandra*.
- 2, (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 144 (146), *Naba Krishna Roy v. Hem Lal Roy*.
(1905) 33 Cal 257 (261, 269, 272) : 9 Cal W N 636 : 1 Cal L Jour 403, *Harishar Ojha v. Dasarathi Misra*
(1918) A I R 1918 Lah 288 (289) : 46 Ind Cas 565, *Khan Bahadur v. Ibrahim Khan*
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 372 (372) (Lah), *Jawala v. Indar*.
(1862) 1862 Pun Re No 141, *Budda v. Khan*. (Article 114 does not apply)
(1892) 1892 Pun Re No 110, *Har Kishen Das v. Allah Baksh*.
3. (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 105 (107) : 169 Ind Cas 326, *Baldeo Das v. Raghunandan Das*.
(1931) A I R 1931 Mad 597 (598) : 133 Ind Cas 773, *Purushotama Ratho v. Brindavana Dass*
(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 659 (660) : 42 Ind Cas 540, *Venkatramanayya v. Dejappa Konde*
(1868) 10 Suth W R 276 (277), *Suntokhee Thakoor v. M. Balasee Koonwur*.
4. (1907) 31 Bom 1 (4) : 8 Bom L R 675, *Rakhmabas Pandurang v. Keshav Raghunath*.
(1915) A I R 1915 Bom 242 (243) : 40 Bom 51 : 30 Ind Cas 909, *Mancharam Pranjandas v. Panubhas Lallubhas*
(1905) 33 Cal 257 (261, 269, 272) : 9 Cal W N 636 : 1 Cal L Jour 403, *Harishar Ojha v. Dasarathi Misra* (The alienation need not be set aside under Article 91)

Article 141
Notes
12—13

Article 125,⁵ will not affect the maintainability of a suit for possession after the death of the female. In *Rangaswamy Goundan v. Nachiappa Goundan*,^{5a} their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

"It is well settled that though he who may be termed a presumptive reversionary heir has a title to challenge an alienation at its inception, he need not do so, but is entitled to wait till the death of the widow has affirmed his character, a character which, up to that date, might be defeated by birth or by adoption"

In the undermentioned case⁶ the reversioner filed a claim in execution proceedings against the widow in her lifetime and the claim was dismissed. He failed to file a suit to set aside the claim order within one year of the date thereof. It was held that such a failure did not bar his suit for possession filed after the death of the female.

13. Adverse possession against female—Effect of.—It was established as early as the year 1863, by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivagunga*¹ that a Hindu widow represented the inheritance and that a decree fairly and properly obtained against her would be binding not only on her but on the reversionary heirs as well.^{1a}

(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 122 (128) : 63 Ind Cas 394 : 2 Pat 217, *Kesho Prasad Singh v. Chandrika Prasad Singh*. (Do)

: 9 Bom L R 602.
m 133 : 17 Mad L

tar Kaur v. Sohan

Singh. (Do)

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 659 (660) : 42 Ind Cas 540, *Venkatramanayya v. Dejappa Konde*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Mad 597 (593) : 133 Ind Cas 773, *Purushotama Ratho v. Brundatana Dass*

(1925) A I R 1925 Bom 9 (11) : 48 Bom 654 84 Ind Cas 374, *Hanangowda Shidgouda v. Irgowda Shidgouda*.

(1906) 3 Nag L R 35 (40), *Anand Rao v. Bausinath*.

(1870) 13 Suth W R 53 (52, 54, 55) : 5 Beng L R 585, *Mt. Raj Kunwar v. Mt. Indurji Koonwar*.

[See also (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 217 (220) : 24 Ind Cas 519, *Chattan Rajah v. Raman Varma*]

5 (1906) 29 Mad 390 (408) : 1 Mad L Tim 183 : 16 Mad L Jour 307 (F B), *Pannamma v. Perrazu*.

(1908) 12 Cal W N 857 (858, 859), *Mt. Mesraw v. Girjaundani Tevari*.

(1865) 2 Suth W R 271 (274), *Monshee Syed Amir Ali v. Mohendra Nath Bose*.

(1882) 1882 Poo Re No. 15, *Jauahir Singh v. Gusam Lal*.

5a (1918) A I R 1918 P C 196 (202) : 42 Mad 523 : 46 Ind App 72 : 50 Ind Cas 498 (P C).

G. (1895) 20 Bom 801 (803), *Tai v. Ladhi*.

Note 13

1. (1863) 9 Moo Ind App 543 (608) : 2 Suth W R 31 : 1 Suther 520 : 2 Str 25 (P C)

1a. See the following cases to the same effect :

(1917) A I R 1917 P C 95 (98) : 45 Cal 590 : 45 Ind App 35 : 44 Ind Cas 408 (P C), *Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gaya Singh*.

Lord Justice Turner in delivering the judgment of the Board observed as follows:

Article 141
Note 13

"The whole estate would, for the time, be vested in her, absolutely for some purposes, though, in some respects, for a qualified interest; and until her death it could not be ascertained who would be entitled to succeed. The same principle which has prevailed in the Courts of this country as to tenants in tail representing the inheritance would seem to apply to the case of a Hindu widow; and it is obvious that there would be the greatest possible inconvenience in holding that the succeeding heirs were not bound by a decree fairly and properly obtained against the widow."

In *Amrit Narain Singh v. Gaya Singh*,² the principle of the *Shiraganga* decision¹ as regards a widow's estate under the Hindu law, was applied also to the case of a female other than a widow, where she holds a woman's estate by inheritance under the Hindu law. In *Harinath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun*,³ it was held that the principle of the decision in the *Shiraganga* case¹ would apply, even where the decree against the Hindu widow in her lifetime was founded upon the law of limitation. And the same view was followed

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- (1897) 19 All 357 (371): 1897 All W N 80, *Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhaguti Prasad*.
 (1898) 20 All 841 (848): 1898 All W N 65, *Thirubuan Sundar Kuar v. Sri Narain Singh*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 448 (448): 75 Ind Cas 614, *Jaggannath Singh v. Sardar Singh*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Bom 11 (13): 42 Bom 69, 43 Ind Cas 233, *Ganpati Dhatta Neelmanee v. Ramkrishna Dhatta Shankar Dhatt*.
 (1937) A I R 1937 Bom 458 (460): 172 Ind Cas 184: I L R (1937) Bom 906, *Madivalappa Irappa v. Subbappa Shankreppa*.
 (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 544 (546): 23 Ind Cas 931, *Gobindanath v. Mohini Mohun*.
 (1912) 14 Ind Cas 142 (143): 39 Cal 887, *Jharula Das v. Jalandhar Thakur*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 629 (632): 27 Ind Cas 954, *Mohendra Nath Biswas v. Mt. Shamsunnessi Khatun*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 165 (168): 57 Cal 289: 123 Ind Cas 444, *Abinash Chandra v. Narahari Mather*.
 (1898) 1899 Pun Re No 29, *Hira Singh v. Sher Singh*.
 (1900) 3 Ind Cas 984 (935, 986) (Lah), *Mt. Mehran v. Qudrut Ullah*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 659 (660): 42 Ind Cas 540, *Venkatramanayya v. Dejjappa Konde*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 601 (602): 60 Ind Cas 635, *Shunmuga Velayudham v. Koyappa Chettiar*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 301 (304): 73 Ind Cas 284, *Rafagopalani v. Ramamoorthy*.
 (1906) 3 Nag L R 35 (40), *Anand Rao v. Banssnath*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 213 (214): 22 Oudh Cas 156: 52 Ind Cas 845, *Achhaybar v. Har Gobind*.
 2. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 95 (98): 45 Cal 590: 45 Ind App 35: 44 Ind Cas 403 (P C).
 3. (1893) 21 Cal 8 (18): 20 Ind App 163: 6 Bar 334: 17 Ind Jur 481 (P C).

Article 141
Note 13

in *Vaithilinga v. Shirengath Anni*.⁴ In the recent case of *Raja-lakshmi v. Bholanath*,^{4a} the rule in the *Shivaganga case*¹ has been explained as being applicable only where a decree has been fairly and properly obtained against a widow in a suit in which a question of title is in issue and not merely a question of the widow's possession during her life.

The question arises whether the principle of the *Shivaganga case*¹ applies to cases of *adverse possession* against a female limited owner where no *decree* has been obtained against the female owner. In other words, does the female owner represent the estate for the purposes of limitation with the result that a bar by adverse possession against the female would operate as a bar against the reversionary heirs?

Under the Act of 1859 suits for possession of immovable property had to be brought within twelve years of the date when the cause of action arose. In cases of adverse possession against a female, her cause of action arose on the date when the possession became adverse to her. It was held in cases arising under that Act that the female represented the inheritance even for purposes of limitation, that therefore the cause of action was the same both for the female and for the reversionary heirs⁶ and that, therefore, where the female was barred and her title extinguished by adverse possession, the reversioners would also be barred.⁶ The basis of the view was that the principle of the *Shivaganga case*¹ was not limited to cases of *decrees* against a Hindu widow, but extended also to cases of adverse possession against the female owner. On the introduction in 1871 of Article 142, corresponding to this Article, giving the reversioner a period of twelve years from the death of the female, the view that adverse possession which would be a bar against the widow would operate as a bar against the reversionary heirs also, was given up and it was generally held that a female limited owner did not represent the estate for purposes of

4. (1925) A I R 1925 P C 219 (256). 52 Ind App 322. 48 Mad 883 : 92 Ind Cas 85.

4a (1938) A I R 1938 P O 251 (257) : 177 Ind Cas 1 (P C).

5. (1866) 9 Suth W R 505 (503, 509, 510) : Beng L R Supp Vol. 1003 (F B).
Nobin Chunder v. Issur Chunder.

6. " 3 Suther

Gopal v. Girindra Nath.

(1883) 5 All 532 (537) : 1893 All W N 117 : 8 Ind Jur 206, *Adideo Narain Singh v. Dukharan Singh*.

(1890) 14 Bom 317 (310), *Babu v. Bhikaji Sadashiv*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Bom 11 (13) : 42 Bom 69 : 43 Ind Cas 293, *Ganpati Bhatta Neelmanee v. Ramkrishna Bhatta Shankar Bhatt*.

(1864) 1864 Suth W R Gap 83 (38), *Mt. Parbutty Moflessa v. Mt. Rajoo*.

(1875) 24 Suth W R 86 (87a) : 3 Beng L R A C 362, *Radha Mohan Dhar v. Ram Das Dey*.

(1867) 8 Suth W R 256 (257), *Ram Dayal Gossain v. Kattiyance Debia*.

(1869) 12 Suth W R 97 (98) : 3 Beng L R A C 208, *Ganga Charan Roy Chowdhury v. Jagannath Dutt*.

limitation and that therefore adverse possession against the female did not affect the reversioner's right to recover possession within twelve years of the death of the female.⁷ A contrary view was also

Article 141
Note 13

- (1869) 12 Suth W R 413 (417) : 3 Beng L R A O 437, *Tarinee Churn Gangooly v. John Watson*.
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 289 (289), *Chunder Nath Sen v. Anundmoyee Dossee*.
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 9 (10) : 2 Beng L R App 14, *Copal Singh v. Kanhaya Lal Sahebzada*.
 (1870) 4 Beng L R A C 136 (139), *Raykashore Dutt Roy v. Girish Chandra Roy Choudhury*.
 (1887) 14 Cal 323 (344), *Drohomoy Cupta v. Datis*.
 (1893) 2 Cal W N 162 (164), *Mohema Chunder Roy Choudhury v. Cours Nath Dey Choudhury*.
 (1893) 23 Cal 460 (470), *Sham Lal Mitra v. Amarendra Nath Bose*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 629 (633) : 27 Ind Cas 954, *Mohendranath v. Mt. Shamsunnessa Khafun*.
 (1905) 3 Ind Cas 415 (416) (Cal), *Abhoy Churn Ghose v. Altarmoni Dassees*.
 (1890) 13 Mad 512 (514, 515), *Sambasra v. Ragata*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 659 (660) : 42 Ind Cas 540, *Venkatramanayya v. Dejjappa Konde*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 756 (757) : 42 Ind Cas 226, *Ramachandra v. Audemma*.
 (1891) 1 Mad L Jour 392 (395), *Ragata v. Sambasra*.
 [See also (1897) 21 Bom 646 (670), *Fundraton Das v. Cursondas*.]

See also the following cases where it was held that title which was extinguished by adverse possession under Act 14 of 1859 could not be revived by the subsequent passing of the Act of 1871 :

- (1893) 26 Cal 255 (293, 296), *Braja Lal Sen v. Jaban Krishna Roy*.
 (1890) 13 Mad 467 (470), *Sanjoran v. Periasamy*.
 (1894) 17 Mad 473 (475) : 4 Mad L Jour 192, *Ranga Rau v. Bhatayammi*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 637 (639) : 27 Ind Cas 103, *Venkoba Row v. Nataraja Cheltiar*.
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 477 (480) : 33 All 356 : 38 Ind App 67 (P C), *Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain*.
 7. (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 729 (730) : 87 Ind Cas 1021, *Bhagwan Din v. Ajudhia*.
 (1892) 14 All 156 (159) : 1892 All W N 22 (F B), *Ram Kahi v. Kedar Nath*.
 (1901) 23 All 448 (453) : 1901 All W N 133, *Amrit Dhar v. Bindsri Prasad*.
 (1903) 25 All 435 (439) : 1903 All W N 93, *Jhannan Kunwar v. Tiloki*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 All 15 (16) : 41 All 154 : 47 Ind Cas 222, *Mt. Ganga v. Kanhai Lal*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 448 (448) : 75 Ind Cas 614, *Jagannath Singh v. Sardar Singh*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 All 561 (562) : 51 All 188 : 112 Ind Cas 801 (F B), *Bankey Lal v. Raghunath Sahni*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 All 739 (740) : 119 Ind Cas 855, *Phul Chand v. Cobardhan Das*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 All 307 (308) : 120 Ind Cas 447, *Kali Pratap Misir v. Amla Pat Tewars*.

 (1900) 2 Bom L R 106 (107), *Hathisingh v. Sati Lal*.
 (1902) 4 Bom L R 893, *Jamnabhai v. Dharsey*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Bom 68 (77) : 41 Bom 315 : 38 Ind Cas 552, *Laxmipati-
rao v. Venkatesh Tirnal*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 709 (710) : 30 Ind Ind Cas 991, *Shrinivasa Raya v. Ramappa Hebbara*.

Article 141
Note 13

taken in some cases, namely that the principle of the *Shivaganga case*¹ would even now apply to cases of adverse possession against the

- (1917) A I R 1917 Bom 11 (13) : 42 Bom 69 : 43 Ind Cas 233, *Ganpatibhatta Neelmanee v. Ramkrishna Bhatta Shankar Dhatt*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Bom 15 (16) : 44 Ind Cas 926, *Bar Jayagauri v. Purshotamdas Sundar Lal*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 142 (144) : 42 Bom 714 : 47 Ind Cas 153, *Malkarjun v. Amrita*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 364 (365) : 77 Ind Cas 479, *Pandurang Wasudeo v. Basappa Shiddappa*.
 (1893) 9 Cal 984 (937) : 13 Cal L R 372 (F B), *Sreenath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar Ghose*.
 (1894) 10 Cal 1003 (1007) : 9 Ind Jur 149, *Ram Pershad Chowdhury v. Jokhoo Roy*.
 (1907) 6 Cal L Jour 490 (522), *Roy Radha Kissen v. Nauratan Lal*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 93 (95) : 114 Ind Cas 139, *Siva Prasad v. Bhadrarani Das*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 165 (167, 168) : 57 Cal 289 : 123 Ind Cas 444, *Abinash Chandra Ghosh v. Narahari Mather*.
 (1895) 1895 Pun Re No. 74, *Saidulla v. Mt. Laila*.
 (1903) 1903 Pun Re No. 41, *Rulia v. Rulia*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 500 (501) : 68 Ind Cas 299, *Nand Singh v. Dhanlaur*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 106 (107) : 68 Ind Cas 177, *Channan Singh v. Salig Ram*.
 (1891) 15 Mad 6 (9, 10), *Shankarn v. Kesavan*.
 (1903) 26 Mad 143 (147) : 12 Mad L Jour 197, *Sreeramulu v. Kristamma*.
 (1809) 5 Mad H C R 428 (492), *Atchamma v. Subba Rayudu*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 217 (220, 221) : 24 Ind Cas 519, *Chattan Rajah v. Raman*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 539 (540) : 25 Ind Cas 692, *Venkataramnam v. Venkataramiah*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 43 (47) : 37 Ind Cas 733, *Neela Kanta Rao v. Narayanaswamy Iyer*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 421 (426) : 119 Ind Cas 57, *Ayyasami Iyer v. Mahadeva Iyer*.
 (1900) 13 C P L R 81 (83), *Rampershad Tewari v. Anandilal*.
 (1914) A I R 1914 Nag 81 (81) : 10 Nag L R 35 : 23 Ind Cas 719, *Sheo Lal v. Mt. Sheorajia*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 104 (105) : 22 Nag L R 175 : 100 Ind Cas 446, *Mt. Deshrani v. Kishore Singh*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 226 (228) : 101 Ind Cas 822, *Devram Gujar v. Biju Gujar*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Nag 204 (204) : 27 Nag L R 1 : 123 Ind Cas 906, *Ganpat v. Narayan*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 31 (35) : 68 Ind Cas 534, *Mt. Parbat v. Muhammad Hadi*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Ondh 164 (166) : 78 Ind Cas 65, *Mt. Raj Dulari v. Mt. Chandesar Des*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (192) : 108 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim v. Raja Saadat Ali*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 155 (192) : 108 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim v. Raja Saadat Ali*.

Uhaus.

- (1911) 11 Ind Cas 981 (992) (All), *Dansadhar v. Lachmi Narain*.
 (1912) 14 Ind Cas 71 (72) : 1912 Pun Re No. 52, *Nur Ahmad v. Rahim Dalhish*.

female, so that the Article can be applied subject to such principle.⁸ The conflict of opinion has now been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Mt. Jaggo Bai v. Utsava Lal*,⁹ where it has been held that, except where there has been a decree or other act in the law in the widow's lifetime depriving the reversionary heir of the right to possession on the widow's death, the heir is entitled to rely upon Article 141 for the purposes of determining the question whether the title is barred by lapse of time. In that case there had been adverse possession against a Hindu widow for over twelve years after which she died and the suit was brought by the reversionary heir within twelve years of her death. Their Lordships observed as follows :

Article 141
Note 13

"The judgment of their Lordships' Board in the *Shivaganga case*¹ established the principle of the representation of the inheritance by a Hindu widow. That case was decided during the currency of the Act of 1859. In *Harnath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun*,¹⁰ their Lordships' Board held that the effect of the Acts of 1871 and 1877 was not to except from the rule laid down in the *Shivaganga* decision,¹ the case where a decree had been obtained against a Hindu widow in her lifetime, founded upon the law of limitation. . . . It is therefore established by this decision that where a decree founded upon the law of limitation is obtained against the widow in her lifetime the reversionary heir is barred and does not get the benefit of Article 141. The question raised by the present case is whether the same result follows where there has been no decree, though at the death of the widow, a stranger has been in adverse possession for twelve years or more. In their Lordships' judgment where there has been no decree against the widow or other act in the law in the widow's lifetime depriving the reversionary heir of the right to possession on the widow's death, the heir is entitled, after the widow's death, to rely upon Article 141 for the purpose of the determination of the question

(1912) 17 Ind Cas 186 (187) (Mad), *Ponma Thurumalai Vanday Thevar v. Kandasamy Vendaya Thevar*.

(1913) 18 Ind Cas 948 (948) (All), *Sheo Chaudhari v. Sadho Das*.

(1913) 18 Ind Cas 959 (959) (All), *Hardwar Ras v. Balaram Ras*.

(1926) 95 Ind Cas 18 (19) (Nag), *Mt. Muha Bai v. Amru*.

8. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 670 (674) . 55 Cal 903 . 112 Ind Cas 496, *Aurabinda Nath Tagore v. Manorama Debi*.

(1930) 51 Cal L Jour 23 (24, 25), *Radha Krishna Kulal v. Nal Kamal Kulal*.

(1897) 19 All 357 (871) . 1897 All W N 80, *Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhagwati*.

(1898) 20 All 42 (46) . 1897 All W N 195, *Tika Ram v. Shama Charan*.

[See also (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 153 (154) 115 Ind Cas 101 4 Luck 592, *Mt. Lachmin v. Ishur Prasad*.]

9. (1929) A I R 1929 P O 166 (170) . 56 Ind App 267 . 117 Ind Cas 498 51 All 439 (P C).

10 (1893) 21 Cal 8 (18) 20 Ind App 183 . 17 Ind Jur 481 . 6 Sar 331 (P C).

Article 141
Notes.
13—14

- whether the title is barred by lapse of time. To hold otherwise, would, in their Lordships' opinion, in effect, compel the Court in determining a question within the scope of the Article to ignore the express words of the Article.

"But their Lordships are further of opinion that the point is already concluded by the judgment of their Board in *Runchordas Vandrarandas v. Parratibai*¹¹. . . The case of *Vaithilinga Mudaliar v. Shirengath Anni*,¹² illustrates the application of the rule in the *Shiraganga case*,¹ where a decree founded upon adverse possession has been obtained against a Hindu widow in her lifetime. The decision is not, in their Lordships' judgment, in conflict with that in *Runchordas Vandrarandas v. Parratibai*,¹³ in which no decree had been obtained against the widow, nor had there been any other act in the law in the lifetime of the widow destroying the heir's interest."

- The decision of the Privy Council has been followed in cases decided subsequently.¹⁴

14. Adverse possession against last male owner. — Where adverse possession commences to run against the *last male owner* himself, the intervention of the limited estate will not prevent time running and will not enable the reversioner coming after the limited owner to say that he got a fresh cause of action on the death of the owner of the limited estate.¹ In *Mokendra Nath v. Shamsunnessa*

11. (1890) 23 Bom 725 (736) : 26 Ind App 71 : 1 Bom L R 607 : 3 Cal W N 621 : 7 Sar 543 (P C).
12. (1925) A I R 1925 P C 249 (251) : 52 Ind App 322 : 43 Mad 583 : 92 Ind Cas 85 (P C).
13. (1890) 23 Bom 725 (736) : 26 Ind App 71 : 1 Bom L R 607 : 3 Cal W N 621 : 7 Sar 543 (P C).
14. (1932) A I R 1932 Bom 431 (435) : 139 Ind Cas 23, *Bai Manchha v. Tribhoran Lallabhai*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 702 (703) : 159 Ind Cas 1101 : 63 Cal 155, *Herendra Nath Roy v. Jnanendra Prasanna Bahaduri*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Cal 34 (36) : 160 Ind Cas 670, *Mahendra Narayan Roy v. Dalskima Ranjan Roy*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 664 (666) : 157 Ind Cas 1100, *Barmappa v. Subba Rao*.
(1937) A I R 1937 Bom 453 (461) : 172 Ind Cas 184 : I L R (1937) Bom 806, *Madireappa v. Subbappa*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Bom 545 (552) : 54 Bom 537 : 127 Ind Cas 597, *Shankar-bhai v. Bai Shau*.
(1920) A I R 1930 Pat 573 (574) : 9 Pat 634 : 125 Ind Cas 181 : *Muni Lal v. Nath Sakay*.
[See also (1933) A I R 1933 Outh 170 (172) : 8 Luck 538 : 150 Ind Cas 346, *Rajeshwar Bai v. Har Kishen Bai*.]

Note 14

1. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 59 (60) : 45 Mad 370 : 67 Ind Cas 246, *Venari Barmappa v. Kusurau Katarappa*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 12 (15) : 45 Mad 361 : 70 Ind Cas 678, *Seetaramaraju v. Subbaraju*.

Khatun,² their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows :

Article 141
Note 14

"It is plain that Article 141 applies only to cases where it is proved that the last full owner was in possession at the time of his death ; if he himself was dispossessed and time began to run against him, the operation of the law of limitation would not be arrested by the fact that, on his death, he was succeeded by his widow, daughter or mother."

Where even excluding the period of intervention of the limited estate, the adverse possession has exceeded twelve years at the time of the suit, it is of course clear that the Article will not entitle the reversioner to sue for possession.³

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 272 (276) : 69 Ind Cas 731 : 41 Mad 951, *Narayanaswamy Naicker v. Periasamy Odayar*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 610 (613) . 33 Mad 473, *Timmajamma Garu v. Subbaraju*.

(1929) A I R 1929 All 419 (420) : 116 Ind Cas 740, *Jaidoo Singh v. Dhoom Singh*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 364 (365) . 77 Ind Cas 479, *Pandurung Wasudeo v. Basappa Shiddappa*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Bom 515 (552) . 54 Bom 837 . 127 Ind Cas 837, *Shankar-bhai v. Bai Shiv*.

(1868) 9 Suth W R 460 (460), *Brinda Dabee Chowdran v. Peary Lall Chowdhry*.

(1892) 19 Cal 629 (634), *Mahabir Pershad Singh v. Hurrishur Pershad Narain Singh*.

(1904) 82 Cal 165 (168), *Amrithalal Dagchi v. Jatindra Nath*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 629 (633) . 27 Ind Cas 954, *Mohendra Nath Daswas v. Mt. Shamsunnessa Khatun*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 702 (704) . 63 Cal 155 . 159 Ind Cas 1101, *Hemendra Nath v. Jnanendra Prasanna*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 474 (475) . 128 Ind Cas 201, *Bhushan Mondal v. Sar-beshwar Mondal*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 106 (106) . 68 Ind Cas 177, *Chaman Singh v. Salig Ram*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 292 (292) : 69 Ind Cas 893, *Khilu Ram v. Bhuran Bai* (Suit for possession by the daughter claiming as heir to her father after the death of her mother)

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 400 (401) . 86 Ind Cas 725, *Ram Narayan v. Barkhandi* (Question raised but not decided)

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 729 (730) . 87 Ind Cas 1021, *Bhagwan Din v. Ajudhia*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 68 (87) . 93 Ind Cas 454 (FB), *Harinar Prasad v. Kesko Prasad*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 192 (194) . 92 Ind Cas 177 . 5 Pat 411, *Mt. Batsia Kuer v. Raja Ram Pandey*.

(1867) 7 Suth W R 453 (454), *Ram Doolab Sandyal v. Ram Narain Moiter*. (Purchase by last full owner—Neither he nor his widow in possession—Suit by reversioner for possession—Limitation ran from death of widow)

2. (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 629 (633) . 27 Ind Cas 954 (958).

3. (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 400 (401) . 86 Ind Cas 725, *Ram Narayan v. Barkhandi*.

Article 141
Note 15

15. Alienation or arrangement entered into by female.—An alienation by a female limited owner for necessity will be binding on the reversioners who have therefore no cause of action at all to recover the property in such a case. Where the alienation is not for necessity it is not binding on the reversioners. But the alienation will be valid during the lifetime of the female. The possession of the alienee is not adverse to the female, much less to the reversioners. The latter's right to recover possession from the alienee arises on the death of the female and he can sue for it within twelve years of her death.¹ The same principle will apply where the female enters into any arrangement or agreement not binding on the reversioners, by which property has been given up by her to third persons. In

Note 15

1. (1881) 8 Cal 224 (229) : 3 Ind App 210 : 4 Sar 294 : 6 Ind Jur 108 (P C), *Bibi Sahodhra v. Rai Jang Bahadur*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 P C 127 (129) 88 Ind Cas 343 : 21 Nag L R 127 (P C), *Haripur Kisangir v. Anand Bharathi*.
- (1897) 19 All 357 (371) : 1897 All W N 80, *Hanuman Pershad Singh v. Bhaguti Prasad*.
- (1901) 1901 All W N 62 (62, 63), *Shahdat Chaudri v. Bhagwati Prasad*.
- (1878) 4 Cal 523 (526) : 3 Cal L R 391, *Prosanna Nath Roy Chaudri v. Asfoloneessa Begum*.
- (1882) 8 Cal 442 (445, 446) 6 Ind Jur 526, *Pursut Koer v. Palut Roy*.
- (1883) 9 Cal 93 (95) : 5 Shome L R 84, *Gaya Prasad v. Heet Narain*.
- (1882) 10 Cal L R 837 (845), *Sheo Narain Singh v. Khurgo Koerry*. (Compromise regarded as alienation.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 306 (309) : 21 Nag L R 62 : 89 Ind Cas 44, *Wasudeo v. Bhawa*. (Do.)
- (1868) 10 Suth W R 276 (277), *Suntokhes Thakoor v. Mt. Balasee Koonour*.
- (1869) 11 Suth W R 183 (184) : 2 Beng L R App 89, *Gopal Mullick v. Onoopp Chunder Roy*.
- (1870) 13 Suth W R 52 (52, 54, 55) : 5 Beng L R 585, *Mt. Raj Koonwar v. Mt. Indurjit Kunwar*.
- (1879) 1879 Pun Re No. 15, *Mt. Jas Devi v. Shib Dayal*.
- (1882) 1882 Pun Re No. 15, *Jawahur Singh v. Gusain Lal*.
- (1893) 1898 Pun Re No. 29, *Hira Singh v. Sher Singh*.
- (1898) 1898 Pun Re No. 79, *Chiragha v. Mahtaba*.
- (1912) 1912 Pun L R No. 198, *Kesho Das v. Nathu Mal*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Lah 353 (354) : 27 Ind Cas 699, *Hakam Singh v. Indar*. (Mutation of names in favour of manager of widow's property—Possession of manager is not adverse to next heir.)
- (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 659 (660) : 42 Ind Cas 540, *Venkatramanayya v. Dejappa Konde*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 601 (602) : 60 Ind Cas 635, *Shunmuga Velayudam v. Koyappa Chettisar*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 306 (309) : 21 Nag L R 62 : 89 Ind Cas 44, *Wasudeo v. Bhawa*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 213 (214) : 22 Oudh Cas 156 : 52 Ind Cas 845, *Achhaibar Singh v. Hargobind Singh*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 164 (166) : 78 Ind Cas 65, *Mt. Raj Dulari v. Mt. Chandesar Des*.

Rajlakshmi v. Bhola Nath,² a Hindu widow had, by a private agreement given up a portion of her estate to the defendant, and the reversioner sued for possession within twelve years of the widow's death. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed "that possession under an agreement which was not binding on the reversionary heirs, could not avail the Sons (i. e. the defendants) in a question with a reversionary heir, whose right to possess could not arise until the succession opened to such heir."

Articles 141
Notas
15-15a

15a. Limited owner setting up full title. — The possession of a limited female owner is not adverse to the reversioner. Nor can she set up adverse title to herself or do anything prejudicial to the interests of the reversionary heirs of her husband.¹ She cannot

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- (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 170 (172) : 8 Luck 539 : 150 Ind Cas 346, *Rafeshar Bai v. Har Kishen Bai*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 310 (364) : 163 Ind Cas 770, *Mala Bakhsh Singh v. Ajodhya Bakhsh Singh* (Surrender by widow to third person)
 (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 72 (74) : 68 Ind Cas 601 : 2 Pat 75, *Abdur Rahman v. Wali Mohammad*.
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 337 (338) : 1911 Pun Re No 32, *Khaire Khan v. Ghulam Ghaus*
 (1921) 63 Ind Cas 837 (899) (Cal), *Sarat Chandra v. Satindra Mohan*. (Possession of third person with widow's permission)
 (1900) 1900 Pun Re No. 53 : 1900 Pun L R No. 391, *Bhagwan Singh v. Khushala* (Do.)
 (1869) 12 Suth W R 234 (235), *Deoranel Koowar v. Mt. Indurjeet Koowar*. (Do.)
 (1872) 18 Suth W R 1 (3) : 2 Suther 561 (P C), *Sheroocommarea Debia v. Keshub Chunder* (Do.)
 (1910) 7 Ind Cas 530 (533) (Mad), *Eman Subbiah v. Venkata Lakshmi-pathi* (Do.)
 (1927) 93 Ind Cas 996 (996) (Lah), *Ghulam Rasul v. Kamir* (Do.)
 2. (1938) A I R 1938 P O 254 (256) : 177 Ind Cas 1 (P C).

Note 15a

1. (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 258 (259) : 53 Ind Cas 761 : 22 Oudh Cas 280, *Baij Nath v. Sheoraj Singh*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 411 (414) : 112 Ind Cas 266, *Deo Datt v. Raj Bai*.
 (1902) 30 Cal 303 (309) : 30 Ind App 41 : 5 Bom L R 6 : 7 Cal W N 225 : 8 Sar 409 (P C), *Ram Anugra Narain Singh v. Choudhury Hanuman Sahas*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 All 341 (314) : 126 Ind Cas 345, *Mt Bhagwan Dei v. Shub Singh*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 All 767 (770) : 49 All 779 : 102 Ind Cas 167, *Jaitra v. Gendan Singh*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 All 799 (801) : 102 Ind Cas 814 : 50 All 89, *Ram Surat Singh v. Badri Narain*
 (1910) 7 Ind Cas 218 (222) (Cal), *Sheolal Singh v. Goor Narain*
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 67 (81) : 109 Ind Cas 835, *Md Ali Khan v. Nisar Ali Khan*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 153 (154) : 115 Ind Cas 101 : 4 Luck 592, *Mt. Lachmin v. Ishur Prasad*.

Article 141
Notes
1. 15a--16

acquire full title to the property by the assertion of such right, and the reversioner would be entitled, nevertheless, to sue for possession within the time limited by this Article.²

16. Suit involving declaration as to adoption by Hindu female.—Where a Hindu widow makes an adoption which is not valid, the reversioner is entitled to bring a suit to obtain a declaration that the alleged adoption is invalid or never in fact took place. Such a suit would be governed by Article 118 *ante* which prescribes a period of six years from the date when the alleged adoption becomes known to the plaintiff. Before the decision of the Privy Council in *Kalyandappa v. Ohenbasappa*,¹ there was a difference of opinion on the question whether a suit by a reversioner for possession after the widow's death, involving the decision of an issue as to the invalidity of an adoption of the defendant alleged to have been made by the widow, would be governed by Article 118 or by this Article. The High Courts of Allahabad,² Calcutta,³ Madras⁴ and Patna⁵ and the

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 215 (219) : 115 Ind Cas 279, *Chandra Shekar Singh v. Jagjwan Bahksh Singh*.

(1922) 70 Ind Cas 39 (42) (Pesh), *Danran v. Zar Gul*.

[See also (1881) 1881 Pun Re No. 83 at page 622, *Mt. Anand Koer v. Sodh Narindar Singh*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 494 (513) : 119 Ind Cas 637 : 5 Luck 305, *Nisar Ali Khan v. Md. Ali Khan*.

(1930) A I R 1930 All 109 (110) : 121 Ind Cas 701 : 52 All 222, *Dhurgaji v. Ram Bharos*.

(1911) 9 Ind Cas 146 (147) (All), *Sri Chand v. Surj Koer*.]

2. (1936) A I R 1936 Pesh 125 (136) : 163 Ind Cas 64, *Ghulam Daud Khan v. Habibullah Khan*.

Note 16

1. (1924) 79 Ind Cas
P C), 13 Ind
and 64 Cal

829 (P C), Referred to)

2. (1886) 8 All 644 (645) : 1886 All W N 232, *Basdeo v. Gopal*.

(1905) 17 All 167 (171) : 1895 All W N 36, *Nathu Singh v. Gulab Singh*.

(1928) A I R 1928 All 25 (27) : 45 All 1 : 75 Ind Cas 14, *Mt. Rodha Dulanya v. Rashik Lal*.

(1925) A I R 1925 All 79 (80) : 46 All 637 : 87 Ind Cas 938, *Shib Deo Misra v. Ramprasad*.

3 (1869) 12 Suth W R 14 (16) : 4 Beng L R 3 (F B), *Sreenath Gangooly v. Mohesh Chunder Roy*.

(1887) 14 Cal 401 (417), *Lala Parbhu Lal v. J. Mylne*.

(1910) 7 Ind Cas 427 (433) (Cal), *Bhagbat Pershad v. Murari Lal*.

(1897) 25 Cal 354 (364, 365), *Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. Ranjit Singh*.

(1900) 27 Cal 242 (254) : 4 Cal W N 405, *Ram Chandra Mukerjee v. Ranjit*.

(1905) 9 Cal W N 232 (224), *Baskanta Chandra Roy v. Kali Charan Roy*.

4. (1907) 30 Mad 308 (310) : 2 Mad L Tim 178 : 17 Mad L Jour 182, *Velaqa*

5. (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 291 (320, 321) : 45 Ind Cas 929, *Sah Deo Naram v. Kusum Kumari*.

Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur^{3a} held that the reversioner was entitled to bring his suit for possession within twelve years of the death of the widow, notwithstanding he did not file any suit for a declaration as to the invalidity of an adoption alleged to have been made by the widow. The High Court of Bombay held a contrary view in some cases⁶ which however were overruled in a later Full Bench decision⁷ of the same Court. The authorities were conflicting in the Punjab⁸. The decision in *Kalyandappa's case*¹ has now set the conflict at rest. In that case *A* died leaving his widow *B*. *B* adopted *C*. *C* died leaving his widow *D*. After *D*'s death *X*, the reversioner, filed a suit for possession within twelve years of *D*'s death. The defendant *Y* contended that he had been adopted by *B* and not *C*, that such adoption was more than six years before suit to the knowledge of the plaintiff and that therefore the suit was barred by Article 118 and was not governed by this Article. Their Lordships after an exhaustive review of all the authorities negatived that contention and observed as follows :

"The words 'a suit to obtain a declaration' are terms of art. They relate back to the Specific Relief Act passed in the same year 1877, being Act No 1 of that year, whereas the Limitation Act is Act No 15. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act deals with declaratory decrees and the illustration (letter *f*) is much in point.

* * * * *

"It is to this class of suit that this particular limitation applies. The date from which time begins to run is a subjective or a personal date ; and the condition of obtaining a particular relief which is sought in a declaratory suit is that the plaintiff should not be guilty of laches, the measure of laches being fixed by the statute as six years. But, if a claimant chooses to run the risk that an adoption which he has not attacked will have overy presumption made in its favour by reason of its long standing, he can wait till his reversionary right has accrued and even till the limit (no doubt a very wide limit) of twelve years from that accruer has passed."

The view was confirmed by the Privy Council in the undermentioned case.⁹

^{3a} See the cases cited in Foot note 15 of Note 2 to Article 118.

⁶ (1899) 24 Bom 260 (285) 1 Bom L R 799 (F B), *Shrinivas Murar v. Hanmant*.

(1913) 20 Ind Cas 162 (169) 37 Bom 513, *Shrinivas Sarjerao v. Balant Venkatesh*.

(1900) 25 Bom 26 (30) 2 Bom L R 495, *Barot Naran v. Barot Jesang*.

⁷ (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 223 (231, 232) 46 Bom 776 67 Ind Cas 181 (F B), *Doddawa v. Yellau a Mallappa Beni*.

⁸ See Note 2 to Article 118 ante

⁹ (1931) A I R 1931 P C 84 (85) 131 Ind Cas 758, *Padmalav Acharya v. Fakira Debba*

Article 141
Notes
16—18

See also Note 2 to Article 118 *ante* for a fuller discussion.

The principle of the decision in *Kalyandappa's case*¹ applies equally to a suit which involves the *affirmation* of the fact of adoption. Where a Hindu widow adopted *B* but it was agreed that the widow was to be in possession until her death, and after her death *B* sued for possession, it was held that this Article governed the case and not Article 119 *ante*, even though the defendants denied the adoption which had therefore to be affirmed before possession could be given to the plaintiff.¹⁰

17. Suit for possession on ground of mistake. — *A*, a Hindu widow, died and *B* and *C*, the reversionary heirs, succeeded to the estate. They were entitled to equal shares, but under a mistake of law as to whether the parties took their share *per capita* or *per stirpes*, they took unequal shares. On discovery of the mistake, but within twelve years of the death of the widow, *B* who had got the smaller share sued *C* for possession of the portion necessary to equalise the share. It was held by the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur that the suit was not governed by Article 96 but by this Article.¹ As has been seen in Note 2 to Article 96, it applies only when the plaintiff cannot succeed without proving the mistake, and not to cases where the plaintiff sues on an existing title, though he alleges a mistake also. In the case cited above, *B* clearly had title to an unequal moiety of the property though, as a reason for his not taking such share he alleged a mistake of law.

18. Suit for redemption of mortgage made by last male owner where mortgagee has, during widow's lifetime, transferred it to third party. — *A*, a male owner of property, mortgages the same to *M* with possession and subsequently dies leaving a widow *B*. During the lifetime of *B*, *M* transfers the property to *N* absolutely. *C*, the reversionary heir of *A*, after *B*, files a suit for redemption and possession, more than twelve years after the transfer by *M* to *N*, but within twelve years of the death of *B*. It has been held by the High Court of Madras in the undermentioned case¹ that the suit is not governed by this Article but by Article 134 and that the suit, though for redemption, is barred under that Article. As has been seen in Note 6 *ante*, this Article will have no application

10. (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 110 (112) : 58 Bom 280 149 Ind Cas 674, *Bhagirathibai v. Appa Dada*. (The view, however, that Article 141 applies even where the widow is in possession under an agreement is not correct. See Note 4 *ante*.)

Note 17.

1. (1920) A I R 1920 Nag 106 (108) : 55 Ind Cas 422, *Wasudeo v. Vithal*.

Note 18

1. (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 272 (275) : 44 Mad 951 : 68 Ind Cas 734, *Narayanaswamy Naicker v. Periasamy Odayar*.

if it is a suit for redemption of a valid mortgage by A, the reason being that C is not entitled in such a case to the possession of the property solely by reason of the death of the female owner. But the reasoning of the High Court of Madras in the above decision that Article 141 does not apply *because Article 134 applies* does not seem to be correct on principle. If both Articles 134 and 141 are assumed to apply to a suit for redemption *under the circumstances noted above*, it is submitted that Article 134 should not be preferred inasmuch as the doing so on the facts of the particular case would be to ignore the fundamental principle of the law of limitation that prescription does not run against a person who is unable to act. See Note 2 *ante*. The proper Article applicable to the case would, it is submitted, be Article 148, neither Article 134 nor Article 141 being applicable.

Article 141
Notes
18—19

19. Section 6 and this Article. — Where at the death of a limited female owner the reversionary heir entitled to possession happens to be under a disability such as is contemplated by Section 6 of the Act, time will not begin to run until the disability ceases. (See Note 19 to Section 6 *ante*.) It is also clear that when time has once begun to run against a reversioner on the death of a limited female owner, it cannot stop and the subsequent disability of the representative of the reversioner does not affect the running of time.¹

A, a Hindu widow, made an alienation and subsequently made adoption of a minor. The minor died during minority and A succeeded him as heir. Subsequent to her death, but long after adoption the reversioner sued for possession of the property alienated by the widow. It was held in the undermentioned case² that the cause of action for the suit arose in favour of the adopted son on the date of adoption and as, on that date he was a minor, he was not bound to sue until after majority, as he died before he attained majority, and as against A there was no adverse possession, time for the reversioner began to run only on the widow's death. It is submitted that the decision does not seem to be correct on principle. It has been seen in Note 32 to Section 6 *ante* that that Section does not prevent the running of time against a person under disability. It would follow that notwithstanding that the adopted son was a minor on the date of adoption, time will begin to run against him in favour of the alienee and such running of time would not stop by reason of his minority. Nor would the reversionary heir get a fresh cause of action against the alienee other than that which the adopted son himself had. The intervention of the limited estate would not prevent the suit from being barred.

Note 19

- 1 (1927) A I R 1927 All 818 (820) 50 All 152 · 107 Ind Cas 45, *Rup Kulkore v. Patrani*.
2. (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 273 (274) . 129 Ind Cas 460, *Venkatanarayan v. Rajya Lakshammamma*.

Article 141
Notes
20—21

20. Onus of proof.—In a suit governed by this Article the plaintiff must prove firstly that he is the nearest reversioner,¹ and secondly that the female died within twelve years of the suit when such fact is not admitted or the defence is one of limitation.² In the undermentioned case^{2a} a contrary view has been expressed, namely that in view of Section 108 of the Evidence Act it is for the defendant to show that the female died beyond the period of limitation. It is submitted that this view is not correct.

Where the reversioner files a suit *prima facie* within twelve years of the death of the female on whose death he is entitled to possession, but the defendant pleads that the last full owner himself had been dispossessed and time ran from that date, it is for the defendant to establish his allegations.³

21. Starting point.—Time, under this Article, runs from the death of the female.¹ It is then that the property vests in the

Note 20

1. (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (192) : 106 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim Khan v. Saadat Ali Khan*.
2. (1924) A I R 1924 P C 136 (136) (P C), *Ramkrishna Rao v. Srivramulu*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Bom 300 (302) : 40 Bom 239 : 33 Ind Cas 484, *Jayawant Jivanrao v. Ramchandra Narayan*.
(1909) 11 Suth W R 173 (174), *Kalee Nath Talookdar v. Joy Doorga Dossia*.
(1904) 14 Mad L Jour 464 (465), *Venkata Hanumanulu v. Lachchamma*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 838 (839) : 82 Ind Cas 534, *Rajagopalachariar v. Baskyachariar*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Nag 34 (35) : 18 Nag L R 16 : 39 Ind Cas 21, *Parsoo v. Munnalal*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 104 (107) : 22 Nag L R 175 : 100 Ind Cas 446, *Mt. Deshrani v. Kishore Singh*.
- 2a (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 191 (192) : 1 Lah 554 : 56 Ind Cas 742, *Tani v. Rishi Ram*.
3. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 702 (704) : 159 Ind Cas 1101, *Hamendra Nath v. Jnanendra Prasanna*.

Note 21

1. (1881) 8 Cal 442 (445, 446) : 6 Ind Jnr 526, *Purnot Koer v. Palut Roy*.
(1914) A I R 1914 P C 38 (40, 41) : 36 All 187 : 23 Ind Cas 715 (P C), *Lala Brij Lal v. Mt. Inda Kunwar*.
(1897) 21 Bom 376 (379), *Harilal v. Bai Rewa*.
(1897) 21 Bom 646 (670), *Vundravandas v. Curson Das*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 364 (365) : 77 Ind Cas 479, *Pandurung v. Basappa*.
(1882) 9 Cal 93 (95) : 5 Shome L R 84, *Gaya Pershad v. Heet Narain*.
(1867) 7 Suth W R 450 (451), *Tilluck Roy v. Phoolman Roy*.
(1871) 15 Suth W R 41 (42) : 14 Moo Ind App 67 : 7 Beng L R 216. 2 Suther 422 : 2 Scr 666 (P C), *Rajendra Nath v. Jagendra Nath*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Lah 288 (289) : 46 Ind Cas 565, *Khan Bahadur v. Ibrahim Khan*.
(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 633 (636) : 152 Ind Cas 773, *Khem Chand v. Krishan Kumar*.

reversioner.² Time runs from the death of the female, not only against the nearest reversioner but against *all* reversioners near or remote. The remote reversioner does not get any fresh cause of action after the expiry of twelve years from the death of the widow.³

Where there are more females than one inheriting the property of the last male owner jointly, the words "when the female dies" in the third column of the Article must be taken to mean "after the death of all the female co-heirs"⁴ Where there are successive female owners, time will run against the reversioner from the death of the last female owner.^{4a}

Where A and B, co-widows, succeed to X, a male owner, and A thereafter surrenders her interest to B but dies before B, the reversioner's right nevertheless comes into existence only on the death of A and time begins to run from that date. He does not get a right

Article 141
Note 21

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- (1897) 20 Mad 493 (491) . 7 Mad L Jour 201, *Venkataramaya v. Venkatalakshamma*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 32 (54) . 41 Ind Cas 368 : 21 Oudh Cas 1, *Bisheshar Baksh v. Rameshar Baksh*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 340 (361) . 163 Ind Cas 770, *Mata Daksh v. Ajodhya Baksh*.
 (1909) 3 Ind Cas 536 (536, 537) (All), *Nanak v. Sibba*.
 (1910) 5 Ind Cas 964 (965) : 34 Bom 321, *Ravji Mahadu v. Sakuji Kaloji*.
 (1912) 12 Ind Cas 453 (455) . 1912 Pun Re No. 6, *Mansaram v. Behari*.
 (1922) 65 Ind Cas 224 (230) (Pat), *Abdul Rahman v. Wali Muhammad*.
 2. (1915) A I R 1915 Nag 109 (110) : 11 Nag L R 116 . 31 Ind Cas 290, *Kashirao v. Uharda*.
 3. (1902) 4 Bom L R 893, *Jamnabai v. Dharsey*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 211 (212) . 121 Ind Cas 70, *Amarnath v. Mt. Balli*.
 4. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 457 (459) . 31 All 557 . 36 Ind App 210 : 13 Oudh Cas 183 (P C), *Muhammad Kamal v. Imtiaz Fatima*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 246 (247) . 60 Ind Cas 135 . 43 Mad 855, *Muthiala Ghengappa v. Budia Guntla*.
 (1905) 27 All 494 (498) . 1905 All W N 68, *Ram Das Kunwar v. Abu Jafar*.
 (1894) 18 Bom 216 (220), *Mukta v. Dada*.
 (1874) 23 Suth W R 125 (126), *Gobind Chunder Majoomdar v. Dulmeer Khan*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 500 (501) . 68 Ind Cas 299, *Nand Singh v. Mt. Dhan Kaur*.
 (1911) 9 Ind Cas 50 (51) . 33 All 312, *Gajadhar Pande v. Parbati*.
 (See also (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 108 (109) . 70 Ind Cas 446, *Ranganatha Rao v. Rama Pandithar*)
 4a (1885) 11 Cal 791 (791), *Koelimon Dassia v. Manick Chandra*.
 (1895) 23 Cal 460 (470), *Sham Lal Mitra v. Amarendra Nath*.
 (1912) 1912 Pun W R (N. W. F. P. Civil) No. 1 (at pages 5, 6), *Kesho Das v. Nathu Mal*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 24 (26) . 44 Mad 131 . 60 Ind Cas 583, *Ivatury Atchamma v. Pappiah*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 168 (169) . 69 Ind Cas 389, *Joga Ferrayya v. Makina Sallyya Patrudu*.
 (1905) 3 Nag L R 35 (40), *Anand Rao v. Bansinath Brahman*.
 (1937) 20 Nag L Jour 278 (280), *Parashram v. Balakrishna*.

Articles 141
Notes
21—22

to the interest of the surrendering widow on the death of *B*. There can be no acceleration of the estate of the reversioner by transactions between the co-widows without the knowledge and consent of the reversioners.⁵ But where *A* and *B* inherited jointly certain property and *A* forfeits her interest in favour of *B* by reason of unchastity, and *B* thereafter gets the whole estate, the reversioners' cause of action will arise on the death of *B* even though *A* survives *B*.⁶

A, a reversioner, filed a suit against the alienees from the widow within twelve years of her death making the other co-reversioners defendants. The latter filed a written statement beyond twelve years of the widow's death claiming their share of the estate. It was held that they were not barred from doing so.⁷

During the lifetime of a Hindu widow, *A* alleging himself to be a reversioner filed a suit for declaration that an alienation by the widow was not valid. The suit was dismissed on the ground that *A* was not the reversioner, but *B*. Subsequently, after the death of the widow, *B* filed the suit as the reversioner for possession but that suit was dismissed also on the ground that he was not the reversioner. This was in the year 1916. *A*'s son thereupon sued for possession more than twelve years after the death of the widow but within twelve years of 1916. It was held that time ran from the death of the widow and, under Section 9 of the Act it did not stop running by reason of subsequent events such as the pendency of, or the decision in, *B*'s suit.⁸

22. Local and special law.—Under Section 29 *ante*, this Article will not apply even if the case is one falling within its purview, where a special period of limitation has been prescribed therefor by any special or local law.¹

5. (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 246 (247) : 43 Mad 855 : 60 Ind Cas 135, *Muthiala Chengappa v. Dudragunta*.

6. (1917) A I R 1917 Lah 435 (435) : 89 Ind Cas 204, *Ghulam Sarwar v. Karam Nahi & Co.*

7. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 345 (347) : 53 Bom 472 : 119 Ind Cas 656, *Rayegavada v. Ramalingappa*.

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 249 (252) : 34 Bom 91, *Narasimha Krishnaji v. Yaman Venkatesh Deshpande*

8. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 108 (109) : 70 Ind Cas 446, *Ranganatha Rao v. Rama Pandithar*.

Notes 22

1. (1886) 13 All 108 (118), *Barkul Tiwari v. Dadri Nath*.

142.* For possession of immoveable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession.	Twelve years.	The date of the dispossession or discontinuance.	Article 142
144.† For possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specially provided for.	Twelve years.	When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.	Article 144

Synopsis

Articles 142 and 144

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of Articles 142 and 144.
3. Suit must be for possession.
4. Suit on possessory title.
5. Suit on proprietary title.
6. "Immoveable property."
7. Interest in immovable property.
8. "Plaintiff" in Article 142, meaning of.

*	Act of 1877, Article 142 Same as above.
	Act of 1871, Article 143 Same as above.
	Act of 1859 No corresponding provision.

†	Act of 1877, Article 144 Same as above.
	Act of 1871, Article 145

Columns 1 and 2—Same as above.

Column 3 ran as follows "When the possession of the defendant, or of some person through whom he claims, became adverse to the plaintiff."

Act of 1859, Section 1, Clause 12

Limitation of twelve years Suits for immoveable property.

To suits for the recovery of immoveable property or of any interest in immoveable property to which no other provision of this Act applies — The period of twelve years from the time the cause of action arose.

- Arts. 142 & 144 9. "Has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession."
10. Defendant must be in possession at the date of suit.
11. "Possession," what is.
12. Possession of part, if possession of whole.
13. Possession of house is possession of site.
14. Plaintiff only in constructive possession — Dispossession or discontinuance of possession.
15. Principle that possession follows title.
16. Adverse possession, what is.
17. "Defendant."
18. Possession is not adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title.
19. Possession of Hindu female.
20. Possession under a temporary arrangement between members of a family.
21. Possession in lieu of dower.
22. Possession in lieu of maintenance.
23. Possession by the holder of a life estate, if can be adverse to reversioners.
24. Possession of property belonging to person under disability.
25. Possession of insolvent.
26. Possession of mortgagor, when becomes adverse to the mortgagee.
27. Possession of a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgagee.
28. Possession of mortgagee.
29. Possession of mortgagee under invalid foreclosure proceedings.
30. Possession of mortgagee under mortgage providing that on default the mortgagee should be full owner.
31. Possession of mortgagee after purchase in contravention of Order 34 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code.
32. Possession of person entering under void mortgage.
33. Possession by the mortgagee, after redemption, of accessions to mortgaged property.
34. Possession of co-mortgagee paying off other co-mortgagees.

35. Possession of co-owners — General. Arts. 142 & 144
36. Possession of alienee from co-owner.
37. Possession of licensee from co-owner.
38. Effect of partition among co-owners.
39. Co-owner deriving possession from a third party claiming adversely against all the co-owners.
40. Adverse possession against alienee of share in property.
41. Adverse possession by co-owners against stranger.
42. Abandonment by co-owner.
43. Relinquishment by co-owner.
44. Co-heirs.
45. Suit for possession by one co-owner against another—Article applicable.
46. Adverse possession of trust property by trustee.
47. Adverse possession of alienee from trustee.
48. Adverse possession of right to perform worship in temple.
49. Adverse possession of property of Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious endowments.
50. Possession of co-trustees after division among them.
51. Possession of alienee from co-trustee.
52. Acts referable to exercise of easement.
- 52a. Adverse possession—Vendor and vendee.
- 52b. Possession held under mistake, if can be adverse.
53. Possession of wrong-doer must be actual.
54. Adverse possession of surface and of subsoil rights in the land.
55. Possession of person who could not advance a hostile title.
56. Permissive possession.
57. Possession of agents, servants, etc.
58. Possession by husband or wife.
59. Possession of tenant.
- 59a. Encroachment by tenant.
60. Possession under invalid transaction.
- 60a. Possession under transfer which subsequently becomes invalid.
61. Adverse possession of inalienable property.

Arts. 142 & 144

- 61a. Adverse possession of land in military cantonments.
- 61h. Adverse possession of rights not recognized by law.
62. Possession of owner, if can be adverse to himself.
63. Possession must be continuous for the statutory period.
64. Break in adverse possession, effect of.
65. Delivery of symholical possession, if interrupts ndvrssr possession.
66. Decree does not interrupt adverse possession.
67. Effect of attachmsnt on adverse possession.
68. Decision of Revenue Officer or Court regarding houndary, if interrupts advrse possession.
69. Subsequant assertion of a different title by defendant, if affects his adverse possession.
70. Submerged land.
71. Receiver and adverse possession.
72. Ahandonment of possession.
73. Confiscation and re-grant.
74. Revenue sale — Adverse possession against purchasser.
75. Dispossession of wrong.dosr by another, if interrupts advrss possession.
76. Possession must be open.
77. Advrss possession against minor or Innatic.
78. Possession is not adverse to person not having a present right to possession.
79. Adverse possession against holder of life-estate.
80. Adverse possession of trnst property by stranger.
81. Adverse possession against one co-trustee, if adverse to the other.
82. Adverse possession against co-owners.
83. Adverse possession against widow is not adverse ngainst subsequently adopted son.
84. Adverse possession against mortgagor, if adverse against mortgagee.
85. Adverse possession against mortgagee, if adverse to mortgagor.
86. Adverse possession against tenant, if adverse against landlord.
87. Onus of proof.
88. Judgment against third party does not alter onus.
89. Question immaterial when evidence has been let in on both sides.

90. Starting point.

91. Defendant made party after limitation.

92. Tacking.

93. Effect of adverse possession.

94. Adverse possessor can get only what quantum owner had.

95. Adverse possessor gets a title only to the interest he purports to prescribe for.

96. Evidence of adverse possession.**97. Plea of adverse possession.****98. Question of adverse possession, if one of law or fact.****99. Adverse possession by or against Crown.****99a. Adverse possession by or against the public.****100. Special or local law.***Other Topics*

- Actual knowledge on part of owner not necessary ... See Note 76, Pts. 2 to 4
- Adverse possession by successive trespassers ... See Note 92, Pts. 10 to 13
- Agent—Repudiation of agency—Essentials ... See Note 57, Pts. 11 to 13
- Alternate pleas ... See Note 97, Pt. 9
- Article 142—Suit under—Mere proof of plaintiff's title—Effect ... See Note 87, Pts. 10 to 13
- Article 142—Whether limited to suits on possessory title... See Note 5, Pts. 3 to 5
- Article 144 is residuary Article ... See Note 2, Pt. 1
- Co-owners—'Ouster'—Meaning of ... See Note 35, Pts. 6 to 10, 17 to 19, 23 to 25
- Dispossession and discontinuance—Common features of ... See Note 9, Pts. 4 to 6
- Dispossession and discontinuance—Difference between ... See Note 9, Pts. 1 to 3
- Equity of redemption—Whether can be adversely possessed ... See Note 7, Pts. 15 to 17, Note 85
- Immovable property—What are—Instances ... See Note 6, Pts. 2 to 11
- Immovable property—What are not—Instances ... See Note 6, Pts. 12 to 13
- Mere non-payment of rent by tenant cannot create adverse possession ... See Note 59, Pt. 5
- Onus in cases falling under Article 142 ... See Note 87, Pts. 4 to 14
- Onus in cases falling under Article 144 ... See Note 87, Pts. 15 to 19a
- Owner dispossessed getting back possession but again dispossessed—Time runs from second dispossession ... See Note 90, Pts. 3, 4
- Possession adverse at start—It cannot become permissive by subsequent events ... See Note 56, Pt. 14
- Possession asked as consequence of primary relief—Article 142 or Article 144 does not apply ... See Note 3, Pts. 6 to 8
- Possession obtained by plaintiff under decree of Court—Decree reversed and plaintiff dispossessed—Whether such dispossession gives cause of action against defendant previously in possession ... See Note 90, Pts. 5 to 11
- Possession of independent trespassers cannot be tacked ... See Note 92, Pt. 2
- Possession of mortgagee after discharge—Whether adverse ... See Note 23, Pts. 7a to 7d
- Possession of person dispossessing usufructuary mortgagee—Whether adverse to mortgagor ... See Note 55, Pts. 2 to 4, 10
- Possession permissive—Article 144 applies ... See Note 2, Pt. 5, Note 56, Pt. 15
- Possession under contract of sale ... See Note 52a, Pt. 9

Arts. 142 & 144 **Note 1**

Possession under title cannot be tacked to possession without title	See Note 92 F-N 6
Possession under void transfer	See Note 60, Pts. 14 to 16
Possession under voidable transfer	See Note 60, Pts. 12, 13
Sale of equity of redemption to mortgagee void or voidable—Possession of mortgagee—Whether adverse	See Note 28, Pts. 7e to 10
Space above land of owner — Whether immovable property	See Note 6, Pts. 10, 20
Submerged land—Owner presumed to be in possession;	See Note 15, Pts. 21 to 23; Note 70, Pts. 5, 6
Submergence will operate as interruption of adverse possession	See Note 70, Pts. 7, 9
Suit for declaration of title—Onus...	See Note 87, Pts. 20 to 25
Suit for possession—Possession need not be actual physical possession	See Note 3, Pt. 18
Suit on mere title — Failure to prove title—Whether plaintiff can succeed on ground of title by adverse possession	See Note 97, Pts. 1 to 4a
Suit on possessory title — Not barred by Section 9, Specific Relief Act	See Note 4 F-N 7
Tacking — Possession of two or more persons—Character of possession of the different persons — Whether should be same	See Note 92, Pts. 6a to 9
Trespass by agent, servant, etc	See Note 57, Pt. 15
Void lease—Tenant dispossessed by third party—Such person's possession is adverse to landlord	See Note 86, Pt. 9
Waste or jungle lands — Presumption as to possession	See Note 15, Pts. 11 to 16a, 24

1. Legislative changes.—Before the Act of 1859, limitation for suits for the recovery of immovable property was provided for by certain Regulations in force in the several Provinces. In the Provinces of Bengal and Bihar, the Courts were, under Regulations III of 1793 and VII of 1795, "prohibited hearing, trying, or determining the merits of any suit whatever against any person or persons if the *cause of action* shall have arisen twelve years before any suit shall have been commenced on account of it."^{1a} By Regulation II of 1805 it was provided that the limitation of twelve years prescribed by the two previous Regulations should not apply if the person in possession of the property claimed in the suit had acquired the possession "by violence, fraud, or by an unjust dishonest means whatever."¹

In the Province of Bombay, Regulation V of 1827 provided for such suits a limitation of thirty years. But "it shall be a sufficient answer to the plea of possession for more than thirty years, that the

Articles 142 & 144 — Note 1

1a (1866) 6 Suth W R 296 (296), *Muddun Mohan Tewaree v. Joy Koomaree Dhee*.

1. (1855) 7 Moo Ind App 238 (253, 254, 259) : 1 Sar 633 (P C), *Rajah Enayat Hossein v. Sayid Ahmed Reza*.

(1866) 5 Suth W R P C 95 (98) (P C), *Lall Dohul Singh v. Lall Rooder*.

person in possession as proprietor, or any of the persons by whom he derives his right, acquired such possession by *fraudulent means*, on proof whereof, a suit may be entertained at any period within sixty years, provided that if such property had been held for more than thirty years by a person or persons *bona fide* believing his or their title as proprietors to be good, such title shall not be affected by the fraud of a former possessor "

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 1-2

Madras Regulation II of 1803, which applied to the Province of Madras, contained a provision similar to that provided for by the Bengal Regulation III of 1793 referred to above.

Under the Limitation Act of 1859, a suit for recovery of immovable property was governed by clause 12 of Section 1 of that Act when no other provision was applicable, and the period of limitation was twelve years from the time when the *cause of action* arose.²

Provisions corresponding to the present Articles 142 and 144 were first introduced in Articles 143 and 145 of the Act of 1871, with this difference, that the third column of Article 145 of the Act of 1871 corresponding to the present Article 144, contained the words "or of some person through whom he claims" The said words have been omitted in the later Acts apparently in view of the new definition of the word "defendant" introduced in them.

There is no difference between the present Articles 142 and 144 and the corresponding Articles in the Act of 1877.

2. Scope of Articles 142 and 144.—Article 144 is a residuary Article and applies only to suits for possession of immovable property *to which no other Article is applicable*.¹ It follows that if Article 142

2. (1893) 5 All 1 (6), 9 Ind App 99, 5 Shome L R 80, 4 Sar 382 (P C), *Kasan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan*
(1874) 13 Beng L R 312 (322, 323), 1 Ind App 157, 3 Sar 314 (P C), *Rani Meera Kunwar v. Rani Hulas Kunwar*
(1880) 3 C P L R 162 (163), *Khetsingh v. Mt. Radha*.
(1870) 13 Suth W R 459 (460), *Gour Mones Moormin v. Shunkures Paharnee*.
(1864) 1 Suth W R 29 (30), *Rajah Baradahant Roy v. Sookmoy Mookerjee*.
(1879) 3 Bom 452 (785), *Bhaskarappa v. Collector of North Kanara*.
(1869) 6 Bom H C R 66 (68), *Lakshuman Ramji v. Ramlal*.

Note 2

1. (1898) 23 Bom 725 (736), 20 Ind App 71, 1 Bom L R 607, 3 Cal W N 621; 7 Sar 543 (P C), *Ranchordas Vandratandas v. Paratibai* (Art 144

(1899) 2 Bom L R 106 (108), *Hathisingh v. Satilal* (Art. 144 does not apply where Art 141 applies)

(1917) A 1 R 1917 Bom 11 (13), 42 Bom 69, 43 Ind Cas 233, *Subbi Ganpatibhatta v. Ramkrishnobhatta*. (Do.)

Arts. 142 & 144 Note 2

is applicable to a particular case, Article 144 cannot be applied to

- (1886) 12 Cal 594 (506, 597), *Azam Bhuyan v. Farzuddin Ahmed.* (Do.)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 93 (93) : 114 Ind Cas 139, *Shiva Prasad Saw v. Bhadramoni Dass.* (Do.)
- (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 469 (480) : 41 Mad 75 : 42 Ind Cas 245 (F B), *Vaidyanatha v. Savithri Ammal* (Do.)
- (1902) 25 Mad 507 (510, 511, 512) : 12 Mad L Jour 119, *Seshamma Shet-tati v. Chichaya Hegade.*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 181 (181) : 91 Ind Cas 454, *Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. Chockalainga Mudaliar.*
- (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 707 (710) : 54 Mad 883. 135 Ind Cas 9, *Rama-kotayya v. Sundararamayya.* (Art. 144 will not apply where Art. 96 applies)
- (1937) A I R 1937 Nag 129 (130) : I L R (1937) Nag 254 171 Ind Cas 271, *Shankarsa v. Punam Chand.*
- (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 185 (201) : 26 Oudh Cas 133 : 75 Ind Cas 626, *Zarif-un-nissa v. Shafr-uz-zaman.*
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 155 (188) : 108 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim v. Saadat Ali.*
- (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 570 (573) : 47 Ind Cas 290 : 3 Pat L Jour 327, *Nathe Pujari v. Rudha Binode Nath.*
- (1910) 8 Ind Cas 1095 (1095) : 33 All 221, *Ram Lakhan Roy v. Gajadhar Rai.*
- (1911) 9 Ind Cas 300 (303) : 1911 Pun Re No. 26 (F B), *Sundar v. Shalig-ram.*
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 10 (11) (All), *Bhole Singh v. Bhagwant Singh.*
- (1921) 64 Ind Cas 462 (464) (All), *Mt. Jagrani Misran v. Mt. Sheo Dulari.*
- (1906) 4 Cal L Jour 55 (100), *Dhanraj Chatterjee v. Kusum Kamini Devi.*
- Itachargee v. Jagdish
- (1921) A I R 1921 All 389 (391) : 43 All 164 : 61 Ind Cas 546, *Mt. Ram Piar v. Budh Sen*
- (1897) 24 Cal 715 (719, 720), *Haris Mohan Shaha v. Baburali*
- (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 448 (457), *Ram Churn Tewari v. Pratap Chandra Dutt.*
- (1907) 5 Cal L Jour 638 (640, 641), *Elokeshi Das v. Abinash Chandra Dose.* (Sale in execution void ab initio — Suit for possession of property is governed by Art. 144 and not by Art. 12.)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 176 (177) : 70 Ind Cas 602, *Janakinath Saha v. Basuntha Nath.* (Suit by auction-purchaser against trespasser — Art. 138 does not apply — Art. 144 applies.)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Lah 303 (305) : 29 Ind Cas 731, *Mahomed Bakhsh v. Bakhshan.* (Objections to execution sale summarily rejected — Suit for recovery of property thus illegally sold — Art. 144 and not Art. 12 governs suit.)
- (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 330 (332) : 48 Ind Cas 399 : 1918 Pun Re No. 119, *Hira Singh v. Gulam Qadir.* (Minor not properly represented in suit—Decree—Sale of minor's property in execution — Suit by minor to set aside sale is governed by Art. 144 and not Art. 12)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 396 (397) : 71 Ind Cas 822, *Azim Khan v. Karim.* (Owner not party to decree—Sale under decree — Suit by owner to set aside sale and for possession is governed by Art. 144 and not by Art. 12.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 53 (54) : 79 Ind Cas 89, *Munna Lal v. Hamid Ali.*

- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 238 (238) : 92 Ind Cis 980, *Narain Das v. Siraj-ud-din*. (Do)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 91 (93) : 141 Ind Cas 401, *Mt. Radha v. Ajudhia Prashad*. (Do)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 784 (786) : 14 Lah 791 : 148 Ind Cas 1143, *Mt. Ghulam Bibi v. Mt. Sariat Bibi* (Suit by heir of Mahomedan dying intestate, for recovery of his share—Art. 144 and not Art. 123 governs suit)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 549 (550) : 117 Ind Cis 803 : 11 Lah 20, *Jano v. Narsing Das*. (Suit by Mahomedan co-heir for possession of his legal share is not governed by Art. 123 but by Art. 144)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 141 (142) : 118 Ind Cas 785, *Bai Jiji v. Bai Bibanboo*. (Do.)
- (1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 369 (370, 371) : 17 Oudh Cas 157 : 24 Ind Cas 45, *Azz-ul-Hal v. Mariam Bibi*. (Do)
- (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 885 (889) : 42 Mad 673 : 51 Ind Cas 366, *Secretary of State v. Gulam Mahboob Khan* (Unlawful resumption of inam by Government—Suit for possession is governed by Article 144 and not Art. 14)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 819 (850) : 92 Ind Cas 245, *Zamorin Rajah of Calicut v. Venkatagiri Pattar*. (Suit by lessor against lessee's assignee for recovery of property by reason of forfeiture—Art. 144 and not Art. 143 applies)
- (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 374 (324) : 35 Ind Cas 87, *Bisucambar Lal v. Jhulan Ram Tewari* (Suit for possession—Arts. 137 and 138 not applicable—Art. 144 applied)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 216 (225) : 84 Ind Cas 586 : 4 Pat 139, *Ram Bachhya Singh v. Kamakhya Narain*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 421 (422) : 96 Ind Cas 632 : 6 Pat 73, *Ajodhya Prasad v. Ramkhehuran Singh* (Land not within estate partitioned—Art. 144 applies)
- (1910)
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 894 (896) : 15 Oudh Cis 111, *Bisheshar Tewari v. Bisheshar Dayal* (Art. 144 and not Art. 127 applies where the alleged joint family property has passed by sale to a stranger)
- (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 546 (550), *Ram Kanna Ghosh v. Harinarayan Singh*. (Transfer of trust property by a trustee to the knowledge of the transferee that the property is trust property—Suit by successor of the trustee—Art. 134, not Art. 144, applies)
- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 733 (733) : 24 Ind Cas 216, *Abbas Dhal v. Masabdi Karikar* (Case falling within Art. 136—Arts. 142 and 144 held not applicable)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 166 (167) : 2 Lah 164 : 63 Ind Cas 791, *Jeta Singh v. Man Singh*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 437 (439) : 96 Ind Cas 447 : 7 Lah 210, *Abdul Wahab v. Secretary of State* (Suit against Government—Art. 143 and not Art. 144, applies)
- (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 145 (146) : 11 Pat 165 : 142 Ind Cas 216, *Ram Prasad v. Budeswaras Prasad*
- (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 250 (250) : 117 Ind Cas 593 : 56 Cal 616, *Biswarath Chakravarti v. Rabia Khafun*
- [See also (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 32 (53) : 21 Oudh Cas 1 : 44 Ind Cas 369, *Bisheshar Baksh Singh v. Rameshar Baksh Singh*
- (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 373 (376) : 163 Ind Cas 593, *Chand Baksh v. Dhola Singh* (Suit in substance for possession of hereditary office—Art. 120 does not apply—Art. 121 applies)]
- (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 211 (212) : 46 Bom 1009 : 50 Ind Cas 371, *Dai Reva v. Valimahomed* (Suit by a subsequent trustee to recover property alienated by the former trustee in breach of trust is governed by Art. 131 and not by Art. 142)]

Arts. 142 & 144 is applicable to a particular case, Article 144 cannot be applied to
Note 2

- (1896) 12 Cal 594 (596, 597), *Azam Bhuyan v. Fazluddin Ahmed*. (Do.)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 93 (95) : 114 Ind Cas 139, *Shiva Prasad Saw v. Bhadraramoni Dass*. (Do.)
- (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 469 (480) : 41 Mad 75 : 42 Ind Cas 245 (F B), *Vaidyanatha v. Savithri Ammal*. (Do.)
- (1902) 25 Mad 507 (510, 511, 512) : 12 Mad L Jour 119, *Seshamma Shetlata v. Chichaya Hegade*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 181 (181) : 91 Ind Cas 454, *Kuppuswami Mudaliar v. Chockalalinga Mudaliar*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 707 (710) : 51 Mad 888 : 135 Ind Cas 9, *Ramakotayya v. Sundararamayya*. (Art. 144 will not apply where Art. 96 applies.)
- (1937) A I R 1937 Nag 129 (190) I L R (1937) Nag 254 : 171 Ind Cas 271, *Shankarsa v. Punam Chand*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 185 (201) : 26 Oudh Cas 133 : 75 Ind Cas 626, *Zarif-un-nissa v. Shaif-us-zaman*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (188) 108 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim v. Saadat Ali*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 570 (573) : 47 Ind Cas 290 : 3 Pat L Jour 327, *Nathe Pujari v. Radha Dinode Nath*.
- (1910) 8 Ind Cas 1095 (1095) : 33 All 224, *Ram Lakhon Roy v. Gajadhar Rai*.
- (1911) 9 Ind Cas 800 (803) : 1911 Pun Re No. 26 (F B), *Sundar v. Shaligram*.
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 10 (11) (All), *Bhole Singh v. Dhagwant Singh*.
- (1921) 64 Ind Cas 462 (464) (All), *Mt. Jagrani Misrani v. Mt. Sheo Dulars*.
- (1906) 4 Cal L Jour 56 (60), *Ramanath Chatterjee v. Kusum Kamini Debi*. (Art. 144 will not apply where Art. 127 applies.)
- (1897) 1 Cal W N 543 (544), *Umesh Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Jagdish Chandra Dhattacharjee*. (Do.)
- (1921) A I R 1921 All 389 (391) : 43 All 164 : 61 Ind Cas 546, *Mt. Ram Puri v. Budh Sen*.
- (1897) 24 Cal 715 (719, 720), *Hari Mohan Shaha v. Daburati*.
- (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 448 (457), *Ram Churn Tewari v. Pratap Chandra Dutt*.
- (1907) 5 Cal L Jour 638 (640, 641), *Elokeshi Dasi v. Abinash Chandra Bose*. (Sale in execution void *ab initio* — Suit for possession of property is governed by Art. 144 and not by Art. 12.)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 176 (177) : 70 Ind Cas 602, *Janakinath Saha v. Baskuntha Nath*. (Suit by auction-purchaser against trespasser — Art. 138 does not apply — Art. 144 applies.)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Loh 303 (305) : 29 Ind Cas 731, *Mahomed Bakhsh v. Bakhshan*. (Objections to execution sale summarily rejected — Suit for recovery of property thus illegally sold — Art. 144 and not Art. 12 governs suit.)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 447 (448) : 67 Ind Cas 517, *Alam Din v. Allah Dad*. (No proper guardian appointed in execution proceedings against minor — Sale concluded — Suit to set aside sale by minor is governed by Art. 144 and not Art. 12.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 396 (397) : 71 Ind Cas 822, *Azim Khan v. Karim*. (Owner not party to decree — Sale under decree — Suit by owner to set aside sale and for possession is governed by Art. 144 and not by Art. 12.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 53 (54) : 79 Ind Cas 89, *Munna Lal v. Hamid Ali*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 2

- (1926) A I R 1926 Lab 238 (238) : 92 Ind Cas 950, *Narain Das v. Siraj-ud-din*. (Do)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Lab 91 (92) : 141 Ind Cas 401, *Mt Radha v. Ajudhia Prashad*. (Do)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Lab 784 (786) : 14 Lab 794 • 149 Ind Cas 1143, *Mt. Ghulam Diba v. Mt. Sarwar Diba*. (Suit by heir of Mahomed in dying intestate, for recovery of his share—Art. 144 and not Art. 123 governs suit)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Lab 549 (550) : 117 Ind Cas 803 : 11 Lab 29, *Jano v. Narving Das*. (Suit by Mahomed in co heir for possession of his legal share is not governed by Art. 123 but by Art. 144)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 141 (142) : 118 Ind Cas 785, *Bas Jais v. Bas Bibanboo*. (Do.)
- (1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 369 (370, 371) : 17 Oudh Cas 157 : 21 Ind Cas 45, *Aziz-ul-Hal v. Mariam Diba*. (Do)
- (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 885 (889) • 42 Mad 673 : 51 Ind Cas 366, *Secretary of State v. Gulam Mahboob Khan* (Unlawful resumption of inam by Government — Suit for possession is governed by Article 144 and not Art. 14)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 819 (850) • 92 Ind Cas 245, *Zamorin Rajah of Calicut v. Venkatayya Pattar*. (Suit by lessor against lessee's assignee for recovery of property by reason of forfeiture — Art. 111 and not Art. 143 applies)
- (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 324 (324) : 35 Ind Cas 87, *Dismambar Lal v. Jhulan Ram Tewari*. (Suit for possession — Arts. 137 and 138 not applicable—Art. 144 applied)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 216 (224) • 84 Ind Cas 586 : 4 Pat 139, *Ram Itachhya Singh v. Kamakhya Narain*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 421 (422) : 96 Ind Cas 632 : 6 Pat 73, *Ajodhya Prasad v. Ramkhalawan Singh*. (Land not within estate partitioned and allocated to one person—Rightful owner's suit for possession, not falling under Art. 14—Art. 144 applies.)
- (1910) 5 Ind Cas 278 (275) (All), *Gajadhar Rai v. Ramlakhau Rai*. (Suit held governed by Art. 144 as Art. 137 did not apply)
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 894 (396) : 15 Oudh Cas 111, *Disheshar Tewari v. Disheshar Dayal*. (Art. 144 and not Art. 127 applies where the alleged joint family property has passed by sale to a stranger)
- (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 546 (550), *Ram Kannai Ghosh v. Harinarayan Singh*. (Transfer of trust property by a trustee to the knowledge of the transferee that the property is trust property—Suit by successor of the trustee—Art. 134, not Art. 144, applies.)
- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 783 (783) • 24 Ind Cas 216, *Abbas Dhal v. Masabdi Karikar*. (Case falling within Art. 136—Arts. 142 and 144 held not applicable.)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Lab 166 (167) : 2 Lab 164 • 62 Ind Cas 794, *Jata Singh v. Man Singh*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lab 437 (438) : 96 Ind Cas 447 : 7 Lab 210, *Abdul Wahab v. Secretary of State* (Suit against Government—Art. 149 and not Art. 144, applies)
- (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 145 (146) : 11 Pat 165 : 142 Ind Cas 246, *Ram Prasad v. Dindeshu Prasad*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 250 (250) : 117 Ind Cas 593 • 56 Cal 616, *Biswanath Chakravarti v. Rabiya Khatun*.
[See also (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 82 (53) : 21 Oudh Cas 1 : 41 Ind Cas 368, *Disheshar Baksh Singh v. Rameshar Baksh Singh*]
- (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 373 (376) : 169 Ind Cas 593, *Chandrika Baksh v. Bhola Singh*. (Suit in substance for possession of hereditary office—Art. 120 does not apply—Art. 121 or Art. 144 applies)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 211 (212) : 46 Bom 1009 • 70 Ind Cas 912, *Bas Beva v. Valimohamed*. (Suit by a subsequent trustee to recover property alienated by the former trustee in breach of the trust is governed by Art. 134 and not by Art. 142)]

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 2

it.² Where, therefore, the question arises whether Article 142 or Article 144 applies to a particular case, it must first be decided whether Article 142 applies to it and it is only when it is clear that it is not applicable, that Article 144 should be applied.

Now Article 142 applies only where the plaintiff, while in possession, has been dispossessed or has discontinued his possession.^{2a} A person can be said to be dispossessed or to discontinue his possession only when another person enters on the property in the possession of the plaintiff, and such entry itself is adverse to the former, that is, in contravention of his title.³ Where the plaintiff is not in possession at all but gets a title to it while the defendant is in lawful possession of it, it cannot be said that the defendant has made any entry on the property while in the possession of the plaintiff in contravention of the latter's title. It is not a case of the plaintiff being dispossessed or discontinuing his possession. Article 142 will not apply to such a case, the Article applicable would be Article 144 if no other specific Article is applicable to it. Thus, where A transfers his property to B but fails to deliver possession to him and B consequently sues A for possession, the case is not one under Article 142 and consequently Article 144 may apply.⁴ See also the undermentioned cases.^{4a} Again,

2. (1934) A I R 1934 All 993 (995) 152 Ind Cas 1. 57 All 278 (F B), *Budhya Chal Chand v. Ram Gharib*.

2a. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 55 (55) : 59 Ind App 180 : 11 Pat 272 : 186 Ind Cas 798 (P C), *Bageshwari Charan v. Jagannath Kuari*.

3. See Notes, *infra*

See also (1912) 17 Ind Cas 606 (608) . 8 Nag L R 163, *Kanhayyalal v. Dular Singh*. (Art. 142 will not apply unless possession of defendant is adverse, nor will Art. 144 apply.)

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (189) : 103 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim Khan v. Saadat Ali Khan*.

(1931) A I R 1931 P C 186 (188) : 130 Ind Cas 815 . 10 Pat 407 : 58 Ind App 29 (P C), *Nageshwar Dux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co., Ltd.* (Adverse possession may imply dispossession.)

4. (1911) 12 Ind Cas 431 (431, 432) (Lah), *Nauaz v. Muhammad Ahsan*.

(1922) A I R 1922 All 410 (411) : 77 Ind Cas 113, *Surat Singh v. Umrao Singh*. (Suit for property got under compromise)

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 394 (394) : 81 Ind Cas 675, *Annada Mohon Roy v. Kina Das*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 914 (915) : 129 Ind Cas 699, *Ramchand v. Gopal Singh*. (Suit for possession and partition of share in joint property by purchaser at auction sale, following symbolical possession)

(1908) 31 Mad 51 (53, 54) : 3 Mad L Tim 241, *Mogera Nandi v. Parameshwar*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Nag 199 (200) : 56 Ind Cas 929, *Mt. Gajbhai v. Nil Kanth*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 363 (365) : 147 Ind Cas 430, *Param Sukh v. Sheo Morat*. (Suit by lessee for possession of property leased)

(1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 310 (311) . 126 Ind Cas 703, *Yakub Khan v. Sheo Dulary*.

[See also (1876) 25 South W R 521 (523), *C. G. D. Belts v. Mohamed Ismail*. (A suit for possession of land got under a compromise in a former suit)]

(1907) 10 Oudh Cas 17 (20), *Karim Daksh Khan v. Mehdi Hasan Khan*. (Suit for property got under compromise)]

4a. (1892) 16 Bom 172 (177), *Hanmant Ramchandra v. Dabaji Abaji*. (Suit for possession by creditor entitled to it on default of payment by debtor—Art. 144 applies.)

where the plaintiff is in possession and the defendant has entered on the property, but such entry is under right *derived from the plaintiff*, or is *permissive*, or is otherwise *consistent with the title* of the plaintiff, it cannot be said that the *entry itself* is in contravention of the plaintiff's title, though by reason of subsequent events, his possession may *become adverse* to the plaintiff. Article 142 will not apply to this case also and consequently Article 144 may apply.⁵

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 2

The test therefore to see whether Article 142 applies to a particular case is to ascertain whether the defendant entered on the property while the plaintiff was in possession and whether such entry was *from the beginning adverse* to the plaintiff.^{5a}

In order to ascertain this, it is necessary to consider the *facts and circumstances admitted or proved in the case*. Where the plaintiff himself alleges possession and dispossession, it may generally be sufficient to bring the case under Article 142,⁶ unless the facts show

- (1885) 1885 Pun Re No 36, *Shree v. Dhan Singh* (When defendant came on the land, it was not in contravention of plaintiff's title as owner as plaintiff got his title only later)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 539 (539, 540) 25 Ind Cas 692, *Venkataram v Venkataramiah* (Art 141 applies to a suit by an adopted son for the recovery of immovable property, the starting point is the date of his adoption)
5. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 582 (583) 117 Ind Cas 532, *Monmothanaath v. Bepin Behary*. (Permissive possession at the start)
- (1887) 1887 All W N 91 (91), *Dalip Singh v. Tulshiram*. (A suit for the recovery of immovable property against a benami purchaser who denies the title of the real purchaser is governed by Art 144)
- (1931) 1931 M W N 856 (856), *Lakshminarayana Natada v Madappayya* (In 1910, an agent of the plaintiff granted a lease of the plaintiff's property treating it as his own. In 1915 plaintiff knew about the lease. The agency terminated in 1922 and this suit was brought in 1925 for possession of the leased property. *Held*, that there being no question of possession and dispossession Article 142 does not apply)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 849 (850) 92 Ind Cas 245, *Zamruin Raja of Calcut v. Venkatagiri Pattar*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 8 (11) I L R (1938) Mad 220 176 Ind Cas 535, *Sitamma v Sitapatirao* (Widow and adopted son living together — Possession and management by son of stridhana property of widow, not adverse to widow — Son's wife collecting rents exclusively after widow's death—Suit by heir of widow for possession—Art 141 applies)
- (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (188) 108 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Hakim v Saadat Ali*
- (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 102 (108) 140 Ind Cas 799, *Zainuddin Hossain v. Md Abdur Rahim*
- (1930) A I R 1930 Nag 7 (9), *Maheshan Lalli Pinjara v Yusufkhan Kallu Pinjara* (Defendant's possession was by transfer from plaintiff and not against his will—No dispossession)
- [But see (1910) A I R 1910 Cal 1027 (1027) 46 Ind Cas 895, *Mohendra Nath Sow v Rajani Kanta Sow* (Plaintiff in possession of patti by receipt of services from chankidars—Latter refusing to vacate on resumption—*Held* it was a case of dispossession)]
- 5a (1912) 17 Ind Cas 606 (608) 8 Nag L R 163, *Kankayyalal v. Dular Singh*.
- G (1935) A I R 1935 All 774 (775) 155 Ind Cas 824, *Baboo Singh v Ram Manohar*
- (1890) 14 Bom 458 (462), *Faki Abdulla v. Babaji Gangaji*.
- (1905) 29 Bom 480 (489) 7 Bom L R 497, *Baluant Ramchandra v. Secretary of State*

Arts. 142 & 144 that there could not have been a dispossession or discontinuance of
Note 2

- (1868) 5 Bom H C R A O 139 (142), *Lalchand Ambaldas v. Sakharam*.
 (1872) 9 Bom H C R 53 (59), *Lakshmi Bai v. Vitthal Ramchandra*.
 (1908) 10 Bom L R 571 (572), *Bhagwansingh v. Secretary of State*.
 (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (643) : 12 Bom L R 936 (968, 969) : 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna*.
 (1938) A I R 1938 Bom 210 (212) : 175 Ind Cas 93, *Naru Shidu v. Krishna Shidu*.
 (1872) 17 Suth W R 505 (507), *Bhromar Coomar Debee v. Banse Madhub Banerjee*.
 (1876) 25 Suth W R 217 (217), *Mt. Dhoryobutty Chowdhram v. Chamroo Mundul*.
 (1877) 26 Suth W R 105 (106), *Hurruck Narain Thacoor v. Mt. Lutchem Koer*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 582 (592) : 31 Ind Cas 965, *Krishen Doyal Giv v. Irshad Ali Khan*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (558) : 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhai Chandra v. Durga Das*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 835 (857) : 51 Cal 669 : 78 Ind Cas 679, *Suresh Chandra v. Shrikanta*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 365 (367) : 100 Ind Cas 806, *Kalipada Basu v. Fort Gloster Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd.*
 (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 160 (151) : 174 Ind Cas 511, *Guru Charan Rudra Pat v. Mafjuddin Molla*.
 (1939) A I R 1938 Cal 206 (208) : 175 Ind Cas 217, *Ramendra Prosad Basu v. Barada Prosad Basu*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 627 (628) : 143 Ind Cas 428, *Sheru v. Sham Singh*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 507 (508) : 157 Ind Cas 399, *Kuar Sam v. Gulab*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 947 (952) : 158 Ind Cas 854, *Venkataratnam v. Venkataratnam*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Nag 7 (13) : 14 Nag L R 82 : 43 Ind Cas 913, *Ganno v. Beni*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 818 (851) : 110 Ind Cas 180, *Milap Chand v. Mt. Mohini Bibi*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 88 (89) : 153 Ind Cas 871 : 10 Luck 513, *Ram Shankar v. Sheo Dutt*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 425 (426) : 156 Ind Cas 92, *Wahid Ali v. Mahboob Ali Khan*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 616 (617) : 3 Pat 673 : 81 Ind Cas 405, *H. Mathewson v. Secretary of State*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 68 (93) : 93 Ind Cas 451 (F B), *Harishar Prasad v. Kesho Prasad*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 376 (378) : 86 Ind Cas 618, *Lachmi Narain v. Rebati Debba*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 625 (631) : 4 Pat 510 : 87 Ind Cas 819 : 68 Ind Cas 141, *Harendra Singh v. Rameshwar Singh*.
 (1916) A I R 1918 Low Bur 131 (131, 132) : 41 Ind Cas 722, *Appan Charan v. Kyause Ma Ma*.
 (1909) 1 Ind Cas 901 (901) (Mad), *Venkatarayudu v. Santharayya*.
 (1909) 2 Ind Cas 381 (383) (Cal), *Lalu Sahu v. Ghunaria Uraon*.
 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 521 (522) (Lah), *Ghulam Rasul v. Umar*.
 (1912) 15 Ind Cas 10 (11) (All), *Bhole Singh v. Bhagwant Singh*.
 (1913) 22 Ind Cas 64 (65) (Cal), *Bishambhar Satbhaya v. Nadiar Chand Mandal*.

possession in the sense in which the expression is used in Art. 142.^{6a} But the fact that the plaintiff does not allege dispossession in his plaint cannot render Article 142 inapplicable if the facts show that the defendant must have entered on the land in the possession of the plaintiff and that such entry must have been adverse from the beginning.⁷ The plaintiff cannot, by framing a suit as if there was no

Arts. 142 & 14
Note 2

- (1934) A I R 1934 All 993 (997) . 152 Ind Cas 1 57 All 278 (F B), *Bindhya Chal Chand v Ram Gharib*.
- (1890) 1890 Bom P J 175 (175), *Zuzia Francis v Manoel Gustin Fernan*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 507 (508) : 157 Ind Cas 399, *Kaur Sain v. Gulab*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 214 (215) : 177 Ind Cas 52, *Manzoor Ali Khan v. Pateshwari Prasad*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 48 (48, 49) : 144 Ind Cas 274, *Ma Hme Ni v. Ma Hme Yan U*.
- [See also (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 14 (19) 53 Bom 12 115 Ind Cas 369, *Sayaji Rao Gaekwar v. Madhattrao*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 133 (133) 50 Ind Cas 762 . 1919 Pun Re No. 117, *Chanan Mal v. Mela Ram*]
- 6a. See (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 297 (297) . 56 Cal 914 119 Ind Cas 280, *Gaya Prasad v. Dalpa Mani Das* (Plaintiff alleged dispossession—But facts showed no dispossession—Art. 144 was applied.)
7. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 554 (555) (Cal), *Bailash Chandra v. Amjud Ali* (7 Cal 225, Followed)
- (1937) A I R 1937 Nag 129 (129, 130) I L R (1937) Nag 254 171 Ind Cas 271, *Shankarsa v Punam Chand*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 42 (44) 27 Oudh Cas 130 79 Ind Cas 964, *Gur Sahaj Kandu v. Chhed*
- (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 177 (228) : 136 Ind Cas 642, *Mahomed Asim Khan v. Mahomed Sandat Ali Khan*
- (1934) A I R 1934 All 933 (1001) . 57 All 278 152 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Bindya-chal Chand v Ram Gharib*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 All 964 (965) 159 Ind Cas 521, *Gurcharan Prasad v Jas Narain Singh* (Defendants planting trees on land—Suit for possession and removal of trees—Art. 142 applied)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 92 (93) 89 Bom 335 23 Ind Cas 24, *Subappa v. Venkappa*.
- (1891) 18 Cal 642 (646), *Kartick Chunder v Saroda Sundari Debi*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1166 (1167) 97 Ind Cas 1003, *Birendra Nath Roy v. Satis Chandra*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 228 (229), *Jnanana Prasanna v. Hemendranath*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 236 (236) 100 Ind Cas 477, *Kanshi Ram v. Taja*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 207 (210) 51 Ind Cas 801 4 Pat L Jour 463, *Bhikkad Bhunjan v Upendra Nath*
- (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 413 (416) 149 Ind Cas 1120, *Tun Mra Lung v Ma Ah Mra* (Where plaintiff alleges that he is owner of certain piece of land but the defendant is proved or admitted to be in possession of it for a long time, and that not with the leave and license of the plaintiff, a suit for possession is governed by Art 142 and not Art 144)
- (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (642) . 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v Eknath Balakrishna*
- (1939) A I R 1939 Nag 7 (9), *Maherban Lalli Pinjara v Yusufkhan Kallu Pinjara* (Dispossession can be established by admissions or by the facts proved)
- [See also the following cases :
- (1890) 14 Bom 458 (463), *Faki Abdulla v Babaji Gungaji*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 13 (14) 89 Ind Cas 995, *Ismail v. Ibrahim*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 21 (23) 147 Ind Cas 805, *Mahomed Mahmud v. Mahomed Afag*.
- (1912) 14 Ind Cas 295 (297) (Mad), *Prahlatai Parkum v Koram*.]

Arts. 142 & 144 dispossession, avoid the operation of Article 142.⁸

Note 2

An examination of the cases arising under the two Articles shows that the decisions are generally consistent with the test referred to above. There have, however, been several cases expressing a variety of views which are not consistent with the said test. Thus, it has been held that the applicability of Article 142 or Article 144 must be decided only with reference to the pleadings in the case,⁹ that Article 142 cannot apply in cases in which the plaintiff does not *allege* in his plaint his possession and dispossession,¹⁰ that Article 144

[But see (1884) 1884 Pnn Re No. 40, *Muhammad Yar v. Ghulam*.
(Article 144 was applied—Submitted wrongly decided)]

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 230 (230) : 100 Ind Cas 51, *Gangaram v. Hasan Shah*.]

8. (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 330 (331) : 126 Ind Cas 800, *Jumman v. Nihal Chand*.

9. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1166 (1167) : 97 Ind Cas 1003, *Birendra Nath Ray v. Satish Chandra*. (Per Cuming J.—To discover which is the correct Article applicable it is sufficient to look at the allegations in the plaint.)

(1935) A I R 1935 Lah 507 (506) : 157 Ind Cas 399, *Kaur Sam v. Culab*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 46 (47) : 137 Ind Cas 678 : 7 Luck 250, *Suraj Bah v. Mahadeo Prasad*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Sind 226 (228) : 30 Sind L R 472 : 170 Ind Cas 621, *Wadero Warisano v. Bhai Pursomal*.

10. (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 70 (70) : 98 Ind Cas 878, *Mt. Nawas Bai v. Ghulam Mohi ud din*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 834 (835) : 87 Ind Cas 866, *Perna Jeeyanaraswami v. Mahomed Esoof Sahib*

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 313 (315) : 29 Oudh Cas 131 : 92 Ind Cas 825, *Sukhdeo v. Mt. Ram Dulari*

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 246 (247) : 103 Ind Cas 109, *Fakir Baksh Singh v. Prag Singh*. (A I R 1926 Oudh 313, Followed)

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 696 (597) : 127 Ind Cas 8, *Mohammad Yar v. Mohammad Yar*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 21 (24) : 147 Ind Cas 805, *Mahomed Mahmud v. Mahomed Afaq*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 593 (593) : 152 Ind Cas 906, *Kanchan Teli v. Moga Mahton*.

(1926) 97 Ind Cas 135 (137) (Pat), *Mt. Dharichna Kuar v. Keshava Prasad Singh*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 48 (49) : 8 Low Bur Rul 264 : 35 Ind Cas 432, *Aung Hla v. Ton Gyi*

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 245 (247) : 144 Ind Cas 72, *Ali Akbar v. Rakha*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 1019 (1020), *Dishambar Das v. Teli Ram*.

[See also (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 105 (106), 141 Ind Cas 231, *Raushan Ara Begum v. Mahomed Beg*

(1915) A I R 1915 Bom 92 (93) : 39 Bom 335 : 28 Ind Cas 24, *Subbappa Shankareppa v. Venkappa Golappa*

(1925) A I R 1925 Nag 370 (370) : 87 Ind Cas 1023, *Singuj v. Gambhuj*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Nag 36 (39) : 30 Nag L R 231 : 148 Ind Cas 62, *Ganpatrao v. Vithabai*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 577 (579) : 97 Ind Cas 282, *Kesho Prasad Singh v. Kartarath*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 287 (297) : 99 Ind Cas 312, *Ramanujachariar v. Sundarachariar*.

(1925) A I R 1925 All 454 (455) : 85 Ind Cas 578 : 47 All 369, *Ali Hammad v. Ghurpattar Singh*.

will apply to all cases based on *title* whether dispossession has also been alleged or not,¹¹ that Article 142 will not apply where the plaintiff was never in possession^{11a} and that where the defendant denies that the plaintiff was ever in possession, Article 142 cannot be applied.¹² It is submitted that none of these views can be accepted as correct on principle.

Arts. 142 & 144.
Notes 2-3

3. Suit must be for possession.—Articles 142 and 144 apply only to suits for possession.¹ In order that a suit may be one for possession it is necessary that there must be a prayer in the plaint

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 171 (172) . 99 Ind Cas 642, *Faqir Mohammed v. Ramzan*.

(1950) A I R 1950 Lah 608 (609) . 122 Ind Cas 81, *Daulu Mal v. Faqir Dalsh*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 1091 (1095) . 99 Ind Cas 971, *Kunhi Moidun v. Pakkar Kutty*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Nag 274 (276) . 30 Nag L R 18 . 150 Ind Cas 679, *Mt. Jijibai v. Zabu*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 382 (384) . 134 Ind Cas 599, *Mt Zahida Begam v. Mumtaz Ali Khan*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 46 (47) . 137 Ind Cas 678 . 7 Luck 250, *Sitaj Bai v. Mahadeo Prasad*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 122 (122) . 136 Ind Cas 256, *Mt Zahida Begam v. Mumtaz Ali Khan*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 133 (135) . 158 Ind Cas 908, *Mulla Ahmad v. Fazal Ahmad*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 48 (49) : 35 Ind Cas 432 . 8 Low Bur Rul 264, *Aung Hla v. Ton Gyi*.

(1909) 8 Ind Cas 15 (17) (Cal), *Guru Das Kundoo v. Basanta Kumar Roy*.

(1929) 117 Ind Cas 834 (834) (Lah), *Hua Lal v. Lalji*.)

11 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 596 (597) . 127 Ind Cas 8, *Mahomed Far v. Mahomed Far*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 576 (579) . 151 Ind Cas 490, *Harnam Singh v. Ugender Chund*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Lah 530 (532) . 166 Ind Cas 684, *Ishar Das v. Ganpat Rai* (A dispossessed by B and property afterwards transferred to C—Suit by A against C—Art. 144 governs the case.)

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 246 (247) . 105 Ind Cas 109, *Faqir Dalsh Singh v. Prag Singh*.

11a (1910) 8 Ind Cas 1095 (1095) . 33 All 224, *Ram Lakhan Rai v. Gajadhar Rai*. (A dispossessed—A's property purchased by B in court-auction—After

who entered into possession after B's death before he entered into possession—Art. 144 applied—Submitted wrong as the case is clearly one of dispossession as the heir must be deemed to have been in possession after B's death and before C's entry.)

12. (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 593 (595) . 152 Ind Cas 906, *Kanchan Teli v. Moga Mahton*.

Note 3

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 387 (395) . 164 Ind Cas 118, *Partap Bahadur v. Jagatjit Singh* (Suit not for possession—Article 142 does not apply.)

(1931) A I R 1931 Pat 436 (437) . 133 Ind Cas 453, *Bairnath Jugal Kishore v. Manindra Chandra* (Action for damages for trespass to mine and removing coal—Article 48 applies and not Article 142 or Article 144.)

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 3**

for the dispossession of some one from the property claimed.² A suit for a mere declaration of right to property, for example, is not a suit for possession within the meaning of these Articles.³ In *Francis*

- (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 672 (673) : 72 Ind Cas 1040, *Khushi Muhammad v. Hayat*. (Property contracted to be transferred — Suit for recovery of property—Suit is one for specific performance of contract governed by Art. 113.)
- (1936) 163 Ind Cas 347 (349) (Cal), *Sarafuddin Nur Ahmad v. Jibannessa Khatoon*. (Do.)
- (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 24 (25) : 135 Ind Cas 203, *Mahbub v. Munshi*. (Do.)
- (1935) A I R 1935 All 569 (570) : 156 Ind Cas 894, *Suraj Patish Nandan v. Mt. Atul Bibi*. (Do.)
- (1908) 5 All L Jour 529 (531). 1908 All W N 245 : 4 Mad L Tim 445, *Charna v. Bans Lal*. (Do.)
- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 589 (590) : 50 Ind Cas 908, *Jotirmoi Mouluk v. Khudiram Sadhu Khan*. (Art. 144 of the Limitation Act has no application to a suit for assessment of fair and equitable rent.)

2. (1897) 20 All 35 (36, 37) : 1897 All W N 193 (F B), *Francis Legge v. Rambaran Singh*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Mad 707 (710) : 54 Mad 883 : 135 Ind Cas 9, *Ramakotayya v. Sundararamayya*. (It is not appropriate to apply Article 144 to a suit which does not claim any specific immovable property but only compensation in shape of a share in the original property divided.)

(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 407 (407) : 35 Ind Cas 646, *Siddalinga Swamulu v. Ramachandracharulu*.

(1899) 2 Oudh Cas 79 (83), *Ashik Ali v. Mozhar Ali Khan*.

(1906) 9 Oudh Cas 292 (294), *Raja Mumtaz Ali Khan v. Sarju Singh*.

3. (1898) 20 All 35 (36, 37) : 1897 All W N 193 (F B), *Francis Legge v. Rambaran Singh*. (Suit for declaration of right and for actual possession.)

(1930) A I R 1930 Bom 61 (63) : 54 Bom 4 : 124 Ind Cas 773, *Erishnafee v. Annafee*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 751 (753, 754) : 31 Ind Cas 242, *Drajendra Kishore v. Bharat Chandra*.

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (643) : 12 Bom L R 956 (971) : 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Cal 842 (843) : 139 Ind Cas 759, *Nagendra Kishore v. Brojendra Kishore*.

(1928) 111 Ind Cas 376 (377) (Oudh), *Sant Baksh v. Ram Nath*. (When a suit is principally a declaratory suit based on title, it does not fall under Article 142 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act though the

(1899) 1899 Pun Re No 8, *Naram Singh v. Ishar Singh*. (When plaintiff does not himself seek possession, and the object of the suit is to place a third party in possession, it is only a suit for a declaration and not a suit for possession within the meaning of Article 142 or Article 144, Sch. II, Limitation Act (XV of 1877).)

(1904) 1 Cal L Jour 73 (78, 79), *Mohabbat Shah v. Abdul Hamid Khan*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 30 (32) : 97 Ind Cas 635, *Abdul Gafur v. Abdul Jabbar*.

(1904) 1 Cal L Jour 73 (78, 79), *Mohabbat Shah v. Abdul Hamid Khan*.

(1904) 1 Cal L Jour 73 (78, 79), *Mohabbat Shah v. Abdul Hamid Khan*.

(1904) 1 Cal L Jour 73 (78, 79), *Mohabbat Shah v. Abdul Hamid Khan*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 631 (635) : 55 Ind Cas 247, *Radha Kanta Lal v. Bhagwat Prasad*.]

Legge v. Rambaran Singh,⁴ where the plaintiff instituted a suit for the declaration of right to and of actual possession in immovable property, their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows:

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 3

"The respondents seek on the other hand, to bring the suit, though expressly described as a suit for a declaration of right to, and of possession in, immovable property, under Article 144 which provides for suits for possession of immovable property or of any interest therein. It seems to us that there is the widest possible difference between a suit for a declaration such as is asked for in this suit and a suit for actual possession of immovable property. *In a suit to which Article 144 would apply, there must be a prayer express or implied, for the dispossession of some one from the property or from the interest in it which the suit claims.* In the present suit the plaintiffs have most distinctly asserted that they are, and have all along been, in possession of the property. There is no one to be dispossessed from it or from any interest in it."

Suits for possession must, under these Articles, be taken to mean suits in which possession is asked for as the *primary relief*. Where the primary relief asked for is something other than possession, and possession is asked as a consequence of the primary relief being granted, the Article governing the suit would be that appropriate to the primary relief and not Article 142 or Article 144. Thus, a suit for pre-emption is primarily to *set aside a competing right* with a consequential prayer for possession, and is therefore not governed by Article 144.⁵ On the same principle a suit for the redemption of a usufructuary mortgage involving a consequential prayer for possession is not governed by Article 144 but by Article 148.⁶ In *Janki Kunwar v. Ajit Singh*,⁷ A had conveyed lands to B by a deed of sale. He subsequently filed a suit against B to have the deed of sale cancelled on the ground of fraud and undue influence, and, as a consequence, to have the property restored to him. It was contended that the suit was governed by the twelve years' rule of limitation. Their Lordships of the Privy Council negatived this contention in the following words:

"It was not a suit for possession of immovable property in the sense in which the limitation of twelve years is applicable. The immovable property could not have been recovered until the deed of sale had been set aside, and it was necessary to bring a suit to set aside the deed upon payment of what had been advanced Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that

4. (1897) 20 All 35 (36, 37) 1897 All W N 193 (F B).

5. (1902) 24 All 17 (26) 28 Ind App 248 5 Cal W N 688 . 8 Sar 133 . 3 Bom L R 707 (P C), *Datul Begam v. Mansur Ali Khan*.

6. (1889) 14 All 1 (3) . 11 All 423 : 1891 All W N 211 (F B), *Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali*.

7. (1887) 15 Cal 58 (65) 14 Ind App 148 5 Sar 92 . 12 Ind Jur 9 : R & J 99 (P C).

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 3

the suit falls within Article 91 of the Act of 1877, and is therefore barred."

See also the undermentioned cases to a similar effect.⁸

Where the primary relief asked for is possession, the suit will be regarded as one for possession within the meaning of these Articles, even though some other prayer which is ancillary to the prayer for possession, or which the plaintiff is not bound to ask, is also asked for in the plaint. Thus, a suit for possession and mesne profits and for correction of an entry in the Record of Rights,⁹ or a suit for possession with an ancillary prayer for the removal of trees planted on the lands¹⁰ is a suit for possession governed by the twelve years' rule of limitation. Similarly, a suit for possession and for cancellation of a

8. (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 313 (317) : 118 Ind Cas 481, *Ramaswami v. Govindammal*.
 (1937) A I R 1937 Cal 500 (504) : 173 Ind Cas 755, *Jafar Ali v. Nasimannessa Biba*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 610 (611) : 34 Ind Cas 188, *Krishna Dhona v. Bhagaban Chandra* (Sale by guardian being only voidable, the ward cannot get possession without getting sale set aside. Suit will be governed by Article 44 and not by Article 144.)
 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 1 (2) : 154 Ind Cas 616, *Anhamma v. Kameshwaramma*.
 (1889) 11 All 456 (460) : 1889 All W N 109, *Hasan v. Nazo*. (A plaintiff cannot by calling a suit one for possession get behind a document which stands in his way and obtain possession without setting aside the document.)

Article 144 :

Surpanarayana v. Narayanaswamy (Ward's suit for possession of property alienated by guardian during minority is governed by Article 44 and not by Article 144.)

- (1932) A I R 1932 All 108 (109) : 53 All 733 : 136 Ind Cas 71, *Ram Charitter Misir v. Suraj Teli*. (A suit by a minor after attaining majority against a certified guardian to set aside a fraudulent transfer is

(A
any
of

Section 1 of Act 14 of 1859 and not within Cl. 12¹)

- (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 423 (424) : 52 Ind Cas 361, *Tafazul Khan v. Mahomed Bakshi Khan*.

- (1895) 12 Cal 69 (74 to 75), *Raghubar Dyal Sahu v. Bhikya Lal Misser*.
 9. (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 423 (424) : 52 Ind Cas 361, *Tafazul Khan v. Mahomed Bakshi Khan*.
 [See also (1864) 1864 Sath W R (Gap) 79 (80), *John Grey v. Anundo Mohun Meistro*]
 10. (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 69 (90) : 99 Ind Cas 199, *Suchit v. Mahomed Habib Ullah*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 47 (48) : 66 Ind Cas 799, *Ghafur Khan v. Prag Narayan*.

document in a case in which the plaintiff is not bound to ask for such cancellation, would be governed by the limitation applicable to a suit for possession.¹¹ See also the undermentioned cases¹²

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 3

11. (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 748 (749) 132 Ind Cas 156, *Krishnadhan Laha v. Brojendra Nath*. (Void transfer of minor's property—Suit by minor for possession after setting aside transfer — Suit is governed by twelve years' rule)
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 817 (848) (Lab), *Rupa Shah v. Irsad Ali*. (Do)
- (1929) A I R 1929 All 879 (881) 122 Ind Cas 680 52 All 110, *Dip Chand v. Munni Lal* (Do)
- (1883) 5 All 490 (491) 1883 All W N 64, *Ramansar Pandey v. Raghubar Jati*. (Do)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 386 (387) 63 Ind Cas 731, *Sunder v. Shuman*. (Do.)
- (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 151 (151) 107 Ind Cas 516, *Waman v. Vishnu*.
- (1884) 6 All 260 (262) : 1884 All W N 73, *Ikram Singh v. Intizam Ali*.
- (1902) 30 Cal 133 (139), *Banku Behari v. Krishno Gobindo*.
- (1893) 1893 Pun Re No 96, *Wanra v. Fattu*.
- (1952) 5 All 76 (79) : 1952 All W N 180, *Hazari Lall v. Jadaun Singh*. (Where, in a suit for possession, canceling or setting aside an instrument is purely incidental in granting the relief of possession, the suit in its essence and substance is one for the recovery of immovable property and Art 144 and not Art 91 applies)
- (1878) 2 Cal L R 10 (12), *Trilochun Chattapadhyaya v. Nobokishore Ghutuck*. (A suit by an heir for possession of immovable property in the hands of a person under an alleged sale deed by the deceased and to set aside the deed, is governed by Art 144 and not by Art 91)
- (1916) A I R 1916 All 839 (840) 32 I. C 930, *Mt Bageshra v. Sheo Nath*.
- (1905) 8 Oudh Cas 191 (192), *Duarka v. Salik*.
- (1909) 1909 Pun W R No 5, *Amir Shah v. Haidar Shah*.
12. (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 996 (998) 167 Ind Cas 916, *Chhaju Mal v. Multan Singh*. (Alienation by manager — Suit by minor co-parceners on attaining majority for possession of property is governed by Art. 144 and not by Art 44 or Art. 91)
- (1934) A I R 1934 Lab 601 (602) 152 Ind Cas 633, *Kaka v. Fakir Chand*. (Do)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 132 (131) 33 Ind Cas 441, *Anandappa v. Telappa*. (Do)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Lah 200 (202) 29 Ind Cas 190, *Radhu Ram v. Mohan Singh*
- (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 247 (248) 33 Ind Cas 913 1916 Pun Re No 83, *Sajjad Ali v. Muhammad Zulfikar Ali*
- (1894) 1894 Pun Re No 56, *Bhai Asa Ram v. Attar Singh*
- (1898) 1898 All W N 256 (257), *Sheo Sahai v. Muhammad Askari*.
- (1911) 12 Ind Cas 140 (145) (Lab), *Muhammad Umar Ali v. Aman Ali*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 1216 (1253 1254) 114 Ind Cas 626, *Secretary of State v. Abdul Rahim* (Dispossession by public servant — Suit for possession—Order of public servant not necessary to be set aside — Art 14 does not apply but Art 144 governs the suit)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 607 (607) 78 Ind Cas 564, *Kanna Panikkar v. Nanchan*
- (1911) 11 Ind Cas 76 (77) 1912 Pun Re No 15, *Saif-ud-din v. Hansraj*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 47 (48) 131 Ind Cas 119, *Abdul Rahman v. Mt. Chhajji* (Suit for ejectment of non-proprietor in the Punjab from his site is governed by Art 144 and not by Art 120)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 910 (911) 94 Ind Cas 342, *Keshab Lal v. Bhola-nath* (A suit which is in essence one for declaration of title and recovery of possession is not governed by Art 148 but by Art 144)
- (1901) 3 Bom L R 682 (684), *Baiwantrao v. Ramkrishna*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 369 (371) 70 Ind Cas 317, *Linga Munisami Reddi v. Govindasami Naicken* (Suits by some coparceners for possession of property sold by other coparceners are governed by Art 144 and not by Art. 127.)

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 3**

It is not always the form of the relief claimed that will determine the real character of the suit.¹³ The question in each case is what in substance the plaintiff claims. Where A claimed to be a trustee of a *mutt* and as such entitled to possession and prayed that he might be enabled to collect the rents and profits from the hands of a Receiver appointed by the Court, it was held that the suit was one for possession within the meaning of these Articles.¹⁴ A suit for a declaration that a pathway was a public pathway and for an injunction to remove an obstruction thereto was regarded as a suit for possession within the meaning of Article 144.¹⁵ A suit for removal of beams constructed by the defendants in such a manner as to overhang the plaintiff's land, was regarded as a suit for possession governed by the twelve years' period of limitation.¹⁶ See also Note 67 *infra* and the under-mentioned cases.¹⁷

(1895) 1895 Pun Re No. 52, *Hafiz Karim Balsh v. Mt. Begam Jan.*

(1893) 16 Mad 311 (316). 3 Mad L Jour 144, *Sundaram v. Seethammal.* (Substantial relief claimed recovery of land and not cancellation of the deed obtained by fraud — Article applicable is Art. 144 and not Art. 91.)

(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 254 (255) : 33 Ind Cas 436, *Velligonda Reddy v. Andra Narayya.* (Art. 144 and not Art. 44 applies in the case of transfer of minor's property by authorised or *de facto* guardian which is void *ab initio*.)

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 1038 (1039) : 40 Ind Cas 418, *Thirupathi Raju v. Venkata Raju.*

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 698 (700) : 24 Ind Cas 246, *Kunhanna Shetty v. Timmaju.* (Suit by *aliyasanihana* family to recover properties alienated by *efaman*, not being a suit to set aside an instrument, is governed by Art. 144 and not by Art. 91.)

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 709 (712) : 153 Ind Cas 121, *Chennamma v. Mangamma.*

(1890) 1890 All W N 115 (116), *Ajuba Begam v. Nasir Ahmad.* (Alienation by one heir not binding on another.—Suit by latter against absence for possession not governed by Art. 91, but by the 12 years' rule.)

(1908) 35 Cal 551 (560) : 35 Ind App 98 : 10 Bom L R 590 : 5 All L Jour 290 : 12 Cal W N 562 : 7 Cal L Jour 529 : 14 Bur L R 109 : 18 Mad L Jour 277 : 4 Mad L Tim 12 : 4 Low Bar Rul 266 (P C), *Petherperumal Chetty v. Munandy Serian.*

(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 538 (539) : 59 Ind Cas 380, *Ram Brich Singh v. Mt. Sonjhari Koer.*

(1907) 11 Oudh Cas 346 (349), *Balbhaddar Singh v. Jawahir Singh.*

13. (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 313 (317) : 118 Ind Cas 481, *Ramaswami v. Govindammal.*

14. (1919) A I R 1919 P O 62 (68) : 43 Mad 253 : 46 Ind App 204 : 53 Ind Cas 238 (P C), *Arunachalam v. Venkatachalapathi.*

15. (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 405 (406) : 69 Ind Cas 910, *Harish Chandra v. Pran Nath.*

16. (1879) 1879 Bom P J 27, *Nahatchand v. Magan.*

17. (1934) A I R 1931 Bom 140 (143) : 151 Ind Cas 156, *Gorindlal Maneklal v. Manekchowk Spinning and Weaving Mills Co.* (A suit for the recovery of possession of land on declaration of plaintiff's right thereto on the basis of an award cannot be regarded as a suit for the specific

A suit for possession does not invariably mean a suit for actual physical possession. It only means a suit for such possession as the property is capable of. In a suit for the recovery of certain endowed properties wrongfully alienated by one of the *vahivatdars*, which were in the possession of occupancy tenants, relief by way of actual possession was out of the question and the only relief that could be claimed was the right to collect the rents. Where in such a case the plaintiffs claimed a declaration that they were entitled to collect the rents and an injunction restraining the defendants from collecting them, it was held that the suit must be regarded as one for possession.¹³

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 3-4

4. Suit on possessory title. — It is an important principle that possession by itself is a substantive right recognized by law and has legal incidents and advantages attached to it apart from the true owner's title.¹ It is a heritable and transferable right² and a person in possession can sue for a *declaration* of his right thereto or for an *injunction* as against any person threatening to infringe it.³ It is *prima facie* evidence of title against all persons except the true

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 419 (452), *Rajagopala Naidu v. Ramasubramanaya Ayyar* (Suit for possession of office which is not hereditary — Article 120 applies)

(1900) 23 Mad 593 (536) : 10 Mad L Jour 208, *Sornattali Ammal v. Mutha-ayya Sastrigal*. (Plaintiff declared entitled to certain land under award — Suit to recover by plaintiff is governed by Article 144, and not Article 113.)

(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 400(401) : 105 Ind Cas 286, *Narayan v. Laxman Rao*. (Suit by an owner for possession of his wall which has been deliberately encroached upon and built upon by the defendants is essentially one for possession, and the incidental fact that under the law applicable to such a case in India it is usual to give to the defendants an opportunity of removing the building, they have constructed on the land encroached upon, in no way makes the suit one for injunction)

18. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 26 (29) 141 Ind Cas 103, *Narayan Batwant v. Datatraya Ramchandra*.

Note 4

1. (1899) 23 Mad 179 (182), *Mustapha v. Santha*. (Citing Pollock and Wright on possession)

2. (1904) 27 All 169 (171) : 1 All L Jour 625 : 1904 All W N 222, *Pahlwan Singh v. Ram Bharose*.

(1907) 29 All 52 (60) : 3 All L Jour 775 : 1906 All W N 264, *Shri Gopal v. Ayesha* (Heritable right — But the heirs must have entered into possession and retained possession at the time of trespass by defendant.)

(1919) A I R 1919 All 43 (44) : 54 Ind Cas 308, *Bazmir Khan v. Rustam Khan* (Heritable)

(1879) 20 Suth W R 114 (115) : 11 Beng L R 237, *Brandabun Chunder Roy v. Tarachand Bindopadhyay*

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 220 (220) : 117 Ind Cas 904, *Mt Mansa Devi v. Sansara* (Heritable)

(1908) 11 Oudh Cas 337 (339, 340), *Wazir-un-nisa Begum v. Wazir Ali* (Do)

(1907) 1907 App Cas 73 (79) : 76 L J P O 19 : 95 L T 690 : 23 T L R 232, *Perry v. Glissold*

(1865) L R 1 Q B 1 (6) : 35 L J Q B 17 : 11 Jnr (N S) 925 : 13 L T 254 : 14 W R 26, *Asher v. Whitlock*

(1877) 6 Ch D 696 (704, 705) : 46 L J Ch 572 : 25 W R 768, *Ex parte Winder*.

3 (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 29 (30) : 37 Mad 298 : 25 Ind Cas 894, *Ayyappapara v. Secretary of State*.

Arts. 142 & 144 owner.* The following passage from Salmond on Jurisprudence may
Note 4 be usefully referred to in this connection :

"The possessor of a thing may be presumed to be the owner of it and may put all other claimants to proof of their title. . . . Even in respect of property already owned, the wrongful possession of it is a good title for the wrongdoer as against all the world except the true owner. Possession is of such efficacy also that a possessor may, in many cases, confer a good title on another even though he has none himself. . . . A wrongful

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- (1934) A I R 1934 Mad 274 (274) : 148 Ind Cas 631, *Ramalinga v. Anthonimuthu*. (Even though plaintiff himself was a trespasser.)
- (1910) 6 Ind Cas 266 (266) 34 Mad 173, *Kondappa Rajan v. Suryanarayana*. (Enjoyment of a water course.)
- (1891) 1891 Bom P J 123, *Janu v. Mahadu*.
[See also (1896) 20 Bom 798 (801), *Gangaram v. Secretary of State*.]
4. (1893) 20 Ind App 99 (106) 20 Cal 834 6 Bar 305 • 17 Ind Jur 321 (P C), *Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghonse*.
- (1900) 25 Bom 287 (303) : 2 Bom L R 1111, *Hanmantrav v. Secretary of State*.
- (1906) 8 Bom L R 96 (98), *Hari v. Dhondi*. (Prior legal possession is evidence in itself of ownership.)
- (1881) 7 Cal 691 (693) : 9 Cal L R 161, *Mohabeer Pershad Singh v. Mohabeer Singh*.
- (1882) 9 Cal 130 (131) : 11 Cal L R 233 • 5 Shome L R 84, *Ertaza Hossein v. Bany Mistry*. (Prior possession is good title against dispossession.)
- (1899) 5 Cal W N 234 (239), *Fazlar Rahman Chowdhry v. Raj Chunder Sen*. (Previous possession and decree in a previous suit negating the defendant's title is sufficient proof of plaintiff's title against defendant.)
- (1867) 8 Suth W R 336 (387), *Khajah Enaetulla Choudhry v. Kishen Soonder Sarma*.
- (1869) 12 Suth W R 472 (473), *Gour Paroy v. Wooma Sunduree Debia*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 797 (798) : 35 Ind Cas 885, *Ram Kristo v. Narendra Kishore*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 199 (199) : 50 Cal 23 : 74 Ind Cas 283, *Naba Kishore v. Pora Beua*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 113 (121) : 123 Ind Cas 250 : 57 Cal 170, *Currimbhoy and Co. v. L. A. Creel*.
- (1905) 28 Mad 69 (71), *Nawab Ajajuddin Ali Khan v. Secretary of State*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 363 (364) • 87 Ind Cas 1000, *Deorao v. Vithal*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Nag 318 (319) • 119 Ind Cas 701, *Kasturchand Bhikamchand v. Almaram*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 202 (201) : 142 Ind Cas 493 : 29 Nag L R 187, *Mt. Manju v. Gulab Rao*. (Possession can however ripen into prescriptive title after twelve years.)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 274 (276) : 150 Ind Cas 679 : 30 Nag L R 18, *Mt. Jijima v. Zabu*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 181 (190) : 119 Ind Cas 872, *Khushwagt v. Jagannath Prasad*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 172 (173) • 38 Ind Cas 797 : 2 Pat L Jour 61, *Hara-dhan Mandal v. Iscar Das*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 814 (815) 57 Ind Cas 320, *Ajundhya Singh v. Anudh Bihari Das*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Upp Bur 21 (22) • 50 Ind Cas 575 : 3 Upp Bur Rul 125, *Nga Tha Zan v. Sunder Singh*.
- (1910) 6 Ind Cas 806 (808) (Cal), *Shama Charan Roy v. Surja Kanta*. (Pointing correctness of previous cases such as 26 Cal 279.)
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 593 (593) (Mad), *Venkatasubbiah v. Secretary of State*. (Rule holds good even against the Secretary of State.)

possessor has the rights of an owner with respect to all persons except *earlier possessors* and except the true owner himself..⁵ Arts. 142 & 144
Note 4

"Even a wrongdoer who is deprived of his possession can recover it from any person whatever simply on the ground of his possession. Even the true owner who retakes his own, may be forced to restore it to the wrongdoer, and will not be permitted to set up his own superior title to it. He must first give up possession and then proceed in due course of law for the recovery of the thing on the ground of ownership. *The intention of the law is that every possessor shall be entitled to retain and recover his possession until deprived of it by a judgment according to law.*"⁶

A person who was in juridical possession but who was dispossessed by another person can, therefore, recover back the possession from such person, on the sole ground of his prior possession, except as against the true owner.⁷ The presumption of ownership arising from the present possession of the defendant will be met by the stronger

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 635 (636) 86 Ind Cas 835, *Chaitra Nath v. Babar Ali* (Long possession without payment of rent may in certain circumstances justify the inference of rent-free title)

[See also (1936) A I R 1936 Bom 201 (208, 209, 212) 103 Ind Cas 632, *Govindbhai v. Dahyabhai*.

(1870) 4 Beng L R App 21 (23), *Tufani Singh v. Mt. Durgaban*.

(1907) 1907 App Cas 73 (79) 76 L J P C 19 95 L T 800; 23 T L R 232, *Perry v. Chissold*.]

5. Salmond on Jurisprudence, 8th Edition, page 293.

6. Salmond on Jurisprudence, 8th Edition, pages 324, 325.

7. (1903) 5 Bom L R 225 (227), *Rajaram Tuljaram v. Nanchand Tuljaram*. (The possession of plaintiff must be juridical possession—Joint possession with defendant is of no avail)

(1867) 1897 All W N 55 (56), *Muhammad Yusuf v. Sukh Nath*.

(1914) A I R 1914 All 54 (55) 36 All 325 23 Ind Cas 532, *M. A. Gaffoor Khan v. Secretary of State* (Vendee from vendor without title—Vendee can sue to eject trespasser.)

(1884) 8 Bom 371 (375), *Krishnarav Yeshwant v. F. Apaji Ghoti Kar*.

(1901) 3 Bom L R 246 (248), *Bas Fatan v. Emad*.

(1908) 10 Bom L R 571 (573), *Bhagwan Singh Daulat Singh v. Secretary of State*

(1889) 1889 Bom P J 303, *Sakatchand Jetha v. Sundarlal Jetha*, (Section 9, Specific Relief Act, is no bar to such a suit.)

(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 178 (179) 77 Ind Cas 307, *Atmaram Bhula v. Balaji Raghunath* (Plaintiff in possession for over twelve years)

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 931 (932) 100 Ind Cas 278, *Sm Gouribala Dels v. Probhas Chandra*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 113 (124) 57 Cal 170 123 Ind Cas 250, *Currimbhoy and Co v. L. A. Creel*.

(1867) 8 Suth W R 386 (387), *Khajah Emaetoolah Chowdhry v. Kishen Sunder Sarma* (Such a suit is not barred by Section 9, Specific Relief Act)

(1902) 1902 Pun Re No 78 1902 Pun L R No 137, *Abdul Hamid v. Sarbuland Khan*

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 11 (14) 97 Ind Cas 369, *Labh Singh v. Ahmad Shah*.

(1862) 1 Mad H C R 85 (89), *Doe. d Kullammal v. Kuppu Pillai*

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 345 (348) 25 Ind Cas 109, *Ganapathy Mudali v. Venkatalakshmi Narasayya*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 642 (643) 62 Ind Cas 396, *Pythunga Padayachi v. Pontusuami Padayachi*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 4**

presumption of ownership arising in favour of the plaintiff from prior possession.⁸ In *Doe D. Harding v. Cooke*,⁹ Park, J., observed as follows :

"We alter no rule of law by deciding in favour of the lessor of the plaintiff. He has shown a presumptive title, arising out of twenty-three years' possession. The defendant sets up a later possession of ten years. There is presumption against presumption, which throws the defendant upon establishing, if he can, a title of a higher description."

(1932) A I R 1932 Mad 32 (33) : 135 Ind Cas 910, *Narayanappa v. Hanumanthappa*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Nag 55 (56, 57) : 10 Nag L R 188 : 27 Ind Cas 506, *Sambhasdeo v. Mahadeo*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Nag 32 (32) : 78 Ind Cas 722, *Maroti v. Sitaram*.

: Ali Khan.
v. Pragi.

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 546 (547) : 39 Ind Cas 458 : 2 Pat L Jour 280, *Sahodra Kuer v. Gobardhan Tiwari*, (Section 9, Specific Relief Act, is no bar.)

(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 814 (815) : 57 Ind Cas 320, *Ajodhya Singh v. Awadh Bihari Das*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 601 (602) : 119 Ind Cas 906 : 8 Pat 351, *Ranjit Singh v. Jhori Singh*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Pat 416 (422) : 171 Ind Cas 317, *Shiv Saran Rai v. Sukhdeo Rai*.

(1905) 3 Low Bur Rul 27 (28), *Watha v. Pe Hlaw*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Rang 203 (204) : 5 Rang 154 : 102 Ind Cas 696, *Ma Pwa Zon v. Ma Pan I*.

(1900) 2 Ind Cas 202 (203) (Cal), *Denis Madhab Christian v. Raj Chandra Pal*, (Tenant dispossessed by trespasser — Suit by tenant for possession.)

(1900) 3 Ind Cas 770 (771) : 33 Bom 490, *Jivanji Jamshetji v. Burjorji Naserwanji*.

(1900) 4 Ind Cas 216 (247) (Bom), *Bala Kishaba v. Abai Amrita Yaghnade*.

(1911) 9 Ind Cas 595 (595) (Mad), *Gowinda Padayachi v. Doraisami Padayachi*.

(1911) 11 Ind Cas 91 (95) (Ondh), *Hub Lal v. Jageshwar*.

(1911) 11 Ind Cas 537 (539) (Ondh), *Ramean Khan v. Muhammad Yakub Khan*.

(1912) 15 Ind Cas 613 (614) (Mad), *Kalyanam Dasarayya v. Alalam Malappa*.

(1926) 97 Ind Cas 369 (372) (Lah), *Labb Singh v. Ahmad Shah*.

[See also (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 507 (508) : 39 Ind Cas 26, *Chandi Misser v. Narasingroy*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 709 (710) : 78 Ind Cas 228, *Alal Akir v. Dasgnath Das*.

(1914) 12 Ind Cas 553 (593) (Mad), *Venkatachala Aiyangar v. Chinnu Goundan* (No title in plaintiff or defendant — Plaintiff had ceased to be in possession before defendant occupied — Plaintiff cannot claim benefit of possessory title)

(1920) 67 Ind Cas 918 (919) (Lah), *Sidhu v. Dhanna*, (Suit for damages for cutting of trees claimed by plaintiff as in his possession)

(1907) 107 App Cas 73 (79) : 76 L J P C 19 : 95 L T 800 : 23 T L R 272, *Ferry v. Gisbold*.]

6. (1892) 15 Mad 315 (321) : 2 Mad L Jour 153, *Secretary of State v. Davolli Hay*, (Following (1831) 7 Bing 316, *Doe. d. Harding v. Cooke*.)

9. (1931) 33 R R 503 (504, 505) : 7 Bing 316 : 5 Moore & Payne 181 : 9 L J Q P 118.

The Legislature has, under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, provided that even as against the *true owner* the person dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law can recover possession in a suit brought for the purpose. Such a suit is, however, to be brought within six months of the date of dispossession under Art. 3 of this Act.¹⁰

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 4

Suits for possession based on prior possession and dispossession are generally referred to as suits based on *possessory title*, as distinguished from suits based on *proprietary title*.¹¹ If the plaintiff proves prior possession and dispossession within six months of the suit, and such dispossession is otherwise than in due course of law, he will be entitled to recover possession *notwithstanding* the defendant may be the true owner. In other words, the plaintiff will succeed irrespective of the question of proprietary title.¹² In other cases the suit would be governed by Article 142 and the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed as against all persons *except the true owner*. It would be therefore for the defendant in such cases to show that he has got a better title to the property than the plaintiff.¹³

10 See Notes to Article 3 *ante*.

11 Salmond on Jurisprudence, 8th Edition, page 325

(1914) A I R 1914 All 51 (55). 36 All 51 : 22 Ind Cas 622, *Umrao Singh v. Ramji Das*.

12. (1903) 5 Bom L R 264 (266, 267), *Ali v. Pachubibi*.

(1902) 1902 Pun Re No. 76 : 1902 Pun L R No. 187, *Abdul Hamid v. Sarbuland Khan*

(1903) 26 Mad 514 (516, 517) 13 Mad L Jour 146, *Narayana Rao v. Dharmachar* (But a decree in such a suit will not be *res judicata* on the question of title)

(1894) 4 Mad L Jour 25 (Jour) critical note on (1893) 20 Cal 834 (P C), *Imam Ali v. Mahomed Ghouse*.

13. (1890) 12 All 46 (50) 1888 All W N 33, *Lachho v. Har Sahai*.

(1900) 25 Bom 287 (291) 2 Bom L R 1111, *Hanmantrav v. Secretary of State*. (Per Jenkins C. J., Ranade J. dissenting)

(1903) 5 Bom L R 264 (266), *Ali v. Pachubibi*. (Defendant cannot succeed if he merely sets up title in a third person from whom he does not derive his right.)

(1936) A I R 1936 Bom 201 (209) 163 Ind Cas 632, *Gorindbhai Lallubhai v. Dahyabhai Nathabhai* (Do)

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 6 (17) 11 Pat 701 141 Ind Cas 157, *Chaturbhuj Singh v. Saradacharan Guha*. (Do)

(1882) 11 Cal L R 183 (184), *Brojo Sunder Gossami v. Kailash Chunder Kur* (In a suit for possession, it was found that the plaintiff had been some eleven years in possession until he was wrongfully ousted by the defendant. Held, that the defendant was bound to prove his title and that he could not be allowed to take advantage of his own wrongful act in order to shift the burden of proof upon his opponent)

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 1165 (1186) 108 Ind Cas 194, *Maruthappan Asari v. Marimuthu Asari*

(1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 374 (376) 126 Ind Cas 675, *Sohan Lal v. Mahomed Hussain* (It is no doubt true that a plaintiff can be given a decree for possession on the basis of his possessory title even in cases other than

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 4**

There have been, however, a number of cases in which it has been held that, apart from Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, a suit will not lie at all on a possessory title.¹⁴ It is submitted that the latter view is opposed to the general trend of opinion and cannot be accepted as correct on principle. In *Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghouse*,¹⁵ where the plaintiff sued for a declaration of title on the ground of his prior possession, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

"The possession of the plaintiff was sufficient evidence of title as owner against the defendant. By Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (Act I of 1877), if the plaintiff had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, he could by a suit instituted within six months from the date of the dispossession, have recovered possession notwithstanding any other title that might be set up in such suit. If he could thus recover possession from a person who might be able to prove a title, it is certainly right and just that he should be able, against a person who has no title and is a mere wrongdoer, to obtain a declaration of title as owner, and an injunction to restrain the wrongdoer from interfering with his possession."

- (1906) 1906 App Cas 569 (575) : 75 L J P C 109 : 95 L T 568, *Emmerson v. Maddison*. (Defendant who takes possession against plaintiff proves title—Plaintiff cannot succeed on the ground of prior possession.)
14. (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 153 (153) : 42 Bom 357 : 45 Ind Cas 550, *Bapuji Narayan v. Bhagwant Balwant*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 122 (122) : 136 Ind Cas 256, *Zahida Begam v. Muntas Ali Khan*.
- (1853) 9 Cal 89 (41) : 11 Cal L R 312, *Debuchurn Baido v. Issur Chunder Manjee*.
- (1889) 17 Cal 256 (260), *Purmeshur Chowdhry v. Brifo Lal Chowdhry*.
- (1906) 8 Cal L Jour 26 (8. N.).
- (1899) 8 Cal W N 159 (160), *Shama Churn Roy v. Abdul Kabeer*.
- (1868) 9 Suth W R 602 (605), *Kalce Chunder Sein v. Addoo Sheikh*. (The rule that "simple possession is conclusive evidence as against a wrongdoer" is not applicable when title is necessary to complete the plaintiff's title to sue.)
- (1869) 11 Suth W R 447 (447) : 3 Beng L R App 44, *Lalhi Kamar v. Ram Dutt Chowdhry*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 469 (478) : 86 Ind Cas 690, *Ramchandra Sul v. Ramanmani Dasi*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 532 (533) : 42 Ind Cas 881, *Gnanendra Nath v. Mohendra Mohini Dehya*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 850 (853) : 82 Ind Cas 386, *Gnanendranath Mustaphi v. Dukhiram Santra*. (Obiter.)
- (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 1225 (1226) : 89 Ind Cas 180, *Year Mamud Mondal v. Paomecha Sarkar*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 561 (562) : 61 Cal 419 : 150 Ind Cas 723, *Kiran Chandra v. Presunno Kumar*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 625 (666) : 4 Pat 510 : 87 Ind Cas 519, *Hitendra Singh v. Bameshwar Singh*. (Foster, J., contra.)
- (1910) 17 Cal 256 (260), *Purmeshur Chowdhry v. Brifo Lal Chowdhry*. 575, tho 15

¹⁵ (1921) 20 Ind App 99 (106, 107). 20 Cal 831. 27 Ind Jur 321 : 6 Ear 205 (PC).

5. **Suit on proprietary title.** — It would follow from what has been stated in Note 2 *ante*, that a suit for immovable property would not be governed by Article 144 unless either the plaintiff's title came into existence while the defendant was in lawful possession, or the defendant's entry on the land was, at the date of the entry, consistent with the title of the plaintiff. It is clear, therefore, that the suit for possession of immovable property contemplated by Article 144 is one by a person *entitled to possession as owner* against a person in possession *without title*.¹ In *Chhatra Kumari Devi v. Mohan Bikram Shah*,² their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that Article 144 "is applicable only to a possessory suit by the owner of the property claimed against a person holding adversely to him without title." It was consequently held that a suit by a person who is not the owner, as for example, a person entitled to sue for the breach of a contract to convey properties or a beneficiary under a trust, is not governed by Article 144.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 5

There is a difference of opinion as to whether Article 142 is confined to suits for possession on the ground of possessory title, or whether it is applicable to all cases of dispossession, whether the plaintiff is suing merely on his possessory title or on his proprietary title also. The general trend of opinion is that the Article will apply to all cases of alleged dispossession, whether the plaintiff sues on his proprietary or on his possessory title.³ The contrary view that the

Note 5

1. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 196 (199) : 58 Ind App 279 : 10 Pat 851 : 133 Ind Cas 705 (P C), *Chhatra Kumari Devi v. Mohan Bikram Shah*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 335 (347) : 177 Ind Cas 6 (F B), *Asaram v. Ludhethwar*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 147 (147) : 161 Ind Cas 585, *Mahomed Yusuf v. Mohamad Waheed*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Low Bur 241 (243) : 8 Low Bur Rul 64 : 24 Ind Cas 911, *Secretary of State v. Ma Dae*.
[See also (1912) 15 Ind Cas 285 (286) : 1912 Pun Re No. 124, *Achar Singh v. Badhau Singh*.]
2. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 196 (199) : 58 Ind App 279 : 10 Pat 851 : 133 Ind Cas 705 (P C).
3. (1888) 16 Ind App 23 (24, 25, 26) : 16 Cal 473 : 5 Sar 321 (P C), *Mohima Chunder Moroomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogi*. (Suit was based on title and dispossession—Art. 142 was applied)
- (1934) A I R 1934 All 362 (365, 367) : 56 All 755 : 152 Ind Cas 12, *Kunja v. Niyaz Husain*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 All 993 (995) : 57 All 278 : 152 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Bindhya-chal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 147 (147) : 161 Ind Cas 585, *Mahomed Yusuf v. Mohamad Waheed*. (Facts show that Art 142 was applied to the case)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 181 (181, 182) : 91 Ind Cas 451, *Kuppaswami Mudaliar v. Chokalinga Mudaliar*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 507 (509) : 157 Ind Cas 399, *Kaur Sain v. Gulab*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1166 (1167) : 97 Ind Cas 1003, *Brendra Nath Roy v. Satis Chandra Jourdar*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 370 (371) : 87 Ind Cas 1023, *Singuji v. Gambhirji*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 92 (93) : 39 Bom 335 : 28 Ind Cas 24, *Subbappa Shanikareppa v. Venkappa Golappa*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 5-6

Article is confined to suits on possessory title and cannot apply to suits based on proprietary title, even though it is a case of dispossession,⁴ is, it is submitted, not correct. There does not seem to be anything in the Article itself limiting its applicability to suits on possessory title only. In *Nawab Muhammad Amanullah Khan v. Badan Singh*,⁵ the plaintiffs were proprietors of certain lands and had been dispossessed by the defendants. They thereupon sued the defendants for possession. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that Art. 142 applied to the case. Their Lordships observed:

"Whether any proprietary right may have existed is not the question. It is whether there has been a dispossession or a discontinuance, which there clearly was. No doubt the proprietary right would continue to exist until by the operation of the law of limitation it had been extinguished; but upon the question whether the law of limitation applies, it appears to be clear that it comes within the terms of Article 142, and if there has been any doubt in the mind of the Courts in the Punjab as to what was the effect of the law of limitation in cases of this description, it seems to have arisen from the introduction of some opinion that there must be what is called adverse possession. It is unnecessary to enter upon that inquiry. Article 144 as to adverse possession only applies when there is no other Article which specially provides for the case.

"In this case their Lordships think that Article 142 does provide for the case, and that the suit is barred by the law of limitation."

6. "Immoveable property." — The expression "immoveable property" has not been defined in this Act and consequently is to be interpreted in the light of the definition thereof given in the General Clauses Act, 1897. Under that Act "immoveable property" has been defined as including land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Where the question concerns the rights of Hindus, it has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council, that the expression "immoveable property" should be taken to include whatever the Hindu Law classes as immovable, although not such in the

4. (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 274 (276) : 30 Nag L R 18 : 150 Ind Cas 679, *Mt. Jyubai v. Zabu*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Sind 226 (227, 228) : 170 Ind Cas 621 : 30 Sind L R 472, *Wadero Warisano v. Bhai Pursumal*.

(1929) A I R 1929 All 753 (753, 754) : 119 Ind Cas 6 : 51 All 1042, *Kanhaya Lal v. Gurwar*. (Overruled by A I R 1934 All 993.)

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 596 (597) : 127 Ind Cas 8, *Mohammad Yar v. Mohammad Yar*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 245 (247) : 144 Ind Cas 72, *Ali Akbar v. Raiha*.

[See (1933) A I R 1933 All 775 (777) : 55 All 209 : 143 Ind Cas 497, *Kallan v. Mohammad Nabi Khan*. (Must be taken to be overruled by A I R 1934 All 993)]

5. (1889) 16 Ind App 148 (160, 151) : 17 Cal 137 : 1890 Pun Re No 23 : 13 Ind Jur 330 : 5 Sar 412 (P C).

ordinary acceptance of the word.¹ "The question must," observed their Lordships, "in every case be whether the subject of the suit is in the nature of immovable property, or of an interest in immovable property; and if its nature and quality can only be determined by Hindu Law and usage, the Hindu Law may be properly invoked for that purpose."

Applying this principle it was held in the undermentioned cases² that a right to a cash allowance granted for the support of a Hindu temple out of *Antastha Sadilvar* (i. e., extra assessment levied to meet local charges) and to three *khundis* of rice to be levied from certain *mahals*, under a *sanad* granted by the Peshwa, was immovable property or an interest in immovable property within the meaning of clause 12 of Section 1 of the Act of 1859.

The following have all been held to be immovable property:—

1. Right to a hereditary office with emoluments attached thereto³
2. Right to levy certain tolls on paddy exports granted by the Peshwas, called *Tripnis Pansare*⁴
3. Right to *brit* offerings⁵
4. Right to officiate at funeral ceremonies of Hindus called *Brit Jajmanka*⁶
5. Right to *Naukar* allowance out of a particular village.⁷
6. Standing trees⁸

Note 6

1. (1873) 1 Ind App 34 (50, 51) 13 Beng L R 254 21 Suth W R 178 • 10 Bom H C R 281 3 Sar 306 (P C), *Maharana Fettehsangji v. Desai Kallianraji* (6 Bom H C R A C J 137, Approved)
[See also (1872) 9 Bom H C R 99 (112), *Balwantrao v. Pursholam*. (Term "immoveable property" is not a *locabulum artis* of the English law)
(1884) 10 Cal 697 (708), *Gopinath Chobey v. Bhugwat Pershad.*]
2. (1892) 6 Bom 546 (559) : 6 Ind Jur 648 (F B), *Collector of Thana v. Hari Sitaram*.
(1880) 5 Bom 322 (332), *Collector of Thana v. Krishnanath Govind*
3. (1872) 9 Bom H C R 99 (113), *Balwantrao v. Pursholam*.
(1874) 1874 Bom P J 295 (296), *Shidramshet v. Huchaya*.
(1886) 10 Bom 149 (151), *Lakshman Das v. Manohar Genesh*.
[See also (1869) 6 Bom H C R 137 (139), *Krishnabhat v. Kapabhat.*]
4. (1909) 2 Ind Cas 489 (489) 33 Bom 373, *Krishnaji Pandurang v. Gajanan Balwant*
5. (1908) 1908 Pun Re No 34 • 1908 Pun L R No 163 • 1908 Pun W R No. 96, *Mohan Lal v. Janki*
6. (1883) 10 Cal 73 (74) 13 Cal L R 263 : 8 Ind Jur 197, *Raghoo Pandey v. Kassey Parey*.
7. (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 129 (132) • 19 Oudh Cas 49 33 Ind Cas 461, *Deputy Commissioner, Fyzabad v. Jagjwan Balsh Singh*.
8. (1895) 19 Bom 207 (208), *Sakharam Mulshet v. Vishram*.
(1831) 16 Bom 353 (356), *Dapu v. Dhondi*. (Possession of mango trees.)
(1881) 3 All 435 (437) • 1881 All W N 9 • 5 Ind Jur 652, *Jagann Bibi v. Ganeshi*.
(1867) 2 Agra 300 (301), *Mt. Ghufoorun Bebee v. Khwajah Mustafedeh*.
(1884) 1884 Pun Re No 112, *Jamal Singh v. Ladha*

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 6

7. Materials of a standing house.⁹
8. Jagir income arising out of land.¹⁰
9. The rights reserved to patnidaris and comprehensively included in the word "contract" in Section 51 of the Bengal Chaukidari Act (6 of 1870).¹¹

The following are not immovable property:—

1. The proceeds of the sale of immovable property.¹²
2. A *pala* or turn of worship.¹³
3. An agreement to grant a lease.¹⁴
4. Arrears of land revenue or cess.¹⁵
5. Money payable as marriage dues to the holder of a hereditary office in a temple.¹⁶
6. Right to have one's name entered in the Revenue Registers.¹⁷
7. Right of exclusive worship of idol.¹⁸

There is a difference of opinion as to whether the space above a land belonging to the owner of the land is immovable property which can be acquired by adverse encroachment thereon for a period of twelve years. According to the High Courts of Allahabad and Madras, an encroachment on such space is an adverse possession of immovable property.¹⁹ The Bombay High Court has expressed

[See also (1872) 4 N W P H O R 167 (169), *Hanooman Pershad v. Surubjeet Singh*. (Right to recover value of trees cut down by defendant is not an interest in immovable property.)]

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 903 (904) : 5 Nag L R 21, *Parmanand v. Dirlhu*. (A right to collect lac from trees)

(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 66 (67) : 160 Ind Cas 1054, *Moti Singh v. Deoki Singh*.

(1931) A I R 1921 Pat 482 (482) 63 Ind Cas 264, *Bani Prasad v. Suraj Singh*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Low Bur 241 (243) : 8 Low Bur Rul 64 : 24 Ind Cas 911, *Secretary of State v. Ma Dwe.*]

9. (1923) A I R 1923 Lab 150 (151) : 73 Ind Cas 705, *Shankar Khan v. Karam Chand*.

(1875) 8 Mad H C R 100 (102), *Narayana Pillai v. Ramasawmy Thavutharan*.

10. (1894) 1894 Pun Re No 4, *Ram Pershad v. Kishan Singh*

11. (1918) A I R 1918 P C 85 (86, 87) : 46 Cal 173 : 45 Ind App 162 : 48 Ind Cas 262 (P C), *Maharaja Ranjit Singh v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh*.

12. (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 548 (551) : 46 Ind Cas 627, *Radha Kishan v. Nauratan Lal*

13. (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 671 (672) : 46 Cal 455 : 47 Ind Cas 25, *Narasingha Bana Goswami v. Prolhodman Tevari*

14. (1874) 22 Suth W R 287 (287), *Ram Sahay Lall v. Bibee Choubam*. (Nor

15.

16.

17.

erect

Boy v. Monmohuni Dassi.

1 Ind Cas 1094, *State of Indore v.*

Jour 281, Ratnarelu Mudakar v.

conflicting opinions.²⁹

Arts. 142 & 144.
Notes 6-7

7. Interest in immovable property. — The scope of Article 144 seems to be wider than that of Article 142. The latter is limited to suits for possession of *immovable property*; the former includes, in addition, suits for possession of *interests* in immovable property.¹ A suit for the possession of an interest in immovable property would be governed, not by Article 142 but by Article 144.² This, it is conceived, would be so even if the case is one of dispossession of the plaintiff.³ It is also conceived that the interest must, for the purpose of this Article, be such as is capable of being enjoyed by acts of ownership, for unless this is so, there cannot be any adverse possession of such interest.

In *Maharana Fatehsanghi v. Desai Kalianraji*,⁴ it was held by the Privy Council that a *toda giras haq*, i.e., a right to receive an annual payment, the liability for which is not a mere personal liability, but one which attaches to the *raamdar* in whosoever hands the village may pass, was 'an interest in immovable property' within the meaning of clause 12 of Section 1 of the Act of 1859. The following have also been held to be interests in immovable property:

1 An *exclusive* right of fishery.⁵ It must be noted that a right of fishery which does not exclude the owner or

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 613 (615) 38 Mad 6 17 Ind Cas 159, *Basaveswaraswami v. Bellari Municipal Council*.

(See also (1910) 7 Ind Cas 571 (572) (Mad), *Admarayanamma v. Syed Murtaza Sahib* (Plaintiff putting up a buttress and in possession thereof for over twelve years must be deemed to have acquired a title to the site covered by the buttress))

20 (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 335 (337) 87 Ind Cas 1003, *Bahadurmal v. Mohanlal* (Right to open shutters and maintain weather frames is acquired by adverse possession—It is not an easement)

(1932) A I R 1932 Bom 224 (224) 133 Ind Cas 453, *Chhaganlal v. Hemchand* (The column of air occupied by a projection over the land of a neighbour is not immovable property or any interest therein within the meaning of Article 144, capable of being acquired by adverse possession)

(1913) 20 Ind Cas 246 (246) 37 Bom 491, *Chhotalal v. Manilal* (Do)

(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 83 (84) 67 Ind Cas 356 46 Bom 827, *Kashibhai Kalidas v. Vallabhai Wagibhai*.

Note 7

1. (1911) 12 Ind Cas 305 (307) (Cal), *Lokenath Bidyadhar v. Jahanna Bibi*
(See also (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 762 (763) 23 Ind Cas 136 (139), *Hem Chandra v. Secretary of State*)

2. (1911) 12 Ind Cas 305 (307) (Cal), *Lokenath Bidyadhar v. Jahanna Bibi*.
(1932) A I R 1932 Cal 300 (302) 59 Cal 344 137 Ind Cas 279, *Krishna Nandi v. Lokenath Mookerjee*.
(See also (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 58 (62) 1 Pat 674 67 Ind Cas 954, *Henry Hill & Co v. Sheoraj Rai*)

3 See the cases cited in Foot-Note (3)

4. (1874) 21 South W R 178 (182) 1 Ind App 34 13 Beng L R 254 10 Bom H C R 291 3 Sar 306 (P C)

5. (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 300 (302) 59 Cal 344 137 Ind Cas 279, *Krishna Nandi v. Lokenath Mookerjee*.

(1911) 12 Ind Cas 305 (307) (Cal), *Lokenath v. Jahanna Bibi*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 7**

other persons from fishing, is only an *easement*.⁵ (See also Notes to the definition of 'easement' under Section 2 *ante*.)

2. Right to possession and management of *saranjam* property.⁷
3. Right to collect assessment of lands endowed in favour of a shrine.⁸
4. Right of occupancy tenant in the land.⁹
5. Right to *parjat*, *charai* and *charsai* dues.¹⁰
6. Right to *Mukurrari* rent.¹¹
7. Right to levy summary cess over land.¹²
8. Right to a watercourse.¹³
9. Right of a zamindar or landlord to recover *melwaram* from land.¹⁴

- (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 679 (680) . 125 Ind Cas 545, *Secretary of State v. District Board of Tanjore*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 58 (62) . 1 Pat 674 : 67 Ind Cas 954, *Henry Hill & Co. v. Sheoraj Rai*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 656 (657) : 84 Ind Cas 841, *Madhabchandra Mandal v. Nagendra Nath Sen*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 9 (11) : 64 Ind Cas 346, *Henry Hill & Co. v. Sheoraj Rai*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 403 (405) : 103 Ind Cas 13, *Debendra Lal v. Secretary of State*.
- (1878) 3 Cal 276 (279) : 1 Cal L R 592, *Parbutty Nath Roy v. Mudho Parol*.
[See also (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 147 (149) : 23 Nag L R 16 : 100 Ind Cas 438, *Manya v. Sitaram*. (Grant of a lease for fishing creates an interest in immovable property)]
- (1880) 5 Cal 945 (948) : 6 Cal L R 269 : 3 Shome L R 123, *Chundee Churn Roy v. Shid Chunder Mundul*.]
6. (1937) A I R 1937 Nag 38 (39) : 168 Ind Cas 921, *Nago v. Mt. Lahani*.
(1885) 9 Mad 285 (303), *Sivasubramanya v. Secretary of State*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 417 (418) : 45 Bom 80 : 57 Ind Cas 143, *Ananta v. Ganu* (Right to take water from another's well is an easement and not an interest in immovable property)
- The following cases which held that easement is an interest in immovable property cannot be regarded as good law —*
- (1882) 5 Mad 253 (255) : 6 Ind Jur 463, *Karupam Zamindar v. Merangi Zamindar*.
- (1875) 24 Euth W R 300 (300), *Mohunt Deo Surun Poory v. Moonshee Mahomed Ismail*.
7. (1891) 15 Bom 247 (255), *Narayan Jaganath v. Vasudeo Vishnu*.
8. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 26 (32) : 141 Ind Cas 103, *Narayan Balwant v. Dattatraya Ramchandra*.
9. (1876) 1876 Pun Re No 19, *Sahib Rai v. Khair Shah*.
10. (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 181 (183) : 21 Oudh Cas 119 : 46 Ind Cas 439, *Sheoraj Singh v. Debi Bakhsh Singh*.
11. (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 49 (50) . 97 Ind Cas 637, *Gopalcharjya v. Dhun Kali*.
(Gift of mukarrari rent—Suit to set aside, is governed by Article 144.)
12. (1911) 12 Ind Cas 716 (718) . 36 Bom 174, *Ranmai Singji v. Mahashankar*.
13. (1880) 4 O P L R 16 (17), *Amrutnath v. Moti Lal*.
14. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 303 (306, 307) . 173 Ind Cas 307, *Chakrapani Rao v. Venkataswami Appa Rao*. (*Melwaram* right when consisting of imposition of full assessment is interest in immovable property.)
[See also (1898) 12 Bom 80 (84), *Krishnayji v. Vithalrao*. (Right to receive share of the income and profits from the land of another.)]

As to whether a right to *malikana* allowance is an interest in immovable property, see Note 20 to Article 132, *ante*. Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 7-8

Where immovable property is mortgaged under a simple mortgage, or under some other form of mortgage under which the mortgagor is entitled to periodical accounts or payments from the mortgagees, the mortgagor's interest is capable of being adversely possessed. In this sense no equity of redemption may be said to be an interest in immovable property which can be acquired by adverse possession.¹⁵ Where, however, A usufructually mortgages his property to B and A has nothing more than a bare right to redeem vested in him, can such right be adversely possessed, and would a suit for a declaration of such right be a suit for possession of an interest in immovable property within the meaning of Article 144? It has been held in the undermentioned cases¹⁶ that it would be so. It is submitted that this view does not seem to be correct on principle. The right is one that cannot be enjoyed in the sense in which an enjoyment is necessary in order to constitute adverse possession. See the undermentioned cases.¹⁷

8. "Plaintiff" in Article 142, meaning of. — Section 2, subsection 8 defines the word "plaintiff" as including any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue.¹⁸ Where therefore the plaintiff claims a right to property through another and the

15 See (1904) 32 Ind App 23 (32) 32 Cal 296 • 9 Cal W N 201 2 All L Jour 71 7 Bom L R 1 1 Cal L Jour 594 8 Sar 731 (P C), *Kharajmal v. Daim*.

[See also (1900) 14 Bom 176 (160), *Puttappa v. Timmaji*]

16. (1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 163 (169) 160 Ind Cas 920, *Udharbhan Singh v. Sheoambar Sahai*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 659 (660) 87 Ind Cas 208, *Annapoorna Koer v. Jageshwar Misra*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 283 (264) 17 Oudh Cas 294 25 Ind Cas 600, *Huddar Khan v. Gajadhar Chaube*

(1902) 6 Cal W N 601 (611), *Lalla Kanha Lal v. Mt Mani Ebi*

(1925) A I R 1925 Bom 9 (12) 49 Bom 654 84 Ind Cas 374, *Hanamgouda Shid Gouda v. Irgouda Shingouda*.

17 (1916) A I R 1916 All 79 (80) 38 All 411 34 Ind Cas 171, *Kunwar Sen v. Darbars Lal* (A right to redeem immovable property cannot be adversely possessed when the right to possession and actual possession is in the hands of the mortgagee)

(1935) A I R 1935 All 174 (178) 153 Ind Cas 73, *Shyam Lal v. Mohamad Ali* (Property in possession of usufructuary mortgagee—Person merely by getting his name recorded in village papers for several years cannot acquire title by adverse possession)

(1920) A I R 1920 Lah 300 (301) 1 Lah 549 59 Ind Cas 476, *Shah Nawaz v. Sheikh Ahmad* (Right to possession and actual possession in mortgagee's hands—Person getting his name recorded in revenue papers cannot be in adverse possession of right to redeem)

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 1150 (1151) 26 Ind Cas 529, *Lakshminarayana Iyer v. Ulagammal* (There can be no adverse possession of any interest in land by a person who does not derive any benefit whatever during the period of the alleged possession)

Note 8

1a. (1937) A I R 1937 Cal 343 (346) 173 Ind Cas 439, *Narattam Dey v. Deben-dra Lal Khan*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 8-9**

latter was dispossessed or the possession of the defendant became adverse to the latter, the date of dispossession of the plaintiff or the date when the possession became adverse to the plaintiff, would, for the purpose of these Articles, be the date on which his predecessor-in-title was dispossessed or on which the defendant's possession became adverse to the predecessor-in-title.^{1b}

An adopted son does not claim through his adoptive mother, and her dispossession or a discontinuance of possession by her is not one by the adopted son.¹ So also, a reversioner succeeding to an estate held by a limited owner, or a person succeeding to another in the event of a contingency, does not claim through the other. A dispossession of the latter is not a dispossession of the former.²

9. "Has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession."—A dispossession must be distinguished from a discontinuance of possession. In *Rains v. Buxton*,¹ which was a case arising under Section 3, Chapter 27, 3 & 4, Will. IV, which used words similar to those used in Article 142 of this Act, Mr. Justice Fry observed :

"In my view the difference between dispossession and the discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this way—the one is where a person comes in and drives out the others from possession: the other case is where the person in possession goes out and is followed into possession by other persons."

This view has been adopted in numerous cases.² Thus, where A is in possession of land and B comes on the land and drives out A by

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- 1b. (1865) 2 Mad H C R 391 (392), *Chandra Chodanghi v. Timmaya*.
(1874) 21 Suth W R 282 (282), *Ahmed Ali v. Hares Chand*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 474 (475, 476) : 128 Ind Cas 201, *Bhushan Mondal v. Sarbeshwar Mondal*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 729 (730) : 87 Ind Cas 1021, *Bhagwan Din v. Ajudhia*.
(1908) 13 B 1222 (1223) : 5 Pat 441 : 89 Ind Cas 127, *Bates v. ...*

- (1869) 2 Beng L R A C 313 (315), *Gobind Chandra Sarma v. Anand Mohan Sarma*. (Once adverse possession has started against the predecessor in title of the plaintiff, then plaintiff does not get a fresh cause of action on his being entitled to the property.)
(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 798 (808) : 41 Mad 749 : 47 Ind Cas 733, *The Midnapore Zamindars Co v. Malayandi Appasami Naicher*.
1. (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 87 (94) : 9 Cal W N 795, *Hareh Chand Babu v. Bijoychand Mahatab*.
2. (1912) 16 Ind Cas 365 (367) : 40 Cal 173, *Prosenno Kumar v. Sri Kantha*. (A ghatwal does not claim through his father as his predecessor within the meaning of S. 2, Limitation Act.)

Note 9

1. (1880) 28 W R (Eng) 954 (956) : 49 L J Ch 473 . 14 Ch D 537 : 43 L T 88.
2. (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 247 (248) : 125 Ind Cas 732, *Bakhal Das v. Khirode Bandhu*.
(1925) A I R 1925-Mad 834 (835) : 87 Ind Cas 896, *Govinda Ramanuja v. Mahomed Essof*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 8 (10) : 49 Ind Cas 89, *Kuppusami Chetty v. Ramiah*.

a tortious act, the case is one of dispossession.^{2a} But where, for instance, A executes a transfer in favour of B and delivers to him the possession of the property transferred, the case is not one of dispossession but one of *discontinuance* of possession by A from the date of the delivery of possession under the transfer.³

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 9

There are, however, some essential features common to both dispossession and discontinuance of possession.

1 In either case there must be a termination of possession on the part of the person who was in possession.⁴

2. It must be followed up by another person's actual possession.⁵

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- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 224 (225) 67 Ind Cas 1005, *Behari Lal v. Nityananda*
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 104 (105, 106) 107 Ind Cas 95, *Mohesh Chandra v. Hemendranath*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 297 (297) 56 Cal 914 119 Ind Cas 289, *Gaya Prasad v. Bahyamani*
 (1939) A I R 1939 Nag 7 (9), *Meherban Lall v. Yusufkhan Kallu*
 (1935) A I R 1935 Sind 193 (201) 178 Ind Cas 690, *Jrab Jhanglu v. Panjalsah Fakubalishah*
 (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 130 (137) 5 Pat 60 91 Ind Cas 169, *Midnagur Zamindary Co., Ltd. v. Ram Kana Singh* (Mere refusal by the landlord to recognise lease does not amount to dispossession of the tenant. Positive act of dispossession is necessary.)
 (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (642) : 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Dal-Krishna*
 (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 1 (6) 50 Cal 49 74 Ind 630, *Charu Chandra v. Nahush Chandra*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 751 (752) 31 Ind Cas 242, *Brojendra Kishore v. Bharat Chandra*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 36 (36) 57 Ind Cas 717 5 Pat L Jour 592, *Madan Mohan Singh v. Dny Behari Lal*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 277 (277, 278) 61 Ind Cas 76, *Bahadur Ali Khan v. Secretary of State*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 59 (61) 45 Mad 370 67 Ind Cas 246, *Ramiah Ramayya v. Kottamma*.
 (1897) 7 Mad L Jour 186 (188), *Kishnammal v. Pichannatayyan*.
 2a (1880) 28 W R (Eng) 452 (454) 49 L J Ex.220 5 Ex D 264 42 L T 463 : 41 J P 488, *Leigh v. Jack*.
 (1939) A I R 1939 Nag 7 (9) 1938 Nag L Jour 418 (120), *Meherban Lall v. Yusufkhan Kallu*.
 3. (1935) A I R 1935 Nag 335 (347) 177 Ind Cas 6 (F B), *Asaram v. Lndheswar*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 P C 180 (181) 46 Cal 694 46 Ind App 60 50 Ind Cas 293 (P C), *Rani Kuar Janti Singh v. Nawab of Murshidabad* (Court of Wards alienating ward's property and alienee obtaining possession—Ward afterwards suing to recover property on the ground of the alienation not binding on him—There is discontinuance of possession by the ward on alienee obtaining possession under the transfer and the ward must sue within 12 years of such discontinuance)
 (1932) A I R 1932 P C 55 (55) 59 Ind App 130 11 Pat 272 136 Ind Cas 798 (P C), *Bageswari Charan Singh v. Jagannath Kuari*.
 (1906) 29 All 281 (283) 3 All L Jour 16 : 1905 All W N 232, *Madho Ram Singh v. Surjan Kunwar*.

4. See cases cited in Foot-Note (2).

5. See cases cited in Foot-Note (2) and Foot-Note (10a)

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 9

3 The latter's possession must be *adverse* to the former.⁶

Termination of possession :

It is obvious that so long as a person continues to do acts of possession on a land he cannot be said to terminate it^{6a} Mere acts of trespass by the defendant are not enough to show that the plaintiff's possession has terminated if he has been enjoying the property in such manner as it is capable of being enjoyed.⁷ "In order to defeat a title by dispossessing the former owner, acts must be done which are inconsistent with his enjoyment of the soil for the purposes for which he intended to use it, and therefore it is necessary to look at the position in which the former owner stands towards the land as well as to the acts done by the alleged dispossessor."^{7a} What acts of the defendant are sufficient to establish a termination of the former owner's possession must be judged from the circumstances of the case and from the nature of the property in question.^{7b} In *Basant Kumar*

6. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 118 (119) . 105 Ind Cas 869, *Gopal Chandra v. Monmohun Das*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 6 (16) 141 Ind Cas 157 : 11 Pat 701, *Chaturbhuj Singh v. Sarada Charan Guha*. (Dispossession merely means exclusion from possession without consent of the person concerned.)

(1931) A I R 1931 Rang 40 (48) : 8 Rang 536 . 129 Ind Cas 511, *Maung Sin v. Maung So Min*. (Per Brown, J : Possession by leave and license of another person recognising his title is not dispossession or discontinuance of possession.)

(1603) 1893 Pun Re No. 104, *Sundar v. Mt. Rohonsu*.

[See also (1935) A I R 1935 All 639 (640) : 157 Ind Cas 696, *Kallu v. Mt. Jayanti*.]

6a (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 224 (225) : 67 Ind Cas 1005, *Behari Lal Nandi v. Nriyandan Ghose*.

7. (1880) 28 W R (Eng) 452 (454) : 49 L J Ex 220 : 5 Ex D 264 : 42 L T 463 : 44 J P 488, *Leigh v. Jack*.

(1909) 1 I C 514 (516, 517) : 36 Cal 28, *Ganoda Sundari v. Nalini Ranjan*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 304 (305) : 127 Ind Cas 47, *Abdul Rahim v. Wasir Ali*. (Mere planting of trees on another's land does not amount to dispossession unless there is denial of right of owner.)

(1913) 20 Ind Cas 79 (80) (Cal), *Purna Chandra v. Ananta Keot*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 71 (71) 109 Ind Cas 657, *Mohammad Amin Khan v. Balanda*. (Collecting cattle on the land or fixing pegs or erecting a platform on it by the defendant will not be sufficient to make the owner out of possession.)

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 130 (135) . 91 Ind Cas 169 : 5 Pat 80, *Madnapore Zamindars Co. Ltd. v. Ram Kanai Singh*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Lah 53 (53) : 79 Ind Cas 39, *Mienna Lal v. Hamid Ali*. (Mere paper dispossession by mutation of names does not amount to dispossession.)

(1906) 11 Cal W N 186 (189) : 4 Cal L Jour 568, *Choudhry Shamanund v.*

7a (1917) A I R 1917 P C 16 (22) : 44 Cal 858 : 44 Ind App 104 : 40 Ind Cas 337 (P C), *Basant Kumar v. Secretary of State*.

[See also (1907) 35 Cal 961 (971, 972) : 6 Cal L Jour 735 : 12 Cal W N 127, *Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baldeo Das*

(1904) 31 Cal 397 (405), *Wali Ahmed Choudhry v. Tota Mea*.]

7b (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 297 (297) : 56 Cal 914 : 119 Ind Cas 289, *Gaya Prosad v. Bakyamani Das*. (Where a Hindu widow, who had been enjoying

v. *Secretary of State*,⁸ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 9

"It is impossible", says Lord Halsbury in *Marshall v Taylor*,⁹ 'to speak with exact precision about the degree of possession or dispossession that will do, unless you have regard, as Lord Justice Cotton said in *Leigh v Jack*,¹⁰ to the nature of the property.' An exclusive adverse possession for a sufficient period may be made out, in spite of occasional acts done by the former owner on the ground for a specific purpose from time to time. Conversely acts, which *prima facie* are acts of dispossession, may, under particular circumstances, fall short of evidencing any kind of ouster. They may be susceptible of another explanation, bear some other character or have some other object "

the property as tenant-in common along with her brothers-in-law, sued to establish her possession and it appeared that her title had not been denied and that she had been receiving rents and profits, held that there was no dispossession)

(1929) A I R 1929 Cal 417 (417, 418) 120 Ind Cas 104, *Profulla Chandra v Kshetra Lal Sinha* (Mere bringing of suit for rent against a person in possession is not an attempt to disturb possession of a party.)

(1900) 1 Ch 19 (23) 69 L J Ch 87 81 L T 564 48 W R (Eng) 177 16 T L R 44, *Littledale v Liverpool College* (Erecting and locking gates is not an act of dispossession)

(1900) 3 Ind Cas 393 (393) (Cal), *Sonatan Sheshh v Chaku Sheshh* (Where the plaintiff allows defendant the user of his land on payment of rent and defendant afterwards denies the plaintiff's title and pays rent to the superior landlord, these facts do not amount to dispossession but adverse possession)

(1886) 1896 All W N 277 (277), *Abdulla v Hargu Lall* (B trying to build a wall on A's land and prevented by order of Magistrate from doing so—No dispossession of A from date of order)

(1870) 13 Buth W R 64 (65, 66), *Nund Kishore Singh v Huree Pershad*

tenure claimed—This view seems questionable as there is no physical dispossession in such a case)

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 757 (758) 60 Ind Cas 396, *Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. Pulin Mal*

(1901) 7 Oudh Cas 259 (263), *Basaran Singh v Nawab Badshah Bahu Begam* (Decree of the Settlement Court giving the mortgagees proprietary possession of the property is a dispossession of the mortgagors)

(1906) 9 Oudh Cas 292 (295), *Raja Mumtaz Ali Khan v Sajju Singh* (Assertion of under-proprietary title by the tenant does not amount to dispossession)

(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 727 (728) 26 Ind Cas 366, *Asiat Ullah v Sadat Ullah*. (Where the proprietor was prevented from collecting the rent from his tenants, it was held that the case was one of dispossession)

(1935) 163 Ind Cas 897 (903) 62 Cal L Jour 177 (188) 63 Cal 300, *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmed Nawab*

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 528 (520) 39 Ind Cas 777 3 Pat L Jour 259, *Baker Hussain v Ranjit Koer* (If a person is completely ousted from his right to catch fish in water on his own land by a definite act of aggression by another party, such act amounts to a dispossession)

8 (1917) A I R 1917 P C 18 (22) 44 Cal 858 44 Ind App 104 40 Ind Cas 337 (P C)

9 (1895) 64 L J Ch 416 (418) 1 Ch 641 12 R 310 72 L T 670

10 (1880) 28 W R (Eng) 452 (454) 49 L J Ex 220 5 F & D 246.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 9**

Where there has been, in fact, a cessation of possession, the question of intention is immaterial, but in determining whether there has been discontinuance of possession, intention cannot altogether be left out of account.^{10a}

Another person must follow into possession :

Where *A* is said to dispossess *B*, it clearly involves the idea that *B*'s possession has terminated by the tortious act of *A* and that *A* has entered into possession by driving out *B*. It has been held that it is necessary even to constitute a discontinuance of possession that the termination of one man's possession must be followed by the actual possession of another.^{10b} A mere ceasing by the person in possession to occupy or enjoy the property is not a discontinuance within the meaning of the Article.¹¹ Nor would a resistance offered by one of several persons in possession to another of such persons in

10a (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 981 (934) : 65 Ind Cas 591, *Abhoyanhar v. Satyendra Prasanna Bose*.

10b (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (612) : 85 Bom 79, *Vasudeo v. Eknath*. (*B* obtaining decree for possession against *A* but failing to execute it within the period of limitation—This does not amount to discontinuance of possession by *B*.)

(1913) 19 Ind Cas 3 (3) (Mad), *Thangaswami Thevar v. Rajaram Naidu*. (Where the owner leaves the land in the possession of strangers for over 20 years and lives away cultivating other lands, it constitutes abandonment.)

(1881) 1881 Pun Re No. 41, *Lutf Ali v. Khushkhat Bai*

(1897) 1 Cal W N 277 (278), *Sonnur Ali Hararika v. J. Hultman*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Upp Bur 44 (45) : 27 Ind Cas 981, *Nga Po v. Nga So Pe*

(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 1 (6) : 50 Cal 49 : 74 Ind Cas 630, *Charu Chandra Pramanick v. Nahush Chandra Kundoo*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 834 (835) : 87 Ind Cas 886, *Govinda Ramanuja v. Mohamed Esoof*

(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 8 (10) : 49 Ind Cas 89, *Kuppuswamy v. Kusala Ramiah*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Pat 36 (36) : 57 Ind Cas 717 : 5 Pat L Jour 592, *Madan Mohan Singh v. Braj Bihari Lal*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Pat 117 (120) : 8 Pat 549 : 115 Ind Cas 699, *Bageswari Charan Singh v. Jagannath Kuari*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 303 (303) : 120 Ind Cas 792, *Mangal Singh v. Ali Sher*.

11. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 18 (21, 22) : 44 Cal 858 : 44 Ind App 104 : 40 Ind Cas 837 (P C), *Basant Kumar v. Secretary of State*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Bom 207 (209) : 58 Bom 397 & 406 : 149 Ind Cas 882 & 885 (F B), *Krishnaji v. Madhusa*. (A I R 1921 Pat 86, Followed)

(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 8 (10) : 49 Ind Cas 89, *Kuppuswamy v. Kusala Ramiah*.

(1873) 20 Suth W R 183 (184), *Pudar Bundo Mahantee v. Mohesh Chunder Sen* (Receipt of rent is good evidence of possession but it does not necessarily follow that a party in possession has been disturbed because he cannot prove that he has collected rent of a particular portion of the property)

(1928) 107 Ind Cas 779 (780) (Lah), *Nur Khan v. Fakir Abdullah*. (Where a person is shown to have been in possession of land for a number of years, the mere fact that the land was not cultivated during certain harvests does not make him out of possession during that period)

(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 694 (695) : 44 Ind Cas 297, *Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. v. v.*

(1906)

(1884)

his attempt to get separate possession of his share amount to a dispossession of the latter.^{11a} In *McDonnell v. McKinty*,¹² which was also a case under Section 3, Chapter 27, 3 & 4 Will. IV, Blackburne, C. J., observed:

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 9

"The word 'discontinuance', I understand to mean an abandonment of possession by one person followed by the actual possession of another. This, I think, must be its meaning; for, if no one succeed to the possession vacated or abandoned, there would be no one in whose favour or for whose protection the Act would operate. To constitute discontinuance there must be both dereliction by the person who has the right and actual possession to be protected. . . . In confirmation of these remarks, I may here refer to all the authorities which have been cited, and which prove, if proof was required, that *actual* possession is the object of the Statute and that to apply its provisions to any other case would be to violate its plain meaning and policy."

Possession of new-comer must be adverse to the former possessor :

This element is also necessary in order to constitute a dispossession or a discontinuance of possession.¹³ For, if the possession of the new-comer were not adverse to the former possessor, it would be consistent with the right of the former possessor and would therefore furnish no cause of action to him in respect of which time can run against him. Thus, when any person, whether a father or a stranger,

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 303 (303) . 120 Ind Cas 792, *Mangal Singh v. Ali Sher* (Waste land—Possession is presumed to be with owner, and mere fact that owner has allowed his land to remain waste does not amount to discontinuance of possession)

(1923) A I R 1923 Rang 138 (139) 79 Ind Cas 817, *Maung Pein v. Maung Po Maung* (Omission to cultivate the land does not amount to abandonment)

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 368 (369) . 45 Bom 1030 62 Ind Cas 101, *Suamirao Shrinivas v. Dhimabai Padappa*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Pat 685 (694) . 9 Pat 447 . 122 Ind Cas 801, *Gopi Ram v. Jagannath Singh* (In the case of mineral rights non-user is not an abandonment of possession on the part of the owner)

[See (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 633 (634) 121 Ind Cas 733, *Sadda Singh v. Lehna Singh*

(1939) A I R 1939 Nag 7 (9), *Meherban Lall Punjara v. Yusufkhan Kallu Punjara* (It imports abandonment)

(1938) A I R 1938 Sind 198 (201) 178 Ind Cas 690, *Arab Jhanglu v. Panjailshah Yakubulishah* (It must be in the nature of an abandonment)

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 402 (405) 119 Ind Cas 866, *Mubimulnissa v. Ali Husain*.

(1900) 2 Bom L R 620 (621), *Bali Khatri v. Dnyanu Bahaji*.]

11a. (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 297 (297) . 56 Cal 914 119 Ind Cas 289, *Gaya Prasad v. Balyaman Das*.

12. (1847) 10 Ir L R 514. (Cited in A I R 1931 Bom 207 (203))

13. See cases cited in Foot-Note 6 ante

(1893) 1893 Pun Re No 101, *Sundar v. Mt Bohonsu* (The terms 'dispossession' or 'discontinuance of possession' will not apply to the case of a permissive occupation by another or an occupation which recognises the proprietary right of another)

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 9-11

enters upon the estate of an infant and continues in possession, the Court will consider such person entering only as guardian to the infant and his possession would be deemed to have begun as that of bailiff or agent of the minor and to have continued as such, until after the minor had arrived at the age of majority he did something to convert it into a wrongful possession on his own account. There is no dispossession or discontinuance of possession in such a case.¹⁴

10. Defendant must be in possession at the date of the suit.—The suit contemplated by Articles 142 and 144 being one for possession, i. e., for the dispossession of the defendant from the property of which possession is claimed,¹ it is clear that, at the date of the suit the defendant must be in possession.² A mortgaged property to B with possession and thereafter died. C, one of A's heirs, received the proprietary allowance from the mortgagee exclusively for several years. It was held that this would not constitute adverse possession of the mortgaged property inasmuch as, until redemption, the possession was with the mortgagee and none of A's heirs was entitled to the possession until redemption.³

11. "Possession," what is.—A possession *in fact* must be distinguished from a possession *in law*. A possession may exist in fact but not in law. Thus, the possession by a servant of his master's property is for some purposes not recognised as such by law, but is merely regarded as a detention or custody rather than possession.⁴ Again, a possession may exist in law but not in fact. Thus, the owner of a diluviated land would in law be deemed to be in possession of the land notwithstanding that, actually, he could not have been in possession of it. Similarly, the owner of a land, who has parted with the surface rights therein, is deemed to be in possession of the subsoil, though as a matter of fact he is not in actual possession of it.⁵ The possession thus attributed to him by law is known as

14. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 689 (642) . 12 Bom L R 956 (968, 969) : 85 Bom 79, *Vasudeo v. Elnath*.

Note 10

1. See Note 3
- 2 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (188) : 108 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim Khan v. Saadat Ali Khan*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1166 (1168) . 97 Ind Cas 1003, *Birendra Nath Ray v. Satis Chandra Jourdar*.
3. (1880) 3 All 24 (35) (F B), *Umr-un-nissa v. Muhammad Yar Khan*.

Note 11

1. Salmond's Jurisprudence, 8th Edition, p 294.
See (1861) 30 L J Q B 253 (256, 257) : 10 O B (N S) 227 : 7 Jur (N S) 948 : 128 R R 681, *White v. Bailey* (A servant, bailiff or any person occupying land in a merely ministerial character does not acquire possession (in a legal sense))
- 2 (1931) A I R 1931 P O 162 (164) : 182 Ind Cas 610 . 58 Ind App 228 : 59 Cal 60 (P C), *Dhupendra Narayan v. Rajeswar Prasad*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 130 (135) : 5 Pat 80 . 91 Ind Cas 169, *Misnapore Zamindari Co. v. Ram Kanai*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 234 (236) . 67 Ind Cas 744 : 5 Pat L Jour 632, *Gajadhar Prasad v. Dulhin Gulab Koer*. (Submerged land)

constructive possession. Such constructive possession is really nothing more than the right to take physical possession, and does not depend upon *user*.³

Arts. 142 & 144.
Note 11

A possession *in fact* may be either in respect of a *corporeal* property, or in respect of an *incorporeal* right such as a right to an office, a dignity, or a monopoly. But in either case two elements must exist in order to constitute a possession *in fact*—the *animus possidendi* and the *corpus possessionis*. The former is the mental element and consists in the *intent to possess*. The latter is the physical element and consists in the concrete realisation of the intent by *actual user* of the thing sought to be possessed.⁴

What constitutes *corpus possessionis* in the case of *corporeal* property differs, however, to some extent from what may be necessary to constitute *corpus possessionis* in the case of *incorporeal* property. In the case of *corporeal* property it consists, according to Sir John Salmond, in the continuing exclusion of alien interference coupled with the *ability to use the thing oneself at will*. Actual use of it is not essential. In the case of *incorporeal* property it consists in actual continuous use and enjoyment, that being the only possible mode of exercise in such cases.⁵

It follows from the above discussion that acts of user without the *animus possidendi* or the intent to possess do not constitute possession at all and therefore do not constitute adverse possession.^{6a}

3 Salmond's Jurisprudence, 8th Edition, p. 294

(1931) A I R 1931 P C 162 (164) 132 Ind Cas 610 58 Ind App 228 59 Cal 80 (P C), *Bhupendra Narayan v Rageswar Prasad*.

4. Salmond's Jurisprudence, 8th Edition, pp. 291 to 391

(1902) 27 Bom 43 (51) 4 Bom L R 721, *Tarubai v Venkat Rao*. (Possession of a right consists in the exercise of the right)

5. Salmond's Jurisprudence, 8th Edition, pp. 319, 320.

(1914) A I R 1914 All 257 (257) 26 Ind Cas 86, *Inayat Hussain v Secretary of State*

5a (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 720 (721) 24 Ind Cas 735, *Boyanna v Asethu* (Occupation for storing hay for 36 years does not by itself create title by adverse possession—But if there be *animus possidendi* manifested by transfers, presumption of title arises)

(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 197 (198, 199) 46 Mad 866 75 Ind Cas 39, *Taluk Board, Dindigul v Venkatarama Ayyar* (Gramanatham in Madras villages—Indiscriminate miscellaneous use by villagers does not amount to adverse possession)

(1873) 20 Suth W R 285 (285), *Ooma Churn Choudhry v Umbra Churn Dey* (Land used by neighbouring villages as a grazing common)

(1914) A I R 1914 Sind 119 (120) 8 Sind L R 331 29 Ind Cas 51, *Sultan Mahomed v Secretary of State*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 210 (216) 3 Pat 915. 80 Ind Cas 544, *Narayan Singh v. Dildar Ali Khan*

(1934) A I R 1934 All 883 (883) 153 Ind Cas 672, *Mahabir Singh v Sheo Shankar Singh* (A miscellaneous user such as making only a temporary use of the land for occasional necessities of a householder cannot create any title by adverse possession, a miscellaneous user of this sort is not possession at all)

(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 59 (59) 74 Ind Cas 282, *Bhuru v Datu Ram* (User of an intermittent nature accompanied by no assertion of right is a very common phenomenon in this country and arouses no opposition—Such user does not amount to adverse possession)

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 11**

Thus, mere acts of trespass without any intent to possess do not constitute adverse possession.⁶ The tying and grazing of cattle by a person without title on vacant or waste land, do not, in this country, excite any particular attention and are neither meant to denote nor understood as denoting an intent to possess, and consequently do not constitute possession.⁷ In the case of uncultivated and junglo land

(1900) 1 Ch 19(23): 81 L T 564: 48 W R (Eng.) 177: 16 T L R 44, *Littledale v. Liverpool College*.

(1905) 8 Oudh Cas 177 (180, 181), *Sheo Narain Singh v. Doda Singh*.

G. (1893) 7 Bom 323 (327): 7 Ind Jur 613, *Anandray v. Shankar*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 568 (569): 88 Ind Cas 676, *Kedar Nath v. Amrita Mandal*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (761): 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prasanna v. Mamindra Chandra*. (Adverse possession must be continuous. A series of isolated acts of trespass fall short of the requisite.)

(1923) A I R 1923 All 399 (400) 71 Ind Cas 265, *Lakhu v. Lalsingh*. (Temporary user which would be unnoticed or permissible would not amount to adverse possession.)

7. (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 960 (961): 153 Ind Cas 964, *Labha Singh v. Municipal Commissioner, Amritsar*. (Non-payment of rent makes no difference)

(1900) 4 Ind Cas 314 (316) (F B) (Lah), *Bawa Narsingh v. Miran Bakhsh*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Lah 294 (294): 86 Ind Cas 207, *Lachman Das v. Narsingh Das*

(1917) A I R 1917 Lah 394 (394): 42 Ind Cas 412, *Fateh Khan v. Bisakh Ram*. (Storing dung cakes and tying sheep on site is not sufficient to give a title by adverse possession.)

(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 25 (26): 69 Ind Cas 4, *Mansa v. Khushali Ram*. (Acts of user over waste land such as tethering of cattle and storing fodder and grazing of cattle, are insufficient to establish adverse possession)

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 844 (846): 27 Ind Cas 640, *Mahabir Misser v. Nanda Kishore Misser*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Nag 90 (91): 13 Nag L R 25: 39 Ind Cas 54, *Radhakadas v. Harmohanlal*. (Occasional tethering of cattle and stacking grass on vacant site is not disposssession of owner.)

(1926) 98 Ind Cas 880 (880) (Lah), *Nadar v. Shub Ram*. (User of a vacant site in a village abadi by tying up of cattle and keeping of heaps of dung is wholly insufficient to create an adverse title or to establish acts of ownership)

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 370 (372): 69 Ind Cas 573, *Waziri Mal v. Ganga Ram*. (Tying cattle and storing cowdung cakes on a vacant site.)

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 432 (432): 115 Ind Cas 71, *Lafpat Rai v. Sohna*. (Tethering of cattle on a vacant site, keeping dung cakes and building a khurh)

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 684 (685): 154 Ind Cas 919, *Mt Aisha Bibee v. Allah Bakhsh*. (Where the defendant in proof of his plea of adverse possession over a certain land relies on various acts of enjoyment such as dumping of rubbish, tethering of cattle, enclosing land with wall, etc., such acts if they stood by themselves would not be sufficient to prove adverse possession on the part of the defendant, but they taken in conjunction with the fact that the defendant had enclosed the land in dispute which had been in existence for a period much longer than twelve years would be sufficient proof of adverse possession.)

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 467 (467) (Mad), *Veeranna v. Ghelammayya*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Lah 492 (493): 178 Ind Cas 971, *Dwarika Das v. Municipal Committee Amritsar*.

(1900) 4 Ind Cas 314 (315) (Lah), *Bawa Narsingh v. Mira Bakhsh*.

which produces nothing but self-sown trees and a seasonal crop of wild grass, it has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that sporadic invasions by the person without title and the grazing and carrying away of grass and the cutting of firewood do not amount to such possession as will enable him to prescribe for a good title.⁸ For other instances, see the undermentioned cases.⁹

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 11

(But see (1934) A I R 1931 Mad 274 (274) 148 Ind Cas 631, *Ramalinga Pandaram v. Anthonimuthu Vathiar*. (Mere storing manure and having cattle upon the land are not sufficient to establish adverse possession. But erection of a fence and enjoyment of fruit are clear acts of adverse possession.))

8. (1930) A I R 1930 P O 291 (292), 11 Lah 638 : 57 Ind App 273 : 127 Ind Cas 531 (P C), *Jahandad Khan v. Abdul Ghafur*.

9. (1917) A I R 1917 All 415 (416) : 42 Ind Cas 896, *Gajadhar v. Bhiman*. (Occupation of Banjar land by a tenant, in the shape of stacking cow-dung, erecting a kicha hut and the like, does not amount to adverse possession against the landlord.)

(1923) A I R 1923 All 557 (557, 559) : 74 Ind Cas 251, *Maqbul Hussain v. Ahmad Hussain*. (Vacant land was being used by the Municipality for the deposit of refuse—Such user will not amount to adverse possession against the owner or dispossession of the owner.)

(1937) A I R 1937 All 299 (240) 169 Ind Cas 151, *Daya Shankar v. Debi Din*. (Isolated plot of plaintiff zamindar occupied by tenant of another zamindar—Attention of plaintiff not directed to question of whether it was in his mahal or in that of other zamindar—Plaintiff is deemed to be in constructive possession and there is no dispossession of the plaintiff.)

(1892) 16 Bom 339 (341), *Framji Cursetji v. Gokuldas Madhwaraj*. (Vacant site—Temporary acts of user without any claim of ownership being thereby intended is not adverse possession.)

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 492 (492) 78 Ind Cas 152, *Mangat Ram v. Siraj-ul-Hasan*. (Merely burying dead bodies in waste land does not amount to dispossession so as to be adverse to the real owner.)

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 324 (324) 176 Ind Cas 930, *Shah Nawaz v. Ghulam Shah*. (Waste land—Building of temporary chhappar, surrounded by ordinary enclosure of bushes, is not sufficient to constitute adverse possession.)

(1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 20 (23) 41 Ind Cas 80, *Rati Pal v. Dipa Chandra Chatterjee*. (Mere casual acts of cutting wood in a large tract of jungle or occasional acts of cultivation need not be treated as an ouster of the owner's possession.)

(1929) A I R 1929 All 428 (429) 116 Ind Cas 816, *Cheri v. Ramsenak*. (Planting by residents in the shade of trees on vacant land near their houses cannot by itself be any evidence of the establishment of exclusive possession.)

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 49 (50) 99 Ind Cas 849, *Nanda Kumar v. Emdad Ali*. (In the case of waste land the cutting of hogla which is a wild grass where it is not supposed to be the exclusive property of any one, is not an act of possession by any party.)

(1926) A I R 1926 Lah 615 (616) 97 Ind Cas 705, *Rula v. Nur Mohammad*. (Erection and user of a cattle shed on a vacant site.)

(1933) A I R 1933 Bom 314 (317) 145 Ind Cas 403, *Secretary of State v. Jaterchand Panaji*. (The physical facts proved coupled with the evidence in the case proved adverse possession.)

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 757 (758) 60 Ind Cas 386, *Moharaj Bahadur Singh v. Pulai Mal*. (Where with the intention of taking possession of a

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 11

Again, the mere existence of the *animus possidendi* will not be

strip of waste land belonging to the plaintiff, defendant deposits earth excavated from a tank and cuts the trees thereon and plaintiff sued more than 12 years afterwards to recover possession. *Held*, that the acts of defendant amounted to ouster of plaintiff.)

- (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 526 (527) : 117 Ind Cas 81, *Dev Ditta Ram v. Waryam* (Dumping of rubbish, tethering of cattle, etc., if they had stood by themselves, would not have been sufficient to prove adverse possession on the part of the defendant, but in conjunction with the fact that the defendant had enclosed the land in dispute with a wall which had been in existence for a period much longer than 12 years, were sufficient proof of his adverse possession.)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 565 (566) : 96 Ind Cas 328, *Mahlan v. Harnan Singh* (Depositing manure on a vacant site in an abadi without the actual possession of the site, does not amount to adverse possession.)
- (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 35 (35) : 69 Ind Cas 363, *Ram Das v. Chand*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 825 (327) : 64 Ind Cas 876, *Birjoo v. Bhikhu*. (Where one of co-sharers sold a definite portion of the unpartitioned shamlat, which did not belong to him exclusively, and after the sale the stranger vendee occupied the land and enjoyed it precisely in the same way as

not having been shown that it was impossible in the nature of things for the strangers to occupy the land by corporal contact, the element of continuity and the necessary adversity have not been established)

- (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 1176 (1180) : 52 Mad 25 : 115 Ind Cas 49, *Secretary of State v. Kuthalanathuswami Temple* (Fugitive and intermittent acts of ownership would not establish any effective possession)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 235 (236) : 92 Ind Cas 18, *Municipal Council, Cochin v. Davu Derussi*. (The act of sweeping the land occasionally by the municipality cannot be said to be adverse possession as against the real owner.)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 720 (720) : 24 Ind Cas 735, *Pulloor Boyanna v. Golusu Asethu*.
- (1900) 1900 Pun L R p. 142 (143), *Dev Ditta v. Ida*. (The mere fact of certain
- (1879) 3 Bom 452 (564), *Bhaskarappa v. Collector of North Kanara*. (Carrying on cultivations in different parts of a forest does not itself make one an owner of the forest.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 492 (492) : 78 Ind Cas 152, *Mangat Ram v. Siraj-ul-Hasan*. (Using land for burial purposes for more than twelve years does not constitute adverse possession.)
- (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 112 (112) : 106 Ind Cas 615, *Mulh Ram v. Harkesh*.
- (1926) 96 Ind Cas 452 (453) (Pat), *Hemat v. Karu Sahu*. (Mere throwing of rubbish and house sweepings on the land in dispute.)
- (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 489 (490) : 134 Ind Cas 294, *Nawab Khan v. Abdulla Khan*. (Erection of Khurli or mud trough and other such temporary and flimsy erections do not give rise to adverse possession.)
- (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 416 (417) : 102 Ind Cas 9, *Kunj Lal v. Ramji Lal*. (Planting of trees on common land is not adverse possession.)
- (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 97 (98) : 94 Ind Cas 5, *Mohendra Nath v. Nabadwip Chandra*. (Occasional user of land for the purpose of exercising a

sufficient without *actual use*.^{8a} Thus, the mere entry of a piece of land in the Revenue Records as Government waste does not transfer possession to Government.^{8b}

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 11

As regards the *corpus possessionis*, the nature of the requisite possession must vary with the nature of the subject possessed. The possession must be a kind of possession of which the particular subject is susceptible.¹⁰ A forest land on hills, very little of it being capable of cultivation, "is far removed as a subject of definite possession from lands under continuous and permanent cultivation,

(See also (1922) A I R 1922 All 50 (51) 70 Ind Cas 483, *Md Shafi v. Bindeshari Singh* (Planting of trees on another person's land is active trespass))

(1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 328 (330) : 114 Ind Cas 815, *Jagatjit Singh v. Muhammad Asghar Ali* (Every owner must be presumed to know the boundary of his own land and if he allows another person to cross that boundary and occupy an area of at least 25 acres, possibly more, and plant thereon a number of trees and forbid the owner's men to enter the land, and this possession extends for a period of over 12 years, it must be held that a title has been obtained by adverse possession))

9a (1934) 67 Mad L Jour 43 (N R C) (Where the land is a waste land, mere assertion of hostile title by another and a sale of the land by him to a third party is not sufficient to disturb the true owner)

(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 645 (693) 9 Pat 447 122 Ind Cas 801, *Gopiram v. Jagannath Singh* (Defendant not owner of sub-soil granting lease to X, in 1887—Lessee working mines only in 1913—X cannot be said to be in possession from 1887.)

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 117 (121) : 101 Ind Cas 62, *Pannalal Ghose v. Adjas Coal Co., Ltd.* (Asserting possession in a written statement is not sufficient to show possession)

(1933) A I R 1933 Nag 202 (203, 204) 142 Ind Cas 493 20 Nag L R 187, *Mt Manju v. Gulab Rao* (Mere continuation of name in the mutation register does not amount to adverse possession)

9b (1914) 24 Ind Cas 813 (818) 7 Sind L R 169, *Secretary of State v. Mushtak Singh*

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 863 (365) (Cal), *Joy Kali Roy Choudhury v. Hemangini Devi*

(1913) 18 Ind Cas 811 (813) (All), *Ganga Sahai v. Kanhaiya Lal*,

[See also (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 80 (82) 22 Oudh Cas 369 54 Ind Cas 317, *Bhagwan Bahadur Singh v. Sant Prasad*, (Where there was no invasion of plaintiff's rights beyond certain entries in the settlement khewat no question of adverse possession arises.)

(1907) 6 Cal L Jour 472 (486), *Mu Waznuddin v. Lala Deoki Nandan*]

10 (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (25) 147 Ind Cas 545 61 Ind App 78 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan*

(1922) A I R 1922 P C 181 (181, 182) 66 Ind Cas 151 48 Ind App 395 44 Mad 883 (P C) *Kuthali Moothavar v. Kunharan Kutty*

(1914) A I R 1914 Cal 762 (763) 23 Ind Cas 136, *Hemchandra v. Secretary of State* (It is as unnecessary as it would be impossible for the grantee of a fishery to exercise his rights over every part of the fishery in order to avoid losing them by lapse of time)

(1903) 31 Cal 397 (403), *Wali Ahmed Choudhry v. Tota Meah Choudhry* (Acts indicative of possession must vary according to the nature of the property over which possession is exercised and in the case of waste lands, the cutting of grass and grazing of cattle would be the ordinary acts by which possession would be asserted. But where the acts are being done by persons on the waste lands of their landlords, the principle can only apply, if the acts done were such as to amount to an assertion of possession adverse to the landlords, and were not acts which were done with their permission)

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 11-12**

compactly situated and capable of being remembered with identification as the lands held and occupied in articulate plots or under leases."¹¹ The Crown, in the case of a fishery belonging to it, exercises its rights by granting leases or licences to fish; it does not itself fish. Consequently the granting, by a person other than the Crown, of leases or licences to fish in the case of a fishery which *prima facie* belongs to the Crown is evidence of usurpation by that person of the distinctive rights of the Crown and is thus most significant evidence of adverse possession.¹²

Where a person entitled to possession enters in the assertion of that possession, the law vests the actual possession in him. If there are two persons in a field each asserting that the land is his, and each doing some act in the assertion of the right of possession and if the question is which of these two is in actual possession, it must be held that the person who has the title is in actual possession and the other person is a trespasser.¹³

12. Possession of part, if possession of whole. — It is a well settled proposition of law that in the case of a rightful owner of property, proof of actual possession of a part of the property will be sufficient to prove his possession of the whole, except such portions of it as may be in the actual possession of another.¹ But, in the case of a trespasser, claiming to be in adverse possession against the true owner, the trespasser will not be deemed

(1935) 163 Ind Cas 897 (902) : 63 Cal 800, *Surendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury v. Ahmed Nawab Choudhury*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 454 (455) : 178 Ind Cas 801, *Atchayya Patrudu v. Jalaluddin Sahib*.

(1917) A I R 1917 P C 18 (22) : 44 Ind App 104 : 41 Cal 859 : 40 Ind Cas 837, *Basant Kumar Roy v. Secretary of State*.

(1910) 7 Ind Cas 700 (701) (Cal), *Raj Krishna v. Muktaram Das*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 470 (471) : 110 Ind Cas 569, *Md. Hasan Ali v. Har Nath Kuer*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 130 (135) : 5 Pat 80 : 91 Ind Cas 169, *Midnapur Zamindari Co. v. Ram Kanai Singh Deo*.

(1908) 5 Cal 229 (1908) 5 Cal 229 : Lord Lovat.

Young.

: 105 L T 587 : 55 S J 696 : 27

(1908) 7 Cal L Jour 414 (421) : 12 Cal W N 273 : 3 Mad L Tim 212, *Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Kunj Behari Lall*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 294 (295) : 149 Ind Cas 1109, *Nalaki v. Abhoya Chandra Sil*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Sidd 182 (141) : 176 Ind Cas 549, *Tahuram Tachchand v. Mt. Mural*.

11. (1922) A I R 1922 P C 181 (181, 182) : 66 Ind Cas 451 : 48 Ind App 395 : 41 Mad 883 (P C), *Kuthali Moolhatar v. Kunharan Kutty*.

12. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (25) : 147 Ind Cas 545 : 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendralal Khan*.

13. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 442 (447) (Cal), *Budhumukhi Das v. Jitendra Nath Roy*.

Note 12

1. (1901) 26 Bom 410 (416) : 4 Bom L R 28, *Vithaldas v. Secretary of State*.

(1936) 164 Ind Cas 452 (454, 455) (Cal), *Durgaram Chaudhury v. Amrita Chandra*.

to be in possession of the whole of a property merely because he is in possession of a part of it.² The reason is that, as will be seen in Note 53 *infra*, in order to constitute adverse possession, the

Arts. 142 & 144-
Note 12

- (1908) 3 Mad L Tim 212 (220) : 12 Cal W N 273 - 7 Cal L Jour 414, *Mirza Shamsheer Bahadur v. Munshi Kunj Behari Lal*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 379 (389) 57 Ind Cas 786 5 Pat L Jour 563, *Ramlal v. Satya Niranjan Chakravarti*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 222 (223) . 17 Pat 210 , 175 Ind Cas 165, *Chandra Mohan Singh v. Ratu Mian* (Large area of waste land settled with tenant—Cultivation of bulk of demised land amounts to enjoyment of possession for purposes of Article 142 in absence of specific acts of adverse possession)
2. (1896) 24 Cal 256 (259) : 1 Cal W N 304, *Mohini Mohan Roy v. Promoda Nath Roy*.
- (1903) 31 Cal 397 (404), *Wah Ahmed v. Tota Meah*.
- (1907) 34 Cal 753 (774) 5 Cal L Jour 583 : 12 Cal W N 193, *Drojo Nath Bose v. Durga Pershad Singh*.
- (1935) 163 Ind Cas 697 (902) . 63 Cal 300, *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmed Nawab*.
- (1935) 164 I C 452 (454) (Cal), *Burgaram Choudhury v. Amrita Chandra*.
- (1904) 9 Cal W N 292 (300), *Dagdu Majhi v. Durga Prasad Singha*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 464 (473) . 29 Ind Cas 156, *Amrita Sundari v. Sheerajuddin Ahmed*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 782 (795) . 47 Ind Cas 315 (S B), *Shib Chandra Roy v. Harendra Lal Rai*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 277 (282) 66 Ind Cas 923, *Maharaja of Cooh-Behar v. Mahendra Ranjan Rai Chaudhuri*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 981 (993) 85 Ind Cas 591, *Abhoy Sanhar v. Satyendra Prasanna*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 117 (121) : 101 Ind Cas 62, *Panna Lal Ghose v. Adjas Coal Co. Ltd*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (762) 159 Ind Cas 752, *Dhabani Prasanna Lahiri v. Manindra Chandra Roy*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 76 (77) 120 Ind Cas 531, *Mohammad Sadiq v. Allah Baksh*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 303 (304) 120 Ind Cas 792, *Mangal Singh v. Ali Sher*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 380 (390) 23 Ind Cas 530, *Karia Kownden v. Baghara Reddi*.
- (1908) 3 Mad L Tim 212 (220) 12 Cal W N 273 7 Cal L Jour 414, *Mirza Shamsheer Bahadur v. Munshi Kunj Behari Lal*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 470 (471) . 110 Ind Cas 569, *Mahomed Hasan Ali v. Harnath Koer*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 135 (137) 135 Ind Cas 689, *Indar Gur v. Special Manager, Court of Wards, Balrampur Estate*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 207 (208, 209) 165 Ind Cas 104, *Ramzan v. Md. Ahmed Khan*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 387 (396) 164 Ind Cas 118, *Paratap Bahadur Singh v. Jagatjit Singh*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 393 (394) 55 Ind Cas 113, *Lodna Colliery Co. Ltd v. Bipin Behari Bose*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 542 (546) 56 Ind Cas 184 . 5 Pat L Jour 273, *Pramatha Nath v. A. J. Meek*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 379 (389, 390) . 57 Ind Cas 786, *Ram Lal Kari Raj v. Satya Niranjan*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 402 (416) 83 Ind Cas 205 3 Pat 85, *Sashi Dhusan v. Ramjas Agarwalla*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 209 (209) . 101 Ind Cas 714, *Saif Hussain v. Etisad Hussain*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 685 (693) 9 Pat 447 : 122 Ind Cas 501, *Gopi Ram v. Jagarnath*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 12**

possession must be *actual*. In other words, the trespasser's adverse possession must be confined to the area *actually* occupied by him,³ and mere constructive possession on the part of a person will not enable him to prescribe for a title by adverse possession.⁴ But, what constitutes actual possession of the whole of a property by a trespasser depends on the circumstances of each case.⁵

Illustrations

1. Possession of a part by a trespasser will be evidence of possession of any other part also, where the two parts are so closely

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- (1931) A I R 1931 Pat 436 (439) 133 Ind Cas 453, *Dajinath Jugal Kishore v. Manindra Chandra Nandi*.
 (1909) 2 Ind Cas 63 (65) 12 Oudh C 58, *Maheswar Baksh Singh v. Pratap Bahadur Singh*.
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 359 (360) (Cal), *Baroda Prasad v. Annoda Mohan*.
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 392 (397) (Cal), *Nauab Bahadur of Murshidabad v. Gopinath Mandal*.
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 742 (744) (All), *Zahuram v. Rahim*.
 (1922) 65 Ind Cas 749 (752) (Oudh), *Durga v. Ram Padarath*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Pat 33 (36) 13 Pat 517 156 Ind Cas 136, *Muktakeshi Patrani v. Midnapur Zemindary Co Ltd* (Removal of comparatively small quantity of minerals is not sufficient to constitute adverse possession. There must be complete exclusion of the true owner. Adverse possession affects only minerals for which possession has been proved.)
 3. (1936) 163 Ind Cas 897 (902) 63 Cal 300 (312), *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmed Nawab Chowdhury*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 303 (304) 120 Ind Cas 792, *Mangal Singh v. Ali Sher*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 374 (376) 126 Ind Cas 675, *Sohan Lal v. Saikh Mohammad Hussain*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 365 (361) 96 Ind Cas 1027, *Keshabji Pitambar v. Shashi Bhusan*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 209 (209) 101 Ind Cas 714, *Sadik Husain v. Elzad Husain*.
 [But see (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 389 (392) 71 Ind Cas 805, *Muhammad Hassan v. Sohara*. (If land is partly cultivated and partly uncultivated and the plaintiff acquires title to the former by adverse possession, he also acquires title to the latter.)]
 4. (1908) 35 Cal 961 (972) 6 Cal L Jour 735 12 Cal W N 127, *Jogendranath Rai v. Baldev Das Marwari*.
 (1906) 3 Cal L Jour 316 (331), *Ananda Hari v. Secretary of State*.
 (1908) 7 Cal L Jour 414 (423) 12 Cal W N 273 3 Mad L Tim 212, *Mirza Shamsheer Bahadur v. Kunj Behari Lal*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 762 (795) 47 Ind Cas 315 (S B), *Shib Chandra Roy v. Harendra Lal Rai*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 855 (863) 51 Cal 669 78 Ind Cas 679, *Suresh Chandra v. Shifu Kanfa*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 270 (271) 61 Ind Cas 279, *Girish Chandra Pal v. Dakshintha Nath*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 951 (983) 85 Ind Cas 591, *Abhoy Sankar v. Satyendra Prasanna*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (761) 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prosanna Lahiri v. Manindra Chandra Roy*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 470 (471) 110 Ind Cas 569, *Mohammad Hussain Ali v. Harnath Kuer*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 20 (23) 124 Ind Cas 631, *Shyam Kreshito Shaw v. Ganesh Kakar*.
 5. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 295 (301) 58 Ind Cas 639, *Secretary of State v. Venkatarasimha Naidu*. (*Held*, in the circumstances of the case that the adverse possessor was in possession of the whole.)

connected or interdependent that the possession of either of them can be treated as possession of the other.⁶

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 12-14

2. Where a tract of land with a defined boundary has been throughout claimed by a person as owner and acts of ownership have been done upon various portions of it, such acts of enjoyment may be accepted as evidence of the possession of the whole.⁷

3. Where the defendant worked certain quarries belonging to the plaintiff in all parts of the land openly without objection or opposition, it was held that they worked the quarries in such a way as to prove possession of the whole.⁸

13. Possession of house is possession of site.—The possession of a house is also the possession of the site on which that house stands and if the house has been in adverse possession for more than twelve years, a suit for the recovery of the site is barred.¹

14. Plaintiff only in constructive possession—Dispossession or discontinuance of possession.—As has been seen in Note 9 *ante*, a dispossession or a discontinuance of possession necessarily involves the position that the *plaintiff* must have been in *actual* possession or possession in fact and must have been driven out or must have gone out of such possession. Where therefore the plaintiff is *only in constructive* possession or possession *in law* of the property, there can be no dispossession or discontinuance possible in the sense in which it is used in Article 142. But there may, nevertheless, be an adverse actual possession of such property. Thus, where the owner of land makes a grant of the surface rights thereof to another, he remains, as has been seen in Note 11 *ante*, in the eye of law in possession of the subsoil *constructively*. But a third person may without right work mines in the subsoil and this would clearly be in actual adverse possession. A suit by the owner for possession of the subsoil by driving out the intruder would be governed, not by Article 142 but by Article 144.¹

6. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 855 (861) 78 Ind Cas 679 51 Cal 660, *Suresh Chandra v Shri Kantia*.

(1935) 164 Ind Cas 452 (455) (Cal), *Durgaram Chaudhury v Amrita Chandra*.

7 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 753 (754) 99 Ind Cas 693, *Nirzam Din v Ali Mohammad*.

(1886) 9 Mad 285 (304, 305) *Srinambaramaya v Secretary of State*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Sind 201 (203) 82 Ind Cas 861, *Ramzan v Fakir Muhammad*.

(1911) 9 Ind Cas 9 (10) 34 Mad 353, *Subramania Pillai v Secy of State*.

8 (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 956 (960) 55 Cal 35 106 Ind Cas 117, *Rajeswar Prasad v Bhupendra Narayan*.

Note 13

1. (1910) 6 Ind Cas 683 (683) (Mad), *Nwadin Kasim v Morris Sebastian Pereira*.

Note 14

1. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 162 (164) 132 Ind Cas 610 58 Ind A J p 223 - 59 Cal 80 (P C), *Bhupendra Narayan v Rajeswar Prasad*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 15**

15. Principle that possession follows title. — It is a fundamental principle that possession is *presumptive evidence of a seisin in fee* until the contrary is shown.¹ In *Jones v. Smith*,² Vice-Chancellor Wigram observed that "possession is *prima facie* evidence of a seisin in fee," and in *Asher v. Whitlock*,³ Cockburn, C. J., observed "I take it to be established authority that possession is good against all the world except the person who can show a better title than the one in possession."

Possession is, therefore, *prima facie* a good title against all but the true owner,⁴ and this is recognised by Section 110 of the Evidence Act which runs as follows :

(1925) A I R 1925 P C 42 (43) : 4 Pat 244 52 Ind App 109 : 86 Ind Cas 289 (P C), *Satya Niranjan v. Ram Lal*.

Note 15

1. (1852) 6 Bom 215 (224) : 6 Ind Jur 416 (F B), *Pemraj Bhatani Ram v. Narayan Shitram*.
- (1863) 10 Moo Ind App 47 (58) 2 Sar 65 (P C), *Zamindar of Ramnad v. Zamindar of Yellapooram*. (In the absence of clear title in the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on his prior long possession if dispossessed—A in possession for 20 years dispossessed by B—Suit by A against B—Neither party showing title—A's possession must prevail as being sufficient proof of title)
- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 411 (418) : 126 Ind Cas 769, *Taraheswar Pal v. Satish Kanta Roy*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Bom 201 (209) 103 Ind Cas 632, *Govindbhai v. Dahya-bhai*. (Such presumption is rebuttable)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 128 (128) . 41 Cal 894 . 25 Ind Cas 70, *Adhar Chandra v. Dibakar Bhuyan*.
- (1867) 7 Suth W R 485 (486), *Gopcenath Doss v. Dyanidhee Sundura Moha-pattur*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 149 (157) : 118 Ind Cas 566, *Khantamoy Debī v. Hirdayananda Bhattacharjee*.
- (1895) 9 Mad 285 (304), *Suasubramanya v Secretary of State*.
- (1866) 6 Suth W R 82 (83), *Gooroo Pershad v. Bykunto Chunder Roy*. (Evidence of possession and enjoyment is good evidence of title as against the real owner only where it has been undisputed and continuous.)
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 955 (956) (Mad), *Gopalaswamy Chetty v. Secretary of State* with respect to
- (1868) _____ Singh.
- (1869) _____ Ghose v. *Kailas Nath Sidhanta*.
- (1869) 12 Suth W R 315 (316), *Jaykishan Mookerjee v. Raj Kishan Mookerjee*.
- (1872) 17 Suth W R 490 (492), *Lallee Singh v. Mt. Amrit Koorer*.
[See (1868) 9 Suth W R 98 (100), *Mt. Woosterun v. Noorul Jan.*]
2. (1841) 58 R R 22 (31) : 1 Hare 43 : 11 L J Ch 83.
3. (1865) 148 R R 598 (602) 14 W R (Eng) 26 : L R 1 Q B 1 : 35 L J Q B 17 : 11 Jur (N S) 925 , 18 L T (N S) 251
4. (1882) 6 Bom 215 (222, 223) . 6 Ind Jur 416 (F B), *Pemraj Bhatani Ram v. Narayan Shitram*.
- (1909) 10 Bom L R 571 (575), *Bhagwant Singh v. Secretary of State*.
- (1904) 27 All 169 (171) 1 All L Jour 625 : 1904 All W N 222, *Pahlwan Singh v. Ram Bharose*. (It is an interest in the property which is heritable and alienable)
- (1922) A I R 1922 All 277 (278) : 66 Ind Cas 529, *Rameshwar Dube v. S. H. Dube*.
- (1889) 1889 Bom P J 309, *Sakalchand v. Sundarlal*.

"When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner."

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 15

The converse of the above principle is also a well recognised principle, namely that title ordinarily carries with it the presumption of possession and that, where the question is as to who was in possession of a land, the presumption is that the true owner was in possession, in other words, *that possession follows title*.⁵ Thus,

- (1896) 1896 Bom P J 200, *Mt. Gatabai v. Dattubawa*.
 (1912) 15 Ind Cas 97 (98, 99) (Mad), *Adinarayana Iyer v. Krishnan*.
 (1929) 118 Ind Cas 650 (680) (Nag), *Nago v. Rajeshwar Sansthan Ahola*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 All 241 (242) · 81 Ind Cas 952, *Anand Sarup v. Chawua*.
 (Plaintiff proving title—Defendant's possession though long, not proved to be adverse to plaintiff—Plaintiff decreed possession)
 (1902) 24 All 157 (153) 1901 All W N 201, *Gobind Prasad v. Mohan Lal (Do)*.
 (1885) 9 Bom 137 (140), *Ramachandra Apati v. Balaji Bhaurav*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 1021 (1022) , 91 Ind Cas 503, *Gangayya v. Satyanarayana* (This defence cannot avail a defendant when the true owner himself is also a party to the suit)
 [See also (1809) 9 Suth W R 120 (120, 121), *Puran Chunder v. Protap Narain*]
 5. (1847) 76 R R 794 (799) 2 Ex 803, 18 L J Ex 456, *Jones v Chapman* (Per Maule J)
 (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 207 (209) · 149 Ind Cas 882 & 885 · 58 Bom 397 & 406 (F B), *Krishnaji v. Madhusa*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 1094 (1095) 90 Ind Cas 971, *Kunhi Moidin v. Pakkar Kutty*.
 (1902) 26 Bom 410 (416) 4 Bom L R 28, *Vithaldas v. Secretary of State*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 27 (27) 76 Ind Cas 591, *Secretary of State v. Lakshminishankar* (The open space between the houses presumably belongs to the owners of the surrounding houses)
 (1904) 8 Cal W N 876 (880), *Kasturi Singh v. Bissen Pragas Narain Singh*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 977 (978) 79 Ind Cas 1038, *Kaly Prossanna Bahadur v. Hemanta Kunari Debi*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 501 (502) 134 Ind Cas 319, *Jira Bewa v. Uma Charan Saha*. (It is not necessary that it must be shown that the land was incapable of enjoyment before the presumption is drawn)
 (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 634 (637, 638) 141 Ind Cas 320, *Galstaun v. Profulla Kumar De*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 192 (203) 142 Ind Cas 535, *Sarat Chandra v. Bhoo-pendra Narain* (Newly formed Chur lands.—Both parties scrambling for possession.—Possession follows title)
 (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 13 (14) 89 Ind Cas 935, *Ismail v. Ibrahim*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 37 (37) 97 Ind Cas 1006, *Tuharam Bajirao v. Tuharam Yeshwant*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 50 (52) 56 Ind Cas 720, *Janki Saran v. Widow of Mahomed Sadiq*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 170 (171) 81 Ind Cas 583, *Subbhan Pande v. Mahesh Prasad*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 528 (529) 96 Ind Cas 225, *Siddh Nath v. Barjor Singh* (Plaintiff can invoke the presumption that possession follows title, if he proves ownership up to the time immediately preceding 12 years where manifest acts of enjoyment cannot be proved)
 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 141 (142) 1 Luck 441 29 Oudh Cas 395 98 Ind Cas 704, *Barjor Singh v. Sidh Nath* (A I R 1926 Oudh 528, Overruled)
 (1910) 7 Ind Cas 700 (701) (Cal), *Raj Krishna v. Mukhtaram Das*

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 15

15. Principle that possession follows title. — It is a fundamental principle that possession is *presumptive evidence of a seisin in fee* until the contrary is shown.¹ In *Jones v. Smith*,² Vice-Chancellor Wigram observed that "possession is *prima facie* evidence of a seisin in fee," and in *Asher v. Whitlock*,³ Cockburn, C. J., observed "I take it to be established authority that possession is good against all the world except the person who can show a better title than the one in possession."

Possession is, therefore, *prima facie* a good title against all but the true owner,⁴ and this is recognised by Section 110 of the Evidence Act which runs as follows :

(1925) A I R 1925 P C 42 (43) . 4 Pat 244 : 52 Ind App 109 : 86 Ind Cas 289 (P C), *Satya Naranjan v. Ram Lal*

Note 15

1. (1852) 8 Bom 215 (224) . 6 Ind Jur 416 (F B), *Pemraj Bhavani Ram v. Narayan Shuram*
- (1863) 10 Moo Ind App 47 (56) . 3 Sar 65 (P C), *Zamindar of Yettiapooram*. (In the absence of clear title in the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on his prior long possession if dispossessed—A in possession for 20 years dispossessed by B—Suit by A against B—Neither party showing title—A's possession must prevail as being sufficient proof of title.)
- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 411 (418) : 126 Ind Cas 769, *Tarakeswar Pal v. Satish Kanta Roy*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Bom 201 (209) . 163 Ind Cas 632, *Govindbhas v. Dahyabhas* (Such presumption is rebuttable)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 128 (128) : 41 Cal 394 . 25 Ind Cas 70, *Adhar Chandra v. Dibakar Bhuyan*.
- (1867) 7 Suth W R 485 (486), *Gopeenath Doss v. Dyanidhee Sundura Mohapattur*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 149 (157) . 118 Ind Cas 566, *Khandamoy Deb v. Hridayananda Bhattacharjee*.
- (1868) 9 Suth W R 98 (100), *Mt. Woorcerun v. Noorul Jan.*
- (1869) 9 Suth W R 315 (316), *Joykishen Mookerjee v. Raj Kishen Mookerjee*.
- (1872) 17 Suth W R 490 (492), *Lallee Singh v. Mt. Amrit Koor*.
- (1841) 58 R R 22 (31) : 1 Hare 43 : 11 L J Ch 83.
- (1865) 148 R R 598 (602) . 14 W R (Eng) 26 . L R 1 Q B 1 : 35 L J Q B 17 : 11 Jur (N S) 925 ; 13 L T (N S) 251.
4. (1852) 6 Bom 215 (222, 223) . 6 Ind Jur 416 (F B), *Pemraj Bhavani Ram v. Secretary of State*.

1901 All W N 222, *Pahlwan*
rest in the property which is

(1922) A I R 1922 AH 277 (278) . 66 Ind Cas 529, *Rameshwar Dube v. S. H. Dube*.

(1889) 1889 Bom P J 309, *Sakalchand v. Sundarlal*.

"When the question is whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he is not the owner." Arts. 142 & 144
Note 15

The converse of the above principle is also a well recognised principle, namely that title ordinarily carries with it the presumption of possession and that, where the question is as to who was in possession of a land, the presumption is that the true owner was in possession, in other words, *that possession follows title*.⁶ This,

- (1596) 1896 Bom P J 200, *Mt. Gitabai v. Dattuboua*.
 (1912) 15 Ind Cas 97 (93, 99) (Mad), *Adinarayana Iyer v. Krishnan*.
 (1929) 118 Ind Cas 680 (680) (Nag), *Nago v. Rajeshwar Sansthan Ahola*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 All 241 (242) - 34 Ind Cas 952, *Anand Sarup v. Chawua*.
 (Plaintiff proving title—Defendant's possession though long, not proved to be adverse to plaintiff—Plaintiff decreed possession.)
 (1902) 24 All 157 (159) 1901 All W N 204, *Goland Prasad v. Mohan Lal (Do)*.
 (1885) 9 Bom 137 (140), *Ramachandra Apaji v. Balaji Bhaurai*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 1021 (1022) 91 Ind Cas 503, *Gangayya v. Satyanarayana* (This defence cannot avail a defendant when the true owner himself is also a party to the suit)
 [See also (1809) 9 Suth W R 120 (120, 121), *Puran Chunder v. Protap Narain*]
 5 (1847) 70 R R 794 (799) 2 Ex 803. 18 L J Ex 456, *Jones v. Chapman* (Per Maule J.)
 (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 207 (203) 149 Ind Cas 682 & 685 : 53 Bom 897 & 406 (F B), *Krishnaji v. Madhusa*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 1034 (1035) - 99 Ind Cas 971, *Kunhi Noidin v. Pakhar Kutty*.
 (1902) 20 Bom 410 (410) 4 Bom L R 28, *Fithaldas v. Secretary of State*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 27 (27) 76 Ind Cas 591, *Secretary of State v. Lakshmishankar* (The open space between the houses presumably belongs to the owners of the surrounding houses)
 (1904) 8 Cal W N 876 (880), *Kasturi Singh v. Dissen Pragas Narain Singh*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 977 (978) 79 Ind Cas 1035, *Kali Prasanna Bahaduri v. Hemanta Kumar Deb*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 501 (502) 134 Ind Cas 819, *Jira Bewa v. Uma Charan Saha* (It is not necessary that it must be shown that the land was incapable of enjoyment before the presumption is drawn.)
 (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 634 (637, 638) 141 Ind Cas 320, *Galstaun v. Profulla Kumar De*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 193 (203) 142 Ind Cas 525, *Sarat Chandra v. Bhoo- pendra Narain* (Newly formed Chur lands.—Both parties scrambling for possession.—Possession follows title)
 (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 13 (14) 89 Ind Cas 995, *Ismail v. Ibrahim*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 37 (37) 97 Ind Cas 1006, *Tukaram Bajnao v. Tukaram Yeshwant*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 50 (52) . 56 Ind Cas 720, *Janaki Saran v. Widow of Mahomed Sadiq*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 170 (171) 81 Ind Cas 688, *Subdhan Pande v. Mahesh Prasad*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 528 (529) 96 Ind Cas 225, *Siddhnath v. Barjor Singh*. (Plaintiff can invoke the presumption that possession follows title, if he proves ownership up to the time immediately preceding 12 years where manifest acts of enjoyment cannot be proved)
 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 141 (142) 1 Luck 411 29 Oudh Cas 395 : 93 Ind Cas 704, *Barjor Singh v. Sidh Nath* (A I R 1926 Oudh 528, Overruled)
 (1910) 7 Ind Cas 700 (701) (Cal), *Raj Krishna v. Mukhtaram Das*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 15

however, is not always a *presumption of law*, which a Court is bound to draw in all cases.⁶ There is no provision corresponding to Section 110 of the Evidence Act providing that a person who has the title *should* be presumed to be in possession. But such a presumption *may* be drawn under Section 114 of the Evidence Act⁷ which runs as follows.

"The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case."

In *Kashinath v. Ganesh*,⁸ Mr. Justice Fawcett observed as follows:

"It is not an absolute presumption of law, but a purely discretionary one depending upon the particular circumstances of each case. This conforms with the provisions of the Evidence Act, for though Section 110 recognised a presumption that a person in possession has also a good title, there is no corresponding Section saying that the person with the title should be presumed to be in possession. This presumption is one that can only come under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which allows the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events."

The presumption is thus one of *fact* and the Court has a *discretion* to draw it or not having regard to the circumstances of the case.^{8a} As in the case of the exercise of discretion of every kind, this discretion also must be exercised on judicial principles. The presumption will not, of course, apply where there is definite evidence to the

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 442 (447) (Cal), *Bidhumukhi Das v. Jitendra Nath Roy*.

(1918) 45 Ind Cas 217 (217) (Nag), *Raghoba v. Palhoba*.

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 619 (620) (Mad), *Sundara Sastrial v. Gorinda Mandarayan*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 471 (473) 41 Ind Cas 114 2 Pat L Jour 506, *Midnapore Zamindari Co. Ltd. v. Panday Sardar*.

(1891) L R 2 Q B 18 (27) 63 L J Q B 513 : 9 R 407 : 70 L T 788. 1 Manson 181, *Ramsay v. Margaret*.

(1923) 111 Ind Cas 376 (377) (Oudh), *Sant Bahsh v. Ram Nath*.

[See also (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 777 (778) : 100 Ind Cas 336, *Dullah v. Mt. Sardaran*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Upp Bur 44 (45) : 27 Ind Cas 981, *Nga Po v. Nga So Pe*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 529 (529) : 143 Ind Cas 620, *Aya Singh v. Latif*.

(1869) 9 Suth W R 556 (557), *Shahabooddeen Chowdhry v. Ram Gutty Chuckerbutty*.]

6. (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 509 (511) 101 Ind Cas 813, *Venkata Somayajulu v. Suryanarayana*.

7. (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 361 (369) . 77 Ind Cas 506, *Kashinath Gyanoba v. Ganesh Sitaran*.

8. (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 361 (362, 363) . 77 Ind Cas 506

8a (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 153 (160) 53 Ind Cas 774 : 5 Pat L Jour 721, *Inder Lal v. Ram Surat Kuer*.

[See also (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 831 (831) : 27 Ind Cas 802, *Sarojini Devi v. Kartabash Das*]

contrary.^{8b} In *Runjeet Ram Panday v. Goburdhun Ram Panday*,⁹ Arts. 142 & 144 their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows. Note 15

- "Now the ordinary presumption would be that possession went with the title. That presumption cannot be, of course, of any avail in the presence of clear evidence to the contrary; but, where there is strong evidence of possession, as there is here, on the part of the respondents—opposed by evidence, apparently strong also on the part of the appellant—their Lordships think that in estimating the weight due to the evidence on both sides, the presumption may under the peculiar circumstances of this case be regarded."

In *Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Maharajah Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur*,¹⁰ their Lordships of the Privy Council again expressed a similar view. They said.

"It is for the appellant, as plaintiff in a suit for ejectment, to prove possession prior to the dispossession which she alleges. At the same time their Lordships consider that in this question of evidence the initial fact of the appellant's title comes to her aid with greater or less force according to the circumstances established in the evidence."

In the case of open, waste or jungle lands, which do not admit of enjoyment by acts of ownership in the same manner as other property,¹¹ or where there is no evidence let in on either side of any

- 5b (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 84 (86) 111 Ind Cas 533, *Nand Lal v. Lahri*
 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (565) 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhachandra v. Durga Das*
 (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 393 (393) 91 Ind Cas 1049, *Bahadur v. Saghar*
 9. (1973) 20 Suth W R (P C) 25 (30) 14 Moo Ind App 203 9 Beng L R 400
 2 Suther 479 2 Sur 731 (P C)
 10. (1906) 16 Mad L Jour 272 (273) 10 Cal W N 630 1 Mad L Tim 135 3 All L Jour 863 8 Bom L R 400 (P C).
 11. (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 243 (244) 66 Ind Cas 764 46 Bom 920, *Muhamad Sahib Ibrahimshah v. Tilokchand Abheerchand* (Open sites)
 (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 477 (478) 89 Ind Cas 894, *Uluappa Basawanappa v. Gadigewa Hugar*.
 (1906) 12 Cal W N 273 (277, 279) 3 Mad L Tim 212 7 Cal L Jour 414, *Mirza Shamsheer Bahadur v. Munshi Kunj Behari Lal*
 (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 802 (804) 33 Ind Cas 547, *Promotha Nath Roy v. Kishore Lal Shah* (Vacant land)
 (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 133 (133) 35 Ind Cas 120, *Chann Sukh v. Gopi Ram*
 (1917) A I R 1917 Lah 201 (204) 39 Ind Cas 971, *Moolchand v. Amarnath*
 (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 615 (616) 97 Ind Cas 705, *Buha v. Nur Muham-mad*
 (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 896 (898) 115 Ind Cas 534, *Ghulam Mohammad v. Fatch Khan* (Vacant land)
 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 34 (35) 111 Ind Cas 533, *Nand Lal v. Lahri*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 669 (670) 127 Ind Cas 11, *Bhalla Singh v. Jagat Singh*
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 76 (77) 120 Ind Cas 531, *Mahomed Sadiq v. Allah Baksh*
 (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 203 (203) 162 Ind Cas 330 17 Lah 449, *Shahbaz Khan v. Danne Khan* (The mere fact that a trespasser has taken possession of a portion of a vacant site cannot affect the constructive possession of the real owner on the portion not trespassed upon)

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 15

- (1925) 49 Mad L Jour 75 (75) (N O C)
 (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 676 (676) : 79 Ind cas 1011, *Srinivasachariar v. Raghavachariar*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 509 (510) : 101 Ind Cas 613, *Yenhtasomayajulu v. Suryanarayana*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 282 (283) : 130 Ind Cas 845, *Seeragan Chetty v. Kannappa Chetty*. (A I R 1922 Cal 557, Followed.)
 (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 871 (872) : 147 Ind Cas 680, *Sumanna v. Subbarayadu*. (Vacant land)
 (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 451 (455) : 178 Ind Cas 301, *Atchayya v. Jalaluddin*. (Do)
 (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 199 (200) : 53 Ind Cas 683, *Paddu v. Mahabur Prasad*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 209 (209) : 101 Ind Cas 714, *Sadiq Husam v. Mir Ehsad Husam* (Abadi land.)
 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 551 (551) : 102 Ind Cas 207, *Imdad Husam v. Mt. Haidari Khanam*. (Vacant land.)
 (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 629 (632, 633) : 3 Pat 258 : 81 Ind Cas 669, *Ramnath v. Gorardhan*. (Gora land.)
 (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 529 (529) : 122 Ind Cas 616, *Gopal Sahu v. Ghanashyam Das*. (Parti land.)
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 376 (390) (Cal), *Fria Nath v. Mahendra Kumar*.
 (1912) 18 Ind Cas 39 (40) (Cal), *Shideeswari Dasya v. Shashi Bhushan Chaudhri*.
 (1924) 79 Ind Cas 692 (693) (Lah), *Abdullah v. Girdhari*.
 (1907) 1907 Pun Re No. 53 (page 228) : 1907 Pun L R No. 89 : 1907 Pun W R No. 120, *Shahabul Shah v. Ganesh Das* (Failure to cultivate unculturable land does not constitute abandonment)
 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 542 (543) (P C), *Jaggadmdranath v. Hemantha Kumari Devi*.
 (1867) 8 Suth W R 422 (423), *Mahomed Ali v. Shurum Ali*. (The fact that the land was lying waste does not of itself show that no one was in possession)
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 1007 (1007) (P C), *Freem Baksh*.
 (1871) 18 Suth " " *Dashcroonissa*.
 (1875) 23 Suth " " *ha Pershad Singh*.
 (1875) 24 Suth " " *v. Dissambhur Roy Choudhry*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Lah 394 (394) : 42 Ind Cas 412, *Fatfeh Khan v. Bisakhi Ram*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Nag 90 (92) : 13 Nag L R 25 : 39 Ind Cas 54, *Radhikadas v. Harmohan Lal*. (Occasional stacking of grass, or tethering of animals on waste land does not amount to adverse possession)
 (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 20 (23) : 41 Ind Cas 80, *Ratipal v. Bipin Chandra*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 489 (491) : 118 Ind Cas 431, *Chatterpal Singh v. Raghunir Singh*.
 (1909) 4 Ind Cas 244 (246) : 33 Bom 712, *Ganapati v. Raghunath*.
 (1895) 1 Cal W N 199 (199) (S N), *Probhakar Tihari v. Raja Baidhya Nath Pandit*.
 (1897) 21 Cal 256 (257, 258) : 1 Cal W N 304, *Mohun Mohan v. Promoda Nath*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 981 (983) : 85 Ind Cas 594, *Abhoy Sanhar v. Satyendra Prasanna*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 49 (50) : 98 Ind Cas 849, *Nanda Kumar v. Emdad Ali*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 104 (105) : 107 Ind Cas 95, *Mohesh Chandra v. Hemendra Nath*.
 (1881) 1881 Pun Re No. 49, *Muhammad Yar v. Ghulam*.
 (1901) 1901 Pun Re No. 105, *Ramzan Ali v. Daskarat Ali*. (The onus is in such a case shifted on to defendant to prove when his possession became adverse)
 (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 414 (415) : 25 Ind Cas 82, *Mt. Narain Devi v. Billa*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 25 (26) : 69 Ind Cas 4, *Mansa v. Khushali Ram*.

acts of ownership,^{11a} or where there is no plea that the owner was

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 16

- (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 230 (230) : 100 Ind Cas 51, *Ganga Ram v. Hasun Shah*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 664 (664) : 103 Ind Cas 678, *Juran Singh v. Karam Din*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 306 (307) : 110 Ind Cas 857, *Nur Muhammad v. Qaim*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 303 (303) : 120 Ind Cas 792, *Mangal Singh v. Ali Sher*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 529 (530) : 148 Ind Cas 820, *Aya Singh v. Latif*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 507 (508) : 157 Ind Cas 399, *Kaur Sam v. Ghulab*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1025 (1025) : 30 Ind Cas 191, *Murugappa Mudaly v. Jagannath Rayaniam Garu*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Mad 183 (184) : 149 Ind Cas 455, *Palaniappa Chetty v. Raman Chetty*.
- (1905) 8 Oudh Cas 177 (182), *Sheo Naram Singh v. Bodai Singh*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 215 (216) : 57 Ind Cas 538, *Dau Bahadur Singh v. Pirthipal Singh*. (In the case of uncultivated lands such as tank lands surrounded by scattered trees of spontaneous growth, the presumption is that possession follows title)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 393 (393) : 1 Luck 469 : 94 Ind Cas 1034, *Hulas v. Barlatunnissa*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 444 (446) : 95 Ind Cas 27 : 2 Luck 239, *Parhadas v. Janaki Ballabha Saran*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 328 (330) : 114 Ind Cas 815, *Jagatjit Singh v. Md. Asgar Ali*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 158 (160) : 58 Ind Cas 774 : 5 Pat L Jour 724, *Inder Lall v. Ram Surat Kuar*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 277 (278) : 61 Ind Cas 78, *Bahadur Ali Khan v. Secretary of State*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 629 (630, 633) : 3 Pat 258 : 81 Ind Cas 669, *Ramnath Sarangi v. Gobardhan Panday*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 422 (423) : 170 Ind Cas 365, *Chandra Mohan Singh v. Butu Mian*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Low Bur 145 (147, 148) : 8 Low Bur Rul 372 : 86 Ind Cas 249, *Asha Bibi v. Sulaiman Ismail Atcha*.
- (1909) 1 Ind Cas 252 (253) (Cal), *Naram Chandra Singh v. Basant Kumari Das*.
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 623 (624) (Cal), *Bhagwan Chandra Dey v. Dayal Hari Das*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 133 (135) : 21 Ind Cas 972 (974), *Pirthi v. Ratti Ram*. (In the case of Banjar, i.e. waste land, mere paper possession by means of decree and execution is sufficient possession)
- (1927) 106 Ind Cas 180 (181) (Lah), *Smail v. Gajjan* (In a case of fallow land, possession must be taken to follow title for the purpose of adverse possession)
- (1930) 126 Ind Cas 129 (130, 131) (Cal), *Alabakshi Bhuyan v. Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 705 (707) : 56 Ind Cas 344, *Brahmanand Singh v. Dundbahadur Singh*.
- (1934) A I R 1938 Oudh 214 (216) : 177 Ind Cas 52, *Manzur Ali Khan v. Peteshwar Prasad Singh*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 118 (121, 122) : 105 Ind Cas 369, *Gopal Chandra v. Menmohini Das*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 454 (455) : 178 Ind Cas 301, *Atchayya Palindu v. Jalaluddin Sahib*.
- 11a (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 207 (210) : 58 Bom 397 & 406 : 149 Ind Cas 882 & 885 (F B), *Krishnaji Shrinivas v. Madhusa Appanna*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 207 (209) : 51 Ind Cas 601 : 4 Pat L Jour 463, *Bhikhad Bhujan v. Urendra Nath*.

Arts. 142 & 144

Note 15

not in possession,^{11b} or where the evidence is equally strong on both sides,¹³ the presumption may properly be drawn in favour of the person having the title. But where the owner alleges definite acts of ownership and fails to prove them,¹³ or where all the circumstances are such as to render it natural for an owner in possession of land to exercise manifest acts of enjoyment thereof during a given period and he fails to prove such facts,¹⁴ or where the evidence let in by the person having the title is totally false and unreliable,¹⁵ the Court is not bound to draw the presumption that possession follows title.

It has, however, been held in some cases¹⁶ that the presumption can be drawn *only* when the evidence is *strong* on both sides and not when it is *equally unworthy of credit*. It is submitted that the decision in *Ranjeet Ram Pandey's case*,⁹ referred to above, which is generally relied on in support of the above view, does not really support that view. In the undermentioned cases^{16a} the presumption

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- (1888) 15 Cal 353 (356), *Syam Lal Sahu v. Luchmun Choudhry*.
 11b (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 197 (199) : 90 Ind Cas 196, *Daulat v. Ramappa*.
 12. (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 228 (233) : 70 Ind Cas 555, *Promode Kumar Roy v. Madan Mohan Saha*.
 18. (1880) 5 Cal L R 481 (483), *Ram Bhandhu v. Kusu Bhattu*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 286 (287) : 66 Ind Cas 914, *Ram Ratan Mandal v. Nilmoni Choudhry*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (566) : 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhai Chandra Ghose v. Durgadas Samanthal*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 765 (767) : 117 Ind Cas 606, *Harbut Ray Chamarra & Co. v. Ujar Shaikh*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 224 (225) : 67 Ind Cas 1005, *Behari Lal v. Nrityananda*. (Both parties alleging definite acts of ownership—Presumption that possession follows title inapplicable—The case must be decided on evidence of possession.)
 14. (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 528 (529) : 96 Ind Cas 225, *Siddh Nath v. Bajor Singh*.
 15. (1899) 26 Cal 114 (118), *Bishun Churn Roy v. Jogendra Nath Roy*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 237 (239, 213) : 62 Ind Cas 1 : 6 Pat Jour 478 (F B), *Shri Prasad Singh v. Hira Singh*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (565) : 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhai Chandra Ghose v. Durgadas Samanthal*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 282 (283) : 130 Ind Cas 845, *Sevugan v. Kannappa*.
 (1933) 146 Ind Cas 448 (449) (Pat), *Guhu Ram v. Adalat Mahala*.
 16. (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (566) : 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhai Chandra Ghose v. Durgadas Samanthal*.
 ...
 (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 309 (310) : 85 Ind Cas 554 : 1 Pat L Jour 146, *Fakira Lal Sahu v. Ram Charan Lal*. (Except in cases of waste or jungle land or land under water)
 16a (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 614 (616) : 54 Mad 623 : 133 Ind Cas 9, *Ramanathan v. Lakshmanan*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 509 (510) : 101 Ind Cas 513, *Venkata Somayajulu v. Suryanarayana*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 765 (766, 767) : 117 Ind Cas 606, *Harbut Ray Chamarra & Co. v. Ujar Shaikh*. (Where evidence of possession on either side is not satisfactory or not quite satisfactory, the party who has succeeded in proving his title is entitled to rely upon the presumption that possession follows title.)

was applied even in cases where the evidence was unsatisfactory on both sides. **Arts. 142 & 144
Note 15**

It has also been held in some cases¹⁷ that the presumption can be drawn *only* in respect of *waste and jungle* lands and not in respect of property which is capable of use and enjoyment, in some cases that the presumption should not be applied where the plaintiff has to prove his possession at a *particular time*,¹⁸ and in some cases¹⁹ that the presumption cannot be applied where no evidence is let in on either side. It is submitted that none of these views, in so far as they restrict the power of the Court under Section 114 of the Evidence Act to exercise its discretion, by confining it to particular

- (1908) 12 Cal W N 273 (260) 3 Mad L Tim 212 7 Cal L Jour 414, *Mirza Shamsher Bahadur v. Munshi Kunj Behari*
- (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 207 (209) . 51 Ind Cas 801 4 Pat L Jour 463, *Bhikad Bhunjan Narain Tewari v. Upendra Nath*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 432 (434) 67 Ind Cas 631 2 Pat 1, *Tian Sahu v. Mulchand Sahu*.
- (1910) 6 Ind Cas 392 (397) (Cal), *Nauab Bahadur of Murshidabad v. Gopinath Mandal*
- (1895) 12 Cal 39 (41), *Dharm Singh v. Hurr Pershad Singh*
- 17 (1878) 3 Cal 768 (770) 2 Cal L R 364, *Mohima Chunder Dey Sircar v. Hurro Lal Sircar*
- (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 544 (545) 41 Ind Cas 456, *Baroda Prasad v. Manmatha Nath*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (566) 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhai Chandra Ghose v. Durgadas Samantha*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 765 (766) 117 Ind Cas 606, *Harbut Ray Chamarla & Co v. Ujir Sheikh*
- (1921) A I R 1921 Lah 202 (203) 59 Ind Cas 891, *Mahmud v. Ude Bhan*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 276 (277) 69 Ind Cas 427, *Sampat Ram v. Ganga Datt* ('Possession goes with title' applies where land is actually vacant—Otherwise presumption exists in favour of person in actual possession)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 883 (383) 94 Ind Cas 1048, *Bahadur v. Saghar*
- (1937) A I R 1937 Nag 129 (130) 1 L R 1937 Nag 254 171 Ind Cas 271, *Shankersa v. Punamchand*
- (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 20 (23) 41 Ind Cas 80, *Ratipal Bapin v. Bepin Chandra Chatterji*
- 18 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 675 (677) 26 Ind Cas 436, *Kalichand v. Bipro Das*, (Purporting to follow 16 Ind App 23—That decision does not give rise to any such view)
19. (1904) 9 Cal W N 111 (116), *Madhab Sundari Dassya v. Gaganendra Nath Tagore*
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1230 (1232) 88 Ind Cas 567, *Panchanan Sarkar v. Basanta Kumar*
- (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 309 (309, 310) 35 Ind Cas 554 1 Pat L Jour 146, *Fakira Lal v. Ram Charan*
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 237 (239, 243) 62 Ind Cas 1 6 Pat L Jour 478 (F B), *Shri Prasad Singh v. Hira Singh*
- (1933) 146 Ind Cas 448 (449) (Pat), *Guhri Ram Singh v. Adalat Mahto*, (Following A I R 1921 Pat 237)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 432 (435) 2 Pat 1 67 Ind Cas 631, *Tian Sahu v. Mulchand Sahu*

Arts. 142 & 144 Notes 15-16 lands or to particular circumstances, can be accepted as correct on principle.²⁰

The doctrine that possession follows title has, in some cases, to be applied as a *matter of law* and not as a matter merely of *discretion* under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Thus, where land is *submerged under water*, and is thus incapable of being possessed by either party, the law will regard the owner as in possession.²¹ The Court is bound to draw this presumption in such cases. In *Bhupendra v. Rajeswar*,²² the Privy Council observed :

"The doctrine that possession follows title is well established. So, while lands are submerged, constructive possession is with the true owner and that, though the physical possession immediately prior to the disavowal has been with the adverse claimant."

In *Satish Chandra Joardar v. Birendra Nath*,²³ where the question was as to who was in possession of submerged land to which plaintiff had proved title, the Privy Council observed :

"It was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to prove 'actual possession' in the sense of occupation after the submergence, as their possession in law continued until they were dispossessed."

Waste and uncultivated land cannot be regarded as land *incapable* of being enjoyed in the sense in which submerged land can be said to be incapable of being enjoyed.²⁴ As has been seen already, the Court is not bound to draw the presumption in such cases, though the Court will, under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, draw the presumption having regard to the nature of the land.

16. Adverse possession, what is.—The expression "adverse possession" means a *hostile possession*, that is a possession which is expressly or impliedly in *denial of the title* of the true owner. In *Ejas Ali v. Special Manager, Court of Wards*,¹ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed :

"The principle of law is firmly established that a person who bases his title on adverse possession must show by clear and

20. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 501 (502). 131 Ind Cas 319, *Jira Dena v. Uma Charan Saha*. (Principle not confined to particular land)
See also cases cited in Foot-Note (11a).

21. (1915) A I R 1915 Oudh 201 (205) 18 Oudh Cas 43 : 28 Ind Cas 855, *Dwijraj Singh v. Ganga Bahad Singh*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Pat 234 (235) : 57 Ind Cas 744, *Gajadhar Prasad v. Mst. Dulhnn Gulab Kuer*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 705 (707) : 56 Ind Cas 344, *Drahnmanand Singh v. Dandabhadur Singh*.

22 (1931) A I R 1931 P C 162 (164) 50 Ind App 228 50 Cal 80 : 132 Ind Cas 610 (P C)

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unequivocal evidence that his possession was hostile to the real owner and amounted to a denial of his title to the property claimed."

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 16

In *Arunachalam v. Venkatachalpathy*,³ their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the possession of the defendant was adverse to the plaintiff, inasmuch as the plaintiff had stood by while the defendant continued to possess "in practical contravention of the plaintiff's alleged rights." Dr Markby in his *Elements of Law*³ observes that possession to be adverse must be possession "by a person who does not acknowledge the other's rights but denies them."

The principle that in order to constitute adverse possession the possession must be in *denial of the title* of the true owner, has been recognised in numerous decisions,⁴ though expressed in different ways. Thus, it has been held that in order to constitute adverse possession the acts of the person in possession should be irreconcilable with the rights of the true owner,⁵ that the person in possession must claim to be so as of right as against the true owner,⁶ that

2. (1919) A I R 1919 P C 62 (68). 43 Mad 253. 46 Ind App 204. 53 Ind Cas 245 (P C)

3. *Markby's Elements of Law*, 2nd Edition, Chapter 10.

4. (1914) A I R 1914 All 547 (550). 27 Ind Cas 35, *Asad Ali v. Anand Sarup*. (1907) 20 All 133 (136). 1906 All W N 805. 3 All L Jour 760, *Bhadder v. Khair-ud-din Hussain*.

(1937) 167 Ind Cas 801 (801) (Nag), *Ramaji Gujar v. Kunwarjee Gujar*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 141 (142). 1 Luck 411. 29 Oudh Cas 395. 98 Ind Cas 704, *Barjor Singh v. Sidh Nath*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 433 (434). 5 Luck 380. 122 Ind Cas 332, *Sai Narain Misir v. Deputy Commissioner, Ajodhya Estate*.

(1905) 5 Cal L Jour 62 (63), *Charatan Singh v. Sadhari Monim*.

(1881) 1831 All W N 143 (143), *Gharam v. Gopal Singh*.

(1896) 20 Mad 6 (8), *Srinivasaragava Iyengar v. Muthusami Padayachi*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Pat 64 (65). 160 Ind Cas 896, *Bairnath Mandar v. Ram Adhin Ray*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Rang 180 (183). 171 Ind Cas 643, *Bashir Ahmed v. Maatschappij*.

(1917) 39 Ind Cas 520 (521) (All), *Bhagwandin v. Shankar Prasad*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 414 (415). 60 Cal 404. 144 Ind Cas 177, *Nutbihari Das v. Dushweshwar Debee*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 440 (411), *Jesha Ram v. Poonan Bhagat*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 393 (391, 395). 1 Luck 469. 94 Ind Cas 1031, *Hulas v. Barkatunnissa Begam*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 156 (157). 51 Ind Cas 575, *Mt Gulab Devi v. Monji Rani*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 18 (19). 101 Ind Cas 760, *Sukdei v. Prag Dutt*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 82 (83). 68 Ind Cas 263, *Chandan v. Bahadur*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 313 (314). 134 Ind Cas 493, *Mahomed Ali v. Mahomed Khan* (Person claiming lien over property and willing to give up possession on payment of the charge is not in adverse possession).

5 (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 454 (455). 178 Ind Cas 301, *Atchayya Patrudu v. Jalaluddin*.

6. (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 544 (546). 142 Ind Cas 582, *Kali Ram v. Dulal Ram*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Lah 308 (308). 46 Ind Cas 961, *Alla Dad v. Fazal Dad*.

(1901) 1901 Pun Re No 43, *Bazkhan v. Sultan Mallick*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 296 (299). 19 Oudh Cas 1. 34 Ind Cas 277, *M/I, Ganisha v. Nageshar Bakshi Singh*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 16**

adverse possession is possession which is wrongful,⁷ that the possession must be by a person holding the land on his own behalf or on behalf of some person other than the true owner, the true owner having a right to immediate possession,⁸ and that the possession of the wrongdoer must be *exclusive*.^{8a} A contrary view namely that the possession of a person may be adverse to another even though he may admit the title of that other, has been held in the under-mentioned case.⁹ It is submitted that this view cannot be accepted as correct.

It follows from the above that a possession on the part of A consistent and reconcilable with the title of B cannot be adverse to B.¹⁰ Where the owner is not prevented from using the property in the way in which it is intended to be used, there can be no adverse

- (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 462 (462, 463) : 146 Ind Cas 987, *Ramshankar v. Sheo Dutt*
- (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 991 (992) 11 Lah 410 : 123 Ind Cas 278, *Ghulam Murtaza v. Nagina*.
7. (1903) 27 Bom 408 (412) 5 Bom L R 269, *Kondiba v. Nana*.
(1936) 163 Ind Cas 347 (349) (Cal), *Sarafuddin Nur Ahmad v. Jabanessa Khatoon*.
8. (1878) 4 Cal 327 (329). 2 Shome L R 106, *Dejoy Chunder v. Kali Prosanna*. (Per Markby, J.)
(1878) 4 Cal 455 (468) 3 Cal L R 355 : 2 Shome L R 153, *Kherodemoney Dossee v. Durgamoney Dossee*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 38 (39) 45 Bom 1001 : 61 Ind Cas 594, *Vishnu Bhikaji v. Babla Lacha*.
(1903) 27 Bom 43 (51) 4 Bom L R 721, *Taru Bai v. Venkatrao*.
(1886) 9 Mad 244 (246) 10 Ind Jur 61, *Madhava v. Narayana*.
(1939) A I R 1939 Bom 1 (17) : 179 Ind Cas 178, *Narayan Jiraji v. Gurunathagouda*.
- 8a (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 46 (48) : 7 Luck 250 : 137 Ind Cas 678, *Suraj Bai v. Mahadeo Prasad*.
(1937) A I R 1937 Sind 78 (79) : 157 Ind Cas 293, *Mt. Sita Bai v. Jumo*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 240 (241) : 50 Ind Cas 45, *Tarachand v. Secretary of State*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 454 (455) : 178 Ind Cas 301, *Atchayya Patrudu v. Jataluddin*.
9. (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 414 (415) 60 Cal 404 : 144 Ind Cas 177, *Nutbihari Das v. Bisneswari Debee*.
- 10 See Note 2 ante.
(1843) 3 Hare 26 (33, 34) : 61 R R 198 67 E R 233, *Lewis v. Thomas* (Defendants claiming under the title of the plaintiff and thus acknowledging plaintiff's title cannot be in adverse possession.)
(1923) A I R 1923 All 399 (400) 71 Ind Cas 265, *Lakhu v. Lal Singh*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 193 (193) : 91 Ind Cas 97, *Abdullah Khan v. Amir Huder Khan*.
(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 46 (48) : 137 Ind Cas 678 : 7 Luck 250, *Suraj Bai v. Mahadeo Prasad* (Every occupier of a house is liable to pay water and house taxes. The payment of these by person pleading adverse possession is not irreconcilable with the plaintiff's ownership of property in a suit for possession.)
(1871) *Thakur*.
ry of State v. dinary rights of be adverse)]
(1938) A I R 1938 Cal 117 (119) 176 Ind Cas 706, *Derajullah Sarkar v. Jyotullah Mand*. (Mere fact that A is allowed to be in joint possession with B of latter's property is not enough to show that A's possession is adverse to B.)

possession, for there is in such a case no hostility to or denial of the title of the true owner. Thus, where *A* claimed to have been in adverse possession of certain drains vested in a municipality, but it was found that the municipality was not in any way prevented by the acts of *A* from enjoying the drains as drains, it was held that *A*'s acts did not constitute adverse possession.¹¹ A mere squatter or intruder who does not deny the title of the true owner and does not set up any claim of right in himself cannot claim to be in adverse possession.¹²

In deciding whether the alleged acts of a person constitute adverse possession or not, regard must be had to the *animus* of the person doing those acts, and this must be ascertained from the facts and circumstances of each case.¹³

Where the acts alleged do not constitute effective possession at all of the interest claimed, they would obviously not constitute adverse possession¹⁴ and the position will not be improved by the denial of the title of the owner,¹⁵ especially when the owner has no knowledge of such assertion.¹⁶ *A*, a zamindar, made a mortgage of his property to *C* on 11th January 1865. Subsequently he granted a *patni* lease thereof to *B* on the 6th of September 1865. On the 21st of February 1867 *A*'s interest was brought to sale by the Sheriff of Calcutta and was knocked down to *B*, but the conveyance was executed in his favour on the 1st of April 1867. *C*, who had in the meanwhile purchased the property in execution of a decree obtained by him on his mortgage, sued *B* for *khas* possession of the property. It was held by the High Court of Calcutta that *B*'s possession as *patnidar*

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 16

11 (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 103 (194) 55 Ind Cas 493, *Arunachala Chethiar v. Municipal Council Mayavaram*

12 (1917) 89 Ind Cas 520 (521) (All), *Bhagwan Din v. Shankar Prasad*
(1904) 9 Cal W N 111 (115), *Madhab Sundari Dassya v. Gaganendra Nath*.
See also footnotes (5a) to (9) to note 11 ante.

13 (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 11 (12) 70 Ind Cas 653, *Rajambal Ammal v. Shanmuga Mudaliar*

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 568 (575, 576) 91 Ind Cas 235, *Ganga Prasad Chowdhry v. Kuladananda Roy*

(1897) 21 Mad 53 (55), *Chochalinga v. Muthusamy* (Where the defendant who was the brother of the plaintiff happened to be using as a back-yard a few square yards of vacant house site land, to which plaintiff had title, it was held there was nothing under the circumstances sufficient to constitute adverse possession by the defendant as against the plaintiff, especially because the parties were brothers and the land in question was situate between their houses.)

14. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 882 (884) 117 Ind Cas 693, *Sourindranath Dasu v. Nirmalchandra Banerjee*

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 625 (626) 114 Ind Cas 70, *Amrit Sarya Ram v. Duman Chand*

(1916) A I R 1916 All 79 (81) 38 All 411 34 Ind Cas 171, *Kunwar Sen v. Darbars Lal*

[See also (1867) 2 Agra 6 (9), *Ramaisher Singh v. Sarazalim Singh*.]

15 (1900) 24 Bom 435 (443) 2 Bom L R 261, *Soorannana Detappa v. Secretary of State*.

(1912) 18 Ind Cas 467 (468) (Mad), *Veeranna v. Chellammayya*.

16. (1912) 13 Ind Cas 467 (468) (Mad), *Veeranna v. Chellammayya*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 16**

could not be considered adverse to *C* who had a superior interest that *B*'s possession as *purchaser* could not be deemed to have commenced till the 1st of April 1867 and that the suit brought within twelve years thereof was within time.¹⁷

Knowledge on the part of the person claiming title by adverse possession that he had no title will not make his possession other than adverse. In *Bhavrao v. Rahmin*,¹⁸ Sir Charles Farran, C. J., observed that "a person coming in under a title which he knows to be defective, or even a trespasser is not, by reason of his knowledge, deprived of the law of limitation." Nor, on the other hand, will the mere *consent* of the true owner affect the question, whether the possessor holds his possession in contravention of the right of the owner. In *Dwarkanath Chowdhury v. Shastri Kinkar Banerji*,¹⁹ Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C. J., observed as follows :

"The mere fact of consent does not prevent possession being adverse. The test is whether the person who sets up adverse possession is able to show that he held for himself, and if he did so, the mere fact that there was acquiescence on the part of the other persons concerned, can, in circumstances like the present, make no difference."

The mere fact that the possession of *A* is hostile to and in denial of the title of *B*, is however not sufficient to confer on *A* a title by adverse possession. In *Radhamoni Debi v. The Collector of Khulna*,²⁰ it was laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council that in order to constitute adverse possession,

"the possession required must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is adverse to the competitor."

And this view has been re-affirmed in numerous cases.²¹

17. (1882) 8 Cal 79 (84) : 9 Cal L R 173. 10 Cal L R 113, *Kasumunnissa Bibi v. Nilratna Bose*.

18. (1898) 23 Bom 137 (140) (F B).

19. (1918) 18 Ind Cas 869 (874) (Cal).

20. (1900) 27 Ind App 136 (140) . 27 Cal 943 . 4 Cal W N 597 : 2 Bom L R 592 : 7 Sar 714 (P C), *Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna*.

21. (1934) A I R 1934 P O 77 (81) : 147 Ind Cas 887 . 61 Ind App 60 : 56 All 111, (P C), *Mt Allahrahi v. Shah Mohammed Abdur Rahim*.

(1934) A I R 1934 P O 23 (25) : 147 Ind Cas 545 . 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan*

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 16

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And this view has been re-affirmed in numerous cases.²¹

17. (1882) 8 Cal 79 (84) . 9 Cal L R 173. 10 Cal L R 119, *Kasumunnissa Bibi v. Nilratna Bose*.

18. (1898) 23 Bom 137 (140) (F B).

19. (1913) 18 Ind Cas 869 (874) (Cal).

20. (1900) 27 Ind App 136 (140) : 27 Cal 943 : 4 Cal W N 597 : 2 Bom L R 592 : 7 Sar 714 (P C), *Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna*.

21. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 77 (81) : 147 Ind Cas 887 : 61 Ind App 50 : 56 All 111, (F C), *Mt. Allahrakhi v. Shah Mohammed Abdur Rahim*.

(1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (25) : 147 Ind Cas 515 : 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan*.

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(1937) A I R 1937 All 429 (431) : 169 Ind Cas 962, *Ram Chandra v. Asa Ram*. (To acquire title by adverse possession, it must be open, exclusive and continuous for twelve years)

(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 141 (142) : 29 Oudh Cas 395 : 98 Ind Cas 704 : 1 Luck 441, *Darjor Singh v. Sudh Nath*.

The principle is derived from the classical requirement that in order to give a title by adverse possession, the possession must be *nec vi nec clam nec precario*, that is, peaceful, open and continuous.²²

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 16

- (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 187 (192) : 151 Ind Cas 1076, *Secretary of State v. Dharendra Nath Roy*
 (1903) 31 Cal 397 (404), *Wali Ahmed Choudhry v. Tola Meah Choudhry*.
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 392 (396) (Cal), *Nauab Bahadur of Murshidabad v. Gopinath Mandal*
 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 577 (580) 67 Ind Cas 170, *Jogendranath v. Jagadendra Nath*.
 (1938) A I R 1938 Sind 193 (202) 178 Ind Cas 690, *Arab Janglu v. Panjal Shah*.
 (1907) 35 Cal 961 (971) ; 12 Cal W N 127 . 6 Cal L Jour 735, *Jogendranath v. Baldeo Das*
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 359 (361) (Cal), *Baroda Prasad v. Annoda Mohan*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 551 (551) . 102 Ind Cas 207, *Imdad Hussain Khan v. Mt. Hydari Khanam*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 240 (241) . 50 Ind Cas 45, *Tarachand Roy v. Secretary of State*
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 742 (743) (All), *Zakuran v. Rahim*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Sind 177 (180) . 16 Sind L R 25 . 80 Ind Cas 118, *Mt. Bhagbhari v. Mt. Khatun*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 46 (48) 5 Luck 410 : 121 Ind Cas 81, *Mahabir Singh v. Chitta Singh*
 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 277 (282) 66 Ind Cas 923, *Maharajah of Cooch Behar v. Mahendra Ranjan Roy*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 687 (695) . 65 Ind Cas 866, *Secretary of State v. Wazed Ali*.
 (1902) 26 Bom 410 (416, 417) . 4 Bom L R 23, *Vithaldas v. Secretary of State*
 (1901) 25 Bom 362 (366) 3 Bom L R 47, *Jagjit Das v. Das Amba*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 202 (204) 56 Ind Cas 811, *Manulla Kolu v. Prasanna Kumar Sarkar*.
 (1913) 18 Ind Cas 809 (810) (Cal), *Duarkhanath Choudhry v. Sasti Kinkar Banerjee*
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1253 (1255) 86 Ind Cas 767, *Dejoy Chand Mahatab v. Sarathkumar Roy*
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 931 (933) 85 Ind Cas 594, *Abhoy Shankar Mazumdar v. Satyendra Prasanna Bose*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 316 (318) 82 Ind Cas 313, *Harisadhan Patari v. Dinanath Banerjee*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 485 (489) . 154 Ind Cas 1032, *Tharichhna Kuari v. Ramyad Kuari*
 (1928) A I R 1928 Bom 287 (288) 110 Ind Cas 303, *Keshav Raghunath v. Gouind Chinnaji*
 (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (761) 159 Ind Cas 752, *Dhabani Prosanna v. Manindra Chandra*
 (1906) 3 Cal L Jour 316 (331), *Ananda Hari Basack v. Secretary of State*.
 (1912) 14 Ind Cas 609 (623) (Cal), *Secretary of State v. Kaila Prasad*.
 (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 140 (142) 136 Ind Cas 700, *Sillabakhsh Singh v. Subadar*
 (1918) A I R 1918 Nag 171 (173) 47 Ind Cas 892, *Prahlad Singh v. Abdul Aziz Khan*
 (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 469 (479) . 36 Ind Cas 890, *Ramchandra Sui v. Ramani Mani Das*
 (1935) 163 Ind Cas 897 (903) 62 Cal L Jour 177 (188) . 63 Cal 300, *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmad Nauab Choudhry*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 82 (85) 77 Ind Cas 564, *Jobeda Khatun v. Tulsi-charan Das*.
 22. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (25) 147 Ind Cas 545 . 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendralal Khan*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 16-18

If the elements stated above, namely, (a) that the possession of the wrongdoer must be in denial of the title of the true owner and (b) that it must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent, exist, the possession must be regarded as adverse. It is not necessary that the owner should be shown to have *protested* that his rights were being violated and that the possession went on adversely to his protests.²³

17. "Defendant." — The word "defendant" has been defined in Section 2 sub-section 4 *ante* as including any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be sued.¹ See Notes to that sub-section *ante*.

18. Possession is not adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title.—Where the possession may be lawful or unlawful it must be assumed, in the absence of evidence, that the possession is lawful.¹ It is also a fundamental principle that where a possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse.²

- (1919) A I R 1919 P C 62 (68) : 43 Mad 253 ; 46 Ind App 204 : 53 Ind Cas 298 (P C), *Arunachalam v Venkatchalapathy*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 P C 86 (38) : 153 Ind Cas 929 : 14 Pat 327 . 62 Ind App 40 (P C), *Srischandra Nandy v. Dasmath Jugul Kishore*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 126 (127) : 50 Ind Cas 649, *Panohu Muchi v. Bhuto Muchi*.
 (1935) 164 Ind Cas 61 (63) : 62 Cal 921, *Upendranath Roy v. Jitendranath Kundu*.
 (1938) A I R 1938 Lab 6 (8) : 170 Ind Cas 991, *Mt. Shanti Devi v. Mani Singh*.
 23. (1919) A I R 1919 P C 62 (68) : 43 Mad 253 . 46 Ind App 204.. 53 Ind Cas 298 (P C), *Arunachalam v. Venkatchalapathy*

Note 17

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 274 (277) : 30 Nag L R 18 : 150 Ind Cas 679, *Mt. Jyoti Bai v. Zabu*.
 (1910) 8 Ind Cas 1095 (1095) : 33 All 224, *Ram Lakhan Rai v. Gajadhar Rai*.
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 467 (471) (Cal), *Khuroda Kanta Roy v. Krishna Das Laha*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 48 (48) : 45 Bom 570 : 50 Ind Cas 805, *Ramchandra Balwant v. Balaji Ganesh*.

Note 18

1. (1918) A I R 1918 P C 1 (2) . 1918 Pun Ro No. 64 : 47 Ind Cas 626 (P C), *Hardt Singh v. Gurmukh Singh*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Lab 673 (674) : 160 Ind Cas 1033, *Mohammad Yakub v. Abdul Karim*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 418 (419) : 71 Ind Cas 1033, *Jharap Rai v. Jasnt Rai*.
 *Rai v. Shyam Bahadur*.
 *v. Adoo Shaikh*.
 : 78 Ind Cas 895, *Indar-*
 .
 (1900) 2 Bom L R 410 (411), *Dasapa v. Dasapa*.
 (1865) 3 Suth W R 12 (12), *Bhuresur Banerjee v. Oncooda Churn Banerjee*.
 (1930) 125 Ind Cas 739 (739) (Cal), *Kuda Koch v. Madan Gopal Agarwalla*.
 (1869) 12 Suth W R 217 (218) 3 Beng L R A C 312, *Selam Sheikh v. Daido-nath Ghatak*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (652) : 67 Ind Cas 81, *Jagannath v. Chandu Dibi*.
 (1912) 16 Ind Cas 27 (29) (Mad), *Rajulu Patter v. Annakutti Mannadhar*.
 2. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 243 (243, 246) (P C), *Corea v. Appuhamy*.

The reason is that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another title. The leading case on the point is *Thomas v. Thomas*,³ decided by the Court of Chancery in the year 1855. In that case X was entitled under the marriage settlement of his father and mother to certain real estates upon the death of his mother, to whom a life estate had been given therein. The mother died in 1832. X attained majority in 1836. The father remained in possession of the settled estate till his death in 1852. The question was whether the father's possession was adverse to X or whether it must be deemed to have been as guardian of X. Wood, V. C., observed as follows:

Arts. 142 & 14
Note 18

"But there is another principle which affects this case, namely that possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. An important authority on this point is *Doe d. Milne v. Brightwen*,⁴ where a party who had taken possession of copyholds on the death of his wife, by an adverse title, lived more than twenty years afterwards and it was then found that there was an old custom of the manor by which he had a right to curtesy, and therefore his possession was referred

- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 104 (106) 22 Nag L R 175 100 Ind Cas 446, *Mt. Deshrani v. Kishore Singh*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Nag 300 (303) 27 Nag L R 152 : 127 Ind Cas 589, *Jairam v. Bhilaji*.
 (1891) 1891 Bom P J 232, *Sheshu kom Ramaya v Venkatramna*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 106 (109) 161 Ind Cas 450, *Nirmal Chandra v. Mohitosh Das*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 449 (460) 112 Ind Cas 522, *Mohammad Jamsil v. Mohammad Hafiz*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 136 (140) 161 Ind Cas 831, *Mt. Dibi Zamab v. Muhammad Ayub*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 418 (419) 71 Ind Cas 1033, *Jharap Ras v Jamsil Ras*.
 (1902) 4 Bom L R 964, *Yesu v Fulchand*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (270, 271) 27 Oudh Cas 77 78 Ind Cas 595, *Indarpat Singh v. Thakur Din Singh*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 532 (533, 534) 42 Ind Cas 884, *Gnanendra Nath v. Mohendra Mohini Debya*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 All 554 (555) 101 Ind Cas 621, *Ram Bharos Pande v. Dhurjati Upadhyaya*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 All 109 (110) 121 Ind Cas 701 : 52 All 222, *Dhurjati Upadhyaya v. Ram Bharos Pande*.
 (1912) 16 Ind Cas 27 (28) (Mad), *Raylu Patter v Annakutti Mannadiar*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 59 (59) 35 Ind Cas 26, *Bisheshwar Gangooly v. Bhagabati Charan*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 121 (122) 26 Ind Cas 346, *Purnusuamy Iyer v. Permaye*.

the man and not adversely)

(1867) 2 Agra 78 (78), *Naram Sahas v. Posoo*]

- 3 (1855) 110 R R 107 (110) 4 W R (Eng) 135 : 2 Kay & J 79 25 L J Ch 159 : 1 Jur (N S) 1160.
 4 (1809) 10 East 583 (594) 10 R R 395 103 E R 897.

"In this case a father, who had several children entitled to estates on the death of his wife, all the children being under age at that time, entered upon the estates I think I must reasonably infer that the entry was an entry on their behalf and as their guardian, and was totally different from the case of a mere stranger entering upon the property under similar circumstances.

"Then it is said that, though the entry might have been lawful in its inception, the retention of the property after the children attained twenty-one barred their rights under the statute of limitation; but I think the better and sounder view here is that, if this gentleman entered as guardian, this Court would never allow him to set up any other title to the estate."

In *Bejoy Chunder Banerjee v. Kally Prosonno Mookerjee*,⁵ Markby, J., observed :

"One who holds possession on behalf of another does not, by a mere denial of that other's title, make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation."

In *Corea v. Appuhamy*,⁶ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed, following *Thomas v. Thomas*⁷:

"Entering into possession, and having a lawful title to enter, he could *not* direct himself of that title by pretending that he had no title at all."

See also the undermentioned case.⁸

19. Possession by Hindu female.—The possession by a female heiress under Hindu Law, of property *inherited by her* is not adverse to the reversioners who are entitled to the property after her death.¹ The reason is twofold: *first*, that in such cases the possession must be referred to her title as heiress, in which capacity

5. (1878) 4 Cal 327 (329): 2 Shome L R 106.
6. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 243 (245): 1914 A C 230: 61 L J P C 151 (P C).
7. (1855) 110 R R 107 (110): 4 W R (Eng) 135: 2 Kay & J 79: 25 L J Ch 159: 1 Jur (N S) 1160.
8. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 293 (239): 22 Ind Cas 271, *Official Assignee v. Moorli Doss*. (A man possessing himself of property in one character, cannot himself alter that character and begin to possess it in another character.)

Note 19

I have not seen him since. . . . 6:

Jagannath Prasad
(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 215 (219) : 115 Ind Cas 279, *Chandra Shekhar*

she would only take a life-estate contemplated by Hindu Law, and *secondly*, that the reversioners not being entitled to the possession of the property till the death of the heiress, time will not, as will be seen in Notes 79 and 83 *infra*, run against them. *A* was entitled to a certain house but could get possession thereof only on the death of *B*, his mother, who had a right of residence therein. The house was sold in execution of a decree obtained against her son *A* and was purchased by one *X*. During the lifetime of *B*, *C* was living in the house. When *X* sued for possession on the mother's death, *C* resisted the suit on the ground that he had been in adverse possession for more than twelve years though within twelve years of *B*'s death. It was held by the Privy Council that *C*'s possession was not adverse to *X* till *B*'s death.² In *Ram Anugra Narain Singh v. Choudhry Hanuman Sahai*,³ where a Hindu widow took possession of her son's estate on his death, and she was his heiress, and remained in possession till her death, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the possession of the widow must be referred to her title as heiress of her son and that no case of adverse possession had been established.

Where a Hindu female who has no right to be in possession of the property gets into possession thereof, her possession will be adverse to those entitled to the property and she will prescribe for an *absolute* title to the property, unless it is shown that she was in possession under some arrangement with the owners or that she was prescribing only for a limited interest.^{3a} Thus, where the widow of a coparcener in a Hindu joint family was in possession of the family property in assertion of absolute ownership, it was held that her

- (1878) 1878 Bom P J 237, *Nilkanth v. Shuram*. (Possession of lessee of widow not adverse during lifetime of widow.)
- 2 (1926) A I R 1926 P C 96 (97) 53 Ind App 201 53 Cal 948 97 Ind Cas 761 (P C), *Annada Prasad Das v. Ambika Prasad Das*
- 3 (1902) 80 Cal 303 (308) 80 Ind App 41 7 Cal W N 225 . 5 Bom L R 6 8 Sar 409 (P C), *Ram Anugra Narain Singh v. Hanuman Sahai*
- 3a (1925) A I R 1925 All 45 (46) . 49 All 713. 102 Ind Cas 175, *Rukhdeo Tewari v. Sukhdeo Tewari*
- (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 270 (270) . 150 Ind Cas 108, *Mukh Ram v. Mt. Sundar*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 1066 (1067) . 86 Ind Cas 296, *Sekhara Rao v. Ramaraju Seshayya*
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 428 (429) 23 Ind Cas 594, *Muttayya v. Kodandaramayya*
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 668 (668) 24 Ind Cas 680, *Vengudusamy Iyer v. Narayanasamy Iyer*
- (1899) 9 Mad L Jour 33 (34), *Dapanayya v. Peddichalamayya*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 633 (636) 152 Ind Cas 773, *Khem Chand v. Krishna Kumar*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 126 (127) 90 Ind Cas 825, *Drigbijoy Singh v. Drigpal Singh*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 669 (670) 87 Ind Cas 164, *Lal Bahadur Singh v. Mathura Singh*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 481 (482) . 113 Ind Cas 258, *Mt. Ram Dulari v. Sher Bahadur Singh*
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 215 (221) 115 Ind Cas 279, *Chandra Shekar Singh v. Jagjwan Baksh Singh*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 19**

possession was adverse to the other members of the joint family and that she would acquire an absolute title to the property after twelve years of such possession.⁴ Similarly, where a Hindu female who is only entitled to maintenance and not to possession, obtains possession, such possession will be adverse to those entitled to possession so as to enable her to prescribe for an absolute title⁵ unless they could show that the possession was the result of some arrangement between them.⁶

The case would be different where a Hindu female enters into possession as an heiress under Hindu Law but subsequently she becomes disentitled to retain possession. Thus, where a Hindu widow

There is no presumption that the possession is that of a qualified owner:

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 63 (64) (Mad), *Kuppaswamy v. Srinivasalingar*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 340 (364, 368) . 163 Ind Cas 770, *Mata Balkish Singh v. Ajodhya Balkish Singh*.

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oolappa Nash.
v. Raj Baha-

dur Kurms.

[See also (1920) A I R 1920 Nag 196 (198) : 16 Nag L R 221 : 56 Ind Cas 952, *Kasturi v. Lole Major*. (Hindu mistress entitled to maintenance but not to possession—Her possession is adverse to rightful owner.)

(1897) 21 Bom 110 (117), *Desai Ranchhodas v. Rawal Nathu Bhai*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Pat 114 (124) : 121 Ind Cas 337, *Chattri Kumari Devi v. Mohan Sukram Shah*.

(1911) 9 Ind Cas 50 (51) 33 All 312, *Gajadhar Pande v. Mt. Parbati*.]

4. (1919) A I R 1919 P C 60 (62) : 42 All 152 : 46 Ind App 197 : 55 Ind Cas 436 (P C), *Saigur Prasad v. Raj Kishore Lal*.

(1878) 2 Mad 23 (29) . 5 Ind App 206 : 3 Cal L R 265 : 2 Ind Jur 616 : 2 Shome L R 128 . 3 Sar 850 (P C), *Zamindar of Pittapuram v. Proprietors of Muttu of Kolanka*.

(1894) 22 Cal 445 (450) : 22 Ind App 25 . 5 Mad L Jour 1 : 6 Sar 523 : R & J 136 (P C), *Lachhan Kunwar v. Manorath Ram*

(1874) 1874 Bom P J 24, *Rajee v. Rambhaje*.

(1924) A I R 1924 All 39 (91) : 45 All 729 : 74 Ind Cas 869, *Uman Shankar v. Mt. Aisha Khatun*.

(1924) A I R 1924 All 740 (742) : 83 Ind Cas 751 : 46 All 769, *Kali Charan v. Mt. Pearce*.

5. (1888) 1888 All W N 133 (134), *Sewa Ram v. Lachman Prasad*.

(1887) 1887 All W N 43 (43), *Narain Das v. Banshidhar*.

(1899) 1899 All W N 95 (95), *Kauldhar v. Raghubir*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 133 (140) : 99 Ind Cas 890, *Rajabahadur Singh v. Kanhaiya Balkish Singh*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 729 (731) : 67 Ind Cas 1021, *Bhagwan Din v. Ajudha*.

6. (1902) 29 Cal 664 (671, 673) : 29 Ind App 132 : 6 Cal W N 657 : 4 Bom L R 547 . 8 Sar 250 (P C), *Sham Koer v. Dah Koer* (The reference in the judgment to the other co-parceners as "reversionary heirs" is an obvious mistake)

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 729 (730) : 67 Ind Cas 1021, *Bhagwan Din v. Ajudha*.

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[See (1899) 12 Suth W R 154 (159) : 3 Peng L R A C 289, *Indubansi Kunwar v. Mt. Grubhiran Kunwar*.

entered into possession as heiress of her husband, but by reason of the birth of a posthumous son her possession became adverse to the son, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the adverse possession must be considered as relating only to a widow's estate under Hindu Law.⁷ Similarly, where a Hindu widow in possession of her deceased husband's property, forfeits her rights to the property on re-marriage⁸ or by conversion to another faith⁹ but continues in possession, her possession would be adverse to the reversioners only in respect of a limited estate in the property which she had prior to the forfeiture or the re-marriage. Likewise, where a Hindu daughter enters into possession of her father's property under a will giving her only a limited estate and it turns out that the will is invalid, it has been held that she will acquire only a limited estate by adverse possession.¹⁰ Again, where the acquisition of full ownership is prohibited by law as in the case of *watan* property in Bombay, a Hindu widow in possession can acquire by prescription only a limited estate therein.¹¹

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 19

It has been held in some cases¹² that the presumption, where a Hindu female without title enters into possession of property, is that her possession is adverse only to the extent of a limited interest in the property. It is submitted that this view is not correct

(1894) 8 O P L R 99 (100), *Gunesb Paudit v. Imrahal Lodhi*.

(1876) 2 Mad 23 (29), 5 Ind App 206 3 Cal L R 265. 2 Ind Jur 616 : 2 Shome L R 128 3 Sar 850 (P C), *Zamindar of Ptilapuram v. Proprietors of Mulla of Kolauka* (Where such arrangement is proved, a suit within 12 years of her death is not barred.)

7. (1921) A I R 1924 P C 121 (122) 5 Lah 192 51 Ind App 171. 80 Ind Cas 789 (P C), *Mt. Lajwanti v. Safa Chand*

[See also (1939) A I R 1939 Oudh 17 (28) 178 Ind Cas 950, *Jadunath Singh v. Birsheshar Singh*]

8. (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 537 (538) 157 Ind Cas 1006, *Kishen Singh v. Mt. Parbati*

(1927) A I R 1927 All 274 (276) 99 Ind Cas 578, *Tarif v. Phool Singh*

(1925) A I R 1925 All 369 (370) 86 Ind Cas 445, *Umrao Singh v. Parthi*

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 827 (828) 119 Ind Cas 238, *Desa v. Dani*.

(1927) A I R 1927 All 523 (524) 49 All 203 100 Ind Cas 734, *Mangat v. Bharto*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 218 (219) 141 Ind Cas 399, *Hassan v. Ibrahim*.

9 (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 92 (93) 7 Luck 320 141 Ind Cas 831, *Mt. Farbati v. Ram Prasad*

10. (1937) A I R 1937 All 197 (204) 168 Ind Cas 541, *Suraj Prasad v. Gulab Dei*

(1908) 31 Mad 321 (327) 18 Mad L Jour 409 4 Mad L Tim 5, *Narsimha Appa Rao v. Jagganadha Gopala Rao*

[See (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 497 (509) 48 Mad 1 93 Ind Cas 705, *Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar*]

11. (1928) A I R 1928 Bom 333 (335) 114 Ind Cas 390, *Arna v. Gojra*

(1900) 27 Ind App 86 (91) 24 Bom 556 4 Cal W N 517 2 Bom L R 549

7 Sar 710 (P C), *Padapa v. Swamirao*

12 (1925) A I R 1925 All 330 (330) 85 Ind Cas 449, *Bindrabau v. Ram Narain*

[See also (1912) 15 Ind Cas 403 (404) (Mad), *In re Prathipati Seshayya*

(1929) A I R 1929 Bom 333 (334) 119 Ind Cas 756, *Anant Ba. Satraya v. Mahadeo Wasudko*]

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 19-20**

Where a widow enters into possession of property without a right to do so, the case is one of dispossession and a suit for possession against her or her alienee is consequently governed by Article 142.¹³

20. Possession under a temporary arrangement between members of a family.—*A*, one of the heirs of a deceased Muhammedan, sued the other heirs for recovery of the share of the property left by the deceased propositus. Pending the litigation the question with regard to the relinquishment of the share of *A*, in her favour, was agreed, by all the heirs, to be referred to arbitration. No reference was, however, actually made, but for several years subsequent to the agreement, a certain fixed sum out of the profits of the estate continued to be paid to *A*. It was held by the Privy Council that the agreement was merely a provisional one, that no title was thereby conferred on *A* with regard to the alleged share in the estate, and that the subsequent payments could not make out a case for *A* of adverse possession, as the possession must be referred to such title as *A* had and not to any higher title.¹

Where *B* was in possession under an agreement to surrender the land to *A*, it was held that his possession at the time of the surrender was not adverse to *A*, but that it became adverse when *B* refused to surrender the land as agreed upon.² Where *A* transferred property collusively in the name of *B*, in order to save the property from *A*'s creditors, it was held in the undermentioned case³ that as the transfer was a sham one intended to save the property from creditors, *B*'s ostensible possession must be deemed to have been

13. (1875) 7 N W P H C R 319 (351), *Gobardhan v. Balmukund*.
(1923) A I R 1923 All 25 (26) : 45 All I : 75 Ind Cas 14, *Mt. Radha Dulaiya v. Rashik Lal*.
(1937) A I R 1937 All 268 (270) : 169 Ind Cas 596 : I L R (1937) All 421, *Rashik Lal v. Mt. Radha Dulaiya*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Lah 695 (696) : 109 Ind Cas 54, *Hakam Singh v. Hazara Singh*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Bom 427 (431) : 159 Ind Cas 697, *Shankar Vinayak v. Ramrao Sahebrao*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Nag 129 (133) : 89 Ind Cas 663, *Teshwant v. Daulat*. (A Hindu widow is entitled to make her own disposal of her share in the property.)

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 820 (822) : 110 Ind Cas 613 : 51 Mad 815, *Muthuswami v. Pennayya*. (Widow having claim for residence and maintenance continuing in possession after death of last male holder but not as heir—Her possession is not wrongful at least till reversioners demand possession from her.)
(1907) 1907 Pun Re No. 102 : 1907 Pun W R No. 78, *Dura Mal v. Narain Das*.
(1932) A I R 1932 All 961 (361, 362) : 54 All 472 : 133 Ind Cas 363, *Mt. Ram Kunwar v. Amar Nath*.

Note 20

1. (1925) A I R 1925 P C 70 (74) 88 Ind Cas 149 (P C), *Karamunnessi Khatun v. Md. Fazlul Karim*.
2. (1876) 25 Suth W R 521 (523), *Betts v. Mahomed Ismail Chowdhry*.
3. (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 420 (421). 22 Oudh Cas 222-53 Ind Cas 961, *Ashfaq Hussain v. Nazir Hussain*.

with the object of maintaining that design and was not therefore adverse to A. See also the undermentioned cases.⁴

Arts. 142 & 143
Notes 20-21

21. Possession in lieu of dower. — Where a Mahomedan widow obtains possession of her husband's estate peaceably and without force or fraud, she is entitled to retain possession of it till her dower debt is paid. The right is, however, not the same as that of a mortgagee to possession which is founded on contract. The possession in lieu of dower is not adverse to the heir, who can on payment of the dower, get back the property. When the heirs of a deceased Mahomedan sued his widow for immediate possession and the suit was decreed on condition that the plaintiffs were to pay the widow a certain amount as being the balance of the dower debt within a certain time, and on failure to pay it the suit was dismissed, and the widow thereupon sold the property to a third person, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the non-payment had not the effect of conferring an absolute estate on the widow and that the decision in the previous suit did not extinguish the plaintiff's right to claim possession at any future time.¹ See also the undermentioned cases.^{1a}

It is not necessary for possession to be peaceable and without force or fraud that it should have been obtained by the widow with the consent of the husband's heirs. In *Bebee Bachun v. Sheikh Hamid Hussain*,² where on her husband's death the widow had got into possession without the consent of the heir and obtained

4. (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 6 (8) . 48 Ind Cas 114, *Mt. Chuhan Bai v. Ramnand* (The possession of a small residential house by a widow under an arrangement with her sons in exercise of her right of residence is not adverse to the sons.)

(1915) A I R 1915 Low Bur 86 (87, 88) 81 Ind Cas 875, *Ma Min Kym v. Maung Wa* (Working lands in turns by mutual arrangement — No adverse possession.)

Note 21

1. (1911) A I R 1911 D C 69 (Pat) 48 Ind Cas 145 47 All 250 : 86 Ind Cas 579

48 Ind Cas 833, *Abdulla v.*

(1921) 65 Ind Cas 224 (230) (Pat), *Abdul Rahman v. Wali Muhammad*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 72 (74) 68 Ind Cas 601 2 Pat 75, *Abdur Rahman v. Sheikh Wali Mahamed*.

time
widow

[But see (1930) 120 Ind Cas 557 (558) (All), *Mt. Mahmuda Bibi v. Abdul Hamid*

(1929) A I R 1929 All 326 (327) 119 Ind Cas 445, *Karam Ali v. Md. Latif*.]

2. (1871) 14 Moo Ind App 377 (384) 10 Beng L R 45 17 Suth W R 113 : 2 Suther 531 3 Sar 39 (P C).

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 21-22**

registration of her name as owner in the Collectorate in spite of the opposition of the heir to such application, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the widow was entitled to retain possession till her dower debt was paid. The contrary view expressed in the undermentioned case³ that where the widow enters into possession without the *consent* of the heirs her possession would be adverse to the heirs and that the widow would obtain an absolute title after twelve years is, it is submitted, not correct.

In *Mutsadi v. Habib Mian*,⁴ a Mahomedan widow entered into possession of her husband's property on his death partly as heir and partly as a creditor in respect of her dower debt and during the course of such possession asserted a hostile title by getting herself recorded as owner in the Record of Rights. Though she was liable to render accounts to the heirs so that they might ascertain the period of time at which her dower debt became discharged, she never furnished any accounts. It was held by a single Judge of Patna High Court that the widow acquired an absolute title to the property by lapse of time. It is submitted that this view also does not seem to be correct in view of the two Privy Council cases referred to above.

The lien of a Mahomedan widow over the property of her deceased husband of which she has come into peaceful possession in lieu of her dower, operates only so long as she remains in possession and gives her merely a right of retention and no title. Consequently if the widow is dispossessed by an heir of the husband, her remedy would be a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. She cannot maintain a suit for possession against the heir based on her title arising from prior possession, as such title is available only against persons other than the rightful owner.⁵

22. Possession in lieu of maintenance. — See also Note 19 *ante*.

Where a person is in possession (under an agreement) in lieu of maintenance for his life, his possession is not adverse to the person entitled after his death.¹ The basis of the rule is that a person who has a lawful title to possession, cannot disclaim that title and claim to be in wrongful possession. As has been seen in Notes 18 and 19 *ante*, possession must be referred to the title which the possessor has. Such a person cannot obtain a title by adverse possession against the person entitled after his death.²

3. (1868) 3 Agr 279 (279), *Mt. Oomrao Begum v. Hamid Jan*.

4. (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 320 (322) : 39 Ind Cas 579.

5. (1927) A I R 1927 All 531 (535) : 103 Ind Cas 363 : 50 All 86, *Mashal Singh v. Ahmad Hussain*.

Note 22

1. (1925) A I R 1925 P C 132 (135) : 83 Ind Cas 335 (P C), *Mt. Bhagwani Kunwar v. Mohan Singh*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Nag 129 (132) : 83 Ind Cas 663, *Yeshwant v. Daulat*.

2. (1925) A I R 1925 P C 132 (135) : 83 Ind Cas 335 (P C), *Mt. Bhagwani Kunwar v. Mohan Singh*.

But where *A* was in possession under a grant for maintenance from *B*, but *B* obtained a *decree for resumption of the grant* but having obtained a decree did nothing further, and *A* continued in possession for twelve years, it was held by the Privy Council that the possession of *A* from that date was adverse to *B*.³ The reason is that the possession in such a case could not be referred to any lawful title and was really without any title.

23. Possession by the holder of a life estate, if can be adverse to reversioners.—The possession of a person who has only a life estate in the property possessed is not adverse to the person who would be entitled to the property on the death of the former. As has been seen in Note 19 *ante*, the reason is that the possession must be referred to the title which the possessor has, that being only a life estate. Further, the reversioner not being entitled to the property until the death of the life estate holder, there can, as will be seen in Note 79 *infra*, be no adverse possession against him. The mere fact that the life estate holder asserts that he has an absolute estate will not enable him to acquire an absolute title by adverse possession.¹

24. Possession of property belonging to person under disability.—Where a person enters into possession of property belonging to a person under disability, such as a minor or a lunatic, and the relationship of the parties and the circumstances of the case are such as would, in equity, fasten on the person so entering into possession a trust actual or constructive, the possession of such person would be presumed to be that of a bailiff or agent of the person under disability, and not adverse to him. Thus, the possession of a *de facto* guardian would be presumed to be on behalf of the minor as his bailiff or guardian and not adverse to him.¹ In *Thomas v.*

3. (1928) A I R 1928 P C 165 (IG5) 109 Ind Cas 618 (P C), *Kesho Prasad Singh v. Madho Prasad Singh*.

Note 23

1. (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 67 (91) : 109 Ind Cas 635, *Mohammad Ali Khan v. Nisar Ali Khan*.

Note 24

1. (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 89 (91) : 173 Ind Cas 103, *Ramya v. Madhi*.
(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 1113 (1117) : 51 Mad 977 : 117 Ind Cas 113, *Mahalakshamma v. Suryanarayana*.
(1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (642) : 12 Bom L R 956 (969) : 85 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 513 (516) : 177 Ind Cas 225, *Ramayya v. Lakshmayya* (Hindu dying leaving minor widow—Her mother-in-law taking possession—Mother-in-law's possession must be presumed to be on behalf of her daughter-in-law.)
(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 153 (154) : 4 Luck 592 : 115 Ind Cas 101, *Mt. Lachmin v. Ishur Prasad* (Do.)
(1926) 51 Mad L Jour 54 (N R C).
(1903) 27 Bom 31 (40) : 4 Bom L R 754, *Jotaram v. Ram Krishna*.
(1928) A I R 1928 Nag 275 (277) : 108 Ind Cas 435, *Mayadad Khan v. Hazari Lal*. (Mahomedan father)
[See also (1911) 9 Ind Cas 505 (506) (Mad), *Thandayaraya Odayan v. Narayana Goundan*. (Property allotted to minor on partition

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 24

Thomas,² the principle on which the possession was not regarded as adverse to the minor was stated to be that the possession must be referred to the title of the possessor as guardian, and that possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. In that case a father entered into possession of a certain estate belonging to his children. Vice Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood observed as follows:

"In this case a father, who had several children entitled to estates on the death of his wife, all the children being under age at that time, entered upon the estates. I am of opinion, that, *prima facie*, unless there is strong evidence to the contrary, his entry must be taken to be on behalf of his infant children and as their natural guardian—the guardian in socage of the plaintiff he could not be, for such guardianship terminates when the child attains fourteen years of age; but considering the right of the father as the natural guardian of the infant plaintiff, and the practice of this Court in making allowances for maintenance, he having entered and received the rents and profits, and there being no evidence of his not having discharged the obligation imposed upon him of maintaining his children, remembering the fact that they were all under his own charge and were infants, I think I must reasonably infer that the entry was an entry on their behalf and as their guardian and was totally different from the case of a mere stranger entering upon property under similar circumstances."

In *Ma Ngue Nang v. Maung Tha Maung*,³ A, a father, conveyed a share of certain property to B, his daughter who was a minor, but continued to be in possession admitting B's title to it. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that such possession was not adverse to the daughter. Similarly, in *Ghulam Mohamed v. Ghulam Hussain*,⁴ when a mother was in possession of certain properties belonging to her minor children, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that such possession was not adverse to the minors.

but the uncle continuing in possession after partition.—*Held*, presumption was that the uncle held possession for his minor nephew.]

2. (1855) 110 R R 107 (110); 2 Kay & J 79; 25 L J Ch 159; 1 Jur (N S) 1160; 4 W R (Eng) 135.
3. (1929) A I R 1929 P C 55 (57); 7 Rang 4; 114 Ind Cas 505 (P C).
4. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 81 (87, 88); 59 Ind App 74; 54 All 93; 136 Ind Cas 454 (P C).

See also the following cases to a similar effect:

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| <p><i>Indalam-mal</i>,
[See also (1911) 11 Ind Cas 93 (94) (Oudh), <i>Bhagawan Das v. Ishar Dat</i>. {Son of feeble intellect.}]</p> | <p><i>v. Ram-ter's pro- from the</i></p> |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|

The presumption in the above cases, is, however, a rebuttable one, and it is open to the guardian to show that he entered into possession on his own behalf adversely to the minor.⁵ But once it is shown that possession once commenced as a guardian, it will continue to be so even after the wards attained their majority.⁶ For, as observed in *Thomas v. Thomas*,⁷ once a person enters as guardian, the Court would never allow him to set up any other title to the estate. In the undermentioned cases,⁸ the view has been assumed that a person entering on the property of a person under disability under circumstances rendering such possession one on behalf of the latter, can make his possession hostile and adverse by asserting a hostile title by some overt act after the disability has ceased.

It has been held by the High Court of Bombay in the undermentioned case,⁹ following the English case of *Morgan v. Morgan*,¹⁰ that even where a mere stranger enters on the property of persons under disability, his possession must be considered to be that of a bailiff or agent of the person under disability.^{10a} The High Court of Madras has, on the other hand, held, following *Thomas v. Thomas*,¹¹ that it cannot be stated as a general proposition that there could be no adverse possession of property which belongs to a person under disability during the continuance of the disability and that the

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 120 (122) : 33 Bom 293, *Umabai Mangeshrao v. Vithal Vasudeo Shetti* (Mother's possession presumed to be as guardian)]

5 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 61 (76) . 74 Ind Cas 225, *Rudra Pratap Singh v. Nirman Prasad Singh*

[See also (1910) 7 Ind Cas 505 (525) (Lab), *Husama v. Sahib Nur*]

6. (1873) L R 17 Eq 378 (399, 400) 43 L J Ch 495 20 L T 862 22 W R (Eng) 290, *Howard v. Earl of Shrewsbury*.

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (642) 12 Bom L R 956 (968, 969) 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna*

7. (1855) 110 R R 107 (110) 2 Kay & J 79 . 25 L J Ch 159 1 Jur (N S) 1160 . 4 W R (Eng) 185.

8. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (642) . 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo v. Eknath*.

(1889) 1889 Bom P J 219 (219), *Govind v. Jaya*. (Plaintiff's expulsion from the house amounts to such overt act)

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 728 (730) (Oudh) *Mohammad Azim Khan v. Brajraj Singh*. (Mere mutation of names in guardian's favour not such an overt act)

(1933) A I R 1933 Bom 287 (293) 57 Bom 488 145 Ind Cas 262, *Fakugouda v. Dyamawa*

(1933) A I R 1933 Nag 387 (389) 148 Ind Cas 237 30 Nag L R 68, *Sheodmal v. Narayandas* (Mere letting out of a portion of the property in his own name, by a person looking after the same during the minority of the rightful owner or person for whom it is natural to do so, does not amount to such assertion of title or ouster as to bar the title of the rightful owner by adverse possession)

9. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (642) 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna*

10 (1737) 1 Atk 489 (489) 26 E R 310 (The rule applies even to a stranger entering into possession of a minor's property)

10a See (1903) 2 Ch 40 (61) 72 L J Ch 473 83 L T 403 51 W R 501, *In re Diss, Diss v. Diss* (Possession of a stranger of infant's property must be taken to be as a bailiff or agent for the infant)

11. (1855) 110 R R 107 (110) 4 W R (Eng) 135 2 Kay & J 79 25 L J Ch 159; 1 Jur (N S) 1160

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 24-25**

question in each case has to be decided with reference to the anterior relationship between the person taking possession and the person under disability, and to whether any circumstances exist which would entitle the Court to hold that the person who entered into possession did so under circumstances which would, in law, make him only an agent or a bailiff of the person under disability.¹² The High Court of Bombay also has in a later case held that a distinction is to be drawn between the possession of the guardian and the possession of a stranger between whom and the minor there is no antecedent relationship.¹³

It was held in the cases cited below¹⁴ that where the guardian conveyed the minor's property to a stranger, who purchased it *bona fide*, his possession would be adverse from the date of his entry on the property.

Where a person enters into possession on behalf of a person under disability, a suit by the latter or his representative against the former for possession would be governed by Article 144, inasmuch as the original entry of the defendant was not adverse to the plaintiff.¹⁵

25. Possession of insolvent.—There is a conflict of opinion as to whether the possession of property by an insolvent after his adjudication and before his discharge can be adverse against the Official Receiver or Assignee. In *Krishnocomul Mitter v. Suresh Chunder Deb*,¹ Mr. Justice Wilson expressed the opinion that the possession by the insolvent may be adverse to the Official Assignee. This view was followed by Mr. Justice Bakewell in *Balkrishna Pillai v. Narayanasamy Naidu*.² In *Official Assignee v. Moorli Doss*,³ Wallis, J., dissented from the view expressed in *Krishnocomul's case*¹ and held that the possession of the insolvent is not adverse to the Official Assignee. He rested this view on two grounds: *first*, that the insolvent acquiring property is to be regarded as the agent of the Official Assignee, that his possession must therefore be referred to his title as agent and was not adverse to the Assignee; *secondly*, that even if the insolvent acquired property by adverse possession, it would *eo instanti* become vested again in the Official Assignee. The case went up on appeal in *Ratna Bai v. Official Assignee*.⁴

12. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 12 (15); 45 Mad 361; 70 Ind Cas 678, *Sectaramaraju v. Subbaraju*.

13. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 287 (287); 57 Bom 483; 145 Ind Cas 262, *Fakir-gowda v. Dyamawda*.

14. (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 703 (710); 126 Ind Cas 632, *Sorimuthu Thondeman v. Perumal Ammal*.

[See also (1893) 1893 Bom P J 403 (405), *Vishvanath v. Vaman*.]

15. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (643); 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna*.

Note 25

1. (1886) 8 Cal 556 (559); 12 Cal L R 253.

2. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 14 (15) (Mad).

3. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 233 (239); 22 Ind Cas 271.

4. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 415 (417); 29 Ind Cas 168.

before a Bench of two Judges. The judgment of Wallis, J., was confirmed, but different reasons were given for coming to that conclusion. According to Mr. Justice Sadasiva Iyer, the insolvent was in the position of an *express trustee* for his creditors by force of statutory provisions, and, since a trustee cannot plead adverse possession as against the *cestui que trust*, his possession cannot be adverse to the creditors and therefore to the Official Assignee who represents the creditors. He was also of opinion that on the analogy of the rule that limitation ceases to run as soon as a suit is filed whatever be the length of time during which the suit is pending, time will not run against the Official Assignee during the pendency of the Insolvency proceedings. Mr. Justice Napier, the other Judge constituting the Bench, doubted whether the doctrine of agency could be applied as *between* the insolvent and the Official Assignee, though it might be resorted to in regard to the relations between the insolvent and third parties. He also doubted whether the doctrine of agency was an answer to the claim by adverse possession. But he held that the Limitation Act did not apply to such cases.

26. Possession of mortgagor, when becomes adverse to the mortgagee.—A executes a *simple mortgage* in favour of B and remains in possession of his property. His possession or the possession of his transferee cannot be adverse to B for the reason that he is not entitled to possession at all under his mortgage^{1a} (See Note 78 *infra*) A executes a mortgage in favour of B. There is a stipulation in the mortgage deed that on default in payment as specified in the document, the mortgagee would be entitled to take possession of the mortgaged property. A commits default. It has been held that the possession of the mortgagor from the date of default would be without title and would be adverse to the mortgagee, and that a suit by the mortgagee would be barred after twelve years from that date¹ In the undermentioned case,² a mortgagee was entitled under the terms of the mortgage to enter into possession of the mortgaged property on default in payment committed by the mortgagor. After the occurrence of the default contemplated, a third person obtained a money decree against the mortgagor, purchased the property himself in execution of his decree and was in possession thereof believing himself *bona fide* to be a full owner. It was held by the Privy Council that his possession was adverse to the mortgagee and that the latter could not recover the property after twelve years.

Note 26

- 1a (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 232 (233) 33 Ind Cas 657 18 Oudh Cas 369, *Mahesh Baksh Singh v. Manohar Lal*
1. (1871) 14 Moo Ind App 144 (150) 8 Beng L R 104 16 Suth W R P C 33 2 Suther 490 2 Str 711 (P C), *Brojonath Koondoo v. Khetut Chunder Ghose*
[But see (1874) 22 Suth W R 543(545) 14 Beng L R 315, *Mt Munkee Koor v. Shaikh Munnoo* (Possession of mortgagor after default of payment is with permission of mortgagee)]
2. (1871) 14 Moo Ind App 101 (111, 112) 16 Suth W R P C 19 8 Beng L R 122. 2 Suther 457 2 Str 698 (P C), *Anundo Moyee Dossee v. Dhanendro Chunder*

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 26-28

But, can the mortgagee sue on his mortgage, even though his right to possession may be barred by reason of the adverse possession of the mortgagor for twelve years? It has been held in the under-mentioned case³ that a suit on the mortgage would not be barred. In cases of mortgages by conditional sale governed by the old Bengal Regulation 17 of 1806, there was no provision for a suit for foreclosure but the mortgagee who wished to foreclose had to get a notice issued to the person entitled to redeem, of his intention to foreclose. The person entitled to redeem had one year of grace allowed to him from the date of such notice to redeem the mortgage. After the expiry of the year of grace the mortgagee became the full owner, and the mortgagor's right of redemption was foreclosed and lost. The possession of the mortgagor after the expiry of the year of grace would be adverse to the mortgagee and a suit for possession twelve years after the year of grace expired, would be barred by limitation.⁴ Where in such a mortgage there was also a stipulation that on default the mortgagee would be entitled to take possession of the mortgaged property, and default was committed, it was held that the possession of the mortgagor after the date of the default was adverse to the mortgagee,⁵ and if the mortgagee's suit for possession became barred before the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act (which created the right to sue for foreclosure), the mortgagee's rights were barred not only in respect of the right to possession but also in respect of the right to enforce the mortgage itself.⁶

See also Note 9 to Article 135, *ante*.

27. Possession of a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgage.—See Note 3 to Article 148, *infra*.

28. Possession of mortgagee.—Where a mortgagee who is not entitled as such to the possession of the mortgaged property, enters into possession of such property without title, his possession is clearly adverse to the mortgagor from the date of his entry into such possession.¹ Thus, where a mortgagee not entitled to possession

3. (1913) 21 Ind Cas 773 (773) [Mad], *Kondayya v. Subbayya Chetty*.

4. (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 198 (201) : 45 Ind Cas 563 : 1918 Pun Re No. 79 : *Ratan Das v. M. Guran*.

(1884) 10 Cal 68 (72) : 13 Cal L R 53, *Modun Mohun Choudhry v. Ashad Ally Beparee*.

5. (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 198 (201) : 45 Ind Cas 563 : 1918 Pun Re No. 79, *Ratan Das v. M. Guran*.

(1884) 10 Cal 68 (71, 72) : 13 Cal L R 53, *Modun Mohun Choudhry v. Ashad Ally Beparee*.

⁶ *Rai v. Bhargu Rai*.

, 276) : 1912 Pun Re No. 91,

Note 28

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 69 (71) : 127 Ind Cas 252, *Humayun Qadar v. Suranya Begam*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Lah 189 (189) : 25 Ind Cas 616, *Mula Singh v. Budh Singh*.

by virtue of his mortgage, enters on the property by virtue of a purchase from the mortgagor which is found to be invalid, his possession will be adverse to the mortgagor.² Similarly, where a mortgagee not entitled to possession as such obtained a foreclosure decree under Bengal Regulation 17 of 1806 and in pursuance thereof obtained possession of the mortgaged property, it was held that if the decree was found not binding on the mortgagors, the possession of the mortgagees would be adverse to the mortgagors.³

A mortgagee entitled to possession of the mortgaged property under the terms of his mortgage, cannot, during the subsistence of the mortgage, convert his possession, by assertion or unilateral act, into one adverse to the mortgagor.⁴ The reason is that his possession

Arts. 142 & 143
Note 28

(1926) 93 Ind Cas 934 (935) (Lah), *Jawahar v. Amar Chand*.

2. (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 902 (904). 16 Lah 12 : 154 Ind Cas 243, *Nizam Din Khan v. Rashid Ali Khan*.

3. (1892) 1892 All W N 1000, *Mr. J. B. Dutt v. Mr. J. B. Dutt*.

4. (1862) 1862 Suth

Hunooman

gagge exists.

(not apply and possession of the mortgagee will not become adverse.)

(1904) 32 Cal 296 (312) 32 Ind App 23 9 Cal W N 201 2 All L Jour 71.

redeem),

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 512 (513) 97 Ind Cas 348 6 Pat 102, *Dinanath Rai v. Rama Rai*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 834 (836) 52 Ind Cas 675, *Kunhunn Panikkar v. Raman* (Person entering as simple kanomdar, subsequently taking invalid permanent kanom from an Ooralan, cannot make his possession adverse to the trust.)

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 478 (479) (Mad), *Sangamma Naicker v. Ramaswamy Naicker*.

(1866) 1866 Pun Re No. 58, *Chiragh Shah v. Ghuseeta*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 182 (183) 80 Ind Cas 592, *Ram Chhor Baksh v. Ram Surat*.

(1906) 16 Mad L Jour 5 (6), *Lakshmi Nachiar v. Rama Chandra*.

(1932) A I R 1932 All 437 (439) 133 Ind Cas 366, *Arjun Singh v. Mahesha Nand*.

(1925) A I R 1925 All 417 (419) 86 Ind Cas 849, *Ram Prasad Singh v. Babu Lal*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 302 (303) 23 Oudh Cas 263 60 Ind Cas 404, *Tilak Chand v. Shambhu Singh*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 71 (72) 68 Ind Cas 883, *Zora v. Chandu*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 491 (492) 92 Ind Cas 832, *Dajrang Dali v. Mt. Maharaja*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 521 (522) 83 Ind Cas 115, *Shuappa Malappa v. Atali Lumanna*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 517 (518) 95 Ind Cas 849, *Nirankar Prasad v. Mt. Dechas*.

(1900) 10 Ind Cas 15 (16) Pat 102, *Shah Bahadur*.

Harri Krishna.

72 52 Ind Cas 159,

Mahomed Kamul v.

Mahomed Salim

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 26-28

But, can the mortgagee sue on his mortgage, even though his right to possession may be barred by reason of the adverse possession of the mortgagor for twelve years? It has been held in the under-mentioned case³ that a suit on the mortgage would not be barred. In cases of mortgages by conditional sale governed by the old Bengal Regulation 17 of 1806, there was no provision for a suit for foreclosure but the mortgagee who wished to foreclose had to get a notice issued to the person entitled to redeem, of his intention to foreclose. The person entitled to redeem had one year of grace allowed to him from the date of such notice to redeem the mortgage. After the expiry of the year of grace the mortgagee became the full owner, and the mortgagor's right of redemption was foreclosed and lost. The possession of the mortgagor after the expiry of the year of grace would be adverse to the mortgagee and a suit for possession twelve years after the year of grace expired, would be barred by limitation⁴. Where in such a mortgage there was also a stipulation that on default the mortgagee would be entitled to take possession of the mortgaged property, and default was committed, it was held that the possession of the mortgagor after the date of the default was adverse to the mortgagee,⁵ and if the mortgagee's suit for possession became barred before the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act (which created the right to sue for foreclosure), the mortgagee's rights were barred not only in respect of the right to possession but also in respect of the right to enforce the mortgage itself.⁶

See also Note 9 to Article 135, *ante*.

27. Possession of a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgagee. — See Note 3 to Article 148, *infra*.

28. Possession of mortgagee. — Where a mortgagee who is not entitled as such to the possession of the mortgaged property, enters into possession of such property without title, his possession is clearly adverse to the mortgagor from the date of his entry into such possession.¹ Thus, where a mortgagee not entitled to possession

9. (1913) 21 Ind Cas 778 (773) (Mad), *Kondayya v. Subbayya Chetty*.

4. (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 198 (201) : 45 Ind Cas 563 : 1918 Pun Re No 79 : *Ratan Das v. Mt. Guran*.

(1884) 10 Cal 68 (72) : 13 Cal L R 53, *Medun Mohun Choudhry v. Ashad Ally Beparee*.

5. (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 198 (201) : 45 Ind Cas 563 : 1918 Pun Re No 79, *Ratan Das v. Mt. Guran*.

(1884) 10 Cal 68 (71, 72) 13 Cal L R 53, *Medun Mohun Choudhry v. Ashad Ally Beparee*.

C. (1912) 15 Ind Cas 240 (244) (Al), *Ram Daur Rai v. Bhargu Rai*

[See also (1912) 15 Ind Cas 275 (276) : 1912 Pun Re No, 94, *Nand Lal v. Goojar*.]

Note 28

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 69 (71) : 127 Ind Cas 252, *Humayun Qadar v. Suraya Begam*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Lah 139 (139) : 25 Ind Cas 616, *Mula Singh v. Budh Singh*.

by virtue of his mortgage, enters on the property by virtue of Arts. 142 & 144 a purchase from the mortgagor which is found to be invalid, his possession will be adverse to the mortgagor.² Similarly, where a mortgagee not entitled to possession as such obtained a foreclosure decree under Bengal Regulation 17 of 1806 and in pursuance thereof obtained possession of the mortgaged property, it was held that if the decree was found not binding on the mortgagors, the possession of the mortgagees would be adverse to the mortgagors.³ Note 28

A mortgagee entitled to possession of the mortgaged property under the terms of his mortgage, cannot, during the subsistence of the mortgage, convert his possession, by assertion or unilateral act, into one adverse to the mortgagor.⁴ The reason is that his possession

(1926) 93 Ind Cas 934 (935) (Lah), *Jawahar v. Amar Chand*.

2. (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 902 (904) 16 Lah 12; 154 Ind Cas 243, *Nizam Din Khan v. Rashid Ali Khan*.

3. (1892) 1892 All W N 51 (51), *Maule Balhsh v. Tajammal Husain*.

4. (1862) 1862 Suth W R FB 87 (38) (FB), *Muddun Gopal Singh v. Lalla Hunooman Dobay* (So long as the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee exists between the parties to a suit, the law of limitation will not apply and possession of the mortgagee will not become adverse.)

(1904) 92 Cal 296 (312) 32 Ind App 23 0 Cal W N 201 • 2 All L Jour 71 : 7 Bom L R 1 1 Cal L Jour 594 8 Sar 734 (P C), *Kharajmal v. Diam* (As between mortgagor and mortgagee, neither exclusive pos-

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redeem).

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 512 (513) 97 Ind Cas 343 6 Pat 102, *Dinanath Rai v. Rama Rai*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 834 (838) 52 Ind Cas 675, *Kunhunnai Panikkar v. Raman* (Person entering as simple kanomdar, subsequently taking invalid permanent kanom from an Ooralan, cannot make his possession adverse to the trust.)

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 478 (479) (Mad), *Sangamma Naicker v. Ramaswamy Naicker*.

(1866) 1866 Pun Re No 58, *Chiragh Shah v. Ghuseela*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 182 (183) : 60 Ind Cas 592, *Ram Chhor Balsh v. Ram Suraf*.

(1906) 16 Mad L Jour 5 (6), *Lakshmi Nachar v. Rama Chandra*.

(1932) A I R 1932 All 437 (439) 138 Ind Cas 366, *Arjun Singh v. Mahesha Nand*.

(1925) A I R 1925 All 417 (419) 86 Ind Cas 849, *Ram Prasad Singh v. Babu Lal*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 302 (303) 23 Oudh Cas 269 60 Ind Cas 404, *Talak Chand v. Shambhu Singh*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 71 (72) 68 Ind Cas 683, *Zora v. Chandu*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 491 (492) 92 Ind Cas 832, *Bajrang Bai v. Jit. Maharajia*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 521 (522) 83 Ind Cas 115, *Shuappa Malappa v. Atali Lumanna*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 517 (518) 95 Ind Cas 849, *Nirankar Prasad v. Mt. Bechai*.

(1866) 1 Agra 15 (16), *Ram Dial v. Shah Dakhlan*.

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 999 (1000) (All), *Gandharp Singh v. Hari Krishna*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 150 (151) 22 Oudh Cas 72 52 Ind Cas 159, *Mohammad Mohsin v. Mohammad Abid*.

(1929) A I R 1929 All 675 (676) 119 Ind Cas 111, *Mahomed Kamul v. Mahomed Salim*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 28

- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 339 (340) (Mad), *Sankaran Moosad v. Othenan Nair*.
 (1882) 1882 Pun Re No. 49, *Teju Mal v. Zulfahar Shah*.
 (1874) 21 Suth W R 13 (14), *Jeechoo Sahro v. Syud Musvecoollah*.
 (1890) 14 Bom 279 (281), *Bhagiant Goind v. Kondi Mahadu*.
 (1907) 29 All 610 (617) : 1907 All W N 221 : 4 All L Jour 521, *Muzaffar Ali Khan v. Parbati*.
 (1864) 1861 Suth W R 68 (68), *Mt. Mohasha v. Mt. Khoondoo*. (Possession by mortgagee cannot be adverse to the heir of the deceased mortgagor.)
 (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 937 (938) : 62 Ind Cas 502, *Kali Mahmud Talukdas v. Dina Bandhu Dutt*. (Simple mortgagee getting into possession by sale—Sale set aside and mortgagee treated as mortgagee in possession—His possession is not adverse.)
 (1926) A I R 1926 Sind 145 (149) : 91 Ind Cas 87 : 20 Sind L R 277, *Sulleman v. Esso*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 519 (550) : 95 Ind Cas 9, *Jivan Singh v. Ghanita*.
 (1908) 1908 All W N 1 (2) : 4 All L Jour 787 : 3 Mad L Tim 132, *Jhabbalal v. Chhajju Mal*.
 (1878) 1 All 655 (657, 658), *Ali Muhammad v. Lalla*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 All 203 (206) : 29 Ind Cas 403, *Fanna Lal v. Rameshar Sahai*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 313 (315) : 19 Oudh Cas 166 : 31 Ind Cas 745, *Jagat Pal Singh v. Harnam Singh*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 811 (815) : 31 Ind Cas 678, *Thottakura Gorindu v. Pepakayala Mallaya*. (The denial of the existence of the mortgage or assertion of a proprietary title to the mortgaged property would not give an adverse possession to the mortgagee.)
 (1857) 10 Mad 189 (191), *Mussad v. Collector of Malabar*. (Do.)
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 613 (613) : 74 Ind Cas 830, *Raghunath v. Jetto Singh*. (Do.)
 (1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 124 (125) : 63 Ind Cas 284 : 24 Oudh Cas 155, *Mahendra Bahadur Singh v. Chandrapal Singh*.-(Do.)
 (1928) A I R 1928 Pat 17 (18) : 104 Ind Cas 644, *Tali Mahlon v. Lakshraj*.
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 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 691 (692) : 126 Ind Cas 66, *Rahmat Allah v. Mt. Mudarak Bibi*. (Do.)
 (1925) A I R 1925 All 34 (35) : 80 Ind Cas 944, *Rani Ganesh Rai v. Rup Narain Rai*. (Do.)
 (1908) 1908 Pun Re No. 65 : 1908 Pun L R No. 90 : 1908 Pun W R No. 113, *Indar v. Asa Singh*. (Do.)
 (1912) 13 Ind Cas 652 (653) (Lah), *Lehma Singh v. Santa Singh*. (Do.)
 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 429 (430, 431) (Lah), *Jiva Khan v. Lakshmi Chand*. (Do.)
 (1916) A I R 1918 Lah 197 (198) : 48 Ind Cas 447, *Rani Singh v. Basti*. (Do.)
 (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 17 (20) : 118 Ind Cas 808, *Mt. Gujral Kunuar v. Bhagwati Din Singh*. (Do.)
 [See (1901) 3 Bom L R 97 (99), *Manohar v. Bantant*.]
 [But see (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 534 (535) : 77 Ind Cas 509, *Mohammad Ramzan v. Municipal Committee, Alipure*. (Observation obiter)]

is only a derivative one and not hostile to the mortgagor.⁵ Further, as seen in Note 18 *ante*, the possession must be referred to the title which he has as mortgagee and he cannot be permitted to discard his title as mortgagee and claim to be in wrongful possession.⁶ In *Khairajmal v. Daim*,⁷ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 28

"As between them (i.e., the mortgagor and the mortgagee), neither exclusive possession by the mortgagee for any length of time short of the statutory period of sixty years, nor any acquiescence by the mortgagor not amounting to a release of the equity of redemption, will be a bar or defence to a suit for redemption if the parties are otherwise entitled to redeem."

It would follow from what has been stated above that the mere fact that the mortgage has been *discharged by payment* will not render the possession of the mortgagee adverse to the mortgagor from the date of discharge.^{7a} A contrary view has, however, been held in the undermentioned cases,^{7b} namely that the possession in such cases would become adverse to the mortgagor. It has also been held in some cases^{7c} that the question whether the possession of the mortgagee after the payment of the mortgage money, is or is not adverse to the mortgagor, is always a question of *animus* or intention

5 (1928) A I R 1928 All 726 (730) : 50 All 986 : 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal*.

(1905) 7 Bom L R 772 (789), *Mahomed v. Ezekiel*.

6. (1925) A I R 1925 All 183 (135) : 47 All 73 : 80 Ind Cas 935, *Bahha Singh v. Ram Naram Singh* (He cannot set up or acquire title by adverse possession so long as the right to redeem subsists and is not barred by limitation)

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 308 (309, 310) : 161 Ind Cas 999, *Veethil Kelu v. Chakkara Chappan*.]

7 (1904) 32 Cal 296 (312) : 32 Ind App 23 : 9 Cal W N 201 : 2 All L Jour 71 : 7 Bom L R 1 : 1 Cal L Jour 584 : 8 Sar 731 (P C)

7a (1910) 5 Ind Cas 664 (665) (All), *Nandan Pat Tewari v. Radha Keshun Kalwar*

(1926) A I R 1926 All 186 (198) : 89 Ind Cas 574, *Mt. Beti Bai v. Tantiya Singh*

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 15 (16) : 56 Cal 1130 : 121 Ind Cas 407, *Harasit Golder v. Jaladhar Biswas*

(1898) 20 All 115 (117) : 1897 All W N 214, *Pohkpal Singh v. Bishan Singh*.

(1910) 7 Ind Cas 855 (886) : 33 All 97, *Sudarshan Das v. Ram Pershad*.

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 963 (964) : 34 All 261, *Habibulla v. Abdul Hamid*.

(1924) A I R 1924 All 522 (523) : 83 Ind Cas 710, *Gobind Ram v. Mt. Ram Koer*

(1865) 2 Mad H C R 382 (383), *Panners Purushottaman Nambudri v. Pattanattil Kunju Menayan*

7b (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 616 (616, 617) : 88 Ind Cas 476, *Khushalla v. Bishan Das*

(1926) A I R 1926 All 62 (63) : 92 Ind Cas 414 : 48 All 145, *Mt. Ram Koer v. Gobind Ram*.

7c (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 402 (404) : 129 Ind Cas 414, *Keshab Lal Goswami v. Bhola Nath*. (34 All 261 : 13 Ind Cas 963, Followed)

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 28

of the parties concerned. It is submitted that these last two views do not appear to be correct on principle. The fact of payment would not put an end to the mortgagor's right to redeem, and a suit for redemption can be brought within a period of sixty years under Article 148 of the Act. So long as the right to redeem subsists and is not barred by limitation, the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee subsists and the possession of the mortgagee must be referred to the title as mortgagee and cannot be considered adverse, unless he actually gives up the property and enters under a different status.^{7d}

Suppose now that the mortgagor sells the equity of redemption to the mortgagee, but the sale is found to be void or voidable. Does the possession of the mortgagee from the date of the sale become adverse to the mortgagor? It has been held in the undermentioned cases^{7e} that it would not, on the general principle that a mortgagee cannot, by asserting possession as owner, convert his possession as mortgagee into one as owner. The general trend of opinion is, on the other hand, that from the date of the sale the possession of the mortgagee would become adverse to the mortgagor.⁸ Various reasons

(1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 13 (14) : 140 Ind Cas 189, *Ram Dakh Singh v. Ganga Lal Singh*. (The sale that the mortgage money was paid by

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 910 (912) : 91 Ind Cas 342, *Keshab Lal v. Bholanath*.

7d (1929) A I R 1929 All 805 (806) : 119 Ind Cas 568, *Jai Nandan Tewari v. Umrao Keri*.

(1925) A I R 1925 All 133 (135) : 47 All 79 : 80 Ind Cas 935, *Balha Singh v. Ram Narain Singh*.

7e. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 489 (493) : 37 Mad 423 : 15 Ind Cas 343, *Ariyaputhira Padayachi v. Muthukumaraswami Padayachi*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Lah 924 (925) : 160 Ind Cas 557, *Nawab v. Lachman Singh*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 30 (31) : 113 Ind Cas 510, *Din Muhammad v. Safdar Ali*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 902 (904) : 16 Lah 12 : 154 Ind Cas 243, *Nizam Din Khan v. Nashed Ali Khan*.

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8. (1928) A I R 1928 All 725 (730) : 50 All 986 : 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal*.

(1928) A I R 1928 All 725 (730) : 50 All 986 : 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal*.
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(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 566 (567) : 87 Ind Cas 331, *Dawood Sahib v. Mowdeen Batcha Sahib*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 720 (720) : 80 Ind Cas 561, *Aiyisa Bivi Ammal v. Kalandarsa Routher*.

have been advanced in support of this view. One reason is that though the possession of the mortgagee must be referred to the title which he has, an *ouster* must be presumed from the date of the sale, and that consequently the possession of the mortgagee would be adverse to the mortgagor.⁹ A second reason is that since the parties could, by common consent, put an end to the mortgagee's estate, the sale would operate as such agreement to put an end to the mortgagee's estate as such, and that therefore, the mortgagor would at once be entitled to possession, with the consequence that the possession of the mortgagee thereafter would be adverse to the mortgagor.¹⁰ A third reason advanced is that where a change in the character of the possession is brought about by an agreement between the parties or with their expressed consent as distinguished from acquiescence, the possession will become adverse from that date.¹¹ The true reason would appear to be that the rule that possession

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 213 (215, 216) 63 Ind Cas 215, *Musigadu v. Gopala Reddi*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 82 (84) 44 Mad 253 : 62 Ind Cas 603, *Kandaswami Pillay v. Chinnabha*.

(1917) A I R 1917 All 212 (214) 40 Ind Cas 121, 39 All 423, *Khedu Rai v. Sheoparsan Rai*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 124 (125) 24 Oudh Cas 155 63 Ind Cas 284, *Mahendra Bahadur Singh v. Chandrapal Singh*. (Mortgage with possession—Invalid sale of the property to the mortgagee—Latter's possession becomes adverse to mortgagor.)

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 71 (72) : 120 Ind Cas 481, *Prem Das v. Sarbaland*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 835 (836) 87 Ind Cas 168, *Sheonath v. Tulsi Pat Ram*.

[See (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 16 (18) 109 Ind Cas 795, *Kandaswami Mudaliar v. Ponnuswamy Mudaliar*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 801 (302) 151 Ind Cas 55, *Santokhi Mitter v. Suro Jha* (Relation of mortgagor and mortgagee ceasing by sale of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee.)]

9. (1928) A I R 1928 All 726 (732) 50 All 986 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal* (Per Kendall J.)

10. (1928) A I R 1928 All 726 (731) 50 All 986 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal*. (Per Mukerji J.)

11. (1928) A I R 1928 All 726 (734, 735) 50 All 986 : 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal*. (Per Sulaman G J.)

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 145 (146) 90 Ind Cas 736, *Ibad Ali v. Duarka*. (Agreement to relinquish equity of redemption not evidenced by document—Still adverse possession against mortgagor starts from date of such agreement.)

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 193 (194) 25 Oudh Cas 83 63 Ind Cas 223, *Dashir Husain v. Chandrapal Singh*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 578 (579) 16 Ind Cas 691 (696) 37 Mad 545, *Usman Khan v. Nagalla Dasanna*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Bom 135 (139) 53 Bom 676 122 Ind Cas 113, *Ahmed Bhauddin v. Dabu Daji*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Low Bur 178 (178) 36 Ind Cas 959, *Abdul Hamid v. Darriah Dibi*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Rang 290 (291) 82 Ind Cas 829, *Mg San Chuen v. Ma Daung U*.

(1882) 1882 All W N 84 (85), *Dhola v. Ajudha Prasad*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 82 (84) 62 Ind Cas 603 44 Mad 253, *Kandaswami Pillay v. Chinnabha*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 28

must be referred to the title which the possessor has and that the possessor cannot be permitted to set up any other title to the property, has no application where the mortgagor *admits* (by execution of the sale deed) that he has no title from that date. The rule above mentioned is really intended for the *benefit of the mortgagor* and can therefore be waived by him by admitting that he has no title, and that the title is in the mortgagee.

Where in a suit between the mortgagor and the mortgagee the Court passes a *decree* that the mortgage is satisfied and that the mortgagor is entitled to immediate possession, it is equivalent to a declaration that the relation between the parties, of mortgagor and mortgagee, has come to an end. There is no further right of suit for redemption. The possession of the mortgagee after the date of such decree is not referable to any lawful title, and will consequently be adverse.¹²

Where *A* executes a usufructuary mortgage in favour of *B* and subsequently thereto, enters into an *agreement with him to sell* the mortgaged property to him, the possession of the mortgagee thereafter is not adverse to the mortgagor.¹³ There is no admission in such a case as in the case of the execution of a sale deed, that the mortgagor has no title to the property from that date, and the general rule that a mortgagee cannot, by assertion, make his possession adverse to the mortgagor, holds good.

Where *A* executes a mortgage with possession in favour of *B* and subsequently sells the mortgaged property to *B*, but nevertheless the mortgagee holds the property only as a mortgagee, it has been held that his possession is not adverse to the mortgagor.¹⁴

Where a *third person* who has no right to the equity of redemption purports to sell it to the mortgagee thereof, it is clear that the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee is not put an end to, and the mortgagee's possession cannot become adverse to the mortgagor.¹⁵ In *Mata Din v. Ahamad Ali*,¹⁶ *A*, a Muhammadan,

[See (1881-82) 6 Bom 674 (680) : 7 Ind Jur 96, *Gopal Sitaram v. Narhar Apaji*.]

12. (1914) A I R 1914 All 212 (245, 246) : 25 Ind Cas 611 (615), *Mt. Zebunnissa v. Parschhal*. (Following 24 All 41.)

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 407 (408) : 50 Ind Cas 33, *Omayyurugam Mutt v. Sitasooria Theroan*.

13. (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 114 (115) : 93 Oudh Cas 100 : 62 Ind Cas 406, *Sitla Sahai v. Dhum Singh*.

14. (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 837 (838) : 172 Ind Cas 449, *Mt. Dhapan v. Sri Ram*.

15. (1897) 11 B. & C. 502 (1897) D. & J. 111

v. Nanhai.

Ali.

Khan v. Kala

Shah.

(1891) 14 Mad 33 (42), *Byari v. Puttanna*.

(1912) 14 Ind Cas 584 (585) : 15 Oudh Cas 89, *Amir Ali v. Nazari*.

See also Note 5 Point (4) under Article 143 *infra* and the cases cited thereunder.

16. (1912) 13 Ind Cas 976 (978) : 15 Oudh Cas 49 : 34 All 213 : 39 Ind App 49 (P C)

mortgaged to *B* certain properties with possession in the year 1885 for a period of ten years. *A* died subsequently leaving a minor son *C* as his heir. *X*, as *de facto* guardian of *C*, sold the equity of redemption to *B*, the mortgagee, in the year 1889. It was held by the Privy Council that the sale was void and *B*'s possession was not adverse to *C* till 1895, the date of the expiry of the term of the mortgage. If their Lordships meant by this that the possession of the mortgagee became adverse from 1895, it is difficult to understand the reasoning behind the view, inasmuch as on general principles, the possession of a mortgagee as such cannot become adverse to the mortgagor so long as the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee subsists between the parties. It is also difficult to understand how their Lordships treated the case under the twelve years' rule of limitation, the suit being one for redemption of a mortgage governed by Article 148 of the Limitation Act

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 28-30

A was in possession of *B*'s property under an arrangement by which he was entitled to be in possession until certain moneys which he had disbursed on *B*'s account were paid back to him. Subsequently in settlement proceedings instituted by *B*, *A* set up adverse title to the property. It was held in the undermentioned case¹⁷ that from that date the possession of *A* became adverse to *B*.

Where a mortgagee without right to possession enters into possession, his entry would constitute a dispossession of the mortgagor and therefore a suit by the latter against the former would be governed by Article 142.¹⁸ But when the possession of a mortgagee entitled to be in possession under the terms of the mortgage, becomes by reason of subsequent events, adverse to the mortgagor and the latter sues for possession, the suit would be governed by Article 144, as there is no dispossession or discontinuance of possession of the mortgagor in such a case.¹⁹

Where a mortgagee sets up adverse possession against a mortgagor, the onus is on the former to show when and how the possession became adverse.²⁰

29. Possession of mortgagee under invalid foreclosure proceedings.— See Note 6 to Article 148

30. Possession of mortgagee under mortgage providing that on default the mortgagee should be full owner.— See Note 7 to Article 148

17. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 391 (993) 14 Oudh Cas 95 33 All 125 33 Ind App 23 (P C), *Muhammad Bakar v Muhammad Bakar Ali Khan*.

18 See Note 2 ante.

19 See Note 2 ante.

20 (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 517 (516) 95 Ind Cas 849, *Niranjan Prasad v. Mt Bechari*

(1912) 17 Ind Cas 913 (913) (Low Bur), *Maung Chit Ton v Maung Aung Gyaw*

(1913) 22 Ind Cas 65 (67) 9 Nag L R 179, *Anjuman Islami v Hissamal*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 31-35

31. Possession of mortgagee after purchase in contravention of Order 34 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code. — See Note 8 to Article 148.

32. Possession of person entering under void mortgage. — See Note 60 *infra*.

33. Possession by the mortgagee, after redemption, of accessions to mortgaged property. — See Note 16 to Article 148.

34. Possession of co-mortgagee paying off other co-mortgagees. — Where a mortgage is indivisible and has been made in favour of a number of co-mortgagees, and one of them pays off the others and remains in possession of the whole property, his possession must be deemed to be only that of a mortgagee so far as the mortgagor is concerned and consequently is not adverse to the mortgagor. As the co-mortgagee pays off each of the other co-mortgagees, he takes their place only as mortgagee.¹

35. Possession of co-owners—General. — Since possession is never considered adverse so long as it can be referred to a lawful title, (see Note 18 *ante*) the possession of one co-owner, who is entitled as such co-owner to be in possession of the property, must be referred to that title only and cannot be considered adverse to the other co-owners.¹

Note 34

1. (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 366 (368) : 73 Ind Cas 475, *Shuja-ud-din Khan v. Sher Muhammad Khan*.

Note 35

1. (1927) A I R 1927 All 816 (846) : 105 Ind Cas 628, *Ganga Sahai v. Nihal Singh*.

Ali v. Md. Ali,
1 Cas 809 (F B),

Rustam Khan v. Mt. Janki.

- (1927) A I R 1927 All 816 (846) : 105 Ind Cas 628, *Ganga Sahai v. Nihal Singh*.

(1878) 5 N W P H C R 122 (127), *Fusuf Ali Khan v. Chubbee Singh*.

(1883) 7 Bom 34 (38, 39), *Dadoba v. Krishna*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 297 (298) : 74 Ind Cas 161, *Mohidin v. Ibrahim*.

(1898) 1898 Bom P J 293 (294), *Dapalal Keshital v. Dapuji Chhotalal*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Cal 106 (109) : 161 Ind Cas 450, *Nirmal Chandra v. Mohitosh Das* (The rule with regard to exclusive possession of a co-sharer in joint properties, to the exclusion of other co-sharers, also applies to property which is held in common by persons in their capacity as shebaitis)

- (1904) 27 Mad 192 (197). 15 Mad L Jour 311, *Ramanathan Chetty v. Murugappa Chetty*. (In case of more trustees than one, possession of one is possession of all and possession adverse against one is possession adverse against all)

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 574 (576) : 111 Ind Cas 19, *Ramchandra Saha v. Lakshmi Kanta*.

- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 574 (576) : 111 Ind Cas 19, *Ramchandra Saha v. Lakshmi Kanta*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 356 (357) : 72 Ind Cas 33, *Joytun Bibi v. Solimuddin Choudhidar* (Possession by manager of one of the co-owners is not adverse to the others)

- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 283 (284, 285) : 21 Ind Cas 621, *Basanta Kumari Dasa v. Mohesh Chandra Shaha*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 362 (363) : 41 Cal 436 : 21 Ind Cas 861, *Israel v. Samset Rahman*.
- (1870) 14 Suth W R 228 (228), *Sookh Lall Bhoowala v. Goolzar Bhoowala*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 631 (632) : 135 Ind Cas 38, *Yara v. Jalal*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 155 (156) : 73 Ind Cas 665, *Hadayat Khan v. Shah-mand*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 293 (294) : 69 Ind Cas 671, *Muhammad Amin v. Karim Dad*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 479 (479) : 80 Ind Cas 519, *Jamna Bai v. Gonda Ram* (Possession of co-parcener (Hindu) who has been converted to another faith is that of a tenant-in-common and is not adverse to the other members of the family.)
- (1857) 11 Mad 116 (127), *Subramanyam v. Paramaswaran*. (Possession of one *uralan* is the possession of all)
- (1919) 36 Mad L Jour 12 (12) (Jour) (Critical Note on (1918) 42 Bom 529 : A I R 1918 Bom 233, *Himattal Magantlal v. Bhikhabhai Amrutlal*)
- (1913) 18 Ind Cas 355 (359) : 1913 Mad W N 331 (381), *Tajuddin Sahib v. Ali Ahmed*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 423 (431) : 179 Ind Cas 82, *Mt. Draupadi v. Fikram Krishna*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Nag 262 (263) : 165 Ind Cas 934, *Krishna Bai v. Parwati Bai*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 274 (276) : 30 Nag L R 18 : 160 Ind Cas 679, *Mt. Jyubai v. Zabu*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 395 (397) : 102 Ind Cas 161, *Kisanachandra v. Ramlal*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 240 (242) : 83 Ind Cas 86, *Mt. Bhagat v. Dheosen*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 2 (4) : 68 Ind Cas 820, *Sakharam v. Deoba*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Nag 211 (211) : 42 Ind Cas 291, *Sadhuram v. Ramadhin*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 337 (391) : 155 Ind Cas 23, *Mt. Rajana v. Musakeb Ali*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 560 (561) : 149 Ind Cas 1172, *Brahma Singh v. Raghuraj Singh*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 547 (550) : 148 Ind Cas 582 : 9 Luck 219, *Harbhan Dai v. Ladi Saran*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 439 (447) : 8 Luck 602 : 146 Ind Cas 710, *Abdul Qayum v. Abdul Rahman*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 200 (201, 202) : 114 Ind Cas 497, *Nur Ali v. Mt. Shahzadi*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 177 (178) : 4 Luck 339 : 121 Ind Cas 892, *Alisher v. Wajid Ali*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 257 (259) : 118 Ind Cas 87 : 5 Luck 31, *Gaya Din v. Gur Din*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 284 (286) : 4 Luck 503 : 116 Ind Cas 195, *Sheo Raj v. Ajudhiya*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 337 (339) : 115 Ind Cas 440, *Bashir Ahmed v. Parshotam*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 402 (401) : 119 Ind Cas 866, *Mubimul Nissa v. Ali Hussain*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 449 (460) : 112 Ind Cas 522, *Mahomed Jamil v. Mahomed Hafiz*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 464 (466) : 96 Ind Cas 455 : 2 Luck 172, *Sidhe-shuar v. Ganga Sagar*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 258 (259, 260) : 92 Ind Cas 635 : 1 Luck 62, *Mahadeo Prasad v. Ram Phal*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 510 (511) : 85 Ind Cas 387, *Ram Nudh v. Janaki*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 241 (249) : 78 Ind Cas 232, *Abdul Shakur Khan v. Mohd. Ali Khan*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 208 (209) : 80 Ind Cas 619, *Chhotey Lal v. Hanoo-man Singh*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (271) : 27 Oudh Cas 77 : 78 Ind Cas 893, *Indar-pal Singh v. Thakur Din Singh*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35**

In *Corea v. Appuhamy*,² a case under the Ceylon Prescription Ordinance, 1871, where the question was whether the possession of one of the heirs of a deceased Christian, on the basis that he was sole heir, was adverse to the other heirs, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

"Entering into possession and having a lawful title to enter, he could not divest himself of that title by pretending that he had no title at all. His title must have accrued for the benefit of his co-proprietors. The principle recognized by Wood, V. C.

(1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 179 (180) : 39 Ind Cas 493, *Lala Jagan v. Mathura Prasad*, (Among members of a joint Hindu family, separation in mess denotes conversion to tenancy-in-common only, and does not give rise to adverse possession unless disclaimer is proved.)

(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 492 (493) 87 Ind Cas 736, *Kameshwar Narain Singh v. Janardhan Prasad*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Rang 211 (213) : 7 Rang 161 : 118 Ind Cas 122, *Ma Fatima v. Monin Dibi*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Rang 40 (40, 41) : 82 Ind Cas 821, *Ma San Hla Me v. Ma Tun Me*.

(1910) A I R 1910 Low Bur 107 (108) : 52 Ind Cas 629 : 10 Low Bur Rul 45, *Hari Pru v. Ma Aung Kraw Zan*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 77 (78) : 32 Ind Cas 569, *Ma Nyein Me v. Ma May*.

(1930) 128 Ind Cas 309 (310) (Lah), *Hanwant Ram v. Mughli*.

(1926) 109 Ind Cas 864 (865) (Nag), *Fakubsha v. Kalusha*.

(1925) 107 Ind Cas 211 (212) (Sind), *Mahomed Kasim v. Natho Dhano*.

(1924) 79 Ind Cas 279 (279) (Lah), *Balmukund v. Wazir Chand*.

(1923) 78 Ind Cas 748 (752) (Pesh), *Ghulam Haidar Khan v. Sardar Ali-khan*.

(1921) 64 Ind Cas 462 (464) (All), *Jagrani Misran v. Mt. Shoo Dukari*.

(1921) 64 Ind Cas 471 (472) (All), *Lachhmi Narain v. Nannha Mal*.

(1918) 45 Ind Cas 217 (217) (Nag), *Raghoba v. Palhoba*.

(1919) 21 Ind Cas 83 (89) (All), *Chunder Singh v. Tuindi*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 171 (175) (Cal), *Dijendra Narain Roy v. Purnendu Narain Roy*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 898 (899) : 1910 Pun Re. No. 29, *Suraya Jah v. Azim*.

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 922 (922) (Lah), *Ude Ram v. Dujan*.

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 965 (965) (Lah), *Atra v. Ram Kishen*.

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 1004 (1004, 1005) (Lah), *Shams Shah v. Hussain Shah*.

(1893) 3 Mad L Jour 100 (104), *Rajyalakshmi v. Suryanarayana*.

(1907) 85 Cal 961 (968) : 12 Cal W N 127 . 6 Cal L Jour 735, *Jogendra Nath Rai v. Baldeo Das*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 447 (448) : 25 Ind Cas 573, *Muthukrishna Aiyangar v. Sankaranarayana Iyer*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 426 (427) : 102 Ind Cas 426, *Mehran v. Rahim*.

[See (1903) 5 Rom L R 225 (227), *Rajaram v. Nanchand*. (Joint possession)]

[But see (1903) 2 Low Bur Rul 184 (185), *Ma Ye v. Maung Hlaw*. (Where a co-heir remains in possession of a property for more than 12 years without any agreement between him and other co-heirs, he acquires right in the said property by adverse possession)]

2. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 213 (245) : 1912 A C 230 : 81 L J P O 151 (P C).

in *Thomas v. Thomas*³ holds good. 'Possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title'. His possession was, in law, the possession of his co-owners. It was not possible for him to put an end to that possession by any secret intention in his mind. Nothing short of ouster or something equivalent to ouster could bring about that result."

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35

It follows that if there is *ouster* or something equivalent to it, then the possession of the co-owner will be adverse to the others.⁴

3. (1856) 25 L J Ch 159 (161) 2 Kay & J 79 4 W R (Eng) 135 110 R R 107 1 Jur (N S) 1160
- 4 (1866) 10 Moo Ind App 511 (535) 2 Sar 189 (P C), *Jowala Balsh v. Dharum Singh*
- (1937) A I R 1937 All 300 (303) 169 Ind Cas 125, *Mt. Jandevi Kuari v. Dalshini Din*
- (1933) A I R 1933 All 173 (175) 55 All 173 149 Ind Cas 810, *Ambika Prasad v. Sada Sheo Lal*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 All 99 (106) 54 All 210 139 Ind Cas 445, *Kanhaya Lal v. B H Skinner* (Lambardar is not a trustee for the co-sharers, and he can, therefore by withholding and appropriating to his own use the profits, acquire a title by adverse possession against them)
- (1929) A I R 1929 All 910 (912) 121 Ind Cas 102, *Abhey Ram v. Jhanda*
- (1922) A I R 1922 All 433 (431, 435) 65 Ind Cas 75, *Mustafakhan v. Mt. Dulari* (Usurpation of share by one consented to by others—Possession may be adverse)
- (1884) 1884 All W N 296 (296), *Hidayat-un-nissa v. Ahsan Ali*
- (1896) 1896 Bom P J 200, *Gitabai v. Dattubona*.
- (1875) 1875 Bom P J 351, *Vidyashankar v. Ganpatram*.
- (1895) 22 Cal 954 (960), *Mahomed Akram Shaha v. Anarbi Choudhrani*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (652) 67 Ind Cas 31, *Jagannath v. Chandni Bibi*
- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 634 (636) 46 Cal 111 45 Ind Cas 783, *Purna Chandra Pal v. Baroda Prosanna Bhattachariya*
- (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 64 (64) 48 Ind Cas 692, *Chand Bibi v. Lal Mohamad*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 644 (644) 94 Ind Cas 486, *Dishna v. Narain Singh*
- (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 114 (115) 50 Ind Cas 550, *Lakhara v. Mahji*
- (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 552 (556) 1 L R (1937) Lah 276 172 Ind Cas 97, *Zafar Husam v. Md. Ghias ud-din*
- (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 284 (285, 286) 1914 Pun Re No 45 22 Ind Cas 805, *Akbar v. Tabu*
- (1889) 1889 Pun Re No 104, *Sayyad Ali Nawaz v. Sayyad Abdul Hussain*.
- (1926) 94 Ind Cas 550 (551) 8 Lah L Jour 129 (131), *Karam Din v. Vehr Din*
- (1917) 32 Mad L Jour 39 (40) (Jour) (Critical Note on (1916) 39 Mad 879 A I R 1916 Mad 139, *Vellayutham Pillai v. Subbaraya Pillai*)
- (1936) A I R 1936 Nag 80 (85) 31 Nag L R Supp 191 162 Ind Cas 577, *Ratnasingh Chhatre v. Jaramsingh Chhatre*
- (1900) 19 C P L R 99 (100), *Sheodayal Singh v. Bhagurath Singh*
- (1926) 16 Nag L Jour 68 (71), *Fakira v. Mt. Mamoonabi*
- (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 881 (882) 132 Ind Cas 772, *Sheoraj Narain v. Jagannath Prasad*
- (1927) 107 Ind Cas 866 (866) 5 Oudh W N 85 (86), *Ram Narain v. Mannu Lal*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 624 (626) 117 Ind Cas 636, *Ramlal Khan Singh v. Chathu Sahai*
- (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 145 (163) 6 Pat 506 106 Ind Cas 620, *Ishuvar Prasad v. Hari Prasad*
- (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 877 (860) 34 Ind Cas 466, *Singheswar Misir v. Rameshwar Jha*
- (1928) 107 Ind Cas 866 (866) (Oudh), *Ram Narain v. Mannulal*.

Arts. 142 & 144 If there is no ouster or exclusion, the possession of one is not adverse to the others.⁶
Note 35

- (1910) 6 Ind Cas 695 (696) (All), *Ganpat Singh v. Mussa Singh*.
 (1909) 1 Ind Cas 322 (323). 33 Bom 317, *Amrita Ray v. Shridhar Narayan*.
 5. (1905) 27 All 348 (350) : 2 All L Jour 110n : 1905 All W N 15, *Raj Bahadur v. Dharat Singh*.
 (1905) 27 All 436 (439, 440) : 2 All L Jour 107 : 1905 All W N 36, *Mehinlal v. Dadri Prashad*.
 (1888) 10 All 343 (346) : 1898 All W N 33, *Hashmat Begam v. Mazhar Husain*.
 (1937) A I R 1937 All 124 (125) : 167 Ind Cas 371, *Ram Manohar v. Baboo Singh*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 All 774 (775) : 155 Ind Cas 824, *Baboo Singh v. Ram Manohar*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 All 193 (195) : 56 All 582 : 150 Ind Cas 81, *Fazal Hussain v. Muhammad Kazim*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 All 173 (174) : 55 All 173 : 149 Ind Cas 819, *Ambika Prasad v. Sada Sheo Lal*.
 (1932) A I R 1932 All 666 (667) : 139 Ind Cas 176 : 54 All 742, *Md. Mohit Ullah v. Bibi Halima Begam*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 All 551 (551, 552) : 132 Ind Cas 201, *Amjad Ali v. Asimuddin*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 All 410 (411) : 100 Ind Cas 650, *Mewa Ram v. Lal Sahai*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 All 454 (457) : 102 Ind Cas 60 : 49 All 763, *Harkesh Singh v. Mt. Hardev*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 All 717 (719) : 101 Ind Cas 501 : 49 All 606, *Amar Singh v. Govind Ram*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 All 663 (664) : 97 Ind Cas 245 : 48 All 663, *Motichand v. Kishanand Singh*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 291 (291) : 71 Ind Cas 640, *Haftiz Abdullah v. Ali*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 418 (419) : 71 Ind Cas 1033, *Jharap Rai v. Jamt Rai*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 447 (447, 448) : 71 Ind Cas 653, *Shakur v. Husain Bibi*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 All 899 (399) : 64 Ind Cas 24, *Deolinandan v. Zamir Husain Khan*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 All 30 (32) : 37 All 203 : 26 Ind Cas 922, *Ahmad Raza Khan v. Ram Lal*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 All 138 (139) : 28 Ind Cas 276, *Mallah v. Behari*.
 (1908) 5 All L Jour 511 (512, 513) : 1908 All W N 239, *Parwati v. Ram Prasad*.
 (1885) 1885 All W N 51 (52), *Karimdad Khan v. Fauzan Bibi*.
 (1905) 29 Bom 300 (304) : 7 Bom L R 252, *Gangadhar v. Parasharam*.
 (1901) 25 Bom 862 (365, 366) : 3 Bom L R 47, *Jayantandas v. Bai Amba*.
 (1886) 10 Bom 24 (27), *Nila Ramchandra v. Govind Ballal*.
 (1883) 7 Bom 34 (38, 39), *Dadoba v. Krishna*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 141 (143) : 118 Ind Cas 785, *Bai Juti v. Bai Bibanboo*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 77 (78) : 64 Ind Cas 552, *Shulungappa v. Satyata Lazman*.
 (1880) 1880 Bom P J 311, *Atmaram Daji v. Madhao Rao Bopuji*.
 (1875) 12 Bom H C R 148 (153, 154), *Narayan Babaji v. Pandurang Ramchandra*.
 (1907) 35 Cal 961 (968) : 6 Cal L Jour 735 : 12 Cal W N 127, *Jogendra Nath Ray v. Baldev Das Maruani*.
 (1904) 31 Cal 970 (973) : 9 Cal W N 32, *Ujjalbi Dibee v. Umahanta Karmokar*.
 (1891) 19 Cal 253 (264) : 19 Ind App 48 : 6 Sar 133 (P C), *Lachmeswar Singh v. Manawar Hossein*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 34 (36) : 160 Ind Cas 870, *Mahendra Narayan v. Dakshina Banjan*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 106 (109, 110) : 161 Ind Cas 450, *Nirmal Chandra v. Mohitosh Das*.

The question next arises as to the meaning of the word "ouster." Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35

- (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 641 (643) : 158 Ind Cas 656, *Indian Iron and Steel Co v. Bara Gopal Thakur*. (Transference of a co-shebant purporting to come in as co-shebants—Their possession is not such as to enable acquisition of title against co-shebants unless it amounts to an ouster of other co-shebants.)
- (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 356 (363) . 60 Cal 1406 149 Ind Cas 410, *Subodh Chandra v. Bhubalika Dasee*
- (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 253 (255) : 143 Ind Cas 402, *Suarnamoyee Das v. Prabodh Chandra*
- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 180 (185) . 126 Ind Cas 36, *Panchanan Banerji v. Surendra Nath*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 341 (343) : 57 Cal 92 . 125 Ind Cas 665, *Alshay Kumar v. Bhajagobinda Shaha*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 260 (252) . 56 Cal 616 : 117 Ind Cas 593, *Biswanath v. Rabiya Khatun*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 396 (307) 107 Ind Cas 741, *Mahendra Nath Biswas v. Charu Chandra*
- (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 65 (68) 97 Ind Cas 539, *Ashutosh Roy v. Manomohan Roy*
- (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 177 (179) . 98 Ind Cas 43, *Debendra Lal Khan v. Pitambar Bera*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 524 (525) 91 Ind Cas 610, *Rasak Ali v. Abdul Basid*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 469 (470) 82 Ind Cas 822, *Jinnatunnessa v. Abdul Halim Munshi*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 45 (46) 50 Cal 467 74 Ind Cas 193, *Bhasrabendra v. Rajendra Narain*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 1016 (1046, 1047) 82 Ind Cas 392, *Hasim Ali v. Abjal Khan*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 18 (21) : 72 Ind Cas 680, *Kailash Chandra v. Bejoy Chandra*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 310 (310) . 67 Ind Cas 300, *Hemengina Das v. Sital Mandal* (If members of a joint family are separate only in mess and not in estate, there can be no adverse possession amongst them.)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 8 (9) . 65 Ind Cas 8, *Joy Narain Sen Ukil v. Srihanta Roy*
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 54 (55) 68 Ind Cas 200, *Jogendra Nath v. Rajendra Nath*
- (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 473 (473) . 47 Cal 274 . 56 Ind Cas 141, *Govinda Chandra v. Dina Nath*
- (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 610 (612) . 47 Cal 182 . 51 Ind Cas 976, *Debendra Narayan v. Narendra Narayan*
- (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 68 (69) 51 Ind Cas 123, *Chintamani Pramanik v. Hriday Nath Kamla*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 501 (502) 44 Ind Cas 216, *Ahamuddin Tamizuddin v. Amiruddin*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 99 (100) 35 Ind Cas 72, *Tomejudd v. Mulai Chowkidar*
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 357 (360) 27 Ind Cas 465, *Abdul Rahman v. Promode Behary*
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 534 (535, 536) 26 Ind Cas 783, *Surja Bibi v. Tarap Mondal*
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 610 (612) 27 Ind Cas 1, *Bibi Bakhtun v. Ahmad Ishage*
- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 535 (535) . 23 Ind Cas 562, *Jayneshwar v. Satish Chandra*
- (1875) 25 Suth W R 53 (54), *Shurfunissa Bibee Choudhiam v. Kylash Chunder Gungopadhy*
- (1873) 20 Suth W R 270 (270), *Dinonath Rana v. Rukeebunnessa Bibee*.
- (1872) 18 Suth W R 198 (198), *Dissessuree Doysee v. Kallee Coomar Roy*.
- (1872) 17 Suth W R 74 (76), *Baboo Jahanchy Deo Narain Singh v. Baboo Umbica Pershad Narain Singh*

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35

- (1938) 67 Cal L Jour 188 (193), *Syed Mahomed Maleeh v. Shasi Moulh Nag.*
 (1899) 4 Cal L Jour 254 (255), *Imba Debya v. Jnanoda Sundari.*
 (1877) 1 Cal L R 364 (364, 365), *Sheikh Isud Ali Khan v. Sheikh Akbar Ali Khan.*
 (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 106 (110): 40 Cal W N 777 (786) : 161 Ind Cas 450, *Normal Chandra v. Mobitosh Das.*
 (1920) 24 Cal W N 1057 (1062), *Balaram Guria v. Shyama Charan Mandal.*
 (1899) 3 Cal W N 774 (776), *Baroda Sundari Deby v. Annoda Sundari.*
 (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 430 (431, 432) : 173 Ind Cas 327, *Chittar v. Ude Singh.*
 (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 91 (91, 92): 157 Ind Cas 1024, *Bal Muland v. Madan Gopal.*
 (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 441 (442), *Imru v. Santa.*
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 258 (259) : 146 Ind Cas 210, *Nandlal v. Mt. Karam Bibi*
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 763 (763) : 149 Ind Cas 1112, *Mam Raj v. Chotu.*
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 784 (786) : 14 Lah 794 : 148 Ind Cas 1143, *Mt. Ghulam Bibi v. Mt. Saricar Bibi*
 (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 143 (143, 141) : 135 Ind Cas 686, *Anant Ram v. Kishore Chand*
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 220 (220) : 117 Ind Cas 904, *Mt. Mansa Devi v. Sansaru*
 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 540 (550) : 117 Ind Cas 803 : 11 Lah 29, *Jano v. Narsingh Das.*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 426 (427) : 102 Ind Cas 426, *Mehran v. Rahimi.*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 522 (524) : 102 Ind Cas 470, *Maulu v. Beli Ram.*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 886 (887) : 106 Ind Cas 489, *Jam Budha v. Dasu Ram.*
 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 106 (107) : 56 Ind Cas 169, *Balak Ram v. Kaura.*
 (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 133 (134) : 50 Ind Cas 762, *Chanani Mal v. Mela Ram.*
 (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 271 (271) : 50 Ind Cas 746, *Mangal Singh v. Shan-lari*
 (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 43 (45) : 35 Ind Cas 549 : 1916 Pun Re. No. 57,

- appa.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 654 (655) : 162 Ind Cas 771, *Sundararaja v. Raghava Reddi*
 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 137 (138) : 151 Ind Cas 720, *Mangammal v. Rangappa Naicker.*
 (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 22 (23) : 120 Ind Cas 454, *Thiagaraja Pillai v. Appavoo Pillai.*
 (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 652 (654) : 109 Ind Cas 553, *Venkatachalam Chet-
 yer v. Sub-
 katala Subba
 Sumarappa
 Murajalli*

- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1097 (1098) . 30 Ind Cas 586, *Hidayat Ali Khan v. Khadar Khan Sahib*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 121 (122) : 26 Ind Cas 316, *Ponnuswamy Iyer v. Permaye*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 713 (713, 714) . 24 Ind Cas 436, *Giri Appayya v. Giri Krishnamma*.
- (1927) 1927 Mad W N 696 (697), *Arogaismami v. Praleshi Ammal*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 69 (90) 173 Ind Cas 103, *Ramji v. Madki*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Nag 211 (211) 42 Ind Cas 291, *Sadthuram v. Ramadhin*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Nag 125 (129) 11 Nag L R 164 . 31 Ind Cas 464, *Dina v. Bishambar Singh*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 70 (72) : 141 Ind Cas 246, *Raghunandan v. Sheo Prasad*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Ouhh 144 (145) . 136 Ind Cas 702, *Badri Misir v. Shankar Misir*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 510 (515) 6 Luck 106 130 Ind Cas 65, *Ejaz Ali Kidwai v. Court of Wards, Dalarampur Estate*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 449 (460) 112 Ind Cas 522, *Shah Mohammad Jamil Ata v. Mohammad Hafiz Ata*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 258 (259, 260) 92 Ind Cas 685 . 1 Luck 62, *Mahadeo Prashad v. Ram Phal* (A co-sharer has a right to repair the whole of the house, and, if he does so, his act cannot be considered to be an act of such an hostile character that it may be considered as equivalent to a denial on his part of the title of the other co-owner or co-owners)
- (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 305 (306) 95 Ind Cas 935, *Ram Manorath v. Sant*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 179 (180) . 30 Ind Cas 498, *Lala Jagan v. Mathura Prasad*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 202 (203) . 36 Ind Cas 743, *Asghar Husain v. Akbar Husain*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 56 (58) 164 Ind Cas 851, *Bairnath Sahu v. Jainamangal Prasad*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 66 (68) 160 I C. 1054, *Moti Singh v. Deoki Singh*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 485 (488) 154 Ind Cas 1032, *Mt Dharichhnanuarsi v. Ramyad Kuar* (Held principle did not apply in the particular circumstances of the case)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 590 (591) 117 Ind Cas 644, *Jageyanand Pande v. Gurjananda Pande*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 624 (625) 117 Ind Cas 636, *Ramlakhan v. Chathu Sahu*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 112 (116) 89 Ind Cas 913, *Tilakdhari Lal v. Abdul Wahabkhan*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 537 (538) . 51 Ind Cas 77, *Lachmi Sahu v. Radha*

v *Katha Singh*

Tam Nath

asul Ali v. Naimuddin

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 893 (899) 1910 Pnn Re No 20, *Jaimal Singh v. Gurmukh Singh*

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 293 (299) 5 Low Bur Rul 112 *Ma Le v. Ma Hmyin*

(1909) 2 Ind Cas 15 (18) 5 Nag L R 41, *Daud Khan v. Gorinda*

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 252 (253) (Cal), *Narayan Chandra v. Dasant Kumari*.
(The mere fact that the plaintiffs are unable to show any overt act of ownership within 12 years before suit does not amount to a discontinuance of possession.)

Arts. 142 & 144 Actual driving out of a co-owner will, no doubt, clearly be an ouster,⁶
Note 35 but such physical eviction is not *necessary* to constitute ouster.⁷ It is conceived that in order to constitute ouster, there should be a refusal, express or implied, by the co-owner in possession, to allow the other co-owners to participate in the enjoyment of the property.⁸ Where the co-owner in possession denies to the knowledge of the other co-owners their title to the property, it may be taken that he impliedly refuses to allow the latter to participate in the enjoyment of the property. Hence, the test to see if there is an "ouster" is to see if the co-owner in possession has openly and unequivocally and to the knowledge of the other co-owners, denied their title to the property.⁹ In some decisions,¹⁰ however, it has been held that a

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 322 (323) 33 Bom 517, *Amrita Rayji v. Shridhar Narayan*.

[See (1930) A I R 1930 All 125 (126) • 122 Ind Cas 893, *Har Nath v. Mt. Phool Koer*.

(1899) 23 Bom 710 (714) : 1 Bom L R 203, *Mahamad Dasu v. Amanji Dasu*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Cal 634 (638) : 141 Ind Cas 320, *Galsiaun v. Profulla Kumar*.]

6. (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 610 (612) : 47 Cal 182 : 51 Ind Cas 976, *Debendra Narayan v. Narendra Narayan*.

7. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 216 (217) : 109 Ind Cas 747 : 55 Cal 306, *Chandra Kishore v. Bissessar Pal*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (652) . 67 Ind Cas 31, *Jagannath v Chandni Bibi*. (Ouster, what constitutes — Violent or intimidating expulsion or repulsion not necessary.)

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 881 (882) : 94 Ind Cas 38, *Sabitri Dasu v. Nadir Chand (Do.)*

(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 357 (360) : 27 Ind Cas 405, *Loknath Singh v. Dakeshwar Prasad*. (Do.)

(1917) A I R 1917 Cal 345 (348) : 35 Ind Cas 36, *Jatindra Nath v. Sabidan-nessa Khatun*.

8. See (1927) A I R 1927 All 454 (457) : 49 All 763 : 102 Ind Cas 66, *Hurkesh Singh v. Mt. Hardevi*.

9. (1923) A I R 1923 All 291 (291) • 71 Ind Cas 640, *Hafti Abdullah v. Ali*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Cal 106 (110) : 161 Ind Cas 450, *Nirmal Chandra v. Mohitosh Das*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 195 (197) : 62 Cal 305 . 155 Ind Cas 987, *Krishna Chandra v. Purna Chandra*.

(1922) AIR 1922 Cal 51 (55) 68 I.O. 200, *Jogendra Nath v. Rajendra Nath*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (651) • 67 Ind Cas 31, *Jagannath v. Chandni Bibi*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 790 (791) : 100 Ind Cas 145, *Mt. Allah Jawai v. Md. Baksh*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (272) : 27 Oudh Cas 77 : 78 Ind Cas 695, *Inderpal Singh v. Thakur Din Singh*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Pesh 24 (25) • 160 I O. 952, *Jang Bahadur v. Abdul Nur*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 97 (98) : 157 Ind Cas 219, *Mahomed Husain Khan v. Ram Rakha*

(1919) A I R 1919 Low Bur 107 (103) . 52 Ind Cas 629 : 10 Low Bur Rul 45, *Harri Fru v. Ms. Jung Kraw Zan*.

— sul.

r v. *Bihari Lal*.

Sheikh Isuf.

Vand Singh v. Natha.

[See also (1902) 5 Oudh Cas 6 (9), *Jagdamba Baksh v. Sitta Baksh*.]

10. (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 156 (156) • 77 Ind Cas 521, *Kesho Narain v. Ram-chandra Ganesh*

bare denial of the title of the other co-owners, though made to their knowledge, does not amount to ouster and does not set time running against them. It is submitted that the view is not correct.

The conduct relied upon to prove adverse possession by a co-owner against other co-owners must be unequivocal and inconsistent with his character as co-owner.¹¹ Evidence which is sufficient to establish adverse possession by a stranger may be totally insufficient to prove adverse possession by one co-owner against other co-owners.¹²

It will be clear from what has been stated above that mere uninterrupted possession on the part of one co-owner is not adverse to the other co-owners.¹³ In other words, mere non-participation in the profits of the property by one co-owner and exclusive possession by the other will not be sufficient to constitute adverse possession

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35

- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 8 (10) 65 Ind Cas 8, *Joy Narain v. Srikanta Roy*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 439 (441) 131 Ind Cas 105, *Sahun v. Malku*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 519 (519) 120 Ind Cas 278, *Indar Singh v. Chamela*
- 11 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (652) 67 Ind Cas 81, *Jagannath v. Chandni Bibi*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 610 (612) 47 Cal 182 51 Ind Cas 976, *Debendra Narayan v. Narendra Narayan*
 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 534 (535, 536) 26 Ind Cas 788, *Surja Bibi v. Tarap Mondal*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 63 (64) 152 Ind Cas 821, *Baksh Shah v. Gulam Ali Shah*.
 (1928) 55 Mad L Jour 223 (227), *Venkatachallam Chettiar v. Annapurni Ammal*
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 449 (460) 112 Ind Cas 522, *Ma Jamil Ata v. Ma. Hafiz Ata*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 6 (7) 98 Ind Cas 80, *Mt. Sughra Begam v. Nurah*
 (1938) A I R 1938 Sind 132 (139) 176 Ind Cas 549, *Takulram Tachchand v. Mt. Mural*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Sind 212 (215) 23 Sind L R 461 118 Ind Cas 207, *Abdul Rahman v. Haji Mahomed Idris*
 (1921) A I R 1921 Sind 177 (180) 16 Sind L R 25 60 Ind Cas 118, *Mt. Bhagbhari v. Mt. Khatun*
 (1918) 18 Ind Cas 358 (360) (Mad), *Tajuddin v. Ali Ahmad*
 (1910) 5 Ind Cas 840 (841) (Lah), *Kurpa v. Juna*.
- 12 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (652) 67 Ind Cas 81, *Jagannath v. Mt. Chandni Bibi* (Evidence to show adverse possession by one co-tenant must be much clearer than between strangers to the title)
 (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (272) 78 Ind Cas 895 27 Oudh Cas 77, *Indar-pal v. Thakur Din*
13. (1918) A I R 1918 P C 277 (279) (P C), *Muttunayagam v. Margaret Brito* (A I R 1914 P C 243 and (1855) 2 Kay & J 79, Followed)
 (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 720 (735) 109 Ind Cas 26, *Budhu Ram v. Uttamchand*
 (1915) A I R 1915 All 138 (139) 28 Ind Cas 276, *Mallah v. Behari*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 106 (110, 111) 161 Ind Cas 450, *Nirmal Chandra v. Mohitosh Das*
 (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 339 (341) 132 Ind Cas 177 12 Lah 101, *Narsingh Das v. Gokul Chand*
 (1920) 5 Lah L Jour 17 (18), *Mangal Singh v. Mathan Singh*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 111 (112) 99 Ind Cas 158, *Gowindasami v. Kothandapani*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 145 (146) 62 Ind Cas 432, *Kuterjee v. Rama*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35**

by the latter.¹⁴ There would, in such cases, be an occupation which would not be inconsistent with the other co-owners' possession.¹⁵ "It is important to bear in mind," observed their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Hardit Singh v. Gurmukh Singh*,¹⁶ "certain facts with regard to the possession of joint property which distinguish it from property separately held. In the former case the phrase 'exclusive possession' has an equivocal meaning; in the latter, it has not. If by exclusive possession of a joint estate is meant that one member of a joint family alone occupies it, that by itself affords no evidence of exclusion of other interested members of the family. Uninterrupted sole occupation of such property without more must be referred to the lawful title possessed by the joint holder to use the joint estate and cannot be regarded as an assertion of a right to hold it as separate, so as to assert an adverse claim against other interested members. If possession may be either lawful or unlawful, in the absence of evidence it must be presumed to be the former."

An "ouster" may, in a proper case, be presumed where one co-owner has been in sole enjoyment of the property for a long

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 494 (495) : 86 Ind Cas 321, *Jagadamba Singh v. Asmat Ullah Khan*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 320 (321) : 39 Ind Cas 570, *Mulnaddi v. Habib Man*.

(1930) 125 Ind Cas 739 (739) (Cal), *Kuda Koch v. Madan Gopal*.

(1911) 12 Ind Cas 427 (428) (Lah), *Govind Sahai v. Thakardas*.

(1921) 60 Ind Cas 293 (301) (Cal), *Balaram Guria v. Shyama Charan Mondal*.

14. (1924) A I R 1924 All 719 (720): 79 Ind Cas 533, *Lachman Pande v. Tribeni Sahu*. (Adverse possession—Mere non-payment of profits to a co-sharer by *lambardar* is not ouster.)

(1901) 24 Mad 441 (443), *Sellam v. Chinnammal*.

(1897) 21 Mad 153 (159) : 8 Mad L Jour 92, *Ittappan v. Manavulrama*.

(1926) 51 Mad L Jour 72 (N R C.)

(1936) A I R 1936 Nag 282 (283) : 165 Ind Cas 931 : I L R (1937) Nag 212, *Krishnabai v. Parwatibai*.

(1887) 2 C P L R 171 (171), *Sheeba v. Simaria*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 402 (404) : 119 Ind Cas 866, *Mubmulnissa v. Ali Hussain*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (271) : 27 Oudh Cas 77 : 78 Ind Cas 895, *Inderpal Singh v. Thakur Dun Singh*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 186 (189) : 161 Ind Cas 331, *Mt. Zainab v. Md. Ayub*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 112 (116) : 69 Ind Cas 913, *Tilakdhari Lal v. Abdul Wahab Khan*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 163 (164) : 67 Ind Cas 795, *Kuldip Singh v. Ram Sevak Singh*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 7 (8) : 143 Ind Cas 926, *Mt. Yakut v. Inayatulla*.

irki.

. *Dashur Ahmed*.

. *Yakub Bakhsh*.

. *Ganga Bakhsh*.

in v. *Bunda*.

15 (1918) A I R 1918 P C 339 (343), *W P. Tamel v. H. A. Anohamy*. (Unsuccessful attempts to assert title are not enough.)

16. (1918) A I R 1918 P C 1 (1, 2) : 1918 P R No. 64 : 47 Ind Cas 626 (P C).

time.¹⁷ In *Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal*,¹⁸ their Lordships of the Privy Council referred with approval to *Culley v. Doe d. John Taylerson*,¹⁹ where it was held that where the claimant, tenant-in-common, has not been in the participation of the rents and profits for a considerable length of time, and other circumstances concur, the Judge will direct the jury to take into consideration whether they will presume that there has been an ouster. In *Corea v. Appuhamy*,²⁰ it was contended that the Court might presume from the long continued possession of one co-owner, an ouster of others. Their Lordships observed. "No doubt in former times, before the Statute of William IV, when the justice of the case seemed to require it, juries were sometimes directed that they might presume an ouster." Their Lordships did not, however, consider it necessary to decide the question.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35

17. (1924) A I R 1924 All 920 (921) : 79 Ind Cas 951, *Basu v. Mt. Nanhi*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 All 447 (448) 71 Ind Cas 653, *Shakur v. Hussain Bibi*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 273 (275) . 154 Ind Cas 824 58 Bom 410, *Anant Ganpati v. Vishnu Rambhau*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 150 (151) 46 Bom 213 : 64 Ind Cas 205, *Chand Bhai v. Hasanbhai*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 77 (78) 64 Ind Cas 552, *Shivalingappa Satnarappa v. Satyara Lazman*.
- (1903) 5 Bom L R 742 (744, 745), *Dandacharya v. Srinivasacharya*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 195 (198) 162 Ind Cas 697, *Chattagong Cotton Mills v. Amar Krishna*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 396 (397) . 107 Ind Cas 741, *Mahendra Nath v. Charu Chandra*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 409 (470) 82 Ind Cas 822, *Jinnatunnesa v. Abdul Halim*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1221 (1223) : 87 Ind Cas 336, *Hangesicar Kundu v. Surjya Narain*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 54 (55) 68 Ind Cas 200, *Jogendra Nath v. Rajendra Nath*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 501 (502) 44 Ind Cas 216, *Ahamuddin Tamjuddin v. Anuruddin*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 106 (110) : 40 Cal W N 777 (787) . 161 Ind Cas 450, *Nirmal Chandra v. Mohitosh Das*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 890 (892) : 175 Ind Cas 605 : I L R (1938) Lah 367, *Amar Singh v. Shiv Datt Kaur*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Lah 60 (63) 38 Ind Cas 120, *Gullu v. Khuda Baksh Khan*.
- (1897) 21 Mad 153 (159) 8 Mad L Jour 92, *Ittappan v. Manathrama*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 170 (171) 98 Ind Cas 278, *Mariamammal v. Augustine Roy*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 340 (344) 29 Nag L R 350 149 Ind Cas 622, *Mt. Mohankuar v. Bhagatram*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 624 (626) 117 Ind Cas 636, *Ramlakhan Singh v. Chathu Sahu*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 260 (262) 58 Ind Cas 731, *Parma Pande v. Ram Sarup Pande*.
- (1912) 17 Ind Cas 623 (524) (All), *Deoknandan v. Dindesuar*.
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 342 (343) (All), *Muhammad Ishaq v. Nathu*.
- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 554 (556) 5 Smd L R 49, *Isudmal v. Ali*.
- 18 (1919) A I R 1919 P C 44 (47) . 43 Mad 244 . 46 Ind App 285 53 Ind Cas 901 (P C).
19. (1840) 9 L J Q B (N S) 288 (292) : 11 A & T 1008 . 3 P & D 539 52 R R 566.
20. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 243 (246) 1912 A C 130 61 L J P C 151 (P C).

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35**

As already stated, in order to constitute ouster, the denial of title must be to the knowledge of the other co-owner.²¹ Such knowledge need not, however, be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances of the case.²²

A mere *demand for partition* by one co-owner and a refusal of such demand by the co-owner in possession will not amount to

21. (1937) A I R 1937 All 696 (698, 699) : 171 Ind Cas 910, *Kishen Prasad v. Mt. Shubratn.*
- (1934) A I R 1934 All 193 (195) : 150 Ind Cas 81 : 56 All 582, *Fazal Husain v. Mahomed Kazim.*
- (1923) A I R 1923 All 291 (291) : 71 Ind Cas 610, *Hafiz Abdullah v. Alli.* (The possession of the mortgagee, under a mortgage by two of the co-sharers does not amount to an ouster of the third and would not amount to adverse possession of the two co-sharers unless the third has knowledge of the same)
- (1923) A I R 1923 All 447 (447) : 71 Ind Cas 653, *Shakur v. Husaini Bibi.*
- (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 323 (326) : 119 Ind Cas 779, *Malhar, Vaman v. Vinayak Ravji.*
- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 34 (36) : 160 Ind Cas 870, *Mahendra Narayan v. Dakshina Ranjan.*
- (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 222 (232) : 143 Ind Cas 179, *Nandalal v. Pramatha Nath.*
- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 466 (468) : 128 Ind Cas 103, *Abdul Wahab v. Mohun Dashi Saha.*
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 54 (55, 56) : 68 Ind Cas 200, *Jogendra Nath v. Rajendra Nath.*
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (652) : 67 Ind Cas 31, *Jagannath Marwari v. Mt. Chandni Bibi.*
- (1916) A I R 1918 Cal 425 (426) : 38 Ind Cas 187, *Kelabai Sheikh v. Toia Bibi.*
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 534 (534) : 27 Ind Cas 420, *Surja Bibi v. Tarap Mondal.*
- (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 456 (456) : 15 Lah 907 : 164 Ind Cas 983, *Bel Ram v. Munshi.*
- (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 149 (144) : 185 Ind Cas 686, *Anant Ram v. Kishore Chand.*
- (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 251 (252) : 122 Ind Cas 105, *Ghulam Muhammad v. Mt. Begam.*
- (1917) A I R 1917 Lah 372 (372) : 39 Ind Cas 762, *Umrao Singh v. Lachhmi Narayan.*
- (1897) 21 Mad 153 (166) : 8 Mad L Jour 93, *Itilappan v. Manavikrama.*
- (1936) A I R 1936 Nag 214 (215) : 165 Ind Cas 177 : I L R (1937) Nag 177, *Khuaja Afzal v. Md. Sahab.*
- (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 340 (344) : 29 Nag L R 350 : 149 Ind Cas 622, *Mt. Mohankuar v. Bhagatram.*
- (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 136 (139) : 161 Ind Cas 331, *Mt. Bibi Zainab v. Muhammad Ayub.*
- (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 61 (76) : 74 Ind Cas 225, *Thakur Rudra Pratap Narain v. Thakur Nirman Prasad.*
[But see (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 27 (27, 28) : 28 Nag L R 282 : 140 Ind Cas 831, *Muraduddin v. Mt. Umraoba.*]
22. (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 466 (468) : 128 Ind Cas 103, *Abdul Wahab v. Mohan Bashi Saha.*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 881 (882) : 94 Ind Cas 83, *Sabitra Dasi v. Nadir Chand.*
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 54 (56) : 68 Ind Cas 200, *Jogendranath Mooharjee v. Rajendranath Bhattacharjee.*
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (652) : 67 Ind Cas 31, *Jagannath Marwari v. Mt. Chandni Bibi.*
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 357 (358) : 27 Ind Cas 465, *Lokenath Singh v. Dhawalshwar.*

"ouster."²³ So also the mere fact that a co-owner sells a portion of the joint property,²⁴ or that the name of one of the co-owners alone is entered in the revenue papers, is not sufficient to constitute "ouster."²⁵

Arts. 142 & 143
Note 35

Where the disputed parcels of land (which are the joint properties of the parties) do not form one property, the fact that the defendant has ousted the plaintiff as regards one of the parcels does not show that his possession of the other parcels was in assertion of an exclusive and hostile title.²⁶

Where a person already in possession in assertion of a hostile title subsequently becomes a co-owner, his possession does not cease to be adverse where he continues to assert a hostile title and exercise exclusive possession.²⁷

Where "ouster" is otherwise established, it is not affected by affirmations of right or applications for partition by the other co-owners.²⁸ Even though "ouster" at any particular moment is not proved, it is open to the Courts to find that there has been ouster for the statutory period.²⁹

The adverse possession of a co-owner may extend to a portion only of the common property.³⁰

The onus of proving "ouster" is on the co-owner who alleges that there has been "ouster."³¹

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- (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 652 (654) : 100 Ind Cas 553, *Venkatachalam Chettiar v. Annagoomi Ammal*
 23. (1938) A I R 1938 Bom 250 (253) . 175 Ind Cas 431, *Dattatraya Silaram v. Shankar*
 24. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 144 (145) . 154 Ind Cas 760, *Bhaba Kanta v. Kerpas Chutia*
 (1920) 60 Ind Cas 298 (300) 24 Cal W N 1057 (1063), *Dalaram Guria v. Shyama Charan*
 25. (1922) A I R 1922 All 899 (899) . 64 Ind Cas 24, *Deokinandan v. Zamir Hussain Khan*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 397 (340) : 115 Ind Cas 440, *Bashir Ahmad v. Parshotam*
 (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 95 (95) . 104 Ind Cas 383, *Mg Than Gyaung v. Ma Lun Daw*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Sind 212 (215) 23 Sind L R 461 118 Ind Cas 207, *Abdur Rahman v. Haji Mahomed Idris*
 (1909) 9 Ind Cas 425 (426) (Oudh), *Bharat Prasad v. Ganga Baksh*
 26. (1931) A I R 1931 All 193 (195) 181 Ind Cas 211, *Shamun Ahmad v. Hesanul Haq*
 (1909) 1 Ind Cas 252 (253) (Cal), *Narayan Chandra v. Basanta Kumari*
 27. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 118 (122) 76 Ind Cas 511, *Pankaj Mohan Rai v. Bipin Behary*
 (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 931 (935) 167 Ind Cas 473, *Ude Singh v. Chittar*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 521 (525) 117 Ind Cas 803, *Bahawal v. Ghulam Mahomed*
 28. (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 183 (184) 78 Ind Cas 113, *Hira Singh v. Punjab Singh*
 29. (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 595 (596) 102 Ind Cas 300, *Venkata Rao v. Venkoba Rao*
 30. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 741 (747) 78 Ind Cas 87, *Venkatarama Iyer v. Subramania Sastry*
 31. (1915) A I R 1915 All 80 (32) 26 Ind Cas 922 37 All 203, *Ahmad Raza Khan v. Razi Lal*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35**

Subject to the above principles the question whether there has

- (1915) A I R 1915 All 133 (139) : 28 Ind Cas 276, *Mallah v. Behari*.
 (1866) 1 Agra 162 (163), *Bamee Sing v. Dhurth Singh*.
 (1866) 1 Agra 285 (285), *Dabee Sukai v. Sheo Das Rai*.
 (1866) 3 Agra 241 (241), *Mehtab Singh v. Purma*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 323 (326, 327) : 119 Ind Cas 779, *Malhari Faman v. Vinayak Ravji*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 424 (429) : 121 Ind Cas 439, *Mulji Narotam v. Hirulal*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 94 (95) : 67 Ind Cas 176, *Vinayak Keshav v. Dala Shicram*.
 (1903) 5 Bom L R 742 (744), *Bandacharya v. Shrinivasacharya*.
 (1907) 35 Cal 961 (970) : 6 Cal L Jour 735 : 12 Cal W N 127, *Jogendra Nath v. Baldeb Das*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 644 (647, 648) : 61 Cal 377 : 151 Ind Cas 461, *Jagadeshchandra Banerji v. Tanyab Sardar*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 356 (358) : 76 Ind Cas 328, *Dwarika Nath Sen v. Taraprasanno Sen*.
 (1877) 1 Cal L R 155 (166), *Rakhaldas Bundopadhya v. Indru Monce Debu*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 106 (109) : 40 Cal W N 777 (781) : 161 Ind Cas 450, *Nirmal Chandra Das v. Mohstosh Das*.
 (1869) 12 Suth W R 468 (468), *Brojonath Paul v. Sreegopal Paul*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 251 (252) : 122 Ind Cas 103, *Ghulam Muhammad v. Mt. Begum*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 914 (915) : 129 Ind Cas 609, *Ram Chand v. Gopal Singh*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 682 (683) : 78 Ind Cas 159, *Udi v. Maru Mal*.
 (1900) 1900 Pun Re No. 116, *Khindad v. Alamgir*.
 (1906) 1906 Pun L R No. 39, *Haji v. Gohna*.
 (1901) 24 Mad 441 (443), *Sellam v. Chinnammal*.
 (1897) 21 Mad 153 (159) : 8 Mad L Jour 92, *Ittappan v. Manavikrama*.
 (1891) 14 Mad 96 (97), *Alma v. Kutti*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 27 (29) : 114 Ind Cas 837, *Vaiyapuri Chettiar v. Subramania Chettiar*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 652 (654) : 100 Ind Cas 553, *Venkatachalam Chettiar v. Annapurni Ammal*.
 (1893) 3 Mad L Jour 100 (101), *Rajyalakshmi v. Suryanarayana*.
 (1927) 1927 Mad W N 696 (701), *Arogaiah v. Prahesi Ammal*.
 (1904) 1904 Pun L R No. 6, *Asim v. Ghulam*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Nag 214 (215) : 165 Ind Cas 177 : I L R (1936) Nag 177, *Khawaja Afzal v. Mahomed Saheb*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 200 (201) : 114 Ind Cas 497, *Nur Ali v. Shaheedi*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 6 (7) : 93 Ind Cas 80, *Mt. Sughra Begam v. Nur Ali*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 141 (142) : 72 Ind Cas 99, *Mahipal Singh v. Sarfoo Prasad*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (271, 272) : 27 Oudh Cas 77 : 78 Ind Cas 895, *Indarpal Singh v. Thakur Din Singh*.
 (1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 228 (230) : 24 Ind Cas 633, *Jagannath v. Kedar*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 136 (139) : 161 Ind Cas 331, *Mt. Zama v. Muhammad Ayub*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 634 (635) : 55 Ind Cas 247, *Radha Kanta Lal v. Bhagwat Prasad*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 77 (78) : 32 Ind Cas 568, *Ma Nyetn Me v. Ma May*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Sind 317 (320) : 27 Sind L R 101 : 150 Ind Cas 279, *Mt. Shamul v. Dost Mohamed Khan*.
 (1937) 167 Ind Cas 801 (801) (Nag), *Ramaji Gujar v. Kunwarjee Gujar*.
 (1926) 94 Ind Cas 855 (857) (Oudh), *Ahmadullah v. Dahir Ahmad*.
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 551 (555, 556) : 5 Sind L R 49, *Asudomal v. Ali*.

been an ouster by one co-owner of other co-owners is one of fact depending upon the circumstances of each case³² Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35

Illustrative cases

1. *A* and *B* are co-owners of certain property. *A* begins to collect the rents of the land to the exclusion of *B* on the ground of exclusive title. His possession would be adverse to *B*.³³
2. *A*, *B* and *C* are co-owners of certain property. *C* dies and his share devolves upon his widow *D*. *A* and *B* are in possession of the property and maintain *D* from out of her share. The possession of *A* and *B* is not adverse to *D* even though she is not paid the full share of the profits.³⁴
3. *A*, *B* and *C* were members of a joint Hindu family. *A*, as manager, purchased certain property out of the joint family funds. Subsequent to the purchase, *A* applied to the Revenue authorities to include the name of a stranger to the family as the proprietor of a fourth share of the property. *A* died thereafter and *X*, who was then the sole surviving member of the family got into possession of all the property. It was held that assuming that the stranger was really entitled to a fourth share, he was in fact never in possession of the properties and that the possession of *X* was adverse to the stranger.³⁵
4. On a dispute between two brothers *A* and *B* as to the right to properties *X* and *Y*, one claiming exclusive right and the other a joint right in them, a compromise was effected between them by which property *X* was allotted to *A* and property *Y* allotted to *B*, and each party was from that date in exclusive enjoyment of the property allotted to him. It was held that the possession

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 575 (576) 35 Mad 618, *Muthuraju Thevan v Robert Gordon Orr*

[See (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 211 (211) 1 I L R (1938) Lah 553, *Karim Baksh v Shadi* (Co-sharer in separate possession of common property dispossessed by another co-sharer—Plaintiff suing for possession—Suit comes under Article 132 and the onus is on the plaintiff to prove dispossession within 12 years of suit)]

32 (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 216 (217) 55 Cal 396 109 Ind Cas 747, *Chandra Kishore v. Biseswar Pal*

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 462 (463, 464) 101 Ind Cas 27, *Nabadrip Chandra v. Dagaban Chandra*

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 473 (473) 47 Cal 274 56 Ind Cas 141, *Govinda Chandra v. Dina Nath*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 501 (502) 44 Ind Cas 216, *Ahamuddin Tamijuddin v. Amiruddin*

(1927) 107 Ind Cas 465 (466) 32 Cal W N 449 (451), *Amara Khatun v. Saburannessa Bibi*

(1925) A I R 1925 Nag 145 (146) 82 Ind Cas 432, *Kuterjee v. Rama*.

(1912) 14 Ind Cas 722 (723) (Cal), *Ayennessa Bibi v Sheikh Isuf*

(1910) 6 Ind Cas 1009 (1009) (Lah), *Farid-ud din v. Ali Hussain*

33. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 96 (101) 43 Cal 660 83 Ind Cas 452 (P C), *Nritya-moni Das v. Lakhan Chandra Sen*

34 (1875) 23 Suth W R 214 (216) 15 Peng L R 10 2 Ind App 113 3 Suther 91 3 Sar 480 (P C), *Amirtolall Boss v. Rajoneekant Mitter*

35 (1886) 9 Mad 483 (491) 13 Ind App 147 10 Ind Jur 425 4 Sar 728 (P C), *Ramalakshamma v. Ramanna*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35**

of each of them of the property allotted to him would be adverse to the other from the date of the entry into possession under the arrangement.³⁶

5. *R* and *A*, co-owners of certain property, executed an unregistered deed of gift of it to *D*, who was the daughter of *R*, in 1895. *D* entered into possession in 1895 and continued in possession. In 1901 *R* died and *D* became entitled to *R*'s share of the property as her heir. More than twelve years after the death of *R*, *A*'s heirs sued *D* for possession alleging *inter alia* that *D*'s possession which began adversely to *A* ceased to be so when she became entitled to *R*'s share and thus became a co-owner with *A*. The contention was overruled and it was held that the adverse possession of *D* having begun adversely against both the co-owners in their lifetime, the character of the possession was not changed by her becoming entitled to a share on *R*'s death, that the ouster continued after *R*'s death, and that the possession of *D* was adverse throughout.³⁷
6. Two brothers constituting a joint Hindu family separated in 1865, but a particular property which had not been actually divided, was being enjoyed by one branch exclusively; they had the perception of the profits for more than the statutory period and in certain revenue proceedings as regards the portion of that property they had denied the title to such property of two other branches. From these circumstances their Lordships of the Privy Council came to the conclusion that there was an ouster of the other branches of the family.³⁸
7. *A*, one of several co-owners, usufructually mortgaged the property to *X* for purposes binding on all the co-sharers, and admitted therein their title. It was held that *A* could not be said to be in exclusive possession through the mortgagee, but the possession of the mortgagee must be taken to be on behalf of all the co-sharers.³⁹

See also the undermentioned cases.⁴⁰

36. (1938) 174 Ind Cas 128 (129) (P C), *Karunakar Takait Samanta v. Purna Chandra*.
37. (1919) A I R 1919 P C 44 (47) 43 Mad 244 : 45 Ind App 285 : 53 Ind Cas 901 (P C), *Varada Pillai v. Jeerathnammal*.
38. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 48 (51) 190 Ind Cas 673 : 27 Nag L R 181 : 58 Ind App 106 (P C), *Gowindrao v. Rajabai*.
39. (1887) 1887 Bom P J 84, *Hasan Abdula v. Kasim Ahmad*.
40. (1895) 17 All 423 (424) . 1895 All W N 88, *Muhammad Husain v. Badri Prasad* (The fact that the defendant has resisted a former suit for profits by the plaintiff and that the latter has not received any profits shows adverse possession.)
- (1932) A I R 1932 All 61 (62) . 133 Ind Cas 899, *Mul Chand v. Thakur Das*. (Where an adoption by a Hindu widow has secretly taken place without the knowledge or assent of her deceased husband's brother who has remained in absolute and exclusive possession of the property, the adopted son cannot be said to be in constructive possession of the property in suit through the other party who will get a perfected title by adverse possession if he has remained in possession for more than 12 years from date of adoption.]

Where there has been "ouster" of one co-owner by another, the adverse possession of the former is not interrupted by the mere fact that a decree is passed in favour of the latter establishing his right

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35

(1905) 1905 All W N 160 (161), *Ram Sarup v Gulzar Bannu*. (Planting of grove on waste land by one of the co-sharers to the knowledge of other co sharers, does not mean an ouster of the latter by the former and hence there arises no cause of action under Art 142.)

(1901) 25 Bom 362 (366) 3 Bom L R 47, *Jaggiwandas v. Bas Amba*. (In the case of a joint family consisting of three brothers, where no partition was proved, the mere fact that two of the brothers went to live in a neighbouring village would not make the possession of the third, who continued to live in the same village, necessarily adverse.)

(1899) 1900 All W N 160 (161), *Ram Sarup v Gulzar Bannu*.

(1897) 11 Bom 365 (367), *Dinkar Sadashiv v Bhikaji Sadashiv*. (Where

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 45 (46) 50 Cal 487 74 Ind Cas 193, *Bhairabendra*

such possession not being referable to a lawful title)

(1937) A I R 1937 Lah 65 (67) : 171 Ind Cas 757, *Narindar Nath v Jas Nath*. (Suit by one co-sharer for declaration that certain portion of joint property is exclusively his — No hostile overt act on his part before suit—Decree rejecting his claim but directing that property could not be partitioned until contribution by other co-sharers to certain expenditure incurred by him — No mention of time limit—Exclusive possession by him for 12 years after decree— Possession held could not be adverse)

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 84 (84) 148 Ind Cas 943, *Jiwa Ram v Man Singh*. (Where the co-sharer has built his residential house on the land, it amounts to an assertion of hostile and exclusive title to the knowledge of the other co sharers)

(1932) A I R 1932 Lah 421 (422) : 139 Ind Cas 676, *Mt. Rakhi v. Mt. Khairan* (Possession of bigger share by co-sharer and unsuccessful suit by him asserting that others are no co-sharers at all—Held in the circumstances of the case that these did not constitute adverse possession as regards the bigger share in his possession)

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 195 (198) 10 Lah 842 109 Ind Cas 658, *Mt. Ahmad Bab v. Shamas Din*. (Application to Municipality for permission to build a wall by a tenant-in-common does not amount to a denial of title of other co-owners)

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 416 (417) 102 Ind Cas 9, *Kunjai v Ramjail*, (Individual proprietor cannot, by planting trees on common land without consent of all, appropriate it to his use and claim adverse possession — Held adverse possession started only when enclosure round these trees was constructed)

(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 102 (103), *Lala v Khalas* (Where an entry regarding a well in dispute in existence in 1957 clearly shows that one co owner and his descendants have been claiming to be not only in possession of this well, but in possession as sole owners and the position was made clear to the others in the course of a litigation in 1891, held the possession had been adverse at least since 1891 and that it had ripened into complete ownership 12 years later)

(1917) A I R 1917 Lah 271 (272) 89 Ind cas 590, *Raj Kaur v Tirath Ram*. (A co-sharer's possession becomes adverse when he rebuilds a house making it pukka)

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 35

as co-owner.⁴¹ But where the decree is a *consent* decree, the possession of the co-owner who is in possession becomes admittedly one on behalf of all the co-owners.⁴²

Where there is an "ouster" of one co-owner by another, the fact that the former's name is recorded in the revenue papers as co-sharer

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 111 (112): 99 Ind Cas 158, *Gorindasami Chettiar v. Kothandapani Chettiar*. (If in a joint property one co-owner absents himself for a number of years but his wife resides on the property, it is an evidence of non-exclusion of the absentee co-owner and the fact that the wife is entitled to the property also in another capacity makes no difference.)

(1923) A I R 1923 Mad 153 (158): 74 Ind Cas 27, *Ibnrakkar v. Kunhikuttigali*. (Elders male member of Thavazi being also Karnavan of Tarwad—Possession by him—Thavazi not in adverse possession against tarwad.)

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 388 (390, 391): 44 Mad 205: 59 Ind Cas 463, *Meenakshi Achi v. Somasundaram Pillai*. (Where the management of a charity is carried on by one of the members of a joint family for some time exclusively on account of his better business capacity or otherwise, it does not amount to an ouster of the other members from management entitling the member in possession to prescribe for the trusteeship.)

(1938) A I R 1938 Nag 89 (90): 173 Ind Cas 103, *Ramji v. Madhi*. (A partition between co-owners in exclusive possession does not amount to ouster or denial of title of the other co-owner not in possession.)

(1936) A I R 1936 Nag 282 (283): 165 Ind Cas 934, *Mt. Krishnabai v. Parvati Bai*. (One co-sharer in exclusive and long enjoyment of property—Other co-owners not participating in profits of property and not in the enjoyment of the property coupled with the fact that the co-sharer in possession sold the property as his own without protest from other co-sharers—Inference of ouster is justified.)

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 337 (340): 115 Ind Cas 440, *Bashir Ahmad v. Parshotam*. (The mere fact that a co-sharer brought a suit to eject a trespasser is no evidence of denial of title of the other co-sharers and does not therefore amount to ouster.)

(1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 404 (405): 53 Ind Cas 1005, *Parmeshwar Din v. Ram Nath*. (Refusal of Revenue Court to effect partition of joint khewat till determination of shares by Civil Court—Opposite party is not vested with adverse title.)

(1926) 94 Ind Cas 550 (551) (Lab), *Karam Din v. Mehr Din*. (Where one of the heirs of a deceased person comes to occupy more than his share to the exclusion of the rightful heir of the excess share and alienates it and such alienation is accepted by the conduct of the latter, the possession of the former is adverse to the latter and ripens into ownership if it extends beyond twelve years.)

(1912) 18 Ind Cas 376 (377) (Cal), *Nagendra Kumar Nath v. Hara Chandra Poddar*. (Where one co-owner dealt with joint property as if it belonged exclusively to himself and alienated the whole of it to a third party, and inasmuch as the other co-owner denied the interest of the latter in the property.)

(1911) 12 Ind Cas 425 (426) (Lab), *Chiragh v. Mahamad Din*. (Where a co-sharer's name and after him his son's name is entered in the Revenue Register and no objection was raised by the actual holders, held, there was no abandonment and adverse possession merely by reason of the change of residence.)

41. (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 284 (286): 22 Ind Cas 805: 1914 Pun Re No 45, *Albar v. Tabu*.

will not prevent the running of limitation against him.⁴³

Arts. 142 & 144.
Notes 35-36

Where one co-owner leases his share to another, the original relationship of the parties as co-owners is revived on the termination of the lease and the possession of the *quondam* lessee is *prima facie* one on behalf of both the co-owners.⁴⁴

The principle that the possession of one co-owner is the possession of all does not apply where a stranger enters into possession claiming to be a fractional owner and his possession must be considered to be adverse to the real owner.⁴⁵

Where one co-owner acquires title by adverse possession to the share of the other also, an abandonment of possession by the former will not revive the title of the latter.⁴⁶

A and B are two Hindu coparceners. A dies leaving C as his heir. B takes possession of the separate property of A. The possession of B is adverse to C, the heir of A, the reason being that B and C are not co-owners with regard to the property.⁴⁷

See also the undermentioned cases⁴⁸

36. Possession of alienee from co-owner.—A co-owner may purport to alienate to a stranger —

1. his undivided share of the common property,
2. the entire common property, or
3. a specific *item* of the common property.

The purchaser in the *first class* may or may not be entitled to claim joint possession of the share purchased by him. In the case of an alienation by a coparcener of a joint Hindu family, for instance, the alienee is not entitled to joint possession of the share purchased, with the other coparceners, but is only entitled to an equity to obtain a partition of the properties. In some Provinces the alienation

43. (1895) 17 All 423 (424). 1895 All W N 88, *Muhammad Husain v Badra Prasad*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 899 (391). 71 Ind Cas 805, *Muhammad Hassan v. Sahara*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Lah 294 (295); 22 Ind Cas 605; 1914 Pun Re No 15, *Ahlar v Tabu*.

(1921) 63 Ind Cas 881 (982) (Lah), *Hans Raj v. Maula*.

44. (1931) A I R 1934 Bom 219 (220). 151 Ind Cas 1056, *Dharma Raghunath v. Keshav Gunajee*.

45. (1934) A I R 1931 Pat 485 (466). 151 Ind Cas 1032, *Dharvichhana Kuari v. Ramyad Kuari*.

46. (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 862 (863). 76 Ind Cas 742, *Daulat Ram v. Nanak Chand*.

47. (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 151 (157). 50 Ind Cas 160, *Mt Mahadevi Kunwar v. Bahu Rani*.

48. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 589 (590). 92 Ind Cas 908, *Siteswar Roy v Tepua Barman*. (Plaintiff setting out to prove *actual* joint possession and failing to do so cannot subsequently rely on the principle that the possession of one co-owner is the possession of all the co-owners.)

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 251 (252). 181 Ind Cas 522, *Sonu Malvi v. Bheri Malvi*. (A, B and C, three co-sharers in a house—A in adverse possession against C but not against B—C's share transferred to B—The adverse possession by A of such share ceases.)

Arts. 142 & 144

. Note 36

is void and the alienee is not entitled to the share at all, much less to the joint possession of such share. In cases in which he is entitled to joint possession, his possession of any portion of the property will not be adverse to the other co-owners. His possession will be that of a co-owner and is subject to all the rights and liabilities of a co-owner. "A person who takes a transfer from a co-tenant or a co-owner steps into the shoes of his transferor. When he takes the assignment he is clothed with all the rights and becomes subject to all the liabilities of his transferor. In short, he becomes as much a co-tenant or a co-owner as his transferor was before the transfer."¹ It follows that the possession of the alienee in such cases is not adverse to the other co-owners,² unless it could be shown that there has been an ouster. A contrary view has, however, been held in the undermentioned cases,³ namely that the position of an alienee is not the same as that of a co-owner and that his possession will become adverse from the date of his entry into possession. It is submitted that this view is not correct.

Where, in cases falling under the *first class*, the alienee is not entitled to possession at all by virtue of his purchase, his possession of any portion of the joint property cannot be referred to any lawful title to such possession and is consequently adverse to the co-owners

Note 36

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 475 (477, 478) : 125 Ind Cas 833, *Halim Shah v. Rahim Bux*.
[See also (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 1059 (1061) : 159 Ind Cas 1021, *Chengalakattil Moideen v. Pottengal Kunhal Kutti*.]

v. Trikha,
: 593 : 56 Cal

Venkatarama

- (1930) 125 Ind Cas 739 (740) (Cal) *Kuda Koch v. Madan Gopal Agarwalla*.

- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 111 (112) : 99 Ind Cas 158, *Gorindasami v. Kothandaram*. (Two Hindu brothers—One becoming a Muhammadan and then alienating his share—Possession of the other brother not adverse.)

- (1912) 1.

- 2 (1934) A I R 1934 Mad 183 (184) : 149 Ind Cas 455, *Palanippa Chetty v. Raman Chetty*. (The observations were obiter.)

- (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 160 (160) : 54 Ind Cas 385, *Sheikh Abdur Gafur v. Ashamath Bibi*.

- (1926) A I R 1926 All 697 (698) : 96 Ind Cas 687, *Sajjad Husain v. Qurban Ali Beg*.

- [See (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 71 (73) : 60 Cal 1212 : 149 Ind Cas 111, *Mons Mohan Pal v. Gour Chandra Das*. (Lessees of different shares under different co-owners in a Zamindari are not themselves co-owners.)]

from the date of his entry into such possession.^{3a}

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 36

In the *second class*, the alienation may or may not be valid as regards the share of the alienor. It is not valid as against the others. If it is valid as regards the alienor's share, and *he is entitled to possession* under such alienation, then his possession of any portion of the property must be referred to his title and is not adverse to the other co-owners.⁴ The contrary view expressed in the under-mentioned cases⁵ does not seem to be correct. If the alienation is valid as regards the alienor's share but the alienee is not entitled to joint possession, his possession of any portion of the property will be without title and will be adverse to the co-owners.⁶

In the *third class*, the possession of the alienee will be clearly adverse to the other co-owners, whether the alienation is valid or not. The reason is that a co-owner of property is himself not entitled, before partition, to any specific portion of the property, or to the possession of any such specific portion, and cannot convey to a stranger anything more than what he himself has. Consequently, the possession of the alienee will be without title and will be consequently adverse to the persons entitled.⁷ The decision in the

8a (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 502 (503) : 150 Ind Cas 903, *Rajender Lal v Kuer Rai*

4. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 657 (658) : 37 Bom 84, *Mallappa v Mudhappa*.

[See (1923) A I R 1923 All 291 (291) : 71 Ind Cas 640, *Hafiz Abdulla v. Ali*.]

5. (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 214 (215) : 116 Ind Cas 890, *Ibrahim v. Ali Muhammad*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Mad 22 (23) : 129 Ind Cas 454, *Thiagaraja Pillai v. Apparat Pillai*

6 (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 869 (871) : 70 Ind Cas 317, *Linga Munisami Reddi v. Govindasami Naicker* (The decision is in conformity with principle, but the grounds of the decision are stated differently)

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 670 (674) (Cal), *Banwari Lal v Sheo Sankar Misser*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Lah 996 (998) : 167 Ind Cas 918, *Chhajumal v. Multan Singh*

(1931) 1931 M W N 859 (891), *Narayanaswami Ayyar v. Thandaresa Iyer*. (A and B coparceners—A alienating property to C but continuing in possession as lessee of C to knowledge of B—C must be held to be in adverse possession against B through A)

[But see (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 447 (448) : 25 Ind Cas 573, *Muthukrishna Iyengar v. Sankara Narayana Iyer*]

7 (1907) 2 Sind L R 43 (44, 45), *Dhunoomal Chandiram v. Mt. Eaim Khatun*. (1898) 23 Bom 187 (142) (F B), *Bhaurao v. Rahhmin*

(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 205 (207) : 71 Ind Cas 171, *Anwar v. Eischen Singh*

(1937) A I R 1937 Pesh 69 (70) : 170 Ind Cas 195, *Sher Mohamed Nauab Khan v. Asma Bibi*

(1924) A I B 1924 All 788 (739) : 80 Ind Cas 12, *Bainath v. Ram Bilas*.

(1932) A I B 1932 Bom 255 (255) : 137 Ind Cas 867, *Fakirappa v. Rudrappa*.

(1902) 1902 Pun L R No 1 (page 3), *Chint Ram v. Balhtawar Rikh*

(1889) 12 Mad 292 (293), *Muttusami v. Ramakrishna*.

(1926) 51 Mad L Jour 83 (83) (N R C)

(1918) A I R 1918 Low Bur 119 (119) : 42 Ind Cas 121, *Hla Gyaw v. Aung Pyu* (Article 142 will apply to the case—The case will be one of dispossession of the others)

[See also (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 500 (501) : 95 Ind Cas 433, *Ram Udit v. Bhagurat Prasad*]

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 36-37**

undermentioned case⁸ seems to proceed on the view that the possession of the alienee of a specific portion of the joint property from a co-owner, will amount to an *ouster* of the other co-owners and that therefore the possession would be adverse.

Suppose now that the alienee of a share of joint property from a co-owner does not obtain any possession, in a case in which he is entitled to be put in joint possession. It would follow from what has been stated above that the alienee being a co-owner himself, the possession of the other co-owners of even *the property alienated would not be* adverse to the alienee. The contrary view has, however, been expressed in the case cited below,⁹ on the ground that the principle that the possession of a co-owner is not adverse to the others, is not applicable to the case of transferees from co-owners. It is submitted that this view is not correct on principle.

Where *A* is in possession of property belonging to himself and *B* jointly, but *B*, though not in possession actually, has not been proved to have been *ousted* by *A*, *A*'s possession is not adverse to *B* and, if *B* alienates his share to *C*, is not adverse to *C* also.¹⁰ If the alienee is, however, ousted from possession, the possession of the other co-owners will, of course, be adverse to the alienee.¹¹

A and *B* were co-owners of a property, *A* being entitled to three-fourths and *B* to one-fourth thereof. Subsequently, they entered into an arrangement whereby each of them enjoyed a specific property as his share. *B*'s one-fourth share was then sold to *C* in execution of a decree against *B*. *C* was obstructed in the delivery of possession and thereupon he sued *B* and *A* for possession. He however obtained a decree declaring that he was entitled to joint possession of one-fourth share in the entire property with *A* on the basis that the partition arrangement was not binding on him. *B* appealed from the decree and the same was confirmed in 1863 by the Appellate Court. *A* thereupon in 1873 sued *C* for his twelve annas share. It was held that the possession of *C* and *B* became adverse, if at all, only from the date of the appellate decree in 1863.¹²

37. Possession of licensee from co-owner.—The possession of a licensee from a co-owner is adverse to the other co-owner.¹ But

S. (1936) A I R 1936 Pesh 21 (26) : 160 Ind Cas 952, *Jang Bahadur v. Abdul Nur*.

9. (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 682 (683) : 78 Ind Cas 159, *Udi v. Marumal*.

10. (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 273 (275) : 58 Bom 410 : 154 Ind Cas 824, *Anant Ganpati v. Vishnu Rambhau*.

(1916) A I R 1916 All 19 (21) : 86 Ind Cas 100, *Ram Parson v. Kalab Husam*.

(1899) 24 Bom 101 (111) : 1 Bom L R 466, *Dhondo v. Vasudeo*.

11. (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 273 (275) : 58 Bom 410 : 154 Ind Cas 824, *Anant Ganpati v. Vishnu Rambhau* (Exclusive receipts of profits may point to ouster)

12. (1870) 5 Cal 644 (653) : 7 Ind App 1 : 6 Cal L R 71 : 4 Sar 86 : 4 Ind Jour 142 : 3 Sother 697 : 3 Shome L R 157 (P C), *Dewan Manwar Ali v. Annodapersad Rai*.

Note 37

1. (1921) A I R 1924 Cal 693 (697) : 51 Cal 135 : 81 Ind Cas 493, *Sarlaja Nath Ray v. Reshee Case Law*.

the Oudh Chief Court has held a contrary view.²

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 37-39

38. Effect of partition among co-owners. — Where, after partition has taken place, one co-owner is in possession of a portion allotted to another, such possession is *prima facie* adverse to the latter, the reason being that such possession is not that of a co-owner.¹

Suppose *A* and *B* are co-owners of certain property. *A* is in possession of the whole property adversely to *B*. Before the expiry of the statutory period, however, a partition is made between the parties. But *A* continues to be in possession of the whole property even after partition. Such possession is adverse to *B* as regards the portion allotted to him. But it has been held that the partition creates a fresh title in favour of *B* and that, hence, he is entitled to a fresh period of twelve years from the date of partition for bringing a suit for possession against *A*.²

Where certain property belonging to a Hindu joint family is in the possession of one of the coparceners and such property is left undivided at a partition among them, the possession of the former continues to be that of a co-owner and is therefore not adverse.³

39. Co-owner deriving possession from a third party claiming adversely against all the co-owners. — Where a third party is in adverse possession against all the co-owners of a property and one of the co-owners then obtains possession of the property from such third party under a lease or other kind of transfer by him, the possession of such co-owner not being referable to his title

(1891) 1891 Bom P J 59, *Dalaji v. Maruti*.

2 (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 503 (505) 171 Ind Cas 89, *Wajid Ali v. Dr. Mohammad Nazimuddin Husam*.

Note 38

1 (1928) A I R 1923 Lah 362 (363) 76 Ind Cas 742, *Daulat Ram v. Nana Chand*.

(1877) 1877 Bom P J 194, *Deva Mahabala v. Ganpaya Amaya*.

(1886) 11 Bom 221 Note (b) · 1883 Bom P J 262, *Fathoba v. Narayan*.

(1904) 9 Oudh Cas 55 (61) *Prag Dat v. Chote Singh*.

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 790 (790) 1911 Pnn Re No. 81, *Fatehdin v. Nisha*.

(1930) A I R 1930 All 845 (846) 128 Ind Cas 820, *Naranjan Singh v. Mahabir Singh* (Possession under the impression that it belongs to him is adverse).

[See (1928) 109 Ind Cas 458 (459) (Lah), *Bhola v. Sant Saran Singh* (Possession not necessarily adverse)]

2 (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 223 (223) 57 Ind Cas 443, *Hanoman Singh v. Ratan Singh*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Lth 83 (81) 67 Ind Cas 425, *Muhammad Din v. Muhammad*.

(1887) 2 C P L R 116 (118), *Dadu v. Raja*.

3 (1924) A I R 1921 Mad 113 (114) 74 Ind Cas 1018, *Rajagopala Iyengar v. Sowdra Raja Iyengar*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 27 (28) 114 Ind Cas 337, *Vanyapuri Chettiar v. Subramanya Chettiar*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 613 (614) 40 Ind Cas 115, *Jagadambal v. Diku Lal*.

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 408 (411) 32 Mad 191, *Vandhanatha Aiyer v. Aiyasamy Aiyer*.

Arts. 142 & 144 as co-owner, is adverse to the other co-owners.¹
Notes 39-42

Where one co-owner, acting on his own behalf and not on behalf of all co-owners, recovers common property from a trespasser, the possession of such co-owner is adverse to the other co-owners.²

40. Adverse possession against alienee of share in property.—*A* and *B* are co-owners of a certain property. *A* is in sole possession of the property on behalf of both the co-owners. *B* sells his share in the joint property to *C*. *A* continues to be in sole possession. *A*'s possession is not adverse to *C* also, the reason being that *C* is a co-owner with him.¹

Where a person sells a *share* of his interest in a certain property and continues in possession of the whole property, such possession is not adverse to the alienee.²

41. Adverse possession by co-owners against stranger.—Where the co-owners of a property encroach upon the adjacent property and such property is in the occupation of one or other of the co-owners continuously for the statutory period, such possession is on behalf of *all* the co-owners in a representative capacity and is not that of *independent* trespassers. Hence, at the end of the statutory period, the co-owners will acquire a title to the property.¹

42. Abandonment by co-owner.—Where one co-owner abandons his share of the joint property, the subsequent possession of the property by the other co-owner is on behalf of himself alone and not on behalf of both the co-owners.¹

Note 39

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 59 (59) : 35 Ind Cas 26, *Biswas Gangooly v. Bhagabai Charan*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 315 (318) : 85 Ind Cas 88, *Jatindra Nath Roy v. Sabidannessa Khatun*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 356 (363) . 60 Cal 1406 : 149 Ind Cas 410, *Subodh-chandra Niyogi v. Dhubatika Dasee*. (Stranger acquiring title to joint property by adverse possession — Purchase from such stranger by one of the co-owners — Possession of such co-owner is not one on behalf of the other co-owners.)
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 616 (617) . 64 Ind Cas 553, *Bholanath De v. Golabdi Sardar*.
2. (1921) A I R 1921 Lah 163 (161), *Zulphi v. Asghar*.

Note 40

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 250 (252) : 56 Cal 616 : 117 Ind Cas 593, *Biswanath Chakravarti v. Rabiya Khatun*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 957 (958) : 120 Ind Cas 604, *Fateh Muhammad v. Ghulam Muhammad*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 430 (432, 433) . 29 Ind Cas 976, *Hassan Ammal Bibi v. Ismail Moodeen*.
2. (1881) 3 Mad 212 (215), *Kanara Paniker v. Ryrappa Paniker*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 763 (763) : 148 Ind Cas 1112, *Mam Raj v. Chhotu*.

Note 41

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 232 (233) : 131 Ind Cas 341, *Asmullah v. Ghulam Mohamamad*.

Note 42

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 99 (100) : 35 Ind Cas 72, *Tomejudd v. Mulai Choukidar*.

43. Relinquishment by co-owner.—Where one co-owner relinquishes his share of the property in favour of the other co-owners, but the deed of relinquishment is invalid for want of registration, the possession of the other co-owner is adverse to the co-owner who has relinquished his share.¹

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 43-44

44. Co-heirs.—The doctrine that the possession of one co-owner is *prima facie* not adverse to the other co-owners is applicable to co-heirs also.¹ This principle applies also to the co-heirs of a Mahomedan.² The contrary view taken in the undermentioned

Note 43

- 1, (1917) A I R 1917 All 47 (48) . 42 Ind Cas 713 . 39 All 696, *Jhampu v. Kutramani*.

Note 44

1. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 243 (245) (P C), *Corea v. Appuhamy*.
(1890) 1890 Pun Re No 97, *Lachhman Singh v. Sohan Singh*.
2. (1931) A I R 1931 All 193 (194) . 131 Ind Cas 211, *Shams Ahmad v. Hesamul Haq*.
(1924) A I R 1924 All 384 (386) 46 All 377 : 79 Ind Cas 174, *Mubarak-un-Nissa v. Muhammad Raza Khan*.
(1919) A I R 1919 All 202 (203) 50 Ind Cas 691, *Haider Khan v. Chand Khan*.
(1916) A I R 1916 All 19 (20, 21) . 36 Ind Cas 100, *Ram Parson Upadhyia v. Kalab Husain*.
(1912) 15 Ind Cas 292 (293) (All), *Chand Khan v. Ali Khan*.
(1881) 1881 All W N 90 (90), *Isaattunnissa v. Muhammad Taqi*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 141 (143) : 118 Ind Cas 785, *Bai Jai v. Bai Bidanboo*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 56 (56) : 45 Bom 519 . 59 Ind Cas 780, *Nuridin Najbuddin v. Bu Umrah*.
(1879) 1879 Bom P J 296, *Imam Sahab v. Sayad Harratsahab*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 480 (480) 91 Ind Cas 725, *Sourab Bibi v. Abbas Ali Biswas*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1176 (1180) 85 Ind Cas 763, *Asruddin Mondal v. Latifunnessa Bibi*.
(1875) 24 Suth W R 1 (1), *Moonshee Suddar v. Molungo Sirdar*.
(1864) 1864 Suth W R 377 (377, 378), *Bacharam Chowdry v. Mahtab Beebee*.
(1936) 170 Ind Cas 89 (90) (Lah), *Jagan Nath v. Begum Bibi*.
(1931) 134 Ind Cas 491 (491) (Lah), *Jalat Din v. Karam Nur*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 251 (252) 122 Ind Cas 105, *Ghulam Muhammad v. Mt Begam*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 78 (79) 119 Ind Cas 335, *Mt Umat-ul-Habibi v. Abdul Karim*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 464 (464) 10 Lah 849 118 Ind Cas 905, *Muhammad Baksh v. Fateh Mahammad*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 195 (198) 10 Lah 842 122 Ind Cas 61, *Ahmad Bibi v. Shamas Din*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 193 (194) 77 Ind Cas 257, *Hasham Ali v. Umar Hayat*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Lah 197 (198) 59 Ind Cas 346, *Murad Bibi v. Rahim Bahsh*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 287 (287) 84 Ind Cas 896, *Dada Sahib v. Ddi Mohv-din Sahab*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1207 (1210) 29 Ind Cas 275, *Mariam Dira Ammal v. Khader Meera Sahib Taragan*.
(1910) 6 Ind Cas 579 (580) 84 Mad 74, *Noonsleen Saib v. Ibrahim Saib*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Nag 77 (27) . 23 Nag L R 252 140 Ind Cas 631, *Muradu-din v. Mt Umrahbi*.

as co-owner, is adverse to the other co-owners.¹

Where one co-owner, acting on his own behalf and not on behalf of all co-owners, recovers common property from a trespasser, the possession of such co-owner is adverse to the other co-owners.²

40. Adverse possession against alienee of share in property.—
A and *B* are co-owners of a certain property. *A* is in sole possession of the property on behalf of both the co-owners. *B* sells his share in the joint property to *C*. *A* continues to be in sole possession. *A*'s possession is not adverse to *C* also, the reason being that *C* is a co-owner with him.¹

Where a person sells a *share* of his interest in a certain property and continues in possession of the whole property, such possession is not adverse to the alienee.²

41. Adverse possession by co-owners against stranger.—
Where the co-owners of a property encroach upon the adjacent property and such property is in the occupation of one or other of the co-owners continuously for the statutory period, such possession is on behalf of *all* the co-owners in a representative capacity and is not that of *independent* trespassers. Hence, at the end of the statutory period, the co-owners will acquire a title to the property.¹

42. Abandonment by co-owner.— Where one co-owner abandons his share of the joint property, the subsequent possession of the property by the other co-owner is on behalf of himself alone and not on behalf of both the co-owners.¹

Note 39

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 59 (59) : 35 Ind Cas 26, *Biswaswar Gangooly v. Bhagabati Charan*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 345 (348) : 35 Ind Cas 36, *Jatindra Nath Roy v. Sabidannessa Khatun*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 356 (363) : 60 Cal 1406 : 149 Ind Cas 410, *Subodhchandra Niyogi v. Bhudalika Dasee*. (Stranger acquiring title to joint property by adverse possession — Purchase from such stranger by one of the co-owners — Possession of such co-owner is not one on behalf of the other co-owners.)
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 616 (617) : 64 Ind Cas 553, *Bholanath De v. Golabdi Sardar*.
2. (1921) A I R 1921 Lah 163 (164), *Zulphi v. Asghar*.

Note 40

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 250 (252) : 56 Cal 616 : 117 Ind Cas 593, *Biswanath Chakravarti v. Rabiya Khatun*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 957 (958) : 120 Ind Cas 604, *Fateh Muhammad v. Ghulam Muhammad*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 430 (432, 433) : 29 Ind Cas 976, *Hassan Ammal Bibi v. Ismail Moodeen*.
2. (1881) 8 Mad 212 (215), *Kanara Paniker v. Ryrappa Paniker*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 763 (763) : 148 Ind Cas 1112, *Mam Raj v. Chhotu*

Note 41

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 232 (233) : 131 Ind Cas 341, *Asimullah v. Ghulam Mohammad*.

Note 42

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 99 (100) : 35 Ind Cas 72, *Tomejuddi v. Mulai Chowkidar*.

43. Relinquishment by co-owner. — Where one co-owner relinquishes his share of the property in favour of the other co-owners, but the deed of relinquishment is invalid for want of registration, the possession of the other co-owner is adverse to the co-owner who has relinquished his share.¹

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 43-44

44. Co-heirs. — The doctrine that the possession of one co-owner is *prima facie* not adverse to the other co-owners is applicable to co-heirs also.¹ This principle applies also to the co-heirs of a Mahomedan.² The contrary view taken in the undermentioned

Note 43

1. (1917) A I R 1917 All 47 (48) : 42 Ind Cas 713 : 39 All 696, *Jhamphu v. Kutramani*.

Note 44

1. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 243 (245) (P C), *Correa v. Appuhamy*.
(1890) 1890 Pun Re No. 97, *Lachhman Singh v. Sohan Singh*.
2. (1931) A I R 1931 All 193 (194) : 131 Ind Cas 211, *Shamin Ahmad v. Hesamul Haq*.
(1924) A I R 1924 All 834 (836) : 46 All 371 : 79 Ind Cas 174, *Mubarak-un-Nissa v. Muhammad Raza Khan*.
(1919) A I R 1919 All 202 (203) : 50 Ind Cas 691, *Haider Khan v. Chand Khan*.
(1916) A I R 1916 All 19 (20, 21) : 36 Ind Cas 100, *Ram Parson Upadhyay v. Kalab Hussain*.
(1912) 15 Ind Cas 292 (293) (All), *Chand Khan v. Ali Khan*.
(1881) 1881 All W N 90 (90), *Ismatunnissa v. Muhammad Taqi*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Bom 141 (143) : 118 Ind Cas 785, *Bai Jiv v. Bai Dibanboo*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 56 (56) : 45 Bom 619 : 59 Ind Cas 780, *Nuridin Najbuddin v. Bu Umrav*.
(1879) 1879 Bom P J 296, *Imam Sahab v. Sayad Hazratsahab*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 480 (480) : 91 Ind Cas 725, *Sourab Bibi v. Abbas Ali Biswas*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1176 (1180) : 85 Ind Cas 763, *Azruddin Mondal v. Latifunnissa Bibi*.
(1875) 24 Suth W R 1 (1), *Moonshee Sirdar v. Motungo Sirdar*.
(1864) 1864 Suth W R 377 (377, 378), *Bacharam Chowdry v. Mahtab Beebee*.
(1936) 170 Ind Cas 89 (90) (Lah), *Jagan Nath v. Begum Bibi*.
(1931) 134 Ind Cas 491 (491) (Lah), *Jalal Din v. Karam Nur*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 251 (252) : 122 Ind Cas 105, *Ghulam Muhammad v. Mt. Degam*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 78 (79) : 119 Ind Cas 335, *Mt. Umat-ul-Habibi v. Abdul Karim*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 464 (464) : 10 Lah 849 : 118 Ind Cas 905, *Muhammad Baksh v. Fateh Muhammad*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 193 (198) : 10 Lah 842 : 122 Ind Cas 81, *Ahmad Bibi v. Shamas Din*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 193 (194) : 77 Ind Cas 257, *Hasham Ali v. Umar Hayat*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Lah 197 (198) : 59 Ind Cas 346, *Murad Bibi v. Rahim Baksh*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 287 (287) : 84 Ind Cas 896, *Dada Sahib v. Aziz Mohi-din Sahab*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1207 (1210) : 29 Ind Cas 275, *Mariam Bibi Ammal v. Khader Meera Sahib Taragan*.
(1910) 6 Ind Cas 579 (590) : 31 Mad 74, *Noonsteen Saib v. Ibrahim Saib*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Nag 27 (27) : 23 Nag L R 282 : 140 Ind Cas 831, *Muradu-din v. Mt. Umraobi*.

decisions³ is not correct.

45. Suit for possession by one co-owner against another
—Article applicable.—Where one co-owner has originally been in

—Article applicable.—Where one co-owner has originally been in possession of the whole property on behalf of all the co-owners, but subsequently his possession has become adverse to the other co-owners, a suit by the latter for joint possession or partition will fall under Article 144¹ (except where the case falls under Article 127 *supra*).

- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 521 (523) : 121 Ind Cas 881; 4 Luck 261, *Mohammad Ali v. Mumtaz Ali*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Oodh 241 (242) : 78 Ind Cas 282, *Abdul Shakur Khan v. Muhammad Ali Khan*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Rang 155 (158) : 1 Rang 405 : 76 Ind Cas 855, *Maung Po Kiu v. Maung Shwe Byn*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Sind 207 (215) : 78 Ind Cas 23 : 18 Sing L R 149, *Usman v. Asaf*.
 3. (1907) 1907 All W N 195 (196) : 4 All L Jour 478, *Chunaji Mal v. Nathia*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 790 (790) : 100 Ind Cas 145, *Mt. Allah Jawai v. Mahomed Baksh*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 519 (520) : 73 Ind Cas 425 : 4 Lah 402, *Mt. Zainab v. Ghulam Rasul*.
 (1888) 1888 Pun Re. No. 69, *Nasir-Ud-din Shah v. Mt. Lal Bibi*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Rang 407 (411) : 106 Ind Cas 501, *Mahomed Ameen v. Eusool Hajee Ahmed*.

Note 45

- Bhagwat Prasad.

[See (1970) A I R 1970 Bom 26 (26) : 44 Bom 913 : 58 Ind Cas 42,
Kala Gunda Patil v. Bibishaya Shah.]

It has been held that where all the co-owners of a property have been in joint possession but subsequently one of them is dispossessed or discontinues his possession, a suit by the latter for joint possession or partition will come under Article 142.² The correctness of these decisions is doubtful in view of the fact that in such cases the possession of the defendant cannot be said to be adverse to the plaintiff from the moment of his *entry*. (See Note 2 *supra*.)

See also the undermentioned case³

As to the limitation applicable to suits between co-heirs for share of inheritance, see Note 4 to Article 123, *supra*.

46. Adverse possession of trust property by trustee.—A trustee cannot, by setting up his own title to the trust property, acquire by adverse possession a title to the property.¹ In *Srinivasa*.

2 (1925) A I R 1925 Rang 233 (235). 83 Ind Cas 609, *Ma Nan Thu v Ma Shwe Ma*

(1934) A I R 1934 All 993 (1002) 57 All 278. 152 Ind Cas 1 (FB), *Bindhya-chal Chand v. Ram Gharib Chand*

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 241 (241) I L R 1938 Lah 558, *Karim Bahsh v. Shadi*

(1906) 28 All 479 (480) 1906 All W N 95 3 All L Jour 834, *Deba v. Rokhtagh Mal* (Property of tenants-in-common—One leaving possession and the other continuing in possession—Held that there is discontinuance of possession within Article 142.)

(1902) 5 Oudh Cas 6 (9), *Jagdamba Bahsh v. Sitta Bahsh*.

3. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 298 (299) 5 Low Bur Rul 112, *Ma Le v. Ma Hmyin*. (Co-owners enjoying property by turns — Plaintiff not availing himself of his turn when it came — Plaintiff cannot be said to have discontinued possession within Article 142.)

Note 46

1. (1927) A I R 1927 P C 270 (272) 107 Ind Cas 344 (P C), *Suumoun v. Dasa Raphael*

(1897) 19 All 277 (291) 24 Ind App 10 7 Sar 131 1 Cal W N 265 (P C), *Billo Kunwar v. Kesho Prasad Misr*

(1938) A I R 1938 Nag 385 (346) 177 Ind Cas 6 (F B), *Asaram v. Ludheswar*.

(1911) 11 Ind Cas 447 (448) 34 Mad 257 38 Ind App 129 (P C), *Srinivasa Murthy v. Venkatarada Iyengar*

(1868) 10 Suth W R 172 (172) 1 Beng L R A C 114, *Jagannath Pal v. Bidyanand*. (Before the Limitation Act of 1871 any trustee could acquire the trust property by adverse possession.)

(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 1 (7) 50 Cal 49 74 Ind Cas 630, *Charu Chandra v. Nahush Chandra* (Breach of trust for over 12 years—No prescriptive title.)

(1848) 2 Deg & Sm 122 (163) 12 Jur 210 79 R R 151, *Attorney General v. Munro* (Do.)

(1872) 17 Suth W R 190 (191), *Ranee Khajoorunnissa v. Mt. Fokeemounnissa*. (An executor holding an estate in trust to pay the profits in certain defined shares to the heirs of the testator, cannot plead adverse possession against them.)

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 563 (567) 125 Ind Cas 227, *Kalatty Mudaly v. Mangapathi Mudali*

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 483 (485) 157 Ind Cas 181, *Manickammal v. Murugappa*

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 477 (479) 37 Mad 373 14 Ind Cas 168, *Pattabikara Manakkal Kuppan v. Munde Kottal*

(1877-78) 2 Bom 888 (413), *Lallubhai Bapubhai v. Manikumarba*
(See also (1865) 34 Fev 576 (582, 583) 34 L J Ch 582 12 L T 557 :
11 Jur (N S) 649 13 W R 827 6 N R 243, *Lyster v. Lyster*.)

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 46

murthy v. Venkatavarada Iyengar,² their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

" No person who has accepted the position of a trustee and has acquired property in that capacity can be permitted to assert an adverse title on his own behalf until he has obtained a proper discharge from the trust with which he has clothed himself."^{2a}

In *Bitto Kunwar v. Kesho Prasad*,³ the Privy Council again expressed a similar view in the following passage :

"Their Lordships can only understand their (the High Court's) thinking thus by supposing that they were of opinion that although there might be a trust, Bachcha Tewari and Ram Kishen (the trustees) might acquire a title by having possession of the property and appropriating it to their own use. The learned Judges appear not to have had in their minds the statement of the law in Sections 63 and 64 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882."

The principle above stated, namely that a trustee cannot acquire title by adverse possession of the trust property, applies equally to quasi or constructive trustees,⁴ to the managers of religious endowments⁵ and in fact to all persons who stand in a fiduciary relation to

(1861) 30 Beav 461 (470) : 31 L J Ch 29 : 7 Jur (N S) 1208 : 5 L T (N S) 570 : 10 W R 26 : 132 R R 363, *Newcome v. Flowers*.

(1884) 11 Cal 17 (30, 32), *Hajon Manick v. Bur Sing*]

2. (1911) 11 Ind Cas 447 (448) : 34 Mad 257 : 38 Ind App 129 (P O).

2a. See also (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 297 (298) : 56 Cal 914 : 119 Ind Cas 289, *Gaya Prasad v. Bakya Mani Dass*.

(1920) A C 636 (653) : 39 L J P C 65 : 123 L T 121, *Taylor v. Davies*.

3. (1897) 19 All 277 (291) : 24 Ind App 10 : 1 Cal W N 265 : 7 Ear 181 (P C).

[See also (1911) 9 Ind Cas 510 (511) (Lah), *Sohandan v. Aurang Khan*.]

4. (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 835 (346) : 177 Ind Cas 6 (F B), *Asaram v. Ludheswar*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 563 (565) : 125 Ind Cas 227, *Kalatty Mudali v. Mangapathy Mudali*.

[See also (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 378 (379) : 26 Ind Cas 345, *Prem Singh v. Mokand Singh*. (Religious endowment—Mahant's possession is not adverse to founder unless founder's title is repudiated—Founder's heir can oust trespasser in the absence of a mahant.)]

(1869) 12 Suth W R 319 (319) : 3 Beng L R A C 409, *Rakhaldas Madak v. Madhusudhan Madak*.

(1899) 21 All 329 (340) : 1899 All W N 106, *Muhammad Munawar Ali v. Rasoolan Bibi*. (Woman takes possession of an estate as behalf of son is not a refusal)

[But see (1934) A I R 1934 All 990 (992), *Ram Chandra v. Jaith Mal*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 821 (825) : 78 Ind Cas 859, *Raunaq Ali v. Nazir Husain*.]

5. (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 603 (604) : 133 Ind Cas 809, *Lachhman Das v. Arya Pratimudhi Sabha*. (A manager of a temple cannot convert himself into a full owner by treating the property as his own private property.)

others.⁶ In the case of express trustees it has been recognised in Section 10 of the Act which provides that no suit against an express trustee or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration) for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, shall be barred by any length of time.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 46-49

47. Adverse possession of alienee from trustee.—Section 10 of the Act does not apply to a suit against an assignee for consideration from a trustee, and hence, a suit for possession against a transferee for valuable consideration of the trust property from the trustee is governed by the ordinary period of limitation. In *Subbaiya Pandaram v. Muhammad Mustafa*,¹ it was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the exception (that is the exception from the operation of Section 10, of the case of assigns for valuable consideration) shows that in that event the claim may be defeated by adverse possession.

48. Adverse possession of right to perform worship in temple.—A right to perform a particular kind of worship in a Hindu temple as *stapananam*, i.e. bathing the idol, offering *neivedyam* and *deeparadhana*, can be acquired by prescription.

Where a right of worship is divisible, into separate parts, the acquisition of a prescriptive right to perform a minor worship will not carry with it the right to perform the major worship.¹

49. Adverse possession of property of Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious endowments.—Religious institutions of Hindus, Muhammadans or Buddhists are recognised as juridical persons capable of holding property.¹ It follows that they can also acquire property by the adverse possession² and likewise lose property

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 50 (52) 98 Ind Cas 442, *Pratap Sinha v. Simji Raja Sahib*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Mad 391 (352, 353) 150 Ind Cas 156, *Savitri Ayyengar v. Venkataramana Ayyengar*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Nag 35 (42) 31 Nag L R 163 157 Ind Cas 17, *Ram Suaroop v. Thakur Ramchandrajee Mandir*.

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 578 (590) (All), *Fakhruddin v. Kifayatullah*.

G (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 166 (170) 61 Ind Cas 807 6 Pat L Jour 273, *Abdul Rahim v. M. Batra*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 295 (303, 304) 60 Cal 54 141 Ind Cas 792, *Suren-draKrishna Roy v. Ishwar Bhuvaneshwari Thakurani* (There can be no adverse possession against an idol by the shebait, as he stands in a fiduciary relation to the idol).

Note 47

1. (1923) A I R 1923 P C 175 (178) 50 Ind App 295 46 Mad 751 74 Ind Cas 492 (P C).

Note 48

1. (1913) 18 Ind Cas 475 (476) (Mad), *Iyyaturai Gurukul v. Ramaswamy Gurukul*.

Note 49

1 (1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 235 (250, 261, 262) 24 Ind Cas 72, *Sitaranji v. Jadunath Singh*.

2 (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 142 (145) 50 Cal 292 74 Ind Cas 793, *Ananda-chandra Chakrabarti v. Bhojatal Singh*.

Arts. 142 & 144 by the adverse possession of a stranger.⁵ As a *material object or property*, and not as an *institution*, a Hindu idol or a Muhammadan mosque can itself be acquired by adverse possession.⁴

Note 49

It is, however, only in an ideal sense that property can be said to belong to an institution as a juridical person. The possession and management must necessarily be entrusted to some person as its manager. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Prosonno Kumar Debba v. Golab Chand Baboo*⁵:

"... it is only in an ideal sense that property can be said to belong to an idol; the possession and management of it must, in the nature of things, be entrusted to some person as *shebait* or manager. It would seem to follow that the person so entrusted must, of necessity, be empowered to do whatever may be required for the service of the idol and for the benefit and preservation of its property at least to as great a degree as the manager of an infant heir."

But the person entrusted with the management of the property of an institution is only the manager and custodian of the institution.⁶ He is not a *trustee* in the strict sense of the term.⁷ But by S. 10 of the Act such manager is to be *deemed* to be a trustee. As such, and even apart from it by virtue of his fiduciary position, such a manager cannot set up adverse possession with regard to the properties of the institution and acquire title to them on his own behalf by prescription.⁸ For the same reason, no limitation will apply to a suit for possession of the endowed property against a gratuitous transferee thereof. But a suit against a transferee for valuable consideration will not be exempt from the bar of limitation as Section 10 does not apply to such cases. Such a transfer, however, although made without legal necessity is not void *ab initio* in all cases. If the manager was not purporting to sell or transfer the property of the juridical person as *manager* but was purporting to make the transfer as owner in his own personal right, the transfer is

(1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 255 (262): 21 Ind Cas 72, *Sitaramji v. Jadunath Singh*.

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4. (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 369 (375) 175 Ind Cas 945 (FB), *Masjid Shahid Ganj v. S G P. Committee*

(1929) A I R 1929 All 315 (316): 51 All 621. 116 Ind Cas 433, *Dasami Sahu v. Param Shameshwar*

5. (1875) 2 Ind App 145 (152) 4 Beng L R 450. 23 Suth W R 253: 3 Suther 102 3 Sar 449 (FC), *Prosonno Kumar Debba v. Golab Chand Baboo*.

6. (1922) A I R 1922 P C 123 (126): 65 Ind Cas 161: 48 Ind App 302: 44 Mad 831 (PC), *Vidya Varuthi Thiruthaswamiyal v. Baluswami Ayyar*.

7. (1922) A I R 1922 P C 123 (126): 65 Ind Cas 161: 48 Ind App 302: 44 Mad 831 (PC), *Vidya Varuthi Thiruthaswamiyal v. Baluswami Ayyar*.

8. See cases cited in Foot-Note (5) to Note 46.

void *ab initio* and time will run against the institution even from the date of the transfer.^{8a} If however he purports to transfer the property as *manager*, the transfer is valid till it is set aside or till the death, resignation or removal of the transferor. Hence, the possession of the transferee, where the transfer is made without legal necessity, does not become adverse to the institution till the death, resignation or removal of the transferor, and hence a suit for possession against him within twelve years of such death or resignation or removal will be in time.⁹ This principle is now specifically embodied in Article 134 B.¹⁰ But where the alienation is of the office of the manager, it is void *ab initio* and the adverse possession of the transferee will begin as soon as he takes possession of the office and the endowed properties under the transfer.¹¹

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 49

Where a *stranger* gets into possession of the endowed property, his possession will be adverse to the institution from the date of the entry and the fact that the manager of the institution is succeeded by another will not give him a fresh starting point of limitation.¹²

8a (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 60 (63), *Venkatasubramania v. Sragurunatha*.

9 (1935) A I R 1935 P C 44 (46) 153 Ind Cas 1100 62 Ind App 47 57 All 159 (PC), *Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti*

Cas 214 60 Ind

App 302 44 Mad
Iyuanam Ayyar,
Cas 452, *Sarabdeo*

Dharaihi v. Nam Bai

(1918) 19 Ind Cas 558 (559) 37 Bom 224, *Mahamadgaus Dadasaheb v. Rajabaksha*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 913 (915) 95 Ind Cas 644, *Raja Manindra Narain Roy v. Executors, Bhuvan Chandra Estate*

(1916) A I R 1916 Lah 239 (240) 32 Ind Cas 558, *Fazal Ilahi v. Zafar Ali*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 25 (27) 13 Lah 677 140 Ind Cas 601, *Garduara Parbandhak Committee v. Premdas*

(1923) A I R 1923 Mad 545 (550) 72 Ind Cas 789, *Jagga Rou v. Gari Bibi*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 769 (770) 49 Mad 513 96 Ind Cas 371, *Rama Reddy v. Ranga Dasan*

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 262 (263) 162 Ind Cas 325, *Veerana Goundan v. Sellappa Goundan*

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 422 (424) 124 Ind Cas 155, *Chidambara Sripalakasa Pandara Sannadhi Somasundaram Pillai*

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 60 (63), *Venkatasubramania v. Sragurunatha*

(1939) A I R 1939 Cal 21 (22), *Charuchandra v. Nritya Gopal*

[But see (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 444 (447) 95 Ind Cas 27 2 Luck 239, *Parhasdas v. Janki Ballabha Saran* (No longer good law)]

10. See (1893) 20 All 482 (487) 1898 All W N 123 (F B), *Dehari Lal v. Muhammad Nuttali* (View that possession of the transferee is adverse from the date of the transfer is no longer good law)

11. (1899) 23 Mad 271 (279) 27 Ind App 69 4 Cal W N 329 10 Mad L Jour 29 2 Bom L R 597 7 Sar 671 (P C), *Gnanasambanada Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram*

(1910) 7 Ind Cas 240 (240) 37 Ind App 147 37 Cal 885 (P C), *Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das*

12 (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 81 (86) 176 Ind Cas 695, *Panna Sundari v. Lenares Bank Ltd*

(1912) 14 Ind Cas 142 (144) 39 Cal 887, *Jharula Das v. Jalandhar Thakur*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 49**

Where a stranger enters into possession of the endowed property claiming to be a *manager thereof*, his possession will not be adverse to the institution itself, but will be adverse against the trustee. The stranger will, after twelve years of such possession, acquire the *right of a manager of the institution*.¹³

(1900) 23 Mad 430 (441) : 9 Mad L Jour 8, *Chidambaram Chetty v. Minam-mal*

(1907) 6 Cal L Jour 621 (636), *Lilabati Misra v. Brishun Chobey*. (Adverse possession against female shabait operates effectively as against the succeeding male shabait.)

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 406 (407) : 70 Ind Cas 369, *Madura Detasthanam v. Samia Pillai*. (Meikkavalgar in possession of manbhram lands for 12 years after his dismissal from office—Suit for possession by his successor is barred.)

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 440 (451), *Rajagopala Naidu v. Ramasubramania Ayyar*. (Nominee of villagers to manage village temple property dismissed and new one appointed—Suit by newly appointed nominee against the dismissed nominee for possession of temples and properties—Previous nominee setting up right in himself repudiating claim of villagers—Adverse possession of previous nominee starts from date of repudiation)

(1923) A I R 1923 Mad 545 (550) : 72 Ind Cas 789, *Jagga Row v. Gari Bibi*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 483 (486) : 157 Ind Cas 181, *Manickammal v. Murugappa Gramani*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 24 (25) : 66 Ind Cas 941, *Abdur Rashid v. Janaki Das*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Rang 40 (40) : 79 Ind Cas 273, *U Waseikla v. U Parama*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 188 (189) : 161 Ind Cas 234, *Jagathambal Anni v. Periatambal Nadar*.

adverse possession)

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 140 (143) : 84 Ind Cas 91 : 51 Cal 953, *Administrator General of Bengal v. Balkissen Misser*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 6 (17) : 141 Ind Cas 157 : 11 Pat 701, *Chaturbhuj Singh v. Sarada Charan Guha*.

(1926) A I R 1926 All 392 (393) : 48 All 348 : 93 Ind Cas 652, *Chitar Mal v. Panchu Lal*

(1903) 3 Ind Cas 98 (99) (Cal), *Ram Kisto Mohapatra v. Jagannath Mohapatra*

The institution cannot be regarded as a perpetual minor under disability; see : (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 369 (385) : 175 Ind Cas 945 (F B), Masjid Sahid Ganj v. S. G. P. Committee

(1932) A I R 1932 Mad 328 (333) : 137 Ind Cas 487, *Periyannan Chetty v. Govinda Rao*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 673 (676) : 123 Ind Cas 195, *Debendra Nath Sadhukhan v. Naharmal Jalan*.

13 (1900) 23 Mad 430 (441) : 9 Mad L Jour 8, Chidambaram Chetty v. Minam-mal

was adverse for more than 12 years)

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chalam Chetty v. he office will not

however be adverse)

(1912) 16 Ind Cas 225 (232) (Mad), *Veeraraghava Thathachariar v. Srin-rasa Thathachariar*.

50. Possession of co-trustees after division among them.— **Arts. 142 & 144**

The fact that joint shebait of an institution divide the debutter property between them and apply the rents and profits thereof to their own use, will not make their possession adverse to the institution. The reason is, as has been seen in Notes 46 and 49 above, that a shebait stands in regard to the idol in a fiduciary relationship and will not be permitted to set up adverse possession against the institution.¹

Notes 50-52

51. Possession of alienee from co-trustee.—Where the management of a religious endowment is vested in two persons, and one of them alienates a part of the property of the endowment to a stranger, it has been held by the High Court of Bombay that a suit by the other for the recovery of the property alienated is governed by Article 144, that time would run from the date of the alienation, and that the alienation cannot be considered to be valid for the lifetime of the transferor.¹ Where one co-shebait transferred certain property to a stranger, and the stranger purported to come in only as co-sharer of the other co-shebait, the possession of such stranger is merely that of a co-owner, and is not adverse to the others in the absence of proof of ouster.²

52. Acts referable to exercise of easement.—It has been seen in Note 18 *ante*, that possession is never considered adverse if it can be referred to a lawful title. Acts, therefore, which can be referred to an easement right on the part of the person doing them, cannot be considered to be adverse to the true owner, and cannot constitute dispossession of the true owner, inasmuch as a dispossession involves, necessarily, as seen in Note 9 *ante*, an *adverse* possession of the property as against the true owner.^{1a} *A* was the owner of a party wall between the houses of *A* and *B*. *B* had a right of easement of support for resting his rafters on the wall. In a suit for possession by *A* of the wall, *B* contended that *A* had been dispossessed by *B* more than 12 years before suit by reason of the

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 183 (190) 41 Ind Cas 630, *Raman Somayajipad v. Kunhi Kutta Kovilamma* (Samudayi can acquire the rights of uralan (trustee) by prescription.)

[See also (1929) A I R 1928 Mad 327 (334) 51 Mad 720 103 Ind Cas 305, *Chockalingam v. Duraiswami* (The rights of a trustee can be acquired by prescribing for those rights)]

Note 50

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 295 (304) 60 Cal 51 141 Ind Cas 792, *Surendra Krishna Roy v. Ishwar Bhuvaneshwari*.

Note 51

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 26 (30) 141 Ind Cas 103, *Narayan Balwant v. Dattatroya Ramchandra*.
[See also (1882-84) 7 Mad 337 (338), *Kannan v. Nilakandan*.]
2. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 641 (643) 158 Ind Cas 656, *Indian Iron & Steel Co. v. Bara Gopal Thakur*.

Note 52

- 1a. (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 38 (41) : 57 Ind Cas 51C, *Fardiz Singh v. Secretary of State*

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 52-52a

fact that *B* had been plastering his side of the wall without interference by the plaintiff. It was held that the acts alleged to have been done by *B* can be referred to his right of easement, that they were not adverse to the existing title and that they did not constitute any dispossession of *A*.¹

Whether the acts alleged are referable to the right of property or possession, or acts of mere right of easement independent of possession, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.² In *Watson and Co. v. The Government*,³ Sir Barnes Peacock, C. J., observed as follows :

"The exercise of such acts of ownership of jungle lands as would ordinarily be exercised over property of that nature would be evidence of possession. For instance, if it were proved that the Ghatwals were in the habit of cutting or preserving the wood, gathering wax or wild honey, collecting stick, lac, etc., (these) may all be evidence of acts of ownership or possession; and those who have to deal with the facts of the case must determine whether the acts were referable to the right of property or possession or acts of mere right of easement independent of possession."

Where it was proved that the plaintiff and his ancestors had for many generations levied cesses and imposts, whenever they could, from the inhabitants of certain hills, exercised the right of hunting elephants and of cutting the adjoor tree, and exacted certain occasional services from the hillmen, it was held that there was nothing in those acts which could be evidence of any proprietary right in the soil of the hills, but that they were acts of mere right of easement independent of possession.⁴

52a. Adverse possession — Vendor and vendee. — Where a person sells immovable property to another but continues in possession of the property, the vendor's possession is adverse against the vendee from the date of the sale,¹ though the vendee may not have paid the purchase-money.²

1. (1908) 31 Mad 528 (529) : 4 Ind Cas 619, *Sundrasastriyal v. Govinda Mandarayan*.

2. (1867) 8 Suth W R 343 (350), *The Government v. Rajah Raj Kishen Singh*. (1865) 3 Suth W R 73 (80). Beng L R Supp Vol 182, *R. Watson & Co. v. The Government*.

3. (1865) 3 Suth W R 73 (80) : Beng L R Supp Vol. 182.

4. (1867) 8 Suth W R 343 (350), *The Government v. Rajah Raj Kishen Singh*.

Note 52a

1. (1899) 18 Bom 421 (428), *Sayad Nyamtulla v. Nana Faridsha*. (11 Cal 229, Followed.)

(1866) 1 Agra 110 (111), *Ungnee Lall v. Hoolasee*.

[See also (1886) 1896 All W N 96 (96), *Kalus v. Kishore*.

(1888) 1888 Bom P J 231, *Rama v. Hajarymal*.]

2. (1893) 1893 Bom P J 491, *Ramji v. Vmayah*.

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 361 (365) : 34 Mad 513, *Pelayuda Chetty v. Gotindaswami Nacker*. (The vendee of immovable property is entitled to possession of property when the conveyance has been duly effected even though the purchase money has not been paid to the vendor.)

In such a case, the remedy of the vendee is by a suit for *possession* to which Art. 144 applies and not by a suit for *specific performance* of a contract to which Art. 113 will apply.³

Arts. 142 & 144.
Note 52a

Where at the date of the sale, the property is in the possession of a third party from whom the vendor subsequently obtains possession, the vendor must be deemed to be in adverse possession against the vendee only from the date when the vendor gets possession.⁴ (See Note 4 to Article 136 *supra*.)

A property in the possession of a usufructuary mortgagee is sold first to *A* and then to *B*. *B* (who is not entitled to the property) redeems the property and enters into possession of it. *B*'s possession is adverse to *A* from the date of his *entering into possession* and he cannot be deemed to be in adverse possession from the date of the sale in his favour.⁵

Where property in the possession of a usufructuary mortgagee is sold, there can be no adverse possession by the vendor against the vendee till the mortgage is redeemed and possession obtained by the vendor.⁶

A sells a half portion of certain property to *B* but continues in possession of the whole property under a rent note for one year executed by *B* in respect of the half portion sold to him. *A* holds over after the expiry of the one year and sells the whole property to *C*. *A*'s suit for joint possession against *C* is governed, not by Article 139 but by Article 144. The reason is that on the expiry of the lease, *A* becomes a co-owner in possession and so the suit against *C* who derives his right from *A* is one against a co-owner in possession and not against a *tenant holding over*.⁷

A sells to *B* property *P* and delivers possession of the property to *B*. *A* then obtains from *B* possession of the property *P* giving *B* in exchange, property *R*. Subsequently, *C* obtains against *B* a decree establishing that *A* was not entitled to the property *R* and that himself (*C*) was entitled to it. *B* then sues *A* for recovery of property *P*. *B*'s right to sue accrues only from the date of the decree negating *A*'s right to property *R* and *A*'s possession of the property *P* becomes adverse to *B* only from such date.⁸

A enters into a contract with *B* for the sale of certain property and delivers possession of the property to *B* in pursuance of such contract. The sale, however, is not completed. *B*'s possession under the contract for sale is only a provisional holding on the sufferance

3 (1911) 9 Ind Cas 238 (239) 1911 Pun Re No 18, *Bhanjan Ram v. Sclaura*.

4. (1888) 13 Bom 424 (428), *Sayad Nyamtulla v. Nana Faridsha*.

5. (1912) 14 Ind Cas 513 (518) (Lab), *Mohan Lal v. Bhagu Shah*.

6 (1887) 1857 All W N 103 (104), *Birangi v. Eam Saran*.

7. (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 462 (463) 60 Ind Cas 589, *Ichalal Jagmohandas v. Nago Sma Patim*.

8. (1871) 16 Suth W R 270 (270), *Kabul Krishna Dass v. Mohessurree Debi*.

Arts. 142 & 144 of A and not adverse to A.⁹
Notes 52a-52b

See also the undermentioned decisions.¹⁰

52b. Possession held under mistake, if can be adverse.—Where A enters into possession of property belonging to B, claiming it to be his own and denying the title of B, the possession of A is adverse to B although A may be under an honest mistake and may not have any intention of depriving B of any property which may lawfully belong to him.¹ Similarly, the fact that the true owner is under a mistake as to his rights and does not know that the property trespassed upon by another belongs to himself, will not make the possession of the trespasser other than adverse.² Even where the mistake is shared by both the parties, possession held under a claim of right by a person who really has no right to the property will be adverse to the true owner.³

In some decisions, however, it has been held that where a person believes that he is entitled to a certain property, his possession cannot

9. (1877) 1877 Bom P J 184, *Farda v. Lakhna*.

10. (1929) A I R 1929 All 799 (800): 119 Ind Cas 110, *Ram Dubey v. Har Narain*.
(Sale of property in possession of usufructuary mortgagee—Vendee

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 593 (600) : 167 Ind Cas 594, *Krishna Kurup v. Rashukhath* (Property of tarwad set apart for maintenance—Property in possession of tenant of tawazhi—Sale by karnavan of tarwad—Tawazhi still enjoying possession for over 20 years without interruption—Purchaser not taking possession—Possession of tawazhi held adverse and purchaser could not recover property from tawazhi or tenants.)

(1919) A I R 1919 Pat 447 (451, 452) : 53 Ind Cas 114, *Badrī Chaudhuri v. Harbans Jha*. (Where the owner of property executed a fraudulent transfer with some ulterior motive but continued in possession of the property for more than 12 years, he is entitled not only to confirmation of possession but to recover possession if he subsequently loses it, even though the fraud intended to be effected was effected.)

Note 52b

1. (1871) 12 Eq 149 (152) : 40 L J Ch 775, *Williams v. Pott*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Lah 811 (812) : 177 Ind Cas 158, *Amar Nath v. Ram Ralha*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Nag 64 (85), *Bhagwan v. Sadhuram*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 679 (682) : 125 Ind Cas 545, *Secretary of State v. District Board of Tanjore*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Rang 111 (111) : 83 Ind Cas 132 : 1 Rang 493, *Ma Shan Ma v. Somasundaram Chetty*.

2. (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 179 (183, 184) : 161 Ind Cas 855, *Shish Chandru Nanda v. Ramji Bachar Das*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 295 (302) : 59 Ind Cas 689, *Secretary of State v. Venkatanarasimha Naidu*.

3. (1918) 18 Ind Cas 869 (874) (Cal), *Dwarika Nath Chowdhury v. Shastri Kinkar Bannerjee*. (A and B in joint possession of A's estate under

(1903) 23 Bom 57 (91) : 5 Bom L R 674, *Pursotam v. Sagaji*.

be adverse because there is no intention to hold adversely to any one.⁴ Similarly, it has been held that possession by the defendant whose right is admitted by the plaintiff under a mistaken belief as to the rights of the parties cannot be adverse to the plaintiff.^{4a} It is submitted that the above two views are not correct.

In the undermentioned case,⁵ a partition took place among certain co-owners. But, owing to a mistake, each of the co-owners took possession of plots that were not allotted to him at the partition but to some other co-owner. Even after the mistake was discovered they continued to hold the same plots as before. It was held that the possession of none of the parties was *adverse*. The reason given was that in the circumstances of the case the possession of each of the parties must be held to be *permissive*, inasmuch as it must be inferred that each of them intended to hold the plots in his possession only so long as the plots to which he was entitled were retained by the other party. It was also pointed out that none of the parties was entitled to the possession of the plots allotted to him at the partition until he was dispossessed of the plots which were in his possession, and so the principle that possession cannot be adverse to a person who has no present right to possession applied.

A, a watandar in the Bombay Presidency, had two sons, B and C. B was born prior to the adoption of A, and C after his adoption. The law was that only the son born after the adoption was entitled to the watan property inherited in the adoptive family. But by mistake C allowed B (the son born before adoption) to share in the enjoyment of the property as a *co-sharer*. The Bombay High Court, while conceding that the possession taken by a stranger under a mistake common to all the parties can be adverse, held that in the peculiar circumstances of the case, the possession of B must be held to be *permissive* and not adverse to C.⁶ See also the undermentioned case⁷ for a similar decision.

53. Possession of wrongdoer must be actual.—In order to sustain a claim to land by limitation there must be *actual* possession of a person claiming as of right by himself or by persons deriving title from him.¹ A mere *intention* to possess is not sufficient.² There

4 (1937) A I R 1937 Sind 78 (80) 157 Ind Cas 283, *Mt Sitabai v Junno*

4a (1921) A I R 1921 Lah 175 (175), *Indar Singh v Bahshusha*

5 (1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 152 (156) 66 Ind Cas 461, *Maqbul Ahmad v Farhat Ali*

6 (1928) A I R 1928 Bom 287 (288) 110 Ind Cas 303, *Keshav Baghuwath v. Goriad*

7. (1921) A I R 1921 Lah 175 (175), *Indar Singh v. Bahshusha*

Note 53

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act of physical possession)

(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 141 (142) 1 Luck 441 98 Ind Cas 701 29 Oudh Cas 395, *Darjor Singh v. Sudh Nath*

2 (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (762) 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prasad v. Lalit*
v. Manindra Chandra Roy

rts. 142 & 144
Notes 53-54

must be both absence of possession by the person who has the right and *actual* possession by another to bring the case within the Statute.³ A trespasser's adverse possession will therefore be confined to the area actually occupied by him. In *Nageswar Bux v. Bengal Coal Co.*,⁴ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

"Now there is undoubted authority for the proposition that when a person without any colour of right wrongfully takes possession as a trespasser of the property of another, any title which he may acquire by adverse possession will be strictly limited to what he has actually so possessed. The maxim *tantum prescriptum quantum possessum* is rigorously applied to him."⁵

Where the defendant is in possession of some land, but it is not identified with the land in dispute in the suit, a plea of limitation by adverse possession must be rejected.⁶

Neither proof of title nor an adjudication on the question of title is proof of actual possession.⁶

The theory of *constructive* possession applies only to the rightful owner and not to a trespasser,⁷ and he cannot acquire any title by prescription on the ground of any such possession.⁸

54. Adverse possession of surface and of sub-soil rights in the land.—Where a person is in adverse possession of land, normally he will acquire not only a title to the surface but also to the sub-soil.¹ It has, however, been held by the Privy Council that where a Zamindar in India makes a grant of a permanent tenure to another, the presumption is that only *surface* rights are thereby granted and that the Zamindar remains in the eye of the law in constructive

1. 6 Cal W N
vs Gupta.
ibid.

4. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 186 (188) : 10 Pat 407 : 58 Ind App 29 : 180 Ind Cas 315 (P C).

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 335 (391) : 96 Ind Cas 1027, *Keshabji v. Shashi Bhusan*.

5. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 126 (128) : 136 Ind Cas 625 (P C), *Shama Kant Lal v. Ramdhan Puri*.

6. (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 234 (286) : 111 Ind Cas 602 : 24 Nag LR 143 : 29 Cri L Jour 902, *Shriram v. Samirmal*.

7. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 700 (762) : 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prosanna v. Manindra Chandra*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Pat 254 (256) : 155 Ind Cas 122, *Mt. Krishna Kuer v. Secretary of State*.

8. (1913) 20 Ind Cas 821 (823) (Cal), *Budhu Kumar v. Hafis Husain*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 464 (473) : 29 Ind Cas 156, *Amrita Sundari Devi v. Serajuddin Ahmed*.

Note 54

1. (1901) 1 Ch 738 (744) : 49 W R (Eng) 474 : 70 L J Ch 411 : 84 L T 225, *Midland Railway Co. v. Wrought*.

possession of the sub-soil.² Evidence of long possession of the surface by the tenure-holder in such cases is not evidence of adverse possession of the sub-soil.³

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 54

As to adverse possession of the sub-soil, it is a well recognised principle that there can be separate ownership of different strata of the sub-soil, at all events, where minerals are involved, and that the adverse possession of one strata is not necessarily adverse possession of another strata.⁴ In *Low Moor Co. v. Stanley Coal Company*,⁵ Lord Cairns observed :

"It is true that in cases where a man has entered upon and taken possession of one seam of coal, and by lapse of time has acquired some title to it, the law will not assume that his possession extends to other seams of coal lying under that particular line."

There is no presumption in law that the possession of a part of a seam infers possession of the whole seam, much less the seams in the mineral field in which part of a seam has been worked.⁶ The principle underlying the propositions stated above is that title by adverse possession can be acquired only to that area of which actual possession has been enjoyed.⁷

In considering the character and effect of acts of possession in the case of mineral fields, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind the nature of the subject and the possession of which it is susceptible. Owing to the inaccessibility of minerals in the earth, it is not possible to take actual physical possession at once of a whole mineral field, it can be occupied only by extracting the minerals and until the whole minerals are exhausted the physical occupation must necessarily be partial.⁸ It is, however, necessary that the working of the minerals should be so general as to indicate that the defendant had taken possession of the whole mineral field.^{8a} The removal of a small quantity of mineral from here and there will not be sufficient.^{8b} But

2. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 89 (89) 58 Ind App 125 58 Cal 1187 131 Ind Cas 753 (P C), *Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh*

(1931) A I R 1931 P C 162 (164) 132 Ind Cas 610 58 Ind App 228 59 Cal 60 (P C), *Bhupendra Narayan v. Rajeswar Prosad*

3. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 89 (94) 131 Ind Cas 753 58 Ind App 125 58 Cal 1187 (P C), *Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh*

4. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 162 (164) 132 Ind Cas 610 58 Ind App 228 59 Cal 60 (P C), *Bhupendra Narayan v. Rajeswar Prosad*

5. (1876) 34 L T (N S) 186

6. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 186 (186) 10 Pat 407 58 Ind App 29 130 Ind Cas 315 (P C), *Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd.*

7. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 186 (189) 130 Ind Cas 315 58 Ind App 29 10 Pat 407 (P C), *Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd.*

See also Note 7 ante.

8. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 186 (188) 130 Ind Cas 315 58 Ind App 29 . 10 Pat 407 (P C), *Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd.*

8a (1935) A I R 1935 Pat 33 (36) 13 Pat 517 156 Ind Cas 136, *Multakeshi Patani v. Midnapore Zamindary Co. Ltd.*

8b (1935) A I R 1935 Pat 33 (36) 13 Pat 517 156 Ind Cas 136, *Multakeshi Patani v. Midnapore Zamindary Co. Ltd.*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 54-56**

where the defendants wrongdoers, in assertion of their right to the minerals under a particular area of land, sank three pits at different points, two of these being half a mile distant from the third, selecting the places at their own discretion, brought plants on the land and erected bungalows for employees, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that adverse possession of the whole mineral field under the area was established. Their Lordships observed:

"It is nothing to the purpose that the Company may not have worked any one pit for twelve years continuously, if for twelve years they have carried on operations in various parts of the mineral field. The fact that one pit in a mineral field is discontinued and another opened in a different part of the field, and that bores are sunk in likely places, is excellent proof of possession of the whole area."⁹

55. Possession of person who could not advance a hostile title.—It has been seen in Note 16 *ante*, that adverse possession necessarily implies a possession in *denial of the title* of the true owner. It follows that where the wrongdoer is not *permitted* by law to advance any hostile title to the true owner, his possession cannot be adverse to the true owner.¹ It is a general principle of law, as has been seen in Note 18 *ante*, that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another title, and that his possession will not therefore be adverse to the person in whom such other title is vested. It is on this principle that the possession of one co-owner is not adverse to the other co-owners (see Note 35), and the possession of a trustee is not adverse to the *cestui que trust* (see Note 46). See also Notes 80 and 81 *infra*.

55. Permissive possession.—A permissive possession is not one in denial of the title of the true owner and is consequently not adverse to the true owner. It will not enable the possessor to obtain a title by adverse possession.¹ The mere fact that the document

9. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 186 (188, 189) : 130 Ind Cas 315 . 58 Ind App 29 : 10 Pat 407 (P C), *Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd.*

Note 55

1. (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 335 (347) : 177 Ind Cas 6 (F B), *Asaram v. Ludheswar.*

Note 56

- 1 (1934) A I R 1934 P C 67 (68) . 12 Rang 238 : 147 Ind Cas 328 (P C), *Lim Charles v. Official Receiver.*

- (1934) A I R 1934 P C 77 (81) . 147 Ind Cas 887 : 61 Ind App 50 : 56 All 103 (P C), *Abdur Rahim.*
1 : 80 Ind Cas

513 : 2 Cal L
ar 788 (P C),

- (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 102 (103) : 140 Ind Cas 799, *Zamuddin Hussain v. Md. Abdur Rahim.*

- (1936) A I R 1936 Lab 673 (674) . 160 Ind Cas 1033, *Mohammad Yahub v. Abdul Karim.*

granting the permission is not valid, will not make the possession other than permissive.² Arts. 142 & 143
Note 56

Possession is, however, *prima facie* adverse,³ and therefore the burden of proving permissive possession is upon the party alleging the same.⁴ It is not necessary that the permission should be *express*. It may be implied from the facts and circumstances of the case.

- (1926) A 1 R 1926 Oudh 353 (355). 91 Ind Cas 779, *Ahmad Shariff v. Umrao Beg* (Defendant proved to be in permissive possession. Plaintiff entitled to possession though he failed to establish the contract of tenancy set up by him.)
- (1918) 18 Ind Cas 367 (368) (Oudh), *Nandi v. Baqar Hussain*. (Possession of a Muhammadan widow under an arrangement—Held permissive.)
- (1899-96) 2 Upp Bur Rul 363 (364), *Maung Lin v. Maung Shwe Thaw*
- (1898) 1898 Bom P J 36, *Gurangauda v. Basava*.
- (1930) A 1 R 1930 Bom 84 (95). 53 Bom 792. 123 Ind Cas 481, *Gujrat Ginning and Manufacturing Co. v. Motilal Hirabhai Spinning & Weaving Co.* (Agent of plaintiff permitting defendant to build upon plaintiff's site.)
- (1929) A 1 R 1929 All 808 (808, 809). 118 Ind Cas 709, *Mt. Ajaib v. Noor Khan*.
- (1915) A 1 R 1915 All 87 (87). 28 Ind Cas 622, *Bachcha v. Shyam Lal*. (Plying *tasra* in a particular land by consent.)
- (1933) A 1 R 1933 Cal 539 (541). 146 Ind Cas 427, *Brajendra Kishore v. Iswar Kaibarta*.
- (1930) A 1 R 1930 Cal 586 (587). 128 Ind Cas 244, *Jadav Chandra v. Akhrur Chandra*.
- (1915) A 1 R 1915 Nag 29 (32). 34 Ind Cas 471. 12 Nag L R 76, *Narsing Das v. Ratanlal*.
- (1920) A 1 R 1920 Oudh 30 (30). 54 Ind Cas 261, *Rameshwar Baksh Singh v. Dwaraka*. (The fact that the licensee has improved buildings on the land or has replaced erections would not confer such a title upon him.)
- (1927) A 1 R 1927 Oudh 206 (207). 102 Ind Cas 26, *Thakur Prasad v. Thomson*.
- (1890) 3 C P L R 160 (160), *Durga Patel v. Atmaram Poular*.
- (1936) A 1 R 1936 Pesb 217 (229). 169 Ind Cas 230, *Sujan Singh v. Secretary of State*.
- (1870) 13 South W R 344 (344). 5 Eng L R App 12, *Astar v. Sam Manick Roy*.
- (1915) A 1 R 1915 Nag 119 (121). 11 Nag L R 126. 31 Ind Cas 307, *Narain v. Bihari*.
2. (1925) A 1 R 1925 Mad 1279 (1280). 91 Ind Cas 565, *Ramanujacharyulu v. Mangarao*.
3. (1913) 21 Ind Cas 765 (767) (Mad), *Rompicherla v. Shaik Ismail Sahib*.
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 146 (151) (Mad), *Ambalavana Chetty v. Singaravelu Odayar*.
- (1932) A 1 R 1932 Oudh 135 (136). 135 Ind Cas 689, *Indar Gir v. Special Manager, Court of Wards, Balrampur Estate*.
- (1928) A 1 R 1928 Lah 959 (959). 113 Ind Cas 145, *Mamman v. Kallumai*.
4. (1920) A 1 R 1920 Lah 475 (475), *Mir Mahfuz Ali v. Mt. Mahomed Zamani Begam*.
- (1911) 11 Ind Cas 777 (777) (Low Bur), *Mt. Mynt v. U Chang*.
- (1929) A 1 R 1929 Rang 153 (154). 7 Rang 85. 117 Ind Cas 591, *U Maung Gyi v. Maung On Bwin*.
- (1887) 11 Bom 221 (221) (Note b), *Vithoba v. Narayan*.
- (1900) 2 Bom L R 410 (411), *Basapa v. Basapa* (Possession is evidence of title, and is primarily exclusive. It is for him who impugns the exclusive title to show that the possession originated in some way which has preserved his own right.)
- (1933) A 1 R 1933 Nag 112 (113, 114). 29 Nag L R 42. 141 Ind Cas 696, *Jai Krishna v. Babu*.

Where possession is proved to be in its origin permissive, it will be presumed that it continued to be of the same character until and unless something occurred to make it adverse.⁷ The onus is on the permissive occupant to show when and how his possession became adverse.⁸ In order to discharge this there must be clear and affirmative evidence to establish the change in the character of possession.⁹ There must be an open and explicit disavowal and disclaimer brought

See also Note 67 *infra*.

[See also (1917) A I R 1917 All 182 (183) 41 Ind Cas 613, *Puttu Mal v. Bharat Indu.*]

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 324 (325) : 120 Ind Cas 602, *Sundar Das v. Md. Akram Khan*.

As to instances of permissive possession, see the undermentioned cases also :

† *v. Chaganlaka*.

. *Phal Singh v.*

(not adverse)

v. *Dholu Lai*.

* Vishan Singh v.

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not sufficient to

village and occupied it for over twelve years, is not sufficient to establish a title against a zamindar by adverse possession.)

(1922) A I R 1922 All 411 (412) : 77 Ind Cas 107, *Jethu Misr v. Godawari Duff*.

(1899) 12 Suth W R 167 (168). *Khurshedkharee Singh v. Dewatlall Singh*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Sind 71 (73) : 90 Ind Cas 1007 : 21 Sind L R 185.

nd Cas 230. *Sujan*

* licensee can never

8. (1970) 2 N W P H C R 16 (17). *Waheer-ood-Deen v. Jhangore*.

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 806 (806) (Mad), *Nataraja Iyer v. Subramania Iyer*.

(1920) 33 Mad L Jour 15 (15) (Jent). (Critical note on 41 All 609: A I R 1919 All 403. *Jaichand v. Gurwar Singh*)

(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 215 (216) : 53 Ind Cas 161, Venkatasubba Row v.

Chaivalat

v. *Sidil*.

2. (1968) 2 N W P H C R 16 (17), *Wahneed-Deen v. Jhangore*.

to the knowledge of the owner.¹⁰ The mere fact of long user¹¹ by the permissive occupant is not sufficient to alter the character of the permissive possession into an adverse one. Where the defendant had been let into possession even during the minority of the plaintiff, and the latter filed his suit more than seventeen years after he attained majority, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed if the defendant failed to show that the character of his possession had become adverse to the plaintiff more than twelve years before suit.¹²

Where the possession by the defendant of a *portion* of certain property is shown to be permissive, it may be presumed that the possession of the other portions of the property also was permissive in the absence of evidence to the contrary.¹³

Where the possession of the defendant is *at the start* adverse to the plaintiff, it cannot, by virtue of subsequent events, become a permissive one.¹⁴

A suit against a person who entered on the property with the permission of the plaintiff, but whose possession has become adverse to the plaintiff, would be governed by Article 144 and not Article 142, inasmuch as the original entry of the defendant was not in contravention of the plaintiff's title and there was no dispossession or discontinuance of possession by the plaintiff.¹⁵

57. Possession of agents, servants, etc.—If a person enters into possession as agent of another and on his request, his possession cannot be treated as that of an owner or as an independent possession.¹ His possession is really, in law, the possession of the

(1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 124 (125) 63 Ind Cas 284 24 Oudh Cas 155, *Mahendra Bahadur Singh v Chandrapal Singh* (The decision also seems to hold that a mortgagee's possession as such is permissive. It is submitted that this is not correct—See Note 57, *infra*)

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 102 (108) 140 Ind Cas 799, *Zamuddin Hussain v. Md. Abdur Rahim*

[See also (1866) 4 Bom HC R App Cas 155 (163), *Radhabai v Shama*]

11. (1921) A I R 1921 All 294 (295) 63 Ind Cas 498, *Ramu Ghata v. Hemanta Kumar Deb*

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 315 (315) 71 Ind Cas 618, *Bhag Singh v. Akhushal Singh*

12 (1884) 1894 Pun Ro No 94, *Bela Singh v. Dula*

13. (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 582 (584) 101 Ind Cas 730, *Ram Abhulal v. Chau-rasi*

[See also (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 437 (437) 129 Ind Cas 859, *Allaha Ditta v. Budha* (X at first in permissive possession of a portion of the area—His absorption of the rest is not adverse)]

14. (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 117 (121) 8 Pat 549 115 Ind Cas 699, *Bageswari Charan Singh v. Jagannath Kauri*

15 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 102 (108) 140 Ind Cas 799, *Zamuddin Hussain v. Md. Abdur Rahim*

Note 57

1. (1935) 159 Ind Cas 322 (324) (P C), *Bikrama Das v. Gomati Das*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 57**

principal.² And so long as the agency continues, the character of the agent's possession is not altered. Thus, where a person starts managing the property of a minor as his agent and continues to manage the same even after the minor has become a major, he cannot acquire a title to the property by adverse possession, although he continues to be in possession for more than twelve years after the minor attains majority.³ It has been held in the undermentioned cases⁴ that the possession of an agent is *permissive*. It is submitted that this view does not seem to be correct. An agent's possession is on *behalf* of the principal, while a permissive possession is one which a person enjoys on *his own behalf* though with the permission of another.

An agency may be express or implied, and hence where the possession of a person can be traced to an implied agency, such possession cannot be treated as adverse.⁵ Thus, where a Buddhist father on his remarriage made over the land in suit to his four children by the first wife by a registered deed towards their mother's share of inheritance in full satisfaction thereof, but himself continued to be in possession and managed the land for the joint benefit of all, it was held that the possession of the father was not adverse to his children but only as agent and manager for the benefit of all the co-owners.⁶ On the same principle, where a person who is the only male member in the family manages the property on behalf of his brother's widow, his possession is not adverse to the widow.⁷ Similarly, the possession of a managing member of a joint Hindu family

(1892) 1892 Bom P J 101, *Ramray Dharamray v. Ganesh Ramchandra*.

(1868) 1868 Pun Re No. 104, *Ahmed Yar v. Shah Buksh*.

(1929) A I R 1929 All 541 (542) : 114 Ind Cas 898, *Girdhari v. Jodha*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 786 (789) 140 Ind Cas 509, *Hussain Ali Shah v. Sardar Ali Shah*.

[See also (1876) 1876 Bom P J 59, *Rango v. Collector of Nashik*. (Person though having right in himself accepting agency from another cannot plead adverse possession against the latter.)

(1875) 23 Sath W R 93 (94), *Azim Ali Khan Bahadur v. Surussutty Debia*. (Where an agent holds the lands of two principals and one of them claims the land of the other by adverse possession

2. (1871) L R 12 Eq 149 (151, 152) : 40 L J Ch 775, *Williams v. Pott*.

See also Note 11, *ante*.

3. (1894) 1894 Pun Re No. 94, *Bela Singh v. Buta*.

4. (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 286 (287) 92 Ind Cas 164. 27 Cri L Jour 212, *Bajirao v. Mt Dadiba*.

(1904) 9 Cal W N 663 (670), *Jogendra Nath Singh v. Kalicharan Roy*.

5. (1868) 1868 Pun Re No. 104, *Ahmed Yar v. Shah Buksh*.

6. (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 13 (15) : 105 Ind Cas 593. 5 Rang 576, *Maung Aung Tun v. Maung San Nyun*.

7. (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 469 (469) : 67 Ind Cas 705, *Kallappa Mallappa v. Kallappa Ningappa*.

(1893) 13 Cal L R 328 (328), *Asad Ali Mirdha v. Toupari Bibi*. (Where a female lives with her male relatives, the ordinary presumption is that they manage her property for her, and do not hold it adversely.)

is by and on behalf of the family as agent and cannot be treated as adverse to the other members of the family.⁸

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 57

Where, however, the agency has terminated, as for instance, by the agent's dismissal, the possession of the erstwhile agent thereafter is not on behalf of the principal but on his own account.⁹ It is also open to the agent after an open and notorious disavowal of the agency to acquire a title by prescription.¹⁰ The repudiation of the agency should, however, be *distinct*¹¹ and to the *knowledge of the principal*,¹² and accompanied by some *overt act* which would amount to an active assertion of an adverse right.¹³ An agent cannot by a mere wish or volition change the character of his possession.¹⁴

Where the agent trespassed into another man's property, it was held in the undermentioned case¹⁵ that such trespass on his part was an individual act, and that unless there was clear and cogent evidence to show that the trespass had been committed by the agent in the interest of the principal, it could not be held that the latter was in any way benefited by such trespass.

The principles discussed above apply also to the case of a possession by a servant, which is only on behalf of the master.¹⁶

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 393 (394) 41 Ind Cas 39, *Jagu Mandal v. Madhab Mandal*. (The possession of the male members of the propositus family where the daughter was entitled to the property of her father governed by Dayabhaga School must be presumed to be on behalf of the daughter.)

[See also (1906) 1906 Pun L R No 69 (93) 1906 Pun Ro No. 88, 1908 Pun W R No. 74, *Mt Dhan Devi v. Kausik Ram*

(1876) 25 Suth W R 439 (442), *Sait Abdool Ali v. Mt. Kulsum*. (Mahomedan brother managing his sister's property.)]

8. (1873) 20 Suth W R 330 (331), *Umbika Soonduree Dossee v. Shama Churn Goohe*

[See also (1865) 2 Suth W R 181 (181), *Mahomed Mudun v. Rhode*. for

20

10 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 183 (190) 44 Ind Cas 630, *Raman Somayajipad v. Kunhu Kutta Korillamma*

(1893) 16 Mad 456 (459), *Sankaran v. Krishna*

11. (1893) 17 Bom 755 (758), *Savud Alamkhan v. Yasulkhan*.

12 (1931) 1931 Mad W N 856 (956), *Lakshminarayan Narada v. Madappa-yya*

13 (1905) 7 Bom L R 836 (841), *Raghunathji Mulchand v. Varjundas Madhaji*

(1916) A I R 1916 Bom 68 (76) 39 Ind Cas 552 41 Bom 315, *Laxmipati-rao v. Venkatesh*

(1911) A I R 1914 Bom 296 (297, 298) 21 Ind Cas 763 (764) 33 Bom 53, *Krishna Dixit v. Bal Dixit* (Held, mere withholding of rent for 2 or 3 years does not necessarily amount to an overt act)

14 (1884) 12 Bom 322 (324), *Mulji Bhulabai v. Manchar Ganesh*.

(1901) 8 Bom L R 673 (675), *Pemraj Chandrabhan v. Shripal Narayan*. (Execution of a will by the manager is not sufficient.)

15. (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 552 (556) I L R (1937) Lah 276 172 Ind Cas 37, *Zaffar Hussain v. Mahomed Ghousd In*

[See also (1887) L R 18 Q B D 796 (814) 56 L J Q B 303, *Lyell v. Kennedy*]

16. (1888) 12 Bom 322 (324), *Mulji Bhulabai v. Manchar Ganesh*.

Arts. 142 & 144
. Note 57

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An agency may be express or implied, and hence where the possession of a person can be traced to an implied agency, such possession cannot be treated as adverse.⁵ Thus, where a Buddhist father on his remarriage made over the land in suit to his four children by the first wife by a registered deed towards their mother's share of inheritance in full satisfaction thereof, but himself continued to be in possession and managed the land for the joint benefit of all, it was held that the possession of the father was not adverse to his children but only as agent and manager for the benefit of all the co-owners.⁶ On the same principle, where a person who is the only male member in the family manages the property on behalf of his brother's widow, his possession is not adverse to the widow.⁷ Similarly, the possession of a managing member of a joint Hindu family

(1892) 1892 Bom P J 101, *Ramrav Dharamrav v. Ganesh Ramchandra*.

(1868) 1868 Pun Re No. 104, *Ahmed Yar v. Shah Dukh*.

(1929) A I R 1929 All 541 (542) : 114 Ind Cas 893, *Girdhari v. Jodha*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 786 (789). 149 Ind Cas 509, *Hussain Ali Shah v. Sardar Ali Shah*.

[See also (1876) 1876 Bom P J 59, *Rango v. Collector of Nash.* (Person though having right in himself accepting agency from another cannot plead adverse possession against the latter.)]

(1875) 23 Satb W R 93 (94), *Asim Ali Khan Bahadur v. Surussutty Debba*. (Where an agent holds the lands of two principals and one of them claims the land of the other by adverse possession through the possession of the agent of such land, he must prove that such adverse claim has been brought to the notice of the other and that the agent has been holding his land adversely to such other.)]

2. (1871) L R 12 Eq 149 (151, 152) : 40 L J Ch 775, *Williams v. Pott*.

See also Note 11, *ante*.

3. (1884) 1884 Pun Re No. 94, *Bela Singh v. Buta*.

4. (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 286 (287) : 92 Ind Cas 164, 27 Cri L Jour 212, *Dajirao v. Mt. Dadhai*.

(1904) 9 Cal W N 663 (670), *Jogendra Nath Singh v. Kalschuran Roy*.

5. (1868) 1868 Pun Re No. 104, *Ahmed Yar v. Shah Dukh*.

6. (1925) A I R 1925 Rang 13 (15) : 105 Ind Cas 598 : 5 Rang 576, *Maung Aung Tun v. Maung San Nyan*.

7. (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 469 (469) : 87 Ind Cas 705, *Kallappa Mallappa v. Kallappa*.

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"They are unable to affirm as a general proposition of law that a person who is, in fact, in possession of land under a tenancy or occupancy title can by mere assertion in a judicial proceeding and the lapse of six or twelve years, without that assertion having been successfully challenged, obtain a title as an under-proprietor to the land."

The mere non-payment of rent or discontinuance in the payment of rent cannot by itself create an adverse possession.⁵

See also Notes 12 and 13 to Art. 139 *ante* for a fuller discussion.

59a. Encroachment by tenant. — Where a tenant encroaches on land which adjoins his holding and which belongs to the same landlord, the possession by the tenant of the land so encroached upon would be adverse to the landlord.¹ The right acquired by the tenant by such adverse possession for the statutory period would depend on the nature of the right in assertion of which the adverse possession was held. Thus, where the tenant was in adverse possession claiming an absolute right in the land, he would acquire by prescription an absolute title to the land.² But where the tenant merely claims to be a *tenant* of the land, he can acquire only a tenancy in the land.³ The general presumption is that the tenant only claims the additional land as part of his holding. Hence, unless some act is proved on his part which shows that his intention was to assert an absolute title to the land, it will be presumed that he only asserted a right to a limited interest in the land as forming part of his tenancy.⁴ In *Gooroodas Roy v Issur Chunder Bose*,⁴ Markby, J. observed as follows "We think the true presumption as to encroachments made by a tenant during his tenancy upon the adjoining lands of his landlord is that the lands so encroached upon are added to the tenure, and form part thereof for the benefit of the tenant so long as the original holding continues, and afterwards for the benefit of his landlord, unless it clearly appeared by some act

5 (1922) A I R 1922 P C 272 (278) 49 Ind App 399 2 Pat 33 71 Ind Cas 934 (P C), *Jagdeo Naram Singh v Baldeo Singh* (40 Cal 173, Approved)

Note 59a

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 624 (626) 117 Ind Cas 636 *Pritul Khan Singh v Chathu Sahi*
2. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 883 (885) 95 Ind Cas 622, *Darendra Narayan v Jhumur Pramanik*
3. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 634 (636) 92 Ind Cas 963, *Gopal Chandra v Satya Bhanu*.
4. (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 579 (583) 127 Ind Cas 763 57 Cal 371, *Mulleshi Das v Manilal Jana*.
5. (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 125 (185), *Ishin Chandra Mitter v Raja Ramranyan*
6. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 883 (885) 95 Ind Cas 622, *Darendra Narayan v Jhumur Pramanik*.
7. (1911) 10 Ind Cas 575 (576) : 35 Mad Cls, *Muthurathnam Thein v Robert Gordon Orr*.
8. 2 Cal L Jour 175 (185), *Ishin Chandra Mitter v Raja Ramranyan*
9. 22 Satb W R 246 (247)

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 58-59**

58. Possession by husband or wife.—Where a man and his wife are living together, and the husband is in possession of the wife's property, his possession must be considered to be on behalf of his wife and not adverse to her.¹ In such a case, the husband is presumed to be the *agent* of his wife.² On the same principle it has been held that where a Mahomedan sells to his wife certain property in lieu of her *mehr* (dower) but himself continues in possession thereof, his possession is on behalf of his wife and not adverse to her.³

It follows from what has been said above that where the husband and wife are in *joint possession*, no question of adverse possession can arise as between them.⁴

A wife, who holds possession on behalf of her husband during his absence, cannot, on the same principle, acquire a title by adverse possession against the husband.⁵

59. Possession of tenant.—As has been seen in Note 12 to Article 139, a tenant's possession is not adverse to his landlord.¹ The reason is that a tenant cannot dispute his landlord's title so long as he remains in possession under an agreement which he made with him.² In *Muhammad Mumtaz Ali Khan v. Dhanna Singh*,³ their Lordships of the Privy Council affirmed the observation they had made in *Muhammad Mumtaz Ali Khan v. Mohan Singh*⁴ to the following effect:

- (1869) 11 Suth W R 333 (334), *Meher Ali v. Golam Nussuff*. (Possession held by a servant under a decree which reserves master's right to dismiss him.)
(1878) 1878 Bom P J 186, *Ramachandra v. Gunwantrao*.

Note 58

1. (1875) 24 Suth W R 274 (275), *Sooda Ram Doss v. Joogul Kishore Gupto*.
- (1868) 9 Suth W R 153 (153), *Abdool Ali v. Kurrunnissa*. (Suit by a Mahomedan for possession of property.)
2. (1876)
3. (1916) A I R 1916 Bom 159 (161, 162) : 41 Bom 5 : 36 Ind Cas 715, *Ibrahim Bhura Jamnu v. Isa Rasul Jamnu*.
4. (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 275 (276) : 108 Ind Cas 435, *Mayadad Khan v. Hazari Lal*.
5. (1878) 4 Cal 327 (329) : 2 Shome L R 106, *Dejoy Chunder Banerji v. Kally Prosonna Moohery*.

Note 59

1. (1902) 25 Mad 507 (511) : 12 Mad L Jour 119, *Seshamma Shettlati v. Chackaya Hegade*.
- (1873) 20 Suth W R 398 (399), *Bungaray Bhookta v. Megh Lall Poorie Gossain*. (The possession of a sub-lessee of the tenant cannot be adverse to the superior landlord.)
- (1928) 117 Ind Cas 812 (845) : 32 Cal W N 720 (723), *Bejoy Chand v. Sukumar Das*.
- (1872) 18 Suth W R 443 (444), *Lakhoo Khan v. Wate*.
- (1891) 8 Cal 79 (81) : 10 Cal L R 113 : 9 Cal L R 173, *Kasimunnissa Dibi v. Nisruffon Hose*.
2. (1935) A I R 1935 P O 59 (61) : 154 Ind Cas 945 (P O), *Chandrika Prasada v. B. B. & C. I Ry Co*.
3. (1929) 121 Ind Cas 590 (592) : 59 Mad L Jour 226 (228) (P O).
4. (1923) A I R 1923 P O 119 (121) : 50 Ind App 202 : 26 Oudh Cas 231 : 45 All 419 : 74 Ind Cas 476 (P O)

"They are unable to affirm as a general proposition of law that a person who is, in fact, in possession of land under a tenancy or occupancy title can by mere assertion in a judicial proceeding and the lapse of six or twelve years, without that assertion having been successfully challenged, obtain a title as an under-proprietor to the land."

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5 (1922) A I R 1922 P C 272 (278) 49 Ind App 399 2 Pat 38 71 Ind Cas 984 (P C), *Jagdeo Naram Singh v Baldeo Singh*, (40 Cal 173, Approved)

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- 1 (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 624 (626) 117 Ind Cas 636 *Hamlakhan Singh v Chathu Sahi*
- 2 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 883 (885) 95 Ind Cas 622, *Devendra Narayan v Jhumur Pramanik*.
- 3 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 634 (636) 92 Ind Cas 963, *Gopal Chandra v Satya Bhanu*
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(1905) 2 Cal L Jour 125 (185), *Ishan Chandra Mitter v Raja Ramrangan*
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 823 (825) 95 Ind Cas 622, *Devendra Narayan v Jhumur Pramanik*.
4. (1911) 10 Ind Cas 575 (576) 35 Mad 618, *Muthuraku Thevan v Robert Gordon Orr*,
(1905) 2 Cal L Jour 125 (185), *Ishan Chandra Mitter v Raja Ramrangan*.
- 5 (1874) 22 Ruth W R 246 (247)

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 58-59

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Note 58

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- (1868) 9 Suth W R 153 (153), *Abdool Ali v. Kurrunnissa*. (Suit by a Maho-

3. (1916) A I R 1916 Bom 159 (161, 162) : 41 Bom 5 : 36 Ind Cas 715, *Ibrahim Dhura Jamnu v. Isa Rasul Jamnu*.
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5. (1878) 4 Cal S27 (329) : 2 Shome L R 106, *Dejoy Chunder Danerji v. Kally Prasanno Mookerji*.

Note 59

1. (1902) 25 Mad 507 (511) : 12 Mad L Jour 119, *Seshamma Shettai v. Chichaya Hegade*.
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- (1872) 18 Suth W R 443 (444), *Lakhoo Khan v. Wite*.
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2. (1935) A I R 1935 P C 59 (61) : 154 Ind Cas 915 (P C), *Chandrika Prasada v. B. B. & C. I Ry Co*.
3. (1929) 121 Ind Cas 590 (532) : 53 Mad L Jour 226 (228) (P C).
4. (1923) A I R 1923 P C 118 (121) : 50 Ind App 202 : 26 Oudh Cas 231 : 45 All 419 : 74 Ind Cas 476 (P C).

"They are unable to affirm as a general proposition of law that a person who is, in fact, in possession of land under a tenancy or occupancy title can by mere assertion in a judicial proceeding and the lapse of six or twelve years, without that assertion having been successfully challenged, obtain a title as an under-proprietor to the land."

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 59-59a

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59a. Encroachment by tenant. — Where a tenant encroaches on land which adjoins his holding and which belongs to the same landlord, the possession by the tenant of the land so encroached upon would be adverse to the landlord.¹ The right acquired by the tenant by such adverse possession for the statutory period would depend on the nature of the right in assertion of which the adverse possession was held. Thus, where the tenant was in adverse possession claiming an absolute right in the land, he would acquire by prescription an absolute title to the land.² But where the tenant merely claims to be a *tenant* of the land, he can acquire only a tenancy in the land.³ The general presumption is that the tenant only claims the additional land as part of his holding. Hence, unless some act is proved on his part which shows that his intention was to assert an absolute title to the land, it will be presumed that he only asserted a right to a limited interest in the land as forming part of his tenancy.⁴ In *Gooroodas Roy v Issur Chunder Bose*,⁵ Markby, J observed as follows "We think the true presumption as to encroachments made by a tenant during his tenancy upon the adjoining lands of his landlord is that the lands so encroached upon are added to the tenure, and form part thereof for the benefit of the tenant so long as the original holding continues, and afterwards for the benefit of his landlord, unless it clearly appeared by some act

5 (1922) A I R 1922 P C 272 (278) 49 Ind App 399 2 Pat 38 71 Ind Cas 984 (P O), *Jagdeo Narain Singh v Baldeo Singh*. (40 Cal 173, Approved)

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1 (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 624 (626) 117 Ind Cas 636 *Itam Lal Khan Singh v Chathu Sahi*.

2 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 883 (885) 95 Ind Cas 622, *Devendra Narayan v Jhumur Pramanik*.

3 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 634 (636) 92 Ind Cas 963, *Gopal Chandra v Satya Bhanu*.

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(1905) 2 Cal L Jour 125 (185), *Ishan Chandra Mitter v Raja Ramranjan*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 883 (885) 95 Ind Cas 622, *Devendra Narayan v. Jhumur Pramanik*.

4 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 575 (576) 35 Mad 618, *Muthuraku Thevar v. Robert Gordon Orr*.

(1905) 2 Cal L Jour 125 (185), *Ishan Chandra Mitter v v Raja Ramranjan*.

5 (1874) 22 South W R 246 (247)

Arts. 142 & 144
Nota 59a

done at the time that the tenant made the encroachment for his own benefit."

In order to confer on the tenant a right of *tenancy* by prescription in the land encroached upon by him, it is not necessary to show that he set up a right of tenancy in such lands, to the *knowledge of the landlord*.⁶ But it has been held that unless the tenant's claim to an absolute title to the encroached lands is made to the knowledge of the landlord, the tenant will acquire only a tenancy right in respect of such lands. The reason given is that as the tenant encroaches *prima facie* in his character as tenant, the landlord is entitled to treat him as such till he has notice of a repudiation of such character and an assertion of a hostile title.⁷

Where a tenant grazes cattle and cuts grass on the adjoining waste lands of his landlord, such acts would be presumed to have been done with the permission of the landlord inasmuch as the acts are such as would ordinarily be done by tenants on waste lands of their landlord without any objection by him. Hence, a tenant cannot claim to have been in adverse possession of the waste lands merely by reason of such acts.⁸

Where a tenant encroaches on land which adjoins his holding and which belongs to a person *other than his landlord*, the possession of such land by the tenant is adverse to the owner thereof. But such adverse possession enures to the benefit of the tenant's landlord, unless the tenant has shown clearly that he intended to hold the land for his own benefit.⁹

In *Whitmore v. Humphries*,¹⁰ Willes, J., observed as follows :

"By the rules of law applicable to this subject the landlord is entitled, at the determination of the tenancy, to recover from the tenant not only the land demised but also any land which the tenant may have added to it by encroachment from the waste, such encroachment being deemed to be made by him as tenant as an addition to the holding and consequently for the benefit of his landlord, unless it is made under circumstances which show an intention to hold it for his own benefit alone and not as a part of his holding under the landlord

"It is not confined to cases where the encroachment is upon land to which the landlord is entitled; it applies to cases where the land encroached upon does not belong to the landlord. It is held in such cases that as between the landlord and the tenant

6. (1911) 10 Ind Cas 575 (576) : 35 Mad 618, *Muthuraka Thevan v. Robert Gordon Orr*. (Dissenting from 31 Cal 397.)

7. (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 125 (133), *Ishan Chandra Mitter v. Raja Ramranjan*.

8. (1903) 31 Cal 397 (405), *Wali Ahmed Chowdhry v. Tota Meah*.

9. (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 112 (113) : 29 Nag L R 48 : 144 Ind Cas 696, *Jai Krishna v. Babu*.

(1936) 167 Ind Cas 697 (906) : 63 Cal 300, *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmed Nawab Chowdhry*.

10. (1871) 41 L J C P 43 (46) : 20 W R (Eng) 79 : L R 7 C P 1 : 25 L T 426. (Quoted in 163 Ind Cas 397 (906).)

the tenant must *prima facie* be deemed to have taken the additional land as part of his tenancy and for the benefit of his landlord Arts. 142 & 143
Notes 89a-60

"There is often great temptation and opportunity afforded to the tenant to take in adjoining land which may or may not be his landlord's and it is considered more convenient and more in accordance with the rights of property that the tenant, who has availed himself of the opportunity afforded him by his tenancy to make encroachments, should be presumed to have intended to make them for the benefit of the reversioner, except under circumstances pointing to an intention to take the land for his own benefit exclusively."

Where a tenant encroaches on the adjoining land belonging to a person other than his landlord and attorns to such person, there is no adverse possession by the tenant and his original landlord cannot derive any benefit from his possession of such land ¹¹

60. Possession under invalid transaction.— Where a person takes possession of property under colour of a transfer which is inoperative, such possession is adverse to the true owner ¹ The reason is that in such cases the transferee gets no title under the transfer and his possession is therefore without title and in contravention of the title of the true owner Thus, where A executes an unregistered deed of gift in favour of B and puts B in possession of

11. (1936) 163 Ind Cas 897 (906) 63 Cal 300, *Surendra Kumar Roy v Ahmed Nawab Choudhry*

Note 60

1. (1866-68) 3 Mad H C R 5 (24), *Syed Ali Saib v Sri Raja Sanyasiraj Peddabaiyara Sindhulu Bahadur* (Possession under alienation in contravention of S. 8 of Regulation, 25 of 1802)
- (1909) 1 Ind Cas 663 (664) 33 Bom 116, *Adam Umar Sale v Bapu Bataji*, (Possession acquired under an alienation made in contravention of Section 8 of the Bhagdari Act, 1862)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 117 (119, 120) 8 Pat 549 115 Ind Cas 699, *Bageswari Charan Singh v Jagannath Kuari*, (Grant in contravention of Section 12-A, Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act (6 of 1876)—Yet title can be acquired by twelve years' adverse possession)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 209 (214) 149 Ind Cas 464, *Sabara Yellappa v. Yamanappa Sabu* (Sale void on the ground of immoral consideration)
- (1900) 23 Mad 271 (279) 27 Ind App 69 4 Cal W N 329 10 Mad L Jour 29 2 Bom L R 597 7 Sar 671 (PC), *Gnanasambanda Pandara Sanadhi v Velu Pandaram*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 449 (451) 152 Ind Cas 180, *Ram Dutt Singh v. Mohammad Nazir Khan* (Person acquiring possession under invalid title—Continuous possession for more than 12 years makes his title unassailable)
- (1878) 4 Cal 327 (330, 331) 2 Shome L R 106, *Bejoy Chunder Banerjee v Kally Prasanna Mukherjee* (Lease granted by unauthorized person—Possession of lessee is adverse to the real owner)
- (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 165 (167) 164 Ind Cas 1003 12 Luck 516 *Gur Din Sah v Badi*, (Transfer of common property from one of several co-owners—Transfer of possession is adverse to the other co-owners)
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 196 (201) 31 All 289 (P C) *Parbati v Muhammad Musaffar Ali Khan* (Possession under transfer by person not entitled to the property is adverse to the true owner)

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 60**

the property in virtue of the gift, the possession by *B* is adverse to *A* from the date of his entering into possession.² Similarly, where *A* executes a sale deed in favour of *B* but the sale is void for want of lawful consideration, the possession of *B* under such sale is adverse to *A*.³ See the undermentioned cases⁴ for other instances.

- (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 861 (866) : 87 Ind Cas 621, *Ghanshamdoss Narayandoss v. Saraswati Bai*. (Possession under void legacy is adverse to the heir of the testator)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 431 (442) : 96 Ind Cas 47 : 26 Oudh Cas 176 : 2 Luck 507, *Jagdev Singh v. Deputy Commissioner Partabgarh*. (Do.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 174 (176) : 48 Bom 166 : 82 Ind Cas 533, *Sangawa*
Ind Cas 1100 : 57 All 159 :
" *Leo Prasad Singh v. Karia*
Bhartha.)
2. (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 311 (342) : 73 Ind Cas 41, *Gayani Sahu v. Balchand Sahu*.
3. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 209 (214) : 149 Ind Cas 464, *Sabava Yellappa v. Yamanappa Sabu*.
4. (1919) A I R 1919 P O 44 (47) : 43 Mad 244 : 46 Ind App 265 : 53 Ind Cas 901 (P C), *Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal*. (Possession under void gift is adverse to the donor.)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 117 (120, 121) : 8 Pat 549 : 115 Ind Cas 699, *Bageswari Charan Singh v. Jagannath Kuari*. (Do.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Nag 222 (223, 224) : 79 Ind Cas 117, *Mt. Kasturi v. Bahram*. (Do.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 800 (800) : 82 Ind Cas 67, *Narayanaswami v. Than-gavelu*. (Do.)
" *in v. Subbamma*. (Do.)
" 927 : 1 Luck 33, *Secretary of*
- (1911) 12 Ind Cas 225 (228) : 36 Bom 214, *Casamally v. Currimbhoy Ebrahim*. (Possession under void trust deed is adverse to the author of the trust.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 745 (746) : 89 Ind Cas 473, *Wajid Ali v. Mt. Sahima Begam*. (Possession under void gift is adverse.)
- (1918) A I R 1918 P O 180 (181) : 46 Cal 694 : 46 Ind App 60 : 50 Ind Cas 202 (P C), *Rani Kuar Mani Singh v. Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad*. (Possession of purchaser under void sale is adverse to the true owner.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 767 (795) : 4 Pat 394 : 92 Ind Cas 1034, *Mt. Jasoda Kuar v. Janak Misir*. (Do.)
- (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 457 (459) : 47 Ind Cas 694, *Sajjad Mirza v. Mt. Nankh Khanam*. (Do.)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 141 (142) : 72 Ind Cas 99, *Mahipal Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad*. (Possession of vendee under unregistered sale deed is adverse to the vendor.)
- (1930) A I R 1930 Bom 448 (449) : 127 Ind Cas 910, *Chhaganbhai v. Tulshibhai*. (Possession under void lease is adverse.)
- (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 146 (147) : 77 Ind Cas 952, *Chaturbhai Lallubhai v. Motibhai Bapuji*. (Do.)
- (1921) 64 Ind Cas 756 (757) (Cal), *Purna Chandra Das v. Joy Lal Payada*. (Do.)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 431 (432) : 91 Ind Cas 1000, *Isher Singh v. Wir Singh*. (Possession under deed of transfer executed by person not entitled to property is adverse to true owner.)

In the following cases⁵ it was held that the possession of the mortgagee under a void usufructuary mortgage was *permissive* and as such not adverse to the mortgagor. It is submitted that the decisions are not correct.

But, the person in adverse possession under an invalid transfer cannot, in every case, obtain *absolute* title to the property by being in such possession for the statutory period. The right acquired by him by such possession will only be the right purported to be transferred.⁶ Thus, where a person enters into possession under a void mortgage, he can only acquire the right of a mortgagee by prescription.⁷ Similarly, where a person enters into possession under a void lease, he can only acquire the right of a lessee by prescription.^{7a} So also, a person entering into possession as a trustee under a void trust deed acquires by prescription only the right of a trustee.⁸

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 60

(1937) A I R 1937 Cal 88 (93) 41 Cal W N 396 (399) 169 Ind Cas 919, *Brajmohini Dassi v Sarala Devi* (Do)

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 593 (601) 43 Mad 436 56 Ind Cas 519, *Narasimha Rao v. Papanna* (Sale deed void owing to fraud on Registration law)
[See also (1911) 12 Ind Cas 362 (363) 35 Bom 438, *Sambha Hanmanta v. Namanarayan*. (Vendee under an unregistered sale deed claiming a lien over the property in respect of mortgage discharged by him—Adverse possession commences after expiry of 12 years from date of the lien.)

(1898) 21 Mad 169 (171) . 8 Mad L Jour 117, *Muniappan Chetty v. Muppi Nair* (Possession of Jenmi lands under cowle from Government is adverse to the Jenmi)

5. (1928) A I R 1928 All 552 (552) 117 Ind Cas 831, *Mt Raj Rani v Gulab*
(1923) A I R 1923 All 191 (192) 79 Ind Cas 232, *Durga Chowdhary v Jagroop*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 115 (116) 118 Ind Cas 57, *Sukhlal v. Bisesar*.

6. (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 75 (77) 124 Ind Cas 300, *Deputy Commissioner, Fyzabad v Bhagwan Din*. (Person holding possession of land of grantee adversely acquires same title as grantee by prescription and no more)

7. (1912) 16 Ind Cas 960 (960, 961) (Mad), *Sundara Gurukulat v. Subramania*.
(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 292 (290) 106 Ind Cas 891, *Bala Tripura Sundaramma v Secretary of State*.

(1897) 7 Mad L Jour 11 (12, 13), *Mamunhi v. Ori Sham Bhatta*

(1930) A I R 1930 Nag 26 (27) 118 Ind Cas 674, *Bhagana v Guman*.

(1903) 26 Mad 72 (73) 12 Mad L Jour 410, *Balkrishnamma Subudhi v Vinayaka Rawa Singh Dey*

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 264 (265) 127 Ind Cas 139, *Somalinga L. Rengier v. Ramia Santhu*

(1915) A I R 1915 Bom 102 (106) 39 Bom 359 . 28 Ind Cas 412, *Javerbhai v Gordhan Narsi*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 410 (412) 44 Mad 916 . 64 Ind Cas 323, *Sontyana Gopala Dassie v Inaputalapula Rams*.

(1927) A I R 1927 All 811 (814) 100 Ind Cas 346, *Maha Manjral Rai v Ashen Kandu*.

(1935) A I R 1935 All 578 (579) 156 Ind Cas 813, *Shamrati Kuer v Kahika Singh*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 288 (290) 144 Ind Cas 439, *Abdul Jalbar v Gulab Khan*

7a. (1930) A I R 1930 Bom 448 (449) 127 I C 910, *Chhaganbhai v Tulshibhai*.

8. (1935) A I R 1935 All 458 (458) 157 I C. 1019, *Sheo Pershad v Karim Dur*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 60

In the undermentioned case^{8a} where *A* entered into possession of property as the adopted son of *B* and the adoption was invalid, it was held that *A* could not acquire by adverse possession any interest different from that which he would have taken if the property had rightly passed to him as the adopted son of *B*. In *Dalton v. Fitzgerald*,^{8b} the principle was stated as follows :

"If a man obtains possession of land claiming under a deed or will, he cannot afterwards set up another title to the land against the will or deed, though it did not operate to pass the land in question and if he remains in possession till twelve years have elapsed and the title of the testator's heirs is extinguished, he cannot claim, by possession, an interest in the property different from that which he would have taken if the property had passed by the will or deed."

Where a transfer of property by *A* to *B* is good during the lifetime of *A* but void beyond his lifetime, the possession of *B* under such transfer would be adverse to *A*'s representatives after his death.⁹

Where property is transferred to a person for his life, the possession of his representative after his death will be adverse to the transferor.¹⁰

A leased certain property to *B* and then made a gift of the property to *C*, by means of an unregistered deed, and directed the tenant to pay the rent to the donee, *C*, in future. This was done and *C* received the rents from *B*, the lessee. It was held by the Madras High Court¹¹ that nevertheless, *C* could not be said to be in adverse possession against *A* until the expiry of the lease. It is submitted that the decision is not correct, as *C* clearly was in adverse possession of the landlord's right even before the expiry of the lease.

Where a transferee of property under a voidable transfer enters into possession, his possession is not adverse till the transfer is set aside.¹² But, in such cases, if a suit for setting aside the transfer is barred by limitation, a suit for possession also will be barred.¹³

[See (1910) 5 Ind Cas 931 (934) (Mad), *Venkatarama Murthi v. Narayanamma*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 130 (131) : 105 Ind Cas 617 : 55 Cal 448, *Mt. Rukhya Banu v. Mt. Naraya Banu*]

8a (1924) A I R 1924 Nag 73 (74) : 78 Ind Cas 840, *Jageshwar v. Pandurang*.

8b (1897) 2 Ch 86 (93) : 66 L J Ch 604 : 76 L T 700 : 45 W R (Eng) 685.

9 : 48
10 : 48
11 : 48
12 : 48
13 : 48

(1936) A I R 1936 P C 183 (187) : 162 Ind Cas 465 : 63 Ind App 261 : 59 Mad 609 (P C), *Dasakshamani Ponnambala v. Periyannan Chetty*.

10. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 1006 (1006) (Lab), *Mt. Surjo v. Hira*.

11. (1909) 3 Ind Cas 122 (123) (Mad), *Acharath Jappan v. Mathummal Chetty*.

12. (1917) A I R 1917 Bom 235 (237) : 42 Ind Cas 904, *Shankerbhai Kashibhai v. Raisingji Jasrat Singji*.

13 (1911) 9 Ind Cas 377 (378) (Cal), *Sham Chandra v. Godadhar Mandal*.

Where a person enters into possession under a void transfer, the transfer need not be set aside before a suit for possession can be brought against him and so, although the period of limitation for a suit to set aside the transfer has expired, a suit for possession against the transferee will not be barred.¹⁴

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 60-60a

Where *A* transfers certain property to *B* under a void document and delivers possession of the property to him under such transfer, *A* "discontinues" possession within the meaning of Article 142 and therefore a suit for possession by *A* against *B* in such cases will come under that Article.¹⁵ The view held in certain decisions¹⁶ that Article 144 will apply to such cases is, it is submitted, not correct.

In the undermentioned case,¹⁷ *A* executed a benami document in favour of *B* and put the latter in possession of the property. *A* then sued *B* for possession. It was held by the Privy Council that Article 144 applied to the case. As *B*'s possession could not, at its inception, have been adverse to *A*, Article 142 could not apply.

60a. Possession under transfer which subsequently becomes invalid.—Where *A* transfers property to *B* and the transfer is valid until *A*'s life or until a certain contingency, *B*'s entry on such property cannot be said to be in contravention of the title of the person entitled to the property after *A*'s death or on the occurrence of the contingency. Nor can it be said that there is any dispossession or discontinuance of possession of such person by the transferee, though it may be discontinuance of possession on the part of *A*. A suit by the person entitled on *A*'s death or on the happening of the contingency

14. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 377 (378) (Cal), *Sham Chandra Dafadar v. Godadar Mandal*
(1919) A I R 1919 Low Bur 53 (55) 50 Ind Cas 324 9 Low Bur Rul 186, *Ma Nui Ma v. Aung Myat* (Sale by administrator without leave of Court—Right of heirs to treat sale as void is not extinguished by lapse of six years—Suit for possession within 12 years of sale is not barred)
- 15 (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 239 (239, 240) 81 Ind Cas 923, *Sadullah v. Suleman*
(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 341 (342) 73 Ind Cas 41, *Gayani Sahu v. Dalchand Sahu*
(1898) 21 Mad 169 (171) 8 Mad L Jour 117, *Muniappan Chetti v. Muzil Nayar*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 13 (16) 72 Ind Cas 693, *Lalit Mohan Sen v. Maro-ranjan Ghose Chondhury*
(1932) A I R 1932 Cal 115 (116) 133 Ind Cas 102, *Ann Chandra Lah v. Ramanath Karmakar*
[See (1911) 9 Ind Cas 377 (378) (Cal), *Sham Chandra Dafadar v. Godadar Mandal*]
[See also (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 428 (429) 70 Ind Cas 869, *Dhiverrara Krishna v. Mohendra Nath*]
- 16 (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 521 (522) 171 Ind Cas 187 *Mt Lachai v. Hayat Mohanmad* (Sale deed by minor is void ab initio—Minor can sue for possession directly—Suit is governed by Article 144 read with Section 6)
(1901) 26 All 346 (353) 1901 All W N 33 1 All I J 11 53 *Tarafa Ibrahim v. Masat Khan*
17. (1908) 85 Cal 551 (560) 35 Ind App 98 10 Bom I R 540 7 All I Jour 290 12 Cal W N 562 7 Cal L Jour 528 14 Ind I R 108 15 Mad I Jour 277 4 Mad I. Tim 12 4 Low Bur R 120 (121) *Jeffer Personal Chetty v. Muniaswami Setti*

Arts. 142 & 144 would be governed by Article 144, time running from the date of the death or the happening of the contingency as the case may be.¹

Notes 60a-61

Where property of a person holding an estate for life therein is forfeited and sold by Government and is purchased by X, a suit by the person entitled after the death of the holder for life would be governed by Article 144.²

See also Note 79 *infra*.

61. Adverse possession of inalienable property.—There are certain cases in which an alienation of property is *prohibited* by law. Thus, under the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, an alienation by a *watandar* of *vatan* property is not competent except for the life of the *watandar*. Similarly, under the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act, 1895, an alienation of property attached to a village service *inam* is prohibited. The question has arisen whether in the case of such property a title can be acquired by *adverse possession* for the statutory period. Before the decision of the Privy Council in *Madhav Rao v. Raghunath*,¹ it had been held generally by the High Court of Bombay that such property could be acquired by adverse possession.² In *Madhav Rao v. Raghunath*,³ their Lordships of the Privy Council referring to the decision in *Radha Bai v. Anant Rao*,⁴ in

Note 60a

- 1 (1910) A I R 1919 Nag 52 (53) : 59 Ind Cas 473, *Mahomed Sirajuddin v. Fayazuddin*.
- (1918) 18 Ind Cas 611 (813) (All) *Gangasahas v. Kanhaiya Lal*. (Mortgage by widow with possession—If reversioner attacked the mortgage as invalid he should have, under Art. 144, sued within 12 years of the widow's death.)
- (1892) 1892 All W N 26 (27), *Murl v. Brij Lal*. (Transfer by occupancy tenant entitled only to be in possession for life.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 307 (303) : 81 Ind Cas 237: 27 Oudh Cas 301, *Mahabir Prasad v. Ram Kumar*. (Sale by grove-holder—Subsequent relinquishment in favour of landlord—Suit by landlord to recover possession.)
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 365 (367): 40 Cal 173, *Frosonna Kumar Mookerjee v. Sri-Lanitha Ray* (Ghatwal relinquishing his office after sale of his interest.)
- 2 (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 45 (46) : 131 Ind Cas 97, *Mehar Khan v. Sakhi Mahomed*.

Note 61

1. (1923) A I R 1923 P C 205 (210) : 47 Bom 793 : 50 Ind App 255 : 74 Ind Cas 362 (P C)
2. (1885) 9 Bom 193 (212) (P B), *Radhabai v. Anantrav Bhagant*.
(1893) 1893 Bom P J 30, *Ramgauda Hirgauda v. Gopal Sadashiv*.
(See also (1895) 10 Bom 34 (41), *Jamel Sahib v. Murgaya Swami*. (Assumed.)
(1888) 1888 Bom P J 46, *Lingangarda v. Chengauda*. (Do)
(1913) 17 Ind Cas 170 (174) 37 Bom 61, *Shivram Narsingrao v. Mahader Narayan*. (Do)
(1866) 4 Bom H O R App Cas 51 (51), *M. S. Sinde v. G. P. Sinde*. (Do.)
(1909) 4 Ind Cas 249 (250) : 34 Bom 41, *Narannha Krishnaji v. Varman Venkatesh*. (Joint *watandars* alienating—Limitation commences after death of both)
(1905) 7 Bom L R 135 (136), *Rama v. Shamrao*. (Do.))
3. (1923) A I R 1923 P C 205 (210) : 47 Bom 793 : 50 Ind App 255 : 74 Ind Cas 362 (P C)
- 4 (1895) 9 Bom 193 (212) (P B)

which a Full Bench had held that a stranger to the *watan* can acquire the property by adverse possession, observed as follows:

Arts. 142 & 143
Notes 61-61a

"It is not necessary for their Lordships to decide in this case whether the answer of the Full Bench, limited as it must have been to the case of a stranger to the *watan*, setting up as a defence twelve years' adverse possession, was or was not correct, although they are constrained to say that it is somewhat difficult to see how a stranger to a *watan* can acquire a title by adverse possession for twelve years of lands the alienation of which was, in the interests of the State, prohibited."

Subsequent to the decision of the Privy Council above referred to, the Bombay High Court has, however, held that their Lordships of the Privy Council could not be considered to have overruled the decision of the Full Bench in *Radha Bai v. Anant Rao*,⁵ and that the decisions which had held that *watan* property could be acquired by adverse possession for the statutory period must still be considered good law.⁶ It has been held by the High Court of Madras, on the other hand, that property attached to a service *inam* cannot be acquired by adverse possession.⁷ According to the Patna High Court, a right of occupancy cannot be acquired in lands granted on police service tenure, by adverse possession for any length of time.⁸

Where, however, land is *not attached to an office*, in the sense in which lands granted to performance of a religious service in a temple are attached to a service, but has been granted for service, it becomes the hereditary property of the granteo. The conditions restraining alienation in such cases apply only as between him and the Crown. Such land may be acquired by adverse possession.⁹

61a. Adverse possession of land in military cantonments.

— It has been held in the undermentioned cases¹ that lands in

5. (1885) 9 Bom 198 (212) (F B)

6. (1931) A I R 1931 Bom 21 (28) 55 Bom 21 129 Ind Cas 145, *Tuka Lakhu v. Ganu Vitlu*

(1932) A I R 1932 Bom 464 (466) 139 Ind Cas 223, *Swamirao v. Bhimabai*

7. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 314 (316) 161 Ind Cas 447 59 Mad 51, *Ramalingam v. Veerabhadradu*

8. (1928) A I R 1928 Pat 603 (607) 7 Pat 566 109 Ind Cas 297, *Muti Dasadh v. Anu Mahto*.

9. (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 947 (947) 34 Ind Cas 898, *Dinabai Lakshminipati v. Pingali Narasimham*

(See also (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 209 (210) 55 Ind Cas 935, *Ghulam Mahamed v. Ahmad Khan* (Where a person holds adversely lands granted in perpetuity to an *als* *Lambardar*, the possession is adverse to the *als* *Lambardar in esse* and *in posse* and bars the title of the latter after the lapse of 12 years.)

(1934) 40 Mad L W 29 (29) (S N) (The period of time for acquiring a title by adverse possession to a Barber Service *Inam* when the Government is not a party is 12 years and not 60 years.)

Notes 61a

1. (1922) A I R 1922 AH 57 (59) 66 Ind Cas 582, *Secretary of State v. Mulla*.

(1911) 12 Ind Cas 117 (119) 88 Ind App 201 (216) 96 Bom 11 (P C) *Kashnuri Idarji v. Secretary of State*

Arts. 142 & 144 military cantonment area cannot be acquired by adverse possession. This view seems to be based on the general principle that a person cannot prescribe against a statute, that is to say, that where certain acts are prohibited to be done by statute, a person cannot by proof of such acts acquire a right by prescription.² The only position open to a person occupying land in cantonments which has not been specifically transferred by the Secretary of State, is the position of a licensee. It is not open to him to exercise acts of ownership, and consequently, he cannot acquire by such acts any right by adverse possession.³

61b. Adverse possession of rights not recognised by law.— It is of the essence of a title by adverse possession that the right sought to be acquired must be one recognised by law. Where a person claimed by adverse possession a title to hold land as "a recognised subdivision" of a *bhag* or share in *narwa* governed by the Bombay Bhagdari and Narwadari Act, 5 of 1862, it was held by the High Court of Bombay that no such title was recognised by the law and that consequently no such title can be acquired by adverse possession.¹ A joint tenancy *with rights of survivorship* is recognised in Hindu law only in a coparcenary between members of an undivided Hindu family, and not in other cases. Such a status cannot therefore be acquired by adverse possession by a *stranger* to the family.² Similarly, a right of fishery by a person *as a member of the public* to fish in a non-tidal river is not recognised by law, and cannot therefore be acquired by adverse possession.³

62. Possession of owner, if can be adverse to himself. — Normally a person cannot prescribe with regard to his own property.¹ But, under certain circumstances, the possession of a person may be adverse to himself. Thus, where *A* is in possession of his own land, but under a lease from *B* under the wrong impression that it belongs to *B* who asserts a title thereto, *A*'s possession would be *B*'s possession and consequently adverse to *A*. In *Secretary of State v. Krishnamoni Gupta*,² in which the facts were as stated above, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 1096 (1097, 1098) (All), *Bank of Upper India v. Secretary of State*.

2. (1891) 39 W R (Eng) Digest Col. 253, *Trull v. M'Allister*.

3. (1922) A I R 1922 All 57 (59) : 66 Ind Cas 582, *Secretary of State v. Mulla*.

Note 61b

1. (1904) 29 Bom 399 (407) : 6 Bom L R 428, *Jethabhai v. Nathabhai*. (4 Bom L R 797, *Rehmed on*)

2. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 11 (11) : 70 Ind Cas 653, *Pajambal Ammal v. Shanmuga Mudaliar*.

3. (1891) 2 Ch 678 (696) : 65 L T 175, *Smith v. Andrews*.

Note 62

1. (1906) 163 Ind Cas 347 (349) (Cal), *Sarafuddin Nur Ahmad v. Jibanness Khatoon*.

2. (1902) 29 Ind App 104 (114) : 29 Cal 618 : 4 Bom L R 337 : 6 Cal W N 617 : 8 Ear 269 (1st C)

"It may, at first sight, seem singular that parties should be barred by lapse of time during which they were in physical possession and estopped from disputing the title of the Government (who was the adverse possessor in the case). But there is no doubt that the possession of the tenant is, in law, the possession of the landlord or superior proprietor and it can make no difference whether the tenant be one who might claim adversely to his landlord or not "

Arts. 142 & 144.
Notes 62-63

Where *A* and *B* were co-owners of a certain property, and both of them were dispossessed by a third party, and subsequent thereto, one of the co-owners, *A*, came into possession of the property under a lease granted by the adverse possessor and so remained in possession for more than 12 years, it was held by the High Court of Calcutta that the title of both *A* and *B* was extinguished, inasmuch as the possession which *A* acquired must be referred to the title which *A* acquired under the lease and not to his title as co-owner of the property.³ *A*, *B* and *C* were joint owners of certain property. *A* usufructually mortgaged the whole property to *X* as his self-acquired property. Subsequently, *X* purchased *C*'s share in the property. More than 12 years after the purchase but within 12 years after the redemption of the mortgage by *A*'s heirs, *X* sued for possession of the one-third share purchased by him. It was held that the suit was barred,⁴ even though *X* was in possession of the share purchased from *C*. The reason is that *X*'s possession during his mortgage of *A* was only that of *A*, even though he had purchased a share of the property from *C*. It was therefore adverse to both *B* and *C* even from the date of the mortgage.

63. Possession must be continuous for the statutory period.—Adverse possession, in order to confer title to the property on the possessor, must be *continuous* for the statutory period.¹ This does not mean that proof of acts of possession must cover every

3 (1921) 4 I R 1921 Cal 616 (617) 35 Cal L Jour 164 (165) 64 Ind Cas 553, *Bhola Nath De v. Golab, Sardar*. (Where a person holds a property adversely to both co-owners and one of them obtains possession under a lease granted by the adverse possessor and continues in possession for over 12 years, the title of the other co-owner is extinguished as the former's possession must be referred to his title under the lease.)

4 (1857) 14 Cal 674 (678), *Nundo Lal Addy v. Jodu Nath Haldar*

Note 63

- 1 (1935) 42 Cal W N 1209 (1210), *Dhabani Prasanna v. Manindra Chandra*.
(1920) 4 I R 1920 Oudh 215 (216) 51 Ind Cas 538, *Dan Bahadur Singh v. Parthipal Singh*
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 185 (186) (Cal), *Shookoor Mallu v. Ichari Lal*
(1866) 3 Mad H C R 99 (101), *Gowindan Pillai v. Chudambara Pillai*
(1870) 2 N W P H C R 16 (17, 18), *Ilahceouddeen v. Jhunjore*
(1934) 4 I R 1934 Pat 485 (489) 154 Ind Cas 1032, *Mt. Dhaukhhna Knari v. Ramjad Knar*.
(1918) 4 I R 1918 All 103 (104) 40 All 461 44 Ind Cas 900, *Debi Prasad v. Badri Prasad*
(1923) 4 I R 1923 Lab 35 (36) 69 Ind Cas 363, *Lal Das v. Chandu*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 63-64**

moment of the requisite period.² "The fact of possession may be continuous though the several acts of possession are at considerable intervals. How many acts will infer this fact is a question of proof and presumption, independent of prescription."³

Where an owner is once shown to have been in possession, the presumption may be drawn under S. 114 of the Evidence Act that it continued till it is shown to have been interrupted.⁴ But, where a person is shown to have been in possession at a certain time and subsequently, there is no presumption that he must have been in possession before that date. The presumption of continuity is prospective rather than retrospective.⁵

64. Break in adverse possession, effect of. — As has been seen already, it is necessary in order to acquire a title by adverse possession that the possession of the wrongdoer must be continuous for the prescribed period of limitation.¹ It follows that where there is a break in the adverse possession of the wrongdoer, limitation ceases to run against the lawful owner of the property.² The leading case on this point is *Trustees, Executors, & Agency Co. v. Short*.³ In that case their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

"They are of opinion that if a person enters upon the land of another and holds possession for a time, and then, without having acquired a title under the statute, abandons possession, the rightful owner, on the abandonment, is in the same position in all respects as he was before the intrusion took place. There is no one against whom he can bring an action. He cannot

2. (1934) A I R 1931 P C 23 (25) : 147 Ind Cas 545 : 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. J. R. S. v. J. R. S.*
- (1935) 62 Cal L Jour 177, *Surendra Kumar Roy Chowd*
- (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760, *Prasanna v. Manindra Chandra*.
3. Millar on Prescription page 36 cited in A I R 1931 P C 23 (25).
(1938) 42 Cal W N 1209 (1210 & 1211), *Dhabani Prasanna v. Manindra Chandra*.
4. (1914) 21 Ind Cas 813 (818) : 7 Sind L R 169, *Secretary of State v. Mush-tak Singh*.
5. (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 37 (37) : 97 Ind Cas 1006, *Tukaram Bajirao v. Tukaram Yeshwant*.

NOTE 64

1. (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 289 (289) : 57 Ind Cas 716, *Pyari Dryee Dabi v. Sakir Mandal*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Pat 495 (499) : 151 Ind Cas 1032, *Mt. Dharichhna Kuari v. Ramyad Kuari*.
2. (1934) A I R 1931 Pat 485 (489), *Mt. Dharichhna Kuari v. Ramyad Kuari*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 981 (983) : 83 Ind Cas 591, *Abhay Sankar v. Satyendra Prasanna*. (There can be no continuance of adverse possession when the land is not capable of use and enjoyment, so long as such adverse possession must rest on *de facto* use and occupation—The real owner does not discontinue his possession so long as the land is cultivated.)
- (1937) A I R 1937 Sind 132 (140) : 176 Ind Cas 549, *Takhlram Tachchand v. Mt. Miral Jamalshah*.
3. (1868) 37 W R (Eng) 433 (434) : 13 A C 797, 58 L J P C 4 : 59 L T 677 : 53 J P 134.

make an entry on himself. There is no positive enactment, nor is there any principle of law, which requires him to do any act, to issue any notice, or to perform any ceremony in order to rehabilitate himself. No new departure is necessary. The possession of the intruder, ineffectual for the purpose of transferring title, ceases upon its abandonment to be effectual for any purpose. It does not leave behind it any cloud on the title of the rightful owner, or any secret process at work for the possible benefit in time to come of some casual interloper or lucky vagrant.

"There is not, in their Lordships' opinion, any analogy between the case supposed and the case of successive disabilities mentioned in the statute. Thoro the statute continues to run because there is a person in possession in whose favour it is running.

"There is no direct authority on the point in this country. But such authority, as there is, seems to be opposed to the doctrine laid down by the Supremo Court. It is sufficient to refer to *McDonnell v McKinty*,⁴ Lord St. Leonards' Real Property Statutes, page 31, and *Smith v. Lloyd*.⁵ In the latter case, which was decided in 1851, Parke, B., giving the judgment of the Court, says: 'We are clearly of opinion that the statute applies, not to want of actual possession by the plaintiff, but to cases where he has been out of, and another in, possession for the prescribed time. There must be both absence of possession by the person who has the right, and actual possession by another, whether adverse or not, to be protected, to bring the case within the statute. We entirely concur in the judgment of Blackburne, C. J., in *McDonnell v. McKinty*,⁴ and the principle on which it is founded.'

"Their Lordships have only to add that, in their opinion, there is no difference in principle as regards the application of the statute between the case of mines and the case of other land where the fact of possession is more open and notorious. . . ."

From the above it is clear that on the abandonment or relinquishment of the property by the adverse possessor, the possession automatically reverts in the owner and that no act is necessary on his part to bring about such reversion. Hence, on such abandonment or relinquishment, limitation ceases to run against the true owner.^{6a}

4. (1847) 10 Ir L R 514.

5. (1851) 23 L J Ex 194 (194) : 9 Ex 562 : 2 C L R 1008 : 22 L T (O S) 239 : 95 R R 837.

6a (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (761) : 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prosanna v. Manindra Chandra*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 330 (336) : 19 Oudh Cas 374 : 37 Ind Cas 715, *Hearsey v. Karam Singh*.

(1922) 63 Ind Cas 749 (752) (Oudh), *Durga v. Ram Padarath*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 303 (303) : 120 Ind Cas 792, *Mangal Singh v. Ali Sher*.

(1905) 32 Cal 247 (291), *Bholanath Singh v. Wood*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 64

In *Secretary of State v. Krishna Moni Gupta*,⁶ their Lordships of the Privy Council, relying upon the case of *Agency Co. v. Short*³ above referred to, held that there was no difference in principle between the break in the continuity of possession by the voluntary abandonment by the wrongdoer and a break in the continuity of possession caused by *vis major*, for example, by the submersion of the land under water and they overruled the decision of the Calcutta High Court in *Kally Churn Saho v. Secretary of State*.⁷

In *Basant Kumar Roy v. Secretary of State*,⁸ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that there can be no continuance of adverse possession when the land is not capable of use and enjoyment, as where the land is submerged under water, inasmuch as adverse possession must rest upon *de facto* use and occupation.

Where, in fact, the trespasser discontinues possession, it is immaterial whether he *intends to return or not*. The discontinuance operates as a break in the continuity without regard to the intention to return or not.⁹

While the defendant is in adverse possession, the plaintiff, the rightful owner, manages to oust him and obtain possession, thus interrupting the defendant's adverse possession. The defendant obtains a decree under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act and again dispossesses the plaintiff. The period of adverse possession of the defendant again starts only from the date of the dispossession of the plaintiff under the said decree.¹⁰

If, before the expiry of the statutory period, the true owner makes an effective re-entry on the property sufficient to destroy the exclusive character of the trespasser's possession, the latter's adverse possession is thereby interrupted.¹¹ What constitutes such re-entry by the owner depends on the circumstances of each case. As the title rests with the true owner, acts of possession not sufficient to

(1923) A I R 1923 Rang 23 (24) : 77 Ind Cas 905 : 11 Low Bur Rul 861, *Kala Muthu Asari v. Meera Hussein*.

(1907) 2 Ch 533 (538) : 76 L J Ch 602 : 97 L T 294, *Johnson v. Brock*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 130 (136, 137) : 5 Pat 80 : 91 Ind Cas 169, *Midnapore Zamindari Co. Ltd. v. Ram Kana Singh Deo*.

(1939) A I R 1939 Nag 7 (9, 10). 1939 Nag L Jour 418 (421), *Meherban Lall Pingara v. Yusuf Khan*.

6. (1902) 29 Ind App 104 (116) : 29 Cal 518 : 4 Bom L R 537 : 6 Cal W N 617 : 8 Sar 269 (P C).

7. (1861) 6 Cal 725 (739) : 8 Cal L R 90 : 4 Shome L R 96.

8. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 18 (21) : 44 Cal 859 : 44 Ind App 104 : 40 Ind Cas 837 (P C).

9. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (762) : 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prosanna v. Mamandra Chandra*.

10. (1905) 9 Cal W N 1061 (1064), *Protab Chandra v. Durga Charan*. (Dissenting from 12 Suth W R 9, 12 Suth W R 452, 22 Suth W R 259; and 12 Cal L R 486.)

11. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 563 (564) : 109 Ind Cas 296, *Bir Bikram Kishore v. Dashrath Rishi*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Cal 582 (585) : 117 Ind Cas 693, *Sourendra Nath v. Normal Chandra*. (Re-entry by owner against tenant of trespasser operates to destroy the adverse possession of trespasser landlord.)

constitute adverse possession as against another may, when done by the true owner, be sufficient to destroy the legal adequacy and exclusiveness of possession in a trespasser and may amount to interruption of his possession.¹³ But the re-entry by the true owner must be more than formal and must be effective to divest the possession of the trespasser and re-vest it in the owner.¹³ Acts such as the following are not of that character :—

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 64

- (a) The mere unyoking of the trespasser's bulls and preventing him from ploughing the land on one occasion or even the cutting away of his crops.¹⁴
- (b) The owner staying as a guest with the possessor.¹⁵
- (c) The owner directing his steward to pull out a stone from the wall of the hut built by the trespasser and to remove a portion of the fence.¹⁶
- (d) Supplying of materials by the owner for the repair of the house to the trespasser's possession.¹⁷

(1924) A I R 1924 All 844 (845) 79 Ind Cas 1047, *Harpal Kurni v. Mohan Kurni* (The owner is given delivery of possession by the Court under a decree against the trespasser—Adverse possession of the latter is interrupted, though he again re-trespasses subsequently)

12 Ind Cas

" Kuari

[See also (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 563 (564) : 100 Ind Cas 296, *Bir Bikram Kishore v. Dashrath Rishi*

(1901) 26 Bom 410 (417) 4 Bom L R 28, *Vithaldas Kanjishet v. Secretary of State* (Plaintiff occasionally placing his boat on the land and storing material on it once—This will displace defendant's title by adverse possession)]

13 (1850) 9 C B 714 (718) 19 L J C P 306 82 R R 511, *Doe d Baker v. Combes*, (1911) 9 Ind Cas 791 (794) 35 Mad 231, *Parthasarathi Nanchen v. Lakshmana Nanchen* (A mere transfer of his interests by the true owner will not amount to re entry)

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 363 (365) 38 Cal 622, *Joy Kali Roy v. Hemangini Debi*, (Registration of a name under the Land Registration Act is not necessarily equivalent to actual possession.)

(1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 73 (74) 55 Ind Cas 490, *Chandila v. Sheoraj*, (The title of a person holding land as an under-proprietor cannot be disturbed or destroyed by an adverse entry in the revenue papers or any orders passed by the Revenue Court refusing to enter name in the revenue papers)

(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 25 (26, 27) 57 Cal 796 129 Ind Cas 355, *Jnanendra-narayan v. Sarda Sundari Dasi* (An entry in the Record of Rights that the land was subject to the rights of the plaintiff does not amount to a tacit recognition of the plaintiff's rights on the part of the defendant.)

(1913) 17 Ind Cas 148 (149) 37 Bom 37, *Maganchand v. Vithalrao*, (An application to Assistant Collector for recovery of possession cannot stop limitation)

14. (1921) A I R 1924 Cal 584 (585) 50 Cal 978 79 Ind Cas 491, *Sukur Mohammad v. Asmat Mandal*, (Cutting or taking away growing crop on one occasion)

(1921) 1921 Mad W N 74 (S N).

15. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 633 (634) 72 Ind Cas 635, *Ammalanadu v. Narayanasami*

16 (1850) 9 C B 714 (718) 19 L J C P 306 82 R R 511, *Doe d Baker v. Combes* (All this was done in the absence of the trespasser)

17. (1866) 1866 Pun Re No. 53, *Chiragh Shah v. Ghuvra*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notss 64-65

(e) Payment of land revenue for the land.^{17a}

It has been seen in Note 16 *ante* that possession to be adverse must be hostile, i. e. in denial of plaintiff's title. If, therefore, before the expiry of the statutory period, the trespasser admits the rightful owner's title, his possession ceases to be adverse,¹⁸ provided that the admission relates to the property in dispute¹⁹ and is unequivocal.²⁰ It has been held that an admission of the plaintiff's title made under a mistake of fact will not interrupt the adverse possession of the person making such admission.²¹

65. Delivery of symbolical possession, if interrupts adverse possession. — The delivery of symbolical possession in execution of a decree to the decree-holder or to the auction-purchaser is, as against the defendant in the suit, equivalent to the delivery of actual possession. It will follow from this that the delivery of such possession to the decree-holder or auction-purchaser will operate as a dispossession of the defendant and will put an end to the adverse possession of the defendant.¹ In *Juggobundhu Mukerjee*

17a (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 177 (177) : 49 Ind Cas 61 · 21 Oudh Cas 824, *Jaipal Din v. Kalka Baksh Singh*.

13. (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 317 (817) : 106 Ind Cas 814, *Mahomed Baksh v. Nathu*.

[But see (1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 24 (25) : 66 Ind Cas 941, *Abdul Rasheed v. Janakidas* (Submitted not correct.)]

19 (1866) L R 1 Ex 259 (200, 261) 12 Jur (N S) 1024 14 W R (Eng) 836, *Dixon v. Baty*

20. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 193 (193) 84 Ind Cas 657, *Gulam Nazar v. Abbas Molla*.

21. (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 811 (812) · 177 Ind Cas 158, *Amar Nath v. Ram Rakha*.

Notes 65

1. (1878) 19 Suth W R 101 (102) : 2 Suther 750 (P O), *Gunga Gobind Mundul v. Bhoopal Chunder Biswas*.

(1897) 19 All 499 (501) : 1897 All W N 127, *Mangli Prasad v. Debi Din*.

(1906) 26 All 722 (723) : 1906 All W N 213 · 3 All L Jour 504, *Jagan Nath v. Mslap Chand*.

(1917) A I R 1917 All 312 (312) · 39 All 460 : 39 Ind Cas 745, *Rajendra Kishore v. Bhagwan Singh*.

(1922) A I R 1922 All 55 (55) : 70 Ind Cas 488, *Mt. Purna Kuer v. Mangat Rai*.

(1922) A I R 1922 All 463 (465) : 73 Ind Cas 920, *Ram Lalan Singh v. Harakh Narain Rai*.

(1924) A I R 1924 All 844 (845) : 79 Ind Cas 1047, *Hargal Kurmi v. Mohan Kurmi*.

(1926) A I R 1926 All 691 (692) : 96 Ind Cas 591, *Bairnath v. Sri Bhagwan*.

(1928) A I R 1928 All 412 (418) 50 All 818 : 115 Ind Cas 791, *Sita Ram v. Ram Sunder*

(1931) A I R 1931 All 234 (235) · 124 Ind Cas 767, *Niranjan Lal v. Jhamman Lal*.

(1933) A I R 1933 All 178 (175) 55 All 173 : 149 Ind Cas 819, *Ambika Prasad v. Sada Sheolal*

(1936) A I R 1936 All 85 (85) : 160 Ind Cas 1037, *Mt. Maharaj v. Bhagwati Prasad*.

(1897) 21 Bom 98 (101), *Pandharinath v. Mahabubkhan*.

(1900) 25 Bom 275 (279, 280) : 2 Bom L R 1021, *Gopal v. Krishna Rao*.

(1901) 25 Bom 353 (361) : 2 Bom L R 1037, *Mahadeo v. Parashram*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 65**

v. *Ramchunder Bysack*,² it was held by a Full Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, that a delivery of symbolical possession under the Code of Civil Procedure against a defendant in the suit is equivalent to the delivery of actual possession. "As against third parties, of course," said their Lordships, "this symbolical possession, (as it is so called) would be of no avail; because they are no parties to the proceeding. But if the defendant should, after this, again dispossess the plaintiff by receiving the rents and profits, we think the plaintiff would have twelve years from such dispossession to bring another suit." The decision in *Juggobundhu's case*² was approved by the Privy Council in *Sri Radha Krishna Chanderji v. Ram Bahadur*³ and it was observed: "This decision is one of long standing and has been followed for many years. Their Lordships see no reason to question or to hold that this rule of procedure should now be altered." A similar view was expressed in *Kesho Pershad v. Mt. Bhagjogna Koer*.⁴ One of the questions in that case was whether the taking of symbolical possession by the holder of a decree against X would have any effect on the adverse possession of Y who was not a party to the suit. Their Lordships observed: "It adds little or nothing that having got a decree he (the decree-holder) took symbolical possession (*dakhal dahani*) or even that he set up boundary pillars well to the north of the land now in suit. The respondents (that is Y) could not prevent his doing these things and their rights are not in any way affected by them." See also the undermentioned cases⁵ in which it was held that symbolical delivery

(1929) A I R 1925 Nag 293 (301) : 116 Ind Cas 70, *Gauri Shankar v. Ibrahim Ali*

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 8 (8, 9) : 3 Luck 180 : 105 Ind Cas 781, *Ali Husain v. Mahomed*.

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 236 (238) (Lah), *Amolak Shah v. Maula Baksh*.

v. *Muhammad Hafiz*.

v. *Saraswati*.

. *Chatterji v. Modhu Sudan*

Mukerji.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 914 (915) : 129 Ind Cas 699, *Ram Chand v. Gopal Singh*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 384 (385) : 120 Ind Cas 602, *Sunder Das v. Mahomed Akram Khan*.

[See also (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 407 (409) : 12 Rang 1 : 149 Ind Cas 916, *Swaminathan Paduachi v. Mona Chinnandi*]

2. (1880) 5 Cal 584 (588) : 5 Cal L R 548 : 3 Shome L R 68 (F B).

3. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 197 (201) : 43 Ind Cas 268 (P O).

4. (1937) A I R 1937 P C 69 (75) : 167 Ind Cas 329 : 16 Pat 258 : 31 Sind L R 212 (P O).

[See also (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 391 (392) : 111 Ind Cas 862 3 Luck 668, *Ataullah Khan v. Mt. Hans Raj Kunwar*.]

5. (1921) A I R 1921 All 9 (10) 48 All 520 : 63 Ind Cas 212 (F B), *Jang Bahadur Singh v. Hanumant Singh*

(1899) 21 All 269 (271) 1899 All W N 56, *Narain Das v. Lalita Prasad*.

(1895) 19 Bom 620 (624, 625), *Harjwan v. Shivram*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 2 (3) : 46 Bom 932 : 68 Ind Cas 91, *Raghunath Vaman v. Konda Babaji*

(1880) 5 Cal 584 (586) : 5 Cal L R 548 : 3 Shome L R 68 (F B), *Juggobundhu Mukerjee v. Ramchander Bysack*.

of possession would not affect the rights of a third party or interrupt the running of time in his favour. Arts. 142 & 144
Note 65

There is a conflict of decisions as to whether symbolical delivery of a property in execution proceedings will interrupt the adverse possession of the defendant and furnish a fresh starting point of limitation against him in cases where the circumstances are such that actual delivery and not symbolical delivery is the prescribed mode of delivery according to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. One view is that symbolical delivery will give a fresh start of limitation for a suit for possession against the defendant, notwithstanding that the circumstances of the case are such that actual delivery and not symbolical delivery is the prescribed mode of delivery under the law.⁶ The other view is that symbolical delivery

- (1884) 10 Cal 993 (995), *Bunwari Singh v. Bunwari Lall Sahu*,
(1889) 16 Cal 580 (533) (F B), *Jagobundhu Mitter v. Purnanund Gossami*,
(1901) 18 Cal 500 (553) (F B), *Puri v. Depin Behary Mitter*,
Waziruddin v. Lala Deoki Nandan,
Jan Mahomed v. Chunder Mohan
- (1881) 11 Cal L R 395 (398), *Doyanadhi Panda v. Kela Panda*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 408 (409) 32 Ind Cas 703, *Sadulla Mridha v. Joyan-*
bunnessa Bibi.
(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 253 (255) : 46 Ind Cas 101, *Safish Chandra v. Brojo-*
gopal.
(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 82 (94) : 77 Ind Cas 564, *Jobeda Khatun v. Tulsi*
Charan Das.
(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 534 (535) : 77 Ind Cas 509, *Muhammad Ramzan v.*
Municipal Committee, Alipur.
(1925) A I R 1925 Lah 61 (61) : 84 Ind Cas 952, *Muland Lal v. Ilam Din*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 42 (44) 90 Ind Cas 1037, *Ranganatha Ayyar v.*
Srinivasa Iyengar.
(1934) A I R 1934 Nag 36 (39) 30 Nag L R 291 148 Ind Cas 62, *Ganpatrao*
v. Vithabas.
(1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 135 (135) 42 Ind Cas 192, *Chunni v. Mt. Ash-*
rafan.
(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 391 (392) : 111 Ind Cas 362 : 3 Luck 663, *Ataulia*
Khan v. Mt. Hansraj Kunwar.
(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 423 (424) 42 Ind Cas 449, *Jhari Singh v. Gopi*
Pasban.
(1910) 5 Ind Cas 278 (275) (All), *Gajadhar Rai v. Ramlakhan Rai*.
(1910) 6 Ind Cas 467 (471) (Cal), *Khroda Kanta Roy v. Krishna Das*.
(1911) 9 Ind Cas 271 (272) (Mad), *In re Rama Moothan*.
(1913) 21 Ind Cas 765 (767) (Mad), *Rompicherla v. Shaiq Ismael*
[But see (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1172 (1173) 96 Ind Cas 451, *Joyendra*
Krishna v. Joy Shih Chaudhury].
6. (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 385 (387) 70 Ind Cas 420, *Brojendra Kumar Roy v.*
Ashutosh Roy.
(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 176 (174) 70 Ind Cas 602, *Jahanmuth v. Baiduntha*
Nath.
(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 371 (372, 373) : 70 Ind Cas 157, *Kulada Prosad v.*
Kudiram Misra.
(1926) A I R 1926 Lah 85 (87) : 89 Ind Cas 596, *Harbharan v. Tri*
(1907) 17 Mad L Jour 595 (601), *Gound v. Venkatasubram*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 819 (850) 105 Ind Cas 243 *Arum v. Mahala-*
lakshmi.
(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 76 (82) 71 Ind Cas 999 24 Cr L Jour 273, *Malala-*
ra Parani v. Nath Sah. De. v. Sarsar v. Eer

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 65**

v. Ramchunder Bysack,² it was held by a Full Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, that a delivery of symbolical possession under the Code of Civil Procedure against a defendant in the suit is equivalent to the delivery of actual possession. "As against third parties, of course," said their Lordships, "this symbolical possession, (as it is so called) would be of no avail; because they are no parties to the proceeding. But if the defendant should, after this, again dispossess the plaintiff by receiving the rents and profits, we think the plaintiff would have twelve years from such dispossession to bring another suit." The decision in *Juggobundhu's case*³ was approved by the Privy Council in *Sri Radha Krishna Chanderji v. Ram Bahadur*⁴ and it was observed. "This decision is one of long standing and has been followed for many years. Their Lordships see no reason to question or to hold that this rule of procedure should now be altered." A similar view was expressed in *Kesho Pershad v. Mt. Bhagjogna Koer*.⁴ One of the questions in that case was whether the taking of symbolical possession by the holder of a decree against X would have any effect on the adverse possession of Y who was not a party to the suit. Their Lordships observed: "It adds little or nothing that having got a decree he (the decree-holder) took symbolical possession (*dakhal dahan*) or even that he set up boundary pillars well to the north of the land now in suit. The respondents (that is Y) could not prevent his doing these things and their rights are not in any way affected by them." See also the undermentioned cases⁵ in which it was held that symbolical delivery

(1929) A I R 1925 Nag 293 (301) : 116 Ind Cas 70, *Gauri Shankar v. Ibrahim Ali*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 8 (8, 9) : 3 Luck 130 : 105 Ind Cas 781, *Ali Husain v. Mahomed*.

... .. v. *Maula Baksh*.
... .. v. *Muhammad Hafiz*.
... .. v. *Saraswati*.

(1918) 18 Ind Cas 761 (762) (Cal), *Girinarain Chatterji v. Modhu Sudan Mukerji*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 914 (915) : 129 Ind Cas 699, *Ram Chand v. Gopal Singh*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 394 (395) : 120 Ind Cas 602, *Sunder Das v. Mahmood Akram Khan*.

[See also (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 407 (409) : 12 Rang 1 : 149 Ind Cas 916, *Suamunathan Padrachi v. Mona China Andri*.]

2. (1880) 5 Cal 584 (588) : 5 Cal L R 543 : 3 Shome L R 68 (F B).

3. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 197 (201) : 43 Ind Cas 268 (P C).

4. (1937) A I R 1937 P C 69 (75) : 167 Ind Cas 329 : 16 Pat 258 : 31 Sind L R 242 (P C).

[See also (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 391 (392) : 111 Ind Cas 362, 3 Luck 668, *Ataulah Khan v. Mt Hans Raj Kunwar*.]

5. (1921) A I R 1921 All 9 (10) : 43 All 520 : 63 Ind Cas 212 (F B), *Jang Bahadur Singh v. Hanumant Singh*

as v. *Lalta Prasad*.

Ind Cas 91, *Raghunath*

(1880) 5 Cal 584 (586) : 5 Cal L R 543 : 3 Shome L R 68 (F B), *Juggobundhu Mukerjee v. Ramchander Bysack*.

Arts. 142 & 144 is totally ineffective in such cases and will not interrupt the adverse possession of the defendant.⁷

Note 65

Similarly, there is a conflict of decisions as to whether a formal defect in the proceeding constituting the symbolical delivery will make it ineffective to arrest the adverse possession of the defendant, one view being that the adverse possession will not be interrupted in such cases,⁸ the other view being that the adverse possession will be interrupted.⁹

As seen above, symbolical delivery is equivalent to actual delivery in the eye of the law, as against the defendant. Where the land of which symbolical delivery is made is in the occupation of ryots, the plaintiff, suing for possession, will have a period of twelve years from the date when the defendant again dispossesses him by collecting the rents and profits of the land from the ryots.¹⁰ But where the land is in the actual possession of the defendant and he continues in such possession after the symbolical delivery, he should be held to dispossess the plaintiff immediately on the symbolical delivery and the plaintiff must bring his suit for actual possession within twelve years of such delivery.¹¹

7. (1919) A I R 1919 Bom 44 (44) : 43 Bom 559 : 51 Ind Cas 72, *Shridar v. Ganpati*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 2 (3) : 46 Bom 932 : 68 Ind Cas 91, *Raghunath Paman v. Kondiba Badaji*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 301 (302) : 71 Ind Cas 385, *Sardar Khan v. Abdulla Khan*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Lah 350 (351) : 174 Ind Cas 821, *Mt. Khairan v. Raghbir Singh*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 1140 (1141) : 86 Ind Cas 489, *Kammayya v. Bhimara Settle Paridesi*.

- - - - - v. Bala Khandu-
nu.
af Ali.

8 (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 612 (613) : 159 Ind Cas 1100, *Mt. Ram Kahi v. Gowardhan Lal*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Lah 749 (750) : 166 Ind Cas 377, *Bhagat Ram v. Ali Baksh*.

9 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 186 (186) : 101 Ind Cas 254, *Abbas Ali Khan v. Yusuf Ali Khan*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 545 (545) : 118 Ind Cas 391, *Harnam Singh v. Melkhi Ram*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 427 (428) : 145 Ind Cas 345, *Harnam Singh v. Ganda Singh*.

10. (1880) 5 Cal 564 (566) : 5 Cal L R 548 : 3 Shome L R 69 (FB), *Juggobundhu Mukerjee v. Ramchunder Bysack*.

11. (1931) A I R 1931 All 231 (235) : 124 Ind Cas 767, *Niranjan Lal v. Jhamman Lal*.

(1928) A I R 1928 All 412 (413) : 50 All 813 : 115 Ind Cas 791, *Sitaram v. Ram Sunder*.

(1903) 8 Cal W N 49 (51), *Hassan Raja Chaudhry v. Karlas Chandra Singha*.

(1904) 9 Cal W N 292 (299), *Bagdu Mayhi v. Rajah Sri Sri Durga Prosad Singha*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Cal 630 (630) : 23 Ind Cas 293, *Deo Nandan Pershad v. Udit Narayan Singh*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Pesh 7 (8) : 160 Ind Cas 411, *Mt. Jan Sultan v. Abdul Manan*.

Where the transferee under an *invalid* alienation of land which is in the occupation of ryots obtains a decree for possession against the vendor and is given symbolical delivery of possession, the transferee will be deemed to be in adverse possession against the vendor from the date of such delivery, unless the judgment-debtor, in spite of such delivery, continues to collect the rents and profits from the ryots.¹²

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 65-66

Symbolical delivery has the effect only of giving a fresh starting point of limitation for a suit for possession against the defendant who is in adverse possession. Such delivery does not, however, put an end to the title which the defendant acquires by prescription under Section 28 by virtue of his adverse possession for twelve years. In other words, where at the date of the symbolical delivery the defendant has already perfected his title to the property by adverse possession, such title is in no way affected by the symbolical delivery and a suit for possession will be barred although within twelve years of such delivery.¹³

The above principles will apply to sales for aircars of revenue, so that, where, under such sales, the auction-purchaser is given symbolical possession, he can bring his suit for actual possession against the defaulting proprietor at any time within twelve years of such symbolical delivery of possession.¹⁴

66. Decree does not interrupt adverse possession. — *X* obtained a decree for money against *A* who was a trustee in respect of certain properties. *A*'s son subsequently instituted a suit to establish that the property belonged to the trust. While the suit was pending, the property was sold in execution of *X*'s decree in 1898 and was purchased by one *M* who obtained possession thereof. It was subsequently decided in the suit filed by *A*'s son that the property belonged to the trust. *A*'s sons filed a suit against *M* in 1913 for possession of the property on the ground that it was trust property. It was held that the suit was barred. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

"At the moment when it (the decree in *A*'s son's suit) was passed, the possession of the purchaser was adverse, and the

[See (1900) 2 Bom L R 407 (409), *Sitaram v. Naro*]

[But see (1919) 2 Lah L Jour 91 (98), *Ali Balkh v. Mt Ghulam Fatima*]

12 (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 145 (147) 26 Ind Cas 537, *Gowinda Doss v. Rajan Venkata Perumal*.

[See (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 444 (446) 95 Ind Cas 27 2 Luck 239, *Parashdas v. Janki Ballabha Saran*]

13 (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 20 (23) 64 Ind Cas 98, *Mt Mahmudunnisa v. Zahid Raza*.

14 (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 199 (201) 37 Ind Cas 239, *Jitendra Kumar v. Mohendra Chandra*

(1917) A I R 1917 Cal 213 (216) 39 Ind Cas 213 41 Cal 412, *Mohim Chandra v. Pyari Lal*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Cal 870 (872) 115 Ind Cas 606, *Jaymanti Nath v. Sheikh Abdululla*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 66**

declaration that the property had been properly made subject to a trust disposition and therefore ought not to have been seized, did not disturb or affect the quality of his possession: it merely emphasised the fact that it was adverse. No further step was taken in consequence of that declaration until the present proceedings were instituted, when it was too late."¹

See also the undermentioned cases² holding the same view, viz. that a mere decree establishing the right of the plaintiff to possession does not interrupt the adverse possession of the plaintiff. In *Singaravelu v. Chokka Mudaliar*,³ Venkatasubha Rao, J., of the Madras High Court observed as follows: "Adverse possession is a question of fact and always implies that the right to immediate possession subsists in the true owner and not in the person having adverse possession. An adjudication that the true owner had a good title to possession is entirely consistent with the fact that the actual possession is with another party who ousted the true owner and has been holding possession as against the true owner on his own behalf. I therefore fail to see how a decree which negatived the first defendant's right could possibly be regarded in the nature of an interruption of the continuity of possession."

Note 66

1. (1923) A I R 1923 P C 175 (176, 177) : 50 Ind App 295 • 46 Mad 751 : 74 Ind Cas 492 (P C), *Subbaya Pandaram v. Md. Mustafa Marakayar*.
2. (1937) I L R (1937) 2 Cal 234 (240), *Bijay Gopal v. Gopee Das* (Declaratory decree does not interrupt adverse possession.)
 (1876) 25 Suth W R 249 (250), *Mulhool Ali v. Wajed Hossein*. (Do.)
 (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 88 (91) : 46 Mad 525 : 70 Ind Cas 994, *Singaravelu Mudaliar v. Chokka Mudaliar*. (Do.)
 (1911) 9 Ind Cas 795 (795, 796) (Mad), *Puthia Valapil Ayissa v. Lakshmana Prabhu*. (Do.)
 (1910) 8 Ind Cas 893 (894) (Mad), *Raghunathachariar v. Tiruvengada Ramanujacharya*. (Do.)
 (1936) A I R 1936 All 466 (467) : 163 Ind Cas 545, *Mahomed Tahir v. Bechey Lal*. (Do.)
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 472 (474) . 129 Ind Cas 703, *Jaimini Das v. Phulla Khan*. (Do.)
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 297 (299) • 120 Ind Cas 486, *Mahomed Ibrahim v. Shaida Muhammad*. (Do.)
 (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 602 (606, 607) : I L R (1937) Lah 255 : 172 Ind Cas 259, *Har Indar Singh v. Shiv Ram*. (Do.)
 (1926) 99 Ind Cas 956 (957) : 8 Lah L Jour 572 (575), *Alla Bakhsh v. Shadi*. (Do.)
 (1872) 17 Suth W R 119 (120) : 8 Beng L R 540, *Amiroonissa Begum v. Umar Khan*. (Decree for possession.)
 (1926) 98 Ind Cas 827 (828) (All), *Dalle v. Amira*. (Do.)
 (1872) 17 Suth W R 450 (451), *Kalee Kishore Sen v. Nilamber Sen*. (Do.)
 (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 70 (71) • 64 Ind Cas 352, *Fazal v. Mihan Khan*. (Do.)
 (1930) A I R 1930 Bom 400 (400) : 129 Ind Cas 339, *Mulchand v. Hirabai*. (Do.)
 (1939) A I R 1939 Bom 1 (16) . 179 Ind Cas 178, *Narayan Jivaji v. Guru-nathgouda*. (Do.)
3. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 88 (91) : 46 Mad 525 : 70 Ind Cas 994. (Dissenting from A I R 1920 Bom 61)

In some decisions⁴ it has been held that a decree in favour of the plaintiff will interrupt the adverse possession of the defendant. It is submitted that this view is not correct. But, where the plaintiff obtains possession under a decree, the defendant's adverse possession will be interrupted although the decree is reversed on appeal and possession is restored to the defendant on such reversal.⁵

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 66-67

In the undermentioned case,⁶ a third party obtained a decree for possession against the defendant and obtained possession in execution of such decree. The decree was reversed on appeal and possession was restored to the defendant. It was held that the defendant's adverse possession against the plaintiff was not interrupted by the third party's possession. It is submitted that the decision is not correct, inasmuch as the Statute requires actual possession on the part of the defendant for the statutory period in order to create a title by prescription in his favour and mere absence of possession on the part of the plaintiff is not enough.

In a suit for possession of land which was in the actual occupation of third parties, viz. riyats, it was held that a former decree obtained by the plaintiff against the riyats for rent showed that at the date of the decree the plaintiff was in possession as landlord and that therefore the decree saved the suit from limitation.⁷

67. Effect of attachment on adverse possession.—An attachment of immovable property under the Civil Procedure Code does not affect the possession of the property. Hence, such attachment does not interrupt the adverse possession of the property.¹ But, where on an attachment a claim petition is filed by the adverse possessor and rejected and he does not institute a suit within one

4 (1893) 5 All 345 (354). 1893 All W N 81 (F B), *Sarsuti v. Kunj Behari Lal* (1892) A I R 1932 Sind 35 (38). 26 Sind L R 127. 140 Ind Cas 225, *Gagumal Metharam v. Allahbux* (Decree for possession and ownership breaks continuity of possession of defendant).

(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 61 (61). 44 Bom 934. 58 Ind Cas 96, *Aliba v. Meer Inayatullah v. Abdul Aziz Mir Saheb Jahagirdar*. (Decree for possession).

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 470 (470). 45 Bom 913. 61 Ind Cas 414, *Rukhma-bai v. Ramchandra Vasudev* (Do).

(1934) A I R 1934 Bom 273 (276). 58 Bom 410. 154 Ind Cas 824, *Govind Ganpati v. Vishnu Rambhau* (Do).

(1892) 2 Mad L Jour 210 (212). *Bapayya v. Basimiah* (When the tenants under X are in possession and the plaintiff's title to the land is declared in a suit against X, a suit by the plaintiff brought within 12 years of such declaration held not barred, as the tenant's possession is the possession of X).

5. (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 609 (691). 35 Ind Cas 421, *Laxmipathaya v. Ramachandra*.

6. (1898) 22 Bom 733 (736). *Daidu v. Kalu*.

7. (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 630 (631). 23 Ind Cas 292, *Dev Narayan Prasad v. Udit Narayan Singh*.

Note 67

1. (1901) 11 Mad L Jour 344 (345). *Setharam Reddy v. Venkateswari* (When a trespasser is holding the property adversely to the owner the attachment of the property by a person who has got a decree against the owner, does not prevent the running of time in favour of the trespasser).

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 67**

year (under Article 11 *ante*) to establish his right (see Civil Procedure Code, Order 21 Rule 63), it has been held that he will be precluded from pleading that he was in adverse possession on the date of the order dismissing his claim petition.² But he will not be precluded from pleading that his possession has been adverse *from* the date of the order rejecting his claim.³ Further, where the attachment is *raised* subsequently, the adverse order on the claim petition ceases to be effective and the adverse possessor is not precluded from contending that he was in possession on the date of the order, although he has not questioned the order by means of a suit within one year under Article 11.^{3a}

An attachment of property under Sections 145 and 146, Criminal Procedure Code, is effected by the Magistrate actually taking possession of the property.^{3b} Hence, it cannot be said that such attachment does not affect the possession of the property. Such possession, however, enures to the benefit of the party in *actual* possession at the date of the proceedings if the attachment is under Section 145, and to the benefit of the party *lawfully entitled* to the property if the attachment is made under S. 146. Hence, where the property is in the possession of a trespasser and is attached under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the attachment does not interrupt the possession of the trespasser.⁴ But, where the attachment is under Section 146, the possession of the trespasser will be interrupted, inasmuch as the possession of the Court during the attachment will be one on behalf of the true owner.⁵

On the same reasoning, where the possession is with the true owner at the date of the attachment under Section 146, the attachment does not amount to a *dispossession* of the true owner.^{5a}

(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 42 (48) : 90 Ind Cas 1037, *Ranganath Iyer v. Srinivasa Iyengar*.

(1860) 4 Mad H C R 281 (285), *Krishnama Rajah v. Narayanasamy Rajah*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 41 (46) : 166 Ind Cas 308, *Dharapuram Janopahara Nidhi, Ltd v. Lakshminarayana Chettiar*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 43 (43) : 89 Ind Cas 424, *Harkishan Das v. Mt. Sundro Bibi*.

2. (1885) 8 Mad 506 (510), *Velayuthan v. Lakshmana*.

3. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 44 (46) : 166 Ind Cas 308, *Dharapuram Janopahara Nidhi Ltd. v. Lakshminarayana Chettiar*.

3a (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 44 (46) : 166 Ind Cas 308, *Dharapuram Janopahara Nidhi Ltd. v. Lakshminarayana Chettiar*.

3b See Notes under Sections 145 and 146 of the Authors' Code of Criminal Procedure.

4 See (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 782 (786) : 95 Ind Cas 117, *Abinash Chandra v. Tarun Charan*.

5 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 534 (586) : 66 Ind Cas 433, *Sarat Chandra v. Bibhabati Debi*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 419 (421) : 49 Cal 514 : 65 Ind Cas 200, *Panna Lal v. Panchu Rindas*.

5a (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 751 (752, 753) : 31 Ind Cas 242, *Drojjendra Kishore Roy v. Bharat Chandra Roy*.

(1902) 26 Mad 410 (413, 414, 415), *Rajah of Venkatagiri v. Isakapalli Subbiah*.

Where property is under attachment under Section 146, Criminal Procedure Code, the remedy of the true owner is by a suit for declaration of title and not for possession, as the property must be deemed to be only in the possession of the true owner during such attachment. Hence, although the true owner may frame his suit as one for possession, it must be treated as one for declaration of title and will not be governed by Article 142 or Article 144 as the case may be.⁶

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 67-68

See also the undermentioned cases⁷

68. Decision of Revenue Officer or Court regarding boundary, if interrupts adverse possession.—A decision of the Revenue authorities as to the boundaries of lands cannot have the effect of dispossessing as a fact any party who is in possession, and cannot constitute an interruption of possession. In *Kuppusami v Venkatasami*,¹ a case under the Madras Surveys and Boundaries Act, 1897, Mr. Justice Ramesam negatived the contention based on a decision of the Full Bench in *Muthirulandi Poosari v. Sethurama Iyer*,² that the decision of a Survey Officer as regards boundaries interrupted the adverse possession of the party in possession at the date of the decision. He held that the Full Bench did not decide the question. In *Azhaga Perumal Pillai v Rasa Pillai*,³ a Bench of the High Court of Madras observed as follows:

"Neither the decision of the Survey Officer nor the planting of stones in accordance with it in proceedings under the Act *ipso facto* dispossesses any party, nor could it make a legal break in existing possession so as to render ineffective, for purposes of limitation, any adverse possession running at its date. We do not agree with Mr. Ramachandra Iyer that that is the effect of the opinion of the Full Bench in *Muthirulandi Poosari v Sethurama Iyer*.⁴ Our view on this point is supported by the opinion of Ramesam, J., in *Kuppusami Iyer v Venkatasami*,⁵ and that of Benson and Krishnasami Iyer, JJ., in S A No. 1102 of 1909. It would be very extraordinary if the Survey

6. (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 419 (421) 65 Ind Cas 200 49 Cal 514, *Panna Lal v Panchu Rindas*

(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 751 (753) 31 Ind Cas 242, *Brojendra Kishore Roy v Bharat Chandra Roy*

7. (1869) 6 Bom H C R App Cas 41 (44), *Lado Lakshuman v Krishnaji Sadashiv*. (Property in possession of defendant attached by Government—Property then restored to defendant—Held that there was no interruption of the possession of defendant during the attachment.)

(1888) 1888 Bom P J 341, *Vishnu v. Bhikaji* (Period during which a village was under attachment by Government could not be taken into consideration in determining the duration of defendant's adverse possession.)

Note 68

1. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 29 (29) 70 Ind Cas 672

2. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 779 (781) 42 Mad 425 50 Ind Cas 43 (F B)

3. (1932) A I R 1932 Mad 310 (311) 138 Ind Cas 362.

4. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 779 (781) 42 Mad 425 50 Ind Cas 43 (F B)

5. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 29 (29) 70 Ind Cas 672

Arts. 142 & 144
• Note 68

Officer's decision could have such a result—a result which would follow no decision of a Civil Court that a party had or had not title."

A similar view has been taken by the High Court of Bombay in a case arising under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879.⁶

A contrary view has, however, been held by a single Judge of the Madras High Court in the undermentioned case,⁷ relying upon the view expressed to the same effect in *Ramamurthi v. Narayan Gajapathi*,⁸ in which Waller, J., observed that the Full Bench case referred to above did actually decide that such decision operated as an interruption of adverse possession. It is submitted that the contrary view stated above cannot be accepted as correct. The question referred to the Full Bench was as to the conclusiveness of the decision of the Revenue Officer on the rights of the parties as on the date of the order. It does not seem to be possible to regard the Full Bench as having impliedly decided what is really against sound principles of law. In *Achutaramayya v. Soorapayya*,⁹ Mr. Justice Wadsworth reviewed the previous authorities and held that a decision of the Revenue Officer as to the title of the parties would not interrupt adverse possession, but that "if the Revenue Officer gave a finding that the defendant was not in *actual physical possession* on the date of the order, the finding cannot be challenged by the defendant in a suit by the plaintiff for possession.

Where A in possession made a declaration that he held the property as trustee for B and the Revenue Court on the application of B subsequently ordered mutation in his name, it was held that this constituted clear dispossession of A.¹⁰

See also the undermentioned cases.¹¹

6. (1920) A I R 1920 Bom 215 (216) : 59 Ind Cas 437, *Manal v. Narayan*. (Fixing boundaries under S. 121 of Bombay Land Revenue Code)
7. (1934) A I R 1934 Mad 685 (686) : 152 Ind Cas 402, *Seetharamaraju v. Narayanaraju*.
8. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 279 (281, 289) : 56 Mad 366 . 141 Ind Cas 807.
9. (1939) A I R 1939 Mad 61 (62, 63).
10. (1923) A I R 1923 All 59 (63) : 69 Ind Cas 971 : 45 All 169, *Udit Narayan Singh v. Randhir Singh*.
11. (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 31 (32) . 61 Ind Cas 46 : 6 Pat L Jour 51, *Mahant Parbhucharan Bharti v. Secretary of State*. (The order of the Collector under S. 41 of the Bengal Survey Act in the case of a boundary dispute operates as the order of a Civil Court declaring the parties to be in possession of the land in accordance with the boundary as determined by the Collector and hence operates as a dispossession of the party adversely affected by the order)
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 277 (278, 279) : 61 Ind Cas 78, *Bahadur Ali Khan v. Secretary of State*. (An adverse decision under S. 41 of the Bengal Survey Act amounts to dispossession within the meaning of Article 142.)
- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 363 (365) (Cal), *Joy Kali Roy Choudhury v. Hemangini Deb*. (Mere registration of owner's name in Collectorate does not interrupt adverse possession.)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 263 (264) . 91 Ind Cas 19, *Mt. Saira Bibi v. Karim Hussain*. (Revenue Court's order refusing mutation of names in favour of a person in respect of an immovable property amounts to dispossession.)

69. Subsequent assertion of a different title by defendant, if affects his adverse possession.—The Government sold a certain taluk for arrears of Government revenue and it was purchased by X who was put in possession thereof in 1855. A filed a suit in 1868 against X for possession on the ground that the sale by the Government was void. He alleged that subsequent to 1855 the Government had made a new grant to X of the said land at an increased revenue, and this gave a fresh cause of action to the plaintiff. It was held that it did not give the plaintiff any fresh cause of action and that the suit beyond twelve years of the first dispossession in 1855 was barred.¹

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 69-70

70. Submerged land.—A person who has a title to land does not lose it by reason of the fact that it becomes submerged under water and thus becomes incapable of use and enjoyment. It follows that where land which became submerged under water re-forms and can be identified as having formed part of a particular estate, the owner of that estate is entitled to it.¹ The leading case on the point is *Felix Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor*.² In that case their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to the following passage in Hale's '*De Jure Maris*' (page 15)

"If a subject hath land adjoining the sea, and the violence of the sea swallow it up, but so that yet there be reasonable marks to continue the notice of it, or though the marks be defaced, yet if by situation and extent of quantity and bounding up on the firm land, the same can be known, or it be by art or industry regained, the subject doth not lose his property . . . But if it be freely left again by the reflux and recess of the sea, the owner may have his land as before, if he can make out where and what it was, for he cannot lose his propriety of the soil, although it for a time becomes part of the sea, and within the Admiral's jurisdiction while it so continues"

Their Lordships then observed as follows :

"This principle is one not merely of English law, nor a principle peculiar to any system of municipal law, but it is a principle founded in universal law and justice, that is to say,

Note 69

1. (1874) 22 Suth W R 187 (187) 1 Ind App 335 3 Sar 39 3 Suther 30 (P C), *Raja Sri Chaitanya Chundra v. Collector of Ganjam*.

Note 70

- 1 (1875) 23 Suth W R 18 (9) 14 Beng L R 268 2 Ind App 28 3 Suther 56 : 3 Sar 411 (P C) *Harsuhas Singh v. Syud Looft Ali Khan*
(1906) 3 Cal L Jour 560 (568) 1 Mad L Tim 175 (P C), *Rani Hemantia Kumari Deby v. Secretary of State*
(1935) A I R 1935 P C 125 (126, 127) 156 Ind Cas 549 (P C), *Tara! das v. Secretary of State*.
(1867) 2 Agr 64 (G-), *Hur Sahai v. Mahomed Dium Khan*
(1905) 3 Cal L Jour 316 (333), *Ananda Hari Prash v. Secretary of State*.
(2 Ind App 28, Followed)
2 (1870) 18 Moo Ind App 467 (472) 14 Suth W R P C 11 5 Beng L R 521 . 2 Suther 336 2 Sar 594 (P C) (3 Suth W R 51, Overruled)

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 70**

that whoever has land, wherever it is, whatever may be the accident to which it has been exposed, whether it be a vineyard which is covered by lava or ashes from a volcano, or a field covered by the sea or by a river, the ground, the site, the property, remains in the original owner."

But, in order to apply the doctrine in *Lopez's case*² it is necessary that the person claiming the re-formed land should have been, before submersion, *entitled* to it. The onus will be on him to show that he had a subsisting title to the property on the date of the submersion.³ Where a person acquires a title by adverse possession to land re-formed after submersion, and thereafter the land is again submerged and again re-formed, the title to it will be that of the person who had acquired title by adverse possession and not of the original owner.⁴

Not only will the *title* continue in the owner during the period of submersion, but *possession in law* would be considered to be in the *true owner* during such period.⁵ This would be so whether the true

3. (1935) A I R 1935 P C 125 (126) : 156 Ind Cas 518 (P C), *Tarakdas v. Secretary of State*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1230 (1231) : 88 Ind Cas 567, *Panchanon Sarkar v. Basanta Kumari*.

4. (1877) 3 Cal 796 (800) : 1 Cal L R 259 : 3 Sutherland 486 : 3 Sar 776 : 2 Ind Jur 147 (P C), *Radha Prosad Singh v. Ram Koomar Singh*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 519 (520) : 106 Ind Cas 86, *Bhagwan Bahsh Singh Dejaipal Singh*.

5. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 18 (21) : 44 Cal 858 : 44 Ind App 104 : 40 Ind Cas 327 (P C), *Patil v. Secretary of State*.

W N 617 :

(1881) 7 Cal L R 364 (368). Sutherland says (1) Of course, according to *Ray v. Inglis*, (The burden of proving that the plaintiff has lost that title by reason of the adverse possession of the defendant would then be upon the defendant.)

(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 687 (695) : 65 Ind Cas 866, *Secretary of State v. Wajed Ali*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1230 (1231) : 88 Ind Cas 567, *Panchanon Sarkar v. Basanta Kumari Das*.

(1906) 28 All 760 (762) : 3 All L Jour 567 : 1906 All W N 234, *Munshi Mashar Hasan v. Behari Singh*.

(1935) 163 Ind Cas 897 (902) : 62 Cal L Jour 177 (188) : 63 Cal 300, *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmed Nawab Chowdhury*.

(1922) 65 Ind Cas 769 (770) (Oudh), *Dachcha Singh v. Sri Kamlayat Prosad*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 417 (417) : 122 Ind Cas 486, *Khan Beg v. Khuda Bahsh*.

(1925) A I R 1925 All 187 (195) : 153 Ind Cas 708 : 57 All 588, *Sri Krishna Dutt v. Mt. Ahmadi Bibi*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 468 (470) : 143 Ind Cas 411, *Rasdhari Lal v. Nandlal Mahlon*.

(1930) 123 Ind Cas 817 (819) (All), *Ram Krishan Das v. Mst Chand*.

(1915) A I R 1915 All 296 (299) : 29 Ind Cas 278, *Baldeo Thakur v. Ugrnath Misra*.

..... v. Annoda Mohan Roy.
..... Hafiz Hussain.

..... v. Anutosh Gossami,
..... Jogendra Nath v. Jagadranath Ray.

(1925) A I R 1925 Nag 164 (165) : 83 Ind Cas 8, *Laladhar v. Khetsingh*.

owner was or was not in possession before the date of the submergence, provided he had a subsisting title to the land on that date. If he was in possession on that date, his possession would not terminate by reason of the submergence, but will be deemed to continue during the period of submersion.⁶ If he was not in possession on that date but had a subsisting title, the possession of any person who was occupying the land at that time wrongfully would terminate⁷ and the true owner would be deemed to be constructively in possession. The reason is that constructive possession cannot be implied in favour of a wrongdoer.⁸ Nor will such possession enable

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 70

- (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 627 (627) : 92 Ind Cas 178, *Darhat v. Relu Mal*.
 (1918) 18 Ind Cas 613 (615) (All), *Loknath v. Manorath Ram*
 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 855 (863) : 51 Cal 669 : 78 Ind Cas 679, *Suresh Chandra v. Shuti Kanta*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 97 (98) : 91 Ind Cas 5, *Mohendra Nath v. Nabadwip Chandra Nandy*.
 (1876) 1876 Pun Re No. 19, *Sahib Rai v. Khair Shah*.
 (1929) 117 Ind Cas 318 (319) (Pat), *Ali Muddin v. Salim*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 277 (281) : 66 Ind Cas 923, *Maharaja of Cooh Behar v. Mahendra Ranjan Rai*
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 75 (76, 77) : 69 Ind Cas 912, *Ram Narain Misir v. Deoki Misir*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 451 (452) : 28 Ind Cas 426, *Mahadeo Prasad v. Mt Sheonandan Koor*
 (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 470 (473), *Secretary of State v. Surya Rao Bahadur Garu*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Pat 468 (470) : 148 Ind Cas 444, *Rasdharslal v. Nandlal Mahlon*
 (1923) 74 Ind Cas 881 (891) (Pat), *Keshav Prasad Singh v. Secretary of State*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 464 (473) : 29 Ind Cas 156, *Amrita Sundari v. Shera-juddin Ahamed*
 [See also (1929) 117 Ind Cas 202 (203) (Pat), *Parbu Pandey v. Rameshwar*
 (1904) 9 Cal W N 111 (115), *Madhab Sundari Dassya v. Gaganendra Nath Tagore*.]

- G. (1930) A I R 1930 P C 198 (200) : 126 Ind Cas 81 (P C), *Rampati Chatterjee v. Ramani Mohan Sen*
 (1905) 3 Cal L Jour 316 (336), *Ananda Hari Dasak v. Secretary of State* (The principle applies even where Government is the owner)
 (1906) 1906 Pun L R No 158, *Amir Muhammad Shah v. Sultan Khan*.
 7. (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 687 (693) : 65 Ind Cas 866, *Secretary of State v. Wazid Ali Khan*.
 8. (1902) 29 Ind App 104 (105) : 29 Cal 518 : 4 Bom L R 537 : 6 Cal W N 617 : 8 Sir 200 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Krishnamoni Gupta*
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 417 (417) : 127 Ind Cas 486, *Khan Deji v. Khuda Baksh*
 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (564, 565) : 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhai Chandra Ghose v. Durgadas Samantia*
 (1912) 16 Ind Cas 17 (17) (Cal), *Golap Moni Das v. Kali Charan Kundu*.
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 359 (360) (Cal), *Barada Prasad v. Annoda Melan*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 70**

a wrongdoer to acquire a title by adverse possession, inasmuch as in order to acquire a title by adverse possession, *actual* possession on the part of the wrongdoer is necessary during the whole period of twelve years.^{6a} (See Note 53 *ante*.)

The result is that if the true owner is shown to have been in possession at the date of submergence and the submergence continued till within twelve years of the suit, the true owner is entitled to recover possession of the land from any wrongdoer in possession. Even if at the time of the submergence the wrongdoer is in possession, the submergence would operate as an *interruption* of the adverse possession, and if the re-formation of the land has taken place within twelve years of the suit, the true owner is entitled to recover the same from the wrongdoer.⁹

In *The Secretary of State for India v. Krishnamoni Gupta*,¹⁰ the Government had dispossessed the true owner of certain lands and were in adverse possession thereof at the time of its submergence under water. The submergence continued till within twelve years of the suit for possession by the true owner. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. Their Lordships observed as follows:

"It is urged on behalf of the Government that, having been in possession through their tenants when the lands became submerged, their possession must be deemed to have continued in law while the lands were under water, and to have revived on their being re-formed, and reliance is placed on a case of *Kally Churn Sahoo v. Secretary of State*,¹¹ decided by the High Court in 1881. For the purpose of trying the question whether limitation applies, the Government must be regarded as a trespasser and dispossessor of the rightful owners, and in the opinion of their Lordships it would be contrary both to principle and authority to imply such constructive possession in favour of a wrongdoer so as to enable him to obtain thereby a title by limitation. In order to sustain a claim to land by limitation under the Indian Act, there must, in their opinion,

(1936) 163 Ind Cas 697 (902) : 63 Cal 300 (312), *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmed Nawab Choudhry*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 387 (398) : 164 Ind Cas 118, *Partab Bahadur Singh v. Jagatjit Singh*.

(1905) 3 Cal L Jour 316 (336), *Ananda Hari Basak v. Secretary of State*.

6a. (1921) 1 I R 300 (Cal 100) (1902) 63 Cal 300 (312), *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmed Nawab Choudhry*.

cannot take the place of actual adverse possession.)

(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 451 (452) : 28 Ind Cas 426, *Mahadeo Prasad v. Mt. Sheonandan Kuer*. (Trespasser's leasing out the fishery rights during the period of submergence is not actual possession of the land by him.)

9. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 94 (95) : 34 All 612, *Habibullah Khan v. Lalita Prasad*.
10. (1902) 29 Ind App 104 (115) : 29 Cal 515 : 4 Bom L R 537 : 6 Cal W N 617 : 8 Ear 260 (P C).
11. (1881) 6 Cal 725 (740) : 8 Cal L R 90 : 4 Shome L R 96.

be actual possession of a person claiming as of right by himself or by persons deriving title from him. The possession of the Government was in fact determined by the submergence of the land which then became derelict, and so long as it remained in that stato no title could be acquired against the true owner. Sir R. Garth, however, seems to have thought that in such a case the possession of a trespasser would continue until the true owner resumed possession.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 70

"Their Lordships cannot agree in this view. On the contrary, they think that on the dispossession of the Government by the *vis major* of the floods, the constructive possession of the land was (if anywhere) in the true owners. In the case of *Trustees, Executors and Agency Co. v. Short*,¹² it was laid down by this Board that 'if a person enters upon the land of another and holds possession for a time, and then without having acquired title under the statute abandons possession, the rightful owner on the abandonment is in the same position in all respects as he was before the intrusion took place.' And the opinion of Parke, B., is there quoted that there must be both absence of possession by the person who has the right and actual possession by another to bring the case within the statute.

"Their Lordships think that for this purpose dispossession by *vis major* has the same effect as voluntary abandonment, and they are of opinion that the case of *Kally Churn Sahoo v. Secretary of State*,¹³ was wrongly decided, and ought to be overruled."

*Krishnamoni Gupta's case*¹⁴ was followed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of *Basant Kumar v. Secretary of State*,¹⁵ where their Lordships held that no rational distinction could be drawn between a case where the re-flooding was seasonal and occurred for several months in each year and a case where the submergence continued for several years at a time. Their Lordships further observed "A man may cease to use his land because he cannot use it, since it is under water. He does not thereby discontinue his possession, constructively it continues until he is dispossessed, and upon the cessation of the dispossession before the lapse of the statutory period, constructively it reverts . . . it seems to follow that there can be no continuance of adverse possession, when the land is not capable of use and enjoyment, so long as such adverse possession must rest on *de facto* use and occupation"

In *Bhupendra v. Rageswar*,¹⁵ their Lordships of the Privy Council again reiterated the same view and observed. "While lands are submerged, constructive possession is with the true owner, and

12. (1888) 37 W R (Eng) 433 (494)

13. (1881) 6 Cal 725 (740) 8 Cal L R 90 4 Shome L R 96

14. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 18 (21) 41 Cal 558 41 Ind App 101 40 Ind Cas 337 (P C)

15. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 162 (164) 182 Ind Cas 610 55 Ind App 225 53 Cal 80 (P C)

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 70-71

that, though immediately prior to the deluviation physical possession had been with the adverse claimant."

It has been held in some cases¹⁶ that in order that coconstructive possessioo may be deemed to be in the true owoer, it is necessary that such owner *must have been in possession* at the date of the submergence. It is submitted that this view is oot correct.

The principle that constructive possession is in the true owner during the period of submergence of the land uoder water is based really on the fact that the land is *incapable* of actual enjoyment during the period of submergence and that the adverse possessioo of the wroogdoer (which must be actual) is thereby terminated. The principle would not, consequently, apply where the laods go under water for a few days every year but without ioterfering with the usual agricultural operation on the land.¹⁷

Where a person claims to have been in adverse possession for the required period of the land *after* its re-formation, no question arises as to the applicability of the doctrine in *Lopez's case*.¹⁸

71. Receiver and adverse possession. — Where the owner of certain property died and the property was kept derelict (the heirs being absent from the place) and possession was taken by the officials of the Court, it was held by the Privy Council that it must be presumed that such possessioo was taken for the benefit of the persons rightfully entitled.¹

The same principle holds good even in cases where rival claimants to the possession of the property are present and a Receiver is appointed by the Court to take charge of the properties *pendente lite*. The possession of the Receiver in such cases would really be on behalf of the person who is ultimately found entitled to it,² and is

16. (1906) 1906 All W N 231 (235) : 28 All 760 : 3 All L Jour 567, *Munshi Mazar Hasan v. Bihari Singh*.

Ghose v.

Vand Lal.

v. Nand

Lal.

(1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 830 (337, 338) : 19 Oudh Cas 374 : 37 Ind Cas 715, *Hearsey v. Sardar Karam Singh*.

1917 All 1000 : 2 Ind Jur

anta Kumar

Roy.

(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 277 (282) : 66 Ind Cas 923, *Maharaja of Cooch Behar v. Mahendra Ranjan Rai Chaudhri*.]

Note 71

1. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 243 (246) : A C 230 : 81 L J P C 151 (P.C.), *Corea v. Appuhamy*.

2. (1920) A I R 1926 Cal 385 (392) : 52 Cal 914 : 90 Ind Cas 851, *Eastern Mortgage and Agency Co. Ltd v. Mohammad Farul Karim*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 600 (610) : 79 Ind Cas 520, *Dwijendra Narain v. Joges Chandra*.

(1901) 27 Mad 591 (593) : 14 Mad L Jour 297, *Vedanyaga Mudaliar v. Vedammal*.

not adverse to him.³ But the possession of the Receiver would operate as a dispossession of the wrongdoer who was in possession at the date of the appointment, and would thus operate as an *interruption of the adverse possession*, so that the wrongdoer cannot, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, count the period of his possession before the Receiver took possession.⁴

The mere appointment of a Receiver however, without his taking actual possession of the property, will not interrupt adverse possession of the wrongdoer.⁵

72. Abandonment of possession.—Where a *trespasser* abandons his possession before the expiry of the statutory period, the rightful owner, on such abandonment, is in the same position in all respects as he was before the intrusion takes place.¹ The possession of the intruder, ineffectual for the purpose of transferring title, ceases upon its abandonment to be effectual for any purpose.²

The question of abandonment by the owner must be considered with reference to local circumstances and conditions. Where a person fails for a long time to take up or keep up a property of *value* and has no explanation for his neglect, it may be fair to suppose that

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 71-72

- (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 602 (611), *Sarala Sundari Das v. Sarada Prosad Sur*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 974 (978) . 40 Ind Cas 50, *Subbiya Pandaram v. Mahamad Mustapha Maracayar*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 61 (62) 97 Ind Cas 783, *Hari Sahib v. Shriaji Raja Sahib*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 887 (395) 12 Luck 371 . 164 Ind Cas 118, *Partab Bahadur Singh v. Jagatjit Singh*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Pat 260 (261) 7 Pat 819 108 Ind Cas 69, *Bisheshwar Pratap v. Chandreshwar Prasad*.
 (1912) 18 Ind Cas 215 (216) 13 Cri L Jour 23 (Mad), *Ismail Ghami Annal v. Katima Rowther*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 8 (10) 49 Ind Cas 69, *Kuppuswamy Chetty v. Kusala Ramiah*.
 (1874) 22 Suth W R 265 (267), *Jeebunessree Dabee v. Kristo Monoo Dabee*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (189) . 103 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim Khan v. Saadat Ali Khan*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 681 (683) 86 Ind Cas 677, *Sreedhar Chaudhury v. Nulmony Chaudhury*.
 (1855) 11 Cal 496 (498), *Karticknath Pandey v. Padmanund Singh*.
 (1894) 17 Mad 501 (503), *Orr v. Nuthua Chetty*.
 3. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 8 (10) 49 Ind Cas 69, *Kuppuswamy Chetty v. Kusala Ramiah*.
 (1855) 11 Cal 496 (498), *Karticknath Pandey v. Padmanund Singh*.
 4. (1928) A I R 1928 Pat 260 (263, 261) 7 Pat 319 103 Ind Cas 69, *Bisheshwar Pratap v. Chandreshwar Prasad*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 61 (62) 97 Ind Cas 783, *Hari Sahib v. Shriaji Raja Sahib*.
 (1904) 2 Cal L Jour 602 (611), *Sarala Sundari Das v. Sarada Prosad Sur*.
 5. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 118 (123) 76 Ind Cas 511, *Pantaj Mohan v. Fuyin Behari*.

Note 72

1. (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 130 (137) 91 Ind Cas 163 5 Pat 50 *Madanar Zamundary Co., Ltd v. Ram Kanai Singh Da.*
 2. (1888) 13 A C 594 (598) 37 W R (Eng) 433 58 L J P C 4 59 L T 677 63 J P 132, *Trustees and Agency Co., Ltd v. Sh. r.*

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 72-75

he may have abandoned his rights. But where the land consists of scanty culturable areas recovered from time to time from the river which had inundated them and it does not pay the owners to devote their attention to working it, it cannot be supposed that the owners have, by not cultivating it, abandoned their rights to it.³

73. Confiscation and re-grant. — By the order of confiscation in Oudh, all titles to the lands confiscated were put an end to and the same were vested in Government. Where the Government made a re-grant of such estate to A and A sued for possession within twelve years thereof, it was held that the suit could not be barred by limitation.¹

74. Revenue sale — Adverse possession against purchaser. — A certain property was sold at a Revenue sale under the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 11 of 1859 in consequence of the non-payment of the Government assessment, and was purchased by X. The sale took place in January 1891. The defendant claimed that he was in adverse possession of the property against all persons having claims since 1859, and that the suit was barred. It was held that what was sold in the Revenue sale was not the interest of the defaulting owner, but the interest of the Crown subject to the payment of the Government assessment, and that therefore the time limited by the Limitation Act commenced to run only from the date of the sale and that the suit within twelve years thereof was not barred.¹

75. Dispossession of wrongdoer by another, if interrupts adverse possession. — It has been seen in Note 64 *ante* that where there is a break in the continuity of adverse possession, the result is that the possession automatically reverts in the owner and that no act is necessary on his part to bring about such reversion. As has been stated in *Trustees & Agency Co., Ltd. v. Short*,¹ if an intruder without title holds possession for less than the statutory period and then abandons possession and there is then no person against whom the rightful owner can bring his action, the rightful owner is in the same position as if no intrusion had taken place, and, although he is out of possession for the statutory period and another intruder subsequently takes possession but does not hold for the statutory period, the title of the rightful owner is unaffected by the statute. There is no difference in principle between a break in continuity

3. (1906) 1906 Pun L R No. 153, *Amir Muhammad Shah v. Sultan Khan*.

Note 73

1. (1901) 21 All 1 (11, 12) 28 Ind App 163. 8 Sar 65 (PC), *Maqbul Husain v. Lalla Prasad*.

Note 74

1. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 82 (83) 25 Ind Cas 309 (P C), *Surja Kanta Acharjya v. Sarat Chandra Roy*.
[See also (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 697 (696) 65 Ind Cas 866, *Secretary of State v. Wazid Ali Khan*.]

Note 75

1. (1888) 37 W R (Eng) 433 (431) 13 A C 733 53 L J P C 4 : 53 L T 677 : 53 J P 132.

caused by the *voluntary abandonment* by the wrongdoer and a break in the continuity caused by extraneous circumstances.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 75-76

Suppose now that a person in adverse possession is, before he has prescribed for the statutory period, himself dispossessed by another person without title. It is clear that such dispossession is an interruption of the possession of the first wrongdoer. But it is also clear that there is no interval in which it can be said that there is no person against whom the rightful owner can bring an action for possession. The possession does not become revested in the rightful owner, and the dispossession of the first wrongdoer by the second is not a dispossession of the true owner.² Thus, where *A* entered on *B*'s property under a title consistent with that of *B*, but his possession became subsequently adverse to *B*, and while in such possession he was dispossessed by *C*, a trespasser, it was held that *C*'s dispossession of *A* was not a dispossession of *B*, that the suit by *B* for possession was not a suit based on dispossession (*A*'s entry having been consistent with *B*'s title) but one governed by Article 144 of the Act.³ It was, however, held in the undermentioned cases⁴ that when the possession passes from the first to the second trespasser, there is a *constructive restoration, even if a momentary one*, of the true title to possession. If it is meant by this that possession momentarily reverts in the true owner at the time of dispossession by the second trespasser, it is submitted that the view does not seem to be correct.

As to the effect of dispossession by the second trespasser of the first trespasser on the applicability of Articles 142 and 144 to a suit by the owner for possession, see Note 92 *infra*.

76. Possession must be open.—It would follow from what has been said in Note 16 *ante*, that one of the essential elements for the acquisition of title by adverse possession is that the possession

2. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (643) : 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balakrishna*.

[See also (1910) 8 Ind Cas 1095 (1095) (All), *Ram Lallan Rai v. Gajadhar Rai* (Person entering without title, on the property of deceased person, dispossessed by second trespasser—Suit by true heir held governed by Art. 144 as heir was never dispossessed by anybody.)

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 48 (48) 45 Bom 570 59 Ind Cas 605, *Ramchandra Dalwant v. Balaji Ganesh*

3. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 639 (643) 35 Bom 79, *Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balakrishna*

4. (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 313 (314) 29 Oudh Cas 131 92 Ind Cas 825, *Sukhdoo v. Mt. Ram Dulari*

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 176 (177) 50 Ind Cas 602, *Jarai Nath Saha v. Eknath Nath*

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 874 (900) 60 Cal 1052 145 Ind Cas 1177, *Asaf Latif v. Hamed Gazi*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 76

of the wrongdoer must be open.^{1a} An open possession is a possession which is overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening.¹ It is not necessary to prove actual knowledge on the part of the owner of the adverse possession.² In *Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal*,³ where

Note 76

1a (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 61 (65) : 160 Ind Cas 896, *Barj Nath Mandar v. Ram Adhin Ray*.

(1935) 164 Ind Cas 61 (63) : 62 Cal 921 (926), *Upendranath Ray v. Jitendra-nath Kundu*. (Where the assertion of right is secret and not open, the possession cannot be held to be adverse.)

1. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (25) : 147 Ind Cas 545 . 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Lah 298 (299) : 27 Ind Cas 610, *Khuda Bakhs v. Kar-mun*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 25 (27) : 13 Lah 677 . 140 Ind Cas 604, *Shriromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Kosakotla v. Prem Das*. (Mahant getting mutation effected in his name by ex parte decree—Not a sufficient overt act.)

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 6 (8) : 170 Ind Cas 994, *Mt. Shanti Devi v. Mani Singh*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Rang 180 (182). 171 Ind Cas 643, *Dashir Ahmed v. Maat-schappij*.

Kundu.
 (1930) 163 Ind Cas 897 (902, 903) : 63 Cal 300 (318, 314, 316), *Surendra Kumar Roy Chowdhury v. Ahmed Nawab Choudhury*.

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 467 (468) (Mad), *Veeranna v. Chelamayya*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Pat 220 (222) . 175 Ind Cas 202, *Gopiram Ramchandra Firm v. v. Natar Lal*: (Sub-lessee, instead of growing crops, erecting head works of colliery—Held sub-lessee's possession was open and public and hence adverse to the landlord.)

(1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 21 (23) : 147 Ind Cas 805, *Mahomed Mahmud v. Mahomed Afeg*.

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 467 (468) (Mad), *Veeranna v. Chelamayya*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Oudh 238 (246) : 177 Ind Cas 718, *Musaheb Khan v. Raj Kumar Bakshi*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Nag 27 (27) : 28 Nag L R 282 : 140 Ind Cas 831, *Mura-duddin v. Mt. Umraobi*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (761, 762) : 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prosanna v. Manindra Chandra*

(1935) A I R 1935 All 265 (267) . 163 Ind Cas 898, *Chanar Singh v. Chanar Singh*

(1909) 8 Ind Cas 431 (432) (Cal), *Barath Badri Sahi v. Chamra Uraon*

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 6 (8) : 170 Ind Cas 994, *Mt. Shanti Devi v. Mani Singh*

[See (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 112 (113) . 29 Nag L R 48 : 141 Ind Cas 696, *Jai Krishna v. Babu* (Possession to the knowledge of the plaintiff and in contravention of his right is clearly adverse to him.)]

3 (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (25) : 147 Ind Cas 515 . 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 262 (P C).

A claimed a title by adverse possession against the Crown and the latter pleaded that it had no knowledge of the adverse possession of A, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

Arts. 142 & 143
Note 76

"Mr. Dunne for the Crown appeared to desiderate that the adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the Crown, but in their Lordships' opinion there is no authority for this requirement. It is sufficient that the possession be overt and without any attempt at concealment, so that the person against whom time is running ought, if he exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is happening. If the rights of the Crown have been openly usurped, it cannot be heard to plead that the fact was not brought to its notice."

It has been held in some cases⁴ that knowledge is necessary on the part of the true owner in order to constitute the wrongdoer's possession adverse. In view of the clear pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Debendra Lal's case*⁵ above referred to, the view expressed in the said cases cannot, it is submitted, be considered to be correct.

Where A sued for possession of underground mining areas in which the defendant was carrying on mining operations, and to which the plaintiff claimed title and proved it, it was held that the defendant must, in order to show adverse possession for the statutory period, prove that the possession was open—i.e. that "there was that to be seen on the surface which the plaintiffs' predecessor, being reasonably vigilant, ought to have seen, and so seeing would have been put on their guard, although they did not have any title to the surface"⁶

⁴ (1879) 3 Bom 452 (520, 784, 785), *Bhaskarappa v Collector of North Kanara*

(1935) A I R 1935 Bom 98 (100, 101) 156 Ind Cas 339, *Daluchand v Shanti*. (Word 'adverse' in Article 144 connotes something similar to knowledge)

(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 101 (106) . 22 Nag L R 175 . 100 Ind Cas 446, *Mt. Deshrani v. Kishore Singh*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 46 (48) . 7 Luck 250 . 137 Ind Cas 678, *Suraj Bala v. Mahadev Prasad*

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 203 (204) . 56 Ind Cas 511, *Manulla Kolu v. Prasanna Kumar Sarkar*

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 402 (405) . 119 Ind Cas 866, *Mubimulniss v. H. Hossain*

(1913) 21 Ind Cas 201 (207) (Cal) *Radha Madhab Naran v. Usan Mahate*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 313 (315) . 29 Oudh Cas 131 . 92 Ind Cas 825, *Sulhdeo v. Mt. Ramdulari*

(1871) 15 Suth W R 191 (191) . 6 Beng L R App 151, *Dhanuk Dhar Singh Gopi Singh*.

[See (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 448 (449) . 104 Ind Cas 394, *Ashraf Ali v. Sakhanat Hussain* (Adverse entry in khewat will not set time running against person unless he has notice)]

(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 213 (214) . 2 Pat 639 . 75 Ind Cas 955 *Ramanadhan Sahay v. Jayram Pandey*]

[See also (1907) 34 Cal 753 (774) . 5 Cal L Jour 583 . 12 Cal W N 193, *Broyenath Bose v. Durga Pershad Singh*]

⁵ (1935) A I R 1935 P C 86 (39) . 153 Ind Cas 929 . 14 Pat 327 . 62 Ind App 40 (P C), *Srischandra Nandy v. Bijnath Jugakur* etc

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 76-77

See also the undermentioned case.⁶

77. Adverse possession against minor or lunatic.—It has been seen in Note 32 to Section 6 *ante* that the mere fact that a person is a minor or lunatic will not prevent limitation from running against him although he will be entitled to an *extended* period of limitation. Hence, although a property may belong to a minor or lunatic, if such property is in the adverse possession of another, limitation will run in the latter's favour.^{1a} But the question arises whether there can be adverse possession against a minor or lunatic. In *Seetharamaraju v. Subbaraju*,¹ their Lordships of the Madras High Court observed as follows:

"We do not think it can be stated as a general proposition that there could be no adverse possession of property which belongs to a lunatic or minor during the continuance of the lunacy or minority of the owner.

"The question has in each case to be decided with reference to the anterior relationship between the person taking possession and the minor or lunatic, and to whether any circumstances exist which would entitle the Court to hold that the person who entered into possession did so under circumstances which would in law make him only an agent or bailiff of the minor or lunatic.

"... It seems to us from the provisions of the Limitation Act that lunacy or minority would not by itself prevent limitation from running as against a lunatic or minor and that in cases where it is clear that the person entering into possession was under no duty to the lunatic or minor and entered into possession for his own benefit and in assertion of a title hostile to that of the lunatic or minor, limitation would begin to run from the date when he so took possession, though the lunatic would be entitled to file a suit within three years from the date when his disability ceases"

It has been seen that in the case of co-owners, there can be no adverse possession by one of them against the others unless there is a denial of their title to their *knowledge*. Suppose the co-owner against whom adverse possession is claimed is a minor. Can there be a denial of his title to his knowledge? In *Jagannath v. Chandni Bibi*,² Mookerjee, J., observed as follows: "Apart from this, we have

⁶. (1912) 13 Ind Cas 467 (468) (Mad), *Veeranna v. Chelamayya*. (If the possession of the defendant is of an ineffective character such as by tying cattle, assuming that its character could be improved by an assertion of title made to the owner's knowledge, it is necessary for the defendant to show that the owner had knowledge of such assertion or that it was made under circumstances which would imply that he must have had knowledge.)

NOTE 77

^{1a} See (1893) 1893 Bom P J 97, *Daga v. Babaji*.

¹. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 12 (15); 45 Mad 861; 70 Ind Cas 678.

² (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 647 (651); 67 Ind Cas 31.

the important circumstance that in this case the rightful owner, the second plaintiff Ramnibas, who, when a child a few months old, was taken in adoption in 1892, was a minor till at least 1910, it is thus difficult to appreciate how the contesting defendants began to hold adversely to the knowledge of the infant in 1901." It is submitted that by his above remarks the learned Judge cannot have intended to lay down as a general proposition that minority necessarily excludes knowledge. The question must be one depending on the age of the minor and other circumstances in each case.³ It cannot be said that minority in itself negatives knowledge.⁴

Although, thus, the minority or insanity of the owner does not prevent limitation from running against him or possession from becoming adverse against him, he will be entitled to an *extended* period of limitation under the provisions of Sections 6 and 8 *ante*.⁵

Article 44 *supra* applies to a suit by a minor to set aside an alienation of his property by his guardian where such alienation is voidable.^{6a} But where the alienation of a minor's property is void, Article 44 does not apply.⁶ (See Notes to Article 44.) In such a case, the remedy of the minor will be by a suit for *possession* where the alienee has taken possession under colour of the transfer. It is conceived that the Article applicable to such a suit will be Article 142. (See Note 60 *ante*.) Hence, it is submitted that the undermentioned decisions,⁷ in which it was held that Article 144 will apply to such cases, are not correct.

78. Possession is not adverse to person not having a present right to possession.—Adverse possession is possession which is in contravention of the right of another to such possession. Hence, possession cannot be adverse against a person who is not entitled to

- 3 (1932) A I R 1932 Bom 23 (24) 184 Ind Cas 366, *Shidlingata v. Rajata*
4. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 793 (798, 800) 52 Ind Cas 725, *Narasimha v. Krishnachandra*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 P O 187 (141) 48 Bom 411 51 Ind App 220 79 Ind Cas 971 (P C), *Kalyandappa v. Chandasappa*.
5. (1903) 1903 Pun L R No. 51, *Dasant v. Indar*.
- 5a (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 346 (347) 161 Ind Cas 797 59 Mad 519, *Ankamma v. Kameshwaramma*.
6. See (1915) A I R 1915 Nag 52 (55) 12 Nag L R 12 32 Ind Cas 212, *Asiram v. Ratansingh*
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 572 (573) 62 Ind Cas 423, *Laloo Karikar v. Jajati Chaudhri Saha*
- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 145 (147) 99 Ind Cas 1050, *Mahadeo v. Somaji*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 154 (155) 49 Ind Cas 118, *Aftabuddin v. Pro'ash Chunder Soot*
- 7 (1879) 5 Cal 363 (370, 378) 5 Cal L R 374 5 Ind Jur 200, *Sekher Chund v. Dulputy Singh*
- (1914) A I R 1914 Nag 75 (76, 77) 10 Nag L R 133 26 Ind Cas 513 *Husen v. Rajaram*
- (1918) A I R 1918 Nag 20 (22) 15 Nag L R 55 51 Ind Cas 943, *Ullu v. Devidas*
- (1931) A I R 1931 Rang 178 (173) 134 I C 214, *Ranga Khim v. Ma Chit*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 457 (461) 49 Mad 76 92 Ind Cas 827, *Seetharamamma v. Appiah*

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 77-78

Arts. 142 & 144 Note 78

possession.¹ Thus, where *A* is entitled to a life-estate in certain land and *B* is entitled to the remainder, the possession of a transferee from *A* does not become adverse to *B* before *A*'s death.² *A* is entitled to a vested interest in a house but not to possession of it during the lifetime of *B*, a widow, who is entitled to possession in virtue of a right of residence. *A* transfers his rights to *C*. The possession of the widow is not adverse to *C* as his right to possession accrues only after the widow's death.³ See the undermentioned cases³ for other instances.

Note 78

1. (1928) A I R 1928 All 726 (730) : 50 All 986 : 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal*.
 - (1878) 4 Cal 327 (329, 331) : 2 Shome L R 106, *Bejoy Chunder Banerjee v. Kally Prosonno Mookerjee*.
 - (1902) 26 Bom 617 (621) : 4 Bom L R 312, *Balkrishna v. Gouind*.
 - (1912) 17 Ind Cas 642 (644) : 37 Bom 64, *Dabaji Akoba v. Dattu Laxman*.
 - (1871) 16 Suth W R 270 (270), *Kabul Krishna Dass v. Mohessuree Debia*.
 - (1937) A I R 1937 Cal 343 (345) : 173 Ind Cas 439, *Narattam Day v. Debedra Lal Khan*.
 - (1885) 1885 Pun Re No. 36, *Sheoji v. Dhan Singh*.
 - (1910) A I R 1916 Pat 93 (94) : 37 Ind Cas 107 : 1 Pat L Jour 293, *Narupraja Singh v. Bhabani Teli*.
 - (1890) 1890 Bom P J 107, *Keshav v. Gopalrao*.
 - (1909) 2 Ind Cas 57 (59) : 12 Oudh Cas 45, *Pratap Dahadur Singh v. Mahetar Balsh Singh*.
 - (1911) 9 Ind Cas 791 (794) : 35 Mad 231, *Parthasarathy Naicken v. Lakshmana Naicken*.
 - (1911) 9 Ind Cas 300 (302) : 1911 Pun Re No. 26, *Sundar v. Saig Ram*.
 - (1910) A I R 1916 Mad 990 (997) : 39 Mad 811 : 31 Ind Cas 412 (F B), *V'yaguri v. Sonamma Dos Amman*.
 2. See (1875-77) 1 Bom 535 (Note) (537), *Dabaji v. Nama*.
 - (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 667 (696) : 65 Ind Cas 866, *Secretary of State v. Wazed Ali Khan*.
 - 2a. (1928) A I R 1923 Cal 250 (252), *Ambila Prosad Doss v. Annada Prosad Dass*.
 3. (1928) 50 All 986 : 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal*.
- sold the property more than 12 years before his return, held that for a suit by plaintiff against vendee, limitation began only on return from Port Blair.)
- (1801) 14 Mad 495 (498), *Kuttyassan v. Mayan*. (Gift of life interest by Karnavan—Suit for possession by succeeding Karnavan—Time runs from the death of the grantee.)
 - (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 562 (564) : 127 Ind Cas 835, *Muchi Ram Bagal v. Balaram Dhumij*. (Possession of under-riyat for life—When becomes adverse to landlord.)
 - (1918) 22 Ind Cas 575 (575, 576) (Cal), *Depin Behari Chakladar v. Jagat Kishore Achary*. (Suit for possession of property allotted in partition—Time begins to run when the property was allotted.)
 - (1884) 8 Bom 585 (590, 591), *Tularam v. Sujaugur Guru*. (Vatan lands attached by Peshwas—Continuance of attachment under, and subsequent redemption by, British Government—Possession by defendant as tenant to Government, if adverse—Plaintiff's incompetency to sue during attachment and resumption.)
 - (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 217 (221) : 24 Ind Cas 519, *Chattan Rajah Acergal v. Raman Varma*. (Adverse possession against a 'stani' in Malabar who holds only for life will not bar next 'stani' when succession opens.)

79. Adverse possession against holder of life-estate.—Where *X* holds only a life-estate in certain property, *Y*, the person entitled to succeed to the property on the death of *X*, cannot be said to have any right to the possession of the property till the death of *X*. There can, consequently, be no adverse possession against *Y* till he becomes entitled to possession on the death of *X*. For, as has been seen in Note 78 *ante*, a possession is adverse to *A* if it is in contravention of the title of *A* to such possession, and there cannot be any such contravention when *A* is *not entitled to possession at all*. Articles 140 and 141 *ante*, are based only on this principle and time is accordingly made to run against the person entitled to succeed on the termination of a previous estate, from the time when such person becomes entitled to possession, and a suit by such person for possession against the defendant who had entered into wrongful possession during the lifetime of the holder of the life-estate would be governed by Article 144, time running from the death of the latter¹. See also Note 13 to Article 141 and Note 2 to Article 140.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 79

(1928) A I R 1928 Lah 250 (255) · 113 Ind Cas 53, *Zinda v Mt Roshnas*. (Where a property is mortgaged for a fixed term and on the death of the mortgagor the guardian of his minor son makes an unauthorized sale of the property and the purchaser redeems the mortgage *prematurely*, the plea of adverse possession by the purchaser cannot stand as the time begins to run against the true owner after the date of the fixed mortgage has expired.)

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 273 (274) · 3 Luck 459 · 112 Ind Cas 481, *Ram Ratan Lall v. Aditya Prasad*. (Where certain property was under a usufructuary mortgage and was in the possession of the mortgagee and the mortgagor sold the property by a duly executed sale-deed, the equity of redemption passes to the vendee and any subsequent repudiation of the sale deed by the vendor or assertion that he was still the owner will not amount to any adverse possession against the vendee and the vendee's rights will not be barred by limitation merely because twelve years lapse from such repudiation of vendee's title or assertion of vendor's title, the property all along continuing in the possession of the mortgagee.)

(1922) A I R 1922 Nag 16 (17) · 65 Ind Cas 362, *Masoti v Larman*. (Where the lessor was adopted into another family, held that assuming that

defendant—Order conferring lease on defendant stated that plaintiff could recover the putnee after 15 years.—After 15 years of his ejectment plaintiff sued defendant for possession.—Defendant pleaded adverse possession for over 12 years.—*Held*, there was no adverse possession.)

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 439 (440) · 131 Ind Cas 105, *Salhun v Malku*. (Where the sale is voidable at the instance of reversioner, it is good for the lifetime of the alienating proprietor (under Punjab Customary Law) and the possession of the vendee can become adverse only after the death of the vendor.)

(1913) 19 Ind Cas 222 (224) · 1913 Pan Re No 19, *Paras Ram v Nathu Mal*. (Do.)

(1911) 11 Ind Cas 93 (94) (Oudh) *Bhagvandas v Ishar Dal*. (Possession of widow is not adverse to the reversioner.)

Note 79

1. (1895) 10 C P L R 78 (79) *Sectaram Brahm v Ram Lal Lalwari*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 79-80**

Where, however, adverse possession has begun against a person *through whom the plaintiff claims*, the interposition of a life-estate will not stop time running against the plaintiff : see Note 14 to Article 141.

Alienation by holder of life-estate.—The possession of an alienee from the holder of a life-estate only in the property alienated, cannot also, on the principles stated above, be adverse to the person entitled to possession on the termination of the life-estate, till the estate falls into possession.²

See also Note 60a, *ante*.

80. Adverse possession of trust property by stranger.—The exemption from limitation under Section 10 of the Act applies only to a suit against a trustee or his legal representatives or his assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration). The exemption does not apply to a suit against a *stranger* to the trust who is in possession of the trust property claiming it to be his own property. Such possession will be adverse to the trust and a suit for possession against the stranger after twelve years from the commencement of the adverse possession will be barred by limitation.¹

Where, however, the stranger does not deny the trust or remove the trust properties from the objects of the trust and claims to be a trustee himself and takes possession of the trust properties *as such trustee*, his possession will not be adverse to the *trust itself*, but will be adverse to the trustee, and after twelve years of such possession he will acquire the right of a trustee. In *Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal*,² it was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council as follows :

“ When property is used for some purpose other than the proper purpose of the trusts in question, it may be recovered without any bar of time, from the hands of the persons indicated in the Section (Section 10). But here there is no question of recovering the property for the trusts of the endowment, because the defendant admits that he is a trustee and says that he is

(1910) A I R 1919 Nag 52 (53) : 59 Ind Cas 473, *Mahomed Sirajuddin v. Fayazuddin*. (Such Inamdar has only life interest—Hence an alienee from such Inamdar cannot plead adverse possession against the next holder, on the basis of such alienation.)

Note 80

1 (1855) 16 C B 652 (670) . 21 L J C P 187 . 1 Jour (N S) 759 : 3 W R (Eng) 535 100 R R 871, *Melling v. Leak*.

(1731) 3 P Wms 309 (310) 21 E R 1076, *Wyck v. East India Co.*

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 130 (135) 30 Ind Cas 669, *Muruga Chetty v. Rajaswamy*. (But a stranger *allowed* to be in possession by a trustee—his possession will be permissive and not adverse.)

2. (1883) 6 All 1 (9) : 13 Cal L R 39 : 10 Ind App 90 : 7 Ind Jour 329 : 4 Sar 435 (P C)

applying the property to the trusts of the endowment. There is no evidence that he is not applying the property to the trusts of the endowment, and there is no reason to conclude that the property would be more applied to those trusts if the plaintiff were to succeed in his suit than it is at this moment. The plaintiff is suing only for his own personal right to manage or in some way to control the management of the endowment. The consequence is that the case does not fall within Section 10 of the Limitation Act. If it does not, then it must be within one of the Articles of the Schedule."

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 80-83!**

81. Adverse possession against one co-trustee, if adverse to the other.—Where there are two co-trustees and one of them who is in management for the time being is dispossessed, and the trespasser continues in possession for a period of twelve years, it has been held that the right of the alienor trustee as well as the right of the other co-trustee will be barred even though the latter had been a minor at the date when the adverse possession began, and the suit is filed within three years of his attaining majority.¹

82. Adverse possession against co-owners.—Where one co-owner who is in possession on behalf of all of the co-owners is dispossessed by a stranger, the possession of such stranger is adverse to all the co-owners.¹

The adverse possession by a stranger against the co-owners of a property is not interrupted by a partition among the co-owners.²

83. Adverse possession against widow is not adverse against subsequently adopted son.—Where *A*, a Hindu male, adopts *B* as his son, *B* does not get any immediate right to possession of the properties of *A*. But, for purposes of limitation the period of adverse possession against *A* will have to be taken into account against *B* also, since *B* derives his right to sue from *A*.

Where a Hindu widow makes an adoption of a son to her deceased husband, the adopted son does not claim through the widow but becomes entitled to the property of the adoptive father as his heir, on the date of adoption. On the principles stated in Note 78 *ante*, adverse possession against the widow will not be adverse against the adopted son.¹ It will become adverse to him only from the date

Note 81

1. (1910) 6 Ind Cas 992 (993) 34 Mad 284, *Thiagaraja v Rathnasabapathy Pillai*

Note 82

- 1 (1919) 4 I R 1919 Cal 55 (56) 50 Ind Cas 870, *Abdul Sattar v Laxmi Prasad Agarwalla*
(1927) 4 I R 1927 Cal 457 (458) 100 Ind Cas 507 *Mabuddin v Md Ezzat Ali*
2 (1920) 4 I R 1920 Oudh 147 (150) 60 Ind Cas 515, *Fazl Haj v Luqman Khanam*

Note 83

1. (1925) 4 I R 1925 Bom 402 (403) 49 Bom 604 89 Ind Cas 62 *Hannant Subbaya v Krishna Manjunath*

Arts. 142 & 144 of his adoption, when, for the first time, he becomes entitled to possession.²
Notes 83-84

A suit by the adopted son for possession of the properties of the adoptive father from a person who has entered into possession before the date of the adoption, whether as an alienee or as a wrongdoer, would be governed by Article 144 and not by Article 142.³ The reason is that at the time of the entry, the defendant could not be said to have entered on the property in *contravention* of the title of the plaintiff, inasmuch as the plaintiff had no title at all on that date to such possession.

Article 119 has no application to a suit by the adopted son for possession of the adoptive father's property, as the adopted son is not bound to sue for any declaration such as is contemplated by that Article, before suing for possession.⁴

84. Adverse possession against mortgagor, if adverse against mortgagee.—*A* executes a mortgage in favour of *B* who has, under the terms of the mortgage, no right to the possession of the property. *C*, a trespasser, enters on the property while in the possession of the mortgagor and remains in possession for twelve years. Is the mortgagee affected by such possession? On the principles stated in Note 78 *ante*, it seems to be clear that his rights cannot become affected in any way. *C*'s possession cannot be said to be adverse to *B*, inasmuch as *B* had no right to possession on the date of *C*'s entry and there can be no possession in contravention of the title of another to such possession when such person has no title to possession. Nor can the mortgagee, in the case stated above, be said to derive his right to sue from the mortgagor as the mortgage is *prior* to the cause of action. The position would be different where *A* executes a mortgage in favour of *B* after the date of *C*'s entry into possession adversely to *A*. The extinguishment of the title of *A* by the adverse possession of *C* will operate to extinguish *B*'s mortgage also. The reason is that *B* is a person claiming through *A* in respect of the cause of action

(1905) 2 Cal L Jour 87 (94, 96) : 9 Cal W N 75, *Harek Chand Babu v. Bejoy Chand Mahatab*.

(1900) 2 Bom L R 411 (414), *Hari Gathal v. Waman Hari*

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 155 (189, 190) : 103 Ind Cas 817, *Abdul Halim Khan v. Sandat Ali Khan*. (Prescription does not run against a person who is either unable to act or is non-existent. Therefore in the case of an adopted son limitation does not run prior to adoption.)

[But see (1899) 13 Bom 276 (278), *Krishnaji Janardhan v. Morbhat*. (Not good law.)]

2. (1905) 9 Cal W N 233 (233) (s N), *Harek Chand v. Bejoy Chand Mahatab*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Nag 111 (111) : 17 Nag L R 18, *Sitaram v. Rajaram*. (Suit by adopted son against adverse possessor before adoption.)

3. (1921) A I R 1921 Nag 111 (111) : 17 Nag L R 18, *Sitaram v. Rajaram*.

(1895) 19 Bom 809 (814, 815, 818, 819), *Moro Narayan v. Dalaji Raghunath*. (Per Candy, J.)

4. (1909) 1 Ind Cas 647 (649) : 33 Bom 89, *Ram Krishna v. Tripurabai*.

(1903) 1903 All W N 163 (166) : 26 All 40, *Chandania v. Salig Ram*.

See also Notes to Articles 118 and 119, *ante*.

against *C* and will be bound by the adverse possession against *A*.^{1a}

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 84

In *Karan Singh v. Baker Ali Khan*,¹ it seems to have been assumed that Article 144 would apply to a suit by the mortgagee to enforce his rights in such cases. The facts of the case were that *A* made a mortgage of his property to *B* in 1862. But before that date, in 1861, the Collector had taken possession of the property in order to secure the Government revenue and retained it till 1863 when he handed over possession to *C*, a rival claimant to the property, who, however, was found not entitled to it. *B* brought a suit for sale on his mortgage in 1874. *C* contended that his possession from 1863 must be tacked on to the Collector's possession which began in 1861 and that therefore the suit was barred by limitation. Their Lordships held that no such tacking could be allowed and that the suit was within limitation. The suit having been brought within twelve years both from the date of the cause of action on the mortgage and from the date of *C*'s entry into possession, it was unnecessary to decide the question of adverse possession. Further, the adverse possession having begun prior to the date of the mortgage, the plaintiff would be bound by such adverse possession against *A* and the suit would therefore be governed by Article 144. *Karan Singh's case*¹ was distinguished on the above ground in *Raj Nath v. Narain Das*,² decided by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. A Full Bench of the High Court of Madras has also held, distinguishing *Karan Singh's case*,¹ that where a person enters adversely into possession of the property of a mortgagor, the mortgage being simple, his possession is not adverse to the mortgagee who is not barred from suing on his mortgage by reason of such adverse possession.³ See also the under-

Note 84

- 1a (1912) 17 Ind Cas 632 (634) 34 All 640, *Nandan Singh v. Juman*
(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 813 (815) 126 Ind Cas 257, *Surendra Nath v. Barisal Loan Co. Ltd.*
(1902) 25 All 85 (37, 38) : 1902 All W N 175, *Ram Lal v. Musum Ali Khan*.
(1899) 23 Mad 37 (39) : 9 Mad L Jour 258, *Nallamuthu Pillai v. Detha Natchen*
(1895) 18 Mad 342 (346), *Subbaramayyar v. Nigamadullah Sahib* (In this case mortgage effected after the title of the mortgagor was extinguished by adverse possession.)
(1928) A I R 1928 Lah 499 (502) 110 Ind Cas 18, *Tara Singh v. Ram Saran*.
(1897) L R 2 Q B 143 (155) 66 L J Q B 705 77 L T S. 46 W R (Eng) 56, *Thornton v. France*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Nag 279 (280) 52 Ind Cas 933 15 Nag L R 151 *Mt. Amirbi v. Khaja*
(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 228 (230) 33 Ind Cas 326 39 Mad 939, *Ponnuru Subbiah v. Ram Reddi*
(1911) 9 Ind Cas 900 (991) (All), *Lajinath v. Bhadayan*
(1870) 2 N W P H C R 223 (224), *Sheenbar Saha v. Idhar Saha*
1. (1882) 5 All 1 (5, 7) 9 Ind App 29 4 Bar S. 2 5 Shams L R 50 (P C).
2. (1914) A I R 1914 All 95 (96) 86 All 517 24 Ind Cas 17 (F I) 121 (S. 1) 5 All 1 (P C).
3. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 290 (296) 33 Mad 111 4 Ind Cas 412 (F I), *Vijayappa v. S. Ramiah Iyer*

Arts. 142 & 144 mentioned cases⁴ in which the same principle has been applied.
Notes 84-85

85. Adverse possession against mortgagee, if adverse to mortgagor.—Where the mortgagee is not entitled to possession under a mortgage and the mortgagor continues in possession after the mortgage, it is clear that the possession of a trespasser who dispossesses the mortgagor is adverse to the mortgagor. Even where the mortgagee is entitled to possession of the property, the mortgagor may be entitled to receive a portion of the rents and profits of the property under the terms of the mortgage. Where, in such a case, a third person interferes with the right of the

4. (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 933 (935) : 44 Cal 425 : 87 Ind Cas 277, *Priya Sakhi Devi v. Breshwar Samanta*.

(1912) 17 Ind Cas 632 (634) : 84 All 640 : *Nandan Singh v. Jumman*.

(1911) 9 Ind Cas 791 (794) : 35 Mad 231, *Parthasarathy Naicken v. Lakshmana Naicken*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 189 (190) : 175 Ind Cas 279, *Ramasray Prasad v. G. G. Atkins* (Invalid lease by mortgagor after mortgage—Lessor's possession is not adverse to mortgagee)

(1914) 22 Ind Cas 94 (95) : 9 Nag L R 191, *Nazar Ali v. Hiranman*. (The principle is equally applicable to the case of a mortgagee by conditional sale not entitled to possession.)

v. *Annada Prasad*.

308 : 77 Ind Cas 125, *Jai*

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 313 (315) : 126 Ind Cas 257, *Surendra Nath v. Barisal Loan Co. Ltd.*

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 600 (609) : 79 Ind Cas 520, *Dwijendra Narain Roy v. Joges Chandra De*

(1906) 83 Cal 1015 (1019) : 10 Cal W N 904, *Aimadar Mondul v. Mahkhan Lal Dey*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Pat 577 (579) : 121 Ind Cas 471, *Mohan Bhakat v. Jagdayan Pandey*.

— (1931) A I R 1931 Pat 64 (67) : 10 Pat 234 : 180 Ind Cas 257, *Ghanshyam Das v. Ragho Singh*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 160 (161) : 99 Ind Cas 831, *Sundaram Iyer v. Thiagaraja Pillai*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 32 (35) : 69 Ind Cas 841, *Sital Chandra Majhi v. Parbati Charan Chakrabarti*.

Venkatakrishna Moorthy decided that the mortgagee's default by the mortgagor in legal possession is not with

the mortgagee and the possession of a trespasser is not adverse to him.)

(1901) 2 K B 96 (100) : 70 L J K B 552-84 L T 485 : 49 W R (Eng) 465 : 17 T L R 897, *Ludbrook v. Ludbrook*

(1909) 2 Ind Cas 57 (62) : 12 Oudh Cas 45, *Pratap Bahadur Singh v. Maheshwar Baksh Singh*

(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 305 (306) : 69 Ind Cas 641, *Kunj Lal v. Kanhai Mahto*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 716 (717) : 50 Ind Cas 304, *Kali Krishna v. Tara Prasanna*.

(1890) 7 Cal 591 (400), *Manly v. Patterson*

(1937) A I R 1937 Pat 13 (14) : 15 Pat 372 : 166 Ind Cas 312, *Narayan Prasad v. Adarmani Dass*.

(1927) A I R 1927 All 309 (310) : 100 Ind Cas 291, *Sami Nath Singh v. Thakur Prasad Das*. (Transferor pendente lite cannot prescribe title by adverse possession against mortgagee auction purchaser till he is entitled to actual possession.)

(1901) 1001 Pun Re No. 10 : 1901 Pun L R No. 81, *Kasar Singh v. Thakur Das*.

mortgagor and receives the rents and profits in assertion of a hostile title, such third person must be held to be in adverse possession of the mortgagor's equity of redemption.¹ But suppose, that the mortgage is with possession and the mortgagor is not entitled to any share in the actual enjoyment of the property. In such a case, if a person dispossesses the mortgagee and enters into possession of the mortgaged property, such possession will not be adverse to the mortgagor, the reason being that possession cannot be adverse to any one who has no immediate right to possession.² But it has been held in several decisions that even in such cases the possession of a third party who dispossesses the mortgagee and enters into possession can be adverse to the mortgagor³ and that it will be adverse to him where the trespasser denies, to his knowledge, his title to the property.⁴ It is respectfully submitted that this view conflicts with

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 85

Note 85

1. (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 592 (597) : 76 Ind Cas 277, *Binanand Sawase v. Thuroo Mahto*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 All 512 (513) : 159 Ind Cas 151, *Salig Ram v. Gauri Shankar*.
- 2 (1875) 12 Bom H C R 180 (183), *Vithoba v. Ganga Ram*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 All 542 (543) : 159 Ind Cas 151, *Salig Ram v. Gauri Shankar*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 315 (316) : 16 Lah 724 : 158 Ind Cas 218, *Amar Nath v. Duni*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 592 (597) : 76 Ind Cas 277, *Binanand Sawase v. Thuroo Mahto*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 689 (640) : 9 Pat 632 : 122 Ind Cas 512, *Dubray Mahto v. Lalji Sahai*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 All 11 (12) 70 Ind Cas 959, *Durga Devi v. Girwar Singh*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 465 (466) 49 Bom 539 87 Ind Cas 765, *Tarabai Ramrao v. Datta Ram Gotind Bhai*.
- (1904) 27 All 395 (396) 1905 All W N 4 1 All L Jour 725, *Muhammad Hussain v. Mulchand*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 357 (358) 71 Ind Cas 1030, *Kamala Kanta v. Ananda Chandra*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 293 (296) . 45 Bom 661 . 60 Ind Cas 913, *Gitabai Bhan v. Krishna Malhar*.
3. (1927) A I R 1927 All 177 (180) : 99 Ind Cas 290, *Munawar Ali v. Jagamalan Ram*.
- (1894) 18 Bom 51 (54, 59), *Chinto v. Janki*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 91 (95) . 67 Ind Cas 176, *Vanayak Keshav v. Balu Shriram*.
- (1903) 27 Bom 43 (67, 69) 4 Bom L R 721, *Tarabai v. Venkat Rao*.
- (1897) 1897 Bom P J 33, *Daulata Ada v. Yesu Narasu*.
- (1889) 1889 Pun Re No. 161, *Nihal Singh v. Mutwaddi*.
- (1893) 1893 Pun Re No. 6, *Khanu Mal v. Khan Muhammad*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 374 (341) 38 Mad 903 22 Ind Cas 615 (F B), *Perrai Anna Ambalam v. Shunmugasundaram*. (Question depends on facts and circumstances of each case)
- (1879) 2 Mad 226 (227), *Ammu v. Ramakrishna Sastri*.
- (1930) 1930 Mad W N 1143 (1151), *Veeranna v. Venkudu*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 40 (43) 26 Oudh Cas 803 77 Ind Cas 125, *Jai Gobind Singh v. Abhai Singh*.
- (1913) 21 Ind Cas 318 (350) (Low Bur), *Maunji Shree Pe v. Ma Yu Ma*.
- 4 (1927) A I R 1927 All 177 (180) 99 Ind Cas 290, *Munawar Ali v. Jagamalan Ram* (Trespasser denying mortgagor's title to his knowledge—Trespasser's possession is adverse against mortgagor)

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 85**

the principle that possession cannot be adverse to a person who has no present right to possession, and hence is not correct. Assuming the view to be correct, the onus of proving that the possession of a trespasser who dispossesses a usufructuary mortgagee in possession is adverse both to the mortgagor and to the mortgagee, is on the person setting up the adverse possession.⁵

Where a trespasser ousts a usufructuary mortgagee and enters into possession of the mortgaged property, the possession of the trespasser is adverse to the mortgagee and if it continues for twelve years, the trespasser will acquire the rights of the usufructuary mortgagee. The mortgagor's suit for redemption against such a trespasser will be governed by Article 148.⁶

Where a stranger pays off a usufructuary mortgage and gets into possession of the mortgaged property, he is not subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. Hence, his possession is adverse to the mortgagor.⁷ But it has been held that where a stranger, believing in good faith that he is entitled to the equity of redemption, pays off a usufructuary mortgage, he is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee and hence his possession of the mortgaged property is only as mortgagee and is not adverse to the mortgagor.⁸ (See Note 2 to Article 148, *infra*.)

Where a stranger renews a usufructuary mortgage in assertion of his own title to the equity of redemption, it has been held that from the date of such renewal the stranger will be in adverse possession of the equity of redemption against the mortgagor.⁹ It is submitted

(1923) A I R 1928 Lah 147 (147, 148) : 107 Ind Cas 612, *Hansa v. Ramlok*. (Do.)

(1903) 27 Bom 43 (68, 69) : 4 Bom L R 721, *Tarubai v. Venkantarao*. (Do.)

(1909) 80 All 119 (121) : 5 All L Jour 85 : 1909 All W N 25 : 3 Mad L Tim 125, *Isma'dar Khan v. Ahamed Hussain*.

(1914)

against him.)

(1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 40 (41) : 26 Oudh Cas 308 : 77 Ind Cas 125, *Jai Gobind Singh v. Abhai Raj Singh*. (Do.)

(1930) 1930 Mad W N 1148 (1151), *Feeranna v. Venkadam*. (Do.)

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6. (1875) 12 Bom H C R 180 (182, 183), *Vithoba v. Gangaram*.

7. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 752 (751, 755) : 93 Ind Cas 101, *Ramanuj Rai v. Dakshinamurthy Rai*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 303 (309) : 161 Ind Cas 999, *Veetil Kelu v.*

.

(1933) 13 Bom 266 (266), *Abu v. Dhondubai*.

8. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 451 (453) : 172 Ind Cas 47, *Moothachettiam Veetil Kelu v. Chellara Chappan*.

9. (1901) 23 Bom 87 (91) : 5 Bom L R 674, *Parasram v. Sagaji*.

that this view is open to doubt inasmuch as possession, in order to be adverse, must be *actual*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 85-86

Where a stranger gets into possession of the mortgaged property through a usufructuary mortgagee who is in possession of the property and in collusion with such mortgagee, it has been held that the possession of such stranger is not adverse to the mortgagor.¹⁰ The reason given is that such stranger is bound by the same estoppel as the mortgagee through whom he gets possession and cannot deny the mortgagor's title.

See also the undermentioned cases ¹¹

86. Adverse possession against tenant, if adverse against landlord. — A landlord is not entitled to possession of property let out to a tenant, so long as the tenancy continues¹ and hence, during the currency of the lease, the landlord cannot sue for possession of the property.² It follows from this that where during the continuance of a lease the tenant is dispossessed by a third party who enters into possession of the property, the possession of such third party cannot be adverse to the landlord so long as the lease

10. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 451 (454) 172 Ind Cas 47, *Moothachettiam Veetil Kelu v Chekkara Chappan*

11. (1890) 23 Cal 483 (492) 23 Ind App 8 6 Mad L Jour 43 6 Sar 669 (P C), *Imdad Hussain v Aziz-un-nissa*. (Usufructuary mortgage by A to B

C is entitled to a certain underproprietary rights in the land—C's possession is adverse to the whole world including A from the date of the decree)

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 911 (912) 81 Ind Cas 630, *Chinnappa Thetan v P. N. S. D. S. D.* (Tenant's right to usufructuary mortgagee—tenants title of the

(1870) 2 N W P H C R 199 (199, 200), *Ajoodhya Singh v Girdharee*. (Mortgagor redeeming possessory mortgage—Mortgagor's right against grantee from mortgagee arises on redemption of mortgage)

Note 86

1. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 18 (20) 92 Ind Cas 20, *Veeraswami Mudali v Venkatachala*.

(1895) 19 Bom 139 (139), *Vinayak Janardan v Matras*

2 (1909) 4 Ind Cas 80 (81) (Mad), *Krishnan Nambudri v Secy of State*

(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 18 (18, 19) 92 Ind Cas 20, *Veeraswami Mudali v Venkatachala Mudali*

(1898) 21 Mad 288 (290) 8 Mad L Jour 121, *Emmanadan Chetty v Iyer Kutti Sertai*

(1896) 18 All 440 (448, 449) 1896 All W N 162 (F B), *Sri Ram v Lal Lal*

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 900 (902) 781 J Cas 47 *K. S. Chandra v L. S. Charan*

(1909) 2 Ind Cas 209 (210) 31 All 271 (271), *Hussain v Hussain*

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 86

continues.³ The reason is that possession cannot be adverse to any one who has no present right of possession. Hence, a suit by the landlord for possession against the trespasser will not be barred by limitation if it is brought within twelve years of the termination of the lease, although more than twelve years may have elapsed from the time when the trespasser first entered into possession.⁴ In *Kathyayani v. Uday Kumar*,⁵ the Privy Council observed as follows:

(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 760 (761) : 89 Mad 1042 : 82 Ind Cas 198, *Tiruvengada Konan v. Veankatchala Konan*. (Held, that though lessor cannot maintain a suit for possession, he can get a declaratory decree declaring his title.)

[But see (1922) A I R 1922 Nag 216 (217) : 18 Nag L R 82 : 64 Ind Cas 902, *Alibhas v. Shamrao*.]

3. (1914) A I R 1914 Bom 296 (297) : 38 Bom 53 : 21 Ind Cas 763, *Krishmadizit v. Baladizit*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 584 (585) : 40 Ind Cas 271, *Hajra v. Kunja*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 586 (587) : 41 Ind Cas 978, *Ishan Chandra v. Nishi Chandra*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Lah 17 (18) : 63 Ind Cas 717, *Girdhari Lal v. M. Umda Jan*. (Following 4 Cal 927.)

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 39 (39) : 45 Bom 1001 : 61 Ind Cas 594, *Vishnu Bhikaji v. Dabla Laska*.

(1895) 19 Bom 138 (139), *Vinayak Janardan v. Mamai*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Pat 89 (90) : 9 Pat 877 : 129 Ind Cas 678, *Ganpat Lal v. Wazira Singh*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Pat 476 (477) : 126 Ind Cas 858, *Bankey Behari Lal v. Gudo Choudhury*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 600 (609) : 78 Ind Cas 520, *Dusjendra Narain Roy v. Jogeschandra De*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 87 (92) : 49 Cal 948 : 68 Ind Cas 126, *Uday Kumar Dass v. Katyani Debi*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Pat 220 (222) : 175 Ind Cas 202, *Gopi Ram Ram Chandra v. Nilas Lal Dutt*.

(1905) 2 Cal L Jour 87 (94) : 9 Cal W N 795, *Harek Chand Babu v. Bijoy Patni* sub-
haser against

Id.

Deb Rai.

Narain Roy.

under Sircar

(1882) 9 Cal L R 317 (318), *Prosonnomoydan v. Kalidas Roy*.

(1867) 8 Suth W R 444 (445), *Ray Narain Roy v. Woomesh Chunder*.]

4. (1907) 29 All 593 (595, 596) : 1907 All W N 185 : 4 All L Jour 726, *Thamman Pande v. Maharajah of Vizianagaram*.

(1886) 18 Cal 101 (103), *Sharat Sundari Dabua v. Dholo Pershad Khan*.

(1891) 10 Cal 577 (580), *Sheo Sohye Roy v. Luckmeshur Singh*.

(1892) 9 Cal 867 (869) : 12 Cal L R 19, *Krishna Gobind Dhur v. Hari Churn Dhur*.

(1868) 10 Suth W R 15 (19), *Womesh Chunder Goopto v. Raj Narain Roy*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 849 (850) : 92 Ind Cas 215, *Manatikrama Zamorin Raja of Calicut v. Ventagiri Pattar*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 307 (309) : 27 Oudh Cas 301 : 84 Ind Cas 237, *Mahabir Prasad v. Ram Kumar*. (Sale of groves—Surrender relinquishment to landlord by vendor—Landlord's suit against vendee—Art. 144 applies—Time runs from relinquishment.)

(1925) 19 Bom 134 (139), *Vinayak Janardan v. Mamai*.

5. (1925) A I R 1925 P O 97 (99) : 52 Ind App 160 : 52 Cal 417 : 88 Ind Cas 110 (P O.)

"It was argued that the lessor had a title to eject the trespasser and that if he did not do so, the trespasser obtained a title by limitation against him as well as against the tenant and that as the latter is now deprived of the possession of the lands, she is entitled, in a question with the landlord, to an abatement of rent. There is a long and consistent body of authority to the opposite effect in India, and although the matter has not been made the subject of direct decision by this Board, their Lordships see no ground for doubting the soundness of the decisions referred to in the judgment of the High Court.

"The duty of a tenant under a perpetual tenure such as the one in question is to protect himself against illegal encroachments by others on the lands of which he has the exclusive possession. If he fails to do so, he cannot prejudice the landlord's claim for rent. The considerations which appear to their Lordships to be conclusive are those stated by Peacock, C. J., in *Womesh Chunder Goopta v. Raj Narain Roy*⁶ and connected appeal, and which are quoted in the judgment of the High Court. It has also been pointed out in other judgments that the landlord cannot in the ordinary case know whether the possession of a particular area of land is adverse to the tenant or has taken place with his consent. He could not therefore safely sue an action at his own hand for ejectment of a trespasser, as he might always be met with the objection that the apparent trespass was acquiesced in by the tenant who can deal with the lands as he pleases."

Although, thus, the landlord's interest will not be affected by adverse possession against the tenant, the latter's interest can be acquired by adverse possession by a third party^{6a}. Where the tenant's interest has thus been acquired by adverse possession for the statutory period by a third party, the landlord in whose favour the tenant relinquishes his rights cannot recover possession from the trespasser. The reason is that in such a case the landlord merely sues as the transferee of the rights of the tenant and if the tenant is barred, the landlord also must be held to be barred⁷.

Where the landlord's right to receive rent from the tenant is interfered with and a third party collects such rents from the tenant

6. (1868) 10 Suth W R 15 (19), *Womesh Chunder v. Raj Narain*.

6a (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 33 (40) 61 Ind Cas 591 45 Bom 1001, *Vishnu Bhatnagar v. Dabla Lacha*.

(1895) 19 Bom 133 (139), *Vinayak Janardan v. Mainas*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 269 (270) . 145 Ind Cas 613, *Ramdeyal Mahanti v. Pitam Bouri*.

"... Cas 60, *Bijoy Chand Mohatab v.*

... Nath Shaha v. Surya Kanta Laksh.

307 (20-) 27 Suth Cas 301 : 84

... *... Ram Kumar (Landlord's own right and not as transferee of*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 86**

in assertion of his own right, the *landlord's* interest must be held to be in the adverse possession of the third party and the latter can acquire the landlord's interest by such adverse possession for the statutory period.⁸

Where a tenant is in possession under a void lease and is dispossessed by a third person, the possession of such third person will be adverse to the landlord from the moment of his entry into possession. The reason is that in such a case the landlord is entitled to possession notwithstanding the lease, as the lease is void.⁹

Where the term of a lease has expired and the tenant is holding over with the landlord's consent and a trespasser dispossesses the tenant, the trespasser's possession will be adverse to the landlord. The reason is that the landlord is entitled to put an end to the tenancy immediately and sue for possession against the trespasser.¹⁰

Where at the commencement of a lease the land is already in the possession of a trespasser, limitation is not saved by the granting of the lease and the landlord is not entitled to a fresh period of limitation from the termination of the lease.¹¹ The reason is that when once limitation has commenced to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue can stop it.

In some decisions,¹² it has been held that even during the currency of a lease the landlord can sue for ejectment of a trespasser, *for the purpose of putting the lessee in possession*. Even assuming that this view is correct, it will be seen that the person entitled to possession during the continuance of the lease is only the *lessee* and hence the possession of the trespasser can only be adverse to him and not to the landlord.

8. (1919) A I R 1919 Bom 45 (50) : 52 Ind Cas 770, *Yamunabai v. Lagmanna*.
(1879) 9 Cal L R 576 (578), *Parbhatti Dasi v. Ram Chand*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 67 (92) : 49 Cal 948 : 63 Ind Cas 126, *Uday Kumar Das v. Katyani Debi*.

(1898) 1898 Bom P J 355, *Mahadev Fithal v. Vishnubhat Shivrambhat*.

(1897) 1 Cal W N 246 (247), *Gossain Mahendra Gir v. Rajani Kant Doss*.
[But see (1900) 3 Ind Cas 122 (123) : 4 Mad L Tim 327 (329), *Acharath Bappan v. Mathammal*.]

9. (1937) A I R 1937 Rang 160 (182) : 171 Ind Cas 648, *Dashir Ahmad v. Maatschappij*.

10. (1905) 10 Cal W N 843 (844), *Kishorewarnath Sahas v. Kali Shankar Sahas*.

11. (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 675 (677) : 26 Ind Cas 436, *Kalihananda Mukherjee v. Dipradas Pal*.

12. (1925) 112 Ind Cas 314 (315) (Pat), *Dasoo Mahton v. Bhagwan Das*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 192 (193) : 70 Ind Cas 792, *Rajecumar Mandal v. Ali Mia*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 932 (934) : 39 Ind Cas 425, *Kathiri Muttie v. Kuttli Chelluttu*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 42 (46) : 41 Mad 937 : 62 Ind Cas 234, *Mohideen Bowther v. Jayarama Aiyar*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 359 (359) : 26 Ind Cas 347, *Soumarammal v. Vellaya Sethurangam*.

[See also (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 896 (897) : 118 Ind Cas 595, *Kuldip Vohra v. Md Hashim*.]

As to effect of abandonment by tenant, see Note 10 to Article 139, Arts. 142 & 144
ante. Notes 86-87

87. Onus of proof. — It has been seen in Note 15 *ante* that possession is presumptive evidence of a seisin in fee until the contrary is shown. It is therefore necessary, in every suit for possession, that the plaintiff should prove a *better title* than that of the defendant. He must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant's case.¹ Proof of *proprietary* title on the

Note 87

1. (1875) 11 B. & C. 100 (1875) 11 B. & C. 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

alleged by the defendants, but upon proof of that title which it is necessary for plaintiff to establish in order to disturb the possession of the defendants.)

(1872) 18 Suth W R 91 (94, 99). 2 Suther 619. 4 Sar 788 (P C), *Wise v. Bro. jendro Coomar Roy*.

(1876) 4 Cal 727 (732). 6 Ind App 76. 3 Sar 665. R and J 54. 3 Ind Jur 222 (P C), *Mirzan Jehan Kadar v. Asfur Bahu*.

(1925) A I R 1925 P C 130 (135). 109 Ind Cas 392 (P C), *Jagobind Pandey v. Ramnandan Sahai*.

(1922) A I R 1922 P C 20 (22). 107 Ind Cas 270. 10 D. & W. 81 Sind L R

7 Ind Cas 518
 suit title suing

(1903) 5 Bom L R 225 (227), *Rajaram Tuljaram v. Nanchand Tuljaram*.

(1870) 7 Bom H C R A C 82 (86, 87), *Dadabhai v. Sub Collector of Broach*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Bom 152 (153). 38 Bom 240. 29 Ind Cas 786, *Sitaram Bhimaji v. Sadhu Anaji*.

(1877) 8 Cal 706 (800). 1 Cal L R 259. 3 Suther 486. 3 Sar 776. 2 Ind Jur 147 (P C), *Radha Prosad Singh v. Ram Coomar Singh*.

(1882) 11 Cal L R 395 (397), *Doyanidhi Panda v. Kelas Panda*.

(1893) 21 Cal 244 (247), *Lep Singh Khasia v. Nimar Khasia*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 555 (560). 60 Ind Cas 357, *Lakshman Chandia v. Takim Dhali*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 140 (142). 64 Ind Cas 91. 51 Cal 953, *Administrator General of Bengal v. Bal Kissen Misser*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 343 (344). 108 Ind Cas 43, *Lila Singh v. Chandra Badansingh*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Lsh 82 (82). 26 Ind Cas 341, *Amar Singh v. Dhola*.

(1908) 1908 Pun W R No 63 (p 241), *Eadar Dun v. Kale Khar*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Hyd 191 (192). 162 Ind Cas 37, *Kadambeti Dewas v. Uralan v. Secretary of State*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Pat 139 (140). 37 Ind Cas 924, *Ghanita Singh v. Mt. Bhagmanu Keer*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 72 (74). 2 Pat 75. 68 Ind Cas 601, *Abdur Rahman v. Sheikh Wali Mohammad*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 64 (65). 150 Ind Cas 246, *Eastman Mandar v. Farid Adhin Ray*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Sind 92 (92). 27 Ind Cas 246, *M. ... v. ...*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87-

part of the plaintiff would, of course, be a better title than that of the defendant who is merely in possession of the property. As has been seen in Note 4, a *prior possession* is itself proof of a better title as against a subsequent possessor without title.

But the mere fact that the plaintiff, in a suit for possession, shows a better title, proprietary or possessory, than that of the defendant, is not necessarily sufficient to entitle him to a decree for possession against the defendant. He has further to prove that such title is a *subsisting one*, that is, that such title has not been extinguished by lapse of time.² For, it is a fundamental principle that it is the obligation of the plaintiff in every case to show that his action or suit is not barred by limitation.³

The above principles are applicable equally to cases falling under Article 142 or under Article 144. To deal first with cases falling under Article 142, that is cases where the plaintiff, while in possession, has been dispossessed or has discontinued possession, and he sues for possession, the *onus* in such cases will, according to the principles stated above, be on the plaintiff to show —

1. that he has a *title* to possession, whether a possessory or a proprietary one, which is superior to that of the defendant, and
2. that his dispossession or discontinuance of possession, as the case may be, was within twelve years of the suit, or in other

(See also (1919) A I R 1919 P C 62 (68) : 43 Mad 253 : 46 Ind App 201 : 53 Ind Cas 288 (P C), *Arunachalam Chetty v. Venkatachalapathy*.)

(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 318 (319) : 119 Ind Cas 701, *Easturchand Dhikamchand Shop v. Almaram*.]

2. (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 256 (257) : 57 Ind Cas 151, *Rammanohar v. Methila Prasad Sahai*.

--- : 567, *Mazhar*

(1903) 5 Bom L R 186 (190), *Tamunabai v. Dhondi*.

(1884) 10 Cal 577 (579, 580), *Sheo Sohye Roy v. Luckmeshur Singh*.

(1871) 15 Sutb W R 178 (179), *Hurro Chunder Chowdhury v. Gobind Chunder Moitra*.

(1878) 1 Cal L R 531 (533), *Mahendra Nath Mukherjee v. Nafur Chunder Pal*. (Court auction purchase—Possession taken under, is adverse if purchase is void—Suit by owner after 12 years against transferee of purchaser is barred.)

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 953 (954) : 42 Ind Cas 709, *Doharijoddar v. Nilmani Kundu*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 432 (433) : 69 Ind Cas 171, *Duni v. Maleri Ram*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Nag 9 (11) : 54 Ind Cas 131, *Lhoji Kunbi v. Akaji Kunbi*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 330 (310) : 37 Ind Cas 715 : 19 Oudh Cas 374, *Hearsey v. Karam Singh*.

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 1123 (1123) : 6 Nag L R 160, *Baliram v. Sitia*.

(1912) 17 Ind Cas 518 (519) (All), *Mt. Sundar v. Saraswati*.

3. See Note 23 to Section 3 ante.

: 93 Ind Cas 250

W R G : 2 Suther
 n v. *Maharajah*

Rajender Kishor Singh.

words, that he was in actual or in constructive possession within twelve years of the suit.⁴ It is not however necessary

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87

(1886) 11 Bom 216 (219) : 1886 Bom P J 325, *Ramchandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev*. (Case under Article 127.)

(1869) 6 Bom H C R App Cas 125 (128), *Pandurang Govind v. Balkrishna Hari*.

(1878) 5 Cal 36 (37, 39), *Mahomed Ibrahim v. Morrison*.

(1868) 9 Suther W R 131 (132), *Nobokishore Dey v. Ramkushen Mohurur*.

But he is not bound to show that he had sufficient cause for not filing the suit earlier: see.—

(1930) A I R 1930 All 193 (197) : 52 All 501 : 124 Ind Cas 510 (F B), *Mt. Ananti v. Ghanu*.

4. (1889) 11 All 438 (446) : 1889 All W N 155, *Parmanand Misr v. Sahib Ali*

(1892) 14 All 193 (194) : 1892 All W N 55, *Jafar Husam v. Mashug Ali*.

(1906) 28 All 479 (480) : 3 All L Jour 334 : 1906 All W N 95, *Deba v. Roh-tag, Mal*.

(1906) 28 All 760 (761) . 3 All L Jour 567. 1906 All W N 234, *Mazhar Singh v. Behari Singh*.

(1905) 2 All L Jour 62 (63, 64) . 1905 All W N 14, *Musafir Roy v. Mt. Lagan Baria Kuar*.

(1915) A I R 1915 All 103 (107) . 28 Ind Cas 552, *Anand Sarup v. Asad Ali*.

(1918) A I R 1916 All 181 (182) . 88 Ind Cas 427, *Sheopujan v. Sohbat Tewari*.

(1917) A I R 1917 All 42 (42) : 40 Ind Cas 420, *Champa Lal v. Mangal Chand*.

(1923) A I R 1923 All 418 (419) : 71 Ind Cas 1033, *Jharap Rai v. Jant Rai*.

(1923) A I R 1923 All 419 (420) : 73 Ind Cas 212, *Tariff v. Asa Ram*.

(1924) A I R 1924 All 920 (920) . 79 Ind Cas 951, *Basu v. Mt. Nanhi*.

(1926) A I R 1926 All 82 (83) . 89 Ind Cas 466, *Komil Prasad v. Bharat Indu*.

(1928) A I R 1928 All 412 (413) . 50 All 813 . 115 Ind Cas 791, *Sita Ram v. Ram Sunder*.

(1933) A I R 1933 All 775 (778) . 55 All 209 . 143 Ind Cas 497, *Kallan v. Mohammad Nabi Khan*.

(1934) A I R 1934 All 993 (995, 997) . 57 All 278. 152 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Bhindhya Chai Chand v. Ram Charib*.

(1935) A I R 1935 All 774 (775) . 155 Ind Cas 821, *Baboo Singh v. Ram Manohar*.

(1882) 6 Bom 508 (511), *Muro Desai v. Ramchandra Desai*.

(1892) 16 Bom 343 (346), *Kashinath Sitaram v. Shridhar Mahadev* (A dispossessed—Selling property to B—Suit by B against C in possession—B must prove A's possession within 12 years)

(1900) 25 Bom 287 (303) . 2 Bom L R 1111, *Hanmantrav v. Secretary of State*.

(1903) 27 Bom 43 (65) . 4 Bom L R 721, *Tarubai v. Venkat Rao*.

(1869) 6 Bom H C R A C 125 (128), *Pandurang Govind v. Balkrishna Hari*

(1900) 2 Bom L R 407 (409), *Sitaram Raghunath v. Navo Gound*.

(1902) 4 Bom L R 801, *Maruti v. Banu Bai*.

(1903) 5 Bom L R 225 (228, 229), *Rajaram v. Nanachand*.

(1906) 8 Bom L R 96 (98), *Hari v. Dhondi*.

(1903) 10 Bom L R 571 (573), *Bhagwan Singh v. Secretary of State*.

(1877) 1877 Bom P J 114 (114), *Villoba v. Shankar*.

(1890) 1890 Bom P J 175, *Zusia Francis v. Manoel Gustin Fernan*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Bom 91 (93) . 33 Bom 335 . 25 Ind Cas 21, *Subappa Shan-larappa v. Venkappa Golappa*

(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 361 (361) . 77 Ind Cas 506, *Kasturath Gyanada v. Ganesh Sitaram*

(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 364 (365) . 77 Ind Cas 473, *Pandurang Waridto v. Basappa Siddappa*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87

- (1936) A I R 1936 Bom 201 (208, 209, 213) : 163 Ind Cas 632, *Govindbhai v. Dakyabhai*.
 (1863) 9 Cal 125 (127), *Bhootnath Chatterjee v. Kedarnath Banerjee*.
 (1894) 10 Cal 374 (377, 378), *Gopaul Chunder Chuckerbuddy v. Nilmoney Mitter*.
 (1897) 14 Cal 610 (614) : 12 Ind Jur 61, *Tulshi Pershad v. Raja Misser*.
 (1908) 7 Cal L Jour 414 (421) : 12 Cal W N 273 . 3 Mad L Tm 212, *Mirza Shamsheer Bahadur v. Kunj Behari Lall*.
 (1925) 41 Cal L Jour 72 (79), *Sarat Sundary Deby v. J. W. Laidlaw*.

- (1894) 3 Cal W N 763 (766), *Rajendro Kumar v. Mohini Chandra*.
 (1903) 7 Cal W N 294 (296), *Keamuddi v. Hara Mohan Mondul*.
 (1926) 31 Cal W N 60 (64), *Lakhan Chandra Malo v. Gopal Sheikh*.
 (1864) 1864 Suth W R 107 (107), *Ishun Chunder Biswas v. Bissumbhur Biswas*.
 (1864) 1 Suth W R 67 (67), *Kedarnath Mookerjee v. Mohesh Chunder Paul*.
 (1865) 2 Suth W R 66 (69), *Mirza Mohamed Hossain v. Surahutoomissa Khanum*.
 (1865) 2 Suth W R 153 (153), *Kedarnath Acharjee v. Dhugwan Chunder Nandee*.
 (1865) 2 Suth W R 246 (247), *Guroodoss Roy v. Huronath Roy*.
 (1866) 6 Suth W R 110 (111), *Gobind Chunder Shaha v. Kishen Chunder Shaha*.
 (1866) 6 Suth W R 327 (328), *Jugodumba Chowdhram v. Ram Chunder Deo Bakshee*.
 (1867) 7 Suth W R 34 (34), *Shanto Monee Gooplah v. Suttoadhama Gooplah*.
 (1867) 7 Suth W R 212 (213), *Boolee Singh v. Hurobuns Narain Singh*.
 (1867) 7 Suth W
 (1867) 8 Suth W
 (1867) 8 Suth W
 (1868) 9 Suth W R 155 (156), *Dinobundhoo Suhaye v. James Furlong*.
 (1868) 9 Suth W R 251 (252), *Bhuloo Mondul v. Motee Lall Ghose*.
 (1869) 10 Suth W R 239 (239), *Kedarnath Mahatah v. Kadumbinee Delbea*.
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 238 (239), *Doydonath Surmah v. Ofan Bibee*. (The plaintiff must prove date of dispossession as accurately as he can).
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 283 (284), *Ram Lochun Chowdhry v. Joy Doorga Dossia*.
 (1870) 13 Suth W R 23 (23) (P C), *Beer Chunder Jobraj v. Deputy Collector of Bhulloah*.
 (1870) 14 Suth W R 51 (51), *Hurro Narain Singh v. Boykunt Narain Singh*.
 (1870) 14 Suth W R 135 (135, 136), *Bussereomissa Chowdrain v. Leelanund Singh*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 43 (43), *Ameer Ali v. Indurjeet Koer*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 178 (179), *Hurro Chunder Chowdhry v. Gobind Chunder Mostro* (Proof of dispossession on a particular date is not necessary—Possession within 12 years of the suit must be proved by plaintiff).
 (1872) 19 Suth W R 114 (115) (P C), *Griya Kant Lahory v. Hurrish Chunder*.
 (1873) 19 Suth W R 192 (191) : 12 Beng L R 219, *Gossaindass Koondoo v. Siroo Keomaree Debia*.
 (1873) 21 Suth W R 79 (79, 60), *Kalee Narain Bose v. Anund Moyee Goopla*.
 (1874) 21 Suth W R 282 (282, 283), *Ahmed Ali v. Hares Chund*.
 (1875) ..

- (1875) 24 Suth W R 273 (273), *Lu'ch'c Khan v. W. Fcley*.

- (1875) 24 Suth W R 315 (315, 316), *Mahomed Kabeer v. Abdool Azeem*.
 (1875) 24 Suth W R 389 (390), *Shaiikh Ghogoolie v. Shaiikh Muzkur Hossein*.
 (1875) 24 Suth W R 417 (418), *Rhoda Newaz Choudhry v. Brojendro Coomar*.
 (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 703 (704) 16 Ind Cas 741, *Nabaduipendra Mookherjee v. Madhu Sudan Mandal*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 99 (99) 35 Ind Cas 72, *Tomejudda v. Mula: Chowkidar*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 79 (80) 39 Ind Cas 356, *Basikat Ali v. Bassant Nunia*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 32 (34) 51 Ind Cas 70, *Rhedon Lal v. Rajendra Narain Singh*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 414 (414) 41 Ind Cas 690, *Ol: Sha v. Farid Sardar*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 672 (673) 45 Ind Cas 408, *Manindra Chandra v. Sarabindu Ray*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 674 (676) 46 Cal 103: 45 Ind Cas 864, *Sachi Prasad v. Amar Nath Rai*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (565) 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhal Chandra v. Durga Das*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 286 (297) 66 Ind Cas 914, *Ram Ratan Mandal v. Nilmoni Chowdhury*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 140 (142) 51 Cal 953 81 Ind cas 91, *Administrator General of Bengal v. Balkissen Misser*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1230 (1231) 88 Ind Cas 567, *Panchanon Sarkar v. Basanta Kumari Das*. (The rule is the same in all cases, and the differences are only in the manner in which plaintiff should prove his possession.)
 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 115 (116) 87 Ind Cas 694, *Rahimuddin Sarkar v. Umesh Chandra*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1166 (1168) 97 Ind Cas 1003, *Birendra Nath Ray v. Satis Chandra*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 118 (121) 105 Ind Cas 369, *Gopal Chandra Maity v. Sm. Monmohini Das*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 765 (767) 117 Ind Cas 606, *Hardutt Ray Chamarra & Co. v. Ugyr Shaiikh*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 673 (676) 128 Ind Cas 193, *Debendra Nath v. Naharmal Jalan*.
 (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 300 (301) 59 Cal 344: 137 Ind Cas 279, *Krishna Nanda v. Lokenath Mookerji*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 151 (153) 154 Ind Cas 714, *Haji Nayebali Sarkar v. Lalit Mohan Roy*.
 (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 150 (150, 151) 174 Ind Cas 511, *Guru Chharan Radra Pal v. Mafajuddin Molla*.
 (1901) 1901 Pun L R No. 59, *Bula Singh v. Albel Singh*.
 (1936) 39 Pun L R 865 (867), *Ladhuo Ram v. Bansi Dhar*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Lah 202 (203) 59 Ind Cas 891, *Mahomed v. Ude Bhan*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 777 (778) 100 Ind Cas 336, *Dullah v. Mt. Sardarani*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 32 (33) 109 Ind Cas 320, *Rakhella v. Wasira*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 98 (100) 8 Lah 655: 109 Ind Cas 266, *Diam v. Khanu* (Actual date of dispossession need not be proved.)
 (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 704 (701): 108 Ind Cas 874, *Daulat Ram v. Ballu*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 896 (897) 115 Ind Cas 534, *Ghulam Muhammad v. v. Fateh Khan*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 92 (93) 109 Ind Cas 691, *Imam Din v. Man Singh*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 627 (628) 143 Ind Cas 428, *Skeru v. Sham Singh*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 529 (530) 148 Ind Cas 820, *Apa Singh v. Latif*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 204 (207) 162 Ind Cas 330: 17 Lah 442, *Sher Mahomed Shalbaz Khan v. Sher Mahomed Barre Khan*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 734 (738) 29 Ind Cas 10, *Kaliaperumal Eeerudayan v. Chidambaram Tirupur*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87

- (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 31 (31) : 52 Ind Cas 637, *Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Kuthalinga Mudaliar*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 59 (60) : 45 Mad 370 : 67 Ind Cas 246, *Vennam Ramiah v. Kusru Kolamma*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 181 (182) : 91 Ind Cas 454, *Kuppusami Mudaliar v. Chokkalinga Mudaliar*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 282 (283) : 130 Ind Cas 815, *Sevugan Chetty v. Kannappa Chetty*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 644 (646) : 133 Ind Cas 9 : 54 Mad 622, *Ramanathan Chetty v. Lakshmanan Chetty*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 191 (192) : 162 Ind Cas 87, *Kodamperi Devswami Uralan v. Secretary of State*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Nag 161 (161) : 48 Ind Cas 70, *Champat v. Lazmi Narayan*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 95 (96) : 69 Ind Cas 883, *Raghuraj v. Ballabhdas*.
- (1939) A I R 1939 Nag 7 (9), *Meherban Lalli Pinjara v. Yusuf Khan*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Oudh 201 (205) : 18 Oudh Cas 43 : 28 Ind Cas 855, *Brij-ray Singh v. Ganga Baksh*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 20 (23) : 41 Ind Cas 80, *Ratipal v. Dipin Chandra*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 42 (48) : 79 Ind Cas 904 : 27 Oudh Cas 130, *Gur Sahas Kandu v. Chheda*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 177 (229) : 136 Ind Cas 642, *Mahomed Asim Khan v. Mahomed Saadat Ali Khan*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 21 (24) : 147 Ind Cas 805, *Mahomed Mahmud v. Mahomed Afag*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 88 (89) : 10 Luck 513 : 153 Ind Cas 371, *Ram Shankar v. Sheo Dutt*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 528 (529) : 39 Ind Cas 777, *Baker Husain v. Ranjit Koer*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 207 (210) : 51 Ind Cas 801, *Bhikkad Bhunjan v. Upendra Nath*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 359 (360) : 56 Ind Cas 40, *Bhikkhan Qassab v. Mardan Ali*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 593 (599) : 54 Ind Cas 960, *Kisun Prasad Singh v. Surat Naram Prasad*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 158 (159, 160) : 58 Ind Cas 774, *Inder Lal v. Ram Surat Kuer*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 277 (277) : 61 Ind Cas 78, *Bahadur Ali Khan v. Secretary of State*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 33 (34), *Nehari Ball v. Lakshmi Kantha Roy*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 96 (98) : 66 Ind Cas 471, *Balgebind Kumar v. Rai Behari Lal*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 558 (560) : 72 Ind Cas 648, *Chattrapat Pratab Bahadur Sahas v. C. G. Lees*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 341 (342) : 73 Ind Cas 41, *Gayani Sahu v. Balchand Sahu*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 629 (630) : 3 Pat 253 : 81 Ind Cas 669, *Ram Nath Sarangi v. Gobardhan Pandey*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 577 (579) : 97 Ind Cas 282, *Kesho Prasad Singh v. Kirtarath*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 529 (529) : 122 Ind Cas 816, *Gopal Sahu v. Ghan-sham Das*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 147 (149, 160) : 161 Ind Cas 585, *Mohamad Yusuf v. Mohamad Wahed*.

to prove the *actual date* of dispossession, provided it is shown to have happened within twelve years of the suit.⁵

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87

Proof of proprietary title in the plaintiff will not, by reference to the principle that possession follows title, shift the burden of proof on to the defendant to show that the plaintiff was not in possession

(1918) A I R 1918 Low Bur 131 (182) : 41 Ind Cas 722, *Appan Charan v. Kyause Ma*

(1920) A I R 1920 Low Bur 175 (175) : 56 Ind Cas 951, *Muthia Chetty v. Seena V. Thevar.*

(1925) A I R 1925 Rang 111 (111) : 1 Rang 492, 83 Ind Cas 182, *Ma Shan Ma v. Somasundaram Chetty.*

(1929) A I R 1929 Rang 153 (154) : 7 Rang 85 : 117 Ind Cas 591, *U Maung Gyi v. Maung On Bwin.*

(1929) A I R 1929 S. 3 672 (1929) 2011, 27 S. 3 711, 110 T. 3 777

Khan.

(1909) 2 Ind Cas 314 (315) (Mad), *Madhava Gowdu v. Lohanatha Patro.*

(1910) 6 Ind Cas 667 (667) (Mad), *Venkatarayudu v. Sankarayya.*

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 498 (500) (Mad), *Subramania Reddy v. Ramachandra Reddy.*

(1912) 14 Ind Cas 295 (297) (Mad), *Prakhateri Parkum v. Koram.*

(1912) 15 Ind Cas 10 (11, 12) (All), *Bhole Singh v. Bhagwant Singh.*

(1912) 15 Ind Cas 97 (97, 98, 99) (Mad), *Adinarayana Iyer v. Krishnan.*

(1912) 15 Ind Cas 190 (190) (Mad), *In re Rangachariar.*

(1912) 16 Ind Cas 741 (742) (Cal), *Nabadwipendra Mukerjee v. Madhusudan Mandal.*

(1918) 18 Ind Cas 17 (20) (P C), *Dharani Kanta Lahuri v. Gabar Ali Khan.*

(1918) 19 Ind Cas 222 (224) : 1918 Pun Re No. 19, *Paras Ram v. Nathu Mal.*

(1918) 21 Ind Cas 335 (336) (Low Bur), *Maung Tun U v. Mg. Myat Tha Zan.*

(1925) 89 Ind Cas 687 (687) (Oudh), *Main Mohammad v. Sharaf Shah.*

(1926) 93 Ind Cas 1006 (1007) (Lah), *Rawal Bakht v. Dolu Mal.*

(1926) 94 Ind Cas 417 (417) (Lah), *Rahmat Ullah v. Nawab.*

(1926) 96 Ind Cas 551 (552) (Pat), *Kirat Singh v. Sheoratan Singh.*

(1926) 97 Ind Cas 267 (269) (Pat), *Ghura Rai v. Harhar Prasad Sinha.*

(1926) 98 Ind Cas 912 (915) (P B) (Cal), *Lakhan Chandra Malo v. Gopal Sheikh.*

(1927) 98 Ind Cas 1061 (1062) (Oudh), *Sheo Dayal v. Zokra.*

(1929) 107 Ind Cas 779 (780) (Lah), *Nur Khan v. Faqr Abdullah.*

(1929) 115 Ind Cas 420 (421) (Lah), *Basala v. Piru Mal.*

(1931) 131 Ind Cas 475 (476) (Oudh), *Abdul Rahim v. Mohammad Nazir.*

(1933) 146 Ind Cas 448 (449) (Pat), *Guhri Ram Singh v. Adalat Mahato.*
(A I R 1921 Pat 237 (F B), Followed)

[See also (1904) 27 All 153 (154) 1904 All W N 199, *Ram Charan Rai v. Kauleshar Rai*

(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 536 (536) 30 Ind Cas 939, *Sobhan Dalish v. Birendra Kishore Bahadur*

(1930) A I R 1930 Pat 410 (411) 129 Ind Cas 543, *Rajrath Pandey v. Sham Shankar Dubey*

(1909) 2 Ind Cas 314 (315) (Mad), *Madhava Gowdu v. Lohanatha Patro*

--- -- Alabailsh Bhuyya v. Lur Dikram

nd Cas 72 Ali Akbar v. Bakht

1 (1937) Mad 147 115 Ind Cas 750

uraia Ra. Bahadur v. Coochabada

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87**

within twelve years of the suit. The reason, as has been seen in Note 15 *ante*, is that the presumption that possession follows title is only an *inference of fact* which a Court, in its discretion, may or may not draw according to the circumstances of the case. In *Maharajah Koowar Baboo Nitrasur Singh v. Baboo Nand Loll Singh*,⁶ which was a case arising under Bengal Regulation 3 of 1793, Lord Justice Turner, in delivering the judgment of the Board, observed as follows :

"The appellant is seeking to disturb the possession admitted to have existed for about eleven years, of defendants, who insist on a possession of much longer duration as a statutory bar to the suit. It clearly lies on him to remove that bar by satisfactory proof that the cause of action accrued to him (for that is the way in which the Regulation puts it) on a dispossession within twelve years next before the commencement of the suit; and, therefore, that he, or some person through whom he claims, was in possession during that period. *No proof of anterior title, such as would be involved in the decision of the boundary question in his favour, can relieve him from this burden, or shift it upon his adversaries by compelling them to prove the time and manner of dispossession.* The lands in question may have been part of Mouzah Gopaulpore, and as such may have been enjoyed by his ancestor, and yet he may have lost, by lapse of time, his right to recover them."

In *Rajah Sahib Perhlad Sein v. Maharajah Rajender Kishore Singh*,⁷ which was a case under the Act of 1859, their Lordships of the Privy Council did not think it necessary to go into the question of the title of the plaintiff, but held the suit to be barred on the ground that he failed to show his possession within twelve years of the suit. They observed as follows :

"The appellant comes into Court admitting upon the face of his plaint that he is out of possession, and has been so for more than ten years; and the date which he assigns to his dispossession is the 20th of March 1851. Upon the issue as settled by the Court, it lay upon him to establish that he was in possession up to that date; or, failing in that, that the date at which he or some former proprietor of Ramnuggur was last in possession is consistent with a right to institute this suit. Act No. VIII of 1859, Section 32, shows that the plaintiff is bound to satisfy the Court that his right of action is not barred by lapse of time."

In *Mohima Chunder Mozoomdar v. Mohes Chunder Neogi*,⁸ also, their Lordships of the Privy Council considered it unnecessary to go into the plaintiff's title though he had proved several documents in

6. (1860) 8 Moo Ind App 199 (221) : 1 Suth W R P C 51 : 1 Suther 420 : 1 Sar 744 : Ser 913a (P C).

7. (1869) 12 Moo Ind App 293 (337) : 12 Suth W R P C 6 : 2 Suther 225 : 2 Sar 430 : 2 Beng L R 111 (P C).

8. (1888) 16 Ind App 23 (26) : 16 Cal 473 : 5 Sar 321 (P C).

support of his title, and held that the plaintiff must prove his possession within twelve years of the suit. They observed: **Arts. 142 & 144 Note 87**

"The plaintiff must succeed by the strength of his own title and it is the opinion of their Lordships that in this case the onus is thrown upon the plaintiffs to prove their possession prior to the time when they were admittedly dispossessed, and at sometime within twelve years before the commencement of the suit, namely, for the two or three years prior to the year 1875 or 1874, and that it does not lie upon the defendants to shew that in fact the plaintiffs were so dispossessed."

In *Dharani Kanta Lahiri Chowdhuri v. Gabar Ali Khan*,⁹ the Privy Council again reiterated the view that in a suit for ejectment "it lay upon the plaintiffs to prove *not only* a title against the defendants but to prove that the plaintiffs had been dispossessed or discontinued to be in possession of the lands within the twelve years immediately preceding the commencement." See also the undermentioned cases¹⁰ in which it has been held that mere proof of plaintiff's title in a suit falling under Article 142 is not enough to entitle him to succeed and will not shift the burden on to the defendant to show that the dispossession or discontinuance, as the case may be, took place more than twelve years before suit. A contrary view has, however, been held in some cases,¹¹ namely that proof of title in cases under Article 142 is sufficient, by reference to the presumption that

9. (1918) 18 Ind Cas 17 (20) (P C).

10. (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 237 (239) · 6 Pat L Jour 478 · 62 Ind Cas 1 (F B).
Sita Prasad Singh v Hira Singh. (Following 6 Moo Ind App 199)

(1867) 2 Agra 177 (178), *Tara Singh v. Chanda Mull*.

(1893) 1893 All W N 60 (61), *Ram Dial v. Lal Bahadur*.

(1914) A I R 1914 All 207 (207) · 23 Ind Cas 521, *Mt. Hulas v. Salamut Khan*.

(1920) 14 Pat 150 (150) · 11 Pat L Jour 111 · 11 Pat L Jour 111.

Gaganendra Nath
Alkhan Bahadoor

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 557 (566, 567) · 67 Ind Cas 673, *Rakhal Chandra Ghose v Durgadas Samanta*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Cal 286 (287) · 66 Ind Cas 914, *Ram Ratan Mandal v Nilmoni Chowdhury*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Cal 206 (208) · 175 Ind Cas 247, *Ramendra Prasad v Baradaprosad Banu*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Lah 201 (204) · 39 I. C. 971, *Mool Chand v. Amar Nath*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Nag 7 (9) · 1938 Nag L Jour 418 (420) *Maherban Lall Pinjara v Yusufkhan*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Pat 234 (235) · 57 Ind Cas 744, *Gajadhar Prasad v. Mt Dulhan Gulab Kuer*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Pat 134 (136) · 123 Ind Cas 612, *Badrinath Upadhyay v Baijnath Mandal*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Rang 124 (125) · 161 Ind Cas 833, *Ma Prar Gai v U Shue Kyun*.

(1928) 108 Ind Cas 732 (733) (Cal), *Sattar Dewan v Samed Ali*.

11. (1924) A I R 1924 All 924 (925), *Shin Prasad Singh v Muneshwar Dubey*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Bom 207 (209, 210) · 58 Bom 397 & 400 · 112 Ind Cas 552 & 553 (F B), *Krishnaji v Madhusa*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 328 (329) · 168 Ind Cas 100 · 114 Pat L Jour 24, *Sree Moorat v Chhangra*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87**

possession follows title, to shift the burden on to the defendant. It is submitted that these decisions cannot be accepted as laying down the correct law. The question whether the plaintiff has proved that he was in possession within limitation and has thus discharged the onus that lies on him, is one of fact, and in deciding the question the fact that the plaintiff has title will be a factor which will come to his aid with more or less force according to the circumstances of the case,¹² just as various other facts may lead to the inference that the plaintiff must have been in possession.¹³

- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 13 (14) : 89 Ind Cas 935, *Ismail v. Ibrahim*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 669 (670) : 127 Ind Cas 11, *Bhalla Singh v. Jagat Singh*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 105 (106) : 141 Ind Cas 234, *Mt. Raushan Ara Begum v. Mahmud Beg*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 722 (723) : 146 Ind Cas 725, *Ganpat Rai v. Har Dial*. (Purporting to follow A I R 1916 P C 21.)
 (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 1019 (1020), *Bishambar Das v. Telu Ram*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 471 (472) : 41 Ind Cas 114, *Madnapore Zamindary Co., Ltd v. Panday*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 529 (529) : 122 Ind Cas 816, *Gopal Sahu v. Ghan-shyam Das*. (Waste land.)

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the defendant must prove his adverse possession for more than

the defendant, who must prove more than 12 years' adverse possession.]

12. (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 87 (87, 89) : 97 Ind Cas 1006, *Tukaram Bajirao v. Tukaram Yeshwant*.
 (1914) A I R 1914 All 287 (287) : 26 Ind Cas 86, *Inayat Hussain v. Secretary of State*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 243 (244) : 66 Ind Cas 764 : 46 Bom 920, *Mahamad-sahab Ibrahim Sahab v. Tilokchand Abheerchand*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 834 (834) : 27 Ind Cas 803, *Sarojini Devi v. Kirtibash Das*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 855 (857) : 78 Ind Cas 679 : 51 Cal 669, *Suresh Chandra v. Shikha Kanta*. (In a suit for possession on ground of possession it. For possession.)
 (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 422 (423) : 170 Ind Cas 385, *Chandra Mohan Singh v. Butu Man*.
 [See also (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 477 (478) : 89 Ind Cas 894, *Ulanappa Basawanappa Hugar v. Gadigewa Hugar*. (The question was treated as one of evidence.)]

13. See (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 79 (80) : 39 Ind Cas 356, *Barkat Ali v. Basant Nunta*. (In an ejectment suit plaintiff should prove his possession within the statutory period but if plaintiff is mentioned in the Record of Rights as the person in possession, then the burden is shifted on to the defendant and he must prove that plaintiff had been out of possession for more than the statutory period.)

Where the plaintiff *does prove* dispossession or discontinuance of possession within twelve years of the suit, the onus will shift on to the defendant to show that he has got a *better title* than the plaintiff and is therefore entitled to retain possession as against the plaintiff.¹⁴

We have till now dealt with cases falling under Article 142, that is, cases where the plaintiff has been dispossessed or has discontinued his possession. Where the case is not one of dispossession or discontinuance of possession, the defendant's possession must, at the time of his entry, have necessarily been consistent with the plaintiff's title, for if the entry was inconsistent with the plaintiff's title it would operate as a dispossession of the plaintiff. A plaintiff therefore who wishes to claim the benefit of Article 144 must show —

- 1 that he is the *owner* of the plaint property,¹⁵ and
- 2, that the defendant's entry into possession was not in contravention of his title, but derivative, permissive or otherwise consistent with his title.¹⁶

[See also (1889) 1889 Bom P J 380 (390), *Kazi Ahmed v Kazi Mohamed*]

- 14 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 977 (978), 79 Ind Cas 1038, *Kaliprasanna Bahadur Hemanta Kumari* (E g, by showing adverse possession for 12 years)
- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 762 (763) 23 Ind Cas 136, *Hemchandra Chaudhri v. Secretary of State* (He can show a better title by proving adverse possession for 12 years)
- (1901) 3 Bom L R 246 (249), *Bai Fatan v. Emad Asha*
- (1869) 12 Suth W R 472 (473), *Gour Paroy v. Wooma Soonduree Debee*.
- (1875) 23 Suth W R 293 (295), *Dattari Mohanti v. Jugo Bundhoo Mohanti*.
- (1879) 1870 Pun Re No. 102, *Sudama v. Kesko*.
15. (1889) 11 All 438 (443) 1889 All W N 155, *Farmanand Mistr v. Sahib Ali*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Bom 386 (391) 56 Bom 501 140 Ind Cas 171, *Secretary of State v. Tatyasaheb*
- " . . . P atongh (Where not more than 12 years red by limitation, it tied him to an exten-
- (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 2 (4) 68 Ind Cas 320, *Sakha Ram v. Deoba*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 42 (43) 27 Oudh Cas 130 79 Ind Cas 964, *Gur Sahaj Kandu v. Chhedi*
- (1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 77 (78) 32 Ind Cas 568, *Ma Ngem Me v. Ma May*
- (1920) A I R 1920 Low Bur 175 (176) 56 Ind Cas 931, *Muthia Chetty v. Seena Thevar*
16. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 166 (187) 130 Ind Cas 315 10 Pat 407 58 Ind App 29 (P C), *Nageshwar Lux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd*
- (1902) 5 Oudh Cas 97 (103), *Amir Havan Khan v. Harpal Singh*.
- (1888) 1888 Pun Re No 116, *Nihal Singh v. Jiwanda*.
- (1903) 6 Oudh Cas 119 (123), *Dhazwan Balish v. Kamta Parshad*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Low Bur 64 (64) 42 Ind Cas 630, *Mauing Gyi v. U Szi Gyok*.
- (1864) 1864 Suth W R Spe No 8 (8) *Fiber Kariat Singh v. Kari P . . .* (Where in a suit for possession the defendant is allowed to be in the management of the suit property and the defendant denying management, sets up adverse title the plaintiff must show that the defendant's possession was for his benefit)

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87

Where the plaintiff proves these two elements or they are admitted by the defendants, the presumption is that the character of the possession continued till within the period of limitation up to the date alleged by the plaintiff as the date when the possession of the defendant became adverse to him. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that his possession became adverse more than twelve years before suit.¹⁷ Where therefore the plaintiff lays the foundation for the applicability of Article 144, the *onus* is on the defendant to prove that he has been in adverse possession for more than twelve years before suit.¹⁸ The *onus* will not be discharged by

(1928) 111 Ind Cas 577 (582, 583) : 55 Mad L Jour 302 (P C), *Raja of Bobbili v. Ayyagari Sodemma*. (Where the defendant was admitted to have been in possession for a long time and the plaintiff alleged that such possession was given only by way of security for debt, it was held on failure to prove such giving, the plaintiff would fail.)

(1902-03) 2 Upp Bur Rul Evidence 7, *Maung Tun v. Maung Pa U*.

[See also (1902) 1902 Pun Re No. 80, *Din Muhammad v. Mehr Daksh.*]

17. (1913) 22 Ind Cas 65 (67) : 9 Nag L R 179, *Anjuman Islamia v. Hisamul*. (Once the defendant is proved to have been in permissive possession, it lies on him to prove that it became adverse subsequently.)

(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 101 (106) : 22 Nag L R 176 : 100 Ind Cas 446, *Mt. Deshrani v. Kishore Singh*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 231 (234), *Nageshar Sahai v. Shiam Bahadur*.

(1893-1900) 1893-1900 Low Bur Rul 360 (361), *Ma Hla Bu v. Ma Te*.

18.

Arts. 142 & 144

Article 144

(1919) A I R 1919 All 403 (404) : 41 All 609 : 52 Ind Cas 366, *Jai Chand v. Girwar Singh*.

(1934) A I R 1934 All 993 (997) : 57 All 278 : 152 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Bindhya-chal Chand v. Ram Gharib*.

(1879) 4 Bom 89 (93), *Sambhubhai Karsandas v. Shivajidas Sadashindas Desai*.

(1887) 1887 Bom P J 242, *Ganga v. Nago*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 361 (361) : 77 Ind Cas 506, *Kashinath v. Ganesh*.

(1936) 163 Ind Cas 697 (903) : 62 Cal L Jour 177 (192) : 63 Cal 300, *Surendra Kumar Roy v. Ahmed Nawab Choudhury*.

(1879) 4 Cal L R 40 (41), *Ogra Kant Choudhree v. Mohesh Chunder Sickdar*.

(1869) 12 Suth W R 250 (251), *Ramdhun Saira v. Nobin Chunder Chowdhry*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 176 (177) : 70 Ind Cas 602, *Jankinath v. Baskuntha Nath*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 62 (65) : 77 Ind Cas 564, *Jobeda Khatun v. Tulsi Charan Das*.

- (1867) 1867 Pun Re No. 97, *Kurm Newaz v. Kurrcem Baksh*.
 (1883) 1883 Pun Re No. 122, *Dula Shah v. Sobha Singh*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 236 (236) : 100 Ind Cas 477, *Kanshi Ram v. Taja*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 619 (620) : 103 Ind Cas 475, *Ali Muhammad v. Barkat*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 549 (550) : 117 Ind Cas 803 : 11 Lah 29, *Jano v. Narsingh Das*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 576 (579) : 151 Ind Cas 490, *Harnam Singh v. Rana Upenderchand* (Plaintiff conferred certain of his own lands to the defendant for temporary use. Later, plaintiff sought to resume the land given to the defendant when the defendants denied his title and claimed the land as being an owner of it)

Siraj-ud-din v.

- (1920) A I R 1920 Nag 274 (274) : 90 Nag L R 18 : 150 Ind Cas 679, *Mt. Jijwas v. Zabu*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 42 (43) : 27 Oudh Cas 130 : 79 Ind Cas 964, *Gur Sahai Kandu v. Cheddai*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 177 (229) : 136 Ind Cas 642, *Mahomed Azim v. Mahomed Saadat Ali*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 392 (381) : 134 Ind Cas 599, *Mt. Zahida Begam v. Mumtaz Ali*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 789 (740) : 86 Ind Cas 771, *Rameshwar Singh Bahadur v. Rati Lal Singh*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 577 (579) : 97 Ind Cas 282, *Kesho Prasad Singh v. Kartarath*.
 (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 145 (146) : 11 Pat 165 : 142 Ind Cas 246, *Ram Prasad v. Budeswar Prasad*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 77 (78) : 32 Ind Cas 568, *Ma Nyem Me v. Ma May*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Low Bur 175 (176) : 56 Ind Cas 951, *Muthua Chetty v. Seena V Thetar*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 13 (14) : 5 Rang 576 : 105 Ind Cas 593, *Maung Aung Tun v. Maung San Nyun*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 95 (95) : 104 Ind Cas 383, *Mg Than Gyaung v. Ma Lun Daw*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Rang 40 (45) : 8 Rang 556 : 129 Ind Cas 511, *Maung Sin v. Maung So Min*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Sind 98 (101) : 53 Ind Cas 722 : 13 Sind L R 150, *Naramdas v. Buto*.
 (1913) 21 Ind Cas 335 (336) (Low Bur), *Maung Tun U v. Mg Myat Tha Zan*.
 (1931) 181 Ind Cas 461 (462) (All), *Mahomed Ishaq v. Zindi Begum*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 399 (400) : 71 Ind Cas 265, *Lakhu v. Lal Singh*. (When defendant's possession is not or is presumed not to be adverse, he must show adverse possession for 12 years).
 (1917) A I R 1917 All 233 (234) : 40 Ind Cas 97, *Shambhunath v. Hari Ram* (Possession of abadi land in agricultural mahal prima facie permissive).
 [See also (1923) A I R 1923 All 565 (565) : 74 Ind Cas 579, *Ragha Mal v. Abdus Sattar*.]
 (1903) 5 Bom L R 742 (744), *Bandacharya v. Shrinivacharya*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 310 (311) : 126 Ind Cas 703, *Yaqub Khan v. Sheo Dularey*.
 (1910) 5 Ind Cas 506 (506) (Mad), *Eranthilal Kunhimacha v. Thoppal Pudua Vittal* (In a suit for possession, where defendant sets up adverse possession, it is not enough for the Court simply to find against defendant and for plaintiff—The Court should find the period for which the defendant was in possession and if for over the statutory period, whether the possession was only derivative—Without a definite conclusion on these points, no finding as to limitation should be recorded in plaintiff's favour.)

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87

proof of possession of an *equivocal* character.^{18a} Thus, where the possession of a widow might have been adverse, but might also under the circumstances have been obtained under some arrangement with the owner, and the matter is not cleared up, the onus cannot be said to be discharged.^{18b}

Where the plaintiff sues for possession on the allegation that the defendant's possession was permissive or derivative at its inception but the defendant denies such allegation and the plaintiff fails to prove the permissive or derivative nature of the possession, the case would be one of dispossession and the Article applicable would be 142. The plaintiff must in such a case show that he was in possession within twelve years of the suit.¹⁹ The contrary view held in the undermentioned cases^{19a} is, it is submitted, not correct. The said decisions are all based upon considerations which have been shown in Note 2 *ante* to be incorrect.

[But see (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 45 (46) : 134 Ind Cas 97, *Mehr Khan v. Sakhi Mahomed*.]

- 18a (1902) 26 Bom 617 (621) : 4 Bom L R 312, *Balkrishna v. Govind*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 454 (455) : 178 Ind Cas 301, *Aichayya v. Jalaluddin Sahib*.
- 18b (1902) 26 Bom 617 (621) : 4 Bom L R 312, *Balkrishna v. Govind*.
19. (1902) 24 All 90 (92) : 1901 All W N 188, *Hajj Khan v. Baldeo Das*.
(1911) 9 Ind Cas 812 (812) (All), *Brijlal Sahu v. Rameshar Sahu*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 415 (419), *Alam Khan Sahib v. Karuppanaswami Nadan*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 893 (894) : 147 Ind Cas 285, *Hasan Mahomed v. Ahmed Bakhsh*.
(1915) A I R 1915 Bom 92 (93) : 39 Bom 835 : 28 Ind Cas 24, *Subbappa Shankerappa v. Venkappa Golappa*. (As soon as the part of the land is found to be in possession of the defendant, the case must necessarily fall under Art. 142—Every suit for possession in which the plaintiff alleges that he has had possession must fall under Article 142.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 370 (370) : 87 Ind Cas 1023, *Singhuji v. Gambhirji*. (Do.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 42 (43) : 27 Oudh Cas 130 : 79 Ind Cas 964, *Gur Sahay Kandu v. Chedi*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 All 124 (126) : 167 Ind Cas 371, *Ram Manohar v. Baboo Singh*.
- (1920) 38 Mad L Jour 15 (15) (Critical Note on (1919) 41 All 669 : A I R 1919 All 403, *Jai Chand v. Garwar Singh*.)
- (1897-1901) 2 Upp Bur Rul 461 (463), *Maung Hman v. Maung Shwe Ka*.
[See also (1906) 1906 Pan L R No. 73, *Behari v. Sadho Mal*.]
- 19a (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 32 (32) : 91 Ind Cas 1047, *Santa Singh v. Narain Singh*. (He can succeed merely on the strength of his title.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 834 (835) : 87 Ind Cas 386, *Govinda Ramanuja v. Mahomed Eyoof Sahib*. (Suit against alleged lessees—Lease denied and not proved—Suit also based on title—Art 144 applied.)
- (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 46 (47) : 7 Luck 250 : 137 Ind Cas 678, *Suraj Bah v. Mahadeo Prasad*.
- (1929) 117 Ind Cas 384 (384) (Lah), *Hiralal v. Lalji*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 287 (287) : 99 Ind Cas 312, *Ramanaujachariar v. Sundarachariar*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 310 (311) : 126 Ind Cas 703, *Yakub Khan v. Shao Dularey*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Sind 193 (201) : 178 Ind Cas 630, *Arab Jhanglu v. Panjal Shah*.

A suit for a declaration of title is not one for possession of immovable property and the question of onus in such suits is strictly not relevant to a discussion of the question of onus in possessory suits. The decisions, however, dealing with the question of onus in declaratory suits are so often referred to in suits under Articles 142 and 144, that it may not be without advantage to refer to them.

Arts. 142 & 144

Note 87

Where a person sues for a declaration of his proprietary title to immovable property, and proves such title, it is for the defendant to show that the title has been lost by the plaintiff by his (defendant's) adverse possession of the property for the statutory period.²⁰ Where a person sues for a declaration of title to property on the ground that he has acquired such title to it by adverse possession for the requisite period, the onus is obviously on him to show his adverse possession for the statutory period.²¹ It is not for the defendant to show in such cases that the plaintiff was not in possession adversely to him for the requisite period. In *Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao*,²² a claim was preferred by an objector under the Madras Forest Act to certain property on the ground that he had, as against the Government, acquired title thereto by adverse possession for the requisite period. The claimant was in law in the same position as a person suing in the ordinary Courts of Justice for a declaration of right. It was contended that it was for the Government—defendant—who was *prima facie* the owner of the property (being the bed of a navigable river) to show that it had a subsisting title. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

"Nothing is better settled than that the onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession for a certain period lies upon the person asserting such possession. It is too late in the day to suggest the contrary of this proposition. If it were correct, it would be open to the possessor for a year or a day to say, 'I am here, be your title to the property over so good, you cannot turn me out until you have demonstrated that the possession of myself and my predecessors was not long enough to fulfil all the legal conditions'."

* * * * *

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 754 (755) 156 Ind Cas 591, *Sulaiman Rowther v. Dawood Khan Sahib*.

(1939) A I R 1939 Nag 7 (9), *Maherbhan Lalla v. Yusuf Khan Kallu*.

20 (1917) A I R 1917 All 130 (131) 37 Ind Cas 794, *Mahomed Kamal v. Habibullah*.

21. (1930) A I R 1930 P C 281 (282) 11 Lah 633 57 Ind App 273 127 Ind Cas 537 (P C), *Jahanda Khan v. Abdul Ghafur*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 177 (179) 43 Bom 589 61 Ind Cas 440 *Faria Bai-unt v. Secretary of State*.

(1929) A I R 1929 All 753 (753) 51 All 1042 119 Ind Cas 6, *Kanhaiya Lal v. Gircar*.

(1937) 167 Ind Cas 801 (801) (Nag), *Ramaji Gujar v. Kanhaiya Gujar*.

22. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 21 (26, 27) 33 Ind 617 43 Ind App 132 35 Ind Cas 902 (P C).

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87**

proof of possession of an *equivocal* character.^{18a} Thus, where the possession of a widow might have been adverse, but might also under the circumstances have been obtained under some arrangement with the owner, and the matter is not cleared up, the onus cannot be said to be discharged.^{18b}

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- 18a(1902) 96 Bom 617 (621) : 4 Bom L R 312, *Balkrishna v. Govind*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 454 (455) : 178 Ind Cas 801, *Atchayya v. Jalaluddin Sahib*.
- 18b(1902) 96 Bom 617 (621) : 4 Bom L R 312, *Balkrishna v. Govind*.
19. (1902) 24 All 90 (92) : 1901 All W N 188, *Hajikhan v. Baldeo Das*.
(1911) 9 Ind Cas 812 (812) (All), *Brijlal Sahu v. Rameshar Sahu*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 415 (419), *Alam Khan Sahib v. Karuppanaswami Nadan*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 693 (894) : 147 Ind Cas 285, *Hasan Mahomed v. Ahmed Bakhsh*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 92 (93) : 39 Bom 335 : 28 Ind Cas 24, *Subbappa Shankerappa v. Venkappa Golappa*. (As soon as the part of the land is found to be in possession of the defendant, the case must necessarily fall under Art. 142—Every suit for possession in which the plaintiff alleges that he has had possession must fall under Article 142.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 370 (370) : 87 Ind Cas 1023, *Singhuji v. Gambhirji*. (Do.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 42 (43) : 27 Oudh Cas 130 : 79 Ind Cas 964, *Gur Sahaj Kandu v. Chedi*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 All 124 (126) : 167 Ind Cas 371, *Ram Manohar v. Baboo Singh*.
- (1920) 38 Mad L Jour 15 (15) (Critical Note on (1919) 41 All 669 : A I R 1919 All 403, *Jai Chand v. Gurwar Singh*)
- (1897-1901) 2 Upp Bur Bul 461 (463), *Maung Hman v. Maung Shwe Ka*.
[See also (1906) 1906 Pun L R No 73, *Behari v. Sadho Mai*]
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- (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 46 (47) : 7 Luck 250 : 137 Ind Cas 678, *Suraj Bali v. Mahadeo Prasad*.
- (1929) 117 Ind Cas 384 (384) (Lah), *Hiralal v. Lalji*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 287 (287) : 99 Ind Cas 312, *Ramanujachariar v. Sundarachariar*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 310 (311) : 126 Ind Cas 703, *Yakub Khan v. Sheo Dularey*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Sind 198 (201) : 178 Ind Cas 690, *Arab Jhangli v. Panjal Shah*.

A suit for a declaration of title is not one for possession of immovable property and the question of onus in such suits is strictly not relevant to a discussion of the question of onus in possessory suits. The decisions, however, dealing with the question of onus in declaratory suits are so often referred to in suits under Articles 142 and 144, that it may not be without advantage to refer to them.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 87

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"Nothing is better settled than that the onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession for a certain period lies upon the person asserting such possession. It is too late in the day to suggest the contrary of this proposition. If it were correct, it would be open to the possessor for a year or a day to say 'I am here, be your title to the property ever so good, you cannot turn me out until you have demonstrated that the possession of myself and my predecessors was not long enough to fulfil all the legal conditions' "

* * * * *

- (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 754 (755) 156 Ind Cas 591, *Sulaiman Bowther v. Dawood Khan Sahib*.
 (1939) A I R 1939 Nag 7 (9), *Maherbhan Lalla v. Yusuf Khan Kallu*.
 20 (1917) A I R 1917 All 180 (191) 37 Ind Cas 791, *Mahomed Kamel v. Habbullah*.
 21. (1930) A I R 1930 P C 281 (287) 11 Lah 633 57 Ind App 273 127 Ind Cas 537 (P C), *Jahandad Khan v. Abdul Ghafur*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 177 (179) 45 Bom 789 61 Ind Cas 410, *Fas'a Baji-wani v. Secretary of State*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 All 733 (733) 51 All 1042 119 Ind Cas 6, *Kanaboy's Lal v. Girwar*.
 (1937) 167 Ind Cas 801 (801) (Nag), *Ramaji Gujar v. Kanaboy's Gujar*.
 22. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 21 (26 27) 33 Cal 617 43 Ind App 192 33 Ind Cas 902 (P C)

Arts. 132 & 144
Notes 87-88

"It would be contrary to all legal principles thus to permit the squatter to put the owner of the fundamental right to a negative proof upon the point of possession. * * * * In an ordinary suit for a declaration it cannot be doubted that the onus of establishing possession for the requisite period would rest upon the plaintiff * * * * nothing further is needed than the acknowledgment of the undisputed fact that these islands formed in the sea belonged to the Crown. That fact is fundamental: until adverse possession against the Crown is complete, that is to say, is for a period of sixty years, that fundamental fact remains and that fact forms 'subsisting title'."

The onus in such suits, i. e. suits for declaration of title on the ground of its having been acquired by possession for a certain period, is not only to prove possession for the requisite period but also to prove that such possession had all the qualities of adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness which should qualify such adverse possession. In *Moolharar v. Kunharan Kutty*,²³ where the plaintiff sued for the establishment of his title to certain property, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

"Standing a title in A, the alleged adverse possession of B must have all the qualities of adequacy, continuity and exclusiveness which should qualify such adverse possession. But the onus of establishing these things is on the adverse possessor. Accordingly, where the holder of a title proves that he too has been exercising during the currency of his title various acts of possession, then the quality of these acts, even although they might have failed to constitute adverse possession as against another, may be abundantly sufficient to destroy that adequacy and interrupt that exclusiveness and continuity which is demanded from any person challenging by possession the title which he holds."

In a suit for *confirmation* of possession by declaration of title, the plaintiff must show not only that he is in possession but also that he has a title.²⁴

Where A claims title to land which has been re-formed after submersion, the onus is on him to show that he was the owner thereof before the submersion.²⁵ See also Note 70 *ante*.

88. Judgment against third party does not alter onus.—A judgment not *inter partes* cannot, in a suit for possession, alter the burden of proof as between rival claimants in the suit.¹

23. (1922) A I R 1922 P C 181 (184) : 48 I. A. 395 : 44 Mad 883 : 66 I. C. 451 (P C).

24. (1873) 19 Suth W R 282 (282), *Shah Omer Ali v. Shah Mukbool Ali*.

25. (1935) A I R 1935 P C 125 (126) : 156 Ind Cas 548 (P C), *Taraladas Acharjee v. Secretary of State*

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1230 (1231) : 88 Ind Cas 567, *Panchanon Sarhar v. Basantha Kumari*.

Note 88

1. (1937) A I R 1937 P C 69 (75) : 167 Ind Cas 329 : 16 Pat 258 : 31 Sind L R 242 (P C), *Kesho Prasad Singh v. Mt Bhagjogna Kuer*.

89. Question immaterial when evidence has been let in on both sides.—Where evidence has been let in by both sides, it cannot matter subsequently by which party it was given.¹ In other words, the question of burden of proof is immaterial where evidence has been let in on both sides

Arts. 142 & 143.
Notes 89-90

90. Starting point.—In a suit falling under Article 142, time runs from the date of dispossession, where the suit is based on dispossession,¹ or if the suit is based on discontinuance of possession, from the date of such discontinuance.² Where, after a dispossession, the owner succeeds in getting back possession but is again subsequently dispossessed, time for a suit for possession will run from the second dispossession.³ Thus, where the plaintiff was ousted by Government and possession was subsequently restored to the plaintiff and then he was again ousted by the Government, it was held that

Note 89

- 1 (1917) A I R 1917 P C 18 (20) 44 Cal 858 44 Ind App 104 40 Ind Cas 837 (P C), *Basanta Kumar Roy v. Secretary of State*.

Note 90

1. (1918) A I R 1918 Lower Bur 131 (181, 192, 194) : 41 Ind Cas 722, *Jagan Charan v. Kyausa Ma.*
(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 243 (244) . 46 Bom 920 : 66 Ind Cas 764, *Mahamad Sahib Ibrahim Sahib v. Tilokchand.*
(1890) 1890 Bom P J 175, *Zuzia Francis v. Manoel.*
(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 702 (704) . 159 Ind Cas 1101, *Hemendra Nath v. Jnanendra Prasanna* (Last full owner dispossessed—Subsequent interposition of widow's estate—Time runs from date of dispossession.)
(1867) 2 Agra 235 (236), *Saligram v. Meheental*. (Decree-holder dispossessed after taking possession privately and not through Court)
(1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 154 (157, 158) . 50 Ind Cas 180, *Mt. Mahades Kunwar v. Mt. Bahu Rani Sahiba.*
(1867) 4 Agra 125 (126), *Seth Oodley Kurrum v. Chait Ram.*
(1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 425 (426) 156 Ind Cas 92, *Wahid Ali v. Mahboob Ali Khan.*
(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 228 (229, 230), *Jnanada Prasanna v. Hemendra Nath.*
(1929) 119 Ind Cas 8 (9) (All), *Baldeo v. Muloo.*
(1921) A I R 1921 Pat 36 (36) 57 Ind Cas 717 5 Pat L Jour 592, *Madan Mohan Singh v. Bray Bihari Lal.*

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A's heirs—Date of dispossession or discontinuance is date when A left village)

- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 86 (86) 57 Ind Cas 717 5 Pat L Jour 592 *Madan Mohan Singh v. Bray Bihari Lal* (Starting point is date of dispossession or discontinuance and not date when plaintiff ceased to occupy land)

3. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 270 (271) 51 Ind Cas 729, *Guruch Chandra Lal v. Darbuntha Nath Singh*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 90**

the plaintiff was entitled to reckon the period of limitation from the date of the second dispossession.⁴

Suppose now that the rightful owner obtains possession from the defendant under a *decree of Court*, but the decree is subsequently reversed in appeal, with the result that the defendant is put back in possession by dispossessing the owner. Does such dispossession furnish a cause of action to the rightful owner and can he reckon limitation from such dispossession? There is a difference of opinion on the point. In *Degumbery Dossee v. Annundnath Roy*,⁶ it was held that a brief possession for a few weeks under a decree subsequently set aside was not such a possession as to entitle the plaintiff to calculate limitation from that time. In *Motee Singh v. Leelanund Singh*,⁶ Loch, J., was of the opinion that possession given under an erroneous order of Court which is subsequently rectified and the party deprived of possession, cannot enable a plaintiff to defeat a defendant's plea of adverse possession. Glover, J., the other Judge in the same case, differed from that view and held that any possession not obtained by force or fraud, takes the case out of the statute of limitation. In *Sayed Nasruddin v. Venkatesh Prabhu*,⁷ it was held by the High Court of Bombay that an ouster by the Court consequent on the reversal of the decree under which possession had been given to the rightful owner, cannot furnish any cause of action for the rightful owner against the defendant who was previously in possession. This view was followed by the High Court of Madras in *Narayanan Chetty v. Kannammai Achi*,⁸ and in *Kaliaperumal v. Chidambaram*.^{8a} In *Lakshmipathayya v. Ramachendra*,⁹ the same High Court expressed a contrary view, namely, that the continuity

(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 129 (120) : 117 Ind Cas 231, *Narbad v. Chhoti*. (There is no difference when the possession is wrongfully obtained with the assistance of a revenue officer and when it is obtained by a wrongful entry.)

(1936) 40 Cal W N 1019 (1020), *Ramesh Chandra v. Dud Mehar Bibi*.

(1880) 6 Cal L Jour 472 (487), *Mir Wazirudin v. Lala Deoki Nandan*.

(1906) 33 Cal 821 (825) : 10 Cal W N 1081, *Jonab Sheekh v. Maharaja Suraya Kant Acharyya*.

(1878) 2 Cal L Jour 1 (6), *Mamtaruddin Bhuian v. Barkatulla*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 48 (49) : 45 Ind Cas 548, *Hari Das v. Debendro Ram Banerjee*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 22 (23) : 140 Ind Cas 530, *Mohan Lal v. Fatoo*.

[See also (1897) 1 Cal W N 569 (571), *Jagubandhu Bhattacharjee v. Hari Mohun Ray*. (Person entitled to property receiving rent and profits from Magistrate for period of attachment under S. 146, Criminal P. O.—Limitation does not run against him during such period as he has constructive possession.)]

4. (1864) 1864 Suth W R Spc No. 4 (6) : 1 Hay 37 : Marsh 13 (F B), *Ranee Surnomoyee v. The Collector of Rungpore*.

5. (1864) 1864 Suth W R (Gap) 43 (43).

6. (1869) 11 Suth W R 49 (51, 52) : 2 Beng L R A G 173.

7. (1879) 5 Bom 382 (386).

8. (1905) 28 Mad 333 (342). (Correctness doubted in A I R 1929 Nag 129.)

8a (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 738 (739) : 29 Ind Cas 10. (Following 11 Suth W R 49.)

9 (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 699 (691) : 35 Ind Cas 421.

of the possession which the defendant must establish for the statutory period, would be broken by the delivery to the rightful owner of possession under a decree of the Court even though such decree was subsequently reversed in appeal. In *Narbadi v. Ohhoti*,¹⁰ the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court has also dissented from the Calcutta, Bombay and the earlier Madras views referred to above. It is submitted that the view expressed in the later Madras decision and by the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur is correct. In order that an owner may lose his property by the adverse possession of another, it is necessary not only that he should be out of possession, but that another should be in continuous possession during the whole of the period prescribed. It cannot be said that either of these elements exist, where, during such period, possession is obtained through Court by the owner under a decree even though such decree is reversed subsequently as being erroneous. It has been held in the undermentioned case¹¹ of the Calcutta High Court that even a forcible dispossession by the true owner of the wrongdoer will prevent the running of time and that this would be so even if the wrongdoer should get back possession from the plaintiff in pursuance of a decree under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.

Subsequent transactions between the defendants themselves will not give a fresh starting point. Certain villages belonging to a zamindar were sold for arrears of Government revenue and the purchaser was put into possession of the property sold. Subsequently, the Government made a fresh grant, by way of zamindari, of the villages, to the purchaser. It was held that the cause of action for the suit by the original zamindar on the ground that the revenue sale was not binding on him is the original dispossession and not the subsequent grant by the Government to the purchaser, which did not give a fresh cause of action.^{11a}

In a suit falling under Article 144 of the Act, time runs from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.¹² The question *when* the possession of the defendant

10. (1929) A I R 1929 Nag 129 (129) 117 Ind Cas 231.

11. (1905) 9 Cal W N 1061 (1064), *Protap Chandra v. Durgacharan* (Dissenting from 12 Suth W R 9, 22 Suth W R 259 and 12 Cal L R 446. The decision is also opposed to the view expressed in 12 Suth W R 452.)

11a. (1874) 1 Ind App 335 (341) 22 Suth W R 167 3 Sar 39 3 Suther 30 (PC), *Chaitanyachandra v. Collector of Ganjam*

12. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 1095 (1095) 33 All 224, *Ram Lalhan Das v. Gajadhar Das*

(1895) 19 Bom 809 (814), *Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath*.

(1911) 9 Ind Cas 791 (794) 35 Mad 231, *Partasarathi Naulen v. Lakshmana Naulen*.

(1909) 2 Ind Cas 314 (315) (Mad), *Madhata Gowadu v. Laksharaita Patrao*

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 48 (48) 45 Bom 570 39 Ind Cas 403 *Pamachandras Balicant v. Balaji Ganesh*

(1891) 1891 Bom P J 232, *Seshu v. Venkatraman*

(1935) 164 Ind Cas 61 (62) 62 Cal 221 *Uppalapati Raju v. Subbarao & Kunda*

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 90-91

becomes adverse to the plaintiff is one of fact to be decided with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case.¹³ Possession *after suit* cannot be reckoned in computing the period of the defendant's adverse possession.¹⁴

91. Defendant made party after limitation.—When a person is added as a defendant subsequent to the institution of a suit for possession, the suit as against him cannot be treated as having been instituted till the date on which he was made a party (see Section 22 *ante*). If, therefore, a person in possession is added as defendant more than twelve years after the accrual of the cause of action, the suit will be barred as against him.¹ But where a defendant is impleaded in proper time but claims his share of the suit property in a written statement submitted twelve years after the cause of action, his claim will not be barred by limitation.² See also Sections 3 and 22, *ante*.

- (1934) A I R 1934 Nag 36 (38) : 30 Nag L R 284 : 148 Ind Cas 62, *Ganpat-
rao v. Vithabas*
(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 240 (242) : 50 Ind Cas 45, *Tarachand v. Secretary of
State*.
(1865) 2 Suth W R 135 (136), *Eshan Chunder Rai v. Ksh. Coomar Rai*.
(1912) 16 Ind Cas 365 (367) . 40 Cal 173 . 17 Cal W N 137 : 16 Cal L J 202,
Prosonno Kumar Mookerjee v. Sri Kantha Ray.
(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 642 (643) : 73 Ind Cas 857, *Sarup Singh v. Pal
Singh*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Bom 217 (221) : 57 Bom 709 : 148 Ind Cas 885, *Hamid-
miya v. Nagandas*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 910 (911) . 109 Ind Cas 561, *Piara Ram v. Sohawa*.
(1917) A I R 1917 Lah 236 (237) : 37 Ind Cas 412, *Arursingh v. Solakahan
Singh*.
(1916) A I R 1918 Oudh 223 (225) : 82 Ind Cas 876, *Mahomed Mumtas Ali
Khan v. Harpal Singh*.
(1869) 12 Suth W R 44 (45), *Shahabooddeen v. Moulvie Naduroojuma*.
(1872) 13 Suth W R 38 (39), *Nobin Chunder Roy v. Radha Pearee Dabee*.
13. (1923)

been resumed and settled with the zamindar by the Government.—
Commencement of adverse possession of the zamindar after the re-
sumption and settlement with him must be determined with regard to
the facts of each case.)

14. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 415 (417) : 29 Ind Cas 168, *Ratna Bai v. Official
Assignee*.

possession endured also for the benefit of A.J.]

Note 91

1. (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 216 (218) : 54 Cal 114 : 100 Ind Cas 293, *Mt. Asru-
fannessa Khatoon v. Hem Chandra*.
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 420 (421) (Mad), *Rangacharlu Chettiar v. Muthuharna-
pam Kothan*.
- (1892) 15 Mad 19 (29), *Byathanma v. Arulla*.
2. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 345 (347) : 53 Bom 472 : 119 Ind Cas 656, *Rayegarda
Hanmantraya v. Ramalingappa Shidgardappa*.

92. Tacking. — As has been seen in Note 87 *ante*, it is for the *defendant*, in a suit governed by Article 144, to show that he has been in continuous adverse possession for twelve years. The word "defendant" in this Act includes persons from or through whom the defendant derives his liability to be sued. (See Note 17 *ante*.) In view of the said definition it is clear that, in computing the period of twelve years' adverse possession under Article 144, the adverse possession of the defendant in the suit can be tacked on to the adverse possession of the person *from or through whom the defendant derives his liability to be sued*. In other words, if the suit is one governed by Article 144, a succession of wrongdoers *claiming through one another* can defeat the right of the owner by tacking on the periods of their adverse possession, though the possession of each one of them has been only for a period of less than twelve years.¹ But where the wrongdoers do not claim from or through one another, that is, if they are *independent trespassers* on the property, their possession cannot be tacked on together for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under the Article.²

Arts. 142 & 14
Note 92

Note 92

1. (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 176 (177). 49 Ind Cas 767, *Ratan Kumar Mahto v Kargal Kumar Mahto* (Devisee of a trespasser can tack on the period of his devisee's possession to that of his own.)
 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 449 (451), *Rajagopala Naidu v. Ramasubramanian Aygar.* (Heir of the trespasser.)
 (1926) A I R 1926 All 697 (698) : 96 Ind Cas 687, *Sajjad Hussain v. Qurban Ali Beg.*
 (1892) 16 Bom 197 (199), *Ali Sahib v Kaji Ahmed.* (Auction-purchaser deriv-
 be tacked, as
 'asam Man.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Rang 261 (265). 1 Rang 176 75 Ind Cas 31, *Ma Mi v. Hadji Mahomed* (Do)
 (1895) 19 Bom 620 (621), *Hariyan v. Shuram* (Purchaser from a vendee who remains in adverse possession against a prior vendee)
 (1894) 18 Bom 37 (40), *Namdai v. Ramachandra Gomaiz.* (Transferee from judgment-debtor who is in adverse possession of property after court-sale.)
 (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 425 (427) 156 Ind Cas 92 : 11 Luck 297, *Wahid Ali v. Mahboob Ali Khan.*
 (1906) 3 All L Jour 424 (425) 1906 All W N 184, *Dabu Ram v Banke Bihari Lal.*
 (1921) A I R 1921 All 389 (391) 43 All 164 61 Ind Cas 546, *Mt Ram Puri v. Dudh Sen*
 (1906) 9 Oudh Cas 230 (231, 232), *Nageshar v. Sheo Mangal*
 (1889) 13 Bom 160 (165), *Padajurat v. Ramrat.*
 (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 50 (56, 57) 33 Ind Cas 371 18 Oudh Cas 2-9, *Ghisa Singh v. Gajraj Singh*
 Cas 279, *Krishna f. Mahmud.*
 v. Farn Elias.
 trustee is effective
 34 40 Ind Cas 327

Illustrations

1. *A's* land becomes submerged under water, and, on its re-formation *in situ*, is taken possession of by Government. Some time later, on *B's* application that it may be delivered to him on the ground that it was a re-formation *in situ* of what was his land before, the Government gives the property to him and he enters into possession. *B* cannot, for the purpose of computing the period of twelve years under Article 144, tack on his possession

(1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (28) : 147 Ind Cas 545 : 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal*.

(1920) 50 Ind Cas 764 (1955) (All), *TP. Jha Dam v. Salla Dam* (Member of

sion.)

(1915) A I R 1915 Oudh 143 (144) : 28 Ind Cas 857 : 18 Oudh Cas 61, *Sheoambar Singh v. Balbhadra Singh*. (Joint decree-holder cannot add the period of judgment-debtor's possession to his own possession to make up adverse possession against the other joint decree-holder.)

(1898) 23 Bom 710 (714) : 1 Bom L R 203, *Mahamad v. Amanji*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 505 (506) : 16 Ind Cas 43 (41) : 37 Mad 440, *Veeramma v. Chinna Reddy*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Bom 278 (276) : 58 Bom 410 : 154 Ind Cas 824, *Anant Ganpati v. Vishnu Rambhau*.

(1898) 2 Cal W N 815 (317), *Guroo Churn Dutt v. Krishna Moni Gupta*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 50 (66, 57) : 18 Oudh Cas 289 : 33 Ind Cas 871, *Ghisa Singh v. Gajraj Singh*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 425 (427) : 156 Ind Cas 92 : 11 Luck 297, *Wahid Ali v. Mahboob Ali Khan*.

(1906) 9 Oudh Cas 230 (231), *Nageshar v. Sheo Mangal*.

(1912) 16 Ind Cas 225 (233) (Mad), *Veeraragava Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 809 (811) : 129 Ind Cas 491, *Abdul Ghani v. Bhagat Ram*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Bom 210 (212) : 175 Ind Cas 93, *Naru Shidhu v. Krishna Shidhu*.

385, *Hamid*

Pramanick v.

(1923) A I R 1923 Rang 261 (265) : 75 Ind Cas 31 : 1 Rang 176, *Ma Ma v. Hadji Mahomad*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 313 (314) : 92 Ind Cas 625 : 29 Oudh Cas 131, *Sukhdeo v. Mt. Ram Dulara*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Lah 21 (21) : 47 Ind Cas 189, *Hussain Baksh v. Pala Singh*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 46 (46) : 45 Bom 570 : 59 Ind Cas 805, *Ramchandra Balwant v. Balaji Ganesh*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 898 (900) : 60 Cal 1082 : 148 Ind Cas 1177, *Abdul Latif v. Hamed Gazi*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 471 (473) : 41 Ind Cas 114 : 2 Pat L Jour 506, *Mirdnapore Zamindars Co. v. Panday Sardar*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 273 (275) (All), *Gajadhar Rai v. Ramlakhan Rai*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 766 (767) : 49 Ind Cas 751, *Chandrao Daya Bhatta-charyee v. Chandrakala*.

(1895) 1895 Bom P J 216, *Lakshman Vithu v. Vithu Patlu*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 488 (489) : 54 Cal 450 : 103 Ind Cas 124, *Satis Chandra v. Hashem Ali*.

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 1035 (1095) (All), *Ram Lakhan Rai v. Gajadhar Rai*.

to that of the Government as he cannot be said to derive his liability to be sued from or through the Government.³

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 92

2. *A*, a mortgagee of property from *X*, is in adverse possession of a right of fishery in water adjoining the property, and after redemption of the mortgage the mortgagor continues in adverse possession of the fishery. *X* can tack on his possession to that of *A*. The mortgagee and his mortgagor cannot be said to be independent trespassers.⁴

3. Pending disputes as to the title to certain property, the Collector took possession of the disputed land in order to secure the Government revenue. Subsequently, it handed over the land to *B* and also paid him the surplus profits remaining after deducting the Government revenue. It turned out that the land really belonged to *A* who thereupon sued *B* for possession. It was held that *B* was not entitled, for the purposes of computing the period of limitation, to tack on his period of possession to that of the Government, inasmuch as he did not claim under the Government.⁵ Further, in that case, the possession of the Government was not a wrongful possession at all as it was entitled to attach and be in possession of the property for the purpose of collecting the Government revenue.

It is of course necessary that in order to complete a title by adverse possession by tacking on the periods of possession of two or more persons, that the possession of each of those persons must have been adverse to the true owner.⁶ There was a conflict of opinion, however, on the question whether the character of the possession of the different persons should be the same. According to one view

(1933) A I R 1933 Nag 274 (277). 30 Nag L R 18. 150 Ind Cas 679, *Mt. Jasibai v. Zabu*

(1849) 18 L J Q B 806 (809) L R 13 Q B 945. 13 Jur 915, *Doe d. Mary Carter v. Darnard*

[See (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 689 (690) : 178 Ind Cas 846, *Utchmatan Bibi v. Rajendra Nath*.]

(1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 133 (185) : 158 Ind Cas 968, *Mulla Ahmad v. Fazal Ahmad*. (If second trespasser has obtained possession otherwise than through first, his possession cannot be tacked.)

3. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 18 (22) 44 Cal 858 44 Ind App 101. 40 Ind Cas 337 (P C), *Basanta Kumar v. Secretary of State*

4. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (28) 147 Ind Cas 545 61 Ind App 78 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan*

5. (1882) 5 All 1 (6, 7) 9 Ind App 99 5 Shomc L R 20 4 Sar 352 (P C), *Karan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan*

6. (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 532 (534) 42 Ind Cas 884, *Ganendra Nath Sanyal v. Mohendra Mohini Debba* (Period of possession under title cannot be tacked on to the period of possession without title to complete a title by adverse possession.)

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 322 (324) 33 Bom 317, *Amrita Raoji v. Shridhar Narayan*.

(1873) 10 Bom H C R 225 (230), *Shidajirai v. Nalajirai*

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 121 (122) 21 Ind Cas 346, *Tannuswamy Iyer v. Permaye*

(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 82 (83, 84) 77 Ind Cas 564 *J. Laxmi Narayan v. Talsan Charan Das*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 31 (32) 146 Ind Cas 811 *Shamu Laxmi v. Ram Das Laxmi*

this was necessary before any tacking could be allowed.^{6a} Thus, it was held that a mortgagee, for example, from a trespasser could not tack his possession on to that of his mortgagor so as to defeat the right of the true owner.⁷ A contrary view, namely that the identity of the nature of possession was not necessary, was held in the under-mentioned cases.⁸ The conflict must now be taken to have been settled by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan*,⁹ where their Lordships held that a mortgagor can tack on his possession to that of his mortgagee who had trespassed on the land of a third person adjoining the mortgaged property. Their Lordships observed: "There can be no question that a mortgagor, for the purposes of the Limitation Act, can avail himself of or 'tack' on to his own adverse possession the adverse possession of his mortgagee."

It has been seen in Note 87 *ante*, that where a suit is one governed by Article 142 of the Act, the *onus* is on the *plaintiff* to show that he was dispossessed or that he discontinued his possession within twelve years of the suit. The question of the tacking of adverse possession by successive trespassers does not arise in such a case. Where, after the dispossession of the plaintiff but within twelve years thereof the trespasser goes out of possession and, *after an interval*, another trespasser gets into possession, the latter trespass operates as a *fresh dispossession* of the plaintiff. The reason is that during such interval, possession would, as seen in Note 64 *ante*, automatically revert in the owner with the result that limitation which was running against him would cease so to run. The entry, therefore, of the second trespasser *after the interval* would be a fresh dispossession of the plaintiff furnishing a fresh starting point.

- 6a(1914) A I R 1914 Lah 458 (460) : 22 Ind Cas 855, *Baldeo Singh v. Mohan Singh*.
(1875) 23 Suth W R 331 (332), *Dhun Monsee Chowdhraim v. Golam Kasom*.
(Lessor and lessee) katap.
623 : 140
- (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 214 (216) : 47 Ind Cas 687, *Mt. Saiyed-un-nissa v. Maulu Lal*. (Mortgagor and mortgagee.)
(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 211 (212) : 46 Bom 1009 : 70 Ind Cas 912, *Bai Rera v. Faki Mahomed*.]
7. (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 214 (216) : 47 Ind Cas 687, *Mt. Saiyed-un-nissa v. Maulu Lal*.
(1889) 1889 Pun Re No. 163, *Bhagat Hiranand v. Lal Khan*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 211 (212) : 46 Bom 1009 : 70 Ind Cas 912, *Bai Rera v. Fakimohammad*.
(1889) 1889 Pun Re No. 189, *Ditu v. Deri Dial*.
8. (1911) 10 Ind Cas 545 (546) (All), *Bens Madho v. Debi Saran*.
(1912) 16 Ind Cas 420 (421) (Mad), *Rangachariu Chettiar v. Muthulakarpantotham*.
(1931) A I R 1931 All 13 (18, 19) : 52 All 976 : 130 Ind Cas 697, *Praklad Singh v. Barumal*.
9. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (23) : 147 Ind Cas 545 : 61 Ind App 78 : 61 Cal 267 (P C).

The position would be different where there is *no interval* between the adverse possession of the first trespasser and that of the second, as where the first trespasser, while in possession, is himself dispossessed by the second trespasser. In such a case the possession does not revert in the owner after the date of the dispossession of the first trespasser, so that the subsequent dispossession of the first trespasser by the second is not a dispossession of the owner. In *Willis v. Earl Howe*,¹⁰ which was a case in which the plaintiff had been dispossessed and the land had thereafter been in the adverse possession of several persons who did not claim through one another, it was contended that if the period of possession of each of them was less than the statutory period, the plaintiff could not lose his title. Kay, L. J., observed as follows:

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 92

"The effect of that (that is, the contention) would be that, if a series of occupiers not claiming under one another kept out the real owner for hundred years, time would only run against him when the last of such occupiers entered into possession. I am of opinion that it is not the law. A *continuous* adverse possession for the statutory period, through a succession of persons not claiming under one another, does, in my opinion, bar the true owner."

The case of *Agency Co. v. Short*¹¹ was distinguished on the ground that there was an interval between the periods of possession of two trespassers.

It follows, therefore, that a suit governed by Article 142 of the Act would be barred even if several persons, independent of one another, have been in adverse possession, each for less than the statutory period, provided the plaintiff has been continuously kept out of possession for twelve years after the dispossession.¹² It has been, however, held in some cases¹³ that when the possession passes

10. (1893) L. R. 2 Ch. 545 (559) 41 W. R. (Eng) 433 (435, 496) 62 L. J. Ch. 690
2 R. 427 • 69 L. T. 358

11. (1888) 37 W. R. (Eng) 433 (484) : 58 L. J. P. C. 4 13 App. Cas. 793 59 L. T. 677
53 J. P. 192.

12. Halsbury (Hailsham Edition), Vol. 20, page 745

(1912) 16 Ind. Cas. 420 (421) (Mad), *Rangachariu Chettiar v. Muthulainapan Kothan*

(1917) A. I. R. 1917 Nag. 7 (18) 14 Nag. L. R. 82 43 Ind. Cas. 913 *Ganno v. Beri*

(1921) A. I. R. 1921 Bom. 49 (48) 45 Bom. 570 59 Ind. Cas. 805, *Ramachandra Balwant v. Balaji Ganesh*.

[See also (1931) A. I. R. 1931 Oudh. 177 (226) 136 Ind. Cas. 642, *Mahomed Arum Khan v. Mahomed Saadat Ali Khan* (At page 226 Narayutti, J. says "In the present case all three alleged trespassers were in possession under a common agreement, namely the compromise and decree of the Court.")

(1930) A. I. R. 1930 Lah. 809 (811) 129 Ind. Cas. 491 *Chand Lal v. Bhagut Ram*

(1922) A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 69 (nd) 45 Mad. 376 67 Ind. Cas. 107 *Perumal Ramiah v. Kusu Ramiah*]

13. See cases cited in Foot-Note (4) to Note 75 ante.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 92-93**

from the first to the second trespasser, there is a *momentary* restoration of the true title to possession. It is submitted that this view is not correct.

93. Effect of adverse possession.—As has been seen in the Notes to Section 28 *ante*, where *A* is in adverse possession of land belonging to *B* for a period of twelve years or more, *B*'s title is extinguished, and *A* gets a good title to the land.¹ If *A* is subsequently dispossessed by *B*, *A* is entitled to sue *B* for possession and *B* cannot resist the same on the ground that he had title and was rightly in possession.² By such dispossession *B* is not remitted to his

Note 93

1. See Note 6 to Section 28, *supra*.

- [See also (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 226 (227) : 92 Ind Cas 247, *Sheo Nandan v. Hira Lal*.
(1877) 3 Cal 224 (226, 227), *Gossain Dass Chunder v. Issur Chunder Nath*.
(1886) 1886 Pun Re No. 16, *Daya Ram v. Badri Mal*,
(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 244 (245) : 98 Ind Cas 860, *Raman Menon v. Madhavan Menon*. (Adverse possession of tarwad property by member of Taravahi—Right of tarwad is lost.)
(1912) 17 Ind Cas 146 (149) : 37 Bom 37, *Maganechand Fulchand v. Vithalrao Kamalrao*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 950 (951) : 38 Ind Cas 957 : 45 Cal 766, *Bhusan Chandra Ghose v. Sarkanta Banerjee*. (Case under Bengal Tenancy Act.)
(1930) A I R 1930 All 441 (442) : 125 Ind Cas 476, *Baij Nath Prasad v. Dharam Pal Singh*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Nag 51 (51) : 16 Nag L R 67 : 55 Ind Cas 499, *Laxman v. Govind*.
(1902) 12 Mad L Jour 387 (386), *Kone Gounden v. Bola Naicken*.
(1909) 3 Ind Cas 599 (599) : 1909 Pun Re No. 65, *Dhan Singh v. Har Narain*. (Entry in wajub-ul-arz after defendants had acquired title by adverse possession that plaintiffs can take the land back when they return—No trust created in plaintiff's favour.)
(1904) 27 Mad 262 (268), *Venkata Krishna Row v. Venkappa*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 330 (330) : 103 Ind Cas 697, *Krishna v. Narayan*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Pat 164 (165) : 155 Ind Cas 1094 : 14 Pat 424, *Nando Kahar v. Bhup Narain Singh*.
(1867) 11 Moo Ind App 345 (363) : 7 Suth W R 24 : 1 Suther 676 : 2 Sar 284 (P C), *Gunga Gobind Mundul v. Collector of 24 Pergunnahs*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 427 (429) : 148 Ind Cas 831, *Abdur Rahman Khan v. Ahmad Khan*.]

2. See Note 6 to Section 28, *supra*.

- [See also (1897) 21 Bom 509 (514), *Dudesab v. Hanmanta*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Mad 633 (634) : 72 Ind Cas 635, *Ammakannu Ammal v. Narayanasami Mudahar*.
(1889) 14 Bom 222 (226), *Hargovandas Lakshmidas v. Bajibhai Jijibhai*. (Possessory owner acquires absolute title and is entitled to sue for and obtain a declaration of such statutory title)
(1867) 11 Moo Ind App 345 (361) : 7 Suth W R 21 : 1 Suther 676 : 2 Sar 284 (P C), *Gunga Gobind Mundul v. Collector of 24 Pergunnahs*]

old title.³ In the undermentioned case,⁴ *A* who was in adverse possession for the statutory period was thereafter dispossessed by *B*. *A* then sued *B* for possession within twelve years of such dispossession. It was held that *A* was entitled to recover.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 93-95

Where the principal right to sue for possession is extinguished under Section 28, rights accessory thereto will also be extinguished.⁵

94. Adverse possessor can get only what quondam owner had. — See Note 6 to Section 28, *ante*.

95. Adverse possessor gets a title only to the interest he purports to prescribe for. — It has been seen in Note 6 to Section 28 *ante*, that the right that is acquired by prescription cannot be anything more than what the wrongdoer purported to prescribe for. Thus, where a Hindu woman enters into possession of property to which she is not entitled, claiming only the limited estate of a Hindu woman under the Hindu law, she will acquire a limited estate by prescription.¹ Similarly, where the wrongdoer

3 See Note 6 to Section 28, *supra*.

[See also (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 20 (23) 84 Ind Cas 98, *Mt. Mahmud-un-nissa v. Zaid Raza*.

(1899) 21 All 204 (208) : 1899 All W N 36, *Dalip Das v. Deoki Das*,

(1873) 20 Suth W R 114 (115) : 11 Beng L R 237, *Brindaban Chunder Roy v. Tara Chand Danerjee*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 600 (603) : 60 Ind Cas 165, *Kassim Hassan v. Hazra Begum*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Nag 280 (280) : 109 Ind Cas 401, *Kapoor v. Nanhi*.

(1873) 21 W R (Eng) 693, *Bryan v. Cowdal*

(1858) 27 L J Ex 297 (299) 114 R R 1039. 1 F & F 27, *Brassington v. Llewellyn*

(1907) 6 Cal L Jour 621 (636), *Lelabati Mesram v. Beshun Chobey*, (Title to office of shebait and to endowed property)]

4 (1901) 21 Mad 387 (395, 396) 5 Cal W N 515 23 Ind App 81. 3 Bom L R 803 7 Sar 819 (P C), *Khadanga Garu v. Mahapatrulu Garu*.

5. See Note 6 to Section 28, *supra*.

[See also (1931) A I R 1931 Loh 648 (649) : 134 Ind Cas 1106, *Karam Dad v. Rehmat*]

Note 95

1. (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 329 (331) 114 Ind Cas 454, *Mahepat v. Mubund Rao*, (1931) A I R 1931 All 450 (451) 133 Ind Cas 790, *Shankar Lal v. Damodar Das*.

(1933) A I R 1933 All 822 (824, 825) 147 Ind Cas 220, *Dunyar Singh v. Mt. Masud Kunwar*

(1914) A I R 1914 Bom 47 (50) 38 Bom 227. 24 Ind Cas 716, *Firsab Kasimsab v. Gurappa Bissappa*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Nag 81 (82) 10 Nag L R 33 23 Ind Cas 719, *Shao Lal v. Mt. Shao Rajya*

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 497 (498) 95 Ind Cas 432, *Mt. Ram Rajya v. Eshbaddar*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 227 (228) 112 Ind Cas 400, *Fekara v. Familaran*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Pat 220 (221) 7 Pat 163 107 Ind Cas 151, *Saraj Lal's Singh v. Tital Dhara Singh*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 95**

enters into possession claiming only to be a tenant,² or a manager.

2. (1928) A I R 1928 P C 146 (149) : 7 Pat 649 : 109 Ind Cas 663 : 55 Ind App 212 (P C), *Kamakhyia Narayan Singh v. Ram Raksha Singh*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 P C 183 (187) : 162 Ind Cas 465 : 63 Ind App 261 : 59 Mad 809 (P C), *Ponnambala v. Periyannan Chetty*.
- (1908) 35 Cal 470 (476) : 12 Cal W N 636 : 7 Cal L Jour 499, *Ichharam Singh v. Nilmoney Bahida*. (As tenant.)
- (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 125 (135), *Ishan Chandra Matter v. Raja Ramranjan*. (When a tenant takes possession of lands outside his tenancy and professes to do so in his character as tenant, the landlord is dispossessed in a limited sense, in other words, he is deprived of actual or khas possession of the lands but not of proprietary possession or possession by receipt of rent.)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 185 (186) : 68 Ind Cas 1003, *Ujir Ali Sardar v. Shadhas Behara*.
- (1909) 3 Ind Cas 431 (432) (Cal), *Barak Badri Sahi v. Chamra Uraon*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Pat 269 (270) : 145 Ind Cas 613, *Ramdeyal Mahanti v. Pitam Bours*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 51 (53) : 20 Ind Cas 823, *Protap Narain Mukherjee v. Bhrat Das*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 193 (194) : 69 Ind Cas 7, *Satyendra Nath Banerjee v. Krishnasakha Kar*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 45 (47) : 50 Cal 487 : 74 Ind Cas 193, *Bhavarabendra Narain v. Rajendra Narain*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 196 (197) : 20 Ind Cas 664, *Probbabati Das v. Taibaturenessa*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 124 (124). 49 Ind Cas 437, *Sudal Chandra Chowdhury v. Surankar Barua*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 952 (953) : 95 Ind Cas 101, *Sadanand Mandal v. Jyotish Kanta Roy*.
- (1913) 19 Ind Cas 863 (851) (Cal), *Motilal Roy v. Kalu Mandal*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 743 (743) : 18 Ind Cas 616, *Kali Charan Saha v. Dabirrudin Ahammad*.
- (1928) A I R 1925 Mad 1226 (1227) : 83 Ind Cas 924, *Rama Rao v. Appu*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1189 (1191) : 69 Ind Cas 747, *Suarnamoyi v. Sourindra Nath*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 39 (39) : 98 Ind Cas 870, *Sohela v. Baggu Singh*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 738 (738) : 23 Ind Cas 703, *Panchkari Chattapadhya v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 122 (123) : 47 Ind Cas 930, *Sheo Gobind v. Ambika Prasad*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 422 (423, 424) : 170 Ind Cas 335, *Chandra Mohan Singh v. Bubu Mian*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 339 (340, 341) : 149 Ind Cas 453, *Kameshwar Singh Bahadur v. Fatursi Misra*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 47 (48) : 105 Ind Cas 85, *Jamiruddee Naskar v. Basanta Kumar Roy*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 619 (622, 624) : 65 Ind Cas 892, *Dhonulal Chowdhury v. W. A. Vincent*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 458 (461) : 150 Ind Cas 102, *Nalinikanta Mukherji v. Gobinda Ramanuj Das*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Mad 828 (832) : 137 Ind Cas 487, *Periyannan Chetty v. Govinda Rao*.
- (1904) 9 Cal W N 292 (299) *Bagdu Majhi v. Durga Prasad Singha*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 147 (149) : 60 Ind Cas 717, *Fazal Haq v. Ruzviya Khanam*.
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 53 (55) (Mad), *Narsya Udya v. Venkataramana Dhatta*.

trustee or mutawalli of an institution,³ he will, after twelve years of such possession, acquire only the right claimed. On the same principle, where *A* and *B* are in possession of property belonging only to *A* as the joint property of *A* and *B*, such enjoyment by *B* is adverse to *A*, so far as his separate right thereto is concerned, and, if *A*'s suit for separate possession is barred, his right to separate possession would be barred with the consequence that *B* would acquire a right to joint possession.⁴ See also the undermentioned cases.⁵ In the case

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 95

- (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 174 (175) 117 Ind Cas 438, *Narhar Narayan v. Ganpati Hari*.
- (1863) 7 Bom 96 (99), *Maidin Saiba v. Nagapa*.
3. (1888) 12 Bom 322 (324), *Mulji Bhulabhai v. Manohar Ganesh*. (As manager of idol.)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 1003 (1009) : 26 Ind Cas 841, *Ambalavana Pandarasandhi Atergal v. Minakshy Sundereswara Devasthanam*. (Do)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 496 (500) : 94 Ind Cas 489, *Brahmayya v. Madhuram*. (Do)
- (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 268 (270, 271) 108 Ind Cas 199, *Pichai Pella v. Lungam Iyer*. (As trustee)
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 477 (479, 480) 87 Mad 873 14 Ind Cas 168, *Pattavhara Manakkal Kuppen v. Choorakkapathil Mundehotil*. (Do)
- (1930) A I R 1930 All 866 (868) 129 Ind Cas 375, *Abdul Alim v. Abdul Hamid* (As mutawalli)
4. (1901) 24 Mad 387 (396) : 28 Ind App 81 3 Bom L R 303 5 Cal W N 545. 7 Sar 819 (P C), *Khadanga Garu v. Mahapatrulu Garu*. (Art. 142 applies to such cases.)
- (1913) 18 Ind Cas 869 (872, 875) (Cal), *Dwarkanath Chowdhury v. Shastri Shankar Bannerjee*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Bom 833 (835) 127 Ind Cas 204, *Babaji Daso v. Jitaji Yeshwant* (Person even after adoption treated as, and openly exercising rights as member of joint family of his birth, can acquire title to joint possession by adverse possession)
- (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 65 (66) 74 Ind Cas 51, *Mt Munga v. Lachmiprasad*
- [See however (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 117 (119) 176 Ind Cas 706, *Derojullah Sarkar v. Ayafullah Akand*. (Mere fact that *A* is in joint possession with *B* of latter's property does not show that *A*'s joint possession is adverse to *B*)]
5. *Claim as mortgagee*
- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 420 (421) (Mad), *Rangachari Chettiar v. Muthukarnappan Kothan*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 All 262 (264) 43 All 127 55 Ind Cas 633, *Abdulla v. Shams ul-Haq*
- (1932) A I R 1932 All 53 (55) 136 Ind Cas 63, *Basdeo Rai v. Jaimangal Rai*
- (1932) A I R 1932 All 893 (897) 54 All 625 140 Ind Cas 653, *Sulab Lal v. Fatah Mahomed*
- (1889) 1889 P un R No 181 *Ditu v. Deta Dasi*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 292 (294, 295) 296 47 Mad 203 79 Ind Cas 510, *Appamma v. Chinnaadu*
- (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 116 (117) 20 Oudh Cas 205 41 Ind Cas 561, *Bihari v. Adva Nath*
- (1913) 19 Ind Cas 891 (892) 87 Bom 500, *Talukdari Settlement Officer v. Bhatnagar*
- (1913) 20 Ind Cas 465 (469) (All) *Lam Sany v. Ganga Sahai*
- (1920) 123 Ind Cas 195 (196) (Mad) *Attavara Pheta v. Appanna Iyer*

Arts. 142 & 144 Note 95

cited below,^{5a} the High Court of Patna expressed a doubt whether a tenancy or a mortgage right which are creatures of *contract* can be at all acquired by adverse possession. This view is against the

Claim as under-proprietor :

- (1901) 4 Oudh Cas 207 (209), *Harnandan v. Bhup Indar Bishram Singh*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 28 (29) : 42 Ind Cas 196, *Nageshwar Datt Ram v. Cheddai Singh*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 7 (8) : 56 Ind Cas 759, *Nadir Singh v. Mt. Anpurna Kunwar*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 433 (433, 434) : 5 Luck 880 : 122 Ind Cas 332, *Sat Narain Misr v. Deputy Commissioner Ajodhia Estate*.

Claim as ex-proprietary tenant :

- (1914) A I R 1914 All 64 (65) : 22 Ind Cas 269, *Ulfat Rai v. Basdeo*.
- (1916) 33 Ind Cas 483 (484) (All), *Ram Dhar Singh v. Jugul Singh*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 All 317 (318) : 37 All 22 : 26 Ind Cas 21, *Baldeo v. Ulfat Rai*. (Exproprietary tenancy cannot be acquired by adverse possession.)
[But see (1929) A I R 1929 All 498 (498) : 117 Ind Cas 620 : 51 All 760, *Paras Ram Singh v. Raj Kumar Singh*.]

Other cases of claim to limited interest :

- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 67 (68) : 22 Nag L R 181 : 98 Ind Cas 540, *Channu v. Subhetti*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 All 868 (870) : 57 All 166 : 149 Ind Cas 797, *Sheo Raj Chamar v. Mudeer Khan*. (Where certain persons buried the dead bodies of their family on the land of another for 80 years, it was held that the former acquired the right by sheer adverse possession.)
- (1896) 21 Bom 509 (516, 517), *Budesab v. Hanmantia*. (Partial interest in land may be lost by adverse possession.)
- (1903) 5 Bom L R 186 (189), *Yamunabai v. Dhondi*. (Limited interest found to have been asserted and acquired.)
- (1914) A I R 1914 Bom 47 (51) : 38 Bom 227 : 24 Ind Cas 718, *Pir Sab Kasim Sab v. Gurappa Basappa*. (Life estate.)
- (1909) 35 Cal 470 (476, 477) : 7 Cal L Jour 499 : 12 Cal W N 638, *Icharam Singh v. Nilmony Bahida*.
- (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 125 (136), *Iskan Chandra Mitter v. Raja Ramranjan*.

as being included in their power, held that their claim was restricted to limited interest and so their possession was adverse to that extent only.)

- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 782 (788) : 47 Ind Cas 315 (S B), *Shib Chandra Roy v. Havendra Chandra Rai*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1189 (1191) : 89 Ind Cas 747, *Swarnamoyi v. Sourindra Nath*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 339 (341) : 126 Ind Cas 259, *Satya Prosanna v. Kali Prosanna Das*.
- (1890) 18 Mad 467 (471), *Santharan v. Periaswami*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 153 (159) : 74 Ind Cas 27, *Abuvalkar v. Kunhikutti Yakk*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 167 (168, 169) : 36 Ind Cas 725, *Shambhu Dayal v. Chandra Shekhar*. (Acquisition of franchise)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 739 (740) : 86 Ind Cas 771, *Rameshar Singh v. Rit Lal Singh*.
- (1910) 5 Ind Cas 930 (930) (Mad), *Raman Nair v. Pannangath Chandu*. (The receipt of rents for more than 12 years as Melcharathdars gives a title by prescription to the holder of the Melcharath.)
- (1918) 19 Ind Cas 367 (368) (Cal), *Lakshmi Dibi v. Bijoy Chand Mahata*.
- (1929) 115 Ind Cas 141 (143) (All), *Rajai v. Behari Lal*.
- 5a (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 479 (490) - 176 Ind Cas 85, *Bhukhan Mian v. Radhika Kumari Devi*.

generally accepted view, and, it is submitted, cannot be accepted as correct.

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 95-96

The nature and effect of possession must depend upon the nature and extent of the rights asserted by the conduct or the express declaration of the person in possession.⁶ The question thus depends upon the *animus possidendi* with which the possession is held by the adverse possessor.⁷

By virtue of the special provisions of the O. P. Tenancy Act, a tenancy cannot, in the Central Provinces, be acquired by prescription.⁸

96. Evidence of adverse possession.—The word "possession" is a legal term and the evidence that would satisfy a Court that a party was in possession would be evidence of acts giving rise to the inference that such party was in possession. It must be remembered that acts sufficient to constitute possession in the owner may not be sufficient to constitute possession in the trespasser.^{1a} Much importance cannot be attached to the evidence of witnesses who come and swear simply that the land was in the possession of somebody or other.¹ Acts giving rise to the inference of possession may be proved by oral² or by documentary evidence. Entries in Revenue Registers to the effect that a party is in possession are evidence that such party was in possession at the date of the entry.³ *Thak* maps showing

6. (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 228 (229, 230) . 53 Ind Cas 559, *Muhammad Mumtas Ali Khan v. Ugraj Singh*.

7. (1912) 15 Ind Cas 403 (404) (Mad), *In re Prattipati Seshayya*.

(1903) 5 Bom L R 186 (189), *Yamunabai v. Dhondi*.

(1902) 1902 Pun L R No 140, *Muhammad Buksh v. Ram Singh*. (Adverse possession by a widow against the reversioners commences only when there is an open and unmistakable act to the knowledge of the plaintiff, showing that she wants to hold the property on her account.)

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 800 (300) . 24 Ind Cas 95, *Meethale Mithai Raman v. Puthulal Ambu*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 718 (719) . 39 Mad L . 17 Ind Cas 112, *Konda Reddi v. Ramaswami Reddi*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 1020 (1020) : 86 Ind Cas 433, *Aiyasa Devi Ammal v. Kalandarsa Rowther*.

(1909) 2 Ind Cas 148 (149) (Cal), *Deb Narain Dutt v. Baidya Nath*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 477 (480) . 14 Ind Cas 169 (171) . 37 Mad 873, *Patishara Manakhal Kuppen v. Chorakkappatti Munde Kottai*.

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 194 (196) (Mad), *Aiyanna Charar v. Lakshmi Ammal*.

8. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 606 (608) . 8 Nag L R 163, *Kanhayalal v. Dular Singh*.

Note 96

1a. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 454 (455) . 178 Ind Cas 301, *Atchayya Patrudu v. Jalaluddin Sahib*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 313 (314) . 100 Ind Cas 823 . 23 Cri L Jour 313, *Loke Nath Roy v. Basal Gani*.

1. (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 234 (236) . 57 Ind Cas 744 . 5 Pat L Jour 632, *Gajadhar Prasad Sahu v. Mt. Dulhin Gulab Kuer*.

2. (1868) 9 Suth W R 155 (156), *Dinobhundhoo Suhaye v. Rajah of Durbhanga*.

3. (1869) 11 Suth W R 35 (39), *Umbata Churn Mundie v. Ramdhan Mohurur*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 98 (99) . 63 Ind Cas 329, *Ghulam Sarfar v. Mohammad Ali*.

Arts. 142 & 144 a party as being in possession of particular property, are evidence of possession of such property by such party at the time the maps were prepared.⁴ The realization of rents of a particular property is evidence that the person realizing them was in possession of such property,⁵ though the payment of revenue may or may not be an act of ownership.⁶

An inference of adverse possession can be drawn from circumstances such as long possession and the absence of proof of license or agreement between the owner and the occupier.⁷ Where A was in possession of B's land and had constructed residential houses thereon and lived in them without rent, it was held that the possession was *prima facie* adverse to B.⁸ In *Innasimuthu Udayan v. Upakarth Udayan*,⁹ the plaintiff had proved his title; the defendant had a possession admitted by the plaintiff, for seven years prior to the suit. The documentary evidence showing that he had been in possession, for five years immediately preceding those seven years, was similar to the evidence which accompanied his possession during that period.

(1883) 9 Cal 431 (434, 437): 12 Cal L R 12, *Saraswati Dass v. Dhanpat Singh*.

But they do not by themselves operate to extinguish title of the owner unless adverse possession for the statutory period is established; see:

(1928) A I R 1928 Lah 516 (522): 9 Lah 428: 119 Ind Cas 258, *Fateh Ali Shah v. Mahomed Baksh*.

So also a mere entry of land in possession of A in Revenue Records as Government waste does not transfer possession to Government; see:

(1914) 24 Ind Cas 818 (818): 7 Sind L R 189, *Secretary of State v. Mushtak Singh*.

Nor would an entry showing A to be in possession amount to proof of such person's title; see:

(1878) 10 Bom H C R 187 (189), *Fatma kom Nubi Saheb v. Darya Saheb*.

(1889) 13 Bom 75 (77), *Bhogji v. Bapuji*.

[See also (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 87 (40): 165 Ind Cas 626, *Ghulam Mahomed v. Samundar*. (Person continuing in possession of proprietary rights in spite of adverse entry in revenue papers—No question of limitation arises.)]

4. (1928) A I R 1928 Pat 558 (560): 72 Ind Cas 648, *Chattrapat Pratap Bahadur v. C. G. Lees*

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 345 (346): 102 Ind Cas 370, *Debendra Nath v. Surendra Nath*.

But mere demarcation of land in survey map as in a person's possession is no evidence or is very weak evidence of possession; see:

(1878) 20 Suth W R 285 (285), *Ooma Churn v. Umbika Churn*.

5. (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 95 (96): 69 Ind Cas 883, *Raghuraj v. Vallabhdas*.

(1894) 10 Cal 1112 (1124), *Mullick Abdool Guffoor v. Muleka*.

6. (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 95 (96): 69 Ind Cas 883, *Raghuraj v. Vallabhdas*.

(1872) 17 Suth W R 490 (492), *Lallee Singh v. Mt. Arit Koor*.

7. (1931) A I R 1931 All 323 (325): 130 Ind Cas 296, *Alopi v. Gajadhar Prasad*.

8. (1933) A I R 1933 Sind 279 (281): 27 Sind L R 341. 146 Ind Cas 777 (F B). *Khanu Chuhr v. Panjal Shah*.

(1893) 9 Cal 802 (805): 12 Cal L R 337, *Mohini Mohun v. Krishno Kishore*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Cal 31 (32): 160 Ind Cas 867, *Sm. Amina Bibi v. Akshoy Kumar*. (Where a question of acquisition of title by adverse possession has to be determined, clear, full and definite evidence has to be brought in.)

9. (1890) 23 Mad 10 (12, 15): 26 Ind App 210: 7 Sar 690 (P C).

This evidence consisted of a series of documents such as was usually given to and received by the possessor of lands and they extended throughout the period in dispute going back far beyond the twelve years which would operate as a bar to the suit. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the evidence raised the inference that the same possession continued for more than twelve years.

In the case of a claim of adverse possession of a fishery right in a particular part of a river, evidence of acts of possession in parts of the river *adjoining* the part actually in dispute is admissible provided there is common character of locality between the different parts.¹⁰ The mere appropriation of fish from a tank may not necessarily constitute adverse possession of the tank, but acts, such as subletting, mortgaging, re-excavation of the tank, or the expenditure of large sums of money in clearing silt, are acts obviously of proprietary character constituting adverse possession.¹¹

Acts alleged to create adverse possession must be scrutinized in the light of the relationship that exists between the parties who assert against each other the title by adverse possession.¹² Thus, acts, during the lifetime of a widow, such as repairs, payment of taxes, etc. by the reversioners, cannot be evidence of adverse possession.¹³ The mutation in the Revenue Register of a Mahomedan son's name is not an assertion of any hostile title to the step-mother especially where both of them live amicably together.¹⁴ In the case of forest and immemorial waste land in Canara, the presumption is that it belongs to Government. In order to rebut this presumption it is not sufficient merely to show such acts as the Government usually permits in forest and waste land for the benefit of the adjoining cultivators, but must consist of acts of undoubted ownership such as the granting of leases to tenants for cultivation and the cutting of valuable timber for sale.¹⁵

An *unregistered document*, in respect of a transaction which had only to be made by a registered document, is not admissible to prove that such transaction is valid, but it may be referred to as explaining the nature and character of the possession thenceforth held by a party to the transaction.¹⁶ Thus, where A executed an unregistered

10. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (25, 26) 147 Ind Cas 545 61 Ind App 78 61 Cal 262 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal Khan* (Citing Baron Parke in *Jones v. Williams*, (1837) 2 M & W 336)

11. (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 644 (646) : 35 Ind Cas 60, *Dijoy Chand Mahatab Bahadur v. Iswar Chandra*

[See also (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 295 (301) 55 Ind Cas 62, *Secretary of State v. Venkatasarasimha Naidu* (The facts, that plaintiff alone enjoyed fishery in a portion of the river leaving fishery rights, that he controlled over the taking of the sand from the river-bed, show his possession as owner of the river bed).

12. (1913) 21 Ind Cas 21 (22) (Mad), *Thungaredu Chetty v. Mangathay Amma*

13. (1913) 21 Ind Cas 21 (22) (Mad), *Thungaredu Chetty v. Mangathay Amma*

14. (1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 7 (7) 145 Ind Cas 226 *Mt. Takat v. Intasulit*

15. (1904) 28 Mad 257 (292, 300) 15 Mad L J 147 *Secretary of State v. Mangeshwar Arishnavva*

16. (1919) A I R 1919 P C 44 (47) 43 Mad 244 41 Ind App 2-5 43 Ind Cas 201 (P C), *Varada Iswar v. Jeyaramma*

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 96-97**

gift in favour of *B*, and *B* entered into possession, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the possession of *B* became adverse to *A* from that date.¹⁷

See also the undermentioned cases.¹⁸

97. Plea of adverse possession.—Where *A* filed a suit for partition against *B* and for possession of his share on the ground that *A* and *B* were both entitled to the property under a particular document of title and that *A* was in joint enjoyment of the property with *B* up to a particular period, when he was dispossessed by *B*, it

(1925) A I R 1925 Lah 491 (492) ; 6 Lah 819 ; 88 Ind Cas 872, *Ata Muhammad v. Shankar Das*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 581 (582) ; 103 Ind Cas 662, *Maula v. Irshad Husain*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Cal 634 (636) ; 141 Ind Cas 820, *J. C. Galstoun v. Frofulla Kumar De*.

17. (1919) A I R 1919 P C 44 (47) ; 43 Mad 244 ; 46 Ind App 285 ; 53 Ind Cas 901 (P C) *Varada Palle v. ...*

18.

(The plaintiffs had been in possession for many years, but they had never paid any rent in respect of the land and in the village papers they had been recorded as *bila faisla* tenants whereas the tenants were recorded as proprietors. Held, that the facts were not sufficient to establish a title by adverse possession.)

(1883) 1883 All W N 246 (247), *Phundo v. Bhushua Das*. (A few acts such as granting of leases, execution of mortgage, are not sufficient for creating title by adverse possession.)

(1872) 17 Suth W R 195 (197), *Collector of Furreedpore v. Kales Dass Hasrah*. (The evidence of Government having sent its officers to measure the land and to surround it with pillars is the very best evidence of possession of a lately formed chur.)

(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 625 (626) ; 80 Ind Cas 914, *Kadir Bux v. Dhirendra Kishore*. (If one possession by the defendant.)

(Of adverse possession.)

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 456 (457, 458) 101 Ind Cas 96 *Secretary of State*

(The planting of the trees mentioned on the site should not change the character of possession of the plaintiff.)

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 328 (330) ; 114 Ind Cas 815, *Jagatjit Singh v. Muhammad Asgar Ali* (If the owner allowed other persons to cross the boundary and occupy an area of 25 acres, and plant thereon a number of trees and forbid the owner's men to enter the land and his possession extends for a period of over 12 years, a title will be obtained)

was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that on failure of the proof of the title alleged, the plaintiff could rely on the plea that he had acquired a right to the property by adverse possession for the requisite period. Their Lordships observed as follows :

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 97

"Then comes in Section 28 by which his right to the property is extinguished at the determination of the period limited for bringing a suit for possession of it. The point does not require to be expressly pleaded, as it is only evidence of the respondent's title."¹

The High Court of Allahabad has interpreted this decision as having held that when a person sues on the ground of title, he can, without more, show that he got the title by adverse possession.² This view has not been accepted in the generality of cases. In *Somasundaram Chetty v. Vadivelu Pillai*,³ it was held by the High Court of Madras, following a decision of the High Court of Calcutta in *Shro Kumari Debi v. Gobind Shaw Tanti*,⁴ that a plaintiff who came to Court alleging title, without more, cannot be allowed to succeed on the basis of title by adverse possession. In *Neyen Bala Debi v. Siti Kanta Banerji*,^{4a} their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows

"Where no case of acquisition of title by adverse possession is made in the plaint nor is the question raised directly or indirectly in any of the issues, the plaintiff ought not to be

(1928) A I R 1928 All 565 (565) . 74 Ind Cas 879, *Ragha Mal v. Abdus Sattar*. (Kabuliats and application to the municipality may not be sufficient to prove possession but *prima facie* counter-part of leases executed by tenants and applications for permission to build put in the Municipal Board are the best possible evidence of possession)

(1916) A I R 1915 Mad 145 (149) . 26 Ind Cas 537, *Gobinda Das v. Venkata Perumal* (Strong evidence is necessary to rebut adverse possession of auction-purchaser put in complete practicable possession)

(1881) 7 Cal L R 269 (270, 271), *Kussessur Roy v. Jaggodishury* (The fact that certain land in village being measured by the revenue authorities as appurtenant to a certain estate is *prima facie* evidence of possession of the land at the time of the survey by the owner of such estate)

(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 754 (758) . 61 Ind Cas 469, *Monmotha Nath v. Anath Bundhu*. (The fact that certain lands were entered in a road cess return filed by a person in respect of lands held by him under the Zamindar is *prima facie* evidence that they were not held adversely to the Zamindar, and the presumption cannot be got over unless it is

Note 97

1. (1900) 24 Mad 357 (396) . 23 Ind App 81 . 3 Bom L R 303 . 5 Cal W N 545 : 7 Scr 819 (P C), *Khadanga v. Mahapatralu*.

2. (1931) A I R 1931 All 670 (672) . 133 Ind Cas 26, *Municipal Board, Etawah v. Mt Him Srs*

3. (1908) 81 Mad 531 (532) . 4 Mad L Tim 344

4. (1877) 2 Cal 418.

See also the following case to a similar effect —

(1890) 11 Suth W R 550 (551-552), *Hura Sundares Debi v. Chandra-purna Debi*

4a (1910) 8 Ind Cas 41 (43, 44) (Cal).

rts. 142 & 144
Notes 96-97

gift in favour of *B*, and *B* entered into possession, their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the possession of *B* became adverse to *A* from that date.¹⁷

See also the undermentioned cases.¹⁸

97. Plea of adverse possession.—Where *A* filed a suit for partition against *B* and for possession of his share on the ground that *A* and *B* were both entitled to the property under a particular document of title and that *A* was in joint enjoyment of the property with *B* up to a particular period, when he was dispossessed by *B*, it

- (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 491 (492) : 6 Lah 819 : 88 Ind Cas 872, *Ata Muham-mad v. Shankar Das*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 581 (582) : 103 Ind Cas 662, *Maula v. Irshad Husam*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 634 (636) : 141 Ind Cas 320, *J. C. Galstaun v. Frofulla Kumar De*.
17. (1919) A I R 1919 P C 44 (47) : 43 Mad 244 : 46 Ind App 285 : 53 Ind Cas 901 (P C), *Varada Pillai v. Jeerarathnammal*.
18. (1931) A I R 1931 Sind 1 (2) : 25 Sind L R 257 : 130 Ind Cas 548, *Jamiatrat Manjmol v. Goumal*. (Mere user cannot be taken as definite assertion of proprietary rights and does not constitute adverse possession.)
- (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 144 (144) : 181 Ind Cas 400, *Dabu v. Thakur Deen*. (The plaintiffs had been in possession for many years, but they had never paid any rent in respect of the land and in the village papers they had been recorded as *bila faisla* tenants whereas the tenants were recorded as proprietors. Held, that the facts were not sufficient to establish a title by adverse possession.)
- (1888) 1888 All W N 246 (247), *Phundo v. Bhiskua Das*. (A few acts such as granting of leases, execution of mortgage, are not sufficient for creating title by adverse possession.)
- (1872) 17 Suth W R 195 (197), *Collector of Furreedpore v. Kalee Doss Hazrah*. (The evidence of Government having sent its officers to measure the land and to surround it with pillars is the very best evidence of possession of a lately formed *chur*.)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 625 (626) : 80 Ind Cas 914, *Kadir Dux v. Birendra Kishore*. (Long possession by the defendant on his own behalf far beyond the statutory period—No payment of rent by the defendants and no receipt of rent by the plaintiff in respect of the lands in suit—Held that these were the elements required for a plea in bar by reason of adverse possession.)
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 456 (457,458) : 101 Ind Cas 96, *Secretary of State v. Muthukumara Pillai*. (The erection and open use of a pucca thatched building on a site forming part of *natham puramboke* for a period of over 60 years used by the plaintiff and co-proprietor for the purpose of tethering cattle and storing hay etc., and the fact of the enclosure of the site by a *kalli* fence all round, constitute adverse possession as against Government and the fact that the Government levied assessment on some of the trees scattered on the site should not change the character of possession of the plaintiff.)
- (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 328 (330) : 114 Ind Cas 815, *Jagatjit Singh v. Muhammad Asgar Ali*. (If the owner allowed other persons to cross the boundary and occupy an area of 25 acres, and plant thereon a number of trees and forbid the owner's men to enter the land and his possession extends for a period of over 12 years, a title will be obtained by adverse possession.)

was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that on failure of the proof of the title alleged, the plaintiff could rely on the plea that he had acquired a right to the property by adverse possession for the requisite period. Their Lordships observed as follows :

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 97

"Then comes in Section 28 by which his right to the property is extinguished at the determination of the period limited for bringing a suit for possession of it. The point does not require to be expressly pleaded, as it is only evidence of the respondent's title."¹

The High Court of Allahabad has interpreted this decision as having held that when a person sues on the ground of title, he can, without more, show that he got the title by adverse possession.² This view has not been accepted in the generality of cases. In *Somasundaram Chetty v. Vadivelu Pillai*,³ it was held by the High Court of Madras, following a decision of the High Court of Calcutta in *Shiro Kumari Debi v. Gobind Shaw Tanti*,⁴ that a plaintiff who came to Court alleging title, without more, cannot be allowed to succeed on the basis of title by adverse possession. In *Nepen Bala Debi v. Siti Kanta Banerji*,⁵ their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows.

"Where no case of acquisition of title by adverse possession is made in the plaint nor is the question raised directly or indirectly in any of the issues, the plaintiff ought not to be

- (1923) A I R 1923 All 565 (565) . 74 Ind Cas 879, *Ragha Mal v. Abdus Sattar*. (Kabulats and application to the municipality may not be sufficient to prove possession but *prima facie* counter-part of leases executed by tenants and applications for permission to build put in the Municipal Board are the best possible evidence of possession.)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 145 (149) . 26 Ind Cas 537, *Gobinda Das v. Venkata Perumal*. (Strong evidence is necessary to rebut adverse possession of auction-purchaser put in complete practicable possession.)
- (1881) 7 Cal L R 269 (270, 271), *Kussensur Roy v. Jaggodishury*. (The fact that certain land in village being measured by the revenue authorities as appurtenant to a certain estate is *prima facie* evidence of possession of the land at the time of the survey by the owner of such estate.)
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 754 (758) . 61 Ind Cas 469, *Monmotha Nath v. Anath Bundhu*. (The fact that certain lands were entered in a road cess return filed by a person in respect of lands held by him under the Zamindar is *prima facie* evidence that they were not held adversely.)

Note 97

- (1900) 24 Mad 337 (396) . 29 Ind App 81 : 5 Bom L R 303 . 5 Cal W N 545 : 7 Sar 819 (P C), *Khadanga v. Mahapatruia*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 All 670 (672) . 133 Ind Cas 26, *Municipal Board, Ferozah v. Mt. Ram Sri*.
- (1908) 31 Mad 531 (532) . 4 Mad L Tim 311.
- (1877) 2 Cal 418.

See also the following case to a similar effect —

(1909) 11 Suth W R 540 (551, 552), *Ruro Soan Juree Debi v. Unno-jerna Debi*.

4a (1910) 8 Ind Cas 41 (43, 44) (Cal).

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 97**

allowed to succeed upon such a case. On the other hand, as pointed out by this Court in the case of *Lilabati Misra v. Bishur Chobey*,^{4b} when the question reduces itself to one of law upon facts admitted or proved beyond controversy, it is not only competent to the Court but expedient in the interests of justice to entertain the plea of adverse possession, if such a case arises on the facts stated in the plaint and the defendant is not taken by surprise. The true test, therefore, to be applied to determine whether the plea of title by adverse possession should be allowed to be urged, though not explicitly raised in the plaint, is, how far the defendant is likely to be prejudiced if the point is permitted to be taken."

The same view has been taken in a number of other cases.⁵ A person may therefore succeed on a title by adverse possession pleaded for the first time in the Court of Appeal, if such a case arises on the facts stated in the plaint and the defendant is not taken by surprise.⁶ Where, however, the plaintiff has not based his title on adverse possession, nor is the question raised in the issues, nor any evidence let in, it cannot be pleaded for the first time in first appeal,⁷ or in second appeal.⁸

4b. (1907) 6 Cal L Jour 621 (635).

5. (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 339 (340) . 33 Ind Cas 630, *Bata Krista Pramanick v. Jogendra Nath Maity*. (Whether plaintiff can succeed on such plea depends mainly on whether defendant is or is not taken by surprise and also on the facts of each case.)

(1917) A I R 1917 Cal 469 (475, 478) : 35 Ind Cas 890, *Ramechandra Sil v. Ramanmani Das* (Do)

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 25 (26) : 13 Lah 677 : 140 Ind Cas 604, *Shiromani Gurdwara Parabandhak Committee v. Prem Das* (The question of adverse possession is a mixed question of law and fact; and if a party claims title by adverse possession it is his duty to make clear allegations in the plaint and to lead evidence as regards facts from which he asks the Court to draw an inference of his adverse possession.)

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 1005 (1010) . 88 Ind Cas 249, *Rangappa Nayakar v. Rangasamy Nayakar*. (Adverse possession should be expressly pleaded in plaint or at least as an alternative ground.)

(1929) 117 Ind Cas 318 (319) (Pat), *Atimuddin v. Salim*. (A declaration of title by adverse possession cannot be given on a title not distinctly stated in the plaint or in the issues.)

(1906) 3 Cal L Jour 316 (330, 331), *Ananda Hari Basak v. Secretary of State*. (Where adverse possession is not pleaded in the plaint, the plaintiff cannot succeed on the ground of adverse possession.)

(1881) 7 Cal 560 (563), *Krishna Churn v. Protab Chunder*.

6. (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 192 (194) : 5 Pat 441 : 92 Ind Cas 177, *Mt. Balisa Kuer v. Raja Ram Pandey*.

7. (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 522 (524) . 102 Ind Cas 476, *Maulvi v. Del Ram*.

(1874) 22 Suth W R 216 (219), *Protab Chunder v. Collector of Goualparah*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 468 (469) : 60 Ind Cas 321, *Wazir Chand v. Nathu Ram*.

8. (1909) 3 Ind Cas 711 (712) . 5 Law Bur Rul 82, *Po Mga v. Na Le*.

A defendant who sets up a title and also pleads limitation, may succeed on limitation even if he is unable to prove his title.⁹

Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 97-98

Where the plaintiff pleads that the defendant is in possession as his licensee, but the defendant denies it and sets up adverse possession, he cannot subsequently rely upon the license or its revocation but must fail if he is unable to establish adverse possession.¹⁰

98. Question of adverse possession, if one of law or fact.— Possession is a question of fact,¹ and the extent of the possession may also be a question of fact.² So also is the question whether a person has been dispossessed of certain property.^{2a} In *Secretary of State v. Subramania Thevar*,³ it was observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council as follows :

"The question whether there has been a persistent claim of right to a tract of land is, their Lordships need hardly say, a question of fact. Such assertion being proved, all questions as

- (1929) 115 Ind Cas 680 (681) (Pat), *Mahomed Sayed Khan v. Abdul Gafoor*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Bom 40 (42) 49 Bom 817 91 Ind Cas 349, *Rachappa Channasappa v. Ningappa Karappa*.
(1934) A I R 1934 All 692 (693) 151 Ind Cas 355, *Pease Lal v. Nath Singh*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 387 (392) 155 Ind Cas 23, *Mt. Rajana v. Musahab Ali*.
(1909) 4 Ind Cas 1167 (1167) (Mad), *Appayya Manigaran v. Muthuswamy Pillai*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 245 (248) 81 Ind Cas 29, *Anil Kumar v. Rash Mohan*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Bom 26 (33) 141 Ind Cas 103, *Narayan Balwant v. Dattatraya Ramcandra* (Plea of adverse possession, cannot be taken for first time in second appeal especially when facts on record are insufficient.)
(1917) A I R 1917 Cal 817 (817) 37 Ind Cas 942, *Priyanath Mitter v. Anath Nath Dev.*
(See (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 398 (399) 69 Ind Cas 185 1 Pat 23, *Khub Lal Upadhyay v. Jugdish Prasad Singh*.)
(See also (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 259 (259) 73 Ind Cas 817, *Deok Ram v. Dulh Chand*.)
9. (1883) 7 Bom 96 (99), *Maidin Saibai v. Nagappa* (Defendant can plead both tenancy and adverse possession).
(1868) 9 Suth W R 131 (132), *Nobokishore Dey v. Ramkrishen Mohurir*.
(1903) 7 Cal W N 294 (296), *Keanuddin v. Hara Mohan Mondul*.
10. (1919) A I R 1919 All 403 (404) 52 Ind Cas 366 41 All 669, *Jai Chand v. Girwar Singh*.

Note 98

1. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 186 (188) 130 Ind Cas 315 10 Pat 407 55 Ind App 29 (P C), *Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co*.
(1931) A I R 1931 All 823 (824) 150 Ind Cas 296, *Alopi v. Gajadhar*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Lah 264 (265), *Mahomad Anam Khan v. Sultan Ahmad*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Pat 398 (399) 69 Ind Cas 185 1 Pat 23 *Khub Lal v. Jugdish Prasad*.
(1923) A I R 1923 All 382 (382) 75 Ind Cas 672, *Bisheshwar Nath v. Abdul Wahid*.
(1897) 21 Bom 91 (96), *Rajaram v. Ganesh Hari*.
(1932) Ind Rul 1932 Lah 628 (629), *Lal Chand Khosla v. Ghosh Far*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 721 (722) 14 Lah 302 135 Ind Cas 650 (651) *Kalau Mal v. Maman*.
2. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 186 (188) 130 Ind Cas 315 10 Pat 407 55 Ind App 29 (P C), *Nageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co*.
2a. (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 656 (656) 165 Ind Cas 678, *Devsingh v. Subramanian*.
3. (1911) 15 Mad 101 (109) 15 Ind App 14 15 Ind App 74 65 Ind 74 (P C).

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 98**

to the amount of use and enjoyment of the tract by the claimants and as to the sufficiency of such use and enjoyment to constitute possession of the whole extent claimed, are also, in the opinion of their Lordships, pure questions of fact."

The question whether possession is *adverse* or not is sometimes one of simple fact, but may be a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact.⁴ Whether a person set up adverse claim is a question of fact,⁵ but whether on the facts found an inference can be fairly drawn that such possession is adverse, is one of law.⁶

4. (1868) 9 Buth W R 79 (80), *Ishan Chunder v. Ram Lochun*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Nag 171 (173) : 47 Ind Cas 892, *Pralhad Singh v. Abdul Aziz Khan*.
(1891) 19 Ind App 48 (56) : 19 Cal 253 : 6 Sar 133 (P C), *Lachmeswar Singh v. Manowar Hossein*.
(1909) 4 Ind Cas 244 (244) : 38 Bom 712, *Ganapati Ambadas v. Raghunath Anant*. (The question whether possession is adverse or not is sometimes one of simple fact but it may be a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.)
(1931) A I R 1931 All 823 (324) : 180 Ind Cas 296, *Alopi v. Gajadhar*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 54 (55) : 63 Ind Cas 200, *Jogendra Nath v. Rajendra Nath*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 30 (31) : 97 Ind Cas 635, *Abdul Gafur v. Abdul Jabbar*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 337 (333, 339) : 115 Ind Cas 440, *Bashir Ahmad v. Parshotam*.
(1936) A I R 1938 Lah 741 (742) : 166 Ind Cas 607, *Mt. Bhanu v. Ujagar Singh*.
(1928) A I R 1923 All 291 (291) : 71 Ind Cas 640, *Hafiz Abdullah v. Ali*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 68 (70) : 51 Ind Cas 123, *Chintamani Pramanik v. Hirday Nath*.
(1932) A I R 1932 All 393 (396) : 54 All 628 : 140 Ind Cas 853, *Subah Lal v. Fateh Mohamad*.
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 185 (186) (Cal), *Shookoor Mallik v. Behari Lal*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 25 (26) : 13 Lah 677 : 140 Ind Cas 604, *Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Prem Das*.
(1895) 21 Bom 91 (96), *Rajaram v. Ganesh Hari*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 387 (392) : 155 Ind Cas 23, *Mt. Rajana v. Musahab Ali*.
(1917) A I R 1917 Cal 817 (817) : 87 Ind Cas 942, *Priyanath Mitter v. Anath Nath Dev*.
(1921) 60 Ind Cas 293 (301) (Cal), *Balaram Guria v. Syama Charan Mondul*.
(1937) A I R 1937 All 429 (431) : 169 Ind Cas 962, *Ram Chandra v. Asa Ram*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (270) : 27 Oudh Cas 77 : 78 Ind Cas 895, *Indar-pal Singh v. Thakur Din Singh*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (760) : 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prosanna v. Manindra Chandra*.
5. (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 462 (462, 463) : 146 Ind Cas 937, *Ram Shankar v. Sheo Dutt*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 721 (722) : 14 Lah 302 : 135 Ind Cas 680, *Kallu Mal v. Maman*.
6. (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 590 (591) : 117 Ind Cas 614, *Jogeyanand v. Girja Nand*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Lah 482 (482) : 93 Ind Cas 161, *Hakim Ali v. Kartar Singh*.
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 185 (186) (Cal), *Shookoor Mallik v. Behari Lal*.
(1921) 60 Ind Cas 293 (301) : 24 Cal W N 1057 (1063), *Balaram Guria v. Syama Charan*.
(1934) A I R 1934 All 253 (290) : 149 Ind Cas 607, *Subhadra Kuar v. Ram Swak*.

99. Adverse possession by or against Crown.—Where the question is one of adverse possession against the Crown, Articles 142 and 144 must be read with Article 149, *infra*.¹ And so reading them, it is clear that no adverse possession can be effectively pleaded against the Crown for a period of less than sixty years.²

**Arts. 142 & 144
Note 99**

It was held by the Privy Council in *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal*,³ that there was no difference as regards the requisites of adverse possession between adverse possession against the Crown and adverse possession against a private person except that, in the former case, a much longer period of adverse possession is necessary in order to acquire title. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed :

"The Limitation Act is indulgent to the Crown in one respect only, namely in requiring a much longer period of adverse possession than in the case of a subject; otherwise there is no discrimination between the Crown and the subject as regards the requisites of adverse possession"

The Crown in that case was the owner of a right of fishery of which it could only be in possession by granting to others leases and licenses to fish. The granting by a person other than the Crown, of leases and licenses to fish, was held to be evidence of usurpation of the distinctive rights of the Crown and was held to be the most significant evidence of adverse possession.

Where a person claims title by adverse possession against the Government, the burden is on him to prove such possession for the full period of sixty years. Proof of adverse possession for a shorter period will not shift the onus to the Government to show that the possession has not continued for the full period of sixty years.⁴

- (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (270) 27 Oudh Cas 77 : 78 Ind Cas 895, *Indar-pal Singh v. Thakur Din Singh*
 (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 129 (180) 89 Ind Cas 663, *Teshwant v. Daulat*.
 (1938) A I R 1938 Sind 132 (188) 176 Ind Cas 549, *Tahuram Tachchand v. Mt. Miral*
 (1937) A I R 1937 All 429 (431) 169 I. C. 962, *Ram Chandra v. Asa Ram*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 293 (294) 54 Ind Cas 673 . 1919 Pun Re No. 170, *Md Umar Khan v. Razi Khan*
 (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 117 (118) 176 Ind Cas 506, *Berojullah Sarfar v. Ayatullah Akand*
 (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 381 (382) 182 Ind Cas 772, *Sheoraj Narain v. Jagannath Prasad*
 (1917) A I R 1917 All 42 (42) 40 Ind Cas 420, *Champa Lal v. Mangal Chand*.

Note 99

1. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 21 (27) 39 Mad 617 43 Ind App 192 35 Ind Cas 902 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao*.
2. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 21 (27) 39 Mad 617 43 Ind App 192 35 Ind Cas 902 (P C) *Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 570 (785) 48 Mad 570 91 Ind Cas 180 *Krishna Sastri v. Singaravelu*
3. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 23 (25) 61 Cal 262 61 Ind App 75 147 Ind Cas 545 (P C)
4. See Note 9 to Article 149, *ante*.
 See also the cases cited in Foot-Note 4 to Note 9 to Art 112, *infra*.

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 98

to the amount of use and enjoyment of the tract by the claimants and as to the sufficiency of such use and enjoyment to constitute possession of the whole extent claimed, are also, in the opinion of their Lordships, pure questions of fact."

The question whether possession is *adverse* or not is sometimes one of simple fact, but may be a question of law or a mixed question of law and fact.⁴ Whether a person set up adverse claim is a question of fact,⁵ but whether on the facts found an inference can be fairly drawn that such possession is adverse, is one of law.⁶

4. (1868) 9 Suth W R 79 (80), *Ishan Chunder v. Ram Lochun*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Nag 171 (173) : 47 Ind Cas 892, *Pralhad Singh v. Abdul Aziz Khan*.
 (1891) 19 Ind App 49 (56) : 19 Cal 253 : 6 Sar 133 (P O), *Lachmeswar Singh v. Manowar Hossein*.
 (1900) 4 Ind Cas 244 (244) : 93 Bom 712, *Ganapati Ambadas v. Raghunath Anant*. (The question whether possession is adverse or not is sometimes one of simple fact but it may be a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.)
 (1931) A I R 1931 All 923 (921) : 130 Ind Cas 296, *Alopi v. Gajadhar*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 54 (55) : 63 Ind Cas 200, *Jogendra Nath v. Rajendra Nath*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 30 (31) : 97 Ind Cas 685, *Abdul Gafur v. Abdul Jabbar*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 337 (338, 339) : 115 Ind Cas 440, *Bashir Ahmad v. Parshotam*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 741 (742) : 166 Ind Cas 607, *Mt. Bhani v. Ujagar Singh*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 291 (291) : 71 Ind Cas 640, *Hafis Abdullah v. Ali*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 69 (70) : 51 Ind Cas 123, *Chintamani Pramanik v. Hriday Nath*.
 (1932) A I R 1932 All 993 (396) : 54 All 629 : 140 Ind Cas 659, *Subah Lal v. Fateh Mohamad*.
 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 185 (186) (Cal), *Shookoor Mallik v. Behari Lal*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 25 (26) : 13 Lah 677 : 140 Ind Cas 604, *Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Prem Das*.
 (1895) 21 Bom 91 (96), *Rajaram v. Ganesh Hari*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 987 (392) : 155 Ind Cas 23, *Mt. Rajana v. Musahab Ali*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 817 (817) : 37 Ind Cas 942, *Priyanath Mitter v. Anath Nath Dev*.
 (1921) 60 Ind Cas 298 (301) (Cal), *Dalaram Guria v. Syama Charan Mondal*.
 (1937) A I R 1937 All 429 (431) : 169 Ind Cas 962, *Ram Chandra v. Asa Ram*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (270) : 27 Oudh Cas 77 : 78 Ind Cas 895, *Indar-pal Singh v. Thakur Din Singh*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 760 (760) : 159 Ind Cas 752, *Bhabani Prosanna v. Manindra Chandra*.
- 5. (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 462 (462, 463) : 146 Ind Cas 957, *Ram Shankar v. Sheo Dutt*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 721 (722) : 14 Lah 302 : 135 Ind Cas 680, *Kallu Mal v. Maman*.
- 6. (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 590 (591) : 117 Ind Cas 614, *Jogeyanand v. Girja Nand*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 492 (482) : 93 Ind Cas 161, *Halim Ali v. Kartar Singh*.
 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 185 (186) (Cal), *Shookoor Mallik v. Behari Lal*.
 (1921) 60 Ind Cas 298 (301) : 24 Cal W N 1057 (1063), *Dalaram Guria v. Shyama Charan*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 All 259 (260) : 149 Ind Cas 607, *Subhadra Kuar v. Ram Swaik*.

99. Adverse possession by or against Crown. — Where the question is one of adverse possession against the Crown, Articles 142 and 144 must be read with Article 149, *infra*¹ And so reading them, it is clear that no adverse possession can be effectively pleaded against the Crown for a period of less than sixty years²

Arts. 142 & 144
Note 99

It was held by the Privy Council in *Secretary of State v. Debendra Lal*,³ that there was no difference as regards the requisites of adverse possession between adverse possession against the Crown and adverse possession against a private person except that, in the former case, a much longer period of adverse possession is necessary in order to acquire title. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed :

"The Limitation Act is indulgent to the Crown in one respect only, namely in requiring a much longer period of adverse possession than in the case of a subject, otherwise there is no discrimination between the Crown and the subject as regards the requisites of adverse possession "

The Crown in that case was the owner of a right of fishery of which it could only be in possession by granting to others leases and licenses to fish. The granting by a person other than the Crown, of leases and licenses to fish, was held to be evidence of usurpation of the distinctive rights of the Crown and was held to be the most significant evidence of adverse possession.

Where a person claims title by adverse possession against the Government, the burden is on him to prove such possession for the full period of sixty years. Proof of adverse possession for a shorter period will not shift the onus to the Government to show that the possession has not continued for the full period of sixty years.⁴

(1921) A I R 1924 Oudh 266 (270) 27 Oudh Cas 77 78 Ind Cas 695, *Indrapal Singh v. Thakur Din Singh*

(1926) A I R 1926 Nag 129 (130) 89 Ind Cas 663, *Feshwant v. Daulat*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Sind 132 (138) 176 Ind Cas 549, *Tahsilram Tackchand v. Mt. Miral*

(1937) A I R 1937 All 429 (431) 169 I. C. 962, *Ram Chandra v. Asa Ram*, Ind Cas 673 1919 Pun Re No 170,

Ind Cas 706, *Berojullah Sarhar v.*

Ayatullah Asana
(1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 381 (382) 132 Ind Cas 772, *Sheoraj Narain v. Jagannath Prasad*

(1917) A I R 1917 All 42 (42) 40 Ind Cas 420, *Champa Lal v. Mangal Chand*.

Note 99

1 (1916) A I R 1916 P C 21 (27) 39 Mad 617 43 Ind App 192 35 Ind Cas 902 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao*

2. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 21 (27) 39 Mad 617 43 Ind App 192 35 Ind Cas 902 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao*

(1915) A I R 1925 Mad 780 (785) 45 Mad 570 91 Ind Cas 130 *Krishna Sastri v. Singaratelu*

3 (1931) A I R 1931 P C 23 (25) 61 Cal 262 61 Ind App 78 147 Ind Cas 545 (P C)

4. See Note 9 to Article 142, ante.

See also the cases cited in Foot-Note 4 to Note 9 to Art. 142, *infra*.

**Arts. 142 & 144
Notes 99-100**

The Crown can, like any other party, acquire title by adverse possession for twelve years.⁵

99a. Adverse possession by or against the public.—The freehold of all soil not shown to be vested in any individual or corporation is in the Crown.¹ The public may have rights of *user* over it as in the case of highways and waterways, but this does not make the public the owner of the property. The public cannot acquire by *prescription* any land as against the person entitled to it. It can acquire, if at all, a right of *user*, by grant or dedication which may be express or implied from user.² The reason is that the public as such cannot have the particular *animus possidendi* necessary to constitute adverse possession. A contrary view, namely that the Muhammadan community can acquire a title by prescription, has been assumed in the undermentioned case.³ It is submitted that this is not correct.

It follows that there can be no acquisition of title by prescription *against the public*, since the public as such cannot be the owner of any property. But the public may lose its rights of *user* over property where a person has been in adverse possession thereof against the person in whom the ownership is vested for the statutory period. Where a person had made an encroachment upon property vested in a municipality, and was in adverse possession thereof for the statutory period, it was held⁴ that right of the municipality was extinguished, and that the right of the public incidental to its right of way also became extinguished.

100. Special or local law.—Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit for the possession of immovable property a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the Limitation Act, the period prescribed by the special or local law will apply to the suit and not the period prescribed by the Limitation Act. (See Notes under Section 29, *supra*.)

[See also (1916) A I R 1916 P C 21 (27) 39 Mad 617; 43 Ind App 192; 35 Ind Cas 902 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao*.]

5. (1899) 3 Cal W N 99 (106), *Kristo Moni Gupta v. Secretary of State*.

Note 99a

1. (1904) 27 Mad 386 (393) • 14 Mad L Jour 37, *Madathapu Ramayya v. Secretary of State*. (Per Bhashyam Ayyangar J.)

See also Section 2 of Madras Land Encroachment Act, III of 1905, which is based on the said principle

2. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 624 (625) • 74 Ind Cas 25 • 47 Mad 116, *Usam Kasim Sait v. Secretary of State*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 207 (208) 165 Ind Cas 101, *Ramzan v. Md. Ahmad Khan* (User will establish dedication)

3. (1890) 1890 Bom P J 276, *Fatu v. Ramchandra*.

4. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 613 (614) 17 Ind Cas 159; 39 Mad 6, *Rasavesswara-swami v. Bellary Municipal Council*.

(1901) 25 Mad 635 (650) 12 Mad L Jour 37, *Sundaram Ayyar v. Municipal Council, Madura*.

143.* Like suit, when the plaintiff has become entitled by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition.	Twelve years.	When the forfeiture is incurred or the condition is broken.	Article 143
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. Forfeiture and breach of condition, distinguished.
4. Forfeiture of tenancy—General.
 5. Forfeiture of tenancy for breach of condition of alienation—Suit against alienee.
 6. Forfeiture of tenancy by denial of landlord's title.
7. Forfeiture in cases other than tenancy.
 8. Forfeiture on remarriage of Hindu widow.
 9. Forfeiture on unchastity of Hindu widow.
 10. Other instances of forfeiture.
11. Onus of proof as to forfeiture.
12. Waiver of forfeiture.
13. Breach of condition imposed by Section 119, Transfer of Property Act.
14. Starting point.

Other Topics

Article not limited to persons committing breach	...	See Note 2, Pts. 5, 6
Article 139 and this Article	...	See Notes 4, 5
Forfeiture by alienation—Date of execution and not date of registration	...	See Note 14, Pt. 3
is starting point	...	See Note 14, Pt. 2
Plaintiff's ignorance or knowledge—Not material for starting point	...	See Note 12, Pt. 3
Successive forfeitures	...	See Note 2, Pts. 2, 3
Suit framed in tort—Article not applicable...	...	See Note 2, Pt. 1 Note 4, Pt. 6
Suit on ground of forfeiture and subsequent determination of tenancy—Article not applicable	...	See Notes 4, 5
T. P. Act, Section 111—Cases falling under	...	

1. Legislative changes. — A provision corresponding to this Article was first introduced by Article 144 of the Act of 1871. It has been retained in practically the same form in this Article

* Act of 1877, Article 143 and Act of 1871, Article 144
Same as above.

Act of 1859
No corresponding provision.

Article 143
Notes
2—3

2. Scope of the Article. — This Article applies to suits for possession on the ground that the plaintiff is entitled to possession by reason of forfeiture or breach of condition. The forfeiture or the breach of condition, as the case may be, must, *by itself*, give rise to a right to possession. A forfeiture by a tenant in a case governed by Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, for example, does not, *by itself*, entitle the landlord to possession of the property. To entitle him to do so, he must determine the tenancy in the way mentioned in that Section and it is the *determination* of the tenancy and not the forfeiture itself that will enable the landlord to sue for possession. A suit, therefore, by the landlord against the tenant on the ground of forfeiture and subsequent determination of the tenancy will not be governed by this Article.¹

The Article does not apply to a suit framed in *tort*.² Thus, where *A*, a landlord, sued *B*, his tenant, for an injunction directing *B* to fill up a tank excavated by him on the land, for an order that *B* should pay compensation to the plaintiff, and, in default, for ejectment of *B*, it was held that the suit was framed in *tort* and not on any breach of any contract and that Article 32 applied to the case.³ Similarly, a suit under Section 155 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for ejectment of a tenant on the ground of misuse of the land was held governed by Article 32 and not by this Article.⁴

The Article is not limited to suits against the *very persons* who have entailed the forfeiture or committed the breach of condition. It applies to suits against *any person* who is in possession if it is based on forfeiture or breach of condition.⁵ Thus, a suit by a landlord against the alienee from a tenant for possession on the ground that the tenancy was forfeited by the alienation, will be governed by this Article.⁶

The Article will not apply where Section 10 of the Act is applicable, inasmuch as where that Section applies no suit will be barred by any length of time.⁷

3. Forfeiture and breach of condition, distinguished. — A forfeiture imports *neglect* or *fault* on the part of a person the result

Article 143 — Note 2

1. See Note 4, *infra*.

2. (1899) 26 Cal 564 (568) : 3 Cal W N 464 (F B), *Sharoop Dass Mondal v. Joggeessur Roy*.

3. (1899) 26 Cal 564 (568) : 3 Cal W N 464 (F B), *Sharoop Dass Mondal v. Joggeessur Roy*.

4. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 395 (396) : 33 Ind Cas 923, *Taher Mondal v. Tarafdi Gharami*.

5. (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 430 (432) : 124 Ind Cas 273, *Ayyaswamy v. Manarikhrama*.

6. See Note 5, *infra*.

7. (1887) 14 Mad 1 (8), *Sathappayyar v. Periasami*. (Suit for removal of trustee and to re-attach trust properties to trust on the ground that the trustee committed breach of trust.)

of which is to cause him to lose his property or his right.¹ A breach of condition on the part of *A* which entitles *B* to possession of the property of *A* may or may not be the result of a neglect or fault of *A*. Where it is the result of such fault or neglect, the breach of condition really works a forfeiture. There may, however, be cases where a breach of condition may not be due to any fault or neglect of any person but would yet entitle another to possession of property. Thus, Section 119 of the Transfer of Property Act imposes a statutory condition that if either of the parties to an exchange loses any portion of the property received in exchange, he will be entitled to a return of the thing transferred by him in exchange. The happening of this event is a breach of a statutory condition giving rise to a right to possession of property, but it cannot be said that there is any forfeiture of property inasmuch as the party losing the property on breach of the condition is not guilty of any fault or neglect.

4. Forfeiture of tenancy—General.—A tenancy is forfeited by a breach of an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter, or by the lessee being adjudicated bankrupt and the contract of tenancy provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event, or by denial by the tenant of the landlord's title to the land. But a cause of forfeiture does not *ipso facto* determine the tenancy. Some overt act on the part of the landlord showing his intention to determine the tenancy is necessary before the tenancy is determined.²

The above principles are of general application and will govern all cases of landlord and tenant, whether coming within the purview of Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or not. There are, however, two important particulars in which cases governed by Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act differ from other cases. The first is that the overt act by the landlord showing his intention to determine the lease must, under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, be in the form specified therein, while in other cases it may be in any form.² The other and more important point of difference is that, in cases governed by Section 111 (g) of

Note 3

1. Oxford Dictionary
Wharton's Law Lexicon

Note 4

1. See Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act.
See Halsbury's Laws of England, 1910 Edn., Vol. 18, Page 530.
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 193 (203) 85 Ind Cas 678, *Gopala Laxman Ray v. Anil Singh*
(1897) 21 Mad 246 (250) 10 Mad L Jour 415, *Srinivasa Iyer v. Muthusamy Pillai* (Tenancy subsists until landlord exercises his option to determine the tenancy)
2. Halsbury's Laws of England, 1910 Edn., Vol. 18, Page 531 [Note: Where the Transfer of Property Act Section 111 is not applicable, the rules of English law as to forfeiture of tenancy are to be applied as being in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience—See *Mithayya of Jeypore v. P. Ramani*, A I R 1919 PC 144. See also A I R 1, 27 Mad 235 (238)]

Article 143
Note 4

the Transfer of Property Act, the forfeiture does not *ipso facto* furnish a cause of action for the landlord to sue the tenant for possession. The tenancy must have determined before the date of suit by the overt act of the landlord specified in the Section.³ It is in fact the *determination* of the tenancy that furnishes the cause of action and not the forfeiture by itself. But in cases not governed by that Section, a forfeiture by the tenant does not furnish, by itself, a cause of action for the landlord to sue the tenant for possession, notwithstanding an overt act has been done before the date of suit, showing an intention to determine the tenancy.⁴ On the cause of forfeiture happening in such cases, the right of action against the tenant comes into existence at once, though the landlord has an option to take advantage of his right or not. The election is not a condition precedent to the right of action and may be manifested by the institution of the suit itself.⁵

Since, as has been seen above, a suit by a landlord against a tenant, in a case governed by Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, for possession on the ground that there has been a forfeiture of the tenancy, is based not on the forfeiture itself as furnishing a cause of action but really on the cause of action furnished by the *determination of the tenancy*, this Article has no application. The suit would be governed by Article 139.⁶ If the case is one not falling within Section 111 (g), Transfer of Property Act, the forfeiture itself, as has been seen above, furnishes a cause of action for the landlord to sue the tenant for possession and such a suit would clearly be one governed only by this Article, if the lease has not been determined by the landlord before the date of the suit.^{7a} Where, however, the landlord has, before suit, determined the tenancy by doing an overt act, the suit will be within both Article 143 and Article 139. In such cases Article 139 will, on general principles, prevail over Article 143, the latter being a general Article and the former a special one. Thus, in *Srinivasa Aiyar v. Muthusamy Pillai*,^{7b} a lessee in a case not governed by the Transfer of Property Act denied the landlord's title more than twelve years before the date of suit. The landlord had determined the lease by a notice

3. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (298) : 172 Ind Cas 690, *Annamalai v. Vaithilinga*.

(1928) 117 Ind Cas 812 (816) (Cal), *Bejoy Chand v. Gurupada Haldar*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 866 (868) : 60 Ind Cas 312, *Motilal v. Chandra Coomarr Sen*.

4. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (293) : 172 Ind Cas 690, *Annamalai v. Vaithilinga*.

5. (1910) 6 Ind Cas 447 (450) : 31 Mad 161, *Padmanabaya v. Ranga*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (293) : 172 Ind Cas 690, *Annamalai v. Vaithilinga*.

6. See (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (299) : 172 I.C. 690, *Annamalai v. Vaithilinga*.

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within twelve years of the date of suit. It was held that Article 139 applied to the case.

In *Annammal v. Vaithilinga*,⁷ however, it was observed broadly by Venkataramana Rao, J., that "where forfeiture itself gives rise to an action for possession, at once Article 143 would apply." In the undermentioned cases^{7a} also, Article 143 was applied to cases not governed by the Transfer of Property Act where the tenancy had been determined within twelve years of the suit but the cause of forfeiture had occurred more than twelve years before suit. It is submitted, on the principles discussed above, that the decisions cannot be accepted as correct.

In *Venkatarama Iyer v. Ponnusamy*,⁸ a tenant failed to perform the services and thus committed a breach of a condition of the tenancy. The case was one not falling within Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act. On the failure of the tenant to perform the services, the landlord gave a notice to the former determining the lease and later on brought a suit in ejectment. It was held that Article 143 applied to the case and further that time ran from the date of the determination of the tenancy by notice. It is submitted that this decision also cannot be accepted as correct. The suit being one by a landlord against his tenant after the determination of the tenancy, Article 139 clearly applies to the case and will prevail over Article 143 which is a general Article. Assuming, however, that Article 143 applies to the case, time will run from the date of forfeiture and not from the date of determination of the tenancy. The view taken in that case that no forfeiture takes place at all until the determination of the tenancy is not correct.⁹

5. Forfeiture of tenancy for breach of condition of alienation—Suit against alienee. — *B* is a tenant of *A* and one of the conditions of the tenancy is that if *B* alienates the tenancy, *A* would be entitled to re-enter on the land. *B* does alienate the land in breach of the condition and *A* sues the alienee for possession. What is the Article applicable to the case? The answer will depend largely on the question whether the case is one governed by Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act or not.

If the case is one governed by that Section, then, as has been seen in Note 4 ante, the only cause of action for the landlord will be

7 (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (299) 172 Ind Cas 690

7a (1907) 11 Cal W N 661 (662-663) *Gochi Sheikh v. H. Mathewson* (Purporting to follow 7 South W R 209 and 15 Mad 123)

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 193 (203) 65 Ind Cas 678, *Gopika Raman Ray v. Aral Singh*

8 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 918 (918, 919) 163 Ind Cas 86.

9 (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (295) 172 Ind Cas 690 *Annammal v. Vaithilinga*

[See also Sec. 112, Transfer of Property Act, which says that a forfeiture is waived by certain acts done by the lesser provided he was aware that a forfeiture has been incurred.—If determination of the lease by the landlord doing some overt act is necessary for effecting forfeiture, there is no necessity for the proviso referred to above.]

Article 143
Notes
5-6

the determination of the tenancy, and not the forfeiture by itself, whether the suit is against the lessee or his alienee. This Article will not therefore apply to suits based on such cause of action. Nor will Article 139 apply inasmuch as the suit is not one by the landlord against the tenant. It is conceived that Article 144 would apply to such cases. In *Motilal v. Chandra Kumar*,^{1a} the landlord sued the alienee from his tenant for possession on the ground that the tenant forfeited his tenancy by reason of the alienation in breach of the conditions of the tenancy. It was held that Article 143 applied to the case and that the suit was barred. It was further held that the suit itself did not lie inasmuch as the tenancy, which was one governed by Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, had not been determined before suit. It is submitted that the observation as to the applicability of Article 143 to the case is not correct. If, as was held, the tenancy had not been determined and no suit would, in cases governed by the Transfer of Property Act, lie against the tenant except on the determination of the tenancy, it follows that no suit will lie even against the alienee on the basis of the alienation in breach of the condition.

If the case is not one governed by Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the forfeiture itself will give a cause of action against the alienee and the suit would consequently clearly fall within this Article.¹ The question whether the tenancy was determined by an overt act before suit does not affect the applicability of the Article to such cases.

6. Forfeiture of tenancy by denial of landlord's title.—It is only in the case of a tenancy that there can be a forfeiture by denial of the landlord's title. In order to constitute such a forfeiture, the denial must be unequivocal and clear, and to the knowledge of the landlord.¹ In *Maharajah of Jeypore v. Rukmani*,² their Lordships of the Privy Council, after stating that Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was in substance, the placing, in a statutory form, the rules of English law^{2a} which had been applied by Indian Courts as being in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience, observed as follows:

Note 5

1a (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 866 (867) : 60 Ind Cas 312.

1. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (299, 300) : 172 Ind Cas 690, *Annamalai v. Vaidhalinga*.

Note 6

1. (1921) 71 Ind Cas 270 (271) : 41 Mad L Jour 525 (527), *Sreedharam Vaidia Rajah v. Parakkat*.

2 (1912) A I R 1912 P C 1 (4) : 42 Mad 599 : 46 Ind App 107 : 50 Ind Cas 631 (P C)

2a. See also (1901) 21 Mad 216 (250) : 10 Mad L Jour 415, *Srinivasa Iyer v. Muthusamy Pillai*.

(1902) 26 Mad 157 (160) : 12 Mad L Jour 199, *Parameswari v. Vallappa Shanbhaga*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 919 (919), *Venkatarama v. Ponnusami*.

"Now the rule of English law is that a tenant will forfeit his holding if he denies his landlord's title in clear, unmistakable terms, whether by matter of record, or by certain matters in pais. The qualification that the denial must be in clear, unmistakable terms has not unfrequently been applied by the Courts in India, which have held that where a tenant admits that he does hold as tenant of the person who claims to be his landlord, *but disputes the terms of the tenancy* and sets up terms more favourable to himself, he does not, though he fails in establishing a more favourable tenancy, so far deny the landlord's title as to work a forfeiture."

A forfeiture by denial of the landlord's title must have occurred before the suit is instituted.³ Denial in the suit itself will not work a forfeiture of which advantage can be taken in that suit.⁴

Where there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, there can be no question of any forfeiture by denial of the landlord's title. Where, therefore, in a suit a plea of forfeiture by denial of title and limitation is raised but it is found that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant at all between the parties, the suit cannot be considered to be based on forfeiture and consequently this Article cannot have any application. This is the view on which the decisions in *Bhairab Chandra v. Kadam Deva*⁵ and *Abinash Chandra Ghosh v. Narhari*⁶ must be considered to have been based. The observations in those cases that Article 143 does not apply when the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist, cannot be understood as meaning that the Article applies only to cases between landlord and tenant, a view which is obviously opposed to the wording of the Article. In *Jadu Nath Guha v. Kasiswar Guha*,⁷ Mitter, J., considered the two cases above mentioned and observed as follows:

"In both the cases cited the suit was brought on the footing that there was a tenancy and the same had been forfeited. It was held that Article 143 was not applicable as there was, at no time, any relationship of landlord and tenant. *If that was so, there was, or could be, no question of forfeiture.*"

7. Forfeiture in cases other than tenancy. — It has been seen in Note 4 *ante* that a tenancy can be forfeited in certain cases

3 (1919) A I R 1919 P C 1 (4) 42 Mad 589 46 Ind App 109 50 Ind Cas 631 (P C), *Maharajah of Jeypore v. Eshwari Pattamahadevi*

(1921) 71 Ind Cas 270 (271) 41 Mad L Jour 825 (527), *Sreedram Vaidya Iyiah v. Parakkal*.

4 (1919) A I R 1919 P C 1 (4) 42 Mad 589 46 Ind App 109 50 Ind Cas 631 (P C), *Maharajah of Jeypore v. Eshwari Pattamahadevi*

5, (1914) 22 Ind Cas 28 (29, 30) (Cal)

6 (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 165 (167) 37 Cal 253 123 Ind Cas 444

7 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 779 (783) 160 Ind Cas 250

Article 143
Notes
7—9

But interests owned by persons other than tenants can also be forfeited by rules of law or by reason of express conditions, positive or negative.¹ See Notes 8 to 10 below.

This Article is in general terms and applies to all suits for possession by reason of *any* forfeiture or breach of condition.²

8. **Forfeiture on remarriage of Hindu widow.**—A Hindu widow forfeits, under the Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act (Act XV of 1856), the estate inherited by her from her husband, if she remarries. The question has arisen whether, in such a case, the reversioner entitled to the property is bound to sue within twelve years of the date of forfeiture as provided by this Article, or whether he may sue within twelve years of the death of the widow as provided by Article 141. In *Nathu v. Mt. Nai Bahu*,¹ it was held by the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur that Article 143 applied to such cases. It was also observed that if Article 141 was to be applied, the remarriage must be taken to be the widow's civil death so that the starting point under that Article also would be the date of remarriage. In *Tilottama Dasi v. Madhu Sudan Giri*,² the High Court of Calcutta doubted the correctness of both the views expressed in the Nagpur case but did not decide the question as it came to the conclusion that there was, in fact, no valid remarriage on the facts of that case. In *Md. Azim v. Md. Saadat Ali*,³ the Chief Court of Oudh applied Article 143 to such a case.

9. **Forfeiture on unchastity of Hindu widow.**—An award provided that A was to be in possession of certain property for her life, that B was to get the same after A's death, but that if A became unchaste, B would be entitled to take possession of the properties at once. A became unchaste. B sued for possession within twelve years of A's death but beyond twelve years of the date of her unchastity. It was assumed by the High Court of Allahabad that this Article would have applied if the forfeiture had not been waived by the plaintiff. It was, however, held that the forfeiture was waived and that, consequently, the suit was not governed by this Article but by Article 141.¹

Note 7

1. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 779 (782) : 160 Ind Cas 250, *Jadu Nath Guha v. Kasi-swar Guha*.
2. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 779 (782) : 160 Ind Cas 250, *Jadu Nath Guha v. Kasi-swar Guha*.

Note 8

1. (1915) A I R 1915 Nag 57 (57) : 29 Ind Cas 612 : 11 Nag L R 86.
2. (1924) A I R 1928 Cal 714 (715) : 117 Ind Cas 703.
3. (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 177 (223) : 136 Ind Cas 642. (Case of Muhammadan widow but Hindu law was applicable under the Oudh Estates Act of 1869)

Note 9

1. (1937) A I R 1937 All 263 (270) : I L R (1937) All 424 : 169 Ind Cas 586, *Rashik Lal v. Mt. Radha Dhulaga*.

10. Other instances of forfeiture.—*A* made a gift to *B* on condition that *B* should maintain and render certain services to *A* and that *A* would be entitled to re-enter on the gifted property on breach of the condition. *B* failed to maintain *A* and render the services and *A* sued *B* for possession. It was held by the High Court of Lahore that this Article applied to the case.¹

Article 143
Notes
10—11

A, B, C and *D* partitioned their properties and there was a clause in the deed of partition that if any one of the co-sharers purchased the raiyati or under-raiyati holding situate within the allotment of any of the other co-sharers, such other co-sharer would be entitled to take *has* possession of the property purchased. *B* purchased the raiyati holding situate within the allotment of *A*, and *A* thereupon sued for possession. It was held by the High Court of Calcutta that this Article applied to the case and that time ran from the date of the purchase.²

A sold a certain property to *B* who, as part of the contract of purchase, agreed to pay *A* certain fees annually in default of which *A* was to be entitled to the possession of a certain portion of the land sold. *B* failed to pay the dues and *A* sued for possession. It was held that the suit was governed by this Article.³

See also the undermentioned cases.⁴

11. Onus of proof as to forfeiture.—It is for the party who sets up forfeiture to prove it. Where a penalty of forfeiture is sought to be enforced, it cannot be presumed or inferred, when the deed between the parties is silent on the point.¹ In *Bibi Sakodra v. Rai Jang Bahadur*,² where *A*, and *B* a Hindu widow, entered into a compromise under which they were to enjoy a certain property during the lifetime of *B*, that *B* should not alienate her interest and that *A* was to get the property after *B*'s death, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows

Note 10

- 1 (1932) Ind Rul 1932 Lah 645 (646), *Budhn v. Hanjro*
2. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 779 (782) 160 Ind Cas 250, *Jadu Nath Guha v. Kanasar Guha*
- 3 (1882) 4 All 493 (496) 1882 All W N 125, *Udayraj v. Gulsan Ali*
4. (1883) 1883 Pun Re No 180, *Dhyan Singh v. Mehan Singh* (Wajib-ul-arz providing for forfeiture if resident of village leaves the village.—Suit for possession based on such forfeiture is governed by Article 143.)
- (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 682 (682) 59 Ind Cas 308 *Kali Kant v. Lajpati Kant*, (*A* made a will bequeathing a house to *B* for life with remainder to *C* with condition a deed that *B* should not leave the house and if he did so, *C* would be entitled to possession at once.—On *B*'s leaving the house, *C* sued for possession within twelve years of *B*'s death but more than twelve years after he left the house.—Held that suit was barred as forfeiture took place more than twelve years before suit.)

Note 11

1. (1867) 7 Sush W R 209 (210), *Tumecraddien Ch. & Dey v. Meer Surkar Khan*
- 2 (1881) 8 Cal 224 (229) 5 Ind App 210 4 Sush 24 113 Ind 108 (111)

Article 143 ?
Notes ?
11—12 1

"There are no words of forfeiture and it would be a very strong thing and a very unusual thing to import a forfeiture when the parties have not provided for one, and where there is no rule of law attaching forfeiture to a particular act."

Where a grant is made with a condition of performance of service attached, the mere fact of non-performance of the service is not sufficient in all cases to show that the land granted is forfeited to the grantor.³ Where a grant was made by A to B on condition of B performing certain services, namely, attendance on certain ceremonial occasions, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the refusal to render these services did not operate to create a forfeiture or give occasion for resumption.⁴ Where, in a lease, there was a condition against alienation by the tenant, but there was no provision for re-entry on breach of the condition, it was held that the mere breach of the condition did not operate as a forfeiture.⁵

12. Waiver of forfeiture.—Where a cause of forfeiture arises in favour of a particular person, that person can, as a general rule, waive the forfeiture.¹ The effect of the waiver is to wipe off or bar the right of action which arises in his favour on the forfeiture.² He can, however, where there is a fresh cause of forfeiture, take advantage of it and bring his action for relief on the basis of such forfeiture.³

In order to constitute waiver there must be some *positive act* on the part of the person in whose favour the cause of forfeiture has arisen. A mere lying by or mere inaction is not waiver.⁴

An award provided that A was to be in possession of certain properties for her life, that B was to get the same after A's death but that if A became unchaste, B would be entitled to take possession of the properties at once. A became unchaste but B did not take any steps to get possession of the properties. He however sued for possession within twelve years of A's death but beyond twelve years of the

3 (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 4 (20): 21 Ind Cas 481 (F B), *Dhagwat v. Sheo Pershad*.

4 (1919) A I R 1919 P O 1 (5): 42 Mad 559: 46 Ind App 109: 50 Ind Cas 631 (P C), *Maharajah of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahadri*.

5. (1902) 26 Mad 157 (161): 12 Mad L Jour 189, *Parameshwari v. Vattappa Shanbhaga*.

Notes 12

1. See cases cited in Foot-Note (3).

2. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (298): 172 Ind Cas 690, *Annamalai v. Vauthilinga*.

3. (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 403 (401): 35 Ind Cas 235, *Locha Ram v. Jinduradda Khan*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 290 (295): 55 Ind Cas 380, *Zamotin Raja Atergal, Calicut v. Samu Nair*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 295 (298): 172 Ind Cas 690, *Annamalai v. Vauthilinga*.

4. See Note 11 to Article 75, ante.

See also Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 18, page 537.

[See also (1929) A I R 1929 Sind 140 (144): 116 Ind Cas 581, *Xenomai v. Chandumal*

(1897) 1897 Pun Re No. 28, *Achhar Mal v. Hukman*.]

unchastity of *A*. It was held that *B* waived the forfeiture by not exercising his option to take advantage of the forfeiture.⁵ It is submitted that this view is not correct. The case was one of *mere inaction* on the part of *B* and this will not, as has been seen already, amount to a waiver. In the undermentioned case⁶ it was doubted whether a forfeiture on the remarriage of a Hindu widow could be waived by the reversioner entitled to the property

Article 143
Notes
12—14

13. Breach of condition imposed by Section 119, Transfer of Property Act.—Where *A* and *B* exchange properties, but *A* is subsequently deprived of the property got by him in exchange, and thereafter *A* sues *B* for possession under Section 119, Transfer of Property Act, the suit would be governed by Article 143 as one for possession on breach of a statutory condition.¹

Section 119, Transfer of Property Act, however, provides that on the deprivation of any portion of the property exchanged, the *whole* transaction of exchange is nullified and the party deprived may get back the *whole* of the property given by him in exchange. Where *A* and *B* entered into a contract whereby they exchanged their properties with the condition that if either lost any portion of the property he would be entitled to get back an *equal portion* out of the property exchanged, and *A*, on so losing a portion, sued *B* for an equivalent portion out of the property exchanged, it was held that the suit was not one based on a statutory condition under Section 119 of the Transfer of Property Act but was merely one for specific performance of a contract governed by Article 113.²

In *Srinivasa Iyengar v. Kottapakki Johusa Rowther*,³ where there was a contract of the same nature as is specified in Section 119 of the Transfer of Property Act, it was held that such contract was in the nature of a *condition subsequent* and that a suit based thereon was governed by Article 143.

14. Starting point.—The starting point under this Article is the time when the forfeiture is incurred or the condition is broken.¹ The

5 (1937) A I R 1937 All 268 (270) : 169 Ind Cas 596 . 1 L R (1937) All 424, *Rashik Lal v. Mt. Radha Dhulayya*

6 (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 714 (715) : 117 Ind Cas 703, *Sm. Tulottama Das v. Madhu Sudan*.

Note 13

1. (1907) 30 Mad 316 (317, 318) : 17 Mad L Jour 149, *Rajagopalan v. Somasundara Thambiran*.

2. (1899) 9 Mad L Jour 187 (198), *Veera Pillai v. Ponnambala Pillai*.

3. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 812 (812) : 42 Mad 690 : 51 Ind Cas 939.

Note 14

1. See (1935) A I R 1935 Bom 98 (100) : 156 Ind Cas 333, *Daluchand v. Shanti*. (Obiter : It was held that there was no breach of condition at all—It was observed, however, that if Article 143 applied, time ran from the date of the breach of condition.)

Article 143 date on which plaintiff acquires *knowledge* of the acts which would
Note 14 : occasion the forfeiture or constitute the breach of the condition is
 not the starting point.²

Where a forfeiture takes place by reason of an alienation by a tenant, it is the date of the *execution* of the document and not the date of the *registration* thereof that is the starting point; the registration dates back to the date of execution.³

A sold certain property to *B* who agreed, as part of the contract of sale, to pay *A* certain fees annually in default of which *A* was to be entitled to the possession of a certain portion of the property sold. *B* failed to pay the dues and *A* sued for possession. It was held that the breach of condition occasioning the forfeiture was not a continuing one within the meaning of Section 23 of the Act and that time would, under this Article, run from the date when *B* first failed to pay the fees.⁴

Article 144	<p>144.* For possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specially provided for.</p>	<p>Twelve years. When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.</p>
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The Commentary on Article 144 is given under Article 142, *ante*.

* Act of 1877, Article 144

Same as above.

Act of 1871, Article 145

Columns 1 and 2—Same as above.

Column 3 ran as follows "When the possession of the defendant, or of some person through whom he claims, became adverse to the plaintiff."

Act of 1859, Section 1, clause 12

Limitation of twelve years. Suits for immoveable property.

To suits for the recovery of immoveable property or of any interest in immoveable property to which no other provision of this Act applies—The period of twelve years from the time the cause of action arose.

2 (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 161 (103) : 36 Ind Cas 565, *Locha Ram v. Jindwadda Khan*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 290 (293) : 53 Ind Cas 380, *Zamotin Raja Acergal, Calicut v. Samu Nair*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 430 (432) : 121 Ind Cas 273, *Ayyanamy v. Manakrama*.

[See also (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 403 (403, 404) : 35 Ind Cas 235, *Locha Ram v. Jindwadda Khan*.]

3. (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 394 (400) : 17 Lah 403 : 166 Ind Cas 157, *Dhuman Khan v. Gurumukh Singh*

4. (1982) 4 All 493 (496) : 1882 All W N 125, *Bhojraj v. Gulshan Ali*.

PART IX — *Thirty years.*

145.* Against a de- positary or pawnee to recover moveable pro- perty deposited or pawned.	Thirty years.	The date of the deposit or pawn.	Article 145
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. "Moveable property."
3. "Deposit" and "depository," meaning of.
4. Articles 49 and 145.
5. Suit against heirs of depository or pawnee.
6. Starting point.
7. Nature of suit must be ascertained from the plaint.

Other Topics

Deposit of Government Securities	...	See Note 2, Pt 12
Deposit of money	...	See Note 2, Pts 2 to 11, Note 3, Pt 10
Mere demand and refusal will not take case out of this Article	...	See Note 4, Pte 5, 6
Suit for redemption of pledge...	...	See Note 7, Pt. 2

1. Legislative changes.

Before the Act of 1859, there was no limitation provided for a suit against a depository or pawnee. Such a suit was not barred by any length of time.¹

*	Act of 1877
	Same as above.
	Act of 1871

PART IX — *Thirty years*

147 — Against a depository or pawnee to recover moveable property deposited or pawned	Thirty years.	The date of the deposit or pawn, unless where an acknowledgment of the title of the depositor or pawnor, or of his right of redemption has before the expiration of the prescribed period been made in writing, signed by the depository, or pawnee, or some person claiming under him, and in such case, the date of the acknowledgment
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Act of 1859, Section 1, clause 15

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claiming under him, from the date of such acknowledgment in writing

Article 145 — Note 1

1. (1868) 1868 Pun Ro No. 2, *Mt. Dayawunttee v Bhai Sundyapol*.

Article 145
Notes
1—2

The Act of 1859 provided in clause 15 of Section 1 a limitation of thirty years for a suit against a depositary or pawnee of moveable property, or a mortgagee of immovable property, the starting point being *the date of the deposit or pawn or mortgage*.

Article 147 of the Act of 1871 repeated the provisions of clause 15 of Section 1 of the Act of 1859 so far as *deposits and pawns* were concerned and Article 148 repeated its provisions so far as *mortgages* were concerned.

In the case of a mortgage, the Act of 1877 altered the law by providing a period of sixty years from the time when the right to redeem or the right to recover possession accrued, thus making the starting point coincide with the accrual of the cause of action.²

Article 145 of the Act of 1877 was a re-enactment of Article 147 of the Act of 1871, the provision as to acknowledgment, however, being omitted from the third column, as a general provision as to extension of the period of limitation by an acknowledgment was made in Section 19 of that Act.

The present Article simply re-enacts Article 145 of the Act 15 of 1877.

2. "Moveable property."—There is a difference of opinion as to whether the words "moveable property" as used in this Article include money or other things which are intended to be consumed in the using and are capable of being estimated by number, weight or measure, and replaced by, such as, corn, wine, or money: in other words, whether the words "moveable property" would include the subject-matter of a contract of *mutuum* in Roman Law, that is, a contract of loan of something which is not to be returned *in specie*, but which is to be replaced by something similar and equivalent.¹ According to the High Court of Bombay,² and the general trend of opinion of the High Court of Calcutta,³ the words "moveable property" in this Article would include money or other things capable

2. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 972 (985). 40 Mad 1010 : 43 Ind Cas 31 (F B), *Seetha Kutti v. Kunhi Pathumma* (Per Srinivasa Iyengar, J.)

Notes 2

1. Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 1, pages 540, 511.
2. (1876) 1876 Bom P J 179, *Vinayak v. Sadashiv*.
3. (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 167 (168) : 55 Ind Cas 515, *Nanda Lal Bose v. Ashutosh*. (1907) 6 Cal L Jour 535 (537, 539), *Gobind Prasad v. Patna Municipality*. (Per Holmwood, J.—A return of current coin is a return *in specie*.) (1885) 12 Cal 113 (115), *Upendralal Mukhopadhyay v. Collector of Rajshahye*. (1904) 31 Cal 519 (523) : 8 Cal W N 500, *Administrator General of Bengal v. Sm. Kristokamini Dasce*. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 869 (870) : 34 Ind Cas 959, *Ganghari Chakravarty v. Nabin Chandra*. (1970) 14 Suth W R 491 (493) : 5 Beng L R 463, *Gour Narayan Mazumdar v. Draganath Kundu*. (Assumed.) (1869) 11 Suth W R 491 (492) : 3 Beng L R App 57, *Gobind Chunder Sein v. Collector of Dacca*. (Do.) [But see (1876) 25 Suth W R 415 (415), *Rudha Nath Bose v. Dama Churn Meekerjee*. (1970) 14 Suth W R 322 (322), *Shumboo Chunder Mullick v. Fran Kristo Mullick*.]

of being replaced. In *Administrator General of Bengal v. Sm. Kristo Kamini Dassee*,⁴ K made over certain Government Promissory Note Securities to I to be kept by him in deposit and, if necessary, to be used by him for raising funds, and I was to draw the interest accruing on the securities from time to time and pay the same to K, and in case I had occasion to pledge or sell the securities he was to redeem or replace the same on being required to do so by K. It was held by Maclean, C J, and Stevens, J, that I was the "depository" within the meaning of this Article, notwithstanding that the securities may not be returnable *in specie*, if they were returnable as securities, though replaced. Mr Justice Hill who was also one of the Judges constituting the Bench, dissenting from the above view, observed as follows :

**Article 145
Note 2**

"An essential characteristic of a deposit properly so called is, that the thing deposited should not be used by the deposittee and his liability is to return *in specie* the very thing deposited, when his right to retain it has determined, the general property in the subject-matter of deposit remaining meanwhile in the depositor. It appears to me further that, although the loan was of the kind generically described as a loan for use, it fell under that particular species of gratuitous bailments, to which the term *mutuum* has been applied and of which the distinguishing characteristics are that the property in the subject of the bailment passes to the borrower, and that he satisfies the obligation cast upon him by the contract, if he restores, not the actual thing lent, but some other thing of the same kind "

In *Lala Gobind Prasad v Chairman of Patna Municipality*,⁵ Mr Justice Mookerji observed that the Legislature used the word "specific" before the words "moveable property" whenever property was referred to, which was recoverable *in specie*, that this Article did not use the word "specific" before the words "moveable property" but that the words "moveable property" were held by the Privy Council in *Asghar Ali v. Kurshedali*,⁶ in a case arising under Article 89 of the Act, to include money, and that therefore the words "moveable property" in this Article must be held to include also money.

On the other hand, the High Courts of Allahabad,⁷ Madras⁸ and

4. (1904) 31 Cal 519 (528) 8 Cal W N 500

5 (1907) 6 Cal L Jour 535 (539)

6 (1902) 24 All 27 (49) 23 Ind App 227 3 Bom L R 576 8 Sar 142 (P C)

7. (1894) 16 All 256 (258) 1894 All W N 73, *Jasoda Bibi v Parmanand*

[See also (1919) A I R 1919 All 102 (103) 41 All 643 55 Ind Cas 45, *Kalyan Mal v Kishen Chand*]

8. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 4 (6) 22 Ind Cas 60 *BalaKrishnudu v Narayanaswamy* (Confirming A I R 1914 Mad 51)

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 717 (719) 25 Ind Cas 812 *Srinivasa Aiyangar v Rangasami Aiyangar*

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 728 (730) 42 Ind Cas 519 *Goundasamy Pillai v Municipal Council Kumbakonam*

[But see (1889) 6 Mad 351 (352) *See also I. J. v. S. v. S. v. S.*]

Article 145
Notes
2—3

Lahore⁹ have held that the words "moveable property" in this Article do not include money. In *Balakrishnudu v. Narayanaswamy*,¹⁰ Sir Arnold White, C. J., stated the reasons why the expression "moveable property" cannot be construed so as to include money, as follows :

"The very fact that the period of limitation is so long goes some way to indicate, to my mind, that the Legislature intended that the transaction to which so unusually a long period of limitation is applicable should not be the sort of transaction which is of every day occurrence—the lending of money and an agreement to pay on demand or on a specific date. . . . I would only add one other reason and that is that the words are "against a depositary or pawnee to recover moveable property deposited or pawned." The word 'pawnee' which occurs in conjunction with the word 'depositary' seems to be wholly inappropriate to the case of money."

It is submitted that the Madras view is correct on principle.

Where the *specific coins* handed over are to be returned, they would be 'moveable property' within the meaning of this Article.¹¹

Government Securities¹² and a right to *malikana*¹³ are also moveable property, but not a right of *brit fujmanka*,¹⁴ or land, or other immovable property.¹⁵

3. "Deposit" and "depositary," meaning of. — A deposit of moveable property is a particular form of bailment of goods.¹

9. (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 322 (323) : 47 Ind Cas 592 : 1919 Pun Re No. 4, *Dalipa v. Labhu Ram*.
(1882) 1882 Pun Re No. 74, *Ganesh Lal v. Chunnalal*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Lah 629 (635) : 165 Ind Cas 723 : 17 Lah 737, *Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Ralia Ram*. (Quere.)
10. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 4 (6) : 22 Ind Cas 60.
11. (1919) A I R 1919 All 102 (103) : 41 All 613 : 55 Ind Cas 45, *Kalyan Mal v. Kishen Chand*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 322 (323) : 47 Ind Cas 592 : 1919 Pun Re No. 4, *Dalipa v. Labhu Ram*.
(1882) 1882 Pun Re No. 74, *Ganesh Lal v. Chunnalal*.
(1894) 16 All 256 (258) : 1891 All W N 73, *Jasoda Dibi v. Parmanand*.
12. (1938) A I R 1938 P C 110 (112) : 173 Ind Cas 612 : 32 Slad L R 426, *Md. Habibul Haq v. Seth Takam Chand*.
(1901) 31 Cal 519 (529) : 8 Cal W N 500, *Administrator General of Bengal v. Kristo Kamini Dassee*. (On appeal from 7 Cal W N 476.)
- (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 87 (91, 92) : 61 Cal 119 : 150 Ind Cas 398, *Bibhu Dhusin v. Anadi Nath*
13. (1865) 2 Suth W R 163 (163), *J. Lyons v. Taj Chunder Shikeresur Roy*.
14. (1883) 10 Cal 73 (74) : 13 Cal L R 263 : 8 Ind Jur 197, *Raghoo Pandey v. Kasey Parcu*. (Under Hindu law it is immovable property.)
15. (1867) 4 Bom 11 C R A C 155 (160, 162), *Padhabai v. Shama*.
(1970) 2 N W F H C R 43 (43), *Doerjun v. Chama*.

Note 3

1. (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 416 (418) : C9 I. C. 900, *Promoth Nath v. Prosymno*.
(1910) 5 Ind Cas 1 (3) : 33 Mad 56, *Gangneni Kondiah v. Kondappa Naidu*.

In *Coggs v. Bernard*,^{1a} Lord Holt stated the law of England as regards bailments very much as it is to be found in the Digest and Institutes of Justinian using, with slight variations, the terms there given to describe the different kinds of bailments. He divided bailments into six classes:—

- (a) *Depositum*. — Tho deposit of a chattel with the bailee, who is simply to keep it for the bailor without reward or recompense.
- (b) *Mandatum*. — Where the bailee has, without reward, to do something for the bailor or with the chattel bailed.
- (c) *Commodatum*. — Where the bailor, without recompense, lends a chattel to the bailee for him to use.
- (d) *Pignus*: — Sometimes called *Vadium* or pawn, where the bailee holds the chattel confided to him as a security for a loan or debt, or the fulfilment of an obligation.
- (e) *Locatio rei*. — Where the goods are lent to the bailee to be used by him for hire.
- (f) *Locatio operis faciendi*. — Where goods are delivered to be carried or something is to be done about them for a reward to be paid to the bailee.

A deposit of chattel in English law means the *depositum* in the Roman law, i. e., the first of the six classes above mentioned, namely, a bailment of a chattel to be kept for the bailor and returned upon demand without recompense.^{1b} There is a difference of opinion whether the word "deposit" in this Article means the same thing as the *depositum* in Roman law or has a wider meaning so as to include other classes of bailment also. In the undermentioned cases,² the High Court of Calcutta took the view that the word "deposit" in the Article is used in accordance with the old use of the word *depositum*. In later cases, however, the same Court has taken the view that the word has been used in the Article in a wider sense than that of *depositum*. In *Gangahari Chakravarti v. Nabin Chandra*,³ where one P made over certain ornaments to B, a goldsmith, to be melted and made into new ornaments, it was held in a suit by P to recover the gold or its price that Article 145 applied so far as the first of the alternative prayers was concerned. It may be noted that the transaction was in the nature of a *locatio operis faciendi*, the sixth class of bailment mentioned in the English case of *Coggs v. Bernard*^{1a} above

1a. 93 E R 107 (103) : 1 Sm L C (11th Edn) 173 : 2 L D Raym 909.

1b. Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 1, page 526

See also Wharton's Law Lexicon : "Deposit".

2. (1889) 16 Cal 25 (29), *Iskur Chunder v. Jibun Kumari*.

(1891) 18 Cal 231 (241), *Secretary of State v. Fazl Ali*. (Overruled on another point by 20 Cal 51)

(1870) 14 Suth W R 322 (322), *Shumboo Chunder v. Pran Kisho*.

3. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 869 (870) : 34 Ind Cas 939.

Article 145
Note 3

referred to. In *Bibhu Bhusan v. Anadi Nath*,⁴ where the transaction was in the nature of a *commodatum*, or loan of chattel for use of the bailee without reward, it was held that a suit for recovery of the property was governed by Article 145, on the ground that the word "deposit" has been used in the Article in the simple sense that when one man's property was handed by that man to another, the latter became a depositary of it.

The decisions of the Madras High Court also are conflicting. In *Narayanaswamy v. Aiyasamy*,⁵ where A gave B twenty loose rubies in order that B might give them to a goldsmith and have them made into a jewel and on the failure of B to do so, A sued him for the rubies or their value, it was held by Mr. Justice Sadasiva Iyer that the transaction was a *mandatum* and not a deposit in the legal sense as the moveable property bailed was not itself to be returned in the condition in which it would naturally remain at the time of the return, (along with any natural accretions, if any such accretions happened to be added) but the defendant promised to have some work performed in connexion with the rubies and to deliver a jewel into which the said rubies had to be worked. In *Balakrishnudu v. Narayanaswamy Chetty*,⁶ it was held by Wallis, J., that the word "deposit" in the Article must be taken to mean the sort of bailment known to lawyers under that name in the Roman law of bailments which was accepted by Bracton and afterwards by Lord Holt in *Coggs v. Bernard*.⁷ He further observed as follows :

"This *depositum* is a bailment of a specific thing to be kept for the bailor and returned when wanted as opposed to *commodatum* where a specific thing as a horse or a watch is lent to the bailee to be used by him and then returned ; and both are contrasted with *mutuum* where corn, wine, or money or other things are given to be used and other things of the same nature and quality are to be returned instead. In my opinion there is no ground for holding that in the Acts of 1859 and 1871 the word 'deposit' in the Sections and Articles already referred to included so-called deposits of money or other things which were not intended to be kept but to be used, and there is nothing in the Acts of 1877 and 1908 to show that any different construction should now be put on Articles 133 and 145.

"The framers of these Acts were lawyers and must be taken to have used the term deposit in the ordinary legal sense. This conclusion is not, I think, in any way affected by the fact that in 1877 the Legislature introduced a new Article 60 which speaks of "money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand," thus using the word "deposit" not in its legal but in its popular sense."

4. (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 87 (91) 61 Cal 119 : 150 Ind Cas 399.

5. (1918) 18 Ind Cas 921 (921) (Mad).

6. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 51 (53) 37 Mad 175 : 24 Ind Cas 852.

7. 92 E R 107 (111) : 1 Sm L C (11th Edn) 173 : 2 L D Raym 909.

The decision of Wallis, J., was affirmed on appeal in *Balakrishnudu v. Narayanaswamy Chetty*,⁸ and Sir Arnold White, C. J., entirely concurred in the reasons stated by Wallis, J. A contrary view has, however, been taken in *Krishnappa Chetty v. Lakshmi Ammal*,⁹ namely, that the word 'deposit' in the Article has not been used in the limited sense of *depositum* but in a wider sense as including a *commodatum*, i. e., a bailment for the use of the bailee. Schwabe, C. J., observed that the Legislature meant to use simple and plain language and in using the words "deposit" and "depository" they meant simply to say that when one man's property was handed by that man to another, he became a depository of it unless there was something in the terms of the handing over which would prevent his being treated as a person with whom it was deposited at all. "It is almost impossible," observed his Lordship further, "that, when they were making a period of thirty years applicable to cases of goods handed over either for safe custody or in pledge, they should have intentionally made a shorter period for cases of goods handed over for the advantage of the person to whom they were handed. It would be most illogical to allow a shorter period in the case when the "depositee," if I may use the word, gets the advantage than is allowed in the case where the depositor is merely doing something for the advantage of the depositor, and it is to be observed that cases not coming under Article 145 come nowhere, unless indeed they can be brought within the words of Article 49."

In the undermentioned case,¹⁰ in which the question was whether a deposit of money was covered by this Article, the High Court of Lahore held that a deposit of money was not within this Article and rested its decision on the view expressed by Wallis, J. in *Balakrishnudu v. Narayanaswamy Chetty*.¹¹ In *Gurbakhsh Singh v. Kharait Ram*,¹² which was a case of a bailment of jewels for use by the defendant at a wedding without recompense, the same High Court held that this Article applied on the ground that the fact that the defendant was "allowed to use the same did not take the transaction out of the category of deposits as that expression is used in Article 145."

The Chief Court of Oudh has adopted the same view as that of Wallis, J. in *Balakrishnudu's case*¹¹ and has held that a bailment in the nature of a *commodatum* is not within Article 145.¹³

It is submitted that the view expressed by Wallis, J., in *Balakrishnudu's case*¹¹ referred to above is correct on principle. Clause 15

8. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 4 (61) 22 Ind Cas 60.

9. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 578 (580) 72 Ind Cas 842.

10. (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 322 (323) 47 Ind Cas 592. 1919 Pun Re No. 4, *Dalip v. Lakhai Ram*.

11. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 51 (53, 54) 37 Mad 175 24 Ind Cas 652.

12. (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 919 (914) 129 Ind Cas 199.

13. (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 595 (596, 597) 126 Ind Cas 682 C Luck 80, *Chaturgun v. Shakti*.

14. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 51 (53, 54) 37 Mad 175 24 Ind Cas 652, *Balakrishnudu v. Narayanaswamy*.

Article 145
Notes
3—4

of Section 1 of the Act of 1859 used practically the same words as those that have been used in this Article, and it had been held in cases arising under that Act that the clause should be construed with reference to the law of limitation in England¹⁵ and that the word "deposit" in the clause referred to the "depositum" of the Roman law and not to *commodatum* or any other form of bailment.¹⁶ The Legislature in enacting Article 147 in 1871 (corresponding to this Article) must have been aware of the earlier decisions and would have used different language than that used in clause 15 of Section 1 of the Act of 1859 if a wider meaning was considered necessary to be given to the word "deposit." Again, the word "deposit," with reference to deposit of chattel, has a definite and settled meaning in English law, and where the same word is used by the Indian Legislature, it must be understood in the same sense unless there is any indication to the contrary

In execution of a decree, certain moveable property was attached under the provisions of Order 21 Rules 44 and 45 of the Civil Procedure Code and put into the custody of a *sapurdar*. *X* objected to the attachment and the Court upholding the objection, ordered the *sapurdar* to return the property to the objector. It was held that the order created the relationship of depositor and depositary between the objector and the *sapurdar* and that a suit by *X* for recovery of the property from the *sapurdar* was governed by this Article.¹⁷

A entrusted a jewel to *B* to procure a loan for *A*. *B* pledged the jewel and obtained the loan. After the loan was paid off, *B* got back the jewel and retained possession of it. On *B*'s refusal to return the jewel to *A*, the latter sued *B* for recovery thereof. It was held that as there was no agreement that after the repayment of the loan the jewel was to remain in deposit with *B*, the suit was not governed by Article 145 but was governed by Article 49.¹⁸

4. Articles 49 and 145.—It follows from the discussion in Note 2 *ante* that the words "moveable property" in this Article mean, with reference to the context, moveable property recoverable *in specie*, in other words, *specific* moveable property. Article 49 *ante* provides a period of three years for suits for "other specific moveable property or for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same." It is a general Article applicable to suits for recovery of specific moveable property and this Article is a special Article providing for suits for recovery of specific moveable property *deposited or pawned*.¹ Where therefore this Article as well as Article 49

15. (1867) 4 Bom H C R A C 155 (162), *Radhabai v. Shama*.

16. (1870) 14 Suth W R 322 (322), *Shumboo Chunder v. Pran Kisto*.

17. (1924) A I R 1924 Nag 12 (13) 75 Ind Cas 787, *Laxminchand v. Dulichand*.

18. (1911) 12 Ind Cas 207 (208) 35 Mad 636, *Gopalsamy Iyer v. Subramanyasastris*.

Note 4

1. (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 416 (418). 69 Ind Cas 900, *Pran Nath v. Prodymno Kumar*.

cover a particular case, the former will prevail over the latter in accordance with the general principle of interpretation of statutes that a special provision will prevail over the general.²

A somewhat different view has been expressed in *Krishtappa Chetty v. Lakshmi Ammal*,³ that Article 49 is not dealing with articles deposited in any sense at all and that therefore there is no question of that Article applying to cases falling under this Article. In *Md. Habib-ul-Haq v. Tikam Chand*,⁴ where Government Promissory Notes were left by A with B and it appeared that they must have been so left either as security for the loan borrowed by A from B or for safe custody, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that in either case a suit by A against B for recovery thereof would be governed by Article 145 and not by Article 49.

Where this Article applies to a case, the mere fact that a demand has been made for the property and has been refused, would not take the case out of the applicability of this Article and bring it within Article 49.⁵ The contrary view expressed in the undermentioned cases⁶ is against the general trend of opinion and does not seem to be correct.

5. Suit against heirs of depositary or pawnee.—In *Promoth Nath Mallik v. Prodyumno Kumar Mullick*,¹ Mr. Justice C. C. Ghose observed that bailments are of two kinds, voluntary and involuntary, that where A makes a deposit with B, B is a voluntary bailee, that if B dies, his heir is an involuntary bailee who may also be described as a "depositary" and that a suit against the heir would

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 1 (1) 33 Mad 56, *Ganginensi Kondiah v. Kondappa Naidu*
(1928) A I R 1928 Rang 309 (310) 116 Ind Cas 468 6 Rang 517, *Ma Shue On v. Ma Saw*

2 (1902) 26 Bom 430 (432) 4 Bom L R 72, *Narmadabai v. Bhatani-shankar*

3 (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 578 (579, 580) 72 Ind Cas 842

4 (1938) A I R 1938 P C 110 (112) 173 Ind Cas 612 32 Sind L R 426

5 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 869 (870) 34 Ind Cas 959, *Gangahari Chakrabarti v. Nabin Chandra*

(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 416 (418) 69 Ind Cas 900, *Promoth Nath v. Prodyumno Kumar*

(1929) A I R 1929 Cal 143 (144) 107 Ind Cas 473, *Ajneswar Karmarkar v. Kailash Chandra*

(1934) A I R 1934 Cal 87 (90, 91) 61 Cal 119 150 Ind Cas 398, *Bibhu Bhushan v. Anadi Nath*

[See also (1895) 1895 Bom P J 213, *Ganapatram Hira Chand v. Parbhudas Narasid*

(1902) 26 Bom 430 (432) 4 Bom L R 72, *Narmadabai v. Bhatani-shankar*

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 1 (2) 33 Mad 56, *Ganginensi Kondiah v. Kondappa Naidu*

(1928) A I R 1928 Rang 309 (310) 116 Ind Cas 468 6 Rang 517, *Ma Shue On v. Ma Saw*

6 (1899) 9 Mad L Jour 51 (56), *Tamaskrishna Reddi v. Panaya Gounjan*

(1919) A I R 1919 All 102 (103) 41 All 613 55 Ind Cas 45 *Kalyan Mal v. Kishen Chand*

Note 5

1 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 416 (419) 69 Ind Cas 900

Article 145
Notes
8-6

therefore be governed by this Article. In *Bibhu Bhusan Dutta v. Anadi Nath Dutt*,² a Bench of the Calcutta High Court dissented from the view expressed in *Promothnath's case*¹ that the heir of a deceased bailee is an involuntary bailee, but came to the conclusion that a suit against the heir would nevertheless be governed by Article 145. It was observed that by the death of the bailee the bailment comes to an end (Section 162 of the Contract Act), but that the character of the transaction, in so far as it is a deposit is not altered, and that the person in whose hands the thing deposited comes, if it does by virtue of his succeeding to the estate of the original depositary, becomes a depositary all the same for the purposes of this Article. The High Court of Madras has held that in the case of a depositary or pawnee it cannot be said that the contract of deposit or pawn comes to an end on the death of the depositary or pawnee and that therefore this Article will apply to a suit against the legal representative of the depositary or pawnee.³ Section 162 of the Contract Act was not referred to.

See also the undormentioned case⁴ where the Article has been applied to suits against the legal representatives of the original depositary or pawnee.

6. **Starting point.**—Time, under this Article, runs from the date of the deposit or pawn and the period of limitation is thirty years from that date.^{1a} And this is so, notwithstanding a contract between the parties fixing a time before which the depositor or pawnor could not recover the property from the bailee.¹ The principle appears to be the same as in the case of loans of money where time runs from the date of the loan even though the loan is stated to be payable on demand. See Note 6 to Article 59 ante. Domat, in his Civil Law, states the reason of the rule as follows:

"A deposit is a covenant by which one person gives to another something to keep which he is to restore whenever the depositor shall think fit to call for it. The deposit ought to be gratuitous, for otherwise it would be a hiring and the letting to hire where the depositary would let out his care. . . . Since it is the nature of the deposit that the things are not deposited for the behoof of the depositary, as things lent are for the use of the borrower, but for the bare advantage of the depositor he may

2. (1931) A I R 1934 Cal 87 (92) : 61 Cal 119 : 150 Ind Cas 393.

3. (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 185 (185) : 84 Ind Cas 1026, *Krishnaswami Iyengar v. Gopalachariar*.

4. (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 913 (914) : 129 Ind Cas 190, *Gurbaksh Singh v. Kharant Ram*.

Note 6

1a (1872) 1872 Pnn Re No. 23, *Gyan Chand v. Mohumda*.

1. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 972 (985) : 40 Mad 1040 : 43 Ind Cas 31 (F B), *Seethi Kutti v. Kunthi Pathumma*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 1 (2, 8) : 33 Mad 56, *Gangineni Kondiah v. Kondappa Naidu*.

take back the thing deposited *whenever he pleases, even although the time of restitution were regulated by contract.*"²

Article 145
Notee
6—7

The reason why such a long period of thirty years has been fixed for suits for recovery of deposits and pawns, has been stated by Doyle, J., of the Rangoon High Court, as follows:

"It is significant that Section 10 of the Limitation Act does not allow limitation to be set up at all by a trustee in the case of an express trust. It is only reasonable therefore to suppose in cases like the above where there is a transaction in the nature of a trust that the law would contemplate a longer period of limitation against a wrongdoer than in cases where no trust of any kind had been established."³

7. Nature of suit must be ascertained from the plaint.—

Where the plaintiff alleges in his plaint that he made a deposit with the defendant of moveable property, and the defendant's statement is a mere denial of the plaintiff's allegations, and no evidence is adduced, it is the plaintiff's allegation and averment in the plaint that should be looked to as the sole basis for considering what period of limitation is applicable to the case, and not any case that may be set up in defence.¹

A suit for redemption of a pledge is a suit to "recover moveable property pawned" within the meaning of this Article.²

146. Before a Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction by a mortgagee to recover from the mortgagor the possession of immoveable property mortgaged.

Thirty years.

When any part of the principal or interest was last paid on account of the mortgage-debt.

Article 146

* Act of 1877

Same as above

Act of 1871

First and third columns Same as above

Second column "Sixty years"

2. Datt's Civil Law, Ss. 691, 692, 697, cited in 5 Ind Cas 1 (at pp. 2 and 3).

3. (1925) A I R 1925 Rang 309 (310). 6 Rang 547 116 Ind Cas 403, *Ma Shaw On v. Ma Saw*

Note 7

1 (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 153 (155) 54 Ind Cas 1026, *Krishna Murthy Iyer v. Gopalachariar*.

2 (1900) 15 Bom 80 (32), *Kashiram Mulchand v. Hiranand Surstani*.

Article 146

Synopsis

Notes

1—3

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope and applicability of the Article.
3. Starting point of limitation.
4. Applicability of Sections 20 and 21 to suits for possession.

Other Topics

Article 135 and this Article	See Note 2
No payment made—Starting point of limitation	See Note 3, Pt. 4
Payment by whom to be made	See Note 3, Pt. 3 & F.N. (3)

1. **Legislative changes.**—There was no corresponding provision to this Article in Act 14 of 1859, and suits for possession by a mortgagee were governed by Section 1 clause 13 of that Act, which prescribed a period of *twelve years* from the time the cause of action arose. By virtue of Section 6 of that Act, it was provided that with regard to suits "in the Courts established by Royal Charter by a mortgagee to recover from the mortgagor the possession of the immovable property mortgaged, the *cause of action* shall be deemed to have arisen from the latest date at which any portion of principal money or interest was paid on account of such mortgage-debt."

Article 149 of Act 9 of 1871, corresponding to this Article, prescribed a period of *sixty years*. The sixty years' period was reduced to thirty years under Article 147 of Act 15 of 1877, the language of which was similar to this Article.

2. **Scope and applicability of the Article.**—This Article deals with suits for possession by a mortgagee before a *Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction*. Article 135 *supra*, deals with such suits in Courts not established by Royal Charter. Unlike Article 135, this Article is restricted to suits for recovery of *possession from the mortgagor*.¹

3. **Starting point of limitation.**—The starting point of limitation under this Article is the date when any part of the principal or interest was last paid on account of the mortgage-debt, and *not the date of payment fixed in the mortgage deed or the date of default in making payment*.¹ Referring to this exceptional provision in the

Act of 1859, Section 1 clause 12 and Section 6.

Limitation of twelve years Suits for immovable property

To suits for the recovery of immovable property or of any interest in immovable property to which no other provision of this Act applies—the period of twelve years from the time the cause of action arose.

Computation of period of limitation in suits in Supreme Courts by mortgagees to recover immovable property mortgaged.

6 In suits in the Courts established by Royal Charter by a mortgagee to recover from the mortgagor the possession of the immovable property mortgaged, the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen from the latest date at which any portion of principal money or interest was paid on account of such mortgage debt.

Article 146 — Note 2

1. See (1886) 12 Cal 614 (618, 619), *Shunmoyee Das v. Srinath Das*.

Note 3

1. (1897) 14 Cal 464 (482) . 11 Ind Jur 414, *Lutchmiput Singh v. Land Mortgage Bank of India Ltd*

corresponding Section 6 of Act 14 of 1859, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed as follows :

Article 146
Note 3

"It may, however, have been deemed necessary to introduce the exception stated above, in order to put mortgages in the English form, when put in suit in the Supreme Court which was generally governed by English law, upon the same footing as that in which English mortgages are under the existing Statutes of Limitation, and their Lordships dealing with suits upon mortgages in the ordinary Courts in India, might, in the simple case of a mortgagee and his mortgagor permitted to remain in possession so long as he paid interest, have found ground for considering that there was a permissive possession, and that a new cause of action and right of entry accrued when that permission ceased."²

The third column speaks of payment of interest or principal on account of the mortgage debt but does not specify as to who should make the payment. In *Lewin v Wilson*,³ the Judicial Committee in construing Section 30 of Capita 84 of the Consolidated Statutes of New Brunswick, the language of which was similar to this Article with regard to the starting point of limitation, observed as follows

"The principle established by authority is, that the only person by whom a payment can be made to stay the currency of the Statute, is the mortgagor, or some person in privity of estate with him,

2. (1871) 16 Suth W R P C 83 (34, 35) 14 Moo Ind App 144 8 Beng L R 104
2 Suther 480 2 Sir 711 (P C), *Drojonath Koondoo Choudhry v Khelul Chunder Ghose*

3. (1886) 11 App Cas 639 (646, 647) 55 L J P C 75 55 L T 410

See also the following English cases

- (1881-82) 30 W R (Eng) 327 (329) 51 L J Ch 391 19 Ch D 539 46 L T 350, *Harlock v Ishberry* (Payment of rent by tenant of the mortgagor to the mortgagee is not payment of interest or principal for the mortgage)

- (1885-86) 31 W R (Eng) 690 (691) 55 L J Ch 789 14 App Cas 423 61 L T 814, *Newbould v Smith* (Payment of interest by mortgagor after he had parted with equity of redemption held insufficient to keep alive the mortgage)

- (1864) 145 R R 79 (84, 85) 11 H L C 115 10 Jur (NS) 855 11 L T (NS) 69 13 W R 20 4 N R 520, *Chinnery v Evans* (A payment by a receiver appointed at the instance of the mortgagee over several mortgaged estates was held to be sufficient though in point of fact the receiver had only been in possession of one of those estates)

- (1888-89) 37 W R (Eng) Dig C 111 (112) *Burdett v Owen* (Held, payment of interest to the administrator of mortgagee prevents the running of limitation)

- (1889-90) 39 W R (Eng) 65 (66) 53 L J Ch 94 43 Ch D 104 61 L T 632, *In re Erisby Allen v Erisby* (Payment by surety)

- (1879-80) 29 W R (Eng) 904 (907) *Heath v Pugh* (Held after the institution of suit for foreclosure time ceased to run against the mortgage-plaintiffs and the effect of the decree for foreclosure was to give the plaintiffs an indefinite right to possession)

- (1894-95) 43 W R (Eng) 327 (328) 1 Ch 219 64 L J Ch 184 71 L T 755 13 R 75, *Kibble v Fairthorne*

- (1897-98) 46 W R (Eng) 56 (59) 66 L J Q B 705 (1-37) L R 2 Q B 143 77 L T 88, *Thornlon v France*

Article 146
Notes
3—4

or the agent of one of them. It will have been seen that their Lordships think it necessary to qualify that doctrine." Their Lordships eventually held that. "In this case their Lordships think it sufficient to say that payments made by a person who under the terms of the contract is entitled to make a tender, and from whom the mortgagee is bound to accept a tender of money for the defeasance or redemption of the mortgage, are payments which by Section 30 give a new starting point for the lapse of time"

The third column of this Article assumes or presupposes a payment for interest or principal on account of the mortgage-debt. But supposing there is no such payment at all, when does limitation start in a suit for possession by the mortgagee? The High Court of Bombay⁴ characterized the language used by the Legislature in the third column as being "very awkward and defective." In the case cited below,⁵ Garth, C. J., observed :

"If it were necessary for us in this case to put a construction upon that Article, I should be much disposed to hold that it is applicable to those cases only where some part of the principal or interest has been paid, and that in other cases the ordinary twelve years' limitation would apply. In cases where any part-payment could be proved, the presumption that would arise from lapse of time (which is the principle upon which all Limitation Acts are founded) would not arise, or at any rate it would not be nearly so strong as in a case where no part-payment had been made. And this might in some degree explain the extraordinary length of time which is allowed to a mortgagee under Article 149."

In the same case, Markhy, J., pointed out :

"This would seem as if the clause only applied to transactions where something had been paid, principal or interest; and there may be a good reason for this, for where some part of the principal and interest has been paid, there is not likely to be any dispute as to the original transaction, of which the payment operates as an acknowledgment."

4. Applicability of Sections 20 and 21 to suits for possession.
—Sections 20 and 21 of the Act apply only to suits for recovery of debts, and not to suits for recovery of possession. See Note 4 to Section 20 *ante*, and also the undermentioned case.¹

4 (1877) 3 Bom 312 (330, 332), *Ganpat Pandurang v. Adary, Dadabhai* (Suit for foreclosure—Held, whether Article 132 or Article 149 of Act 9 of 1871 applied, the suit having been filed within twelve years from date of mortgage is not barred.)

5. (1879) 4 Cal 283 (296, 303) 3 Cal L R 336, *Ram Chunder Ghosal v. Jugut Monmohney Dabee*

Note 4

1. (1903) 26 All 167 (170, 171) . 1903 All W N 223, *Anwar Husain v. Lalmir Khan*.

<p>146A.* By or on behalf of any local authority for possession of any public street or road or any part thereof from which it has been dispossessed or of which it has discontinued the possession.</p>	<p>Thirty years.</p>	<p>The date of the dispossession or discontinuance.</p>	<p>Article 146 A</p>
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. "By or on behalf of any local authority."
4. "Public street or road."
5. "Dispossessed or of which it has discontinued the possession."
6. Effect of bar of suit by expiry of period prescribed by this Article.

Other Topics

Applicability of Article—Essentials	See Note 2
Suit barred by limitation—Whether local authority can proceed under Municipal statute	See Note 6, Pts 3 to 6
Suit by or on behalf of Local Government—Article not applicable	See Note 3, Pt 2
Suit by private person—Article not applicable	See Note 3, Pt 1
Suit for possession of Crown lands entrusted to local authority—Article not applicable	See Note 4, Pt 7

1. Legislative changes.—This Article was first introduced in the Act of 1877 by Act XI of 1900. Prior thereto, suits contemplated by this Article were held governed by the twelve years' period of limitation.¹

2. Scope of the Article.—This Article applies to suits by or on behalf of any local authority for the possession of a public street or road from which it has been dispossessed or of which it has discontinued the possession. In order therefore that this Article may apply, it is necessary that —

- 1 The suit must be by or on behalf of any local authority.
See Note 3 below

* Act of 1877
Same is alive

Note — This Article was added to the Act of 1877 by Act XI of 1900

Article 146 A — Note 1

1 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 613 (614) 17 Ind Cas 178 (190) 35 Mad C. Extraordinary v. Tolly Municipal Council

Article 146 A
Notes
2—4

2. It must be one for possession.
3. The subject-matter of the suit must be a public street or road or any part thereof. See Note 4 below.
4. The local authority must have been dispossessed of such street or road or must have discontinued possession thereof. See Note 5 below.

3. "By or on behalf of any local authority."—This Article applies only to suits by or on behalf of any local authority. It does not apply to a suit for ejectment by a *private person* against another in respect of a specified field, although the field has been recorded as part of a thoroughfare and *shamilat-i-deh*.¹ Nor does it apply to suits by or on behalf of the Local Government. In *Basaveswaraswami v. Bellary Municipal Council*,² where a suit was filed against the Municipality as well as the Local Government for a declaration of ownership regarding a *pial* put up over a drain, it was held that although the plaintiff had established title by prescription as against the Municipality by reason of his possession for over thirty years, inasmuch as the drain over which the *pial* was put up originally belonged to the Government, the plaintiff had acquired no title by prescription against the Government because he had not been in possession for sixty years.

4. "Public street or road." — A "road" is a general term meaning a way or a passage.¹ A public road is a road which the public has a right to use. A "street" is a town or village road that has houses on one side or both of it,² and a public street is a street which the public has a right to use.

The word "road" is not confined to the portion actually used by the public, but extends also to side lands which are kept as parts of the road for the purposes of the road though they may not be actually used by the public. A too narrow construction cannot be put upon the expression "public street or road" in this Article, as it is intended to safeguard the interests of public bodies which are not expected to be as vigilant over their rights as private individuals.³

"Street" includes the drains or ditches on either side thereof.⁴

Note 3

1. (1912) 15 Ind Cas 285 (286); 1912 Pun Re No. 124, *Achar Singh v. Badhawa Singh* (Held, Article 120 applies.)
2. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 613 (615, 617) 39 Mad 6 · 17 Ind Cas 158.

Note 4

1. Wharton's Law Lexicon.
2. Concise Oxford Dictionary.
3. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 485 (487) 112 Ind Cas 24, *Anukul Chandra v. Dacca District Board*.
[See also (1890) 17 Cal 684 (685), *Ram Chandra Chose v. Dally Municipality* ("Road" in cl 5 of S. 217 of Bengal Act III of 1884 is not limited to roads vested in the Municipal Commissioners but include paths over which the public have a right of way)]

4 See the definition of "Public Street" in Section 3 of the Madras District Municipalities Act, 5 of 1920.

As to what is sufficient evidence to establish that a road is a public road, see the undermentioned cases.⁵

Article 146 A
Notes
4-5

The Article applies only to suits for the possession of any public street or road. It does not apply to suits for possession of other property.⁶ Thus, it does not apply to a suit for possession of Crown lands entrusted to the local authority for management.⁷ But the Article is not restricted to suits for possession of streets or roads formed by the local authority on lands belonging to or acquired by it in proprietary right. In *Sundaram Iyer v. Municipal Council of Madura*,⁸ Mr. Justice Bhashyam Iyengar observed as follows.

"I do not think that the new Article (146 A) can be reasonably restricted to streets or roads formed by the Municipality on lands belonging to or acquired by it in proprietary right. The operation of Section 28 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) upon this new Article will be to extinguish the right of highway on the expiration of thirty years from the date of dispossession of the Municipality by encroachment and thus free the land from the burden of the highway, if the person encroaching upon the highway be the owner of the land. If the owner of the land on which the highway exists be a third party, an encroachment of a permanent character on the public highway will also, as a general rule, operate as occupation of the soil and dispossession of the owner of the soil equally with the Municipality, and his ownership will be extinguished in favour of the trespasser at the expiration of the ordinary period of limitation, viz., 12 years, and at the expiration of 30 years the ownership thus acquired by the wrongdoer will be freed from the burden of the highway. But, if the highway has been dedicated to the public by the Crown, the right of the Crown as owner of the land can be extinguished only at the expiration of sixty years' adverse possession or occupation by the trespasser."

5. "Dispossessed or of which it has discontinued the possession." — See Notes to Article 142, *ante*

[But see (1901) 28 Mad 17 (18) 1 Weir 916, *Fenkatarama Chetty v. Emperor* (A case decided under Madras Act III of 1889—Not correct law in view of the definition in Section 3 of the present Act V of 1920)]

6 (1880) 6 Cal L R 282 (284), *Anderson v. Juggodumba Dab*

Escot

Nadan v. Aggarwal (Judges' decision to continue a highway discussed)

(1898) 1898 Pun Re No 62, *Rana Ganpat Singh v. Kangra Valley State's Company* (Principles of English law, how far applicable to Indian highways discussed)

6. See (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 79 (181) 125 Ind Cas 545, *Secretary of State v. District Board of Tanjore*

7 (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 900 (961) 153 Ind Cas 964, *Labha Singh v. Municipal Committee, Amritsar*.

8. (1902) 25 Mad 635 (650) 12 Mad L Jour 37.

Article 146 A
Notes
5—6

In *Arunachalla v. Municipal Council of Mayavaram*,¹ where the question arose as to whether the plaintiff had dispossessed the Municipality of the drains on the sides of a public street and acquired an indefeasible right as against it, the High Court of Madras observed as follows :

"The plaintiffs can acquire adverse title against the Municipality only if they did any acts by which the Municipality were prevented from enjoying the drains as drains. The Municipality's possession and enjoyment consisted principally in the water of the street falling into and being carried off by the drains unless the enjoyment of the drain by the Municipality as a drain is prevented, there could be no adverse possession. The mere fact that the Municipality did not repair the drains or that the plaintiffs have been repairing or looking after the drains cannot prevent the enjoyment by the Municipality of the drains as drains so long as they are carrying off the street rain water and hence no adverse possession has been established."

6. Effect of bar of suit by expiry of period prescribed by this Article.—The streets in municipal towns are vested in the Municipalities by Government for purposes for which they were constituted. The right of the Municipality over the street is not a mere right of easement; the street itself as well as the soil thereof is vested in the Municipality in trust for the public. The Municipality cannot give up the rights of the public in the street or affect their rights by any act of their own, but this will not affect the capacity of a person in hostile possession to acquire rights which would affect the public. Thus, where the owner of a house abutting a street constructs a *pial* over a portion of the street and is in hostile possession for a period of more than thirty years, a suit by the Municipality for possession of the space covered by the *pial* would be barred under this Article, and by the operation of Section 28 *ante*, the rights of the Municipality to such space will be extinguished in favour of the trespasser.¹ Similarly, where a person built a *rowak* or platform upon a portion of a street vested in the Municipality and was using it as an integral part of his building for over fifty years before suit, it was held that the right of the Municipality to that portion of the street or drain which was occupied by the wall of the *rowak* was extinguished. It was also pointed out that the erection of the *rowak* was not a continuing wrong as contemplated by Section 23 of the Act but that the injury was complete on the erection of the *rowak*.²

Note 5

1. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 193 (194) : 55 Ind Cas 493.

Notes 6

1. (1895) 19 Mad 151 (157), *Municipal Commissioners, Madras v. Sarangapani Mudaliar*.
2. (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 807 (808) : 49 Ind Cas 93, *Ashutosh Sadhukhan v. Corporation of Calcutta*.

Under various local Acts, e.g., the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901 (Section 122) and the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920 (Section 182), the local authority is authorized to remove encroachments made by persons on public streets and roads. There is a difference of opinion as to whether, after a suit for possession of a public street or road is barred by limitation under this Article, the local authority can remove the encroachments under the power given to it by the statute. According to the High Court of Bombay, the local authority cannot remove the encroachment, as the encroached portion ceased, after the expiry of the period prescribed by this Article, to be a public street or road.³ The High Courts of Madras⁴ and Lahore⁵ and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Sind⁶ have, on the other hand, held that the right of the local authority to remove the encroachment is not affected by the fact that the title of the local authority to the space occupied by the encroachment might have been extinguished by the bar under this Article.

Article 146 A
Note 6

PART X—Sixty years.

147. By a mortgagee for foreclosure or sale.	Sixty years.	When the money secured by the mortgage becomes due.
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Article 147

* Act of 1877
Same as above.

Acts of 1871 and 1859

See Note 1 "History and . . ." above Clause 12, Section I of the Act of 1859 provided.

To suits for the recovery of immoveable property or of any interest in immoveable property to which no other provision of this Act applies—the period of twelve years from the time the cause of action arose.

3 (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 111 (112) 64 Ind Cas 203. 46 Bom 335, *Abaji Bagho v. Municipality of Jalgaon*

(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 9 (9, 10) 58 Ind Cas 326, *Tayabali 'Abdullahkhan v. Dohat Municipality*

64 Ind Cas 913, *Ahmeda-*

4 (1911) 161) 33 Mad 6,

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 64 (65, 66) 47 Mad 716 81 Ind Cas 694 25 Cri L Jour 1070, *Public Prosecutor v. Varadarajulu Naidu* (Distinguishing 20 Ind Cas 956)

5. (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 182 (182) 159 Ind Cas 639, *Municipal Committee, Amritsar v. Mt. Gujra* (A I R 1922 Bom 111, Not followed, and A I R 1925 Mad 64, Followed)

6. (1935) A I R 1935 Sind 222 (222) 1935 Cri Cas 1253 37 Cri L Jour 52 159 Ind Cas 247, *Durlabji Hanrao v. Municipal Corporation Karachi* (Case under Section 195 of Karachi City Municipal Act, 1933)

(See however (1915) A I R 1915 Sind 4 (7) 50 Ind Cas 13 9 Sind L R 1, *Karachi Municipality v. Sharoo Laddha* (Held as plaintiff has acquired a prescriptive title the bar is his private property and S 122 (2) of the Municipal Act does not help the Municipality))

Article 147
Note 1

Synopsis

1. History and scope of the Article.
2. Applicability of Article to mortgages by deposit of title deeds.
3. "Mortgagee."
4. Starting point.

Other Topics

Anomalous mortgage	See Note 1, Pt. 14 & F-N (6)
Article confined to suits for foreclosure or sale in the alternative	See Note 1
...	Pt. 11, Note 3.
Article 132 and this Article	See Notes 1, 4
English mortgages—Applicability of Article after amendment of T. P. Act, Section 67	See Note 1, Pt. 14
Mortgage by conditional sale	See Note 1, Pt. 2 and F-N (2), (6)
Usufructuary mortgage	See Note 1, F-N (6)

1. History and scope of the Article. — There was no provision corresponding to this Article in the Act of 1859 and a suit to enforce a mortgage, whether simple,¹ or by conditional sale,² or by deposit of title deeds,³ was held to be one for the recovery of an interest in immovable property governed by the twelve years' rule in clause 12 of Section 1 of that Act.

The Act of 1871 introduced Article 132 providing for suits "for money charged upon immoveable property." There was no provision corresponding to this Article. It was held in cases arising under that Act that a suit to recover money in enforcement of a mortgage or charge was governed by Article 132.⁴ It was even held in some cases that a suit for a mere personal decree for money charged upon

Article 147 — Note 1

1. (1875) 1 Cal 163 (167) : 25 Suth W R 84 : 3 Ind App 1 : 8 Suther 222 : 3 Sar 581 (P C), *Juneshwar Dass v. Mahabeer Singh*.
 (1868) 9 Suth W R 170 (174) : Beng L R Sup Vol 879, *Surwan Hossein v. Shahajadah Gulam Muhammad*.
 (1868) 10 Suth W R 379 (379) : 9 Beng L R 175n, *Munoo Lall v. T. W. Pique*.
 (1864) 2 Mad H C R 51 (54), *Chetti Goundan v. Sundaram Pillai*.
 " " " " *Tachapa Suppa*.
 " " " " *Muttammal*.
 " " " " *Isuamy v. Basireddy Konda*.
2. (1885) 12 Cal 614 (616, 619, 620) : 10 Ind Jur 458, *Shurnomoyee Das v. Shrinath Das* (Mortgages in English form between Hindus in the mofussil of Bengal were held to be enforceable only as mortgages by conditional sale).
 (1878) 4 Cal 283 (302) : 3 Cal L R 336 : 2 Shome L R 2, *Ram Chunder Ghosal v. Juggutmonmohiney Dabee*.
 (1888) 11 All 144 (147) : 1889 All W N 41, *Murlidhar v. Kanchan Singh*.
3. (1868) 10 Suth W R 56 (57), *Pearee Mahun Bose v. Gobind Chunder Addy*.
4. (1884) 7 All 502 (506) : 12 Ind App 12 : 9 Ind Jur 160 : 4 Sar 619 (P C), *Ram Din v. Kalka Prasad*.
 (1877) 3 Bom 312 (332), *Ganpat Pandurang v. Adarji Dadabhai*.

immovable property would be governed by Article 132 of that Act, as it was a suit literally for "money charged upon immoveable property."⁵

Article 147
Note 1

The Act of 1877 introduced a slight modification in Article 132 by the substitution of the words "to enforce payment of money charged upon immoveable property" for the words "for money charged upon immoveable property" which occurred before. It also introduced a new provision corresponding to the present Article 147 providing a period of sixty years for suits "by a mortgagee for foreclosure or sale." The introduction of this Article gave rise to a considerable conflict of opinion. According to one series of decisions, this Article applied to suits for sale or for foreclosure in respect of *mortgages* and Article 132 applied to suits in respect of *charges* not amounting to mortgages.⁶ It was further held in some cases that a suit for a mere personal decree for money charged on immoveable property would also be governed by Article 132 notwithstanding the change introduced in that Article.⁷ According to another series of decisions, this Article applied only to cases where the mortgagor sued for *sale or foreclosure in the alternative* and Article 132 would apply to all other suits to enforce a mortgage or a charge.⁸ The leading case expressing this view was the decision of the Calcutta High Court in

5. (1882) 6 Bom 719 (723) (F B), *Lallubhai v. Naran*.

6. See cases cited in Foot-Note 3 to Note 2 to Article 132, ante

(See also (1895) 17 All 483 (485) 1895 All W N 110, *Ram Ratan v. Lalla Prasad*.)

(1907) 29 All 544 (552, 553) • 1907 All W N 159 . 4 All L Jour 424, *Ram Singh v. Sobha Ram*. (Suit based on pious obligation of sons and grandsons.)

(1888) 1888 All W N 200 (200), *Radho v. Umar Daraz Khan*

(1886) 1886 All W N 212 (213), *Jugal Kishore v. Ram Sahai*. (Anomalous mortgage—Simple usufructuary mortgage.)

(1886) 10 Bom 592 (595), *Gobind Bhaichand v. Kalnah*

(1884) 1884 Bom P J 29, *Mahableshwarbhai v. Ratnabai*

(1891) 1891 Bom P J 16, *Firm known as Nonji v. Pandu*

(1891) 1891 Bom P J 85, *Davaji Niraji v. Tatyaji Jayaji*.

(1900) 27 Cal 185 (186, 187), *Aman Ali v. Arjar Ali Mia*. (Barred after twelve years.)

(1893) 18 Mad 64 (65, 66) 2 Mad L Jour 155, *Ammanna v. Gurusurthi*. (Mortgage by conditional sale—Suit for foreclosure.)

(1896) 19 Mad 411 (414) 6 Mad L Jour 210, *Udayana Pillai v. Senthilatu Pillai*. (Usufructuary mortgage containing covenant to pay.)

(1906) 16 Mad L Jour 53 (54), *Chairman, Municipal Council, Rajahmundry v. Venkateswarulu*

(1885) 1885 Pun Re No 19, *Gujar Mal v. Hachis Ram*

(1888) 1888 Pun Re No 115, *Karim Balhish v. Mt Amar Devi*]

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The above cases are no longer law

[See (1885) 7 All 502 (506) 12 Ind App 12 4 Sat 619 (P C), *Ram Din v. Kalla Prasad*]

8 See the cases cited in Foot Note 4 to Note 2 to Article 132, ante

[See also (1890) 1890 Pun Re No 112 (F B), *Fari Saran Dass v. Mehtab*.]

Article 147
Note 1

Girwar Singh v. Thakur Narain Singh,⁹ where it was observed that the object of introducing Article 147 was to provide for cases where reliefs of foreclosure or sale in the alternative could be claimed and for which there was some uncertainty felt before as to the provision applicable. A third view was expressed in some cases that, with regard to hypothecations of immovable property made before the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Article 132 of the Act of 1877 applied and not Article 147, whatever might be the position with regard to mortgages created after the coming into force of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The view proceeded on the ground that in such cases there was only a *charge* and not a *mortgage* as defined in the Transfer of Property Act.¹⁰ This conflict has now been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai*,¹¹ to the effect that this Article is confined to that class of mortgages in which the suit may be, and in fact always is, brought for *foreclosure or sale in the alternative* and that suits in respect of all other mortgages are governed by Article 132. Their Lordships observed as follows :

"The previous Act was Act 9 of 1871, in which Article 132, referring to suits 'for money charged upon immoveable property,' was practically the same as the present Article bearing that number. There was nothing corresponding to Article 147. Under that state of things it was perfectly settled law that *suits of the present class* (i. e. suits on simple mortgage) were governed by Article 132, whilst some uncertainty had been felt as to the rule of limitation applicable to another class of mortgages, the English mortgage.

"The two views taken under the Act of 1877 are these. According to one view, Article 147 applies to every suit by a mortgagee, in which he asks either for foreclosure or for sale. According to the other view, Article 147 applies only to the class of mortgages (English mortgages) in which the suit may be, and in fact always is, brought for 'foreclosure or sale', while Article 132 means what the corresponding Article meant before.

* * * * *

"The narrower construction escapes the necessity of attributing to the Legislature a great and sudden change of policy. It also gives effect to the ordinary presumption that the Legislature, when it repeats, in substance in a later Act, an earlier enactment that has obtained a settled meaning by judicial construction, intends the words to mean what they meant before. The other construction fails in both these particulars."

9. (1887) 14 Cal 730 (740) (F B).

[See also (1890) 1890 Pun Re No 112 (F B), *Ram Saran Dass v. Mehtab*]

10. See the cases cited in Foot-Note 5 to Note 2 to Article 132, *ante*.

11. (1907) 30 Mad 426 (483, 484) . 34 Ind App 186 . 4 All L Jour 625 : 9 Bom L R 1104 : 11 Cal W N 1005 : 6 Cal L Jour 879 : 17 Mad L Jour 444 : 2 Mad L Tim 333 (P C).

After the said decision of the Privy Council it has now been held that Article 147 applies only to mortgages, such as the English mortgage, in which the suit is for foreclosure or sale in the alternative¹² and that Article 132 applies to all other suits to enforce mortgages.¹³

By Act 20 of 1929, Section 67 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, has been amended, the result of which is that a mortgagee under an English mortgage is not entitled to ask for *foreclosure*, but can only sue for *sale*. It would follow that, after the coming into force of the amendment, Article 147 can have no application to English mortgages in Provinces to which the Transfer of Property Act applies. The Article would apply only to English mortgages in Provinces to which the Transfer of Property Act does not apply, and perhaps to anomalous mortgages which provide for the remedies of foreclosure or sale.¹⁴

2. Applicability of Article to mortgages by deposit of title deeds.—Before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was amended by Act 20 of 1929, there was a difference of opinion as to the remedies available to a mortgagee by deposit of title deeds. The conflict arose by reason of the fact that Section 67 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which specified the remedies of various mortgages did not specifically make any reference to mortgages by deposit of title deeds, though such mortgages were recognized by Section 59 of that Act. According to the High Court of Bombay, a mortgagee by deposit of title deeds was entitled to both the remedies of foreclosure and sale.¹ According to the Calcutta² and Madras³ High Courts, the remedy was only a suit for *sale*. This conflict has been set at rest by the amendment of Sections 58 and 67 of the Transfer

Article 147
Notes
1—2

12. (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 736 (737) 82 Ind Cas 399, *A. I. Campbell v. Audisakaratu*
13. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 736 (737) 82 Ind Cas 399, *A. I. Campbell v. Audisakaratu*
(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 232 (233) 31 Ind Cas 475, *Ramayya v. Seshayya*
(1931) A I R 1931 Mad 542 (549) 133 Ind Cas 497, *Chandranma v. Gunna Seethan*
(1926) A I R 1926 All 493 (494, 496) 48 All 302 94 Ind Cas 819, *Sheoram Singh v. Babu Singh*. (Mortgage by conditional sale)
(1926) A I R 1926 All 531 (552) 95 Ind Cas 100, *Khan Sahai v. Mahurman*. (Usufructuary mortgage)
(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 39 (39) 3 Lah 233 69 Ind Cas 419, *Ullam Chand v. Mt. Thakar Devi*
14. See (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 112 (113) 1 L R (1938) Nag 91, *Bhagwantrao Anandrao v. Damodar Goudrao*.

Note 2

1. (1890) 14 Bom 269 (273), *Manohji Framji v. Rustumji Naserwanji Mistry*.
(1877) 3 Bom 312 (330 to 332), *Gangpat Pandurang v. Adarji Dadabhai*.
(1897) 23 Bom 164 (169), *Khushal Sadashur v. Panamchand Jusrupji*.
2. (1897) 24 Cal 348 (350) 1 Cal W N 225, *Srinath Roy v. Godaithur Das*.
3. (1897) 21 Mad 326 (F B), *Ramachandra Govindaraju v. Madhu Padai*.

Article 147
Notes
2-4

of Property Act, 1882, under which a mortgagee by deposit of title deeds has only the remedy of *sale* of the mortgaged property and not of foreclosure. It follows from what has been said in Note 1 *ante* that a suit to enforce an equitable mortgage is not within this Article.

3. "Mortgagee." — The word "mortgagee" will include all persons deriving title under him. This is made clear by Section 59A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which, however, only gives legislative recognition to what was before recognized as the law. In view of the discussion in Note 1 *ante*, it is clear that the word "mortgage" in this Article refers only to the case of a mortgage in which a suit can lie for foreclosure or sale in the alternative.

4. Starting point. — Time, under this Article, runs from the date when the "money secured by the mortgage becomes due." The starting point is the same as that in Article 132 *ante*, the only difference being that the period of limitation is, under Article 132, twelve years from that date, and, under this Article, sixty years from that date.

As to when the money "becomes due," see generally Note 23 to Article 132, *ante*.

Article 148

148.* Against a mortgagee to redeem or to recover possession of immoveable property mortgaged.	Sixty years.	When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues: Provided that all claims to redeem arising under instruments of mortgage of immoveable property situate in Lower Burma which had been executed before the first day of May 1863 shall be governed by the rules of limitation in force in that province immediately before the same day.
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Act of 1877

Same as above, except that the words 'British Burma' occur in the third column in the place of 'Lower Burma.'

Synopsis

Article 148

1. Legislative changes.

1a. Scope.

2. "Mortgagee."

3. Redeeming co-mortgagor, position of.

4. Adverse possession by mortgagee against mortgagor.

5. Invalid transfer of equity of redemption to mortgagee — Effect.

6. Invalid foreclosure proceedings — Effect.

7. Mortgage providing that on default of mortgagor in paying the mortgage money within a fixed term, he should become absolute owner of the property — Effect.

8. Mortgagee purchasing the mortgaged property in contravention of Order 34 Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code.

9. Void mortgage—Person entering into possession under such mortgage.

10. Extinction of mortgage by decree or order of Court.

11. Effect of proceedings under Bengal Regulation, 17 of 1806.

12. Abandonment of land by mortgagor.

13. Adverse possession by strangers.

Act of 1871

148. — Against a mortgagee to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged.

Sixty years

The date of the mortgage, unless where an acknowledgment of the title of the mortgagor or of his right of redemption has, before the expiration of the prescribed period, been made in writing signed by the mortgagee or some person claiming under him, and, in such case, the date of the acknowledgment

Provided that all claims to redeem, arising under instruments of mortgage of immovable property situate in British Burma, which have been executed before the first day of May 1863 shall be governed by the rules of limitation in force in that Province immediately before the same day

Act of 1859

Section 1, clause 15 — To suits against a depositary, pawnee or mortgagee of any property moveable or immovable, for the recovery of the same—a period of thirty years if the property be moveable, and sixty years if it be immovable, from the time of the deposit, pawn or mortgage, or if in the meantime an acknowledgment of the title of the depositor, pawnee or mortgagor, or of his right of redemption shall have been given in writing signed by the depositary, pawnee or mortgagee or some person claiming under him, from the date of such acknowledgment in writing

Limitation of thirty and sixty years. Suits against depositaries, pawns or mortgagees.

Article 148
Note 1

14. "To redeem or to recover possession."
15. Claim for surplus profits — Limitation.
16. Accessions to mortgaged property.
17. "Immoveable property."
18. Starting point of limitation.
19. This Article and Article 134.
20. This Article and Article 126.
21. Suit by puisne mortgagee for redemption of prior mortgage.
22. Suit by execution purchaser of equity of redemption.
23. Burden of proof.
24. Laches of mortgagor.
25. Effect of bar of limitation.
26. Special or local law.
27. Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act, 2 of 1913—Dismissal of application for redemption under — Effect.

Other Topics

Article applies to all mortgages ... See Note 2, Pt. 8
 Co-mortgagee redeeming another co-mortgagee—His possession is not adverse to mortgagor ... See Note 4 F N (8)
 Decree for redemption passed—Second suit for redemption ... See Note 10, Pt. 1

No date fixed for payment in mortgage deed—Right to redeem accrues immediately on execution of deed ... See Note 10, Pt. 6
 Suit against redeeming co-mortgagor—Starting point of limitation ... See Note 8, Pts. 6, 7
 Suit to redeem usufructuary mortgage ... See Note 1a, Pt. 1, Note 2 F N (3)

1. Legislative changes.

1. Before the Act of 1859, there was no provision prescribing any period of limitation for a suit to redeem or to recover possession of mortgaged property.¹
2. Section 1 clause 15 of the Act of 1859 provided a period of sixty years for a suit against a mortgagee of immovable property for the recovery of the property.² There was a similar provision in

Article 148—Note 1

1. (1900) 27 Cal 1004 (1010) 27 Ind App 103; 4 Cal W N 565; 7 Sar 718 (P C), *Fatimatulnissa Begum v. Sunder Das*.
 (1865) 2 Mad H O R 382 (383), *Purushotam Nambudri v. Kunju Menevan*.
 (1925) A 1 R 1925 Lah 105 (106) 78 Ind Cas 368, *Shahadat v. Ganesh Das*.
 (1894) 1894 All W N 87 (87), *Jamna Prasad v. Gokla*.
 [See (1863) 1 Mad H O R 146 (147), *Pudiyakoru Nagalla v. Kadinni*.
 (1909) 2 Ind Cas 469 (470) (Bom), *Hiralal Ichhalal v. Narsilal*.]
2. See the following decisions bearing on the above provision:
 (1867) 5 Bom H C R (A C) 176 (179), *Ahiloji Khandoji v. Dongar Harichand*.

Article 148 of the Act of 1871. The chief points of difference between the above provisions and the corresponding provisions in the Acts of 1877 and 1908 are as follows :

- (a) The provisions in the Acts of 1859 and 1871 only applied to suits for possession of the mortgaged property and did not apply to *suits for redemption where possession was not asked for*. But the Articles in the later enactments apply to both kinds of suits.
- (b) Under the Acts of 1859 and 1871, the period of limitation began to run from the date of the mortgage,³ whereas under the Acts of 1877 and 1908, the starting point of limitation is the time when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrued.
- (c) Section 1, clause 15 of the Act of 1859 and Article 148 of the Act of 1871 contained within themselves provisions as to the computation of a fresh period of limitation in case of an acknowledgment of liability by the mortgagee.⁴ But in the Acts of 1877 and 1908, such provisions were omitted, and at the same time the scope of Section 19 (which previously applied only to debts and legacies) was enlarged so as to include suits for redemption of mortgages. (See Note 16 to Section 19.)

3. The present Article is merely a reproduction of Article 148 of the Act of 1877 with this difference that the words "British Burma" in the third column of the Article in the prior enactment have been replaced by the words "Lower Burma."

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- (1871) 3 N W P H C R 119 (120), *Mahomed Abdul Ruzah v. Asif Ali Shah*.
 (1867) 2 Agra 227 (227), *Chuzfoo Singh v. Nasir Hossein*.
 (1878) 13 Beng L R 177 (179, 180, 181) 2 Suther 897, 20 Suth W R 375 (P C), *Luchmee Buhsh Roy v. Runjeet Ram Pandey*.
 (1900) 27 Cal 1001 (1010, 1011) 27 Ind App 103 4 Cal W N 565 7 Sac 718 (P C), *Fatimatulnissa Begum v. Sundar Das*.
 (1868) 9 Suth W R 187 (189) Beng L R Sup Vol. 901 (F B), *Lail Doss v. Jamal Ali*.
 (1868) 10 Suth W R 478 (480, 482), *Runjeet Narain Singh v. Shurfoonissa*.
 (1882) 5 Mad 182 (184), *Mulhans v. Manan*.
 3. (1894) 6 All 551 (557, 558) 1891 All W N 193 (F B), *Shib Lal v. Ganga Prasad*.
 (1881) 1881 Bom P J 116 (116), *Mohiana v. Vargisal*.
 (1906) 29 All 333 (335) 1906 All W N 23 3 All L Jour 113, *Muhammed Akbar Hussain v. Issat un nissa*.
 (1894) 1 Cal W N 513 (516), *Sundar Das v. Fatimatulnissa Begum*.
 4. See the following decisions bearing on the above provisions :
 (1894) 1891 All W N 87 (87), *Jamna Prasad v. Golla*.
 (1893-91) 17 Bom 173 (178, 181, 183), *Bhogilal v. Amritlal*.
 (1875-77) 1 All 425 (426, 427) 2 Ind Jur 115, *Dina Chand v. Sarfras Ali*.
 (1875-77) 1 All 117 (123) (F B), *Dina Chand v. Sarfras*.
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 238 (240) (All), *Chunna v. Huzam Singh*.
 (1930) 1 I R 1930 Bom 55 (57) 122 Ind Cas 662, *Dhanki Shrivari v. Laxman Mahasabji*.
 (1900) 1900 Pun Re No 62, *Bhagwan Dasi v. Muhammed Yusuf*.

Article 148
Note 1a

1a. Scope.—This Article applies to two classes of suits :

1. Suits to *redeem* mortgages.
2. Suits to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged.

A right to *redeem* is a right to require the mortgagee, on payment of the mortgage money, to do the various things referred to in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the first three paragraphs of which run as follows :

"60. At any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgage-money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee, (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor, and (c) at the cost of the mortgagor, either to re-transfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third person as he may direct, or to execute and (where the mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument) to have registered an acknowledgment in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished.

"Provided that the right conferred by this Section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by decree of a Court.

"The right conferred by this Section is called a right to redeem and a suit to enforce it is called a suit for redemption."

In a suit for redemption a preliminary decree is passed under Order 34 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code fixing a time within which the mortgagor is to pay the amount found due, and providing for what is to happen on default. After the expiry of the date fixed for payment, a final decree is passed under Order 34 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code requiring the mortgagee to do the various things specified in Section 60 referred to above if the mortgagor has made the payment, or, if the amount is not paid as directed, declaring that the mortgage is foreclosed or ordering the property to be sold, as the case may be.

Where the mortgage amount *has been paid off*, but the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, and the mortgagor sues to recover possession of the property, the suit is not one for redemption as contemplated by this Article, but a suit to recover possession

(1886) 1888 Pun Re No. 157, *Hakhat Ras v. Ganga Das*.

(1880) 1880 Pun Re No. 32, *Lala Mal v. Gulam Mahomed*.

(1878) 1878 Pun Re No. 78, *Kaur Muhammad v. Ahmudin*.

(1877) 1877 Pun Re No. 93, *Deota v. Kesho*.

(1877) 1877 Pun Re No. 61, *Mt Mah Bibi v. Motan Mal*.

(1916) A I R 1918 Mad 86 (87) : 43 Ind Cas 60, *Raman Kurup v. Chappan Nair*.

of the mortgaged property. A decree in such a suit is to be passed in the manner prescribed by Order 34 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. There are not two decrees to be passed in such suits as in the case of suits for redemption.

It will be seen from the above that a suit to redeem a usufructuary mortgage involves also a prayer for possession of the mortgaged property and is substantially a suit for possession.¹ But a suit for possession of the mortgaged property, where no payment is to be made by the mortgagor, is not a suit for redemption, as contemplated by the Article.

The period of limitation for both classes of suits is sixty years.

2. "Mortgagee."—This Article applies only to a suit against a mortgagee.¹ Thus, it does not apply to a suit against a chargeholder² But it applies to all kinds of mortgage.³

Note 1a

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 292 (296) 47 Mad 203. 79 Ind Cas 510, *Appamma v. Chinnaveadu*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 63 (64) 160 Ind Cas 1066, *Baynath Prasad v. Muneshwar*

Note 2

1. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 910 (911) 94 Ind Cas 342, *Keshab Lal v. Dholanath*. (1882) 6 Bom 674 (678, 680), *Gopal Sitaram v. Desai*. (Held that the transaction in question was a conveyance for a term of years and not a mortgage within the meaning of this Article.)

See the following cases which are illustrative of what are and what are not mortgages for the purpose of this Article :

- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 862 (864, 866) 36 Ind Cas 353, *Mohini Mohan v. Sarat Sundari*.
- (1890) 14 Mad 312 (315), *Raman v. Shathanathan*
- (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 123 (128) 32 Ind Cas 353, *Raghunath Prasad v. Mt. Kethi*
- (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 208 (209) 38 Ind Cas 626, *Mahabir Singh v. Sheo Ratan*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 169 (170) 74 Ind Cas 42, *Baldeo v. Sher Bahadur Singh*.
- (1910) 6 Ind Cas 183 (187, 188) (All), *Jhanda Singh v. Wahid-ud-din*.
- (1883) 1883 Pun Re No. 57, *Deva Singh v. Harnam Singh*.
- (1864) 1 Suth W R 7 (9), *Pultun Singh v. Reshal Singh*
- (1904) 26 All 837 (841) 1 All L Jour 48 1904 All W N 39, *Jai Ram v. Makunda*
- 2 (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 744 (745) 12 Lah 671 135 Ind Cas 506, *Jhandu v. Nur Mahomed*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 238 (238) 92 Ind Cas 980, *Narain Das v. Saraj Din*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 311 (312) 71 Ind Cas 847, *Wazir v. Girdhari*
- (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 234 (238) 55 Ind Cas 450, *Basantav Dhanna Singh*
- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 631 (635) 46 Cal 111 45 Ind Cas 753, *Purna Chandra Pal v. Parada Prasanna*
- (1922) A I R 1922 All 410 (411) 77 Ind Cas 119, *Surat Singh v. Urrao Singh*
- (1914) A I R 1914 All 547 (549) 27 Ind Cas 35, *Asad Ali v. Anand Sarup*
- (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 326 (326), *Sinnama Chettiar v. Sthalami Arimal*
[But see (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 98 (99) 63 Ind Cas 2-2, *Ram Narain Rai v. Rim Dasi Rai* (Limitation Act recognises no distinction between charge and mortgage)]
8. (1873) 20 Suth W R 375 (376) 2 Suther 897 13 Peng L R 177 (P C), *Luchmee Buxsh Roy v. Runjeet Ram Pandey* (Section 1, clause 15 of Act of 1859 applied to usufructuary mortgages also)

Articles 148
Note 2

Where there is a partial failure of consideration for a mortgage, the mortgage is valid to the extent of the consideration that has not failed and so the possession of the mortgagee under the mortgage deed is only in his capacity as mortgagee and a suit against him for the recovery of the property is within this Article.⁴

The term "mortgagee" in this Article includes any person who has acquired the rights of a mortgagee,⁵ by assignment,⁶ subrogation⁷ or otherwise.⁸

Where a third person who has no interest in the equity of redemption voluntarily pays off a mortgage, he cannot thereby obtain the rights of the mortgagee, and if on paying off the mortgage he gets into possession of the mortgaged property, his possession is only that of a stranger and not that of a mortgagee and a suit against him for the recovery of the property will not be governed by this Article.⁹ But, in a recent case,¹⁰ the Madras High Court has held that where a person, though not having any interest in the equity of redemption, pays off a mortgage in the *bona fide* belief that he is entitled to the equity of redemption, he is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee and a suit against such a person will be within this Article.

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 828 (830) : 101 Ind Cas 549, *Dattu Mal v. Ilahi Baksh*. (Article applies to *lekha mukhs mortgages*.)

nt Raghol-

Campbell
emption of

English mortgage.)

4. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 289 (290, 291) : 35 Mad 114, *Tirumal Raju v. Pandla Muthial Naidu*.

5. (1879) 2 Mad 226 (227, 228), *Ammu v. Ramakrishna Sastri*.

6. (1887) 9 All 97 (102) : 1886 All W N 303, *Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 350 (351) : 44 Bom 614 : 57 Ind Cas 568, *Taramiya Pirsahed v. Shabeilsahed Fakirsahed*.

(1873) 21 Suth W R 13 (13), *Jeechoo Sahoo v. Syud Mussevoollah*.

(1892) 15 Mad 831 (832), *Arumuga v. Chockalingam*.

7. (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 60 (61) : 160 Ind Cas 933, *Ram Dayal Sen v. Chakrapani Nandi*. (Puisne mortgagee paying off prior mortgage.)

8. (1925) A I R 1925 Sind 167 (170) : 79 Ind Cas 466 : 19 Sind L R 268, *Mahomed Moosa v. Kasu Fatehullah*. (Auction-purchaser of interest of mortgagee purchasing under *bona fide* belief that he is purchasing full title only gets rights of a mortgagee and this Article applies to suit against him.)

9. (1924) A I R 1924 All 834 (836) : 78 Ind Cas 1026, *Bijai Bahadur v. Parmeshwari Ram*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 303 (309) : 161 Ind Cas 999, *Veetil Kelu v. Chekkara Chappan*.

See also Note 35 to Article 144.

[But see (1883) 1883 Pun Re No. 121, *Azim v. Mahmud*. (The view taken in this case that the stranger becomes an assignee of the mortgagee interest, is, it is submitted, not correct.)]

10. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 451 (455) : 172 Ind Cas 47, *Veetil Kelu v. Chekkara Chappan*.

[See also (1912) 16 Ind Cas 27 (28) (Mad), *Raylu Patter v. Annakutti Mannadiar*.]

In the undermentioned case¹¹ it was held by the Bombay High Court that if a stranger pays off a mortgage *with the knowledge and consent of the mortgagor*, such stranger acquires a *lien* on the mortgaged property and that so long as such lien remains enforceable by a suit under Article 132 *supra*, the possession of the *lienor* will not be adverse to the mortgagor but such possession will be adverse to the mortgagor from the expiry of the period of limitation under Article 132. It is submitted that the view that the possession of the *lienor* becomes adverse to the mortgagor as soon as a suit to enforce the lien becomes time-barred under Article 132 is not correct. The possession of the *lienor* cannot change its character merely because limitation for a suit to enforce the lien has expired, in the same way as the possession of a mortgagee does not become adverse to the mortgagor merely because the period of limitation for a suit to enforce the mortgage has expired. (See Note 28 to Article 144.)

3. Redeeming co-mortgagor, position of.—Before the amendment of Section 93 of the Transfer of Property Act by Act 20 of 1929, there was a conflict of decisions as to the position of a co-mortgagor who redeems a mortgage and as to the period of limitation applicable to a suit by the other co-mortgagors for the recovery of their shares of the property which the redeeming co-mortgagor takes possession of on redemption. The decisions fall into three groups :

1. According to the *first* set of decisions, the redeeming co-mortgagor steps into the shoes of the mortgagee¹ and a suit against such redeeming co-mortgagor is governed by this Article.^{1a}
2. According to the *second* set of decisions, the redeeming co-mortgagor acquires only a *charge* on the shares of the

11 (1911) 12 Ind Cas 362 (363) . 35 Bom 438, *Sambu Hanumanta Kodal v. Nana Narayan*

Note 3

1. (1894) 16 All 254 (255) ; 1894 All W N 72, *Gobardhan v. Sujan*
(1892) 14 All 1 (2) ; 1891 All W N 211 11 All 423 (F B), *Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali*.
[See (1910) 5 Ind Cas 123 (123) . 32 All 100, *Saiduddin Khan v. Ratan Lal*.
(1892) 15 Mad 331 (332), *Arumuga v. Chokalingam*.]
- 1a. (1929) A I R 1929 All 100 (101), 113 Ind Cas 632, *Shiam Lal v. Mt. Hukum Kuar*.
(1922) A I R 1923 All 410 (410) 77 Ind Cas 113, *Surat Singh v. Umrao Singh*.
(1918) A I R 1918 All 386 (387) 40 All 683 47 Ind Cas 533, *Wazir Ali v. Ali Islam*
(1916) A I R 1916 All 201 (202) 38 All 540 . 36 Ind Cas 452, *Khwaiz Raza v. Taib Ram*
(1889) 11 All 423 (437, 438) 14 All 1 1891 All W N 211 (F B), *Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali*
(1886) 8 All 295 (300) . 1886 All W N 98, *Nura Bibi v. Jajai Narain*.
(1886) 1886 All W N 152 (152), *Raghubar Sahai v. Bungad Ali*
(1885) 1885 All W N 300 (300), *Ram Singh v. Baldeo Singh*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Nag 300 (301) 27 Nag L R 152 127 Ind Cas 529, *Jai Ram v. Bhilaji*

3. (1912) 15 Ind Cas 500 (503) (Bom), *Bhaiji Shamrao v. Hafimya Mahamad*.
(1891) 16 Bom 191 (196) : 1891 Bom P J 123, *Faki Abas v. Faki Nurudin*.
(1885) 1885 All W N 51 (52), *Karumdad Khan v. Fausan Bibi*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 357 (359) : 52 Ind Cas 875, *Sheo Ganga Balsh Singh v. Ranjit Singh*.
(1920) 2 Lah L Jour 160, *Shahabuddin v. Kasam Ali Khan*.
(1911) 9 Ind Cas 572 (574) : 33 All 463, *Jagdis Narain Singh v. Dillar Singh*.
[See (1893) 7 Mad 26 (28) : 1 Weir 610, *Chathu Nair v. Aku*.
(1886) 11 Bom 422 (425), *Ramchandra Fashwant v. Sadashio Abaji*.

Hence, a suit against such co-mortgagor by any of the other co-mortgagors for the recovery of his share of the property on paying the proportionate amount due from him will be a suit against a *mortgagee* within the meaning of this Article and as such will be governed by this Article.⁴

Where a usufructuary mortgage is satisfied out of the rents and profits of the property, and thereafter the property is taken possession of by one of several co-mortgagors, his position is not that of a co-mortgagor who has redeemed the mortgage, and so a suit by the other co-mortgagors for the recovery of their shares from him is not governed by this Article.⁵

In some decisions, though Article 148 has been applied to the suit against a redeeming co-mortgagor by the other co-mortgagors, the starting point of limitation has been held to be the date of the redemption of the mortgage by the defendant.⁶ It is obvious that such a view is incorrect inasmuch as the starting point of limitation under this Article is the date when the right to redeem the mortgage accrues, so that, in the case of a suit against a co-mortgagor who has redeemed a mortgage, limitation under the Article will begin to run from the date when the right to redeem the mortgage accrued and not from the date when the defendant co-mortgagor paid off such mortgage and became subrogated to it.⁷

(1913) 20 Ind Cas 580 (581) : 16 Oudh Cas 163, *Muhamad Taqi v. Muhamad Baqar*.]

4 (1934) A I R 1934 All 946 (947) 153 Ind Cas 664, *Narottam Das v. Sanical Dass*

(1933) A I R 1933 All 223 (229) 144 Ind Cas 152, *Ahmad Zaman Khan v. Daldeo Das*.

(1939) A I R 1939 Oudh 127 (137, 131) 174 Ind Cas 714 (F B), *Kundanlal v. Sheikh Faqir Baksh*

The contrary view taken in the following cases is not correct

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 91 (92) 141 Ind Cas 404, *Mt. Radha v. Ajudhia Prashad*

(1936) A I R 1936 Lah 290 (291) 159 Ind Cas 633, *Mohammad Ali v. Ghulam Nabi*

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 744 (745) 12 Lah 671 135 Ind Cas 506, *Jhandu v. Nur Mahomed*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Bom 114 (117) 57 Bom 131 141 Ind Cas 8, *Ramchandra Khoserao v. Ganesh Balwant*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Rang 65 (67) 176 Ind Cas 923, *Ma F. Khin v. P. S. Mohamed Ali*

(1931) 132 Ind Cas 261 (262) (Oudh), *Ram Agre v. Ramuddi*

5 (1913) 20 Ind Cas 580 (581) 16 Oudh Cas 163, *Muhamad Taqi v. Muhamad Baqar*

(1897) 20 All 182 (184) 1893 All W N 19, *Inayat Husen v. Ali Hussain*

(1894) 16 All 254 (255) 1894 All W N 72, *Gobardhan v. Sujan*

6. (1930) A I R 1930 Nag 300 (304) 27 Nag L R 152 127 Ind Cas 889, *Jairam v. Bhilaji*.

7. (1889) 14 All 1 (2) 11 All 423 1891 All W N 211 (F B), *Ashfaq Ahmad v. Wazir Ali*

(1916) A I R 1916 All 201 (202) 36 Ind Cas 452 33 All 540, *Khalid Ram v. Taib Ram*

(1922) A I R 1922 All 410 (410) 77 Ind Cas 113, *Surat Singh v. Umrao Singh*

Article 148 Note 4

4. Adverse possession by mortgagee against mortgagor. — This Article only applies where the suit is against a mortgagee as such. Where the mortgagee is not entitled as such to the possession of the mortgaged property but enters into possession without title, the suit against him for the recovery of the property will not be within this Article.

A mortgagee who has entered into possession of the mortgaged property as mortgagee cannot, during the subsistence of the mortgage, convert the nature of his possession into that of a full owner, merely by asserting his absolute title to the property.¹ Nor does a mere order in mutation proceedings entering the name of the mortgagee

Note 4

1. (1905) 32 Cal 296 (312) : 32 Ind App 23 : 9 Cal W N 201 : 2 All L Jour 71 : 7 Bom L R 1 : 1 Cal L Jour 584 : 8 Sar 784 (P C), *Khairajmal v. Davn*

(1923) A I R 1923 All 613 (613) : 74 Ind Cas 830, *Baghunath Singh v. Jetto Singh*.

(1915) A I R 1915 All 203 (206) : 29 Ind Cas 408, *Panna Lal v. Rameshar Sahai*.

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 999 (1000) (All), *Gandharp Singh v. Harikishna*.

(1908) 1908 All W N 1 (2) : 4 All L Jour 787 : 3 Mad L Tim 182, *Jhapa Lal v. Chajju Mal*.

(1875) 7 N W P H C R 220 (222) (F B), *Sheopal v. Khadim Hossein*.

(1806) 21 Bom 793 (796), *Pandu v. Anpurna*

(1889) 14 Bom 279 (281) : 1889 Bom P J 311, *Dhagvant Govind v. Konds Mahadu*.

(1868) 10 Suth W R 219 (220), *Ajoodhya Pershad v. Esharee Dyal*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Lah 540 (550) : 95 Ind Cas 9, *Jiwan Singh v. Ghanita*.

(1908) 1908 Pan Re No. 28 : 1908 Pan W R No. 41 : 1908 Pan L R No. 141, *Balwant Singh v. Ramdas*.

(1882) 1882 Pan Re No. 49, *Teju Mal v. Zulfakar Shah*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 16 (18) : 109 Ind Cas 795, *Randaswamy Mudahar v. Ponnuswami Mudahar*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 578 (579) : 37 Mad 545 : 16 Ind Cas 694, *Usuman Khan v. Nagalla Dasanna*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 489 (493) : 15 Ind Cas 343 (346) : 37 Mad 423, *Ariya Puthira Padayachi v. Muthukumaraswami Padayachi*.

(1902) 25 Mad 507 (511) : 12 Mad L Jour 119, *Seshamma Shettati v. Chikaya Hegade*.

(1900) 25 Mad 189 (189) : 25 Mad L Jour 119, *Seshamma Shettati v. Chikaya Hegade*.

Mirza v. Ahmad Shah

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 517 (518) : 95 Ind Cas 649, *Niranhar Prasad v. Mt. Bechai*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 491 (492) : 93 Ind Cas 832, *Bajrang Bali v. Mt. Mahraja*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 124 (125) : 21 Oudh Cas 155 : 63 Ind Cas 284, *Mahendra Bahadur Singh v. Chandrapal Singh*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 302 (301) : 23 Oudh Cas 269 : 60 Ind Cas 404, *Talak Chand v. Shambhu Singh*.

(1912) 14 Ind Cas 684 (585) : 15 Oudh Cas 39, *Amir Ali v. Niaz Ali*.

as proprietor change the character of his possession.² But it has been held that a decree of a Settlement Court declaring the mortgagee to be the owner of the property has the effect of altering the character of his possession so as to take out of the purview of this Article the mortgagor's suit for the recovery of the property.³

The mere fact that a mortgage has been discharged out of the usufruct of the property or otherwise, does not alter the character of the possession of the mortgagee (who continues in possession after such discharge) and make the possession one held as owner and not as mortgagee.⁴ So also, the continuance in possession of a mortgagee

Article 148
Note 4

(1911) 11 Ind Cas 853 (853) (Low Bur), *Mg. Shue Paung v. Maung On*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 512 (513) : 97 Ind Cas 348, 6 Pat 102, *Dinannth Rai v. Rama Rai*.

(1926) 93 Ind Cas 934 (934) (Lah), *Jowahar v. Amar Chand*.

[See also (1863) 1 Mad II C R 146 (147), *Pudiyakovslagalla v. Allu-nannalatta Kadamm*

(1889) 18 Mad 89 (40), *Rairu Nayar v. Moidin* (When a mortgage was in fact for Rs 62, the mortgagee cannot by merely asserting for over twelve years that the mortgage was for a larger amount acquire a prescriptive right to hold as a mortgagee for the larger amount by alleging the renewal of the mortgage deed)]

2. (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 594 (600) 97 Ind Cas 922 1 Luck 529, *Achche Mirza v. Akwad Shah*

(1923) 72 Ind Cas 989 (993) (Pesh), *Ghulam Haider Shah v. David Shah*.

(1925) A I R 1925 All 34 (35) : 80 Ind Cas 944, *Ram Ganesh Ras v. Rup Narain Rai*.

(1929) 120 Ind Cas 789 (790) (Lah), *Godar v. Nizamdin*.

[But see (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 197 (198) : 48 Ind Cas 447, *Ram*

proprietary body of the village and mutation was effected in his favour, without any objection from the proprietary body—Held that the possession of the mortgagee became adverse to the proprietary body of the village from the date of the mutation)]

3. (1904) 7 Oudh Cas 259 (263, 264), *Dasawan Singh v. Nawab Badshah Bahau Begam*

(1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 802 (804) : 23 Oudh Cas 269 : 60 Ind Cas 404, *Tilak Chand v. Shambu Singh*.

4. (1883) 1883 All W N 202 (202), *Kedar Nath v. Ulfat Rai*

(1926) A I R 1926 Bom 40 (42) 49 Bom 847 91 Ind Cas 349, *Rachappa Chandasappa v. Nengappa*

(1926) A I R 1926 All 136 (138) 89 Ind Cas 574, *Mt. Beta Das v. Tanya Singh*

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 15 (16) 56 Cal 1180 121 Ind Cas 407, *Harant Golder v. Jaladhar Biswas*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 910 (912) 94 Ind Cas 342, *Keshab Lal v. Dholanath*.

(1910) 7 Ind Cas 385 (386) 83 All 97, *Sudarshan Das v. Ram Pershad*.

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 968 (964) 84 All 261, *Haberbullah v. Abdul Hamid*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 13 (14, 15) 140 Ind Cas 159, *Ram Bahksh Singh v. Ganga Pal Singh*

(1919) 37 Mad L Jour (N R C) 6 (6).

(1924) A I R 1924 All 522 (522) 83 Ind Cas 740 *Gorind Ram v. Ram Keer*

[But see (1924) 46 Mad L Jour (N R C) 80 (80) (When mortgagee after redemption refuses to give up possession, the nature of his possession is altered and thereafter he sets up title as owner to the knowledge of the mortgagor and a suit for possession must be filed within twelve years of the date on which the nature of defendant's possession was altered)]

Article 148 Note 4

4. Adverse possession by mortgagee against mortgagor. —

This Article only applies where the suit is against a mortgagee as *such*. Where the mortgagee is not entitled as such to the possession of the mortgaged property but enters into possession without title, the suit against him for the recovery of the property will not be within this Article.

A mortgagee who has entered into possession of the mortgaged property as *mortgagee* cannot, during the subsistence of the mortgage, convert the nature of his possession into that of a full owner, merely by asserting his absolute title to the property.¹ Nor does a mere order in mutation proceedings entering the name of the mortgagee

Note 4

1. (1905) 32 Cal 296 (312) : 32 Ind App 23 : 9 Cal W N 201 : 2 All L Jour 71 : 7 Bom L R 1 . 1 Cal L Jour 584 : 8 Sar 784 (P C), *Khairajmal v. Daim*.

Ram Narain Singh.

- (1923) A I R 1923 All 613 (618) : 74 Ind Cas 830, *Raghunath Singh v. Jetto Singh*.

- (1915) A I R 1915 All 203 (206) : 29 Ind Cas 403, *Panna Lal v. Rameshar Sahai*.

- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 999 (1000) (All), *Gandharp Singh v. Harikishna*.

- (1908) 1908 All W N 1 (2) . 4 All L Jour 787 . 8 Mad L Tim 182, *Jhaba Lal v. Chafju Mal*.

- (1875) 7 N W P H C R 220 (222) (F B), *Sheopal v. Khadim Hossein*.

- (1896) 21 Bom 793 (796), *Pandu v. Anpurna*.

- (1889) 14 Bom 279 (281) : 1889 Bom P J 311, *Dhagvant Govind v. Konda Mahadu*.

- (1868) 10 Suth W R 219 (220), *Afoodhya Pershad v. Esharee Dyal*.

- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 549 (550) : 95 Ind Cas 9, *Jivan Singh v. Ghasia*.

- (1908) 1908 Pun Re No. 28 : 1908 Pun W R No. 41 : 1908 Pun L R No. 141, *Balwant Singh v. Ramdas*

- (1882) 1882 Pun Re No. 49, *Teju Mal v. Zulfakar Shah*.

- (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 16 (18) : 109 Ind Cas 795, *Kandaswamy Mudaliar v. Ponnuswami Mudaliar*.

- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 578 (579) . 37 Mad 545 : 16 Ind Cas 694, *Usuman Khan v. Nagalla Dasanna*.

- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 489 (493) : 15 Ind Cas 343 (346) : 37 Mad 423, *Ariya Puthiya Padayachi v. Muthukumaraswami Padayachi*.

- (1902) 25 Mad 507 (511) : 12 Mad L Jour 119, *Seshamma Shettlati v. Chickaya Hegade*.

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- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 517 (518) . 95 Ind Cas 840, *Niranhar Prasad v. Mt. Bechas*

- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 491 (492) . 92 Ind Cas 832, *Dajrang Bali v. Mt. Mahraya*.

- (1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 124 (125) . 24 Oudh Cas 155 : 63 Ind Cas 284, *Mahendra Bahadur Singh v. Chandrapal Singh*.

- (1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 302 (304) : 23 Oudh Cas 269 : 60 Ind Cas 404, *Talok Chand v. Shambhu Singh*.

- (1912) 14 Ind Cas 584 (585) . 15 Oudh Cas 89, *Amir Ali v. Nasir Ali*.

5. Invalid transfer of equity of redemption to mortgagee — Effect.—For a full discussion on the subject, see Note 28 to Article 142 *ante*. Suppose the mortgagor transfers or relinquishes in favour of the mortgagee the equity of redemption and such transfer or relinquishment is invalid and inoperative, is the mortgagee's possession from the date of such attempted transfer in his character as mortgagee or under a claim of full ownership? On this question, there is a conflict of decisions. The generally accepted view is that though the transfer may fail to vest the equity of redemption in the mortgagor, the possession of the mortgagee from the date of the transfer will be not in his character as mortgagee but under a claim of full ownership, so as to take out of the purview of this Article the suit by the mortgagor for the recovery of the property from the mortgagee.¹ This view proceeds on the ground that the parties to a mortgage can agree as to what the character of the possession held

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 305 (314, 315) . 123 Ind Cas 591 : 53 Mad 805, *Ambu Nair v. Kelu Nair* (Suit for possession by usufructuary mortgagee—Rajinama decree granting possession to mortgagee and providing *inter alia* that mortgagor after depositing mortgage money should get possession of properties from mortgagee failing which mortgagee to continue in possession as mortgagee — If possession is not delivered

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 407 (408) : 70 Ind Cas 33, *Omayurupagam Mutt v. Sivasoria Theroan*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Sind 145 (148) 91 Ind Cas 87 : 20 Sind L R 277, *Sullemann Hashim v. Esso* (Mortgagee taking possession as mortgagee, but wrongfully—Still his possession is only as mortgagee)

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 478 (479) (Mad), *Sangamma Naicker v. Ramaswamy Naicker* (Mortgagor's claim in a prior suit to declare the mortgage bad does not enable mortgagee to prescribe to the mortgaged property from mortgage date—His second suit to redeem mortgage not barred under Article 144, Limitation Act, 1877)

(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 366 (368) . 73 Ind Cas 475, *Shujauddin v. Sher Mohamed* (Co-mortgagee redeeming another co-mortgagee — His possession does not become adverse against mortgagor)

Note 5

1. (1928) A I R 1928 All 726 (730) 50 All 986 118 Ind Cas 177 (F B), *Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 16 (18, 19) 109 Ind Cas 795, *Kandasami Mudaliar v. Ponnusami Mudaliar*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 213 (214, 216) 63 Ind Cas 215, *Munjadu v. Gopala Reddy*

(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 82 (83, 84, 85) 44 Mad 233 62 Ind Cas 603, *Kandasami Pillai v. Chinnappa*

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 811 (815, 816) 31 Ind Cas 678, *Gerundu v. Mallappa*

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 578 (579, 580) 37 Mad 545 16 Ind Cas 191, *Cernan Khan v. Nagalla Dasanna*

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 145 (145) . 90 Ind Cas 726, *Ilad Ali v. In arala*

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 385 (386) 57 Ind Cas 188, *Shro Nath v. Thwin Lal Ram*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 124 (125) 24 Oudh Cas 155 63 Ind Cas 281, *Mohendra Bahadur Singh v. Chandrapal Singh*.

Article 148
Note 5

by the mortgagee should be from a certain date.² But the contrary view has been held in certain decisions,³ according to which the invalid transfer can have no effect on the character of the mortgagee's possession which therefore is only possession held as mortgagee in spite of such transfer, and so the suit against the mortgagee for the recovery of the property will be governed by this Article notwithstanding the attempted transfer of the equity of redemption to the mortgagee.

A mere contract to sell the equity of redemption in favour of a usufructuary mortgagee will not be sufficient to alter the character of the possession of the mortgagee.^{3a}

Where the mortgagee obtains a transfer of the equity of redemption from a third party who is not authorized to transfer it, the mortgagee's possession is not affected by such transfer and continues to be only a possession held as mortgagee.⁴ Hence, notwithstanding such transfer, a suit against the mortgagee for the possession of the property will only be a suit against a mortgagee and therefore, will be governed by this Article. On this principle, where there are several co-mortgagors and the equity of redemption in the mortgage is transferred to the mortgagee by one of the co-mortgagors, the possession of the mortgagee as regards the other co-mortgagors is only that of a mortgagee and a suit by such co-mortgagors will be governed by this Article.⁵ A contrary view, however, has been taken

2. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 578 (579) : 16 Ind Cas 694 (695) : 87 Mad 545, *Usman Khan v. Nagalla Dasanna*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 7 (10) : 67 Ind Cas 572 : 25 Oudh Cas 115, *Bijai Parlab Singh v. Raghuraj Singh*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 566 (567) : 87 Ind Cas 331, *Sheikh Dawood v. Mohi-udeen Balcha*.

3. (1912) 13 Ind Cas 852 (853) (Lab), *Lehna Singh v. Santa Singh*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 573 (574, 575) : 39 Mad 1158 : 25 Ind Cas 772, *Muthukaruppan v. Muthu Samban*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 489 (493) : 15 Ind Cas 343 (346) : 37 Mad 423, *Aryaputhira Padayachi v. Muthukumarasami Padayachi*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Nag 33 (36) : 46 Ind Cas 672, *Awdh Singh v. Nanhai*.

3a (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 114 (115) : 82 Ind Cas 406 : 28 Oudh Cas 100, *Silla Sahai v. Dhum Singh*.

4. (1907) 29 All 640 (647) : 1907 All W N 221 : 4 All L Jour 521, *Muzaffar Ali Khan v. Pardats*.

(1878) 1 All 655 (658, 659), *Ali Mohammad v. Lalita Bulsh*.

(1897) 21 Bom 793 (796), *Pandu Lakshman v. Anupurna*.

(1910) A I R 1910 Lah 336 (337) : 32 Ind Cas 961, *Abdul Aziz Khan v. Kale Shah*.

(1912) 14 Ind Cas 584 (585) : 15 Oudh Cas 39, *Amir Ali v. Niaz Ali*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Lah 753 (756) : 163 Ind Cas 506, *Sher Mohammad Khan v. Chuhr Shah*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Lah 30 (31) : 113 Ind Cas 540, *Din Mohammad v. Safdar Ali*.

[But see (1924) 46 Mad L Jour 82 (83) (N R C). {Submitted not correct.}]

5. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 264 (265) (Bom), *Hanmantha Yamaaji v. Gopal Sadashiv*.

in the undermentioned cases.⁶ It is submitted that such a view is not correct on principle.

Where the equity of redemption under a mortgage is transferred to the mortgagee by a person alleged to be the adopted son of the mortgagor, after the latter's death, and such alleged adoption is void, the rightful heir of the mortgagor can sue for redemption of the mortgage within the period of sixty years given by this Article, although he has not sued within the period of six years under Article 118 *supra* for a declaration that the adoption is invalid.⁷

Where the equity of redemption under a mortgage is sold to the mortgagee by the guardian of a minor mortgagor, the latter must, if he means to impeach the sale, sue to set it aside within three years of his attaining majority (see Article 44). If he fails to do so, he cannot thereafter sue to redeem the property within the longer period conferred by this Article.⁸

6. Invalid foreclosure proceedings — Effect. — Where a mortgagee, not being entitled to possession under the mortgage, takes possession of the mortgaged property as a result of foreclosure proceedings which are invalid, the possession of the mortgagee will not be in his character as mortgagee but under a claim of ownership and hence, a suit against him for the recovery of the property will not be governed by this Article.¹ But, where a mortgagee is already in possession as mortgagee, the fact that subsequent proceedings are instituted for foreclosure of the mortgage (which proceedings turn

(1923) A I R 1923 Lah 74 (74) . 68 Ind Cas 733, *Amir v. Nadir Ali*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Lah 924 (925) 160 Ind Cas 557, *Nauab v. Lachhman Singh*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 20 (20) . 44 Bom 848 58 Ind Cas 39, *Katu Deoba v. Rupchand Kishandas*.

[See also (1909) 5 Ind Cas 123 (124) 32 All 160, *Saiduddin Khan v. Rafan Lal*. (Purchase in execution of one co-mortgagor's interest—Possession of mortgagee not adverse to the other co-mortgagor.)]

6. (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 50 (52) . 25 Oudh Cas 245 : 70 Ind Cas 983, *Janla Shah v. Mohammad Abbas*

(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 1 (1) 67 Ind Cas 219, *Idhrani Gulam Husain v. Mohideen Balku Modat*

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 182 (183) 80 Ind Cas 502, *Ram Chhore Lalsh v. Ram Surat*

7. (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 336 (337) 32 Ind Cas 961, *Abdul Aziz Khan v. Kala Shah*

8. (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 619 (620) 87 Ind Cas 602 6 Lah 417, *Labha Mai v. Malat Ram*

(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 1 (6, 7) 44 Bom 742 . 58 Ind Cas 257 (F B), *Falharappa Limanna v. Mahadu Lumanna*.

Note 6

1 (1928) A I R 1928 All 197 (198) 114 Ind Cas 187, *Luchi Rai v. Jajarnath Sahu*.

(1926) 93 Ind Cas 934 (935) (Lah), *Jauhar v. Amar Chand*

(1911) 11 Ind Cas 429 (431) (Lah), *Jawa Khan v. Lakhmi Chand*.

Article 148
Notes
6—7

out to be invalid), will not convert the possession into one held as full owner.² Hence, a suit against the mortgagee for the possession of the property will be governed only by this Article notwithstanding the foreclosure proceedings.

7. Mortgage providing that on default of mortgagor in paying the mortgage money within a fixed term, he should become absolute owner of the property — Effect. — Notwithstanding a condition in a mortgage deed that on default of the mortgagor in paying the mortgage money (or interest) within a stipulated period, the mortgagee should become the absolute owner of the property, the mortgage does not come to an end on such default by the mortgagor and the possession of the mortgagee (where he is in possession) is only that of a mortgagee even after such default.¹ But where in pursuance of such a clause in the mortgage deed the mortgagor himself consents that the mortgagee should hold the property as owner from a certain date, and the mortgagee accordingly begins to hold the property as owner, his possession will not be that of a mortgagee but under a claim of full ownership.² The reason suggested is that it is open to the parties to a mortgage to agree what the character of possession to be held by the mortgagee should be from a certain date.³ In such a case, though the mortgagor's consent in the absence of a transfer of the equity of a redemption to the mortgagee cannot confer on the latter full title to the property, yet,

(1925) A I R 1925 Lah 53 (54) : 79 Ind Cas 89, *Munna Lal v. Hamid Ali*.

2. (1895) 23 Cal 228 (238, 237) : 22 Ind App 183 : 5 Mad L Jour 261 : 6 Sar 649 (P O), *Kishore Mohun Roy v. Ganga Bahu Debi*.

[See also (1903) 1903 Pan Re No. 65 : 1903 Pan L R No. 90 : 1903 Pan W R No. 113, *Indar v. Asa Singh*. (Mortgage by conditional sale—Invalid foreclosure proceedings—Mutation of names in mortgagee's favour—No adverse possession.)]

Note 7

1. (1872) 9 Bom H O R 79 (83), *Krishnaji alias Babaji Keshav v. Ravji Sadashiv*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Bom 146 (148) : 43 Bom 863 : 53 Ind Cas 164, *Bai Kanhu v. Bai Jadav*.

• (1872) 9 Bom H O R 69 (72, 76), *Shankarbai Chulabhai v. Kassi Bhas Vithalbai*.

• (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 71 (72) : 68 Ind Cas 883, *Zora v. Chandu*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Lah 850 (352) : 1914 Pan Re No. 94 : 22 Ind Cas 837, *Bulak Mal v. Duns Chand*.

2. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 578 (579) : 16 Ind Cas 694 (695, 696) : 37 Mad 545, *Usman Khan v. Nagalla Dasanna*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 133 (134) : 68 Ind Cas 223 : 25 Oudh Cas 63, *Dashir Hussain v. Chandra Pal Singh*.

[See also (1924) A I R 1924 Rang 290 (201) : 82 Ind Cas 829, *Mg. San Chrin v. Ma Daung U*. (Mortgagee holding land as owner to knowledge of mortgagor—Mortgagee's possession is adverse to mortgagor.)]

3. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 578 (579) : 16 Ind Cas 694 (695) : 37 Mad 545, *Uruman Khan v. Nagalla Dasanna*.

the mortgagee will acquire such title by prescription if he continues in possession for a period of twelve years under the claim of full ownership. (See Note 28 to Article 142 *ante*)

Article 148

Notes

7—9

In the undermentioned case,⁴ a mortgage provided that in case the mortgagor failed to pay the mortgage money within a certain date, the mortgagee should *take* possession of the mortgaged property in his own right. On the expiry of the fixed term, the mortgagee took possession of the property. It was held that the possession of the mortgagee was not in his capacity as mortgagee but in assertion of his full ownership to the property and so, a suit against him for the recovery of the property from him was not governed by this Article.

See also Note 5 above.

8. Mortgagee purchasing mortgaged property in contravention of Order 34 Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code — Effect. — Where a mortgagee purchases the mortgaged property in execution of a money decree for the mortgage debt, such sale is invalid under Order 34 Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code. As observed in *Khairajmal v. Daim*,¹ such a sale cannot relieve the mortgagee of his obligations as mortgagee or deprive the mortgagor of his right to redeem. But such a sale is not void. It is only liable to be *set aside* at the instance of the mortgagor. Hence, unless the sale is set aside by an application made within the period prescribed by Art. 166 *infra*, the sale would be binding on the mortgagor and he cannot thereafter sue to redeem the mortgage, ignoring the sale.² Where, however, the mortgagor gets the sale set aside by a proper application as above, the parties will continue as mortgagor and mortgagee and the mortgagor can sue for redeeming the property from the mortgagee within the period of limitation provided by this Article.

9. Void mortgage — Person entering into possession under such mortgage. — Where a mortgage is void, the possession of the mortgagee who enters into possession of the mortgaged property under such void mortgage is adverse to the mortgagor.³ A suit by the mortgagor for the recovery of the property against such mortgagee (on the ground of the latter being merely a trespassor) will not be within this Article. Such a suit must be brought within twelve years

4. (1882) 1882 All W N 84 (85), *Dhola v. Ajudhya Prasad*.

Note 8

1. (1904) 32 Cal 296 (316) : 32 Ind App 23 : 9 Cal W N 201 : 2 All L Jour 71 : 7 Bom L R 1 : 1 Cal L Jour 584 : 8 Sar 734 (P C).

2. (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 363 (366) : 55 Ind Cas 157 : 47 Cal 377 (F B), *Uttam Chandra v. Raj Krishna*.

Note 9

1. [But see (1926) A I R 1926 All 532 (552) : 117 Ind Cas 831, *Mt. Raj Rani v. Gulab*. (The proposition in this case that the possession of the mortgagee in such cases is not adverse is not correct.)]

Article 148
Notes
9—10

from the mortgagee entering into possession.² But a person who enters into possession of a property under a void mortgage can prescribe only for a mortgagee's title to such property and not for an absolute title.³ Hence, even after the expiry of twelve years from his entering into possession, although he cannot be ejected as a trespasser, a suit can be brought against him as a mortgagee within the longer period of limitation provided by this Article.⁴

Where a person is let into possession under a void mortgage and subsequently, within the period of twelve years from his entering into possession, the property is sold to him under a void deed of sale, his possession from the date of the sale becomes one held as owner and hence, he prescribes for a full title from such sale.⁵

A mortgage of vatan property by a vatandar is valid during his lifetime but is not hindring on his successors. Where a mortgagee from a vatandar enters into possession under the mortgage and continues to be in possession after the vatandar's death, it has been held that the mortgagee's possession is adverse to the successors of the vatandar from the latter's death; but the mortgagee acquires by such adverse possession against the successors, only the title of a mortgagee.⁶ As to correctness of this view, see Note 61 to Article 142 ante.

10. Extinction of mortgage by decree or order of Court. —
The mere fact that a decree for redemption has been passed against

2. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 300 (301) : 1 Lah 540 : 50 Ind Cas 478, *Shah Nawas v. Sheikh Ahmad*.
3. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 292 (294) : 47 Mad 203 : 70 Ind Cas 510, *Appamma v. Chinnaveedu*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 720 (720) : 80 Ind Cas 561, *Aiyisa Biri Ammal v. Kalandarsa Routhar*.
(1912) 16 Ind Cas 960 (960, 961) (Mad), *Sundara Gurulal v. Subramania Archakar*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 115 (116) : 118 Ind Cas 57, *Sukhlal v. Bisesar*.
4. (1927) A I R 1927 All 311 (314) : 100 Ind Cas 316, *Maha Mangal Rai v. Kishun Kandu*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 410 (411 412) : 44 Mad 946 : 64 Ind Cas 323, *Sontynagopala Dasee v. Inaputalapula Rami*.
(1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 116 (117) : 20 Oudh Cas 203 : 41 Ind Cas 862, *Bihari v. Adya Nath*.
(1930) 123 Ind Cas 195 (197) (Mad), *Sayyapureddy Abbayya v. Sayam Appanna*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 63 (65) : 160 Ind Cas 1066, *Baj Nath Prasad v. Muneshwar Singh*.
(1932) A I R 1932 All 239 (260) : 140 Ind Cas 42, *Halka v. Nannhon*.
5. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 720 (721) : 80 Ind Cas 561, *Aiyisa Biri Ammal v. Kalandarsa Routhar*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 1020 (1020, 1021) : 86 Ind Cas 433, *Aiyisa Biri Ammal v. Kalandarsa Routhar*.
[But see (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 377 (377) : 93 Ind Cas 955, *Dutchi Raju v. Seetharamayya*.]
- 6 (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 131 (131) : 29 Bom 587 : 30 Ind Cas 390, *Ramchandra Venkaji v. Kollo Decji*.

a mortgagee does not alter his character as mortgagee and a second suit for redemption against him (assuming such a suit to be maintainable) is only a suit against a *mortgagee* and so is governed by this Article.¹

11. Effect of proceedings under Bengal Regulation, 17 of 1806. — See the undermentioned cases.¹

12. Abandonment of land by mortgagor.—Where a mortgagor sues for the redemption of the mortgaged land within the period of limitation prescribed by this Article, the suit is maintainable although the land had previously been abandoned by the plaintiff.¹

13. Adverse possession by a stranger.—See Notes 84 and 85 under Article 142, *ante*.

14. "To redeem or to recover possession." — See Note 1a above. Where a dispute as to the amount due on a mortgage is referred to arbitration and the arbitrators decide what the amount is and also that the mortgagees should be in possession for a certain number of years, a suit for redemption by enforcing the award

Note 10

1. (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 300 (300, 301) : 47 Bom 692 : 72 Ind Cas 556, *Hanmantha v. Shidu Sambhu*,
(1892) 15 Ind 866 (370, 371), *Ramunni v. Brahma Dattan*,
(1909) 4 Ind Cas 939 (940) (Lab), *Mohan v. Dialu*,
(1918) A I R 1918 Bom 1 (12) : 49 Ind Cas 894 : 43 Bom 334 & 477 (F B),
Ramji Bapuji v. Pandharimath Rayji,
[But see (1870) 13 Suth W R 78 (80), *Ram Surun Singh v. Mahomed Amcer*]

Note 11

1. (1914) A I R 1914 All 242 (246) : 25 Ind Cas 611, *Mt. Zashunissa v. Par-*

his suit, the possession of the mortgagee ceased to be that of mortgagee and subsequent suit against him came within Article 141.)

- (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 274 (277) : 72 Ind Cas 121, *Rupaba v. Rodba*.
(Mortgagee issuing notice of foreclosure under the Regulation, but not taking any further proceedings after the year of grace allowed by the notice — Relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee does not change and the subsequent possession of the mortgagee is not adverse to the mortgagor)
- (1900) 1900 Pun L R 167 (169), *Sula Khan v. Nanak Singh*. (Suit for redemption of a mortgage by way of conditional sale — Regulation 17 of 1806 — Irregular proceedings — Effect of — Mortgagor can redeem within period prescribed by Article 148.)

Note 12

1. (1917) A I R 1917 Lah 461 (462) : 36 Ind Cas 221, *Md. Chiragh Shah v. Choghatta*. (No question of abandonment can arise before expiry of limitation in such cases.)

Article 148
Notes
14—18

would be governed by this Article.¹

Where a person is made to sign a document by misrepresentation that it is only a *mortgage* deed, while, in fact, it is a *sale* deed, a suit by such person for the redemption of the mortgage on the ground that the sale under such circumstances is void, is governed by this Article and not by Article 91.² The reason is that a void document need not be set aside and Article 91 does not apply to such cases (see Note 3 to Article 91 *supra*).

See also the undermentioned case.³

15. Claim for surplus profits — Limitation. — See Notes under Article 105, *supra*.

16. Accessions to mortgaged property. — An accession to mortgaged property to which the mortgagor is entitled on redemption is not property *mortgaged*, and hence, the mortgagor's suit for such an accession is not governed by this Article.¹

17. "Immoveable property." — For the meaning of the expression "immoveable property," see Article 3, Note 4; Article 132, Note 19 and Note 6 to Article 142, *supra*.

A grove of *mahua* trees¹ and the right to officiate as priest² have been held to be "immoveable property" for the purpose of this Article.

18. Starting point of limitation. — Subject to the proviso contained in the third column of the Article, the period of limitation under this Article begins to run from the time when the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues.

Note 14

1. (1923) A I R 1923 Rang 103 (109) : 70 Ind Cas 517 : 4 Upp Bur Rul 124, *Maung Ne Dun v. Maung Cho*.
2. (1912) 18 Ind Cas 375 (376) (Upp Bur), *Nga Paw v. Nga Lu Gale*.
8. (1923) A I R 1923 Rang 232 (233, 236) : 76 Ind Cas 624, *Ma Hin Tha v. Ma The Su*. (Law in British Burma prior to introduction of Transfer of Property Act in 1922 — When in the case of a mortgage containing a forfeiture clause the mortgagor offers to redeem the mortgage within the period fixed but the mortgagee refuses redemption and the mortgagor brings a suit for the purpose, the suit may be regarded as one for *specific performance* and limitation for the suit is three years from the date on which redemption was refused.)

Note 16

1. (1917) A I R 1917 Lah 480 (482) : 42 Ind Cas 468, *Khuda Dad Khan v. Girdhars Ram*.

Note 17

1. (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 103 (108) : 81 Ind Cas 650, *Chand v. Sal Naram*.
2. (1893) 10 Cal 78 (74) : 18 Cal L R 263 : 8 Ind Jur 197, *Raghoo Pandey v. Kassy Parey*.
 (See also (1908) 1908 Pun Re No. 24 : 1908 Pun W R No. 96 : 1908 Pun L R No. 163, *Mohan Lal v. Janaki*.)

Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act provides as to when the right to *redeem* a mortgage accrues. The right accrues when the mortgage money has become "due." Before the amendment of the Section by Act 20 of 1929, the word used in the Section was "payable." Nevertheless, it was generally held that when a period was fixed for the payment of mortgage money, the right to redeem accrued only after the expiry of the period and not before,¹ except where there was a special contract providing to the contrary.^{1a} This

Article 148.
Note 18

Note 18

1. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 36 (37) : 36 All 195 : 41 Ind App 84 : 23 Ind Cas 355 (P C), *Bakhtawar Begum v. Husaini Khanum*.
- (1877) 2 Mad 45 (45) : 3 Ind Jur 64, *Keshava v. Keshava*.
- (1889) 1889 All W N 187 (189), *Kamla Kuer v. Har Sahas*.
- (1889) 1889 All W N 185 (186), *Maharaja of Benares v. Sita Ram Naik*.
- (1907) 29 All 471 (473, 474) : 4 All L Jour 375 : 1907 All W N 138, *Husaini Begam v. Collector of Cawnpore*.
- (1886) 8 All 95 (98) : 1888 All W N 13, *Raghubar Dayal v. Budhu Lal*.
- (1869) 8 Bom H C R A C 121 (123), *Sitaram Dandekar v. Ganesh Gokhale*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 529 (529) : 88 Ind Cas 859, *Chiman Lal v. Ram Rika*.
- (1935) 158 Ind Cas 409 (409), 18 Lah 440 (441), *Mohamed Hasan v. Chandu Ram*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 662 (863, 865) : 86 Ind Cas 353, *Mohini Mohan v. Sarat Sundari Deb*.
- (1877) 2 Mad 814 (816) : 4 Ind Jur 500, *Setrucherla Ramabhadra Raju v. Vairucherla Suryanarayana Raju*.
- (1910) 8 Ind Cas 707 (708) (Cal), *Ram Tarak v. Ashulosh*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 552 (552) : 97 Ind Cas 919, *Shivan Manohar v. Husaini*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 11 (14) : 79 Ind Cas 870, *Rama v. Wamanrao*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Nag 22 (23) : 17 Nag L R 202 : 64 Ind Cas 730, *Bala v. Ghasi*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 940 (940) : 30 Ind Cas 370, *Chandu v. Koaja Poojari*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 425 (425) : 25 Ind Cas 576, *Mer Mahamad Rowther v. Nagoor Rowther*.
- (1892) 16 Mad 486 (489) : 2 Mad L Jour 272, *Terugnana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Nallatambi*.
- (1910) 8 Ind Cas 1068 (1069) (Mad), *Muhammed Ibrahim v. Muhammed Aris*.
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 287 (288) : 39 Cal 828, *Purna Chandra v. Peary Mohan*.
- (1874) 11 Bom H C R 283 (286), *Lalla Morji v. Vasudev Moreswar*.
- (1866) 2 Bom H C R 225 (231) : 1 Ind Jur (N S) 250, *Sakharam Narasimha v. Vithu Laka Gouda*.
- (1925) 90 Ind Cas 763 (764) (Cal), *Mahommed Ismail v. Sharfatulla*.
- (1909) 2 Ind Cas 180 (181) : 51 All 300, *Kalka Prasad v. Bhuiyan Din*.
- [But see (1889) 10 All 602 (610) : 1888 All W N 263, *Bhagwat Das v. Parshad Singh*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 385 (386) : 51 Ind Cas 880, *Anant Lam v. Kalua*.]
- 1a. (1867) 8 Mad H C R 363 (365), *Dorappa v. Mallikarjunudu*.
- (1906) 16 Mad L Jour 146 (147, 148), *Chinnaswamy Reddyar v. Krishna Reddy*.

Article 148
Note 18

view proceeded on the ground that the right to redeem and the right to foreclose (or sell) are co-extensive and arise simultaneously; so that, if the mortgagee has no right to sue for the mortgage money, the mortgagor also can have no right to sue for the redemption of the mortgage. This view has been made clear by the amendment of Section 60 above referred to, so that where a mortgage deed provides a period for the payment of the mortgage money, the mortgagor's right to redeem the mortgage will arise only *after* the expiry of the period and not before, inasmuch as before the expiry of such period, the mortgage money would not be "due" in the sense that the mortgagee could sue to recover it.²

In the undermentioned case,³ a mortgage deed provided that if the mortgagor paid the mortgage money in the month of any *Jeth* within ten years, the mortgage would be redeemed but that if he failed to redeem within ten years, the mortgagee would become its owner. It was held by the Allahabad High Court that the mortgagor's right to redeem under the above mortgage deed arose in the first *Jeth* succeeding the date of the mortgage and a suit for redemption instituted more than sixty years after the first *Jeth* would therefore be barred by limitation. It is submitted that the correctness of the decision is doubtful in view of the express language of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act under which the right to redeem accrues only on the mortgage money becoming *due*.

Even where the time fixed for redemption under a mortgage deed is very long after the date of the mortgage, the right of redemption cannot arise before, unless the clause fixing the term of the mortgage is held to be a clog on the equity of redemption, or is, for some other reason, held not binding on the mortgagor.⁴

Where no date is fixed in a mortgage deed for payment of the mortgage money, the money becomes due immediately on the execution of the deed and consequently, the right to redeem also accrues immediately on the execution of the deed.⁵

(1908) 18 Mad L Jour 235 (236), *Vishvendra Thirthaswami v. Vishnumurthi Bhatla*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 940 (940) : 30 Ind Cas 370, *Chandu v. KoaJa Poojari*.

(1896) 20 Bom C77 (587), *Sayad Abdul Hal v. Gulam Jilani*.

[See (1912) 15 Ind Cas 237 (239) : 39 Cal 823, *Purna Chandra v. Peary Mohan*]

2. (1932) A I R 1932 All 155 (156) : 134 Ind Cas 459, *Akbar Husain v. Shah Ahsanul Hug*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 130 (131) : 159 Ind Cas 1052, *Har Bakhsh Singh v. Mahabir Singh*.

3. (1937) A I R 1937 All 32 (33, 34, 35) : 166 Ind Cas 479, *Bageswari Tewari v. Nandoo Singh*.

4. (1867) 3 Mad H O R 363 (367), *Dorappa v. Mallikarjunudu*.

(1912) 15 Ind Cas 890 (891) (All), *Ram Prasad v. Jagrup*.

5. (1913) 10 Ind Cas 291 (296) : 33 All 227 : 40 Ind App 74 (P C), *Soni Ram v. Kanharyalal*.

Under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, where a usufructuary mortgagee is authorised to pay himself the mortgage money from the rents and profits of the property, the right of the mortgagor to recover possession of the property accrues when the mortgage money is so paid.⁶ In such cases, even where a term is fixed for the mortgage and the mortgage is discharged out of the usufruct of the mortgaged property *before* the expiry of such term, the mortgagor can recover possession on the discharge of the mortgage debt and hence, limitation under this Article begins to run from the date when the mortgage debt is so discharged.⁷

In the case of *lekha mukhi* mortgages in the Punjab, it has been held that the period of limitation for a suit for redemption runs from the date of the mortgage.⁸

See also the undermentioned cases.⁹

19. This Article and Article 134. — This Article applies not only to a suit against a mortgagee but also to one against an assignee of the mortgagee's rights. Suppose, a mortgagee in possession of the mortgaged property transfers the property to a third person for consideration, professing to be the *absolute* owner of the property, and the transferee takes possession of the property under such transfer. In such a case, notwithstanding the misrepresentation of the mortgagee-transferor, the transferee would, under the law, only get the rights of the mortgagee in the property and not rights of full ownership. In other words, such a transferee would only be an assignee of the rights of the mortgagee. But, in such cases, there is a special period of limitation provided by Article 134 *supra* for a suit

(1928) 110 Ind Cas 560 (560) (All), *Markunday v Mahabir Pandey*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 20 (20) 51 Ind Cas 956 · 1 Lah 89, *Khandu Lal v. Fazal*.

(1925) 90 Ind Cas 763 (764) (Cal), *Mahammed Ismail v Sharfatulla*.

6. (1892) 16 Mad 486 (488) · 2 Mad L Jour 272, *Tirugnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v Nallatambi*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 481 (483) 25 Ind Cas 797, *Dorayya v. Ayyama-charyulu*.

[See also (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 231 (236) 108 Ind Cas 277, *Venkataramanamma v B. Simon*]

7. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 36 (38) 36 All 195 41 Ind App 64 23 Ind Cas 355 (P C), *Mt Bakhtawar Begam v. Husam Khanum*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 482 (434) 47 Ind Cas 161, *Prag v. Mohanlal*.

8. (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 828 (830) · 101 Ind Cas 549, *Dittu Mal v. Ilahi Baksh*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 20 (21) · 51 Ind Cas 956, *Khandu Lal v. Fazal*.

9. (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 270 (271) 122 Ind Cas 763 : 5 Luck 684, *Rugghu Singh v. Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur*. (Mortgage without possession—Provision in mortgage that if amount due is not paid by end of 1848, mortgagor will lose all right in property and will deliver possession to mortgagee—Possession delivered in 1852 without paying amount due—Suit for redemption in 1929—Suit held barred by

Article 148
Nota 18

view proceeded on the ground that the right to redeem and the right to foreclose (or sell) are co-extensive and arise simultaneously; so that, if the mortgagee has no right to sue for the mortgage money, the mortgagor also can have no right to sue for the redemption of the mortgage. This view has been made clear by the amendment of Section 60 above referred to, so that where a mortgage deed provides a period for the payment of the mortgage money, the mortgagor's right to redeem the mortgage will arise only *after* the expiry of the period and not before, inasmuch as before the expiry of such period, the mortgage money would not be "due" in the sense that the mortgagee could sue to recover it.²

In the undermentioned case,³ a mortgage deed provided that if the mortgagor paid the mortgage money in the month of any *Jeth* within ten years, the mortgage would be redeemed but that if he failed to redeem within ten years, the mortgagee would become its owner. It was held by the Allahabad High Court that the mortgagor's right to redeem under the above mortgage deed arose in the first *Jeth* succeeding the date of the mortgage and a suit for redemption instituted more than sixty years after the first *Jeth* would therefore be barred by limitation. It is submitted that the correctness of the decision is doubtful in view of the express language of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act under which the right to redeem accrues only on the mortgage money becoming *due*.

Even where the time fixed for redemption under a mortgage deed is very long after the date of the mortgage, the right of redemption cannot arise before, unless the clause fixing the term of the mortgage is held to be a clog on the equity of redemption, or is, for some other reason, held not binding on the mortgagor.⁴

Where no date is fixed in a mortgage deed for payment of the mortgage money, the money becomes due immediately on the execution of the deed and consequently, the right to redeem also accrues immediately on the execution of the deed.⁵

(1908) 18 Mad L Jour 235 (236), *Vishendra Thirthaswami v. Vishnu-murthi Bhatta*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 940 (910) : 30 Ind Cas 370, *Chandu v. Kooja Poojari*.

(1896) 20 Bom 677 (687), *Sayad Abdul Hal v. Gulam Jilani*.

[See (1912) 15 Ind Cas 237 (288) : 39 Cal 828, *Purna Chandra v. Peary Mohan*.]

2. (1932) A I R 1932 All 155 (156) : 134 Ind Cas 459, *Akbar Husain v. Shah Ahsanul Haq*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 130 (131) : 159 Ind Cas 1052, *Har Bakhsh Singh v. Mahabir Singh*.

3. (1937) A I R 1937 All 32 (33, 34, 35) : 166 Ind Cas 473, *Dagensari Tewari v. Nandoo Singh*.

4. (1867) 3 Mad H O R 363 (367), *Dorappa v. Mallikharjunudu*.

(1912) 15 Ind Cas 680 (681) (All), *Ram Prasad v. Jagrup*.

5. (1913) 19 Ind Cas 291 (296) : 33 All 227 : 40 Ind App 74 (P C), *Soni Ram v. Kanhaiyalal*.

Under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act, where a usufructuary mortgagee is authorised to pay himself the mortgage money from the rents and profits of the property, the right of the mortgagor to recover possession of the property accrues when the mortgage money is so paid.⁶ In such cases, even where a term is fixed for the mortgage and the mortgage is discharged out of the usufruct of the mortgaged property *before* the expiry of such term, the mortgagor can recover possession on the discharge of the mortgage debt and hence, limitation under this Article begins to run from the date when the mortgage debt is so discharged.⁷

In the case of *lekha mulki* mortgages in the Punjab, it has been held that the period of limitation for a suit for redemption runs from the date of the mortgage.⁸

See also the undermentioned cases⁹

19. This Article and Article 134. — This Article applies not only to a suit against a mortgagee but also to one against an assignee of the mortgagee's rights. Suppose, a mortgagee in possession of the mortgaged property transfers the property to a third person for consideration, professing to be the *absolute* owner of the property, and the transferee takes possession of the property under such transfer. In such a case, notwithstanding the misrepresentation of the mortgagee-transferor, the transferee would, under the law, only get the rights of the mortgagee in the property and not rights of full ownership. In other words, such a transferee would only be an assignee of the rights of the mortgagee. But, in such cases, there is a *special* period of limitation provided by Article 134 *supra* for a suit

(1928) 110 Ind Cas 560 (560) (All), *Markunday v. Mahabir Pandey*

(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 20 (20) . 51 Ind Cas 956 1 Lah 89, *Khandu Lal v. Fazal*.

(1925) 90 Ind Cas 763 (764) (Cal), *Mahammed Isamil v. Sharfatulla*.

6. (1932) 16 Mad 486 (486) : 2 Mad L Jour 272, *Tirugnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi v. Nallatambi*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 481 (483) : 25 Ind Cas 797, *Dorayya v. Ayyama-charyulu*.

[See also (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 234 (236) 109 Ind Cas 277, *Venkataramanamma v. B. Simon*]

7. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 36 (36) 36 All 195 41 Ind App 84 23 Ind Cas 355 (P C), *Mt. Bakhtawar Begam v. Hussain Khanum*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 432 (434) . 47 Ind Cas 161, *Prag v. Mohanlal*

8 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 828 (830) : 101 Ind Cas 549, *Dattu Mal v. Ilahi Baksh*

(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 20 (21) . 51 Ind Cas 956, *Khandu Lal v. Fazal*,

9. (1928) A I R 1928 S. 11 277 278.

tion to mortgagee — Possession delivered in 1852 without paying amount due — Suit for redemption in 1928 — Suit held barred by

**Article 148
Note 19**

for possession against the transferee, and this Article will not, therefore, apply.

The view is sometimes expressed that where a mortgagee transfers the mortgaged property professing to be the owner thereof, the transferee is not a transferee of the *mortgagee-interest* and hence, this Article does not apply to a suit for possession or redemption against such a transferee.¹ It is submitted that such a view is not correct, for whatever the professions of the mortgagee, the transferee can get in such a case only the rights of a *mortgagee*. The reason for the non-applicability of this Article to a suit against such a transferee is not that he is something more than a transferee of the *mortgagee-interest* in the property but that there is a different Article which *specially* provides for such cases. In the undermentioned case,² it was observed that the object of Article 134 was "to cut down the period available to the mortgagor under Article 148 and to compel him to watch the conduct of the mortgagee and intervene on a transfer, thus making the transfer a cause of action which otherwise did not exist." It is submitted, with respect, that the view as to Article 134 *creating* a cause of action which otherwise did not exist is not correct. The Limitation Act does not *create* a cause of action. The object of the Act is only to provide the period of time before the expiry of which the cause of action must be enforced. (See Section 3 Note 2 *supra*.)

A transferee from a mortgagee, who has professed to act as the full owner of the property, gets at least the rights of the mortgagee in the property.³ Hence, although Article 134 speaks of a suit for *possession*, where anything remains due on the mortgage, the Article can only mean a suit for possession *on redemption* of the mortgage,⁴ for the simple reason that a suit for possession *simpliciter* without

Article 148 as right to redeem accrued on execution of mortgage—Suit was barred even if the right accrued in 1852)

..... (Mort-
ion and
ey, the
land would be released—No date for redemption fixed in deed — Held
on construction of deed that right of redemption did not accrue till
the mortgagee got possession under the deed)

Note 19

1. (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 547 (548) : 29 Oudh Cas 853 : 97 Ind Cas 874 : 1 Luck 423 (F B), *Srs Ram v. Najibullah*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 All 889 (890, 891) : 43 All 164 : 61 Ind Cas 546, *Mt. Ram Puri v. Budh Sen*.
2. (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 272 (276) : 44 Mad 951 : 68 Ind Cas 734, *Narayana-swamy Naicker v. Periaswamy Odayar*.
3. (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 272 (275) : 44 Mad 931 : 68 Ind Cas 734, *Narayana-swamy Naicker v. Periaswamy Odayar*.
4. See (1927) A I R 1927 All 807 (810) : 102 Ind Cas 135, *Lakhmi Das v. Mt. Badia*. (Article 134 applies to suit for redemption.)

offering to redeem the mortgage will not lie at all against the transferee in such cases. The cause of action for such a suit against the transferee is the same as that against the mortgagee himself, and such cause of action is not accelerated simply because the mortgagee has transferred his rights to another, professing to have full rights to the mortgaged property. Hence, where the right to redeem the mortgage has not arisen, the mortgagor cannot sue the transferee for redemption, notwithstanding the transfer by the mortgagee in the professed exercise of rights of *ownership* over the property.

Suppose, the right to redeem the mortgage arises *after* the mortgagor comes to know of the transfer by the mortgagee (the time mentioned in Article 134 as the starting point of limitation under the Article). The question arises whether Article 134 will apply to such cases. There does not seem to be any decided case on this point. But it is conceived that Article 134 will not apply to such cases. The reason is that limitation cannot begin to run before the accrual of the cause of action, and the Articles in the Limitation Act must be read subject to this principle, so that if at the time mentioned in the third column of any Article the cause of action for a suit (falling within the description contained in the first column) has not arisen, the Article must be held inapplicable to the case. (See Notes to Section 9 *ante*.) It is conceived that in such a case Article 148 will apply.

Where, in a suit against a transferee from a mortgagee for the recovery of the mortgaged property, the defendant contends that the suit is governed by the shorter period of limitation under Article 134 and not by this Article, it is for the defendant to prove the facts which would bring the case within Article 134.⁵

20. This Article and Article 126.—Where a Hindu son sues to set aside a mortgage of joint family property executed by his father and not to redeem the mortgage, the Article applicable is Article 126 *supra* and not this Article.¹

Where a Hindu executes a usufructuary mortgage of joint family property and then sells the equity of redemption to the mortgagee, the sons will lose their right to the property altogether if they do not sue to set aside the sale within the period of twelve years under

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 547 (548) 29 Oudh Cas 353 : 97 Ind Cas 574 : 1 Luck 423 (F B), *Srs Ram v Najibullah*. (Do)

[But see (1925) A I R 1925 Rang 140 (142) 2 Rang 561 : 84 Ind Cas 984, *Ma Myat Gyi v. Ma Ma Nyan* (Article 134 does not apply to suit for redemption — Submitted, decision is not correct)]

5. (1881) 1881 All W N 122 (123), *Kamla Prasad v. Balur Ali*

Note 20

1. (1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 196 (197, 198) 21 Oudh Cas 530 : 64 Ind Cas 757, *Chokhey Singh v. Hardeo Singh*.

Article 148
Notes
20-21.

Article 126. Hence, where the sons have not sued to set aside the sale within the period of twelve years under Article 126, they cannot sue to redeem the property, taking advantage of the longer period of limitation allowed by this Article.²

21. Suit by puisne mortgagee for redemption of prior mortgage. — This Article applies to a suit for redemption of a mortgage by whomsoever such suit may be brought. In other words, the Article is not confined to suits by the original mortgagor. Thus, the Article applies to a suit by a puisne mortgagee to redeem a prior mortgage.¹

Where a prior mortgagee sues to enforce his mortgage without impleading the puisne mortgagee and the latter thereafter sues to redeem the prior mortgage, there is a conflict of decisions as to whether this Article will apply to the suit. One view is that this Article will apply to such a suit² and the other view is that such a suit is really one to enforce the puisne mortgage and so is governed by Article 132 *supra* and not by this Article.³ It is submitted that the latter view is not correct, there being a clear distinction between the puisne mortgagee's right to enforce his own mortgage and his right to redeem a prior mortgage.

2. (1926) 112 Ind Cas 151 (152) (Oudh), *Kailash Singh v. Balbhaddar Singh*.

Note 21

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 503 (504) : 14 Lah 596 : 142 Ind Cas 805, *Sundar Das v. Delh Ram*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 189 (140) : 10 Luck 531 : 153 Ind Cas 808, *Ram Adhar v. Shankar Dalhsh Singh*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Cal 609 (611) : 119 Ind Cas 195 : 57 Cal 704 (F B), *Sayamal Molla v. Anisuddin Molla*. (Puisne mortgagee suing on his mortgage without impleading the prior mortgagee and purchasing the property himself can sue the prior mortgagee for redemption and to such a suit this Article will apply.)

.. .. . Nag 367 : 172 Ind Cas 289,
.. .. . (Prior mortgagee foreclosing
by puisne mortgagee within

sixty years not barred though after twelve years from prior mortgagee getting possession under foreclosure decree.)

2. (1934) A I R 1934 All 946 (947) : 153 Ind Cas 664, *Narotam Das v. Sanwal Das*.

(1923) A I R 1923 All 271 (273) : 79 Ind Cas 498 : 45 All 268, *Prisya Lal v. Bohra Champa Ram*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 337 (339) : 5 Pat 513 : 91 Ind Cas 281, *Ramjhar Koer v. Kashi Nath Sahai*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Nag 205 (207) . I L R (1937) Nag 367 : 172 Ind Cas 289, *Mt. Ramkunnarbai v. Mt. Chaita Bai*.

3. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 560 (560) : 91 Ind Cas 719, *Nrl Madhab Mahapatra v. Joy Gopal Mahanta*.

(1909) 5 Ind Cas 877 (878) (Cal), *Nadhiram Dandopadhya v. Sarbessur Biswas*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 76 (77, 78) : 84 Ind Cas 301, *Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Sellamuthu Nacker*.

22. Suit by execution purchaser of equity of redemption.—Where the equity of redemption under a usufructuary mortgage is sold in execution of a decree against the mortgagor, a suit by the purchaser in execution for redemption and possession of the mortgaged property is governed by this Article and not by Article 137 *supra*.¹

23. Burden of proof.—The burden of proving that the mortgage is a subsisting one and that the suit for redemption is not barred by limitation, is on the plaintiff.¹

24. Laches of mortgagor.—The laches of a mortgagor in taking no steps for many years to enforce his alleged rights may afford

Note 22

1. (1889) 1889 All W N 135 (135, 136), *Maharajah of Benares v. Sita Ram Naik*.

Note 23

1. (1933) A I R 1933 All 21 (24) . 141 Ind Cas 91 54 All 975, *Jauhari v. Tunday*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 All 201 (205) 36 Ind Cas 452 38 All 540, *Khalis Ram v. Tark Ram*.
 (1914) A I R 1914 All 512 (513) 25 Ind Cas 353, *Frank Hay v. Rafiuddin*.
 (1918) 20 Ind Cas 29 (30) (All), *Ganesh Lal v. Basanti Lal*.
 (1889) 11 All 433 (443) : 1889 All W N 155, *Parmanand Misr v. Sahib Ali*.
 (1886) 8 All 295 (300) . 1886 All W N 93, *Nura Bibi v. Jagat Narain*.
 (1898) 1898 All W N 30 (39), *Rani v. Amir Dakhsh*.
 (1905) 1905 All W N 14 (15) : 2 All L Jour 62, *Musafir Ras v. Mt. Lagan Baria Kuar*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 515 (516) . 155 Ind Cas 576, *Sher Mohammed v. Karam Chand*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 632 (633) . 89 Ind Cas 788, *Ahmad Khan v. Musrafer Khan*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 484 (485) . 78 Ind Cas 617, *Piroze Khan v. Kanhiya Ram*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 219 (220) . 71 Ind Cas 577, *Sri Rani v. Matwala Ram*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 20 (22) . 1 Lah 89 51 Ind Cas 956, *Khandu Lal v. Fazal*.
 (1894) 1894 Pun Re No 53, *Ghulam Hassan v. Haji Muhammad*.
 (1893) 1893 Pun Re No 38, *Rahia Ram v. Radha Ram*.
 (1902) 26 Mad 34 (36) 12 Mad L Jour 101, *Ittappan Kuthiravattal Nayer v. Nannu Sastry*.
 (1918) 20 Ind Cas 63 (64, 65) (Oudh), *Gajraj Singh v. Muhammad Baker Ali Khan*.
 (1918) 18 Ind Cas 229 (232) (Oudh), *Sarju Prasad v. Manni Lal*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 124 (125) . 42 Ind Cas 119, *Dudar Husain v. Gaya-prasad*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 615 (616) 153 Ind Cas 761, *Mt. Khuro Kuer v. Syed Noorul Hussain*.
 (1921) 63 Ind Cas 490 (492) (All), *Harimurat v. Ramkist*.
 (1926) 95 Ind Cas 945 (945) (Oudh), *Binda v. Sankata Prasad*.
 (1918) 20 Ind Cas 29 (30) (All), *Ganesh Lal v. Basanti Lal*.

Article 148
Notes
24—27.

evidence against the existence of those rights, but cannot estop him from asserting them, if they do exist, at any time within the period of sixty years allowed by this Article.¹

See also Note 40 to Section 3, *ante*.

25. Effect of bar of limitation.— Where a suit for recovery of possession of the mortgaged property from the mortgagee is barred under this Article, the right of the mortgagor to the property is extinguished under Section 28 *ante*, and the mortgagee becomes the owner of the property.¹

26. Special or local law.— See the undermentioned decisions.¹

27. Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act, 2 of 1913 — Dismissal of application for redemption under — Effect, — See under Note 2 to Article 14 *supra*.

Note 24

1. (1875) 23 Suth W R 99 (101) : 14 Beng L R 385 : 2 Ind App 49 : 8 Sar 419 : 8 Suther 61 (P O), *Juggernath Sahoo v. Shah Mahomed Hossein*.
- (1896) 23 Cal 228 (236, 237) : 22 Ind App 183 : 5 Mad L Jour 261 : 6 Sar 649 (P O), *Kishori Mohun Roy v. Ganga Dahu Debi*.

Note 25

1. (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 339 (340) : 87 Ind Cas 609, *Induras Dhauras v. Shivlal Nabhubhai*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 All 21 (24) : 141 Ind Cas 91 : 54 All 975, *Jauhari v. Tunday*.

Note 26

1. (1882) 6 Bom 734 (736), *Dabaji v. Yashu*. (Under the Dekkan Agriculturists Relief Act, XVII of 1879, the mortgagor may redeem before the expiry of the term.)
- (1930) A I R 1930 Ondh 270 (271) : 122 Ind Cas 709 : 5 Luck 684, *Rugghu Singh v. Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur*. (In order to take advantage of Section 6 of the Oudh Estates Act the mortgage must have been executed on or after 13th February 1844, and then too the advantage is available in two cases only namely, in mortgages which fixed no term within which the property comprised might be redeemed or mortgages which fixed the term within which the property comprised might be redeemed if such term has not expired before the 13th February 1856.)
- (1927) A I R 1927 Ondh 457 (464) 105 Ind Cas 93, *Suraj Dakhsh v. Ganga Dakhsh*. (A suit for redemption resting on an instrument of mortgage of the year 1849 in which no term was fixed for redemption, or if any

<p>149.* Any suit by or on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council, the Secretary of State, the Crown Representative, the Central Government or any Provincial Government, except a suit before a Federal Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.</p>	<p>Sixty years.</p>	<p>When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.</p>	<p>Article 149</p>
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of Article.
3. Applicability of Limitation Act to Government—General.
4. Suit by or on behalf of the Government — Illustrative cases.
5. Suit by manager of religious endowment.
6. Suit by Municipality.
7. Article not applicable to suit by person deriving title from Government.
8. Resumption or assessment of lakhiraj grants—Right of Government, whether extinguished by bar of limitation.
9. Acquisition of title by adverse possession against Government.
10. Special or local law.
11. "Private person."
12. Acquisition of easements against Government.

Other Topics

Adverse possession against Government—Onus of proof .. See Note 9, Pts. 4 to 6
 Applications and appeals by Government—Article not applicable ..
 See Note 2, Pt. 1
 Suits against Government—Article not applicable ... See Note 2, Pt. 4

* Act of 1877

<p>149 — Any suit by or on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council</p>	<p>Sixty years</p>	<p>When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person</p>
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Act of 1871

<p>150 — Any suit in the name of the Secretary of State for India in Council.</p>	<p>Sixty years.</p>	<p>When the right to sue accrued.</p>
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Act of 1859

See Note 1, Legislative Changes. The Bengal Regulation referred to in the Note was repealed by Act 8 of 1868.

Article 149

Notes
1—2

1. Legislative changes.

1. Under some of the Regulations that were in force prior to the Act of 1859, such as the Bengal Regulation 2 of 1805, suits in regard to public rights were exempt from the ordinary period of limitation and a special period of limitation of sixty years was provided in regard to such suits.¹

2. Section 17 of Act 14 of 1859 provided as follows :—

"This Act shall not extend to any public property or right, nor to any suits for the recovery of the public revenue or for any public claim whatever, but such suits shall continue to be governed by the laws or rules of limitation now in force."

3. Article 150 of the Act of 1871 provided for suits "in the name of the Secretary of State for India in Council." The period of limitation for such suits was sixty years and time began to run under the Article from the date when the right to sue accrued.

4. In Article 149 of the Acts of 1877 and 1908, the words "in the name of the Secretary of State for India" were replaced by the words "by or on behalf of the Secretary of State for India." The starting point of limitation was altered as the time when the period of limitation would begin to run under the Act against a like suit by a private person.

5. The words "the Secretary of State . . . Provincial Government" were added by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937. The words "except a suit before a Federal Court. . . . original jurisdiction" were added by Act 14 of 1937.

2. Scope of Article.—The Article applies only to *suits* by or on behalf of the Government. It does not apply to *applications* and

Article 149 — Note 1

1. See the following cases decided under such Regulations

(1866) 6 Suth W R P C 3 (9) • 2 Moo Ind App 390 (P C), *Jewan Doss Sahoo v. Shah Kubeerood-deen*. (Bengal Regulation 2 of 1805, Sec. 2.)

(1868) 10 Suth W R 76 (77) • 1 Beng L R A C 34, *Assoo Meah v. Dojoo Meah*. (Case decided under S. 17 of Act of 1859 under which the Regulations in force at the date of the Act continued to apply.)

(1872) 17 Suth W R 557 (558), *Shib Ram Doss v. Sudanund Surmah*. (Do.)

(1873) 20 Suth W R 231 (231, 232), *Hossein Duksh v. Ameena Khatoon*.

(1874) 8 Mad H O R 40 (43), *The Collector of South Arcot v. Thathacharry*. (Regulation 2 of 1805)

(1866) 5 Suth W R 115 (116), *Collector of Bangalore v. Prasanna Coomarr Tagore*.

(1846-51) 4 Moo Ind App 466 (496, 497) • 1 Snt 335 (P C), *Raja Mahlab Chund Bahadoor v. Government of Bengal*.

(1866) 5 Suth W R 136 (136), *Dromanund Gossain v. The Government*.

(1870) 14 Suth W R 170 (170), *Rughoonath Surmah v. Gobind Chunder Doy*.

(1872) 17 Suth W R 430 (431), *Shah Lal Mahomed v. Lalla Draj Keshore*.

(1868) 9 Suth W R 153 (160), *W. Fergusson v. The Government*.

[See also (1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 83 (90) : 61 Ind Cas 671 : 24 Oudh Cas 77, *Secretary of State v. Mohammad Qasim*.]

appeals by Government.¹ But it applies to *all* suits by the Government,² for example, to summary suits by the Government under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act.³ The Article applies only to suits *by or on behalf of* the Government. Suits *against* the Government are not within the Article.⁴

Article 149
Notes
2—3

3. Applicability of Limitation Act to Government—General.—

The question has sometimes been raised whether, apart from the provisions which expressly or by necessary implication are declared applicable to the Government, the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to the Government. In *Appayya v Collector of Vizagapatam*,¹ where the question was whether Article 178 of the Act of 1877 (Article 181 of the Act of 1908) applied to applications by Government, the High Court of Madras observed as follows

"We are of opinion that the Government is not entitled to any exemption from the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to applications. If the maxim on which the Counsel for the Crown relies applies to this country—and the Crown is not bound by the provisions of any Act unless they are expressly declared binding on the Crown—it may be inferred from the circumstance that this Act contains provisions prescribing limitation to the Government for the institution of suits and presentation of criminal appeals, that the Legislature contemplated that the Crown should be subject to the provisions of the Act and should enjoy a privilege to the extent expressed and no further—*expressum facit cessare tacitum*."

In *Venubai v The Collector of Nasik*,² it was held that the period of limitation for an application for execution by the Government was the same as the period of limitation for a similar application by a private person. The High Court of Bombay in the above case observed as follows.

"We think that the right of Government to recover court-fees under Section 309 is subject to the same period of limitation as

Note 2

1. (1881) 4 Mad 155 (156, 157), *Appayya v Collector of Vizagapatam*
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1064 (1064) 53 Cal 561 . 93 Ind Cas 334, *Mahabunnessa Bibi v Secretary of State*
(1874) 22 Suth W R 512 (512) (F B), *Collector of Beerbhoom v Sreehury Chuckerbutty*
(1883) 7 Bom 552 (Note) (553), *Venubai v Collector of Nasik*
2. (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 197 (200) 40 Bom 166 . 33 Ind Cas 428, *Manilal Gangadas Desai v Secretary of State*.
3. (1925) A I R 1925 Sind 275 (279) 67 Ind Cas 1002, *Secretary of State v. Dinshaw Navroji*
4. (1895) 19 Mad 165 (166), *Secretary of State v. Bapannamma Garu*
(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 679 (680, 682, 683) 125 Ind Cas 545, *Secretary of State v. District Board of Tanjore*

Note 3

1. (1881) 4 Mad 155 (156, 157).
2. (1883) 7 Bom 552 (552) (Note)

Article 149
Note 3

the right of a subject to enforce a decree or order would be. The Legislature in passing the Limitation Act of 1871, which is applicable to this case, where it intends that the Government should have a longer period than the subject, has been careful expressly to say so: as, for instance, in Article 150 of Schedule 2, where the period assigned to suits brought by the Secretary of State is sixty years from the time of the accrual of the cause of action; but the Legislature makes no difference between Government and its subjects in the cases of appeals or applications: see *Govind Lakshman v. Narayan Moreshwar*, 11 Bom. H. C. Rep. 111."

In *The Secretary of State v. Mathurabai*,³ the High Court of Bombay held that the rule in England that the Crown is not included in an Act unless there be words to that effect is equally applicable in India and that therefore the provisions of Section 26 of the Limitation Act of 1877 did not apply to the acquisition of easements against the Government. In distinguishing the decision in *Venubai v. Collector of Nasik* (above referred to) the High Court observed as follows:

"In Special Appeal No. 7 of 1877, *Venubai v. The Collector of Nasik* (referred to in the note to I. L. R. 7 Bom. 552) the above Act came under the consideration of Westropp, C. J., and Melvill, J., who held that the period for execution in the case under Act 9 of 1871 was the same for Government as for the subject, on the ground that the express provision for a longer period of limitation in favour of Government, in case of suits, showed it was intended that Government should be bound by the ordinary period of limitation in the case of executions. But this inference cannot be extended to Section 26 of the Limitation Act which relates to an entirely different matter from the limitation of suits, viz., to a branch of substantive law and the creation of rights by the enjoyment of them, unless indeed the mere mention of the Crown in an Act be held to have the effect of making all its provisions applicable to the Crown. That this is not so, the decision of the Appeal Court in *Ex parte Postmaster-General; In re Bonham*, L. R. 10 Ch. D. 595 at page 601, where the applicability of the Bankruptcy Act to the Crown was disallowed, is an authority in point."

In the unmentioned cases⁴ it was held that the Collector can take action under Section 3 of the Bombay Bhagdari Act 5 of 1862 at any time and that his action is not subject to any rule of limitation. In one of the above cases⁵ the above view was based on the ground that the Collector acted as a representative of the Crown and the

³ (1889) 14 Bom 213 (218). (Following 1 Bom 7.)

⁴ *Haraji*.

maxim "*Nullum tempus aut occurrit regi*" (No time or place affects the King or the rights of the Crown) was relied on for the view that there was no limitation for the proceeding by the Collector.

Article 149
Notes
3—5

Reference may also be made to the judgment of Bhashyam Iyengar, J., in *Bell v. Municipal Commissioners of Madras*,⁶ in which he comes to the conclusion that the Government is not exempt even from taxing statutes passed by the Indian Legislatures, unless the very nature of the tax is such as to make it inapplicable to the Government.

4. Suit by or on behalf of the Government.—Illustrative cases.—Where a State Railway is managed by a Railway Company as managing agents under the Government, a suit by the Railway Company in respect of land belonging to such State Railway is one on behalf of the Government and as such is governed by this Article.¹

Certain land was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act for the purposes of a Railway, but before it was handed over to the Railway Company the defendant entered into possession of the land. It was held that the suit against the defendant for the recovery of the land must be by the Secretary of State and not by the Railway Company and that it would be governed by this Article.²

5. Suit by manager of religious endowment.—Before the passing of the Religious Endowments Act, 20 of 1863, religious endowments were under the management of the Government and hence, a suit by the manager of an endowment was treated as a suit by an officer of the Government brought on behalf of the Government so as to be governed by the longer period of limitation applicable to such suits.¹ But, since the passing of the Religious Endowments Act of 1863 under which the management of religious endowments has been taken away from the hands of the Government, a suit by the manager of a religious endowment cannot be treated as a suit by an officer of the Government and as brought on behalf of the Government and hence, the longer period of limitation applicable to suits by or on behalf of the Government will not apply to such suits.²

6 (1901) 25 Mad 457 (480) 12 Mad L Jour 208

Note 4

1. (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 362 (369) 163 Ind Cas 525, *Dengal North-Western Railway Co. Ltd. v. Janki Pershad*
2. (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 508 (570) 171 Ind Cas 828, *Seetharam v. Secretary of State*

Note 5

- 1 (1866) 6 Suth W R P C 3 (9) 2 Moo Ind App 890 (P C), *Jewan Dass Sahoo v. Shah Kubeerooddien*
2. (1893) 20 All 482 (488, 489) 1893 All W N 123 (F B), *Behari Lal v. Md. Mutak*
(1872) 17 Suth W R 430 (431), *Shankh Lal v. Lalla Brij Kishore*
[See (1903) 27 Bom 500 (510) 5 Bom L R 303, *Sajun Lal v. Chenz v. Raja Hussan*]

Article 149
Notes
6—7

6. Suit by Municipality. — A suit by a Municipal Committee is not a suit by or on behalf of the Government and hence is not governed by this Article.¹ Thus, this Article will not apply to a suit by a Municipal Corporation for recovery of a certain land as forming part of a highway, title to which is vested in the Corporation by statute.² But, where Government land has been entrusted to a Municipality for management and the Municipality sues in respect of such land, the suit is one on behalf of the Government and is governed by this Article.³

See also Notes under Article 146 A, *ante*.

7. Article not applicable to suit by person deriving title from Government. — This Article applies only to suits by or on behalf of the Government. It does not apply to a suit by a person deriving title from the Government.¹

Illustrations

1. A purchases from the Government certain land which, at the time of the purchase, has been in the possession of B adversely against the Government for more than twelve years. A's suit for possession against B is governed by Article 144 and not by this Article and is barred as not being within twelve years of the commencement of the adverse possession.²

Note 6

v. Sarangapani Mudaliar.
Cas 158 (162) : 38 Mad 6,
Souncil.

2. (1895) 19 Mad 154 (156), *The Municipal Commissioner v Sarangapani Mudaliar*
3. (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 960 (961) : 153 Ind Cas 961, *Labha Singh v. Municipal Committee, Amritsar*.

Note 7

- 1 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 391 (391) : 81 Ind Cas 675, *Ananda Mohan Roy v. Kina Das*
(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 1155 (1157, 1159) : 97 Ind Cas 253, *Yenlathasurya-narayana v. Venku Naidu*.
(1917) A I R 1917 Lah 201 (201) : 39 Ind Cas 971, *Moolchand v. Amar Nath*.
(1909) 2 Ind Cas 314 (314, 315) (Mad), *Madhara Gowdu v Lokanath Patro*.
(1910) 6 Ind Cas 392 (391) (Cal), *Nawab Bahadur of Murshidabad v. Gop-nath Mandol*
(1906) 30 Mad 245 (243) : 17 Mad L Jour 174, *Kuthaperumal Rajah v. Secretary of State*
(1904) 28 Mad 505 (506, 507) : 15 Mad L Jour 416, *Sanharan Nambudri v. Veetil Thalakat Muhammad*.
(1895) 19 Mad 154 (156), *The Municipal Commissioner v. Sarangapani Mudaliar*.
(1875) 24 Suth W R 61 (65), *Doords Roy v. Pandit Dunsee Thakoor*.
(1872) 17 Suth W R 377 (377), *Brindaban Chunder Sircar v. Bheopal Chunder Biswas*
[But see (1831) 8 Cal 230 (235, 236) : 10 Cal L R 41, *Kotlashashini Das v. Gokulmoni Das*.]
2. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 391 (391) : 81 Ind Cas 675, *Ananda Mohan Roy v. Kina Das*. (In such a case the purchase does not give a fresh starting point of limitation.)

2. *A* obtains a lease of certain land from the Government. He is then deprived of possession of the land by *B*. *A*'s suit for possession against *B* is not governed by this Article.³
3. *A* was in possession of certain land which belonged to the Government, adversely to the Government. The Government took steps to remove him from possession and actually removed him from possession and itself entered into possession. Thereafter it granted the land to *B*. *A* then sued *B* for possession on the ground that he had acquired a prescriptive title to the land and that he had been wrongly deprived of possession. It was held that he could not succeed unless he proved that at the time when he was deprived of possession of the land by the Government he had been in adverse possession against the Government for sixty years. The reason is that in such a case, the question is whether a suit by the Government would have been barred by limitation and not whether a suit by the transferee from the Government would have been so barred at the time when *A* was deprived of possession of the land.⁴

The mere fact that in a suit for possession of land by a transferee of such land from the Government, the latter is joined as a co-plaintiff will not make this Article applicable to the suit by the transferee.⁵ But, where the Government is entitled to sue for the restoration of possession of the land to the transferee, the suit by the Government for such restoration will be governed by this Article, although a suit by the transferee himself for possession will not be governed by this Article. Hence, in such a case, if the Government is made a co-plaintiff in the suit by the transferee, the suit, so far as the Government is concerned, will be governed by this Article, though this Article will not apply so far as the transferee is concerned.⁶

8. Resumption or assessment of lakhiraj grants — Right of Government, whether extinguished by bar of limitation. —
See the undermentioned cases.¹

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- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 1155 (1157) 97 Ind Cas 253, *Venkata Suryanarayana v Venku Naidu*
3. (1904) 32 Cal 129 (139) 31 Ind App 203 6 Bom L R 765 1 All L Jour 585 8 Cal W N 809 8 Sar 698 (P O), *Jagindra Nath Roy v Hemanta Kumari Das*
[See also (1915) A I R 1915 Sind 4 (5, 6), 30 Ind Cas 13 9 Sind L R 1, *Karachi Municipality v Shamoo Ladda*]
- 4 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 1082 (1084) 105 Ind Cas 202, *Maniappa Udayan v. Sabapathy Asari*
- 5 (1903) 28 Mad 505 (506, 507) 18 Muz 744 116 S. 1111 116 Muz 744 v. *Vellil Thalakat Md*
[See also (1867) 11 Mo 1 Suther 676 v. *Collector of the 24 Parghanas*]
6. (1872) 18 Suth W R 130 (131), *Petumber Dey v Juggannath Roy*

Note 8

1. (1903) 27 Mad 16 (20), *Jagannadham v Secretary of State* (No limitation applies to such right)

Article 149
Note 9

9. Acquisition of title by adverse possession against Government.—A title to immovable property can be acquired by adverse possession against the Government in the same way as such title can be acquired against a private person.¹ But, the person claiming such title against the Government must prove that the adverse possession has extended for a period of sixty years or more.² This is so even where the suit is not one *by* the Government but one *against* the Government. Thus, where the plaintiff sues the Government for a declaration that he has acquired a title against the Government by adverse possession for the statutory period, he must prove that his possession has extended for a period of sixty years.³

Where a person claims title by adverse possession against the Government, the burden is on him to prove such possession for the full period of sixty years. Proof of adverse possession for a shorter period will not shift the onus to the Government to show that the possession had not continued for the full period of sixty years.⁴ The contrary view taken in the undermentioned cases⁵ cannot be regarded

(1934) A I R 1934 Mad 147 (151) : 57 Mad 501 : 154 Ind Cas 990, *Thiruvannamalai v. Secretary of State*. (Do.)

(1891) 8 Cal 230 (235, 236, 237) : 10 Cal L R 41, *Kailashbhashini Dossee v. Gooloom Dossee*. (Right barred after 60 years)

(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 363 (374) : 62 Cal 515 : 159 Ind Cas 98, *Raj Krishna v. Darabani Coal Concern Ltd.* (Do.)

Note 9

1. (1885) 9 Mad 285 (307), *Sivasubramanya v. Secretary of State*.

2. (1899) 9 Mad L Jour 141 (142), *Adakalam Katha Nadan v. Kandasamy Pillai*.

(1892) 19 Cal 312 (321) : 19 Ind App 69 : 6 Sar 113 (P C), *Secretary of State v. Durbhoy Singh*.

(1911) 9 Ind Cas 765 (767) : 35 Bom 182, *Ranchhodlall v. Secretary of State*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 456 (457) : 101 Ind Cas 96, *Secretary of State v. Muthukumara Pillai*.

(1922) 22 Cal 100 (101) : 22 Cal L R 100, *Secretary of State v. ...*

Cal L Jour 460,
Deo v. Secretary of State.

(1924) A I R 1924 P O 150 (151) : 51 Ind App 257 : 47 Mad 572 : 80 Ind Cas 835 (P C), *Ambu Nair v. Secretary of State*. (A person must prove continuous possession for full sixty years to acquire title against the Government.)

3. (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 437 (438) : 7 Lah 210 : 96 Ind Cas 117, *Abdul Wahab v. Secretary of State*

(1922) 22 Cal 100 (101) : 22 Cal L R 100, *Secretary of State v. ...*
192 : 35 Ind Cas
Secretary of State v. Sree-

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 780 (785, 786). 49 Mad 570 : 91 Ind Cas 130, *Krishna v. Singaravelu*

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 177 (179) : 45 Bom 789 : 61 Ind Cas 440, *Vasta Dattant v. Secretary of State*

(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 411 (412, 413) : 119 Ind Cas 490, *Jayaram Naidu v. Secretary of State*.

5. (1892) 15 Mad 315 (318) : 2 Mad L Jour 153, *Secretary of State v. Barrett Hajis*

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 832 (833) : 33 Mad 1, *Chelamani Ramaswami v. Secretary of State*.

as good law in view of the decision of the Privy Council in *Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao*.⁶

As regards the essentials which will make a person's possession adverse to the Government, see Notes under Article 144. See also the undermentioned cases⁷ dealing with adverse possession of land in cantonments.

10. Special or local law. — The Article is subject to the provisions of Section 29 *ante* under which, if a different period is fixed by a special or local law, such period must apply in preference to the period laid down in the Articles in the Schedule. Thus, in the undermentioned case¹ it was held by the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Sind that a suit by the Government against the Karachi Municipality in a matter covered by Section 167 of the Bombay District Municipalities Act of 1901 was governed by the six months' period of limitation under that Section and not by this Article.

11. "Private person." — In *In the matter of the Indian Stamp Act 1899*,¹ the Bombay High Court observed as follows

"... the expression 'private person' is not a term of art it must be construed, I think, with reference to the context in which it appears 'Private person' may be used in contradistinction to an 'official person' or to a Government servant. it may have many meanings In Article 149, Limitation Act, it seems to be used in contradistinction to Government, because that Article

(1912) 16 Ind Cas 626 (629) (Mad), *Alagasanga Ayya Varalangan v. Taluk Board, Rajahmundry*

(1866) 5 Suth W R 136 (137), *Bromanund Gossain v. The Government*

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 118 (118, 119) 33 Mad 862, *Venkatarama Aiyer v. Secretary of State*

(1912) 15 Ind Cas 257 (258) (Mad), *Narayana Pillai v. Secretary of State*

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 720 (721) 24 Ind Cas 735, *Bojana v. Asethu*

(1895) 9 Mad 175 (181, 184), *Secretary of State v. Vira Rayan*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 803 (809) 25 Ind Cas 608, *Sambasiva Mudaliar v. Secretary of State* (Though the general presumption, where a person

some one is shown to have encroached on it)

6. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 21 (27) 39 Mad 617 43 Ind App 192 35 Ind Cas 902 (P C).

7 (1922) A I R 1922 All 57 (58, 59) 66 Ind Cas 582, *Secretary of State v. Mulla*

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 1096 (1097, 1098) 33 All 229, *Bank of Upper India v. Secretary of State* (6 All 143, Followed)

(1911) 38 Ind App 204 (216) 36 Bom 1 12 Ind Cas 117 (P C), *Kaikhusrulderji v. Secretary of State*

Note 10

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Sind 55 (55) 131 Ind Cas 151, *Secretary of State v. Municipality of Karachi*

Note 11

1 (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 231 (232) 58 Bom 437 151 Ind Cas 911 (S D).

Article 149
Notes
11—12

provides that time runs against the Secretary of State from the same date as it would in a suit against a private person."²

12. Acquisition of easement against Government. — See Notes to Section 26, *ante*.

SECOND DIVISION : APPEALS

Article 150

Description of appeal.	Period of limitation.	Time from which period begins to run.
150.* Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from a sentence of death passed by a Court of Session.	Seven days.	The date of the sentence.

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope and applicability.

1. Legislative changes.

1. There was no Article corresponding to this Article in the Act of 1871. Section 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, however provided a period of seven days for such appeal.
2. The provision was first introduced in 1877.
3. The words "Sessions Judge" which occurred in the Act of 1877 were substituted in the present Act by the words "Court of Session."

2. Scope and applicability. — This Article applies only to appeals from a sentence of death passed by a Court of Session. As to the limitation for other appeals under the Criminal Procedure Code, see Articles 150A, 151, 155 and 157 *infra*.

The right of appeal from a sentence of a Court of Session is given by Section 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Article 150A

150A. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from a finding rejecting a claim under section 443 of that Code.	Seven days.	The date of the finding.
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Act of 1877

Substantially same as above.

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision.

² The expression "against a private person" in the above passage is obviously a mistake for "by a private person."

*Synopsis*Article 150 A
Notes
1—2

1. Legislative changes.

2. Scope and applicability.

1. **Legislative changes.**—This Article has been newly introduced into the Limitation Act by Section 42 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 12 of 1933, which received the assent of the Governor-General on 16th March 1933.

2. **Scope and applicability.**—The claim under Section 443 of the Criminal Procedure Code referred to in this Article, is a claim to be tried under the special procedure of Chapter 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to trial of cases outside the Presidency Towns in which European and Indian British subjects are concerned.

Where the Magistrate rejects the claim of any person to be tried under the procedure prescribed by the said Chapter, and records a finding to that effect, the person by whom such claim is made has, under the said Section 443 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a right of appeal to the Sessions Judge whose decision is final.

This Article prescribes the period of limitation for presentation of such appeals. Where the claim is rejected, the Magistrate is required to stay proceedings until the expiration of the period allowed for the presentation of the appeal under this Article, or if an appeal is presented, until it has been decided.

151.* From a decree or order of any of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras, Bombay and Lahore in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.	Twenty days.	The date of the decree or order.	Article 151
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.

2. Scope of the Article.

3. Starting point.

* Act of 1877			
151 — From a decree or order of any	Twenty days	The date of the decree or order.	
its original jurisdiction			
Acts of 1871 and 1859			
No corresponding provision.			

*Synopsis*Article 150 A
Notes
1—2

1. Legislative changes.

2. Scope and applicability.

1. **Legislative changes.**—This Article has been newly introduced into the Limitation Act by Section 42 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 12 of 1923, which received the assent of the Governor-General on 16th March 1923

2. **Scope and applicability.**—The claim under Section 443 of the Criminal Procedure Code referred to in this Article, is a claim to be tried under the special procedure of Chapter 33 of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to trial of cases outside the Presidency Towns in which European and Indian British subjects are concerned.

Where the Magistrate rejects the claim of any person to be tried under the procedure prescribed by the said Chapter, and records a finding to that effect, the person by whom such claim is made has, under the said Section 443 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a right of appeal to the Sessions Judge whose decision is final.

This Article prescribes the period of limitation for presentation of such appeals. Where the claim is rejected, the Magistrate is required to stay proceedings until the expiration of the period allowed for the presentation of the appeal under this Article, or if an appeal is presented, until it has been decided

151.* From a decree or order of any of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras, Bombay and Lahore in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.	Twenty days.	The date of the decree or order.	Article 151
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.

2. Scope of the Article.

3. Starting point.

* Act of 1877

151 — From a decree or order of any	Twenty days.	The date of the decree or order.
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Acts of 1871 and 1859
No corresponding provision.

Article 151
Notes
1—2

Other Topics

Appeal under Indian Divorce Act ... See Note 2, Pt. 6
 "Decree or order" covers 'judgment' under Letters Patent ... See Note 3, Pt. 3
 Original jurisdiction and ordinary original civil jurisdiction: See Note 2, Pts. 4, 5
 Time for obtaining copy to be excluded, even if copy not required under rules ...
 See Note 3, Pt. 4

1. Legislative changes.

1. There was no provision corresponding to this Article in the Act of 1871 and the Act of 1859. The various High Courts framed their own rules as to the period within which the appeals referred to in this Article should be filed.¹
2. By the Amending Act 8 of 1930, the words "Lahore and Rangoon" have been substituted for the words "or the Chief Court of the Punjab or the Chief Court of Lower Burma," inasmuch as there are now High Courts in the said two provinces.
3. The word "and" was inserted before "Lahore" and the words "and Rangoon" after "Lahore" were omitted by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937.

2. Scope of the Article.—This Article applies only to appeals from the decrees or orders made in the exercise of the *original* jurisdiction of the High Courts specified. It does not govern appeals from the decrees or orders made in the exercise of their *appellate* jurisdiction. The expression "*original jurisdiction*" is used in this Article as opposed to "*appellate jurisdiction*." The original jurisdiction of the High Courts includes insolvency¹ and matrimonial² jurisdictions. The power of the High Courts to issue High Prerogative Writs such as *Mandamus*, *Certiorari* and *Habeas Corpus* is part of their original jurisdiction.³ There is a distinction between the original jurisdiction of the High Court, and its *ordinary* original civil jurisdiction.⁴ The Patna and Allahabad High Courts have not

Article 151 — Note 1

1. (1893) 22 Bom 612 (616), *A v. B.*
 (1869) 12 Suth W R 459 (459) : 13 Suth W R 216 : 5 Beng L R 47, *Hurruck Singh v. Toolsee Ram Sahay.*
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 107 (103), *In the matter of Hurruck Singh.*

Note 2

1. (1889) 13 Bom 520 (533) : 16 Ind App 136 : 5 Ssr 400 : 13 Ind Jur 251 (P.C.). *In the matter of Candas Narrandas Naviraku.* (Case under Article 160 of the Act of 1877.)
 [See however (1929) A I R 1929 Rang 229 (232) : 7 Rang 201 : 119 Ind Cas 615, *In the matter of J. W. Nasse* (Application for review of judgment passed in its insolvency jurisdiction is not within Article 162 of the Act.)]
2. (1893) 22 Bom 612 (616), *A v. B.*
3. (1930) A I R 1930 M S 1896 (902, 910) : 53 M L J 979 : 123 Ind Cas 831, *Penkataratnam v. Secretary of State*
4. (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 779 (780) : 53 M L J 237 : 126 Ind Cas 481, *In the matter of Kuppusamy Nagayar.*

been invested with the *ordinary* original civil jurisdiction.⁵ An appeal under the Indian Divorce Act of 1869 against a decree absolute made on the Original Side of a High Court in a suit for divorce is governed by this Article. Compare Section 29, Clause (3) of the Limitation Act, which provides that "nothing in the Limitation Act shall apply to *suits* under the Indian Divorce Act of 1869." This prohibition is restricted only to *suits* and hence does not extend to *appeals*.⁶

This Article also governs an appeal from a decree or order of the Madras City Civil Court to the High Court: vide Section 15, Clause (2) of the Madras City Civil Courts Act (7 of 1892).

3. Starting point.—Time, under this Article, commences to run from the date of the *decree* or *order* appealed from. Order 20 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the decree *shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced*. By virtue of O. 49 Rule 3 of the same Code, however, Order 20 Rule 7 does not apply to Chartered High Courts in the exercise of their original civil jurisdiction. But, as a matter of *practice* of the various High Courts, the decree is made to bear the date of the judgment.¹ It has accordingly been held that the starting point under the Article is the date of the judgment even though the decree is finally settled long after the date of the judgment.²

The words "*decree or order*" as used in this Article are wide enough to cover a '*judgment*' in the sense in which that word is used in the Letters Patent. Therefore, the period of limitation for an appeal under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent from a *judgment* of the Rangoon High Court on its Original Side is twenty days *from the date of the judgment*, such an appeal falling under this Article.³

In computing the period of twenty days allowed by this Article, the time taken in obtaining copies of the judgment and decree appealed from should be excluded under Section 12, sub-section 2 *ante*, even in cases where such copies are not required to be annexed to the memorandum of appeal by the rules of the High Court

5 (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 538 (544) : 10 Pat 218 : 129 Ind Cas 529 (F B), *Suraj-mot Brijlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa*.

6 (1898) 22 Bom 612 (616), *A v B*.

Note 3

1. (1913) 21 Ind Cas 545 (545) [Mad], *Abroobuchar Rahimtulla Savi v. Official Assignee of Madras*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Bom 64 (65) : I L R (1937) Bom 421 : 107 Ind Cas 664, *Nemichand Uttamchand v. Chaturbhuj Damji*.

[See also (1884) 10 Cal 652 (659, 660, 661), *Ramey v. Droughton*. (The decision assumed that Section 265 of the old Civil Procedure Code corresponding to the present Order 20 Rule 7 applied to the decree passed on the Original Side of the High Court)]

2. See the cases cited in Foot-Note 1.

3 (1927) A I R 1927 Rang 20 (25) : 4 Rang 265 : 99 Ind Cas 417, *Jyothoy N. Surty v. T. S. Chettiar Firm*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Rang 143 (144) : 98 Ind Cas 689, *M. H. Ariff v. Perumal*.

Article 151
Note 3

concerned.⁴ Similarly, where a portion of the period allowed by this Article is occupied by the appellant in getting the order appealed from varied and settled by the Registrar, it may be excluded under sub-section 3 of Section 12.⁵ As to the question whether Section 12 can be invoked for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under this Article in cases (a) where application for copy of decree is made after the expiration of twenty days prescribed by this Article or (b) where the time limited by this Article is fully taken up in getting the *decree* prepared in accordance with the practice of the Original Side of the High Court, see the undermentioned cases.⁶

Article 152

152.* Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the Court of a District Judge.	Thirty days.	The date of the decree or order appealed from.
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope.
- 2a. "Under the Code of Civil Procedure."
3. "Date of the decree."
4. Amendment of decree under Section 152, Civil Procedure Code—Effect of.
5. Effect of review of judgment.
6. Appeals from orders.
7. Time expiring on date on which Court is closed.
8. Extension of time.
9. Exclusion of time.

* Act of 1877
Same as above.

Act of 1871

Columns one and two, same as above. Column three ran :—The date of the decree appealed against.

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision.

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4. (1928) A I R 1928 P C 103 (105) - 6 Rang 302 - 109 Ind Cas 1 : 55 Ind App (Reversing on

as 852 (F B),

* Muhammad.

5. (1937) A I R 1937 P C 107 (107) - 167 Ind Cas 345 . 31 Sind L R 239, *Hubert Rowan Hodge v Mohamed Kamgar Shah*.

6. (1937) A I R 1937 Bom 162 (163, 164) . 168 Ind Cas 77 : I L R (1937) Bom 443 (F B), *Murlidhar Shrinivas v Motilal Ramcoomar*.

- (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 734 (735) - 56 Cal 709 : 121 Ind Cas 307, *Sambhu Nath v Gopal Chandra*

J 1215 (F B), *Secre-
I R 1920 Cal 804)*

as 277, *Kamruddin*

J 999 : 68 Ind Cas
- *Lee*.

1. **Legislative changes.**—This Article is the same as Article 152 of the Act of 1877 and Article 151 of the Act of 1871. In the Act of 1871, the third column contained only the words "the date of the decree appealed against." There was no reference to orders appealed against.

2. **Scope.**—This Article prescribes the period of limitation for an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code, to the Court of the District Judge. Article 156 *infra* prescribes the period of limitation for an appeal to the High Court except where the appeal is from a decree or order passed in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court. In the latter case, Article 151 is applicable and prescribes the period of twenty days from the date of the decree or order.

2a. "Under the Code of Civil Procedure."—See generally Note 3 to Article 156 *infra*. An appeal to the District Judge under the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, against a decree of the Revenue Court is governed by the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code and the period of limitation prescribed by Article 152.¹

3. "Date of the decree."—See for a full discussion Note 5 to Article 156 *infra*. As will be seen from that Note, the date of the decree is the date of the judgment, no matter on what date the decree was actually signed.¹ The reason is that it is on the date of the judgment that the Court must be deemed to have expressed what the decree is, and, when a person has the judgment of the Court in his favour, it may be said that he then obtains his decree, and that decree though drawn up afterwards relates back to the date of the judgment.²

Order 20 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that, after the case has been heard, the Court shall pronounce judgment in open Court either at once or on some future day, of which due notice must be given to the parties or their pleaders. Where counsel of the parties have been duly given notice of the date fixed for

Article 152 — Note 2a

- 1 (1912) 17 Ind Cas 653 (653) (All), *Ram Lal v Amar Chand*

Note 3

- 1 (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 67 (66) 126 Ind Cas 543, *U Po Thaw v Ma Thi*.
(1899) 23 Bom 442 (445), *Yamaji v Antaji*.
(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 308 (308) 25 Ind Cas 67, *Narayanasaamy v Krishnaswami*.
(1898) 25 Cal 109 (111), *Golam Gaffar Mandal v Goljan Bibi*.
(1936) 165 Ind Cas 53 (54) (Cal), *Kedar Nath Moyra v Ghollam Hossein Mollah*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 511 (512) 32 Ind Cas 744, *Anandram v Nityananda Barham*.
(1890) 12 All 461 (468) 1890 All W N 149 (17 B), *Becky v Ihsan Ullah Khan*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Nag 113 (113) 66 Ind Cas 7, *Narayan v Ramdulars*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Rang 335 (335) 101 Ind Cas 319, *Perumal Maistry v. Paitirs Komor*.
2. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 1064 (1065) 32 Ind Cas 746, *Gurabala Das v. Biswambhar Haldar*.

Article 152
Notes
3-5

delivery of the judgment, limitation for appeal will begin to run from that date, although neither the parties nor their counsel were present.³ It is not necessary, in such cases, that the Court should communicate the result of the case to the parties.^{3a} But where a judgment is pronounced in the absence of the parties or their counsel on a date of which *no notice* had been given to them, and the Judge only sent an intimation to the plaintiff's pleader of the decision of the case against him, the judgment cannot be said to have been pronounced in accordance with law, and limitation for appeal begins to run only from the date on which intimation is received about the decision of the case and not from the date on which judgment was written and signed.⁴ But from the fact that the whole judgment has not been read out in Court, it cannot be said that judgment is not pronounced.⁵

4. Amendment of decree under Section 152, Civil Procedure Code — Effect of. — See Note 14 to Section 5 *ante*, Note 8 to Article 156 *infra* and the undermentioned cases.¹

5. Effect of review of judgment. — Where a review of judgment is granted, the result is a new decree *superseding* the original decree.¹ In this respect it differs from an *amendment of a decree* under Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code. Where therefore a review of judgment has been granted, time for appeal from the decree passed on review runs from the date thereof.¹ And this would

3. (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 59 (59) : 93 Ind Cas 942, *B. B. & C. I. Ry. Co. v. Ramnarup Mahrumal*.

3a (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 742 (743) : 166 Ind Cas 698, *Ladha Mal-Bishen Das v. Nadar*

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5. (1926) 94 Ind Cas 121 (121) (Nag), *Kutub-ud-din v. Gulam Rabbani*.

Note 4

1. (1917) A I R 1917 Low Bur 162 (163) : 35 Ind Cas 347, *War Lone v. Rainey*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 893 (899) : 78 Ind Cas 525, *Satya Ranjan Nag v. Kehulish Chandra Pal*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 All 567 (568) : 85 Ind Cas 637, *Ishwar Prasad v. Bishunath Prasad Singh*.
- (1905) 9 Cal W N 605 (607), *Menat Ali v. Amdar Ali*.

Note 5

1. (1881) 6 Cal 22 (25) • 6 Cal L R 575 : 5 Ind Jur 522 : 3 Shome L R 197, *Joykishen Mookerjee v. Ataoor Bohonian*.
- (1906) 30 Bom 56 (60) • 7 Bom L R 664, *Vidyal v. Fulchand*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 323 (327) • 131 Ind Cas 253, *Aditya Kumar v. Abimash Chandra*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 576 (579) : 133 Ind Cas 571, *Soudamini Das v. Nabalak Maa*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 62 (62) : 4 Lah 165 • 75 Ind Cas 520, *Nawaz Ali v. Aliu*.
- (1936) 165 Ind Cas 53 (54, 55) (Cal), *Kedar Nath Moyra v. Gulam Hossein McIlah*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 55 (56) • 90 Ind Cas 119, *Ghuttur Singh v. Phulang Singh*.

be so even if the original decree is ultimately upheld on review.² See also Note 9 to Article 156 *infra*.

Article 152
Notes
5—9

6. Appeals from orders.—This Article governs also appeals under the Civil Procedure Code from orders to the District Judge. As in the case of an appeal from a decree, the memorandum of appeal in the case of orders also should be accompanied by a copy of the order appealed from as well as a copy of the judgment.¹ Where, however, a formal order has not been drawn up, it is sufficient for the appellant to attach to the memo of appeal a copy of the judgment alone and time will run from the date of the judgment.² It has also been held that where the formal order is an exact copy of the concluding portion of the judgment, failure to file a copy of such order will not invalidate the appeal.³ See also the undermentioned case.⁴

7. Time expiring on date on which Court is closed.—Where the period prescribed by this Article expires on a day on which the Court is closed, the appeal may, under Section 4 of the Act, be filed on the day on which the Court re-opens. See Notes to Section 4 *ante*.

8. Extension of time.—An appeal governed by this Article may be admitted after the expiry of the period prescribed, if sufficient cause is shown under Section 5 *ante* for not preferring it within that period. See Notes to Section 5 *ante*.

9. Exclusion of time.—As to the right of the appellant to exclude the time requisite for obtaining copies of the judgment and decree, see Notes 7 and 10 to Section 12 *ante*.

On the question as to whether and when the interval between the pronouncing of the judgment and the signing of the decree can

[See also (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 113 (114) 73 Ind Cas 34, *Gour Krishna Sarkar v Nilmadhab Saha*

(1929) A I R 1929 Bom 183 (185) 116 Ind Cas 227, *Shidramappa Retanshidappa v Gurushantappa Shankappa*]

2 (1918) 20 Ind Cas 647 (648) (All), *Nanhe v. Mangat Das*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Cal 418 (419) 107 Ind Cas 751, *Nubran Chandra v Abdul Hakim*

(1915) A I R 1915 Low Bur 152 (152) 27 Ind Cas 732, *Maung Kyaw v Ma Gaul*

Note 6

1 (1918) A I R 1918 All 894 (395) 42 Ind Cas 888 40 All 12, *Qasim Ali Khan v Mt Bhagwant Kuar*

(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 177 (181) 47 Bom 349 77 Ind Cas 83, *Dadabhai Framji v Cowasji Dorabji*

2 (1912) 14 Ind Cas 1006 (1006 1007) (Cal), *Kamala Das v Tarapada Mukerji*

(1924) A I R 1924 All 162 (162, 163) 74 Ind Cas 486, *Kidar Nath v Nanak*

(1933) A I R 1933 All 762 (763) 147 Ind Cas 865 56 All 27, *Surendra Narain v Lal Bahadur Singh*

3. (1923) A I R 1923 All 579 (579) 74 Ind Cas 761, *Mt Kausilla Kuar v Mt Sulhdei*

4. (1902) 6 Cal W N 283 (284), *Khirode Sundari v Jnanendra Nath* (Appeal from order under Section 47, C P C.—It is sufficient to attach to the memorandum of appeal a copy of the order itself.—Copy of decree need not be attached even if such a decree may have been drawn up.)

Article 152
Note 9

be deducted in computing the period of limitation for appeal, see Note 25 to Section 12 *ante*.

Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply to appeals. But where through a *bona fide* mistake, time has been spent in prosecuting an appeal in a wrong Court, the delay may be excused in the exercise of the Court's discretion under Section 5.¹ But if the appellant has been guilty of carelessness, he is not entitled to extension of time on the ground of his having prosecuted his remedy in the wrong Court.²

See Note 9 to Section 5 *ante*.

Article 153

<p>153.* Under the same Code to a High Court from an order of a Subordinate Court refusing leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council.</p>	<p>Thirty days. The date of the order.</p>
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1. Scope of the Article. — Under Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure an appeal lies in certain cases, direct to the Privy Council from Courts other than High Courts. Thus, the Court of First Appeal against orders under Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Code is a Court of "final appellate jurisdiction" within the meaning of Section 109 of that Code and an appeal lies direct to the Privy Council provided the other conditions necessary exist. Where in such cases leave to appeal is refused under Order 45 Rule 6 of the Code, an appeal from such order of refusal will lie under Order 43 Rule 1, Clause (v). This Article provides the limitation for such appeals.

*

Act of 1877

153 — Under the same Code, Section 601, to a High Court. { Thirty days. { The date of the order refusing the certificate.

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision.

Note 9

1

2. (1904) 28 Bom 235 (237) : 5 Bom L R 947, *Daudbhai Musabhai v. Emnabai*.
(1907) 34 Cal 216 (219) : 5 Cal L Jour 360, *Sarat Chandra Bose v. Saraswati Dedi*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 233 (234) : 2 Lah 1, *Ummed Ali v. Jhangmaghiana Municipality*. (Revision filed though appellant knew appeal lay—Delay not excused.)

154.* Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to any Court other than a High Court.	Thirty days.	The date of the sentence or order appealed from.
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Article 154

Synopsis

1. Scope and applicability.
2. Appeals from orders under Sections 476 and 476 A of the Criminal Procedure Code — Starting point.
3. Appeals from jail.

1. Scope and applicability. — This Article applies to appeals under the Code of Criminal Procedure to any Court *other than the High Court*. The next Article and Article 157 apply to appeals to the *High Court*, excepting appeals covered by Article 150. Chapter 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifies the various cases in which appeals will lie to Courts other than the High Court, and Section 476 B provides that an appeal shall lie from an order making or refusing to make a complaint under Sections 476 and 476 A of the Code.

An *application* under sub-section 6 of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before its amendment in 1923, was held not to be an appeal and not governed by this Article¹ That sub-section has now been abolished, and the said cases are no longer of any importance.

An application made under Section 520 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to a Court of appeal, confirmation, reference or revision is not in the nature of an appeal, so as to attract the provisions of the Limitation Act²

2. Appeals from orders under Sections 476 and 476 A of the Criminal Procedure Code—Starting point.—Where an application under Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure asking the Court to make a complaint is *refused*, time runs from the date of the

* Act of 1877, Article 154 and Act of 1871, Article 152

Substantially same as above

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision.

Article 154 — Note 1

- 1 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1112 (1111) 14 Ind Cas 305 13 Cri L Jour 209 39 Mad 750 (F B), *Dapu v. Dapu*
(1912) 16 Ind Cas 167 (169) 13 Cri L Jour 599 42 Cal 239, *Pochy Mistay v. Emperor*
(1920) A I R 1920 Lah 305 (305) 1 Lah 602 60 Ind Cas 33 22 Cri L Jour 177, *Punna Lal v. Jamia Mal*
- 2 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 797 (793) 50 Mad 916 104 Ind Cas 719 28 Cri L Jour 879, *Srinivasa Moorthi v. Narasimhalu Naidu*

Article 154
Notes
2—3

order of refusal.¹ Where, however, an order is made *directing* a complaint to be filed, time is to be calculated not from the date of such order but from the date when the complaint *has been actually made*. The reason is that Section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives a right of appeal to a person against whom a complaint "*has been made*."²

3. Appeals from jail.—For the purposes of computing the period of limitation in the case of appeals proffered by appellants in jail, time is to be calculated up to the date of presentation of the appeal to the officer in charge of the jail. The reason is that under the provisions of Section 420 of the Criminal Procedure Code, presentation of the petition of the appeal to the officer in charge of the jail is equivalent to the presentation to the Court so far as the requirements of the Limitation Act are concerned.¹

Article 155

155.* Under the same Code to a High Court, except in the cases provided for by article 150 and article 157.	Sixty days.	The date of the sentence or order appealed from.
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Synopsis

1. Scope.
2. Appeal from order of Civil Court under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
3. Appeal from order of Single Judge of High Court.
4. Application for leave to appeal under Section 449 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
5. Starting point.

*

Act of 1877

Substantially same as above.

Act of 1871, Article 153

Column one—Under the same Code to the High Court
and three substantially same as above

Columns two

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision

Note 2

1. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1228 (1230) : 52 Cal 1009 . 90 Ind Cas 529 : 26 Cri L Jour 1569, *Chunder Kumar Sen v. Mathuraya Debva*.
(1931) 1931 Mad W N 1064 (1067), *Kandasamy Pillai v. Thirunatikarasa Pillai* (A I R 1928 Bom 64 and A I R 1925 Cal 1228, Referred to.)
2. (1928) A I R 1928 Bom 64 (64) . 106 Ind Cas 26 : 52 Bom 164 : 29 Cri L Jour 315, *Daga Devji Patil v. Emperor*.
(1927) 106 Ind Cas 584 (584) (Lah), *Labha Mal v. Wasana Mal*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 54 (54, 55) : 7 Lah 77 . 98 Ind Cas 393 : 27 Cri L Jour 1921, *Fitzholmes v. Emperor*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Nag 199 (200) . 1935 Cri Cas 1006 : 31 Nag L R 370 : 158 Ind Cas 496 : 36 Cri L Jour 1371, *Dal Goring v. Jannabai*.

Note 3

1. (1886) 9 Mad 253 (259) . 1 Weir 789, *Queen-Empress v. Lingappa*.

1. Scope. — This Article applies to appeals, under the Criminal Procedure Code, to the High Court except in the cases provided for by Articles 150 and 157. In other words, it applies to all appeals to the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, excepting appeals from sentences of death, and appeals from acquittals.¹

An appeal preferred to the High Court under the Extradition Act is not one under the Criminal Procedure Code and is not governed by this Article.²

2. Appeal from order of Civil Court under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code. — An appeal against the order of a Civil Court (e. g. the District Judge), making or refusing to make a complaint under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code is *not* a *civil appeal* governed by the Civil Procedure Code, but an appeal under the Criminal Procedure Code and is governed by this Article and not by Article 156.¹

3. Appeal from order of Single Judge of High Court. — The Article is not limited to appeals to the High Court from Courts in the mofussil, but extends also to appeals from orders of a Single Judge of the High Court to a Division Bench of the High Court. Thus an appeal from an order of a Single Judge of a High Court under Section 449, sub-section 1, clause (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code is an appeal under the Criminal Procedure Code, and consequently this Article will apply.¹

Suppose an order is passed under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code by a Single Judge of the High Court. The question whether an appeal will lie to a Bench of the same High Court under Section 476B of the said Code depends upon the question whether such Single Judge can be considered as the *subordinate* of the Division Bench. The reason is that an appeal lies under that Section only to the Court to which the Court passing the order sought to be appealed from is *subordinate*. It has been held by the High Court of Allahabad² and the Chief Court of Lower Burma³ that

Article 155 — Note 1

1. (1925) A I R 1925 Rang 99 (39) 2 Rang 886 26 Cri L Jour 293 84 Ind Cas 437, *In re Abdulla* (Appeal under S. 408 (b), Criminal P. C., from a sentence exceeding 4 years by a specially empowered Magistrate.)
2. (1932) 15 Mad 414 (415) 2 Mad L Jour 142 1 Weir 588, *Hayes v. Christian*.

Note 2

1. (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 718 (719) 104 Ind Cas 456 28 Cri L Jour 640, *Rajani Kanta Kayal v. Bisoomoni Das*
- (1926) A I R 1926 All 211 (212) 93 Ind Cas 851, *Sheo Prasad v. Sheo Bans Rai*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Sind 215 (216) 20 Sind L R 90 27 Cri L Jour 780 95 Ind Cas 316, *Gerswal v. Sheuaram*.

Note 3

1. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1203 (1204) 53 Cal 746 98 Ind Cas 248 27 Cri L Jour 1804, *Thomas v. Emperor*
2. (1917) A I R 1917 All 474 (475) 36 Ind Cas 535 39 All 147 17 Cri L Jour 537, *Ramjas v. Mahadeo Pershad*
3. (1911) 12 Cri L Jour 469 (470) 11 Ind Cas 1005 6 Low For Rul 25, *Than Pe v. Ba Than*

Article 155
Notes
3—5

a Single Judge of the High Court is not subordinate to the High Court, and therefore an order by such Single Judge under Section 476 is not appealable at all under Section 476 B to the High Court. The High Courts of Bombay,⁴ Calcutta⁵ and Madras⁶ have, on the other hand, held that he is so subordinate and that an appeal will lie to the High Court under Section 476 B. In the latter view, the appeal so preferred will be one under the Criminal Procedure Code⁷ and will be governed by this Article. In the undermentioned case⁸ the question was raised whether Article 151 or this Article will apply to such cases, but it was not decided. It is submitted that Article 151 which is a general provision will not prevail against this Article which is a specific provision.

4. Application for leave to appeal under Section 449 of the Criminal Procedure Code.—An application for leave to appeal under Section 449 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been held to be governed by the sixty days' rule under this Article. The reason is that such application must necessarily precede the admission of the appeal itself. In other words, where the appeal is barred under this Article, the application must also necessarily be barred.¹ Similarly an application under Section 449 for determination of the status of the accused as an European British subject presented after sixty days from the date of the conviction would be barred by limitation, as the appeal itself would be barred.²

5. Starting point.—Where a complaint is directed to be made under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, time runs from the date of *making the complaint* and not from the order directing the complaint to be made.¹ (See also Notes to Article 151.)

	1947 . 47
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8. (1)

Note 4

- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1203 (1204) : 53 Cal 746 : 98 Ind Cas 248 . 27 Cri L Jour 1804, *Thomas v. Emperor*
(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 307 (308) : 54 Cal 52 : 101 Ind Cas 657 . 28 Cri L Jour 481, *Gallagher v. Emperor*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1203 (1204) : 53 Cal 746 : 98 Ind Cas 248 : 27 Cri L Jour 1304, *Thomas v. Emperor*.

Note 5

- (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 54 (54) : 98 Ind Cas 393 . 7 Lah 77 : 27 Cri L Jour 1321, *Fitzholmes v. Emperor*

156.* Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High Court, except in the cases provided for by article 151 and article 153.

Ninety days. The date of the decree or order appealed from.

Article 156

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. "Under the Code of Civil Procedure."
4. "High Court."
5. "Date of the decree."
6. Decree or order.
7. Several decrees in same suit.
8. Amendment of decree — Effect of.
9. Review of judgment — Effect of.
10. Death of party after decree.
11. Ex parte decree set aside by trial Court but restored by High Court.
12. Section 4 and this Article.

Other Topics

'Appeal' means appeal preferred as of right ... See Note 2
 Letters Patent Appeal—Article not applicable ... See Note 2, Pt 2
 Right of appeal conferred by other Acts but procedure governed by Civil Procedure Code—Article applies ... See Note 3, Pts 1 to 3
 Section 5 and this Article ... See Note 8

1. Legislative changes.

1. Article 154 of the Act of 1871, corresponding to this Article, did not contain in the first column the words "except in the cases provided by Article 151 or Article 153" as there were no such Articles in that Act. Nor did it contain in the third column, the words "or order."
2. Article 156 of the Act of 1877 was worded in terms similar to this Article

2. **Scope of the Article.**—Article 151 *ante* provides for appeals from decrees or orders of certain High Courts in the exercise of their

*

Act of 1877

Same as above

Act of 1871

163 To a High Court for the admission of a special appeal | Ninety days | The date of the decree appealed against

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision

Article 156
Notes
2—3

original jurisdiction. Article 153 provides for an appeal to a High Court from an order of a subordinate Court refusing leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. This Article applies to all appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure to a High Court other than those provided by Articles 151 and 153.

An "appeal" means an appeal which is preferred as a *matter of right* and not an appeal which is entertainable or not at the discretion of the Appellate Court. Thus, where it was provided by Section 27 of the Burma Courts Act (17 of 1875) that the Judicial Commissioner *may* receive an appeal under certain circumstances, it was held by the High Court of Calcutta that such an appeal was not governed by the period of limitation prescribed by this Act for appeals to the High Court.¹ It has been held by the Chief Court of Oudh that an appeal from the judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court made in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under the Letters Patent (which provides that no such appeal will lie unless the Judge declares that the case is a fit one for appeal) is not governed by this Article.²

3. "Under the Code of Civil Procedure." — The expression "appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure" means an appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so far as procedure is concerned. It is not restricted to appeals the right to prefer which is conferred by the Civil Procedure Code. Where, under Section 49 of the Burma Courts Act (17 of 1875) there was a right of appeal from the Court of the Recorder of Rangoon to the High Court, and, under Section 97 of that Act the procedure to be followed was that of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in *Aga Mahomed v. Cohen*¹ that the appeal was one "under the Code of Civil Procedure" within the meaning of this Article. Their Lordships observed:

"The Limitation Act, Schedule 2, Article 156, when it speaks of the Civil Procedure Code, is, on the face of it, speaking of a Code which relates to procedure, and does not ordinarily deal with substantive rights; and the natural meaning of an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code appears to us to be an appeal governed by the Code of Civil Procedure so far as procedure is concerned."

The case was followed by the High Court of Madras in *Ramaswamy Pillai v. Tahsildar of Madura*,² where the question was in respect of the period of limitation applicable to an appeal to the

Article 156 — Notes 2

- 1 (1884) 10 Cal 946 (946, 949, 950), *Mahomed Hossain v. Inodeen*. (On a reference from (1872-1892) Low Bur Rul 275 (277))
2. (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 108 (109) . 3 Luck 145 . 106 Ind Cas 496, *Mt Braj Bani v. Suba Din*

Note 3

- 1 (1886) 13 Cal 221 (224)
- 2 (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 407 (406) . 43 Mad 51 : 53 Ind Cas 405. (13 Cal 221, Followed)

High Court under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894). After referring to *Aga Muhammad's Case*,¹ and the passage quoted above, their Lordships observed as follows :

Article 156
Notes,
3—4'

"There seems to be no good reason for saying that an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code means only an appeal, the right to prefer which is conferred by the Code itself. On the other hand, it would not be straining the language of the Article too much to hold that an appeal, the procedure with respect to which from its inception to its disposal is governed by the Civil Procedure Code, may rightly be spoken of as an appeal under the Code. This interpretation seems to us to be strengthened by the reference in Article 156 itself to Article 151 of the same Schedule. Article 151 provides for appeals from a decree or order of the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Now, though the right to appeal from such decrees or orders is not given by the Code of Civil Procedure, but by the Letters Patent, yet Article 156 speaks of such appeals as appeals under the Civil Procedure Code. That also tends to show that what is meant by the Legislature is appeals, the hearing and disposal of which is governed by the rules of procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code."

In *Dropadi v. Hira Lal*,² Sir Henry Richards, C. J., observed as follows :

"There are several Acts, for example, the Succession Act, the Probate and Administration Act, and the Land Acquisition Act, which make the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings under the Act and give a right of appeal to the High Court, but do not prescribe any period of limitation for the appeal. It has always been assumed, probably rightly, that such appeals are appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure, governed by what is now Article 156 of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act and by the general provisions of the Act also."

See also the undermentioned case³

4. "High Court." — There is no definition of the expression "High Court" in this Act, and, consequently, the definition thereof given in the General Clauses Act (10 of 1897) will apply. Section 3, sub-section 24 of that Act defines "High Court" as follows :

"'High Court', used with reference to civil proceedings, shall mean the highest Civil Court of Appeal, (not including the Federal Court) in the part of British India in which the Act or Regulation containing the expression operates "

3 (1912) 16 Ind Cas 149 (153) 31 All 496 (F B)

4 (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 488 (489) 110 Ind Cas 374, *Pana Ebi v. Vahla* (Article 156 of Schedule 1 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals under special Acts, the procedure in respect of which is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore limitation for an appeal under Section 47, Guardians and Wards Act, is 90 days from the date of the order under appeal.)

Article 156
Note 5

5. "Date of the decree."—Order 20 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "the decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced" and that "when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree." The date of the decree is, therefore, the *date of the judgment* even though the decree was actually signed later. This view has been generally accepted as applying to the interpretation of the words "date of the decree" in this Article also.¹ A contrary view, namely, that time runs from the date on which the decree is signed, has been taken in some cases. In *Ram Asray Singh v. Sheonandan Singh*,² Champier, C. J., held that time ran under this Article from the date on which the decree was signed and not from the date on which the judgment was delivered. He relied for this view on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in *Beni Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dasi*.³ That decision, however, did not decide that time ran from the date on which the decree was signed. On the contrary, it decided that time did run from the date of the judgment, but that in computing the period of limitation the period between the date of the judgment and the date of signing the decree should be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act as being time requisite for obtaining copies. In two cases decided by him, Kinkhede, A. J. C., also took the view that the starting point under this Article was the date on which the decree was signed.⁴ His view has not, however, been accepted in later decisions of the Nagpur Court.⁵ A Single Judge of the Lahore High Court⁶ has purported to follow the view expressed in *Beni Madhub's case*⁷ as well as those expressed by the Patna High Court in *Ram Asray's case*⁸

Note 5

1. (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 129 (130) : 75 Ind Cas 879. 1 Pat 771, *Sagarmal Marwari v. Lachmisaran Misar*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 1 (2) : 98 Ind Cas 1057 (F B), *Umda v. Rupchand*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 349 (349) : 22 Nag L R 60 : 97 Ind Cas 307, *Dindayal v. Anop*.
- (1928) 112 Ind Cas 715 (716) (All), *Firm Baldeo Prasad Babu Ram v. Firm Haji Ali Mohammad Usman*.
- (1926) 94 Ind Cas 121 (121) (Nag), *Kutub-ud-din v. Gulam Rabbani*
- (1929) A I R 1929 Rang 116 (116) : 7 Rang 18 : 117 Ind Cas 251, *Maung Po Kyaw v. Ma Lay*
- (1886) 13 Cal 104 (106) (F B), *Beni Madhub Mitter v. Matungini Dasi*
2. (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 267 (267) : 35 Ind Cas 868 (F B).
3. (1886) 13 Cal 104 (106) (F B).
4. (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 207 (207) : 89 Ind Cas 938, *Tukaram v. Luzim-narayan*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Nag 271 (273) : 20 Nag L R 131. 78 Ind Cas 996, *Pandu v. Rajeshwar*.
5. (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 1 (2) : 98 Ind Cas 1057 (F B), *Umda v. Rupchand*
- (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 349 (349) : 22 Nag L R 60 : 97 Ind Cas 307, *Dindayal v. Anop*.
- (1926) 94 Ind Cas 121 (121) (Nag), *Kutub-ud-din v. Gulam Rabbani*.
6. (1936) AIR 1936 Lah 976 (978) : 168 I C 897, *Khan Chand v. Gurdit Singh*.
7. (1886) 13 Cal 104 (106) (F B).
8. (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 267 (267) : 35 Ind Cas 868 (F B).

and by Kinkhede, A. J. C., in the two Nagpur cases referred to above. It is submitted that the view that time runs from the date the decree is signed is not correct. The Article clearly specifies the starting point as the date of the decree, and the date of the decree is under Order 20 Rule 7 clearly the date of the judgment. The Legislature must be presumed to have known of this interpretation when it repeated the Article in the present Act. It does not seem permissible to make time run from a date other than that specified in the Article on any ground of supposed hardship. It is also submitted that there does not really seem to be any hardship in accepting the view that the date of the decree is the date of the judgment. A party must know on the date of the judgment itself whether he is going to appeal or not against it. And if he intends to do so he can immediately apply for copies of judgment and the decree and, automatically the time taken by the Court in preparing the decree would be excluded under Section 12 of the Act. There is no reason why he should be allowed to wait until the decree is prepared before applying for copies.

Order 20 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that when the judgment is not pronounced immediately after the case is heard, notice must be given to the parties or their pleaders of the day on which the judgment is to be pronounced. Where a judgment is delivered without such notice, it must be taken that the judgment was never pronounced according to law, and time for an appeal will run from the date on which the party or his pleader receives intimation of the decision of the case against him.⁹

Where the Judge gave a judgment but considering that the plaintiff was liable under the Stamp Act to pay a penalty on the sale deed in suit, he ordered that the decree should not be drawn up until that penalty had been paid, and the decree was prepared and signed on the date on which the penalty was eventually paid, it was held in the undermentioned case¹⁰ that the judgment did not become an operative judgment until the date when the preparation of the decree was ordered and that this was the date of the judgment as well as of the decree from which limitation would run.

6. "Decree or order."—It has been held in the undermentioned case¹ of the Patna High Court that the word "decree" in this Article is not confined to a decree as defined under Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that an order having the force of a decree under special or local Acts, such as an order under Section 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, is a decree for the purposes of this Article also.

9 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 839 (539) 100 Ind Cas 993, *Sera Ram v. Massu*

(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 102 (103) 1919 Pun Re No 27 51 Ind Cas 239, *Lalli v. Sam Ditta*

10 (1916) 11 R 1916 Sind 2 (8) 9 Sind L R 193 34 Ind Cas 867, *Khudadad v. Moriookhan*

Note 6

1 (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 622 (623, 624) 57 Ind Cas 236 (F I), *Gelab v. Janhi Kuer*

Article 156
Notes
6—8

It is submitted that this view does not seem to be correct. The Civil Procedure Code is an enactment in *pari materia* with the Limitation Act, and contains a definition of "decree" as well as of "order". There is no reason why the words should be considered to have a different meaning here. No difficulty is created by limiting the word "decree" to the definition given to it by the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as if there is a right of appeal from an order to the High Court, the period of limitation is that prescribed by this Article, whether or not the order amounts to a "decree" as defined in the Civil Procedure Code.²

In certain proceedings it often happens that although there is a judgment, an order, i.e., the formal expression of the decision, is not drawn up. In such cases the concluding portion of the judgment which embodies the order is to be treated as the order against which the appeal is to be preferred, and time will run from the date of the judgment.³

7. **Several decrees in same suit.** — Where there are *several* judgments and *several* decrees in the same suit, time for appeal against a particular decree will run from the date of *that* decree. Thus, time for an appeal against a preliminary decree will run from the date of that decree and not from the date of the final decree.¹ Where there are several decrees against different defendants on different dates, the starting point for appeal for any particular defendant will be the date of the particular decree against him.² Similarly, where an interlocutory judgment was passed against one of two defendants and thereafter a final judgment and decree was passed against both the defendants, it was held by the High Court of Rangoon that the decree must be read as if there were two decrees, one relating to the interlocutory judgment and one relating to the final judgment, and that time for an appeal against the interlocutory judgment ran from the date thereof, even though the decree was signed only on the date of the final judgment.³

8. **Amendment of decree — Effect of.** — See also Note 14 to Section 5 *ante*.

An amended decree must be taken as in force from the date of the original decree. There is a distinction between a case of amendment and one of novation or substitution. Where an instrument is amended so as to express the real intention which, it was

2 See also (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 407 (408) : 43 Mad 51 : 53 Ind Cas 405, *Ramaswamy Pillai v Tahsildar of Madura*.

3 (1912) 14 Ind Cas 1006 (1007) (Cal), *Kamala Das v. Tarapada Mukerji*.

Note 7

1 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 596 (596) : 146 Ind Cas 359, *Benodini Choudhuran v. Jagabandhu Roy*

2 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1010 (1010) : 31 Ind Cas 917, *Sambasiva Iyer v. Muhammad Hussain Routhier*

3 (1930) A I R 1936 Rang 318 (314) : 164 Ind Cas 718, *Hock Sein v. Kyashlat Municipality*

intended to express, but which it did not completely express, the transaction is not, in substance, varied, but only its inaccurate description rectified.¹ On this principle it has been held that an amendment of a decree under Sections 151 or 152 of the Civil Procedure Code does not give a fresh starting point of limitation for an appeal² or application, except an application for execution of a decree in respect of which it is specifically provided by Article 182 *infra* that time shall run from the date of amendment. Where, however, a party is prejudiced by an amendment but finds that, at the date of the amendment, an appeal from the decree is barred if the period is calculated from the original decree, the Court will excuse the delay under Section 5 of the Act.³

There are however some decisions which have taken a somewhat different view. In *Mt. Gopi Bibi v. Chanu Prasad*,⁴ it was observed by the Patna High Court, purporting to follow the decision of the Calcutta High Court in *Amar Chandra v. Asad Ali*,⁵ that where a decree is amended in *material particulars*, time would run from the date of the amendment. It was also observed that, in any case, the delay caused by the amendment would be excused under Section 5 of the Act. In *Soudamini Dasu v. Nablak Mia*,⁶ it was held that where a decree is amended, whether by way of review or under Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code, time for appeal therefrom would run from the date of the amendment. It is submitted that this contrary view cannot be accepted as correct on principle.

9. Review of judgment — Effect of. — If a decree is modified on review or even if the same decree is passed after review is granted, the old decree is superseded and the decree for the purposes of appeal is the decree passed on review. The "date of the decree" in such cases will be the date of the review decree.¹ But where an application for

Article 156
Notes
8—9

Note 8

- 1 (1891) 14 Mad 150 (152), *Pydel v. Chathappan*
(1892) 15 Mad 403 (404) . 1 Mad L Jour 535, *Chathappan v. Pydel*
- 2 (1906) 3 Cal L Jour 188 (191, 192), *Brojolah Roy v. Tara Prasanna Bhattacharya*
(1917) A I R 1917 Low Bur 162 (163) 85 Ind Cas 347, *Wor Lene v. O. Rainey*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 622 (625) 37 Ind Cas 236 (FB), *Gotab v. Janaki Kuer*
- 3 (1906) 3 Cal L Jour 188 (191, 192), *Brojolah Roy v. Tara Prasanna Bhattacharya*
(1930) A I R 1930 Pat 142 (143) 117 Ind Cas 187, *Mt. Gopi Bibi v. Chanu Prasad*
- 4 (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 142 (143) 117 Ind Cas 187
- 5 (1905) 32 Cal 908 (909), *Amar Chandra Kundu v. Asad Ali Khan*
6. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 578 (579) 133 Ind Cas 571 (A I R 1931 Cal 323, Followed)

Note 9

1. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 418 (419) 107 Ind Cas 751, *Nibaran Chandra Sakdar v. Abdul Hakim*
(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 55 (56) 90 Ind Cas 119, *Ghuttur Singh v. Phulrang Singh*.
(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 323 (325, 326) . 131 Ind Cas 258, *Aditya Kumar v. Abinash Chandra*

place of the old and that therefore time would run from that date. It does not seem correct that the third column must be read differently from what it plainly purports to say.

12. Section 4 and this Article. — This Article should be read with Section 4 *ante*, and the period allowed for filing an appeal is the time allowed by Article 156 *plus* the time during which the Court was closed.¹

Article 156
Notes
11—12

<p>157.* Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from an order of acquittal.</p>	<p>Six months.</p>	<p>The date of the order appealed from.</p>
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Article 157

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope and applicability.

1. Legislative changes.

- 1 There was no Article corresponding to this in the Act of 1871. Under Section 272 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 10 of 1872), it was provided that the rules of limitation were not applicable to appeals against acquittal. By the Amending Act 11 of 1874, a period of six months was provided for such appeals.¹ This provision was transferred to the Limitation Act in 1877, and inserted as Article 157 of that Act.

- 2 The word "judgment" which occurred in Article 157 of the Act of 1877 has in the present Act been substituted by the word "order"

2. Scope and applicability. — This Article refers to appeals under the Criminal Procedure Code from an *order of acquittal*. The only Sections of that Code that provide for appeals from orders of *acquittal* are Sections 417 and 419 sub-section 2, and under these two Sections it is only the *Government* that can appeal and not any private person.

Although an appeal under Section 417 would be in time if brought within six months of the date of the order of acquittal, still, justice,

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Act of 1877

Substantially same as above.

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision

Note 12

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Pat GO (GO) 130 Ind Cas 265, *Ram Chandra Shukla v. Sri Thakurji Mandi Darhadhis*

Article 157 — Note 1

1. (1877) 2 Cal 436 (438) (F B), *The Empress v. Jayadulla*
(1874) 11 Bom H C R 117 (118, 119), *Regina v. Dorabji Balabhai*.

Article 157
Note 2

public interest, necessity and policy, all require that such appeals should be preferred with all reasonable expedition possible, for there may be cases where a new trial may have to be ordered or further evidence to be taken and the larger the interval that has elapsed since the investigation and trial, the greater is the inconvenience and difficulty, not only to get witnesses together but to obtain from them accurate or reliable testimony.¹ The effect of this Article is to fix the period of limitation in respect of all classes of cases of acquittal, whatever may have been the form of trial and whatever may be the scope of the appeal, i e., whether the trial was or was not one by a jury and whether the scope of the appeal extends to questions of fact as well as to questions of law.²

THIRD DIVISION : APPLICATIONS

Description of Application	Period of limitation.	Time from which period begins to run.
Article 158 158.* Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to set aside an award.	Ten days.	When the award is filed in Court and notice of the filing has been given to the parties.

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope and applicability.
3. Period of limitation.
4. Starting point.
5. Extension of time.
6. Exclusion of time.
7. Effect of bar.

*		
Act of 1877		
158.—Under the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside an award.	Ten days.	When the award is submitted to the Court.

Act of 1871		
155.—Under the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside an award	Ten days	When the award is submitted to the Court, and notice of the submission has been given to the persons and in manner prescribed by the High Court.

Act of 1859
No corresponding provision.

Note 2

1. (1883) 5 All 253 (255) . 1883 All W N 25, *Empress of India v. Yakub Khan*.
(1932) A I R 1932 Rang 146 (147) . 10 Rang 312 : 133 Ind Cas 523 : 33 Cri L Jour 701 : 1932 Cri Cas 709, *Emperor v. U San Win*.
2. (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 610 (611) . 61 Cal 931 : 151 Ind Cas 662 : 35 Cri L Jour 1367 : 1934 Cri Cas 903, *Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v. Bagvath Mahlo*.

1. **Legislative changes.** — Article 155 of Act 9 of 1871 corresponding to this Article provided that time ran from the date "when the award is submitted to the Court, and notice of the submission has been given to the persons and in manner prescribed by the High Court." Under Article 158 of Act 15 of 1877 the starting point was the date "when the award is submitted to the Court." These words were altered to their present form by Section 2 and Schedule 1 of the Repealing and Amending Act 18 of 1919.

2. **Scope and applicability.** — An award made on a *reference through Court* can be set aside on an application made for the purpose, on any of the grounds specified in Paragraph 15, Schedule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An award made on a *reference without the intervention of the Court* cannot be set aside on any application, though it may be filed on an application under Paragraph 20 of that Schedule.

This Article applies only to an *application to set aside* an award, that is, to an application under Paragraph 15 aforesaid.¹ Thus, it will not apply to the following cases —

1. An application to *modify or correct* an award under Paragraph 12 of that Schedule.²
2. An application for *remission* of an award under Paragraph 14 of that Schedule.³
3. An application to *file* an award under Paragraph 20 of that Schedule.⁴
4. A *written statement* filed by defendant in answer to an application for filing an award under Paragraph 20 aforesaid.⁵

In the first three cases the application is not to *set aside* the award, and in the last case there is no *application* but only a *defence* to which the Limitation Act itself does not apply.

As to whether a party is bound to apply to set aside an award which is *null and void* and whether the Court can take notice of such invalidity, see the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code, Schedule 2, Paragraphs 15 and 16 and the Notes thereto.

An application to revise a decree passed on the basis of an award is virtually an application to set aside the award, and is therefore

Article 158 — Note 2

1. (1886) 8 All 64 (67) 1886 All W N 2, *Muhammad Abid v. Muhammad Ashgar*
2. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 877 (877) 47 Ind Cas 597, *Appayya v. Venkataswami*. (1933) A I R 1933 All 649 (649) 146 Ind Cas 596, *Kiroli v. Dehari Lal*. (1918) 19 Ind Cas 496 (496) (Mad), *Hyder Sahib v. Guria Chettiar*.
3. See cases cited in Foot-Note 2
4. (1936) A I R 1936 Pesh 135 (136) 2 J R 16, *Lechhu Singh v. Ganesh Das*.
5. (1912) 18 Ind Cas 520 (523) 14 Oudh Cas 308, *Badruddeen Hasan v. Amir Begum*. (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 951 (951) 162 Ind Case 124, *Manghoo Ram v. Firm Girdhari Lal Ramchand*

Article 158
Notes
2—4

governed by this Article.⁶

An award made on a reference made in a suit on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court was submitted on the 6th July 1920 and on the 16th July 1920 the defendants filed an affidavit in the Prothonotary's Office objecting to the award. On the 22nd of July they gave notice that they would move the Court on the 29th of July that the award be set aside. It was held by the High Court of Bombay that the filing of the affidavit in the Prothonotary's Office on the 16th of July must be considered to be an "an application" to set aside the award within the meaning of Article 158.⁷

3. Period of limitation. — The period of limitation is 10 days from the date specified in the third column. The object of the Legislature in allowing so short a period for the preferring of objections to awards has been stated by Mr. Justice Rampini in the undermentioned case¹ to be as follows. "Litigants may be very willing to have their cases referred to the decision of arbitrators, whom they regard as amicably disposed towards them, but the moment the arbitrators decide against them they do their utmost to resile from their agreement and to set aside the award. The Legislature has framed Article 158 of the Limitation Act with the object of discouraging and preventing such discreditable attempts. If the provisions of Article 158 are loosely interpreted, and if an award is to be held not to be an award simply because any sort of unsubstantiated objection is made against it, then the object of the Legislature will be defeated and the provisions of Article 158 will be practically erased from the Statute Book."

4. Starting point. — Till the third column of the Article was amended in 1919, the starting point was the date "when the award is submitted to the Court." There was a conflict of decisions on the question whether, in view of Paragraph 10 of Schedule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code which requires the Court to give the parties notice of filing of the award, time under the Article must, notwithstanding the third column, run only from the date of the notice.¹ The words of

6. (1902) 29 Cal 167 (165) : 29 Ind App 51 : 4 Bom L R 161 : 12 Mad L Jour 77 : 6 Cal W N 226 : 8 Sar 154 : 1902 Pun Re No. 25 (P C), *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*.

(1903) 12 Mad L Jour 95 (96) (Jour), Critical Note on (1902) 29 Cal 167, *Ghulam Khan v. Muhammad Hassan*.

7. (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 419 (420) : 45 Bom 1071 : 68 Ind Cas 929, *Gopalji Kallianji v. Chhagan Lal Vitthalji*.

Note 3

1 (1902) 29 Cal 86 (41), *Ram Narain Roy v. Baij Nath Malla*.

Note 4

1. (1914) A I R 1914 Sind 141 (143) : 8 Sind L R 190 : 27 Ind Cas 371, *Kahan Barth v. Dochanbas*. (No.)

(1912) 18 Ind Cas 234 (235) (Mad), *Narayana Nambi v. Krishnan Mossad*. (No.)

(1916) A I R 1916 Lah 321 (322) : 31 Ind Cas 250, *Jauahar Singh v. Mehr Singh*. (Date fixed for submission—Presentation of award before that date without knowledge of opposite party is not "submission".)

the third column were substituted in 1919 for the words "when the award is submitted to the Court" and it is now clear that time runs only from the date when the award is *filed in Court* and notice of the filing has been given to the parties.

Where the arbitrator states a special case for the opinion of the Court, and the Court expresses its opinion, the date on which it so expresses its opinion must be taken to be the date when the "award is filed."²

A notice can, it is submitted, be said to be *given* to a party when such party *receives* the notice.³ A mere *direction to issue notice* is not *giving* any notice.⁴ The words "where notice has been given" show that it is not sufficient, in order that time may begin to run, that the party has received knowledge *aliunde* of the filing of the award. The Court must have *given* notice to the parties.⁵ Where on the date on which an award was filed in Court the defendant came late and applied for time for objections and the Court informed him that a decree had been passed in terms of the award and rejected his application, it was held that it could not be said that notice had been given to the defendant of the filing of the award.⁶

A *formal* notice is, however, not necessary in order to start time running. Where the award was brought in by the parties themselves and the Court informed them that they should file their objections within 10 days, it was held that notice must be taken to have been

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- (1901) 5 Cal W N 813 (815), *Nobin Kally Dabee v. Ambica Churn Banerjee*. (No)
- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 224 (225) 46 Cal 721 53 Ind Cas 46, *Sota Chand Bhutoria v. Hurry Dux Deora* (The word "submission" must be interpreted in the light of Para. 10 of Sch. 2 of the Code and time runs only when the award is "filed," i. e. after the procedure in Para. 10 is followed.)
- (1917) A I R 1917 Nag 211 (212) 13 Nag L R 172 42 Ind Cas 266, *Seetharam v. Rupram* (Yes)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Lah 352 (352) 28 Ind Cas 427, *Sahib Ras v. Chait Ram*. (Yes)
- (1921) A I R 1921 All 63 (63) 63 Ind Cas 899, *Sheo Prakash Ras v. Sri Ram Mahadeo*. (Yes.)
- (1898) 20 All 474 (475) 1898 All W N 132, *Chatarbhuj Das v. Ganesh Ram*. (The Court is bound to give notice of the filing of the award to the parties.)
2. (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 22 (25) 48 Bom 663 84 Ind Cas 378, *Lakshman Baburao v. Ramchandra Rajaram*.
3. See (1930) A I R 1930 All 477 (478) 126 Ind Cas 14, *Mohammad Thasim Khan v. Basant Ras*. (Quære)
4. (1930) A I R 1930 All 477 (478) 126 Ind Cas 14, *Mahomed Thasim Khan v. Basant Ras*.
5. (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 228 (229) 119 Ind Cas 331, *Punnoo Ram v. Nebh Raj*.
- (1898) 20 All 474 (475) 1898 All W N 132, *Chatarbhuj Das v. Ganesh Ram*. [See also (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 619 (619) 89 Ind Cas 240, *Gurditta Mal v. Firm of Bisanta Mal Panna Lal* (1888) 11 Mad 144 (145), *Pengasamy v. Muthusamy*]
6. (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 228 (229) 119 Ind Cas 331, *Punnoo Ram v. Nebh Raj*.

Article 158
Notes
4-6

given "to the parties".⁷ Where the Court made an order: "Inform the parties of the filing of the award," and the Bench Clerk informed the parties accordingly, it was held that notice had been given.⁸ Similarly, where the parties were shown the order recording the award and their initials taken in acknowledgment of the fact that they had notice, it was held that it was sufficient giving of notice.⁹

The word "parties" is not confined to parties *personally* but would include their pleaders and duly authorized agents. A notice to such persons therefore is notice to the parties for the purposes of this Article.¹⁰

5. Extension of time. — Section 5, Limitation Act, does not apply to applications to set aside an award and the Court has no power to enlarge the time within which such an application should be filed.¹ But where an application containing an additional ground of objection to the validity of an award is filed beyond time in addition to the one filed within time, the Court has a discretion to allow the additional ground to be added by way of amendment or to entertain it of its own motion if it thinks that the ground was such as to render a reference to arbitration or the award based thereon absolutely invalid.² Time may, however, be extended under Section 4, Limitation Act.³ The Court has power to extend the time allowed under Article 158 for supplying the necessary court-fee stamp on an application to set aside an award.⁴

6. Exclusion of time. — In computing the period of limitation, the time requisite for obtaining copy of the award can be excluded

7. (1926) A I R 1926 Bom 312 (312) : 95 Ind Cas 547, *Valchand Digchand v. Gulba Laxman*.
8. (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 619 (621) : 103 Ind Cas 625, *Saroj Bala v. Jatindra Nath*.
9. (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 135 (139) 95 Ind Cas 321, *Bholanath Roy v. Bala Krishna Roy*
[See also (1918) 21 Ind Cas 298 (301) (Lah), *Gulam Mustafa v. Hafiza Bibi*]

- Jatindra Nath.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 135 (139) : 95 Ind Cas 321, *Bholanath Roy v. Bala Krishna Roy*

Note 5

1. (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 723 (724) : 17 Ind Cas 7, *Surya Narain Jha v. Banwari Jha*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 273 (273) : 8 Lah 274 . 100 Ind Cas 955, *Devi Datta v. Babu Ram*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Nag 211 (212) : 13 Nag L R 172 . 42 Ind Cas 266, *Sitaram v. Rupram*.
2. (1918) 20 Ind Cas 773 (774) . 16 Oudh Cas 233, *Bhagwan Din Singh v. Fakir Singh*.
3. (1916) A I R 1916 Lah 321 (322) : 34 Ind Cas 250, *Jawahir Singh v. Mehr Singh*.
4. (1928) A I R 1928 Sind 67 (89) : 23 Sind L R 91 : 107 Ind Cas 223, *Admali v. Abdulah*.

under the provisions of sub-section 4 of Section 12 *ante*. See Note 30 to Section 12.

Article 158
Notes
6-7

7. Effect of bar.—The Court has no power to pass a decree in terms of the award before the expiry of ten days allowed by Article 158 except by consent of parties ^{1a}. If a decree is passed before that period, the procedure is illegal and the decree is liable to be set aside.¹

An objection to the validity of an award based on the reference is one which ought to be urged within 10 days as prescribed by Article 158 and when not so urged, the parties are precluded from relying on it in order to set aside the award and decree based on it ²

159.* For leave to appear and defend a suit under the summary procedure referred to in section 128 (2) (f) or under Order 37 of the same Code.	Ten days.	When the summons is served.
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Article 159

Synopsis

1. Scope.
2. Extension of period fixed.
3. Starting point.
4. Rangoon Small Cause Court Rules 1922, Rule 101.

* Act of 1877

159 —For leave to appear and defend a suit under Chapter 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure	Ten days	When the summons is served
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Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision.

Note 7

- 1a (1918) 21 Ind Cas 298 (301) (Lab), *Gulam Mustafa v Halima Bibi*.
 1 (1908) 5 All L Jour 36 (S N)
 (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 179 (180) 71 Ind Cas 266 45 Mad 466, *Pengiah Chetty v Govindasamy Chetty*
 (1934) A I R 1934 Mad 619 (620) 152 Ind Cas 157, *Subba Rao v Ramalin gavya*
 (1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 148 (148) 64 Ind Cas 90 24 Oudh Cas 234, *Mani Ram v Ram Aray*
 (1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 154 (154) 62 Ind Cas 819 24 Oudh Cas 263, *Sohan Lal v Munna Lal*
 (1925) A I R 1925 Rang 103 (103) 76 Ind Cas 307, *Achabar Pande v Kuldip Singh*
 (1911) 9 Ind Cas 197 (199) (Mad), *Valu Pillai v Appasami Pandaram*
 (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 166 (167) 107 Ind Cas 668, *Ram Kumar v Kushalchand Ganeshdas*
 2. (1907) 1907 Pun W R No 20 (page 42) 1907 Pun Re No 4, *Uda v Mal Chand*

Article 159
Notes
1—4

1. Scope. — Where a summary suit is filed under the provisions of Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code, the defendant is not entitled to appear and defend the suit unless he obtains leave of the Court to so appear and defend. (See Rule 2 of Order 37.) For this purpose he has to file an application. This Article prescribes the period of limitation for such applications

2. Extension of period fixed. — The period fixed by the Article cannot be extended by the Court under the provisions of Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure.¹ The High Court may, however, under its rule-making powers, extend Section 5 of this Act to applications for leave to defend and where it has been so extended, the Court may, for sufficient cause, excuse the delay in making the application. The Bombay High Court has so extended Section 5 to such applications. It has also been held by the same High Court that, under Rule 193 of the High Court Rules, a discretion is vested in the Chamber Judge, in a fit case, to extend the period of ten days in cases to which Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable.²

3. Starting point. — The starting point is the date when the summons is served.

A, the defendant, in his application for leave to defend alleged that he was served on 5.1.1896 and obtained an *ex parte* order granting the application. *B*, the plaintiff, applied thereafter to the Court praying that the order granting leave may be set aside on the ground that the defendant was actually served on 23.12.1895 and that the defendant's application had been made beyond time. The Sheriff's return showed that *A* was served on 23.12.1895. *A* thereupon wanted to show that he was not served at all. It was held that, at that stage, *A* could not be allowed to do so, that the date of service must be taken to be the date mentioned in the Sheriff's return, and that the order granting the leave should be set aside.¹

4. Rangoon Small Cause Court Rules 1922, Rule 101. — It has been held by the High Court of Rangoon that Rule 101, in so far as it curtails the period of ten days prescribed by this Article for an application for leave to defend, is *ultra vires* to that extent.¹

Article 159 — Note 2

1. (1901) 5 Cal W N 259 (262), *Quasim Mahumdar Rohman v. Sarat Chundra Dutt*
2. (1926) A I R 1926 Bom 578 (578) 97 Ind Cas 766, *Mohanlal Manordas v. C K. Daruwala*.

Note 3

1. (1896) 23 Cal 573 (575), *Madhub Lall Durgur v. Woopendra Narain Sen*.

Note 4

1. (1936) A I R 1936 Rang 501 (503) : 166 Ind Cas 148 : 14 Rang 729, *Ratilal Jamnadas Mehta v. V. Prajapati*.

160.* For an order under the same Code, to restore to the file an application for review rejected in consequence of the failure of the applicant to appear when the application was called on for hearing.	Fifteen days.	When the application for review is rejected.	Article 160
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Synopsis

1. Scope of the Article.

2. Starting point.

1. Scope of the Article.—This Article prescribes the period of limitation for applications under Order 47 Rule 7 sub-rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides as follows :

"Where the application" (i.e. the application for review) "has been rejected in consequence of the failure of the applicant to appear, he may apply for an order to have the rejected application restored to file, and, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when such application was called on for hearing, the Court shall order it to be restored to the file upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit and shall appoint a day for hearing the same."

2. Starting point.—The starting point is the date of rejection of the application

The period fixed by the Article cannot be extended by the Court on any ground¹ See Notes to Section 3, *ante*

161.† For a review of judgment by a Provincial Court of Small Causes or by a Court invested with the jurisdiction of a Provincial Court of Small Causes when exercising that jurisdiction.	Fifteen days.	The date of the decree or order.	Article 161
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Act of 1877

160 - For an order under section 629 of the same Code restoring to the file a rejected application for review

Fifteen days

When the application for review is rejected

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision

Act of 1877, Article 160 A.

Same as above.

Article 160 — Note 2

1. See (1915) A I R 1915 Lah 176 (176) 27 Ind Cas 703, *Kalu v. Sukaria*.

Article 161
Notes
1—4

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Court of Small Causes.
3. "Review," meaning of.
4. Security deposit.

1. Legislative changes.

1. This Article was inserted as Article 160 A by Section 36 of Act 9 of 1887. Before the Article was so inserted, an application for review, in cases where the circumstances admitted of a new trial, had to be made within seven days of the date of the order under Act 21 of 1865. In other cases the application was governed by Article 173 of the Act of 1877 corresponding to this Article¹

2. The words in the second column were substituted for the word "Ditto" by Section 2 and Schedule 1 of the Repealing and Amending Act 9 of 1923.

2. Court of Small Causes. — Under Section 24 sub-section 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, a Court trying any suit transferred or withdrawn from a Court of Small Causes is, for the purposes of such suit, deemed to be a Court of Small Causes.¹

3. "Review," meaning of. — See Article 162 *infra*.

4. Security deposit. — Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 9 of 1887 requires that an applicant for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application, either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of the judgment, or give such security for the performance of the decree or compliance with the judgment, as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed. The words "or in pursuance of the judgment" are to be read distributively and applied to the words "for a review of the judgment" which precede it.¹ There was a divergence of opinion among the different High Courts before the Section was amended by Act 9 of 1935, as to whether the deposit of the decretal amount or

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision.

Article 161 — Note 1

1. (1884) 10 Cal 297 (298), *Modon Mohun Poddar v. Purno Chunder Purbot*

Note 2

1. See (1917) A I R 1917 All 484 (485) : 39 All 425 : 34 Ind Cas 113, *Chhotey Lal v. Lakshmi Chand*.

Note 4

1. (1923) A I R 1923 All 605 (606) : 45 All 569 : 74 Ind Cas 64, *Gardhar Lal v. Firm Achat Singh Takhat Singh*.

the furnishing of security was a condition precedent to the entertaining of the application. See the undermentioned cases² which are now only of academical interest.

As to the applicability of Section 5 to applications for review of the judgment of a Court of Small Causes, see Notes to Section 5 *ante*.

Article 161.
Note 4

162.* For a review of judgment by any of the following Courts, namely, the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras, Bombay, Lahore, and Nagpur and the Chief Court of Sind in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.	Twenty days.	The date of the decree or order.
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Article 162

* Act of 1877		
162.—For a review of judgment by any of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras and Bombay, or the Chief Court of the Punjab, or the Chief Court of Lower Burma, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.	Twenty days	The date of the decree or order

Acts of 1871 and 1859
No corresponding provision

- 2 (1900) 28 All 470 (472, 473) 3 All L Jour 818 1900 All W N 93, *Jagan Nath v. Chet Ram* (Proviso to S 17 is mandatory and deposit of security is condition precedent to entertaining of application)
- (1928) A I R 1928 All 111 (111) 50 All 254 108 Ind Cas 464, *Suraj Prasad Baldeo* (Do)
- (1891) 18 Cal 83 (85), *Joy Ahir v. Bishen Dayal Singh* (Do)
- (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 195 (196) 42 Ind Cas 751, *Tarapada Ghose v. Jagat Mohini Das* (Do)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 330 (332) 70 Ind Cas 496, *Balakrishna Iyer v. Pichai Muthu Pillai* (Do)
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 111 (112) 56 Ind Cas 810, *Ram Charitar Ram v. Hashim Khan* (Do)
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 470 (471) 54 Ind Cas 971, *Khanatar Poldar v. Punni Naddaf* (Do)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 544 (544) 97 Ind Cas 581, *Dunia Din v. Farzand Husain* (Do)
- (1930) A I R 1930 Nag 137 (137) 26 Nag L R 63 116 Ind Cas 641, *Chandulal v. Motilal Bansilal* (Do)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 102 (103) 141 Ind Cas 813 29 Nag L R 104, *Maniklal Varma v. Khushal Mahi* (Do)
- (1910) 6 Ind Cas 945 (945, 946) 1910 Pun Re No 54, *Rugku Nath Das v. Doctor Panna Lal* (The words "At the time of presenting the application" in the Proviso to Section 17 are directory and the Court has the discretion to extend the time in appropriate cases)
- (1930) A I R 1930 All 830 (831) 128 Ind Cas 765 53 All 59, *Moti Lal Ramchandrar v. Durga Prasad* (Do)
- (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 124 (125) 50 Ind Cas 917, *Mulanda Lal v. Pars Ram*. (Do)

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. "Review."
4. "Original jurisdiction."
5. Application for review, when maintainable.
6. Starting point.

1. **Legislative changes.** — This Article was first enacted as Article 162 of Act 15 of 1877.

The words "the following Courts, namely" were inserted by Section 2 and Schedule 1 of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1927 (10 of 1927).

The words "Bombay, Lahore, Rangoon and Nagpur and the Chief Court of Sind" were substituted for the words "and Bombay or the Chief Court of Sind, or the Chief Court of Punjab or the Chief Court of Lower Burma" by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1927 and by Section 2 of the Central Provinces Courts (Supplementary) Act 8 of 1935.

The word "Rangoon" was omitted by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937.

2. **Scope of the Article.** — Article 161 *ante* provides for applications for review of judgments of Small Cause Courts. This Article deals with applications for review of the judgments of the Courts specified in the Article in the exercise of their original jurisdiction. Article 173 *infra* deals with applications for review of judgments except those specified in Article 161 and this Article.

The Article applies only to applications for review. A certificate of the Advocate-General under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent (Cal) is not an application and consequently, a review made on such certificate is not governed by this Article.¹ Nor will this Article

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 332 (331) . 131 Ind Cas 635 . 12 Lah 359 (F B), *Geda Mal Dharani Das v. Huna Mal Shedu Ram*. (Do.)

(1890) 18 Mad 178 (188) (F B), *Ramaram v. Kurisu*. (Do.)

(1919) AIR 1919 Mad 103 (103) : 53 Ind Cas 926, *Akhla Achah v. Lakshminarasimham*. (Do.)

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 141 (142) . 55 Ind Cas 618, *Suryanarayana Iyer v. Soundararaja Iyengar*. (Do.)

(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 165 (166) : 99 Ind Cas 779, *Vithu Mhal v. Vithu Mahadji*. (Do.)

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 562 (563) : 43 Mad 579 . 55 Ind Cas 977 (F B), *Awan Md Sahib v. Rahman Sahib*. (The words are directory to this extent that the deposit of security need not be made or tendered with the application, but this can be done within the period of limitation but not beyond it.)

(1905) 32 Cal 339 (342) . 1 Cal L Jour 43, *Jenn Muchi v. Budhram Muchi*. (Do.)

(1894) 1894 Pun Re No 108, *Muhammad Fazal Ali v. Karim Khan*.

Article 162 — Note 2

1 (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 617 (622) . 30 Cri L Jour 993 : 119 Ind Cas 193 : 1929 Cri Cas 228 (S B), *Padam Prashad v. Emperor*.

govern a case where the Court reviews its judgment under its inherent powers.²

Article 162
Notes
2-4

3. "Review."—The word "review" would *prima facie* seem to include a review, whether under the Civil Procedure Code or under any other enactment. Thus, an application for review under Section 8 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (3 of 1909) would be governed by this Article. This is the view of the High Court of Madras.¹ The High Court of Rangoon has, however, in the undermentioned case² held that the word "review" in this Article as well as in Article 173 must be confined to a review under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code and that it does not include a review under Section 8 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. It is submitted that this view is not correct. No reason is mentioned in the said decision for departing from the application of the cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that words must be construed according to their *plain meaning*, unless by reason of such construction there is a repugnancy with the other provisions of the statute.

It has been held that the High Court has, under the Criminal Procedure Code, no right of review in criminal cases, and that its inherent powers in such matters do not extend to reviewing a judgment.³ No question of the applicability of this Article would arise in such cases. See also Note 3 to Article 173, *infra*.

4. "Original jurisdiction."—The original jurisdiction of the Chartered High Courts is derived from the Letters Patents issued to them. The original jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Sind is derived from the provisions of the Sind Courts Act (Bombay Act 12 of 1866).

It has been held that the original jurisdiction of the Chartered High Courts would include matrimonial¹ and insolvency jurisdiction.²

- 2 (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 385 (387) 118 Ind Cas 753 4 Luck 562 (F B), *Mahomed Raza v. Ram Saroop*
(See (1901) 28 Cal 680 (684) 6 Cal W N 114, *Puran Mal v. Janki Pershad Singh*)

Note 3

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 662 (665) 83 Ind Cas 174, *Official Assignee of Madras v. Official Assignee of Rangoon*
2. (1929) A I R 1929 Rang 229 (232) 118 Ind Cas 1 7 Rang 201, *In the matter of L. W. Nasree*
3. (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 462 (463) 10 Lah 1 29 Cri L Jour 669 110 Ind Cas 221, *Paju v. Emperor*
(See also (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 367 (368) 56 Cal 32 114 Ind Cas 132 30 Cri L Jour 254 *Famesh or Ahmerbulla v. Emperor* (High Court should not under Sec 491, Criminal P C try questions already determined on its Original Side)

Note 4

1. (1882) 6 Bom 416 (434), *Harriette A King v. James S King*
2. (1889) 13 Bom 520 (533) 16 Ind App 156 15 Ind Jur 251 (P C), *In the matter of Cassin Nassir Khan*

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. "Review."
4. "Original jurisdiction."
5. Application for review, when maintainable.
6. Starting point.

1. **Legislative changes.**— This Article was first enacted as Article 162 of Act 15 of 1877.

The words "the following Courts, namely" were inserted by Section 2 and Schedule 1 of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1927 (10 of 1927).

The words "Bombay, Lahore, Rangoon and Nagpur and the Chief Court of Sind" were substituted for the words "and Bombay or the Chief Court of Sind, or the Chief Court of Punjab or the Chief Court of Lower Burma" by the Repealing and Amending Act of 1927 and by Section 2 of the Central Provinces Courts (Supplementary) Act 8 of 1935.

The word "Rangoon" was omitted by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order, 1937.

2. **Scope of the Article.**— Article 161 *ante* provides for applications for review of judgments of Small Cause Courts. This Article deals with applications for review of the judgments of the Courts specified in the Article in the exercise of their original jurisdiction. Article 173 *infra* deals with applications for review of judgments except those specified in Article 161 and this Article.

The Article applies only to *applications* for review. A *certificate* of the Advocate-General under Clause 26 of the Letters Patent (Cal) is not an *application* and consequently, a review made on such certificate is not governed by this Article.¹ Nor will this Article

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 332 (334) : 131 Ind Cas 635 : 12 Lah 359 (F B), *Gedi Mai Dharam Das v. Huna Mai Shedu Ram* (Do.)

(1890) 13 Mad 178 (188) (F B), *Ramasami v. Kurisu*. (Do.)

(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 103 (103) : 53 Ind Cas 926, *Alula Achiah v. Lakshminarasimham*. (Do)

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 141 (142) : 55 Ind Cas 818, *Suryanarayana Iyer v. Soundararaja Iyengar*. (Do)

(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 165 (166) : 99 Ind Cas 779, *Vithu Mahli v. Vithu Mahadji*. (Do)

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 562 (563) : 43 Mad 579 : 55 Ind Cas 977 (F B), *Aziz Md Sahib v. Bahaman Sahib*. (The words are directory to this extent that the deposit of security need not be made or tendered with the application, but this can be done within the period of limitation but not beyond it)

(1905) 32 Cal 339 (342) : 1 Cal L Jour 43, *Jeun Muchi v. Budhiram Muchi*. (Do.)

(1894) 1894 Pun Re No. 103, *Muhammad Fazal Ali v. Karim Khan*.

Article 162 — Note 2

1 (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 617 (622) : 30 Cri L Jour 993 : 119 Ind Cas 193 : 1929 Cri Cas 228 (S B), *Padam Prashad v. Emperor*.

Other Topics

Dismissal for default of appearance	See Note 2, Pts 1 to 3
Dismissal for default without jurisdiction—Article does not apply ...	See Note 5, Pts 1, 2	
Dismissal for failure to furnish security for costs ...	See Note 2	
Dismissal for failure to pay costs of service of process ...	See Note 2	
Order pronouncing judgment under O 10 R 4, C. P. C. ...	See Note 2, Pts. 2, 3	
Plaintiff not aware of dismissal—Starting point not affected	See Note 8, Pt	
Plaintiff's death subsequent to dismissal for default—Legal representative does not get fresh starting point ...	See Note 4, Pts. 1, 2	

Article 163 Notes 1—2

1. Legislative changes.

1. There was no Article corresponding to this Article in the Act of 1859
- 2 Article 156 of the Act of 1871 corresponding to this Article provided merely for an order to set aside a *judgment by default*.
- 3 Article 163 of the Act of 1877 substituted the words "dismissal by default" for the words "judgment by default."

2. Scope of the Article. — Article 168 *infra* applies to an application for the re-admission of an *appeal* dismissed for want of prosecution. This Article applies to an application by a *plaintiff* for an order to set aside

- 1 a dismissal for default of appearance,
- 2 a dismissal for failure to pay costs of service of process, and
3. a dismissal for failure to furnish security for costs.

Dismissal for default of appearance :

An order of dismissal of a suit for default of appearance may be made under Rules 3, 8 and 12 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 3 provides that where *neither party appears* when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the suit be dismissed. Rule 4 of the said Order empowers the plaintiff in such a case to apply to have the dismissal set aside. Rule 8 provides that where the *defendant* appears but the plaintiff does not appear the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed and Rule 9 empowers the plaintiff in such a case to apply to have the order of dismissal set aside. Rule 12 provides that where a plaintiff or defendant, who has been ordered to appear in person or show sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court, fails so to appear, he shall be subject to all the provisions of the previous Rules applicable to plaintiffs and defendants respectively who do not appear. An application under Rule 4 or Rule 9 of Order 9 would be governed by this Article.¹

Under Order 10 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code the Court can, under the circumstances specified therein, direct a party to appear in Court on a particular date and can, on his failure so to appear

Article 163 — Note 2

1. See (1896) 2 Cal W N 318 (319), *Kotlash Mondal v. Nabadwip Chandra Kar*. (Rule 4.)
(1903) 31 Cal 150 (151) : 8 Cal W N 97, *Hingabbee v. Munna Bhee*. (Rule 9.)

Article 162
Notes
5-6

5. Application for review, when maintainable.—See Section 114 and Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the decisions thereon.

6. Starting point.—Time, under this Article, runs from the date of the decree or order sought to be reviewed. The date of the decree is the date of the judgment. See Note 5 to Article 156, *ante*. Where, under the practice of the High Court a party has to apply to have the order drawn up and he fails to do so, he cannot escape the bar of limitation by reason merely of the fact that the order has not been drawn up.¹

Article 163

163.* By a plaintiff for an order to set aside a dismissal for default of appearance or for failure to pay costs of service of process or to furnish se- curity for costs.	Thirty days.	The date of the dismis- sal.
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. Application.
4. "By a plaintiff."
5. "To set aside a dismissal."
6. "Appearance," meaning of.
7. Application for restoration itself dismissed for default.
8. Starting point.
9. Section 5 and this Article.
10. Section 12 and this Article.
11. Section 14 and this Article.
12. Court's inherent power to extend time.

* Act of 1877

163 — By a plaintiff for an order | Thirty days. | The date of the dismissal.
to set aside a dismissal by default.

Act of 1871

156 — By a plaintiff for an order | Thirty days | The date of the judgment.
to set aside a judgment by default

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision.

(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 732 (733) 51 Mad 510 : 112 Ind Cas 149 (F B), *In the matter of Kencherla Krishna Rao*.

Note 6

1. (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 321 (323) : I L R (1938) 2 Cal 22, *Ritchson v. Ritchson*.

Other Topics

Dismissal for default of appearance ...	See Note 2, Pts. 1 to 3
Dismissal for default without jurisdiction—Article does not apply ...	See Note 5, Pts. 1, 2
Dismissal for failure to furnish security for costs ...	See Note 2
Dismissal for failure to pay costs of service of process .	See Note 2
Order pronouncing judgment under O 10 R 4, C. P. C. .	See Note 2, Pts. 2, 3
Plaintiff not aware of dismissal—Starting point not affected	See Note 8, Pt.
Plaintiff's death subsequent to dismissal for default—Legal representative does not get fresh starting point ...	See Note 4, Pts. 1, 2

Article 163 Notes 1—2

1. Legislative changes.

1. There was no Article corresponding to this Article in the Act of 1859.
2. Article 156 of the Act of 1871 corresponding to this Article provided merely for an order to set aside a *judgment by default*.
3. Article 163 of the Act of 1877 substituted the words "dismissal by default" for the words "judgment by default."

2. **Scope of the Article.** — Article 163 *infra* applies to an application for the re-admission of an *appeal dismissed* for want of prosecution. This Article applies to an application by a *plaintiff* for an order to set aside

1. a dismissal for default of appearance,
2. a dismissal for failure to pay costs of service of process, and
3. a dismissal for failure to furnish security for costs.

Dismissal for default of appearance *

An order of dismissal of a suit for default of appearance may be made under Rules 3, 8 and 12 of Order 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 3 provides that where *neither party appears* when the suit is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the suit be dismissed. Rule 4 of the said Order empowers the plaintiff in such a case to apply to have the dismissal set aside. Rule 8 provides that where the *defendant* appears but the plaintiff does not appear the Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed and Rule 9 empowers the plaintiff in such a case to apply to have the order of dismissal set aside. Rule 12 provides that where a plaintiff or defendant, who has been ordered to appear in person or show sufficient cause to the satisfaction of the Court, fails so to appear, he shall be subject to all the provisions of the previous Rules applicable to plaintiffs and defendants respectively who do not appear. An application under Rule 4 or Rule 9 of Order 9 would be governed by this Article ¹

Under Order 10 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code the Court can, under the circumstances specified therein, direct a party to appear in Court on a particular date and can, on his failure so to appear

Article 163 — Note 2

1. See (1896) 2 Cal W N 318 (319), *Kailash Mondal v. Nabadakur Chandra Kar.* (Rule 4.)
(1903) 31 Cal 150 (154) 8 Cal W N 97, *Hangabbee v. Munna Dabee.* (Rule 9)

Article 163
Note 2

without lawful excuse, pronounce judgment against him. An order pronouncing judgment against a party under that Rule is appealable as an order under the provisions of Order 43 of the Code. The question has, however, arisen as to whether such an order may be considered to have been made under the provisions of Order 9 of the Code. According to the High Court of Madras such an order must be taken to have been made only under Order 10 Rule 4 and not under Order 9 and therefore no *application* will lie to set the order aside.² The High Court of Allahabad has, on the other hand, held that such an order, made where the plaintiff and his pleader are both absent, must be considered to have been passed only under the provisions of Order 9 and that therefore an application will lie to set the order aside.³ If in such cases an application will lie to set aside the order of dismissal, it is conceived that this Article will apply to such applications.

Dismissal for failure to pay costs of service of process :

An order of dismissal of a suit for failure to pay costs of service of process is made under Order 9 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code which runs as follows:—

"Where on the day so fixed it is found that the summons has not been served upon the defendant in consequence of the failure of the plaintiff to pay the court-fee or postal charges (if any) chargeable for such service, the Court may make an order that the suit be dismissed.

"Provided that no such order shall be made although the summons has not been served upon the defendant, if on the day fixed for him to appear and answer, he attends in person or by agent when he is allowed to appear by agent."

Rule 4 of the Order empowers the plaintiff, where such an order of dismissal has been made, to apply to have the order set aside, and such an application also would be governed by this Article.

Dismissal for failure to furnish security for costs :

Order 25 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code empowers the Court, in the circumstances mentioned therein, to call upon the plaintiff to furnish security for the costs of the suit. Rule 2 sub-rule 1 of that Order provides that on the failure of the plaintiff to furnish such security, the Court shall make an order dismissing the suit. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 2 however enables the plaintiff to apply to have the order set aside, and such an application also will be governed by this Article. Order 22 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code empowers the Court under certain circumstances to order the assignee or the Receiver of an insolvent plaintiff to furnish security for costs and to dismiss the suit on default of furnishing such security. Rule 9 of that Order provides for an application by the assignee or the Receiver to

2. (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 417 (418) : 63 Ind Cas 961, *Chengara Chandu v. Chengara Raman Nair*.

3. (1917) A I R 1917 All 136 (136) : 42 Ind Cas 945, *Chunni Lal v. Chakerphan*.
(1932) A I R 1932 All 595 (596) : 138 Ind Cas 613, *Nandan Sahu v. Hari Shankar*.

set aside the order of dismissal. Such an application is, however, not within this Article as it cannot be said to be an application by *the plaintiff*, and also as a specific Article, namely Article 172, prescribes the limitation for such cases.

3. Application.—An application to the Registrar of the Original Side for the issue of a notice of motion under Rules 154 and 155 of the Original Side Rules of the Madras High Court is an application within the meaning of this Article. The fact that the affidavit supporting the application was sworn later, or because the notice of motion states a date which is beyond the statutory period as the date on which the application will be heard, will not affect the validity of the application.¹

4. "By a plaintiff." — Where a suit is dismissed for default of the plaintiff's appearance, and subsequently the plaintiff dies, his legal representative does not get a fresh starting point for an application to set aside the dismissal. His application will, therefore, be barred under this Article if it is made beyond thirty days of the order of dismissal.¹ It has been held by the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Oudh that even where a Court dismissed the suit for default in ignorance of the death of the plaintiff, it was necessary for the legal representatives of the plaintiff to apply to set aside the dismissal within the time prescribed by this Article.²

5. "To set aside a dismissal." — The Article will apply only to a case where it is necessary for a plaintiff to set aside a dismissal for default against him. Where a dismissal for default is *without jurisdiction*, it is not necessary that it should be set aside within the thirty days prescribed by this Article. Where the plaintiff in a representative suit died and the Court dismissed the suit on the ground that other constructive plaintiffs failed to appear, it was held that the Court had no jurisdiction to make such an order and that it need not be set aside within the period prescribed by this Article.¹ Similarly, where no date was fixed for the hearing of the suit and no notice was given to the plaintiff of any such date, but the Court dismissed the suit for default, it was held that the application to set aside the dismissal was not one under Order 9 Rule 9, but one under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, and was governed not by this Article, but by Article 181.²

Note 3

- 1 (1907) 17 *Mad L Jour* 215 (216), *S P R S Kuttayan Chetty v Ellappa Chetty*

Note 4

1. (1938) 146 *Ind Cas* 1001 (1002) (Oudh), *Dhanpat Dei v. Ram Pachhpai Singh*
2. (1912) 14 *Ind Cas* 711 (713) (Oudh), *Debi Baksh Singh v Habib Shah*
(1912) 14 *Ind Cas* 221 (222) (Oudh), *Habib Shah v Debi Bax Singh*

Note 5

- 1 (1931) A I R 1931 *Mad* 590 (591, 592) 51 *Mad* 770 132 *Ind Cas* 2-9, *Muhammad Kanni Bowther v. Naima Muhammad Bowther*
2 (1935) A I R 1935 *Pesh* 186 (188) 160 *Ind Cas* 457, *Mt Zainab Bibi v. Bihari Lal*

Article 163
Notes
6—9

6. "Appearance," meaning of. — See Order 3 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code and the Notes thereunder in the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code.

7. Application for restoration itself dismissed for default. — Where a suit is dismissed for default and an application for restoration thereof is also dismissed for default, the applicant is not debarred from making a fresh application for restoration of the suit, provided it is made within the period prescribed by this Article.¹ Suppose now that the applicant applies for restoration of the application which was itself dismissed for default. Is such an application maintainable at all? And if maintainable, what is the period of limitation applicable to such applications? As to the first question there is a conflict of opinion among the various High Courts for a discussion of which see the General Note 2 under Order 9 of the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code (Second Edition).

In the undermentioned case² it was held that such an application did not lie, but the application was treated as a second application to set aside the order of dismissal of the suit itself. As to the second question, there appear to be no decided cases on the point, but on principle it is conceived that this Article would not apply inasmuch as the application would not be one by the *plaintiff* in such cases. This would result in the application being governed by Article 181 of the Act which gives a period of three years, a result which would not have been contemplated by the Legislature. It is submitted that the absurdity of this result is an argument in favour of the view that Order 9 Rule 9 cannot be applied to an application to restore another application dismissed for default.

8. Starting point. — Time, under this Article, runs from the date of dismissal. There is nothing in the Article about the date of knowledge as there is in Article 164. Hence an application filed beyond thirty days of the date of dismissal is barred, even though the plaintiff was not aware of the dismissal.¹

9. Section 5 and this Article. — Section 5 of the Act has been made applicable to applications under Order 9 Rules 4 and 9 by the High Court of Bombay. An application under the said Rules may, in Bombay, be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed by this Article if the applicant satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for not making it within the period.¹ In other

Note 7

1. See (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 479 (439) : 22 Ind Cas 689, *Subba Rao v. Venkataratnam*. (In this case, however, the application was dismissed as having been made more than two months after the dismissal of the suit.)
2. (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 511 (1927) 54 Cal 405 : 103 Ind Cas 1, *Sural Krishna Rao v. Ganeshwar Wodekar*.

Note 8

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Pat 537 (556) : 147 Ind Cas 179, *Deccan v. Mrs. Pitts*.

9

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 262 (2) : Bom 453 : 122 Ind

nath v. Thakoredas.

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Provinces where Section 5 has not been made applicable to such applications, a delay in presenting them cannot be excused under Section 5 of the Act.²

Article 163
Notes
9—11

10. Section 12 and this Article. — The time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order dismissing a suit for default cannot be excluded under Section 12 of the Act in computing the period of thirty days prescribed by this Article¹

11. Section 14 and this Article. — Section 14 of the Act of 1877 provided that in computing the period of limitation for an application, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting with due diligence another application in a wrong Court could be excluded. It was held in a case arising under that Act that time during which an applicant in an application under Section 102 of the Code (Order 9 Rule 8) was prosecuting a suit in a wrong Court could not be excluded.¹ Under the present Section 14, such period can, if the other conditions of that Section are satisfied, be excluded.

It was held by the High Court of Calcutta in the undermentioned case² that the time spent in obtaining copies of the judgment and order for the purposes of appeal under the wrong impression that an appeal lay may be excluded as time spent in prosecuting another proceeding in a wrong Court.

In *Veerayya v. Sreesailam*,³ the High Court of Madras has held in a similar case that though the period of obtaining copies might be excluded under Section 14, the period after obtaining copies and before filing the appeal in the wrong Court cannot be excluded under that Section

(But see (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 521 (521) 44 Bom 839 90 Ind Cas 610, *Mahadeo v. Lakshminarayan* (This case was, before Section 5 was extended to applications under Order 9 Rule 9))

2 (1929) A I R 1929 All 127 (128) 51 All 487. 113 Ind Cas 767, *Kali Prasad v. Parameshwar Prasad*

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erayya v. Sreesailam.
Ind Cas 103, *Saba v.*

Dayaram.

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 557 (558) 147 Ind Cas 179, *D'Cruze v. Mrs. Pitts*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Rang 274 (275) 82 Ind Cas 418, *S. G. M. Samson v. Siltaran*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Rang 187 (188) 2 Rang 655 85 Ind Cas 324, *Ma Naw v. Somasundaram Chetty*

[See however (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 489 (490) 72 Ind Cas 13, *Kalyanasundarappa v. Chinnasamy*]

Note 10

1. (1926) 93 Ind Cas 1023 (1023) (Lah), *Mohan Lal v. Sher Muhammad Khan*.

Note 11

1. (1886) 1886 Pan Re No 63, *Sheoji Ram v. Sheo Chand Rao*

2. (1910) 7 Ind Cas 775 (776, 777) (Cal), *Lakshiram Vandal v. Serratus, Passar*.

3. (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 556 (557) 110 Ind Cas 47.

Article 163
Notes
6—9

6. "Appearance," meaning of. — Sea Order 3 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code and the Notes thereunder in the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code.

7. Application for restoration itself dismissed for default. — Where a suit is dismissed for default and an application for restoration thereon is itself dismissed for default, the applicant is debarred from re-applying, provided it is not shown that the applicant was prevented from applying.

Suppose now that the applicant applies for restoration of the application which was itself dismissed for default. Is such an application maintainable at all? And if maintainable, what is the period of limitation applicable to such applications? As to the first question there is a conflict of opinion among the various High Courts for a discussion of which see the General Note 2 under Order 9 of the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code (Second Edition).

In the undermentioned case² it was held that such an application did not lie, but the application was treated as a second application to set aside the order of dismissal of the suit itself. As to the second question, there appear to be no decided cases on the point, but on principle it is conceived that this Article would not apply inasmuch as the application would not be one by the plaintiff in such cases. This would result in the application being governed by Article 181 of the Act which gives a period of three years, a result which would not have been contemplated by the Legislature. It is submitted that the absurdity of this result is an argument in favour of the view that Order 9 Rule 9 cannot be applied to an application to restore another application dismissed for default.

8. Starting point. — Time, under this Article, runs from the date of dismissal. There is nothing in the Article about the date of knowledge as there is in Article 164. Hence an application filed beyond thirty days of the date of dismissal is barred, even though the plaintiff was not aware of the dismissal.¹

9. Section 5 and this Article. — Section 5 of the Act has been made applicable to applications under Order 9 Rules 4 and 9 by the High Court of Bombay. An application under the said Rules may, in Bombay, be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed by this Article if the applicant satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for not making it within the period.¹ In other

Note 7

1 See (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 438 (438) : 22 Ind Cas 659, *Subba Rao v. Venkataratnam*. (In this case, however, the application was dismissed as having been made more than two months after the dismissal of the suit.)

2. (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 534 (536) : 54 Cal 405 : 103 Ind Cas 69, *Sarat Krishna Bose v. Bisweswar Misra*.

Note 8

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Pat 557 (558) : 147 Ind Cas 179, *Decruze v. Mrs. Patis*.

Note 9

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 262 (263) : 53 Bom 453 : 122 Ind Cas 76, *Pandarinath v. Thakoredas*.

Provinces where Section 5 has not been made applicable to such applications, a delay in presenting them cannot be excused under Section 5 of the Act.²

Article 163
Notes
9—11

10. Section 12 and this Article. — The time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order dismissing a suit for default cannot be excluded under Section 12 of the Act in computing the period of thirty days prescribed by this Article.¹

11. Section 14 and this Article. — Section 14 of the Act of 1877 provided that in computing the period of limitation for an application, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting with due diligence another application in a wrong Court could be excluded. It was held in a case arising under that Act that time during which an applicant in an application under Section 102 of the Code (Order 9 Rule 8) was prosecuting a suit in a wrong Court could not be excluded.¹ Under the present Section 14, such period can, if the other conditions of that Section are satisfied, be excluded.

It was held by the High Court of Calcutta in the undermentioned case² that the time spent in obtaining copies of the judgment and order for the purposes of appeal under the wrong impression that an appeal lay may be excluded as time spent in prosecuting another proceeding in a wrong Court.

In *Veerayya v. Sreesailam*,³ the High Court of Madras has held in a similar case that though the period of obtaining copies might be excluded under Section 14, the period after obtaining copies and before filing the appeal in the wrong Court cannot be excluded under that Section.

[But see (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 521 (521) 44 Bom 839 90 Ind Cas 610, *Mahadeo v. Lakshminarayana* (This case was, before Section 5 was extended to applications under Order 9 Rule 9.)]

2 (1920) A I R 1920 All 127 (129) 51 All 437 113 Ind Cas 767, *Kali Prasad v. Parameswar Prasad*

(1902) 1902 Pun Re No. 83, *Sahib Ditta v. Roda*.

(1897) 1897 Pun Re No. 15, *Nur Muhammad v. Dina*

(1879) 1879 Pun Re No. 141, *Mahu v. Jivan*

(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 556 (557) 110 Ind Cas 47, *Teerayya v. Sreesailam*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Nag 91 (92) 23 Nag L R 183 107 Ind Cas 193, *Saba v. Dayaram*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 557 (558) 147 Ind Cas 179, *D'Cruze v. Mrs. Pitts*

(1924) A I R 1924 Rang 274 (275) 82 Ind Cas 418, *S. G. M. Samson v. Sitaran*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Rang 187 (188) 2 Rang 655 85 Ind Cas 321, *Ma Nave v. Somasundaram Chetty*.

[See however (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 489 (490) 72 Ind Cas 13, *Kalyanasundarappa v. Chinnasamy*]

NOTE 10

1. (1926) 93 Ind Cas 1023 (1023) (Lab), *Mohan Lal v. Sher Muhammad Khan*.

NOTE 11

1. (1886) 1886 Pun Re No. 63, *Sheep Ram v. Sheo Chand Roy*

2. (1910) 7 Ind Cas 775 (776, 777) (Cal), *Lakshiram Mandil v. Somatun Basar*.

3. (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 556 (557) 110 Ind Cas 47.

Article 163
Note 12

12. Court's inherent power to extend time. — A Court has no inherent power to extend the period of limitation under this Article.¹ See also Notes 3 and 28 to Section 3, *ante*.

Article 164

<p>164. By a defendant, for an order to set aside a decree passed <i>ex parte</i>.</p>	<p>Thirty days.</p>	<p>The date of the decree, or where the summons was not duly served, when the applicant has knowledge of the decree.</p>
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. Ex parte decree under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.
4. "Defendant," if includes his legal representative.
5. Starting point.
6. "Summons," meaning of.

*	Act of 1877	
164.—By a defendant for an order to set aside a judgment <i>ex parte</i> .	Thirty days.	The date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment.
	Act of 1871, Article 157 Same as in the Act of 1877.	
	Act of 1859 No corresponding provision.	

Note 12

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 319 (320) 129 Ind Cas 778, *Madha Ram v. Mt. Tuppo Rubhani*.
 - (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 495 (496) : 163 Ind Cas 274, *Mt. Karam Behari v. Jagannath*.
 - (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 321 (321) : 86 Ind Cas 256, *Firm Dunichand Gokulchand v. Pritam Das*.
 - (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 346 (347) : 55 Ind Cas 55, *Bano Mal v. Bano Mal*.
 - (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 980 (983) : 50 Mad 67 : 97 Ind Cas 1003, *Narayana Chettiar v. Muthu Chettiar*.
 - (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 259 (259) : 143 Ind Cas 240, *Sundaresa v. Subba Rao*.
 - (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 91 (92) : 23 Nag L R 183 : 107 Ind Cas 193, *Saba v. Dayaram*.
 - (1935) A I R 1935 Rang 466 (471) : 13 Rang 595 : 159 Ind Cas 915, *K. P. L. S. S. Chettiar v. Official Receiver, Ramnad*.
 - (1924) A I B 1924 Rang 274 (275) : 82 Ind Cas 418, *S. G. M. Samson v. Sultan*.
- [See also (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 105 (106) : 80 Ind Cas 75, *Shamshad Mehdi v. Mahbub Khan*, (Sult dismissed against two defendants, restored as against one defendant on plaintiff's application — Court on its own initiative restoring suit against the other defendant beyond limitation — Held, order was ultra vires)]

7. Service of summons referred to is service on the original defendant.
8. "Knowledge of the decree."
9. Extension of time.
10. Exclusion of time under Section 14.
11. Section 18 and this Article.
12. Section 22 and this Article.
13. Parties to application.
14. Onus of proof.
15. Subsequent application.

Article 164
Notes
1—2

Other Topics

Application to set aside <i>ex parte</i> decree not to be altered to one for review to avoid limitation	See Note 9, F-N (1)
Article applies only to application but not to suit to set aside <i>ex parte</i> decree	See Note 2, Pts 7a, 8
"Decree" limited to decree passed in suit	See Note 2
Defendant must apply	See Note 2, Pt. 9
Defendant must have right to apply	See Note 2
Due service—What is	See Note 5 and F-Ns (3) to (6)
Substituted service — If due service	See Note 5, Pts. 6 to 8 and F-N (4)
Summons duly served—Applicant's knowledge is immaterial	See Note 5, Pt. 2

1. Legislative changes.—There was no provision corresponding to this in the Act of 1859. Section 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, however, provided that an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree should be made within 30 days "after any process for enforcing the judgment has been executed" against the defendant.

The provision as to limitation in Section 119 of the Code of 1859 was enacted as Article 157 in the Act of 1871, the 30 days' period being made to run as before from the date of executing any process for enforcing the judgment.

The Article was re-enacted without any change in the Act of 1877.

In the present Act, the word "judgment" which occurred in the corresponding provisions of the previous Acts has been substituted by the word "decree." The third column has been materially altered.

2. Scope of the Article.—In order that this Article may apply

- 1 There must be an *ex parte* decree against a defendant
- 2 Such defendant must have a *right to apply* to have such decree set aside.
- 3 There must be an *application* by the defendant made for that purpose

1. *Ex parte* decree against a defendant — The word "decree" interpreted in the light of the words "where the summons was duly served" in the third column of the Article seems to be limited to a decree passed in a *suit*. This is also made clear by the fact that

Article 164

Note 2

an application by a *respondent* to set aside an *appellate decree* passed *ex parte* is separately provided for by Article 169 *infra*, under which time runs from the date of the decree in appeal or where notice of the appeal is not duly served, when the applicant has knowledge of the decree. An order having the force of a decree in a proceeding which is not a suit would therefore not be a "decree" within the meaning of this Article. Thus, an application to set aside an *ex parte* order in execution which has the force of a decree under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code is not governed by this Article. This is borne out by the enactment in Madras of Rule 15 of Order 9 of the Civil Procedure Code providing a period of limitation for such applications.

It does not, however, seem necessary that the *suit* and the *decree* should be *under the Civil Procedure Code*. Where under any enactment, as for example Section 295 of the Succession Act, a particular proceeding is to take the form of a suit and the order passed is to be enforced as a decree, an application to set aside such a decree passed *ex parte* will be governed by this Article.¹

It would follow from the above discussion that an application to set aside an order which does not amount to a *decree* at all in any sense cannot be governed by this Article. Thus, an application to set aside an *ex parte* order under Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code,² or under Section 150 of the Companies Act 1832,³ or under Order 21 Rule 50 sub-rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,^{3a} is not within this Article. A contrary view has, however, been expressed in some cases. The High Court of Lahore has held in the undermentioned case⁴ that an application to set aside an *ex parte* order of adjudication of an insolvent must be made within the period prescribed by this Article. According to the Sialkot Judicial Commissioner's Court, the Article is not necessarily restricted to applications to set aside decrees passed in suits, but applies to applications under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for example, to applications for filing an award under the Arbitration Act.⁵ This view was rested on the decision of the Madras High Court in *Subbiah Naicker v. Ramanathan Chettiar*.⁶ *Subbiah Naicker's case*⁶ has, however, now been overruled by a Full Bench decision of

Article 164 — Note 2

1. See (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 65 (86) : 24 Ind Cas 27 : 41 Cal 810, *Abhyacharan v. Saroja Sundari*.
2. (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 264 (263) : 145 Ind Cas 823, *W. H. Lawrence v. Duran Singh*.
3. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 51 (53) : 1 Lah 187 : 55 Ind Cas 820, *Hindustan Bank Ltd v. Meharaj Din*.
- 3a. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 386 (388) : 53 Dom 839 : 120 Ind Cas 833, *Kanjil Shirs v. Yashraj Shirs & Co.*
4. (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 522 (523) : 133 Ind Cas 377, *Umar Din v. Raghu Nath Sahi*.
5. (1921) A I R 1921 Sind 56 (56) : 75 Ind Cas 1035, *Fleming Shaw & Co. v. Mangalchand Durakadas*.
6. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 162 (169) : 37 Mad 162 : 22 Ind Cas 899.

the same Court,⁷ and is no longer law. It is submitted that the decisions of the Lahore and Sind Courts referred to above are not correct on principle.

2. *Defendant must have a right to apply* — Unless there is a right to apply to set aside the *ex parte* decree, it is clear that no application will lie at all and consequently there is no room for the applicability of this Article. In the case of decrees passed in suits, Order 9 Rule 13 gives a right to the *ex parte* defendants to apply to set aside such decrees under certain circumstances. In the case of other proceedings, if Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to such proceedings, Order 9 Rule 13 may apply to orders passed therein which may amount to decrees. But, as has been seen already, the "decree" contemplated by this Article is a decree in a *suit* and not in any other proceeding, and in that view this Article would be inapplicable.

3. *Defendant must apply.*—The Article applies only to an application to set aside the *ex parte* decree.^{7a} It does not apply to a *suit* to set aside such decree on the ground of fraud.⁸ Further, such application must be made by a *defendant*. An application, for example, for revocation of a probate of a will by a person who was not cited in the probate proceedings (which is to be in the form of a suit under Section 295 of the Succession Act) and therefore was not a "defendant" in such proceedings, is not governed by this Article.⁹

It has been held by the High Court of Calcutta that the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code do not in terms apply to proceedings on the Original Side of the High Court and that consequently an application to set aside a decree filed on the Original Side of the High Court is not governed by this Article.¹⁰

3. *Ex parte decree under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.*—Before the amendment of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act in the year 1935, there was a conflict of opinion on the question whether the deposit or security required to be made or given by that Section should accompany the application or may be made or given within the period prescribed by this Article or whether the Court could grant time for that purpose even beyond the 30 days prescribed by this Article.¹ The amendment of the

7. (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 656 (658) 61 Mad L Jour 319 (354) 55 Mad 17 134 Ind Cas 806 (F B), *Arunachallam v. Veerappa Chettiar* (A I R 1914 Mad 162, A I R 1926 Mad 412, A I R 1929 Mad 757, Considered.)

7a. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 95 (96) 154 Ind Cas 414, *Abbasali v. Ram Kanas* (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 545 (547) 42 Ind Cas 421, *Sundaram Reddy v. Pattabhirami Reddy*

8. (1896) 26 Cal 320n (332n) 3 Cal W N 395, *Motilal Chuckerbutty v. Busnel, Chandra Bairagi*

9. (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 85 (86) . 41 Cal 819 21 Ind Cas 37, *Abhesa Charan v. Saroja Sundari*

10. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 864 (865) 116 Ind Cas 633, *Ramjan Ali Haji v. Hajra Abdul Gaffur*, (A I R 1929 Cal 772, Followed.)

Note 3

1 For a full discussion of the conflicting views, see (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 332 (335) 131 Ind Cas 635 12 Lah 359 (F B), *Gedi Mal v. Huna Mal*.

Article 164
Notes
3—4

Section in 1935 has now set the conflict at rest and unless the deposit or the security, as the case may be, accompanies the application, there is no valid application on which the Court can act.² The Court cannot now extend the time for making such deposit or for giving such security.³

4. "Defendant," if includes his legal representative.—The word "defendant" in this Article would also include his legal representative so that an application by the legal representative of a defendant against whom an *ex parte* decree has been passed to set aside such decree, would be governed by this Article.^{1a} Thus, it has been held by the High Court of Madras that the word "defendant" in this Article is wide enough to include the executor of the original defendant against whom an *ex parte* decree has been passed and that he can apply to set aside the decree within the time allowed by this Article, whether he has been made a party to the suit or not, or whether he has been brought on record or not at the time when the application is made.¹ It has also been held in cases arising under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the word "defendant" in that Rule would include his legal representative and that such legal representative can apply to have the decree set aside under that Rule.²

[See also (1933) A I R 1933 All 933 (934) : 147 Ind Cas 858, *Ahmad Yar Khan v. Khayali*. (Application to set aside *ex parte* decree—Security bond filed in time but verified late—Validity of.)]

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 330 (332) : 70 Ind Cas 406, *Bala Krishna Aiyar v. Pichamuthu Pillai*. (Security must be given within 30 days)

(1930) A I R 1930 All 830 (831) : 53 All 59 : 128 Ind Cas 765, *Moti Lal Ramchandrar v. Durga Prasad*.

(1931) A I R 1931 All 727 (733) : 54 All 154 : 136 Ind Cas 609 (FB), *Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh*

(1928) A I R 1928 All 607 (608) : 51 All 402 : 111 Ind Cas 719, *Kiran Koomar v. Baij Nath*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 1 (2) : 122 Ind Cas 328 : 5 Luck 294, *Narain v. Pudan*.]

2. (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 18 (19) : I L R (1937) Lah 728 . 173 Ind Cas 952, *Mohammad Ramzan Khan v. Khubi Khan*.

[Bul see (1936) A I R 1936 Pesh 193 (194) : 167 Ind Cas 479, *Jugal Kishore v. Abdul Hnan*. (The amendment was not adverted to in this case.)]

3 (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 18 (19) : I L R (1937) Lah 728 . 173 Ind Cas 952, *Muhammad Ramzan Khan v. Khubi Khan*.

[Bul see (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 206 (207) : 166 Ind Cas 137, *Din Muhammad v. Darbari Lal*. (The amendment of S. 17 in 1935 was not adverted to in this case)]

(1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 407 (409) : 161 Ind Cas 470 . 12 Luck 297, *Mahabir v. Sheo Saran*. (Oo)]

Note 4

1a (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 370 (371) : 27 Oudh Cas 299 : 85 Ind Cas 529, *Mt. Deoki v. Jugal Kishore*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 1201 (1205) 21 Ind Cas 568 : 38 Mad 412, *Venkata-subbier v. Krishnamurthy*.

1. (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 1201 (1205) . 21 Ind Cas 568 . 38 Mad 412, *Venkata-subbier v. Krishnamurthy*. (29 Cal 33 Followed)

2. (1902) 29 Cal 37 (36), *Ganoda Prasad Roy v. Shib Naram Mukerjee*.

In *Doraisamy Iyer v. Balasundaram Iyer*,³ it has been held that Section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code refers only to taking proceedings or making applications and not to *continuing* proceedings or applications already started, and that therefore, the legal representative of a defendant who has died after making an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree against him, cannot continue such application. It has also been held in the same case that even assuming that Section 146 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to the case, the applicant cannot continue the proceedings inasmuch as there was no possibility of proving that the defendant had knowledge of the decree within the thirty days prescribed by this Article.

5. Starting point.—Under the provisions in the previous Acts corresponding to this Article, time for an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree ran from the date of *executing any process for enforcing the judgment*.^{1a}

Under the present Article, time runs *from the date of the decree, or where the summons was not duly served, from the date when the*

(1923) A I R 1923 All 30 (30) 83 Ind Cas 601, *Mt Banoo v. Hardwar Lal*.

(1907) 23 All 574 (575) 1907 All W N 176 4 All L Jour 480, *Beti Joo v. Sham Bihari Lal*

See also Note 16 to O 9 R. 13 of the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code

3. (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 507 (508) : 102 Ind Cas 243.

Note 5

1a (1867) 7 Suth W R 198 (198), *Radha Benode Chowdhry v. Modhoo Soodun Sircar* (Section 119 of the Code of 1859).

(1866) 6 Suth W R 51 (51), *Shib Chundar Bhadure v. Lachee Debia Choudhrai* (Do)

(1867) 7 Suth W R 375 (375), *Shash Ghulam Ahyak v. Sham Soondur Koonwaree* (Do)

(1868) 9 Suth W R 236 (239) Beng L R Sup Vol 947 (FB), *Radha Bindoo Chowdhry v. Digumburee Dossee* (Do)

(1870) 13 Suth W R 436 (437), *Shumboo Chunder Holdar v. Ram Lal Ghose*

(1871) 15 Suth W R 210 (211), *Sookh Moyee Dossee v. Nurmooda Dossee*.

(1876) 25 Suth W R 72 (73), *Kail Prasad v. Digambur Chatterjee*

(1869) 1869 Pun Re No. 3, *Mt Googree v. Ruttun Chand Puree*

(1878) 1878 Pun Re No. 32, *Chowdhri Hail v. Jas Kishen*.

(1876) 2 Cal 123 (124), *Poorno Chunder Coomdo v. Proenno Coomar Sikdar*. (Act of 1871)

(1906) 1906 Upp Bur Bul 2nd Qr Lam. 7, *Nga Tha Din Mi Tin v. Nga Po Chan* (Act of 1877)

(1910) 6 Ind Cas 400 (400) 34 Mad 88, *Suryanarayana v. Ramanna* (Do)

(1897) 1897 Pun Re No. 5, *Ishra Singh v. Jhanda* (Do)

(1905) 1905 Pun L R No. 110, *Gurandutta v. Ziyada* (A notice served under S. 243 is an execution of a process for enforcing judgment)

(1883) 9 Cal 869 (870), *Bhobunessury v. Judobendra Narain Mullik* (Do.)

(1884) 1884 All W N 322 (322), *Pachu v. Jas Kishen* (Do)

(1885) 7 All 345 (353) 1885 All W N 73, *Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali*. (Do)

(1884) 6 All 144 (147) 1884 All W N 1, *Sunraj Kuari v. Ambika Prasad Singh* (Do)

(1898) 20 All 311 (314) 1898 All W N 45, *Mulamad Khan v. Hanwant Singh* (Do)

(1888) 1888 Bom P J 56 (56), *Eatje v. Ramji*. (Do)

(1907) 31 Bom 303 (307) 9 Bom L R 323, *Hanwant v. Shastar* (Do)

Article 164
Note 5

applicant has *knowledge of the decree*. It must be noted that time will run from the date of knowledge *only where the summons is not duly served*.¹ Where the summons is duly served, the date of the applicant's knowledge of the decree is immaterial and time will run from the date of the decree.²

The second part of this Article comes into operation only where the application is made more than thirty days after the passing of the decree, and the applicant pleads that he had not been duly served and had knowledge of the decree only within thirty days from the day on which he made the application.³ The question therefore arises as to when a summons may be said to be *duly served* in law. Order 5 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribes the various modes in which a service may be effected. If the service is effected in the prescribed mode, it is clear that there has been a "due service." The applicant may show that as a matter of fact there was no due service, i.e., service in the manner prescribed by law.⁴ But if he does not show this and *prima facie* the record shows that the prescribed procedure

(1906) 8 Bom L R 567 (569), *Sidharthari v. Anantram*. (Do.)

(1912) 17 Ind Cas 420 (420) • 15 Oudh Cas 289, *Rajab Ali Shah v. Upper India Paper Mills Co. Ltd.* (Attachment of debt due to judgment-debtor is an execution of a process for enforcing judgment.)

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 663 (666) (Mad), *Chidambara Thevan v. Arunachalla Thevan*. (Do.)

1 (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 13 (14) • 69 Ind Cas 549, *Panjab Rao v. Daliram*
(1928) 108 Ind Cas 753 (754) (Mad), *Sudramania Iyer v. Krishnasamy Naidu*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 558 (559) : 91 Ind Cas 420, *Doraisamy Aiyar v. Balasundaram Aiyar*.

(1912) 15 Ind Cas 642 (642) (Mad), *Sanka Iyer v. Subbiah Iyer*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 327 (329) : 91 Ind Cas 965, *Daldecodas Lohia v. Shubcharandas Goenka*.

2 (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 444 (445) : 89 Ind Cas 223, *Ghanshiram Daluram v. Misrilal Chundlal*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 326 (327) : 141 Ind Cas 759, *Har Charan Seth v. Muhammad Aszullah*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 651 (652) . 29 Ind Cas 476, *Tara Sanhar Ghose v. Nasaruddin*.

3. (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 397 (399) : 129 Ind Cas 689, *Mir Ahmed v. Pir Bakhs* (Party who is cognizant of proceedings against him is duly served when after failure to effect personal service, proclamation is published in newspapers.)

has been followed, the defendant cannot claim any extension of the period of thirty days from the date of the decree on the ground that, really he had no knowledge of the decree.⁵ The above principles will apply to service of summons in *any* of the modes prescribed by Order 5 of the Code and will therefore apply also to the case of substituted service prescribed by Order 5 Rule 20 of the Code. The general trend of opinion accordingly is that substituted service is "due service" unless it is shown that the procedure prescribed for effecting such service has not been followed, and that time in such cases will run from the date of the decree and not from the date when the applicant has knowledge of the decree.⁶

Article 164
Not 5

- (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 745 (746). 152 Ind Cas 830, Kedar Mull v. Wazifunissa
- (1938) A I R 1938 Oudh 11 (12). 171 Ind Cas 617, Gajadhar v Uma Datt.
- (1931) A I R 1931 All 727 (729). 54 All 154 136 Ind Cas 609 (FB), Ram Bhatose v. Ganga Singh.
- (1918) 19 Ind Cts 425 (426) 9 Nag L R 35, Habibullah v Karanji
See also cases cited in Foot-Notes (5, 6), below
5. (1928) 109 Ind Cas 753 (754) (Mad), Subramanyya Iyer v Krishnaswami Naidu
[See also (1914) A I R 1914 Sind 109 (110) 27 Ind Cas 351 8 Sind
- dant to appear and answer on the day fixed in the summons)
- (1017) A I R 1917 Sind 27 (28) 42 Ind Cas 611 . 11 Sind L R 71,
Kesachand v Lakhamai. ("Duly served" means served in such
a way as to give the defendant information of the proceedings,
i e duly served within the meaning of the term as used in
O 5 R 9))
- 6 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 487 (488) 101 Ind Cas 651, Narasimha Chettiar v.
Balakrishna Chetty
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 507 (508) 102 Ind Cas 213, Doraiswamy Iyer v.
Balasundaram Iyer
- (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 815 (816) 51 Mad 660 110 Ind Cas 400, Sharifa
Beeby v. Abdul Salam.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 222 (224) 122 Ind Cas 35, Krishna Padayachi v.
Vinayaka Swamiyar (In the case of substituted service, the Article
lays down that when the order is rightly made and the service directed
by the order is properly effected, knowledge of the defendant is immat-
terial and time runs from the date of the decree Where however, an
order for substituted service is improperly obtained, as being made
on insufficient material contained in an application supported by
affidavit, the summons cannot be said to have been duly served within
the meaning of Art 164, and the time accordingly runs not from the
date of the decree but from the date when it first came to the knowl-
edge of the defendant)
- (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 812 (813) 55 Mad 240 135 Ind Cas 344, Muhaimin
Kader Veera Sahib v Lakshumanan Chettiar (There may be
circumstances under which there is no difficulty in treating substituted
service as due service If defendant deliberately evades service and
substituted service is properly asked for, granted and effected, there is
due service)
- (1932) A I R 1932 Mad 472 (473) 133 Ind Cas 146, Rajagopalachari v
Subramaniyam
- (1931) A I R 1931 All 727 (729) 54 All 154 136 Ind Cas 609 (FB), Pama
Dharose v Ganga Singh
- (1918) 19 Ind Cas 425 (426) 9 Nag L R 35, Habibullah v Karanji.

Article 164
Notes
5-7

In *Venkatachalam v. Subbaya*,⁷ it was however held by Mr. Justice Srinivasa Iyengar that a substituted service can never be "due service" within the meaning of this Article and that consequently time will run only from the date when the applicant got knowledge of the decree. This view has not been followed in other cases⁸ of the Madras High Court and cannot be considered to be correct. In *Gyanammal v. Abdul Hussain*,⁹ Mr. Justice Reilly was of the opinion that even though substituted service is technically and formally effected in the manner prescribed by the Code, it is not due service unless it has been really effective, i. e., has achieved the object of service by bringing the claim against him to the knowledge of the defendant, or respondent. It is submitted that this view also does not appear to be correct. Where a mode of service prescribed by the Code is followed in the manner prescribed in all details, it cannot be said that there has, nevertheless, been no due service.

6. "Summons," meaning of. — The word "summons" in this Article refers to summons to be served on the defendant for the first hearing of the suit. It does not include notices that might be served on the defendant during subsequent stages of the suit. Therefore, where the summons for the first hearing has been duly served on the defendant and the fact that the case was transferred to another Court and notice of such transfer was not duly served on the defendant,¹ or the fact that the suit was adjourned to another date and notice of such date was not given to the defendant,² or the fact that the suit was remanded by the Appellate Court for re-hearing and no notice of the date of hearing on remand was duly served on the defendant,³ will not give a fresh starting point of limitation under this Article.

7. Service of summons referred to is service on the original defendant. — The party with reference to whom service of summons is spoken of in this Article is the *original defendant*. Where a legal

(1925) A I R 1925 Lah 639 (639) : 92 Ind Cas 272, *Dillu Ram v. Nawab*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 116 (116) : 131 Ind Cas 344, *Hansraj v. Narain Singh*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 369 (369) : 132 Ind Cas 778, *Thakur Prasad v. Barahi Lal*.

[See also (1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 112 (113) : 157 Ind Cas 878, *Dharam Chand v. Dharam Chand*

(1925) A I R 1925 Rang 187 (188) : 2 Rang 655 : 85 Ind Cas 324, *Ma Naw Naw v. Somasundaram Chetty*]

7. (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 655 (655) : 103 Ind Cas 890.

8. See the Madras cases cited in Foot-Note 6 above.

9. (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 613 (616) : 65 Mad 223 : 131 Ind Cas 1202.

Note 6

1. (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 539 (510) : 139 Ind Cas 351, *Sham Sundar Khushi Ram v. Devi Ditta Mal*.

2. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 261 (262) : 57 Ind Cas 15, *Mt Lal Devi v. Amar Nath*

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 666 (666) : 76 Ind Cas 14, *Surjit Singh v. C. J. Torrie*.

3 (1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 7 (7) : 151 Ind Cas 429, *Tara Chand v. Ram Chand*.

representative of a deceased defendant against whom an *ex parte* decree had been passed, applied to set aside such decree and it was found that the original defendant had been duly served, it was held that time ran from the date of the decree and not from the date when the legal representative got knowledge of the decree.¹

8. "Knowledge of the decree."—The term "knowledge" means a certain and clear perception of a fact. The expression "knowledge of the decree" in the Article means knowledge not of a decree, but of the particular decree which is sought to be set aside.¹ It does not, however, mean knowledge of the contents of the decree or the general effect thereof.^{1a}

In *Bapu Rao Sakharani v. Sadhu Bhivra*,² Macleod, C. J., observed as follows:

"We think the words of the Article mean something more than mere knowledge that a decree had been passed in some suit in some Court against the applicant. We think it means that the applicant must have knowledge not merely that a decree has been passed by some Court against him, but that a particular decree has been passed against him in a particular Court in favour of a particular person for a particular sum."

The same view has been held in the undermentioned cases also.³ A vague suspicion that the defendant must have heard of some decree is not enough to dismiss his petition on the ground that it is barred by limitation.⁴ Knowledge of the suit is not knowledge of the decree.^{4a} A party praying to set aside an *ex parte* decree cannot be held to have had knowledge of a decree that had been passed against him from the mere fact that he had been told some information in a suit of which he is given no details. The fact that such information might have put the defendant on inquiry does not impose on him a

Note 7

- 1 (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 1201 (1205) · 33 Mad 442 21 Ind Cas 668, Venkata-subbia v. Krishnamurthy

Note 8

1. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 586 (587, 588) (Bom), Pundlick Bapu v. Vasantrao Madhavrao.
 (1911) 9 Ind Cas 189 (193) 38 Cal 294, Kumud Nath v. Jatindra Nath.
 1a (1910) 6 Ind Cas 901 (903) (Bom), Abdool Hossain v. Esmailji.
 2 (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 193 (193) 47 Bom 485 72 Ind Cas 130.
 3 (1926) 92 Ind Cas 295 (296) (Nag), Issam v. Gangra.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 31 (33) 90 Ind Cas 1042, Mohamed Sahib v. Aiyappa Chettiar.
 (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 17 (19, 20) 166 Ind Cas 635, Kedar Nath Singh v. Kesri Mull.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Nag 119 (120) 27 Nag L R 53 131 Ind Cas 279, Chintaman v. Pannalal.
 4 (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 31 (33) 90 Ind Cas 1042, Mohamed Sahib v. Aiyappa Chettiar.
 (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 17 (19, 20) 166 Ind Cas 635, Kedar Nath Singh v. Kesri Mull.
 4a (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 276 (278) 129 Ind Cas 689, Mir Ali v. Pir Bulshah.

Article 164
Notes
8—9

particular obligation to inquire further. The duty is rather on the plaintiff of giving full information as to the litigation and knowledge of the decree.⁵ Where the petitioner's brothers had knowledge of the *ex parte* decree made against the petitioner, the inference cannot reasonably be drawn that the petitioner had knowledge of it, when it is proved that he lived away from his brothers and there is no evidence that they communicated the fact of the decree to him.⁶

The question when the applicant has knowledge of the decree is one of fact.⁷ Before holding that the application for setting aside the decree is barred by limitation, the Court is bound to make an inquiry as to when the defendant got knowledge of the decree.⁸

The knowledge of the decree referred to in the Article is that of the applicant. If the legal representative of a deceased defendant, against whom an *ex parte* decree has been passed, wishes to file an application to set it aside, on the ground that the summons was not duly served on the defendant, he should do so within 30 days of his (i. e. the applicant's) knowledge of the decree.⁹ But if the defendant himself has made such an application and on his death the legal representative continues the application, the date of knowledge of the legal representative is immaterial and it must be shown that the application by the defendant was made within 30 days of defendant's knowledge.¹⁰

9. Extension of time. — It is a general principle that the Court cannot under its inherent power extend the period of limitation prescribed by the Act.¹ It follows that the Court cannot override

(1933) A I R 1933 Pat 279 (280) : 12 Pat 745 : 145 Ind Cas 314, *Rajeshwari Prasad Singh v. Brahmanand Lal*. (Under Article 164 an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree must be filed within thirty days from the date of the applicant's knowledge of the decree and not within thirty days of his knowledge of the suit.)

5 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 381 (381, 382) : 99 Ind Cas 621, *Palanappa Chelliar v. Vedachalla Mudaliar*.

6. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 189 (193) : 38 Cal 391, *Kumud Nath v. Jalindra Nath*.

7. (1889) 12 Mad 512 (516) : 5 Sar 435 : 13 Ind Jur 409 (P C), *Krishnan v. Sridevi*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Pat 17 (19, 20) : 166 Ind Cas 635, *Kedar Nath v. Keshri Mull*.

8. (1934) A I R 1934 All 1011 (1013) : 151 Ind Cas 579, *Ajodhya Pershad v. Sari Ram*.

[See also (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 235 (236) : 116 Ind Cas 620, *Charan Das v. Puran Lal Gobind Pershad*. (It is necessary for the

9. (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 370 (371) : 85 Ind Cas 529 : 27 Oudh Cas 299, *Mt. Deoki v. Jugal Kishore*.

10. See (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 507 (508) : 102 Ind Cas 213, *Doraiswamy Iyer v. Balasundaram Iyer*.

Note 9

1. See Note 3 to Section 3, *ante*

(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 666 (666) : 76 Ind Cas 14, *Surjit Singh v. C. J. Torrie*.

under its inherent powers the period prescribed by this Article on any equitable grounds.²

Section 5 of the Act does not expressly refer to an application under this Article and therefore, unless it has been made applicable to such applications by or under any other enactment, it cannot be resorted to for the purpose of excusing the delay in filing the application.³ In the Provinces of Bombay and Madras and the Central Provinces, Sec 5 has, however, been made applicable to applications under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, and in those Provinces the Court can, for sufficient cause, excuse the delay in filing the application.⁴

Article 164 Note 9

[See also (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 261 (261) 57 Ind Cas 15, *Mt Lal Dei v. Amar Nath*. (Application to set aside an *ex parte* decree cannot be altered to one for review, by merely changing the description, to avoid limitation)]

2. (1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 146 (147), *Ajab Khan v Alaf Gul*
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 901 (902) (Bom), *Abdool Hussain Eusafally v. Esmailys Abdool Hossain*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Rang 273 (275) 113 Ind Cas 811 6 Rang 494, *U E Maung v P A R P Chettiar Firm*
 (1934) A I R 1934 Nag 43 (44) 144 Ind Cas 394, *Pundalik Vithoba v Ganpat*
 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 261 (262) 57 Ind Cas 15, *Mt Lal Dei v Amar Nath*
 (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 479 (480) 65 Ind Cas 341 . 1 Pat 277, *Ajodhya Mahlon v. Phul Kuer*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 135 (135) 69 Ind Cas 427, *Firm Kundan Lal Mukhandi Lal v. Kanshi Ram*
 (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 266 (266) 66 Ind Cas 270, *Khairati v Umar Din*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 342 (343) 100 I C 936, *Pal Singh v Harnam Singh*
 (1936) A I R 1936 Rang 305 (305) 164 Ind Cas 286, *Jagadamma Pandit v Naresh Pandey*.
- 3 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 651 (652) 29 Ind Cas 476, *Tara Sanhar Ghose v. Nasaruddin*
 (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 446 (446) 89 Ind Cas 462, *Mt Sitaba v Mata Din*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Rang 167 (188) 2 Rang 655 85 Ind Cas 324, *Ma Nau Nao v Sonasundaram Chetty*
 (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 110 (111) . 144 Ind Cas 980, *Ramanathan Chettiar v Baldeo Singh*
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 342 (343) 100 Ind Cas 936, *Pal Singh v Harnam Singh*
 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 261 (262) 57 Ind Cas 15, *Mt Lal Dei v Amar Nath*
 (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 266 (266) 66 Ind Cas 270, *Khairati v Umar Din*
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 901 (902) (Bom), *Abdool Hossain Eusafally v Esmailys Abdool Hussain* (Section 5 has now been made applicable to such
4. (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 14 (17) 47 Mad 624 80 Ind Cas 677 (F B), *Krishnamachariar v. Sri Rangammal*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 957 (957) 32 Ind Cas 975 *Sennumalai Goundan v. Palani Goundan*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 186 (187) 45 Mad 628 66 Ind Cas 104, *Sudalaimuthu Kudumban v. Juddi Reddhar*

Article 164
Notes
9—13

Section 6 of the Act is limited in its applicability to suits and applications for execution and, consequently, cannot be taken advantage of for making an application governed by this Article.⁵

10. Exclusion of time under Section 14. — In computing the period of limitation prescribed by this Article, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting another civil proceeding in a wrong Court may be excluded under the provisions of Section 14 *ante*, if the conditions of that Section are satisfied.¹

11. Section 18 and this Article. — Section 18 can be availed of by an applicant to set aside an *ex parte* decree, where he has been kept by fraud from the knowledge of his right to apply. See Notes to Section 18 *ante*. But the fraud must be such as to have kept him from knowledge of his right to apply and not such as has prevented him from exercising his right. Where the petitioner alleged that he went to the decree-holder and asked him about the decree and the latter said that he would come and settle things with him, it was held that the fraud alleged was not of the nature contemplated by Section 18 and that it did not affect limitation.² The fact that an *ex parte* decree has been obtained by fraud is not a ground for postponing the period of limitation under Section 18.³ Where the holder of a preliminary decree represented to the judgment-debtor that he should not and need not appear in the final decree proceedings on the assurance that such proceedings would be dropped, but nevertheless, continued the proceedings and obtained a final decree, it was held that fraud such as is contemplated by Section 18 was practised on the judgment-debtor and that Section 18 could be availed of by him in an application to set aside the *ex parte* decree.³

12. Section 22 and this Article. — See Note 3 to Section 22, *ante*.

13. Parties to application. — There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code requiring that persons in whose favour an *ex parte* decree has been passed should be named in the application to set aside such decree. If the application is made in time, the fact that

5. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 543 (544) : 35 Mad 678, *Chidambaram Chetty v. Karuppan Chetty*

(1917) A I R 1917 Lah 144 (146) : 37 Ind Cas 292 : 1916 Pun Re No. 101, *Manohar Lal v. Mt. Sadiqa Begam*.

Note 10

1. (1932) A I R 1932 All 340 (342) : 51 All 423 : 140 Ind Cas 178, *Raghunandan Chaube v. Bhupal Tewari*. (A I R 1923 All 919 held not correctly decided.)

(1910) 6 Ind Cas 154 (156) (Cal), *Basuruddin Mondal v. Sonaulah Mondal*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Bom 351 (352) : 57 Ind Cas 551, *Ibrahim Harun v. Jusaf Hussain*.

Note 11

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 110 (111) : 141 Ind Cas 920, *Ramanathan Chettiar v. Baldeo Singh*.

2. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 261 (261) : 57 Ind Cas 15, *Mt. Lal Devi v. Amar Nath*.

3. (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 353 (359) : 94 Ind Cas 56, *M. D. Kinkhede v. Mohanrao*.

the person in whose favour the decree was passed was not named in it at the time, but later, does not affect limitation.¹

Article 164
Notes
13—15

14. Onus of proof. — When an application for setting aside an *ex parte* decree is made more than 30 days from the date of the decree and the applicant alleges that he was not duly served, the onus is on him to show that he did not have knowledge of the decree more than 30 days before the application was made.¹ It lies all the more heavily upon him when it is found that he was perfectly well aware of the progress of the suit.² The onus cannot be shifted by the bare denial of knowledge made by the defendant.³

15. Subsequent application. — Where an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree is made in time, but owing to the impossibility of serving the opposite side with notice the Court consigned the application to the record room, and subsequently the judgment-debtor renewed his application to set aside the decree, but beyond time, it was held by the Lahore High Court that the original application must be deemed to be pending, that the subsequent application must be considered as merely one in continuance of the suspended original application and that, therefore, no question of limitation arose.¹ In the undermentioned case,² where an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree was dismissed for default and the applicant made a further application to restore the prior application to file, it was held by the Allahabad High Court that the second application might be treated as an original application to set aside

Note 13

1. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 506 (507) 62 Cal 1057 157 Ind Cas 876, *Dulal Chandra v. Atul Krishna*

Note 14

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 305 (305) 164 Ind Cas 286, *Jagadamma Pandit v. Nareesh Pandey*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 285 (236) 116 Ind Cas 620, *Charan Das v. Firm Puran Lal Gobind Prasad*
 (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 192 (192) 124 Ind Cas 673, *Tota v. Badri Pershad*
 (1928) 109 Ind Cas 82 (82) (Lah), *Karam Singh v. Barkat Ram*
 (1929) 120 Ind Cas 591 (595) (Lah), *Mathra Das & Sons v. Kanshi Ram*
 (1932) 139 Ind Cas 131 (131) (Lah), *Tippar Chand Lakshmi Chand v. Habib-ud-Rahman*
 (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 639 (639) 92 Ind Cas 272, *Dattu Ram v. Nawab*
 (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 268 (268) 46 Ind Cas 777, *Suzru Mal Haracharan Das v. Sham Lal Gokal Chand*
 (1928) 107 Ind Cas 281 (281) (Lah), *Mt. Rajo v. Ali*
 (But see (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 233 (233) 73 Ind Cas 84, *Nihala v. Karam Singh*)
 2. (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 379 (380) 95 Ind Cas 124 7 Lah 161, *Piraj Shah v. Qarib Shah*
 3. (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 535 (537), *Bengal Coal Co Ltd v. Baul Chandra Mukherji*

Note 15

1. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 69 (70) 55 Ind Cas 824, *Eshkat Ullah v. Farai v. Manla*.
 2. (1924) A I R 1924 All 503 (504) 78 Ind Cas 858 46 All 319, *Patanbaha Lal v. Dandee Singh*

Article 164
Notes
9—13

Section 6 of the Act is limited in its applicability to suits and *applications for execution* and, consequently, cannot be taken advantage of for making an application governed by this Article.⁵

10. Exclusion of time under Section 14. — In computing the period of limitation prescribed by this Article, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting another civil proceeding in a wrong Court may be excluded under the provisions of Section 14 *ante*, if the conditions of that Section are satisfied.¹

11. Section 18 and this Article. — Section 18 can be availed of by an applicant to set aside an *ex parte* decree, where he has been kept by fraud from the knowledge of his right to apply. See Notes to Section 18 *ante*. But the fraud must be such as to have kept him from knowledge of his *right* to apply and not such as has prevented him from *exercising* his right. Where the petitioner alleged that he went to the decree-holder and asked him about the decree and the latter said that he would come and settle things with him, it was held that the fraud alleged was not of the nature contemplated by Section 18 and that it did not affect limitation.¹ The fact that an *ex parte* decree has been obtained by fraud is not a ground for postponing the period of limitation under Section 18.² Where the holder of a preliminary decree represented to the judgment-debtor that he should not and need not appear in the final decree proceedings on the assurance that such proceedings would be dropped, but nevertheless, continued the proceedings and obtained a final decree, it was held that fraud such as is contemplated by Section 18 was practised on the judgment-debtor and that Section 18 could be availed of by him in an application to set aside the *ex parte* decree.³

12. Section 22 and this Article. — See Note 3 to Section 22, *ante*.

13. Parties to application. — There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code requiring that persons in whose favour an *ex parte* decree has been passed should be named in the application to set aside such decree. If the application is made in time, the fact that

5. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 543 (544) : 35 Mad 678, *Chidambaram Chetty v. Karuppan Chetty*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Lah 144 (146) : 37 Ind Cas 292 : 1916 Pun Re No. 101, *Manohar Lal v. Mt. Sadva Begam*.

Note 10

1. (1932) A I R 1932 All 340 (312) : 54 All 423 : 140 Ind Cas 178, *Raghunandan Chaudh v. Bhupal Tewari* (A I R 1923 All 319 held not correctly decided)

(1910) 6 Ind Cas 154 (156) (Cal), *Baturuddin Mondal v. Sonaulah Mondal*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 351 (352) : 57 Ind Cas 551, *Ibrahim Harun v. Jusaf Hussam*.

Note 11

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 110 (111) : 141 Ind Cas 950, *Ramanathan Chettyar v. Baldeo Singh*.

2. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 261 (261) : 57 Ind Cas 15, *Mt. Lal Devi v. Amar Nath*.

3. (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 333 (339) : 91 Ind Cas 56, *M. B. Kulkade v. Mahanga*.

3. "By a person dispossessed." — As seen in the foregoing Note, this Article applies to applications under Order 21 Rule 100, Civil Procedure Code. That Rule provides for applications by a *person other than the judgment-debtor*. The use of the words "by a person" in this Article, which is very wide, has however led to a conflict of judicial decisions as to whether this Article applies also to applications by a *judgment-debtor* complaining of delivery of property in excess of what has been decreed or sold. In the earlier cases decided by the High Courts of Allahabad,¹ Madras² and the Chief Court of Oudh,³ it was held that this Article is wide enough to include applications by the judgment-debtor who has been dispossessed of immovable property and who disputes the right of the decree-holder or purchaser to be put into possession. But in later cases the High Court of Allahabad,⁴ a Full Bench of the High Court of Madras⁵ and the Chief Court of Oudh⁶ have taken a contrary view and held that this Article does not apply to applications by judgment-debtors, but applies only to applications by a person other than the judgment-debtor as under Order 21 Rule 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court of Madras for taking the latter view is that the provision in Section 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, was re-enacted as Article 158 in Act 9 of 1871 and subsequently as Article 165 of the Limitation Acts of 1877 and 1908, and that inasmuch as Section 230 applied only to obstructions and dispossession of a person *other than the defendant*, the Legislature in re-enacting that Section in Article 158 of the Act of 1871 must have intended the Article to apply only to cases covered by Section 230, *viz.*, applications by third parties. The High Courts of Bombay,⁷ Calcutta,⁸ Lahore⁹ and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of

Note 3

- 1 (1900) 25 All 843 (846) 1903 All W N 50, *Har Din Singh v. Lachman Singh*

- (1891) 1 Mad L Jour 42 (43), *Vythilinga Muppanar v. Seethalakshmi Ammal*
3. (1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 270 (271) 17 Oudh Cas 94 21 Ind Cas 137, *Raja Ram v. Itay Kunwar*

- (1902) C Oudh Cas 44 (46), *Jagan Nath v. Datta*

4. (1916) A I R 1916 All 101 (106) 38 All 339 34 Ind Cas 231, *Abdul Karim v. Mt. Islamunnissa Bibi*

5. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 269 (271) 42 Mad 753 53 Ind Cas 437 (F B), *Thattantavita v. Kombi Ahasan*

- 6 (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 76 (79) 115 Ind Cas 444 4 Luck 209, *Mt. Jilas v. Abdul Rahman*

- 7 (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 271 (272, 273) 68 Ind Cas 349 46 Bom 1031, *Rasul Malik Pinjar v. Amina Hanif*

- (1931) A I R 1931 Bom 446 (447, 448) 133 Ind Cas 858, *Gangadhar Martand v. Jagmohanlal Varjandas*

- 8 (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 287 (288) 67 Ind Cas 663, *Bakur Das Pal v. Girish Chandra Pal*

- [See however (1881) 7 Cal 91 (96) 9 Cal L R 53, *Mahomed Hossain v. Kehil Singh*]

9. (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 430 (432), *Sharfu v. Mir Khan*.

Article 165
Notes
3-5

Upper Burma¹⁰ have also preferred to follow the latter view, so that the present accepted view of practically all the Courts is that this Article does not apply to applications by the judgment-debtors. According to the latter decisions, applications by the judgment-debtors are governed by Article 181 of the Act.

4. "Dispossessed," meaning of. — In order to sustain an application under Order 21 Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the applicant thereunder must have been actually dispossessed. Mere symbolical delivery of possession does not amount to dispossession so as to entitle a person to apply under that Rule.¹ Where, however, actual possession is delivered to the purchaser in court-sale, in spite of objection by a third party and in the presence of the latter's agent, he is dispossessed and will be estopped from disputing the possession of the purchaser more than twelve years after such dispossession.²

5. Starting point of limitation. — Under this Article limitation begins to run from the date of dispossession.¹ Where possession is delivered by a Court Amin, the date of delivery of possession by the Amin and not the date of his report as to such delivery, is the starting point.²

In computing the thirty days' period of limitation, the date of dispossession must be excluded. Thus, where the dispossession took place on 14th December 1875, and the application was filed on 14th January 1876, 13th January 1876 being a holiday, it was held that the application was not barred.³

Where an application under Order 21 Rule 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed within thirty days from the date of dispossession impleading the purchaser who dispossessed the applicant as a party, such application cannot be considered to be defective and barred simply because the sub-purchaser has not been originally added as a party.⁴

10. (1918) A I R 1918 Upp Bur 3 (3) : 46 Ind Cas 323 : 3 Upp Bur Rul 79.
Maung Tha v. Ma Pyu

Note 4

1. (1903) 30 Cal 710 (712), *Ibrahim Mullick v. Ramjadu Rakshit*.
2. (1903) 27 Mad 262 (266, 267), *Venkatakrishna Row v. Venkappa*.

Note 5

1. (1902) 6 Oudh Cas 44 (47), *Jagannath v. Datta*.
2. (1864) 1864 Suth W R Mis 18 (18), *Kasheerath Doss v. Bhowanes Doss*.
3. (1876) 2 Bom 673 (675), *F. K. Gurjar v. V. D. Barre*.
4. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 355 (357) : 59 Cal 55 : 132 Ind Cas 631, *Indubhushan Das v. Haricharan Mandal*.

166. Under the same Code to set aside a sale in execution of a decree (including any such application by a judgment-debtor).	Thirty days.	The date of the sale.	Article 166
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of Article.
3. "Under the same Code."
4. "To set aside."
- 4a. Void sale — Application in respect of.
5. "Decree."
6. Adjustment of decree after sale — Application to record adjustment and set aside sale — Limitation.
7. Application under Order 21 Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code.
8. Application on ground of judgment-debtor having no saleable interest in the property — Limitation.
9. Sale in insolvency proceedings—Applicability of Article.
10. Applicability of Article to application to set aside sale under Section 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
11. Parties to application to set aside sale — Effect of joining them after limitation.
12. Notice to persons affected by application to set aside sale — Limitation.
13. Application by notice of motion, when deemed as made.
14. Suit to avoid sale treated as proceeding under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code — Limitation.
15. Setting aside of sale under inherent power — Limitation.

Act of 1877, Articles 166 and 172

	Thirty days.	The date of the sale.
Court.		
172.—By a purchaser at an execution-sale, to set aside the sale on the ground that the person whose interest in the property purported to be sold had no saleable interest therein.	Sixty days	The date of the sale.

Act of 1871

159.—To set aside a sale in execution of a decree, on the ground of irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale	Ditto	The date of the sale.
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Act of 1859

No corresponding provision.

Article 166
Note 1

16. Fresh ground for setting aside sale, if can be urged after limitation.
17. Extension of time under this Article.
18. Computation of limitation under the Article — Effect of fraud.
19. Defence not barred.
20. Special or local law, period prescribed by.
21. Starting point of limitation.
22. Order setting aside sale subsequently reversed — Limitation for fresh application to set aside sale.

Other Topics

Acceptance of highest bid by Court—If necessary to complete sale	...	See Note 21, Pts 3, 4
Article does not override special provisions of Civil Procedure Code	...	See Note 2, Pt. 13
Completion of sale	...	See Note 21, Pts. 2 to 7 and F.N (5)
Confirmation of sale is no bar to application within time	...	See Note 2, Pt. 15
Date of sale and not that of confirmation is starting point	...	See Note 21, Pt. 1
Exclusion of time under Section 14	...	See Note 17, Pts. 9, 10
Mere deposit of amount within thirty days —	Not sufficient to prevent bar of limitation	...
Right to apply to set aside sale arising subsequent to sale—Article does not apply	...	See Note 2, Pts. 16, 17
Section 4 applies	...	See Note 17, Pt. 11
Sections 5 and 6—Applicability	...	See Note 17, Pts. 4 to 6
Sections 12, 13—Not applicable	...	See Note 17, Pts. 7, 8
Voidable sales	...	See Note 2, Pts 12, 14

1. Legislative changes.

Position under Act of 1859: The Act of 1859 (which only applied to *suits* and not to appeals or applications) did not contain any provisions corresponding to this Article. But, the Civil Procedure Code of 1859, Section 256, provided that at any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, an application might be made to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of any material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale.¹ It was held with reference to this provision that the Court had a *discretion* to receive an application under the Section even after the period of thirty days prescribed by it.²

Position under Act of 1871: A provision corresponding to this Article was for the first time enacted in the Act of 1871, as Article 159. But this Article only applied to an application to set aside a

Article 166 — Note 1

1. (1866) 6 Suth W R 313 122 (122), *Ishan Chunder Dutt v. Mothooranath Doss*
[See (1870) 7 Bom H G R A C 74 (77), *Far Singappa v. Sadashuappa*.
(Section 256 did not apply where the sale was attacked on the ground of fraud)]
2. (1872) 18 Suth W R 333 (334), *Raj Coomarr Singh v. Lalljee Sahoo*.
(1872) 18 Suth W R 11 (11, 12), *Poulson v. Dunn*.
(1872) 18 Suth W R 11n (12n), *In re Umrito Lall Dose*.

sale on the ground of irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale, and did not apply to applications based on other grounds

Article 166
Note 1

Changes made by Act of 1877 : The Act of 1877 contained two provisions, viz. Articles 166 and 172 specifically relating to this subject

Article 166, when it was originally enacted, merely reproduced Article 159 of the Act of 1871. But, by Act 12 of 1879, the Article was enlarged so as to include an application to set aside a sale on the ground that the decree-holder had purchased the property without the permission of the Court. Thus, the Article, as amended, applied to two cases :

1. applications based on the ground of irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale, and
2. applications based on the ground that the decree-holder had purchased the property without the permission of the Court³

The Article did not apply to applications based on other grounds.⁴ For instance, it did not apply to applications based on the ground of fraud in the execution proceedings. Such applications were held to fall within the residuary Article 178 of the Act⁵ (now Article 181).

Article 172 of the Act of 1877 provided a period of sixty days for an application to set aside a sale on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property sold.⁶

Changes made by Act of 1908 :

1. The words relating to the grounds on which the application was made were omitted so as to make the Article applicable to all applications to set aside an execution sale irrespective of the ground on which it was based.⁷

3. (1903) 13 Md L Jour 231 (235), *Mamuthu Udayan v. Subbaraya Pillai*, [But see (1897) 11 Bom 588 (590), *Chintamurai Natu v. Pithabai* (The view taken in this case that the Article did not apply to application to set aside sale on ground of decree holder having purchased without permission of Court, is not correct)]

4. (1900) 22 All 376 (377) 1900 All W N 129, *Lalman Das v. Jagan Nath*, (1897) 24 Cal 707 (709, 710) 1 Cal W N 534, *Chand Monce Dasia v. Santo Monce Dasia*

(1898) 3 Cal W N 833 (336), *Luchmipat v. Mt. Mandi Koor*, (1911) 9 Ind Cas 584 (585) (Cal), *Lakshmi Charan Sen v. Sris Chandra Roy*, (1910) 7 Ind Cas 48 (48) (Cal), *Saleh Sardar v. Kali Prasanna Saha*

5. (1885) 9 Bom 468 (471), *Sakharam Goumd v. Damodar Akharam*, (1899) 26 Cal 324 (331) 3 Cal W N 899, *Bhubon Mohun Pal v. Nunda Lal Dey*

(1898) 2 Cal W N 691 (693), *Nimai Chand Kanjia v. Dano Nath Kanjia*, (1907) 5 Cal L Jour 328 (332), *Devendra Nath v. Prasanna Kumar*, (1909) 2 Ind Cas 844 (845) 36 Cal 651, *Purna Chandra Mandal v. Anand Dasia*

(1919) A I R 1919 Pat 574 (576) 74 Ind Cas 202, *Laidee Singh v. Mejha Singh*

(1900) 5 Cal W N 265 (268), *Sarat Kumbhar Dubey v. Nimai Charan Dey*

6. (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 506 (507), *Hari Charn Bose v. Hari's Law*

7. (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 725 (725) 57 Ind Cas 404, *Jaythar Misur v. Dharma Khatica*.

Article 166
Notes
1—2

2. The words "under the same Code" (meaning "under the Civil Procedure Code") were added in the beginning of the Article.
3. The special provision contained in Article 172 of the Act of 1877 relating to applications for setting aside the sale on the ground of the judgment-debtor having no saleable interest in the property was repealed, so that such applications also came within the thirty days' rule under this Article, whereas under Article 172 of the Act of 1877 a period of 60 days was prescribed for such applications.

Amendment after 1908 : The words "including any such application by a judgment-debtor" were added at the end of the Article by Act 1 of 1927.

2. Scope of Article. — This Article prescribes the period of limitation for an application under the Civil Procedure Code to set aside a sale in execution of a decree. As seen in Note 1 above, the scope of the Article in the present Act has been widened so as to make it applicable to *all* applications under the Code to set aside a sale in execution, irrespective of the ground on which or the provision of the Code under which the application is made.¹ But, notwithstanding this, it was held in some decisions that the Article

- (1924) A I R 1924 Rang 124 (125) : 1 Rang 583 : 77 Ind Cas 868, *Ma Pwa v. Mahomed Tambi*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 268 (271) : 27 Ind Cas 294, *Arjun Das v. Gunendra Nath Basu*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 817 (818) : 81 Ind Cas 844, *Alhar Rowther v. Narayana Kudumban*.

- (1911) 11 Ind Cas 295 (298) (Cal), *Kishori Das v. Mukund Lal Dutt*. (Article in Act of 1908 applies to application made after coming into force of that Act though sale was prior to coming into force of the Act)

Note 2

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 137 (138) : 47 Mad 525 : 77 Ind Cas 631, *Paramita*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 507 (509) : 2 Pat 65 : 77 Ind Cas 957, *Ramdhuri Chowdhuri v. Deonandhan Prasad Singh*. (Do.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Rang 124 (124, 125) : 1 Rang 533 : 77 Ind Cas 368, *Ma Pwa v. Mahomed Tambi*. (Do.)
- (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 715 (715) : 57 Ind Cas 261, *Sakhi Bai v. Ram Autar Bai*. (Do.)
- (1935) A I R 1935 All 889 (890, 891) : 156 Ind Cas 389, *Gulzari Lal v. Sheo Charan Lal*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 627 (629) : 140 Ind Cas 732, *J. C. Galstaun v. Syed Mohammad Hussain*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 165 (166) : 51 Ind Cas 431 : 46 Cal 975, *Satish Chandra v. Nishi Chandra Datta*. (Where the applicant to set

did not apply to an application under Section 47 of the Code to set aside a sale.² In order to make it clear that the Article applies also to such applications, the words "including any such application by a judgment-debtor" were added at the end of the Article by Act 1 of 1927.³ It is now clear that whether the application is under any of the Rules in Order 21 like Rule 72 and Rules 89 to 91 or is one under Section 47, the Article applicable is this Article.⁴

(1938) A I R 1938 Nag 558 (559), *Maroti v. Kisanlal*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 500 (561) 172 Ind Cas 247, *Subramania Asari v. Ramaswami Pillai*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Mad 48 (49) 69 Ind Cas 1001, *Subramanyan Nambudri v. V. K. V. Kammathi*. (Court extending time for deposit by the auction-purchaser under O 21, R. 85, C. P. C. or accepting a

Subramania Moorthan. (A sale held without notice of sale proclamation and an application to set

) 30 Nag L R 135, *Sobha*

not liable to attachment and sale — Application by judgment debtor to set aside sale is within Article)

(1921) A I R 1921 Pat 145 (149) 61 Ind Cas 623, *Das Narayan Singh v. V. K. V. Kammathi*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 817 (818) 81 Ind Cas 844, *Altair Bowther v. Narayana Kudumban* (Do)

(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 152 (154) 51 Ind Cas 447, *Bashu Ram v. Hassan Muhammad* (Do)

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 285 (287) 45 Bom 174 58 Ind Cas 231, *Bhaichand Kirparani v. Ranchhodas Manchharam*. (Sale held in contravention of O 34, R 14 is voidable and not void)

(1916) A I R 1916 Bom 61 (63) 41 Bom 357 : 39 Ind Cas 9, *Ganesh Narayan v. Gopal Vishnu* (Do)

(1931) A I R 1931 All 314 (314) 151 Ind Cas 214, *Narotam Das v. Bhagwan Das* (Application under O 21, R 90—Article applies)

2. See (1917) A I R 1917 Low Bur 60 (51) 37 Ind Cas 627, *Ramaswami Chetty v. Maung Tha*

(1928) A I R 1928 Cal 865 (866) 116 Ind Cas 631, *Hafeez Umr Ali v. Nasimannessa Bibi*

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 171 (175) 46 Ind Cas 221, *Ram Kinkar Tewari v. Siftu Ram Panja*

3. See Statement of Objects and Reasons, Gazette of India, dated 29th January 1927, Part V, Page 5 (Page xxxiv in Vol I)

4. (1937) A I R 1937 Rang 126 (128) 169 Ind Cas 267 1937 R L R 164, *Ma B's Gyan v. Maung Than Byu*.

(1931) A I R 1931 All 145 (146) 150 Ind Cas 703, *Kashi Ram v. Mt. Hasmat Banco*

(1938) A I R 1938 Cal 118 (116, 117) 1 L R (1938) 1 Cal 280, *Nirode Kish Roy v. Rai Harendra Nath*

(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 425 (426) 131 Ind Cas 561, *Mt. Kuti Paru Bhai v. Jitendra Nath Roy*.

Article 166
Note 2

But, in order that this Article may apply, the application must be one to *set aside* a sale in execution.^{4a} This necessarily implies that the sale in respect of which the application is made is binding on the applicant till it is set aside. Where the sale is *void*, it need not be set aside and can be disregarded without any *proceeding to set it aside*.⁵ In fact, in such cases, there is nothing to be set aside and hence, there can be no application to *set aside* the sale. Hence, the Article can have no application to such cases.⁶ Such a sale can, however, be *declared* to be *void*⁷ and an application may be made to the executing Court to make such a declaration. But such an application will not be one to *set aside* the sale and therefore

[But see (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 570 (573) : 145 Ind Cas 113, *Hanaraj v. Karam Chand*. (The unqualified observation in this decision that limitation for lodging objections under S. 47, O. P. C., is governed by Article 181 and not by Article 166 is not correct.)]

4a (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 818 (819) : 54 Cal 493 : 103 Ind Cas 621, *Satindra*

Original Side Rules
it complete on pro-
Auction-purchaser
sale under certain

conditions — application must show that he, auction-purchaser, was not bound to complete sale and asking for refund of purchase-money — Application is not one to *set aside* sale and is therefore not within this Article)

5. (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 153 (154) : 119 Ind Cas 801, *Moinuddin Meerza v. Mohamed Amin*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 305 (311) : 116 Ind Cas 65, *Sunderbai v. Bapuna*. (An application for review of the order confirming sale can, in such a case, be treated as an application under Sec. 47, C. P. C., and governed by Article 181.)

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 93 (35) : 29 Ind Cas 314 : 33 Mad 1076, *Paysdanna v. Lakshminarasamma*.

(1904) 92 Cal 296 (312) : 32 Ind App 23 : 9 Cal W N 201 : 2 All L Jour 71 : 7 Bom L R 1 : 1 Cal L Jour 584 : 8 Bar 734 (P O), *Khairajmal v. Daim*.

G. (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 496 (497) : 163 Ind Cas 34, *Firm Ramanand Ganpat Bai v. Rakhal Mandal*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Raig 126 (128) : 160 Ind Cas 967 : 1937 R L R 154, *Ma We Gyan v. Maung Than Byu*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Cal 113 (116, 117) : 1 I L R (1938) 1 Cal 280, *Nirode Kali Roy v. Ras Havendra Nath*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 12 (15) : 123 Ind Cas 24, *Chengaltraya Reddy v. Kollapur Reddi*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 17 (18) : 125 Ind Cas 53, *Lakshmi Chand v. Phul Chand*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 431 (437) : 47 Mad 288 : 60 Ind Cas 92 (F B), *Rajagopala Aiyar v. Ramanujachariar*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 688 (689) : 51 Cal 224 : 82 Ind Cas 848, *Jogeshwar Mahata v. Jhapal Santal*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 609 (611) : 64 Ind Cas 476, *Gurudas Biswas v. Bhowanipore Zamindary Co., Ltd.*

[But see (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 417 (420) : 70 Ind Cas 743, *Ganapathy Mudaliar v. Krishnamachari*. (Submitted not correct.)]

7. See (1921) 60 Ind Cas 529 (530) (Pat), *Ghanshyam Chaudhury v. Basdeb Jha*. (Notice under S. 153 (b), Bengal Tenancy Act, not having been issued, sale was void—Suit was held to be within time being governed by Article 120)

will not come within the purview of this Article.⁸ Even where an application in respect of a void sale purports to be one to set aside the sale, it is really one to obtain a declaration that the sale is void and, as such, is not governed by this Article. The undermentioned decisions will fall within this principle.⁹ Such applications, however, are not entirely exempt from the law of limitation¹⁰ They will be governed by Article 181, *infra*, and must be brought within three years of the accrual of the right to apply.¹¹

Where, however, the sale is not void but is only voidable, it can only be avoided by means of an application to set it aside and such application must be made within the period of 30 days prescribed by this Article.¹² The object of providing such a short period of limitation for the application is to see that titles arising from judicial sales are settled as soon as possible.¹³

For instances of void and voidable sales, see the undermentioned cases.¹⁴

8. (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 118 (115, 116) I L R (1938) 1 Cal 280, *Nirode Kail Roy v. Bai Harendra Nath*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 60 (62) 105 Ind Cas 65 55 Cal 96, *Monmatha Nath Ghose v. Luchmi Debi*
- (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 586 (589) 132 Ind Cas 493, *Sundar Das v. Nisha*
- 9 (1934) A I R 1934 All 314 (315) 151 Ind Cas 244, *Narotam Das v. Bhagwan Das*
- (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 402 (402, 403) 49 Mad 313 56 Ind Cas 260, *Seshagiri Rao v. Sreenivasa Rao* (Property belonging to defendant exempted from decree — Sale of such property in execution — Sale is void *ab initio*)
10. (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 351 (351) : 137 Ind Cas 378, *Surga Kanta Das v. Jgendra Nath Dutt*.
[But see (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 761 (762) 54 Cal 624 105 Ind Cas 193, *Umamoyee Darya v. Jatan Beica* (Sale being nullity, no question of limitation arises—View not correct)]
11. (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 397 (398) : 97 Ind Cas 793, *Bhara Lal Mitter v. Tanuk Lal Mander*.
See also cases in Foot-note 6, above.
12. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 48 (49) 69 Ind Cas 1001, *Subramanyam Nambudri v. V. K. V. Kammathi*. (Deposit under O. 21, R. 85 paid beyond time and accepted by Court—Sale merely irregular and not a nullity)
13. (1919) A I R 1919 Bom 130 (131) : 43 Bom 735 53 Ind Cas 135, *Raoji Baburao v. Bansilal Narayan*.
14. (1900) 25 Bom 337 (347, 348) 27 Ind App 216 5 Cal W N 10 10 Mad L Jour 868 : 2 Bom L R 927 : 7 Sar 739 (P G), *Malikarjun v. Narhari*. (Erroneous decision of Court as to who are legal represen-
- (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 137 (138) : 47 Mad 525 : 77 Ind Cas 631, *Paramasina Theilar v. Pulukaruppa* (Failure to bring on record legal representative of deceased judgment-debtor—Sale irregular, not void)
- (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 307 (309) : 68 Ind Cas 667, *Ragunathasami v. Gopauj*
- (1895)

Article 166 Note 2

Where an application to set aside a sale is within time under this Article, it is not barred merely because it is made after the confirmation of the sale.¹⁵

The Article is subject to the general principle that limitation cannot begin to run before the accrual of the cause of action and that the Articles in the Schedule can only apply to cases in which the cause of action has arisen at the time specified in the third column of the Article as the starting point of limitation. (See Notes to Section 9, *ante*.) Hence, where the right to apply to set aside an execution sale arises *subsequent* to the sale (which is the starting point of limitation under this Article), this Article will not apply.

- (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 384 (386, 387) : 86 Ind Cas 141, *Barhamdeo Narayan v. Sahigram Sahay*. (Do)
- (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 302 (303) : 75 Ind Cas 196, *Saradindu v. Gosla Behari*. (Purchase by decree-holder without permission of Court is irregular, not void)
- (1916) A I R 1916 Bom 61 (63) : 41 Bom 357 : 30 Ind Cas 3, *Ganesh Narayan v. Gopal Vishnu*. (Do)
- (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 171 (173) : 46 Ind Cas 221, *Ram Kinkar Tewari v. Sibi Ram Panja* (Failure to serve notice under O 21 R 22 makes sale void.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 431 (436) : 47 Mad 288 : 80 Ind Cas 92 (F B), *Rajagopala Ayyar v. Ramanujachariar*. (Do)
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 609 (611) : 64 Ind Cas 476, *Gurudas Biswas v. Dhawanipore Zamindary Co., Ltd.* (Do.)
- (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 381 (381) : 137 Ind Cas 378, *Surja Kanta Das v. Jogendra Nath Dutta* (Do)
- (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 153 (154) : 119 Ind Cas 691, *Momuddin Meerza v. Mohammad Amin*. (Do.)
- (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 205 (207) : 59 Mad 461 : 162 Ind Cas 156 (F B), *Kanchamalai Pathar v. Shahaji Rajah Sahib*. (Do)
- (1910) 5 Ind Cas 390 (394, 395) (Cal), *Mrs. Letenia Ashton v. Madhabmoni Dasi*. (Omission to serve notice under Order 21, Rule 22 makes the sale voidable)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Rang 124 (125, 126) : 1 Rang 533 : 77 Ind Cas 368, *Ma Pua v. Md. Tambi*. (Absence of attachment in execution sale — Sale is merely irregular and not void.)
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 33 (35) : 33 Mad 1076 : 29 Ind Cas 314, *Pasumarti Payudanna v. Ganti Lakshminarasamma* (Minor legal representative of deceased judgment-debtor brought on record without being represented by guardian *ad litem*—Sale is void and need not be set aside)
- (1934) A I R 1934 All 314 (315) : 151 Ind Cas 244, *Narotam Das v. Bhagwan Das* (Sale by Civil Court, of agricultural land contrary to notification by Government under S 68, G. P. O., requiring that such sale must be by the Collector—Sale is void)
- (1910) 6 Ind Cas 713 (715) : 1910 Pun Re No. 40, *Madho Lal v. Jawahir Singh*. (Error in warrant of attachment is only a material irregularity —The sale is not void but voidable.)
- (1904) 31 Cal 385 (392), *Kohli Singh v. Edal Singh*. (Omission to comply with the provisions of S. 290, G. P. O. of 1882 (O. 21 R. 68) cannot nullify a sale)
- (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 734 (736), *Sarifa Khaloon v. Assumannessa Bibi*. (Absence of necessary notice under O. 21 R. 16 is not a mere irregularity but vitiates the whole execution proceedings and sale.)

See also cases in Foot-Note (1) above.

15. (1915) A I R 1915 Low Bur 97 (97) : 27 Ind Cas 656, *Ismail v. Vistanadan Chetty*.

Illustrations

Article 166
Notes
2-5

1. A certain property is sold in execution of an *ex parte* decree and purchased by the decree-holder himself. Subsequently, the decree is set aside. In such cases, the judgment-debtor is entitled to apply to set aside the sale. But, the application will be governed not by this Article, but by Article 181, *infra*. The reason is that the right to apply in this case arises only on the setting aside of the *ex parte* decree, i. e., subsequent to the time specified in the Article as the starting point of limitation.¹⁶
2. A certain property was sold first to A in execution. Then, before the confirmation of the sale, the same property was sold to B. The sale to A was then confirmed. B thereafter applied to have the sale to himself set aside on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property. It was held that B's application was not governed by Article 166, but by Article 181, the reason being that before the confirmation of the sale to A, B had no right to apply to set aside the sale at all.¹⁷ In other words, B's right to apply only accrued after the time specified in the Article as the starting point of limitation.

The Article is a *general* provision and cannot override the special provisions of any particular Section or Rule of the Civil Procedure Code to the contrary. Thus, under Order 34 Rule 5 of the Code, a judgment-debtor can, after depositing the requisite amount, have the sale under a mortgage decree set aside *at any time before the confirmation of the sale*, although the period of thirty days prescribed by this Article may have expired.¹⁸

3. "Under the same Code." — These words refer to the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, which is mentioned in the previous Article, *viz.*, Article 165. It has been held that an appeal under the Civil Procedure Code does not mean only an appeal the *right* to prefer which is conferred by the Code itself and that the expression would include an appeal the *procedure* with respect to which is governed by the Code.¹ On the same reasoning, it is conceived, that an application under the Code will include an application the *procedure* in respect of which is governed by the Code, though the right to make the application is not conferred by the Code. See also Note 10, *infra*.

4. "To set aside." — See Note 2 above.

4a. Void sale — Application in respect of. — See Note 2 above.

5. "Decree." — See Note 9, *infra*.

16 (1919) A I R 1919 Bom 175 (175, 176) 43 Bom 235 43 Ind Cas 130, *Shitbas Babya Suami v. Yesku Choo Nayakim*

17. (1910) 6 Ind Cas 804 (506) [Cal], *Gopal Saran Narayan Singh v. Mahomed Sheikh Ashkan*

18. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 560 (561) 172 Ind Cas 247, *Subramanya Asari v. Ramaswami Pillai*

Note 3

1 (1886) 18 Cal 221 (224), *Aga Mahomed Hamadani v. Cohen*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 407 (408) 43 Mad 51 53 Ind Cas 405, *Ramaswami Pillai v. Tahsildar of Madura*

Article 166
Note 6

6. Adjustment of decree after sale — Application to record adjustment and set aside sale — Limitation. — Suppose, after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed by this Article, an application is made to the Court alleging an adjustment of the decree subsequent to the sale, and praying that such adjustment should be recorded and certified and that the sale should be set aside. Can the adjustment be recorded and the sale set aside? The answer to this question depends on whether the purchaser is a stranger or is the decree-holder himself. In the former case, the adjustment of the decree as between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor cannot affect the rights of the auction-purchaser and the sale cannot be set aside on the ground of such adjustment¹ The only way in which such a sale can be got rid of is by means of an application under Order 21 Rule 89 within the period of limitation prescribed by this Article.² In *Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh*,³ the Privy Council observed as follows :

"In the first place, Order 21 Rule 2, which provides for certification of an adjustment come to out of Court, clearly contemplates a stage in the execution proceedings when the matter lies only between the judgment-debtor and the decree-holder and when no other interests have come into being. When once a sale has been effected, a third party's interest intervenes and there is nothing in this Rule to suggest that it is to be disregarded. The only means by which the judgment-debtor can get rid of a sale which has been duly carried out, are those embodied in Rule 89, viz., by depositing in Court the amount for the recovery of which the property was sold, together with five per cent. on the purchase-money which goes to the purchaser as statutory compensation, and this remedy can only be pursued within thirty days of the sale : See Article 166, Schedule 1, Limitation Act, 1908."

But, where the decree-holder himself is the purchaser, there being no third party's interests to be protected, the adjustment of the decree, though made after the execution sale, can be recorded under Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code and the sale set aside.⁴ The expiry of

Note 6

1. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 33 (35) : 130 Ind Cas 686 : 58 Ind App 50 : 27 Nag L R 95 (P C), *Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh*
- (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 503 (509) : 15 Lah 801 : 149 Ind Cas 445, *Gulab Singh v. Kishan Singh*
- (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 238 (239). 137 I C. 735, *Saha Nand v. Jhanga Ram*.
- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 146 (150, 151) (Cal), *Bibi. Sharfan v. Mahomed Habibuddin*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 136 (138, 143) : 109 Ind Cas 449, *Kabiruddin v. Krishna Rao*.
2. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 33 (35) 130 Ind Cas 686 : 58 Ind App 50 : 27 Nag L R 95 (P C), *Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh*.
3. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 33 (35, 36) : 130 Ind Cas 686 : 58 Ind App 50 : 27 Nag L R 95 (P C)
4. (1928) A I R 1928 Pat 40 (43) . 104 Ind Cas 753, *Shivaram Sand v. Manu Lal Khemka*.

the period of 30 days prescribed by this Article would be no bar to such a procedure.⁵ The reason is that where the parties to a proceeding enter into a *lawful* compromise, the Court is bound to recognise and give effect to such a compromise without going into the question as to whether the relief granted to either party by such compromise is barred by limitation or not. (See Note 20 to Section 3, *ante*)

Where one of the terms of the adjustment in such cases (i.e. cases in which the decree-holder himself is the purchaser) is that the judgment-debtor must, as a condition of the adjustment being recorded and the sale being set aside, deposit in Court or pay to the decree-holder within a particular date, a certain amount, the Court cannot extend the time so fixed except with the consent of the parties.⁶

Article 166
Notes
6—7

7. Application under Order 21 Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code.— This Article applies, *inter alia*, to an application to set aside a sale under O 21 R 89 of the Code,¹ which must, therefore, be made within thirty days of the sale. O. 21 R 93 requires that in such cases the deposit required by Rule 89 must be made within thirty days of the sale. Hence, it is necessary that both the application and the deposit required under Rule 89 must be made within 30 days of the sale.² Where, however, the fact that the deposit is made after the expiry of 30 days from the sale is due to the fault of the Court or its officers and not of the applicant, the deposit must be held to be in time, on the principle contained in the maxim *actus curiæ*

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 508 (509) 15 Lah 801 149 Ind Cas 445, *Gulab Singh v. Kishan Singh*

(1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 55 (56) 11 Luck 418 157 Ind Cas 603, *Nand Kumar v. Maqsood Ali*

6. (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 344 (344) 39 Ind Cas 664, *Rameshwar Misser v. Sureshwar Misser*.

Note 7

1. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 33 (35, 36) 130 Ind Cas 686 58 Ind App 50 27 Nag

Channappa v.

ih

2 (1931) A I R 1931 P C 33 (35, 36) 130 Ind Cas 686 58 Ind App 50 27 Nag L R 95 (P C), *Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh*

(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 176 (176, 177) 33 Ind Cas 996, *Vanniasami Thevar v. Periyasami Thevar*

(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 10 (11) 106 Ind Cas 568, *Sadasheo v. Narayan*

(1937) A I R 1937 Pat 113 (115) 16 Pat 202 169 Ind Cas 453 (F B), *Bhagwat Narain v. Srinivas*

(1915) A I R 1915 Low Bur 97 (97) 27 Ind Cas 656, *Ismail Ali v. Vistandan Chetty*

[See (1918) 19 Ind Cas 475 (476) 37 Bom 337, *Ganesh Bab Nair v. Yithal Vaman Mahalinga* (The deposit need not be sufficient to meet the claims of other decree holders who may be entitled to rateable distribution)]

Article 166
Notes
7-8

neminem gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no man).³

The mere deposit of the amount required under Rule 89 within thirty days of the sale will not prevent the bar of limitation under this Article. In order to prevent such bar, there must be an *application* to set aside the sale within thirty days from the sale.⁴ But, the application need not be in writing,⁵ nor need it be signed.⁶ It may be oral. In the undermentioned case⁷ it was held that an application under Rule 89 was good though it did not contain an *express* prayer for the setting aside of the sale.

8. Application on ground of judgment-debtor having no saleable interest in the property — Limitation. — Where property, in which the judgment-debtor has no saleable interest at

3 (1922) A I R 1922 All 195 (196) : 67 Ind Cas 321, *Durga Prasad v. Babu Lal*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 All 414 (415) : 87 All 591 : 80 Ind Cas 186, *Munnalal v. Radha Kishan*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 249 (250) : 126 Ind Cas 207, *Rangin Sundari v. Hiratal Biswas*.

(1910) 7 Ind Cas 52 (54) (Cal), *Palturam Singh v. Kamini Mani Dasu*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 875 (876) : 155 Ind Cas 603, *Buti Ram v. Sardar Singh*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Nag 331 (331) : 96 Ind Cas 876, *Raolmal v. Amarsingh*.
 [See also (1906) 9 Oudh Cas 211 (216), *Radhe Lal v. Sheo Prasad*.]

(1903) 6 Oudh Cas 68 (71), *Ram Nath v. Murlidhar*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 338 (339) : 13 Pat 641 : 151 Ind Cas 818, *Lachmi Ojha v. Ram Ran Bijay Prasad Singh*.]

4 (1911) 9 Ind Cas 83 (33) (All), *Mathura Prasad v. Ram Lal*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Bom 130 (131) : 43 Bom 735 : 53 Ind Cas 135, *Raoji Babu Rao v. Bansal Narayan*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 639 (640) : 87 Ind Cas 437, *Pachiyal v. Vallimuthu Velan*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 63 (63) : 66 Ind Cas 44, *Venhatasubba Rao v. Narayana Rao*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 662 (662) : 33 Ind Cas 783, *Venkata Narasimha v. Lakshmi Narasimha*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 225 (226) : 32 Ind Cas 45, *Parat Veethi Seethi v. Ambalath Veethi Kolathur Ahmad*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 411 (412) : 87 Ind Cas 722, *Ram Autar v. Sheo Prady Lal*.

[But compare (1905) 7 Bom L R 263 (264, 265), *Mathurji v. Kondaji*.
 (Decision turning on construction of S. 310 A of the C. P. Code of 1882)]

5 (1929) A I R 1929 All 593 (596) : 119 Ind Cas 103 : 51 All 910, *Dip Chand v. Sheo Prasad*.

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 404 (405) (All), *Sarvas Begam v. Haider Shah*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 909 (910) : 86 Ind Cas 498, *Murugappa Asari v. Shanmuga Mudaliar*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 209 (209) : 22 Ind Cas 291, *Mariappa Annam v. Harihara Iyer*.

6. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 209 (209) : 22 Ind Cas 291, *Mariappa Annam v. Harihara Iyer*.

7. (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 111 (111) : 106 Ind Cas 933, *Ronya v. Daliram*.

the time of the sale, is sold, the sale is not a nullity so far as the purchaser is concerned. Hence, an application by the purchaser to set aside a sale on the ground that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property is governed by this Article.¹ Where the purchaser is the decree-holder himself and he does not apply to set aside the sale within the period prescribed by this Article, he cannot thereafter ignore the sale and apply again for execution of the decree as if the prior sale was a nullity.² But, where property belonging to A (who is a party to the suit) is sold in execution of the decree against B, and A applies under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code for relief in respect of such sale, his application is not one to set aside the sale but is one to declare it void and not binding on him and hence is not governed by this Article.³

Article 166
Notee
8—9

9. Sale in insolvency proceedings—Applicability of Article.
—There is a conflict of decisions as to the applicability of this Article to an application to set aside a sale in insolvency proceedings. In the undermentioned case,¹ it was held by the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court that the provisions of Order 21 are applicable to such sales and that, therefore, an application to set aside the sale being one under the Civil Procedure Code, this Article applies to such an application. But the Punjab Chief Court has taken a different view, its reason being that a sale in insolvency proceedings is not one "in execution of a decree" as contemplated by this Article.² It is submitted that the latter view is correct.

Note 8

- 1 (1935) A I R 1935 All 889 (891) 156 Ind Cas 389, *Qulsari Lal v Sheo Charan Lal*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 205 (206) 46 Bom 833 67 Ind Cas 360, *Dalwant Ranganath v Bala Malu*.
- (1928) A I R 1923 Cal 85 (88) 50 Cal 115 70 Ind Cas 600, *Mahar Ali v. Sarfaddin*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 340 (341) 159 Ind Cas 993, *Keshavan v. Dipathumma*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 835 (838) 101 Ind Cas 614, *Jagannadha Rao v. Basawayya*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 394 (395) 50 Mad 639 100 Ind Cas 522, *Muthu Kumarasamia Pillai v Muthusami Thevan*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 148 (152) 124 Ind Cas 611 5 Luck 552 (F B), *Bhadur Singh v. Ram Phal*.
- 2 (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 97 (99, 100, 101) 160 Ind Cas 1049 15 Pat 303 (F B), *Surendra Kumar v Srichand Mahata*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 340 (341) 159 Ind Cas 993, *Keshavan v. Dipathumma*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 835 (837) 101 Ind Cas 614, *Jagannadha Rao v. Basawayya*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 394 (395) 50 Mad 639 100 Ind Cas 522, *Muthu Kumarasamia Pillai v. Muthusami Thevan*.
3. (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 113 (115, 116) . I L R (1938) 1 Cal 280, *Nirode Kaly Roy v. Harendra Nath*.

Note 9

- 1 (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 262 (263) 102 Ind Cas 543, *Balaji v. Gopal Mali* (Following A I R 1921 Nag 25.)
2. (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 209 (209) : 23 Ind Cas 397, *Afzal Ali v. Amar Ali*.

Article 166
Notes
10-11

10. Applicability of Article to application to set aside sale under Section 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.—There is also a conflict of decisions as to the applicability of the Article to an application under Section 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act to set aside a sale. According to the High Court of Calcutta, such an application is "cognizable under Section 47" of the Civil Procedure Code and is therefore governed by this Article.¹ According to the High Court of Patna, on the other hand, such an application is not one under the Civil Procedure Code and is therefore not governed by this Article.²

11. Parties to application to set aside sale — Effect of joining them after limitation.—There is a conflict of decisions as to whether an application to set aside a sale in which the auction-purchaser or the decree-holder is not joined as a party within the period of thirty days from the date of the sale but is so joined *afterwards*, is barred by limitation. According to one view, the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser are *necessary* parties to an application to set aside an execution sale and so, where either of them is not joined as party to the application till after the expiry of period of limitation, the application is barred.¹ But, according to the other view, the law only requires that *notice* should be given to the parties affected by an application to set aside a sale and it is not necessary that they must be joined as *parties* to the application.² (See Order 21 Rule 92 Proviso.) It is submitted that the latter

Note 10

1. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 351 (352) : 51 Cal 1014 : 82 Ind Cas 822, *Haripada Halder v. Baradaprobad*. (Following 24 Cal 707.)
2. (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 177 (177, 178) : 6 Pat 366 : 101 Ind Cas 564, *Ananta Charan Padhan v. Nmas Bahubalendra*. (Case relating to application under S. 227 of the Orissa Tenancy Act which corresponds to S. 173 of Bengal Tenancy Act. Dissenting from A I R 1925 Cal 351 cited above.)
- (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 30 (30) : 33 Ind Cas 209, *Chandramma Roy v. Maharaja of Dumraon*.

Note 11

1. (1891) 1891 All W N 121 (121), *Karamat Khan v. Mir Ali Ahmed*. (1893) 15 All 407 (409) : 1893 All W N 173, *Ali Gauhar Khan v. Bansidhar*. (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 510 (510) : 50 Ind Cas 5, *Ajuddin Ahmed v. Khoda Bux*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 189 (190) : 107 Ind Cas 733, *Satish Chandra v. Rakhai Chandra*.
- (1919) 37 Mad L Jour 25 (26) (N R C).
- (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 318 (318) : 9 Pat 310 : 125 Ind Cas 570, *Rameshwar Singh v. Mongal Prasad*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 498 (498) : 62 Ind Cas 61, *Mt. Sumitra Kuer v. Damri Lal*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 All 593 (595) : 119 Ind Cas 103 : 51 All 910, *Dipchand v. Sheo Prasad*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 503 (503, 503) : 62 Cal 286 : 157 Ind Cas 637, *Radha Kisson Mahari v. Tansuk Mahesri*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 394 (396) : 82 Ind Cas 776, *Rajchandra Das v. Kalakanta Das*.
- (1897) 1897 Pun Re No. 3, *Sevak Ram v. Kundan Lal*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 413 (414) : 107 Ind Cas 494, *Kirpa Ram v. Nand Lal*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 414 (417) : 108 Ind Cas 391, *Manjiv v. Hazarigir*.

view is correct. There does not seem to be any provision in the Code for naming parties in applications.

See also the undermentioned cases.³

12. Notice to persons affected by application to set aside sale—Limitation.—Under the proviso to Order 21 Rule 92 sub-rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, no order setting aside a sale in execution of a decree shall be made unless notice of the application to set aside the sale has been given to all persons affected thereby. The period of limitation prescribed by this Article only refers to an application to set aside a sale and does not refer to the notice abovementioned. Hence, where an application to set aside a sale has been made within the period of thirty days from the date of the sale, the sale may be set aside although the notice required by the above provision is given *after* the expiry of such period.¹

13. Application by notice of motion, when deemed as made.
— See Note 3 to Article 183 *infra*.

14. Suit to avoid sale treated as proceeding under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code—Limitation.—Where a *suit* to avoid a sale is treated as a proceeding under Section 47 of the Code of Civil

(1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 307 (307, 308) : 17 Oudh Cas 306 : 25 Ind Cas 907, *Ghasanfar Husain v. Ram Rattan*.

(1933) 143 Ind Cas 552 (553) (FB) (Cochin), *Aniha Allas v. Ananthasankara Ayyar*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Pat 255 (256) 11 Pat 504 139 Ind Cas 810, *Nitar Dutta v. Bishun Lal Sao*

(1930) A I R 1930 All 167 (168) 124 Ind Cas 23, *Jat Singh v. Daulatia Tamta* (A judgment-debtor making an application to set aside a sale under O 21 R 89 need not show the name of the auction-purchaser in the array of parties)

[See (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 37 (38) 2 Pat 800 75 Ind Cas 430, *Mt Zainab Bibi v. Paras Nath*]

3 (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 733 (733) 140 Ind Cas 446, *Sailabala Dass v. Kalipada Banerjee* (An application to set aside sale in execution

Note 12

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 37 (37, 38) 2 Pat 800 75 Ind Cas 430, *Mt Zainab v. Paras Nath*

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 266 (267) 94 Ind Cas 31, *Ishwardas Marwari v. Diveswar Lal*

(1928) A I R 1928 Lah 413 (414) 107 Ind Cas 494, *Kurpa Ram v. Nand Lal*

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 129 (130) 68 Ind Cas 238, *Abdur Rahman v. Har Narayan*

(1918) 19 Ind Cas 475 (476) 37 Bom 387, *Ganesh Bab Nath v. Vithal Vaman Mahalya*

(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 763 (764) 52 Mad 861 121 Ind Cas 855, *Narayana Sahu v. Petamma*

(1932) A I R 1932 Pat 255 (256) 11 Pat 504 139 Ind Cas 810, *Nitar Dutta v. Bishun Lal Sao*

Article 166
Notes
14—17

Procedure, the period of limitation applicable is that applicable to an application under Section 47¹ and the application must be deemed, for purposes of limitation, to have been filed on the day on which the suit was instituted.²

15. Setting aside of sale under inherent power—Limitation.—As seen in Note 28 in Section 3 *ante*, the law of limitation does not apply to what the Court does in the exercise of its *inherent* power. Hence, where the Court has inherent power to set aside a sale, this Article does not apply and the Court can set aside the sale in the exercise of such power although the period of limitation under this Article may have expired.¹

16. Fresh ground for setting aside sale, if can be urged after limitation.—Where an application to set aside a sale is made in time, new grounds of objection to the sale cannot be urged for the first time after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing an application to set aside the sale.¹ The reason is that the preferring of such objections must be treated as a fresh *application*. But, where any grounds have been already raised in the original application, further particulars of such grounds can be given after the expiry of the period of limitation under this Article.²

17. Extension of time under this Article.—The period of limitation fixed by this Article cannot be enlarged except under the express provisions of the Act.¹ The Court has no power to extend such

Note 14

1. (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 285 (289, 289) : 45 Bom 174 : 59 Ind Cas 231, *Bhaichand Kirparam v. Manchhoddas Manchharam*. (Do.)
- (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 614 (615) : 64 Cal 419 : 103 Ind Cas 233, *Umapati Mukerjee v. Sheikh Soleman*.
- (1900) 22 All 376 (377) : 1900 All W N 129, *Lalman Das v. Jagannath Singh*.
2. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 15 (17) : 155 Ind Cas 848, *Protita Sundari Debi v. Sarada Charan Goho*.

Note 15

Chettiar v. Dara Sahib. (Partly guilty of laches—Inherent power cannot be exercised in his favour)]

Note 16

1. (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 576 (576) : 140 Ind Cas 715, *Volkart Brothers of Karachi v. Ghulam Hamdani*.
2. (1926) A I R 1926 All 305 (305, 306) : 92 Ind Cas 467 : 49 All 256, *Ram Saran Das v. Girdhari Lal*.

Note 17

1. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 515 (516) : 78 Ind Cas 149, *Giribala Dasi v. Tarak Nath Jatan*.

period.² Hence, the fact that the Court fixes a date beyond thirty days from the sale for hearing objections to the sale will not enable an application to set aside the sale being made after the expiry of the thirty days' period prescribed by this Article.³

Section 5 *ante* will only apply to an application to set aside a sale in execution where the Section has been made applicable to such application by or under any enactment for the time being in force. Hence, where the Section has not been so made applicable, the Court has no power under the Section to admit such an application after the period of thirty days prescribed by this Article.⁴

Article 166
Note 17

- (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 723 (729) . 24 Ind Cas 249, *Jotindra Mohun v. Brojendra Kumar*.
 (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 381 (381) : 137 Ind Cas 378, *Surja Kanta Das v. Jogendra Nath Dutt*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 422 (422, 423) : 50 Ind Cas 610, *Asa Nand v. Jhangu Ram*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 8 (9) . 147 Ind Cas 130, *Maung Lat v. Maung Kyaw Tha*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 286 (286) . 6 Rang 490 : 113 Ind Cas 610, *Mahomed Cassim v. A J David*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 639 (640) . 96 Ind Cas 377, *Muhammad Din v. Sharanpat*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 344 (344) . 39 Ind Cas 664, *Rameshwar Misser v. Sureshwar Misser*.
 (1896) 1 Cal WN 67 (70), *Kailash Chandra Holdar v. Bissonath Paramanic*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 77 (78) : 48 Ind Cas 970, *Abha Munshi v. Komu Molla*.
 [See (1907) 1907 Pun Re No. 92, *Girdhari Lal v. Bhago*]
 2. (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 875 (876) : 155 Ind Cas 603, *Buti Ram v. Sardar Singh* (Time cannot be extended under S 148, C. P. C.)
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 143 (152) (Cal), *Bibi Sharofan v. Mahomed Habibuddin*. (Do)
 (1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 25 (26) . 148 Ind Cas 1092, *Bhagchand v. Aft Najab Sultan* (Do)
 (1935) A I R 1935 Rang 466 (471) . 13 Rang 595 . 159 Ind Cas 945, *K. P. L. S S Chettiar v. Official Receiver, Ramnad* (Inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked to override the time prescribed by the Limitation Act)
 (1924) A I R 1924 All 668 (669) . 46 All 631 . 79 Ind Cas 997, *Tota Ram v. Panna Lal* (Do)
 [See (1929) A I R 1929 All 485 (492) . 121 Ind Cas 552, *Baldeo Prasad v. Sakhdoo Prasad*. (Do)
 (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 176 (177) . 33 Ind Cas 996, *Vanniasami Thevar v. Periyasami Thevar* (Court has no inherent power to extend the period for depositing the amount under O 21 R 89, C. P. C.)
 3. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 71 (71) . 57 Ind Cas 224, *Genda Mal v. Munshi Ram*.
 4. (1934) A I R 1934 All 314 (314) . 151 Ind Cas 244, *Narotam Das v. Bhagwan Das*
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 143 (152) (Cal), *Bibi Sharofan v. Mahomed Habibuddin*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 422 (422) . 50 Ind Cas 610, *Asa Nand v. Jhangu Ram*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 152 (154) . 51 Ind Cas 447, *Bashu Ram v. Hassan Muhammad*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 411 (412) . 67 Ind Cas 722, *Ram Aular v. Sheo Piarey Lal*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 25 (26) . 148 Ind Cas 1092, *Bhag Chand v. Aft. Najab Sultan*.

Article 166
Note 17

As Section 6 *ante* only applies to suits and applications for execution, it does not apply to an application to set aside a sale in execution and hence, the minority or other disability of the applicant will not affect the period of limitation for such an application.⁵ Under the Act of 1877 the law was different on this point. Section 7 of that Act (which corresponded to Section 6 of the present Act) applied to all applications and not only to applications for execution and hence, it was held that the minority or other disability of the applicant was a ground for extending under that Section the period of limitation for an application to set aside a sale.⁶

The time occupied in obtaining a copy of the report of the sale officer cannot be excluded in computing the period of limitation under the Article.⁷ The reason is that Section 12 *ante* which provides for the exclusion of time requisite for obtaining copies in certain cases does not apply to a proceeding to set aside an execution sale.

Section 13 *ante* which provides for the exclusion of the time during which the defendant has been absent from British India applies only to *suits* and hence does not apply to an *application* to set aside a sale.⁸

Under clause 2 of Section 14, *ante*, the applicant will be entitled to the exclusion of the time occupied by a prior application by him to set aside the sale, where such application has been prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Where, however, there has not been a *bona fide* mistake of jurisdiction on the part of the applicant,⁹ or where the prior application has not been made to a Court,¹⁰ he will not be entitled to any exclusion of time under the Section.

Where the period of limitation prescribed by this Article expires on a day when the Court is closed, the application may be made,

5. (1935) A I R 1935 Pat 450 (450) : 159 Ind Cas 253, *Bholanath v. Mt. Sayedatunnissa Begum*.

6. (1911) 11 Ind Cas 491 (402) (Cal), *Fazil Karim v. Ananda Mohan*.
(1887) 9 All 411 (413) : 1887 All W N 58, *Baldeo Singh v. Kishori Lal*.
(1910) 6 Ind Cas 488 (489) (Lah), *Gujjar Mal v. Sita Ram*.

[See (1900) 1 Ind Cas 186 (186) (Cal), *Yashwanth v. Yashwanth*.]

Act 11

7. (1929) A I R 1929 All 593 (596) : 51 All 910 : 119 Ind Cas 103, *Dyband v. Sheo Prasad*.

8. (1860) 8 All 185 (186), *Ahsan Khan v. Ganga Ram*.

9. (1899) 23 Bom 531 (535) : 1 Bom L R 33, *Narayan v. Nasul Khan*. (Application to Collector to set aside sale—Second application to Civil Court after limitation)

10 See (1920) A I R 1920 Bom 130 (130) : 44 Bom 50 : 54 Ind Cas 670, *Tiran*. (Collector or 'Court'.)
Gadigappa

under Section 4 *ante*, on the day on which the Court re-opens.¹¹

See also Note 18 below.

Article 166
Notes
17-18

18. Computation of limitation under the Article — Effect of fraud. — By virtue of Section 18 *ante*, where an applicant for setting aside a sale has been kept from the knowledge of his right to apply by the fraud of the opposite party, he will be entitled to have the period of limitation reckoned from the date when he became aware of the fraud.¹ In order to claim the benefit of Section 18, two factors are necessary —

- (1) there must be fraud by the opposite party,² and
- (2) such fraud must have resulted in the applicant being kept from the knowledge of his right to apply.³

Hence, the mere fact that the applicant was unaware of the sale proceedings is not sufficient to attract the provisions of Section 18. It must be established that such ignorance on his part was brought about by the fraud of the opposite party.⁴ Conversely, the fact that

- 11 (1938) A I R 1938 Bom 209 (209, 210) 175 Ind Cas 221, *Veerappa Channappa v. Iratappa Malaga*
 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 586 (386) 60 Cal 1106 . 147 Ind Cas 797, *Jnanendra Kumar v. Amritakrishna Dutta*
 [See also (1903) 6 Oudh Cas 68 (70), *Ram Nath v. Murlidhar*. (Deposit under Order 21 Rule 89 made on re-opening day is sufficient.)
 (1922) A I R 1922 All 195 (196) . 67 Ind Cas 321, *Durga Prasad v. Babu Lal*. (Do.)
 (1906) 9 Oudh Cas 214 (215), *Radhe Lal v. Sheo Prasad*. (Do.)
 (1896) 19 All 140 (140) 1897 All W N 7, *Bashir-ud-din v. Jhori Singh* (Do.)]

Note 18

1. (1923) A I R 1923 All 282 (283, 284) 45 All 316 71 Ind Cas 631, *Sheo Ram Koori v. Ikhamunnissa Bibi*
 (1914) A I R 1914 Lah 209 (209) 23 Ind Cas 307, *Ajmal Ali v. Aman Ali*
 (1916) A I R 1916 All 184 (185) . 35 Ind Cas 473, *Nazir Husain v. Kanhaiya Lal*
 (1899) 26 Cal 539 (545) 3 Cal W N 403, *Hira Lal Ghose v. Chandra Kanto Ghose*
 (1924) 28 Cal W N 56 (56) (S. N.)
 (1929) A I R 1929 Nag 305 (310) 116 Ind Cas 65, *Sunderabai v. Baguna*.
2. (1919) A I R 1919 Lrb 152 (154) 51 Ind Cas 447, *Bashu Ram v. Hassan Muhammad*
 (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 507 (510) 77 Ind Cas 957 2 Pat 65, *Ramdhuri Chowdhuri v. Deonandhan Prasad Singh*
 (1896) 1 Cal W N 67 (70), *Kailash Chandra Haldar v. Bissonath Paraman*
 (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 627 (629) 140 Ind Cas 732, *Galstaun v. Mahammad Husain*
3. (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 145 (147) 61 Ind Cas 823, *Babu Das Narayan Singh v. Muhammad Yusuf*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Rang 62 (63) 7 Rang 101 117 Ind Cas 63, *Dourammah v. A. N. J. N. Chettiar*
 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 438 (442) (Cal), *Rudrananda Thakur v. Pruthi Chand Lal*
 (1912) 16 Ind Cas 464 (465) (Cal), *Narayan Sahu v. Damodar Das*
4. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 515 (516) . 78 Ind Cas 149, *Giribala Das v. Taral Nath*.

the opposite party has been guilty of fraudulent conduct is not sufficient to extend the period of limitation for the application. The fraud must have resulted in the applicant being kept in ignorance of his right to apply. Thus, the fact that the opposite party has, by fraud, induced the applicant not to apply within the period of limitation is not sufficient to extend limitation under the Section.⁵

Where an execution sale is sought to be set aside on the ground of fraud in the course of the execution proceedings leading up to the sale, and such fraud also has resulted in the applicant being kept from the knowledge of his right to apply, it is not necessary to prove any *independent* fraud in order to entitle the applicant to an extension of limitation. In other words, fraud antecedent to the sale may also be a ground for the extension of limitation, if by such fraud the applicant has been kept from the knowledge of his right to apply.⁶ A contrary view, however, has been taken in certain decisions⁷ in which it has been held that in order to entitle an applicant to an extension of limitation on the ground of fraud, the fraud must be one committed *after* the sale and not merely one committed in bringing about the sale. It is submitted that such a view is not correct. There is no reason, on the wording of Section 18, to restrict the fraud contemplated by that Section to fraud committed after the accrual of the cause of action. In fact, as seen in Note 2 to Section 18, it would be violating the provisions of Section 9 to hold that where there is no fraud sufficient to extend the period of limitation at the time of the accrual of the cause of action and consequently limitation begins to run, the occurrence of fraud *subsequently* will stop the running of limitation.

Where the applicant has been kept in ignorance of his right to apply by the fraud of the opposite party, the applicant is entitled to have limitation computed from the time when he comes to know of

5. (1918) A I R 1918 All 336 (337) : 43 Ind Cas 671, *Harish Chander v. Gunga Bishun*.
G. (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 496 (497) : 80 Ind Cas 761, *Thakur Mahton v. Jha- man Mahton*
(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 268 (271) : 27 Ind Cas 294, *Arjun Das v. Gunendra Nath*.
.
Ilu v. Damodar Das.
v. Mukund Lal Dutt.
Cas 553, *Nabin Chandra v.*
(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 521 (522) : 85 Ind Cas 622, *Dajrang Prasad Singh v. Mt. Sonejehara Kuer*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 251 (252) : 48 Cal 119 : 60 Ind Cas 801, *Bhusan Mani Dasi v. Profulla Kristo Deb*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Mad 353 (354) : 72 Ind Cas 46, *Sheikh Muhammad Rowther v. Subba Naicker*.
[See (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 633 (636) : 101 Ind Cas 199, *Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. Karani Mai*. (Willful suppression of sale notices—Fraud keeping knowledge of right to apply from applicant may be inferred.)]
7. (1896) 1 Cal WN 67 (70), *Kailash Chandra Halder v. Bissonath Paramanic*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 725 (725, 726), 57 Ind Cas 401, *Jagdhari Mistry v. Dhora Khatri*.

the fraud. Hence, where there has been such fraud, it is necessary to find when the applicant became aware of his right to apply so as to determine whether his application is within the period of limitation computed from the time of his becoming so aware.⁸ Where an applicant is entitled to an extension of time on the ground of fraud, his right will not be affected by the fact that the sale has been confirmed before he makes his application.⁹

Under Section 18, time is extended only as against the party guilty of the fraud. Hence, the question has arisen whether the fraud of the decree-holder or the auction-purchaser alone will be sufficient to extend the period of limitation for an application to set aside a sale. On this question there is a conflict of decisions. The views expressed may be summarised as follows :—

1. The fraud of the decree-holder alone will be sufficient.¹⁰
2. The fraud of the decree-holder alone will not be sufficient and unless the auction-purchaser also is guilty of fraud, there can be no extension of limitation.¹¹
3. The fraud of the auction-purchaser alone is sufficient.¹²
4. The fraud of the auction-purchaser alone is not sufficient and unless the decree-holder also has been guilty of fraud, time cannot be extended.¹³

Where an application to set aside a sale is *prima facie* barred by limitation, and the applicant claims an extension of limitation under Section 18, the burden is, to begin with, on the applicant to prove that he was, by the fraud of the opposite party, kept from the knowledge of his right to apply.¹⁴ But, when once such fraud is

- 8 (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 77 (78) 48 Ind Cas 970, *Abha Munshi v. Komu Mollah*.
- 9 (1928) 112 Ind Cas 847 (847) (Lab), *Mt Jannat v Abdul Rahman*.
(1937) I L R (1937) 2 Cal 496 (500), *Charles de Sa Fragoso v Meher Ali*.
(1923) A I R 1923 All 282 (283) 45 All 816 71 Ind Cas 631, *Sheo Ram Koer v Ikramunnissa Bibi*.
(1912) 18 Ind Cas 436 (436) (Cal), *Nilmong Singh v Brinda Dasya*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Pat 422 (423) 70 Ind Cas 675, *Ram Pershad Lal v. Chamar Singh*.
[But see (1887) 14 Cal 679 (681), *Gobind Chundra Majumdar v. Uma Charan Sen*].
- 10 (1928) 54 Mad L Jour 24 (24) (N R C).
(1927) 99 Ind Cas 946 (947) (Cal), *Kedar Hura v Asutosh Foy*.
(1934) A I R 1934 All 255 (258) 55 All 613 147 Ind Cas 1114 (F B), *Mt. Ballesha Kunwar v Harakh Chand*.
11. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 33 (38) 33 Mad 4076 29 Ind Cas 314, *Payadanna v Lakshminarasamma*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Cal 706 (707) 166 Ind Cas 127, *Majaharali v. Mafi Jaddi*.
--- : --- : --- : --- : --- 1 Cas 317, *Parthasarathy v. Ahindra*.
--- : --- : --- : --- : --- 56 Mad 734 145 Ind Cas 388, *Pulla*.
- 12 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1227 (1228) 86 Ind Cas 745, *Anunnassa v. Dwarsika Prosad Borai*.
- 13 (1909) 2 Ind Cas 844 (845) 36 Cal 654, *Purna Chandra Mandal v. Anukul Biswas*.

Article 166
Notes
18—20

established, the burden is shifted to the opposite party to show that the applicant became aware of the fraud more than thirty days before the date of his application.¹⁵

19. Defence not barred. — It is a general principle that limitation does not bar a *defence*. See Note 15 to Section 3 *ante*. Hence, where the judgment-debtor continues to be in possession of the property sold, he can resist a suit for possession by the purchaser on the ground that the sale is voidable by him (the judgment-debtor), although he has not applied within the period of limitation under this Article, to set aside the sale.¹

20. Special or local law, period prescribed by. — Under Section 29 sub-section 2 *ante*, where for any suit, appeal or application, a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from that prescribed by the First Schedule to this Act, the period prescribed by the special or local law must apply. Accordingly, it was held in the undermentioned case¹ that the application to avoid the sale was barred under Section 231 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act, although the application was not barred under this Article.

15. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 349 (350) : 108 Ind Cas 83, *Ramesh Chandra v. Diraj-sundari Gupta*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 171 (173) : 46 Ind Cas 221, *Ram Kinkar Tewari v. Shikhi Ram*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 490 (497) : 80 Ind Cas 761, *Thakur Mahton v. Jha-man Mahton*.
(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 268 (271) : 27 Ind Cas 294, *Arjun Das v. Gunendra Nath*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Cal 339 (340) : 143 Ind Cas 284, *Ramzaddi Basar v. Nimaddi Basar*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 633 (636) : 104 Ind Cas 199, *Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. Karan Mai*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 521 (522) : 85 Ind Cas 622, *Bajrang Prasad v. Mt. Sonejharu Kuer*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Pat 223 (229) : 117 Ind Cas 46, *Dabu Lal v. Parem Kumari*.
(1912) 16 Ind Cas 464 (465) (Cal), *Narayan Sahu v. Damodar Das*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 229 (231) : 87 Ind Cas 555, *Nabin Chandra Haldar v. Bipin Chandra Haldar*. (17 Bom 341, Followed)
(1928) 112 Ind Cas 847 (848) (Lah), *Mt. Jannat v. Abdul Rahman Khan*.

Note 19

1. (1926) A I R 1926 Bom 33 (34) : 91 Ind Cas 426, *Dharmappa v. Venkappa*. (Defendant can contend that the sale was brought about by fraud)

[But see (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 81 (82) : 78 Ind Cas 126, *Jagnewar Sukdar v. Kailash Mandal*. (Order confirming the sale amounts to a judicial determination that none of the objections exist upon which the validity of the sale could have been questioned)]

Note 20

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 49 (50) : 37 Ind Cas 633, *Nilmou Goswami v. Roban Majhi*.

21. Starting point of limitation. — The starting point of limitation under the Article is the date of the sale and not that of the confirmation of the sale.¹

A sale in execution of a decree is not complete until the acceptance of the bid by the competent authority — the sale does not become complete merely on the highest bid being made.²

There is a difference of opinion as to whether acceptance by the Court of the highest bid is necessary to complete the sale, or whether acceptance of such bid by the officer conducting the sale is sufficient for the purpose. According to one view, a sale is not complete till the highest bid has been accepted by the Court,³ while according to another view, the acceptance of the bid by the officer conducting the sale is sufficient to complete the sale.⁴

Again, according to certain decisions, the deposit of twenty-five per cent. of the purchase-money under Order 21 Rule 84 of the Civil Procedure Code is necessary to complete the sale,⁵ while such

Article 166 Note 21

Note 21

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 558 (559) 167 Ind Cas 225, *Chuni Lal v. Ram Ran-
ajoy Prasad*
(1902) 29 Cal 626 (628) 6 Cal W N 776, *Chowdhry Keshri Sahay v. Gians
Roy* (Case under Section 310 A of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882)
(1887) 14 Cal 644 (647), *Kishori Mohun Roy v. Chunder Nath Pal* (Meaning
of "sale" in Article 138 of Act of 1877.)
(1912) 17 Ind Cas 881 (883) . 8 Nag L R 177, *Wasudeo v. Hiralal*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Nag 108 (109) . 19 Nag L R 162 78 Ind Cas 47, *Sitaram
v. Asaram*.
- 2 (1912) 17 Ind Cas 783 (784) 35 All 67, *Munshi Lal v. Ram Narayan*
(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 41 (42) 118 I C 900, *Abdulla Khan v. Ganpat Rai*.
(1928) A I R 1928 Nag 111 (112) 106 Ind Cas 333, *Rounga v. Balaram*
(1938) 1938 Nag L Jour 10 (12), *Ramchandra v. Aijun* (In case of an appli-
cation to set aside a sale held by the Collector, the time under Art 166
starts from the date when the bid is accepted by the Collector)
3. (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 181 (182, 183) 153 Ind Cas 719 10 Luck 557,
Hari Shankar v. Mt. Amma Bibi
(1932) A I R 1932 Lah 525 (525) 138 Ind Cas 86, *Jetha Mal v. Punjab &
Sindh Bank Ltd. Amritsar*
(1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 291 (292) 132 Ind Cas 263, *Kanwal Ram v.
Mt. Gurdev*
(1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 25 (27) 9 Luck 393 147 Ind Cas 1077, *Iqbal
Naram v. Rajkumar Bakshi*
(1924) A I R 1923 Pat 525 (527) 2 Pat 548 56 Ind Cas 113, *Jaybhadar Jha
v. Matukdhari*
4. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 78 (78) 131 Ind Cas 227, *Nur Dn v. Bulaqi Mal &
Sons*
[See also (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 123 (124) 141 Ind Cas 367 . 29
Nag L R 52, *Mannulal v. Nanhelal*]
5. (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 809 (310) 50 Ind Cas 914, *Mt. Khairan v. Alliance
Bank of Simla*
(1909) 1 Ind Cas 12 (12) (Lah), *Atma Singh v. Duni Chaud* (When the
decree-holder himself is the auction purchaser and no deposit is made
by him, the date of the completion of the sale is that date on which
the executing Court, acting under the second part of Section 294 of
the Civil Procedure Code orders the purchase money to be set off
against the amount of decree)
(1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 25 (27) 148 Ind Cas 1082, *Bhag Chand v. Mt.
Najab Sultan* (Do.)

Article 166
Notes
21—22

deposit is not necessary according to certain other decisions.⁶

But, payment of the full amount of the purchase money is not necessary for the completion of a sale in execution.⁷

22. Order setting aside sale subsequently reversed — Limitation for fresh application to set aside sale. — In the undermentioned case,¹ a sale was set aside after thirty days from the date of the sale on the application of one of the judgment-debtors. But, the order setting aside the sale was afterwards reversed in revision by the High Court and the sale was confirmed. Thereupon the other judgment-debtors applied to have the sale set aside. It was contended on their behalf that when the sale had been set aside the judgment-debtors ceased to have any cause of action to apply for setting aside the sale, and that the confirmation of the sale by the High Court gave them a fresh cause of action and that they were entitled to a period of thirty days from the date of such confirmation. In overruling the contention, a learned Judge of the Patna High Court observed as follows :

"I can well imagine a case in which before the expiry of the time for making an application for setting aside the sale it is set aside by the Court erroneously and thereby the party who is entitled to apply for setting it aside is unable to do so. If, afterwards, the sale which was erroneously set aside is affirmed, the party whose right was taken away by the Court may well claim that the period during which on account of the sale being non-existent he was prevented from making an application for setting it aside should be excluded, but, here, as I have said, the entire period expired before the sale was actually set aside."

Article 167

167.* Complaining of resistance or obstruction to delivery of possession of immovable property decreed or sold in execution of a decree.	Thirty days.	The date of the resistance or obstruction.
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* Act of 1877

6. (1924) A I R 1924 Nag 108 (109) : 19 Nag L R 102 : 78 Ind Cas 47, *Sitaram v. Asaram*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 160 (161) : 159 I C 273, *Padam Lal v. Mohan Lal*.
 [See (1926) A I R 1926 Bom 375 (335) : 95 Ind Cas 549, *Vana Khushal Patil v. Rairlal Bhaidas*]
 7 (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 309 (310) : 50 Ind Cas 914, *Mt. Khairan v. Alliance Bank of India*. (Dissenting from 1 Ind Cas 12)

Note 22

- 1 (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 558 (559) : 167 Ind Cas 525, *Chuni Lal v. Ram Ran-joy Prasad Singh*.

Synopsis

Article 167
Notes
1—2

1. Legislative changes.
2. Starting point of limitation — Second obstruction.
3. Application beyond time — Conversion into a suit.
4. Minority and limitation.
5. Transfer of execution case to another Court and limitation for an application under Order 21 Rule 97.

1. Legislative changes.

1 In Articles 158 and 160 of the Act of 1871 (corresponding to the present Articles 165 and 167), the following cases alone were dealt with :—

- (i) Dispossession by a decree-holder (Article 158).
- (ii) Dispossession by an auction-purchaser (Article 160).
- (iii) Obstruction or resistance to the delivery of possession to the auction-purchaser (Article 160)

There was no provision for cases of obstruction or resistance to the delivery of possession to the *decree-holder*.

2. In the Act of 1877, Article 165 dealt with cases of dispossession by a decree-holder as well as by an auction-purchaser, and Article 167 dealt with the same two cases, and also with cases of obstruction or resistance to the delivery of possession to the *decree-holder* and to the auction-purchaser, so that Article 167 really included also the two cases dealt with by Article 165

3 The present Act has removed this redundancy by deleting from this Article the provision relating to dispossession and retaining only the provision relating to obstruction and resistance to the delivery of possession.¹

2. Starting point of limitation—Second obstruction.—Time, under this Article, runs from the date of “the resistance or obstruction.” Suppose now a decree-holder for possession or a purchaser of immovable property in an execution sale is resisted in the delivery of possession and possession is not consequently delivered to him and he applies again for delivery of possession and is again resisted and an application complaining of the latter resistance is made within

Act of 1871

160 —Complaining of resistance or obstruction to delivery of possession of immovable property sold in execution of a decree, or of dispossession in the delivery of possession to the purchaser of such property

Thirty days

The date of the resistance, obstruction, or dispossession.

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision

Article 167 — Note 1

1 See (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 269 (271) 42 Mad 753 53 Ind Cas 437 (F B), *Thattantaisla v. Kombi Aliasan*

Article 167
Notes
2—3.

thirty days thereof, what is the starting point of limitation for the application? It has been held generally that the starting point is the date of the *second obstruction*, the reason being that the resistance referred to in Column 3 of the Article is the same as that complained of in the first column.¹ It is immaterial that no application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Civil Procedure Code was made on the first resistance,² or that the application was made and dismissed for default.³ According to the Bombay High Court, however, if the second obstruction is by the *same* person who made the first obstruction and in the same character, the starting point of limitation would be the date of the earlier resistance, the reason being that the second resistance is really not a fresh one.⁴

On the question whether on obstruction, a decree-holder or auction-purchaser is bound to apply for removal of the obstruction or whether he can apply again for possession, see the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code, Order 21 Rule 97, Notes 4 and 5 and the undermentioned cases.⁵

3. Application beyond time—Conversion into a suit.—If an application for the removal of obstruction is allowed to be converted

Note 2

1. *Devi v.*

I. v. Ray
— Same

obstructor.)

(1896) 18 All 233 (236) : 1896 All W N 84, *Narain Das v. Hazari Lal*.
(Obstructions by the same person.)

(1928) 1928 Mad W N 236 (236), *Ammu Kotilamma v. P. Manakkal*.
[See (1891) 1891 All W N 131 (132), *Budhan v. Faral Ali*.]

2 (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 559 (561) : 66 Ind Cas 722, *Mayappa Chetty v. Meyappan Serrai*

(1882) 5 Mad 113 (114), *Ramasekhara v. Dharmaraya*. (Decree for possession.)

3. (1938) A I R 1938 Cal 352 (353) : 176 Ind Cas 816, *Surama Sundari Devi v. Kiranshashi Choudhrani*

4. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 457 (459, 460) : 146 Ind Cas 11 (F B), *Mukund Dapu v. Tanu Sakhu*

Pillai.

(1879) 5 Cal 331 (332, 333) : 5 Ind Jur 136, *Shoteenath Mookerjee v. Obhoy Nund Ray*.

[See also (1881) 7 All 79 (91) -

v. Gokal Chand. (The

Code, says 'may apply,'

application is filed, it is

prescribed by Article 167.)

(1912) 16 Ind Cas 432 (432) (Mad), *Muthusamy Goundan v. Ethirajulu Naidu*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Nag 369 (370) : 147 Ind Cas 582, *Nathu Harishankar v. Fatusa*.

(1886) 10 Mad 53 (56) : 11 Ind Jur 19, *Srin v. Muthuswami*.]

into a suit, the law of limitation applicable is the law relating to suits.¹

Where an application under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made after the lapse of one month of the obstruction, the Court should not convert it into a suit and then dismiss the suit on the ground that the application was barred by time. The Court should dismiss the application itself as barred by time instead of converting the application into a suit and dismissing it, thereby making such dismissal a bar to a further suit.²

4. Minority and limitation. — See Note 13 to Section 6 *ante*, and the undermentioned case.¹

5. Transfer of execution case to another Court and limitation for an application under Order 21 Rule 97. — A decree-holder auction-purchaser applied to the Bombay High Court under Order 21 Rule 97 and also for further execution under Order 21 Rule 50 against a partner of the judgment-debtor firm. The Bombay High Court transferred the decree for execution to the Sind Court. The Sind Court held that the matter of the removal of the obstruction not being *in execution*, it did not have to deal with the application under Order 21 Rule 97. The decree-holder then made a fresh application under Order 21 Rule 97 to the Sind Court which was dismissed as barred. On appeal it was held that the application under Order 21 Rule 97 being by a decree-holder-auction-purchaser, the matter was one relating to execution and also that time for the said application should be computed from the date of the application to the Bombay High Court.¹

Article 167
Notes
3-5

168.* For the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution.	Thirty days.	The date of the dismissal.
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Article 168

Act of 1877, Article 168, Act of 1871, Article 161

Same as above.

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision.

Note 3

- (1892) 18 Bom 37 (40), *Namdev v. Ramchandra*.
- (1885) 1885 Bom P J 163 (164), *Haribhai Gangadas v. Balaji Pandurang*.
- (1910) 6 Ind Cas 285 (285) (Mad), *Valliammas v. Shanmugam Pillai*
(See also (1897) 21 Bom 392 (393), *Lola v. Narayan*.)

Note 4

- (1897) 11 Bom 473 (474), *Vinayakrav Amrit v. Debrao Gound* (Application under Order 21 Rule 97 should be made within one month of attainment of majority.)

Note 5

- (1936) A I R 1936 Sind 11 (13) . 161 Ind Cas 524 . 90 Sind L R 290, *British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. A. M. Jeyaraj & Co.*

Article 168
Notes
1—2

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. "Dismissed for want of prosecution."
 4. Application to restore appeal rejected under Order 41 Rule 10.
 5. Application to restore appeal rejected for non-payment of court-fee.
 6. Dismissal without jurisdiction.
7. Application made in time — Party impleaded afterwards — Effect.
8. Starting point.
 9. Court cannot extend time prescribed by this Article.
10. Rangoon High Court Rules of Procedure, Rule 9, sub-rule 2.

Other Topics

Application for re-admission of appeal	See Note 2, Pt. 2, Note 3, Pts. 1, 2
'Rejection' of appeal is not 'dismissal' See Note 4
Section 5 and this Article See Note 0, Pt. 4
Section 6 is not applicable See Note 8, Pt. 2

1. Legislative changes.

1. There was no provision corresponding to this Article in the Act of 1859. Section 347 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, however, contained a provision that an application for re-admission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution may be made within thirty days of the date of dismissal.¹

2. Article 161 of the Act of 1871 introduced the provision corresponding to the present Article.

2. Scope of the Article. — This Article applies to an application for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution. It has been held that the application referred to is one under the *Code of Civil Procedure*¹ and that the Article has no application to

Article 168 — Note 1

- 1 (1867) 8 *Suth W R* 361 (361, 362), *Shashk Miltoo Khan v. Ruhmun Khan*.
 (1868) 10 *Suth W R* 437 (437), *Tarkales Dabee v. Nitya Noyce Dabee*.
 (1868) 10 *Suth W R* 450 (451) : 2 *Beng L R A O* 110, *Tara Chand Ghose v. Anand Chundra Ghoudhry*.
 (1868) 10 *Suth W R* 450 (451), *Alloo Umoolloo v. Feroze* (The time

Note 2

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 223 (231, 233) : 8 Rang 280 : 127 Ind Cas 161 (F D).
Abdul Ganny v. Mrs. I. M. Russell.

applications for re-admission under the Rules of the High Court.² Again, a Court can restore, under its *inherent* powers, an appeal which has been rejected or dismissed in cases not covered by a specific provision of law.³ An application by a party in such cases invoking the Court's inherent powers for restoration of such appeal is not governed by any period of limitation.⁴ The Article only applies to a dismissal for *default of prosecution* and not to an application to set aside a compromise decree in appeal on the ground of fraud.⁵

Article 168
Notes
2—3

3. "Dismissed for want of prosecution." — Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for an application for the re-admission of an appeal dismissed:—

1. under Order 41 Rule 11 sub-rule 2, where, without sending notice to the respondent, the Court fixes a day for hearing the appellant and he fails to appear on such date, or
2. under Order 41 Rule 17, where, after notice to the respondent, the Court fixes a day for hearing and the appellant fails to appear on that day, or
3. under Order 41 Rule 18, where, on the day fixed for hearing it is found that notice has not been served on the respondent in consequence of the default of the appellant in paying the costs of process.

The dismissal in each of the above cases is clearly a dismissal "for want of prosecution" within the meaning of this Article and the application for re-admission in such cases would be governed by this Article.¹ But the Article is not necessarily confined to applications

2 (1905) 23 Cal 339 (346, 347), *Ramhari Sahu v. Madan Mohan Mitter* (This case was overruled in 24 Cal 350 in so far as it decided that the dismissal could be set aside under the Rules of the Court, but did not affect the decision so far as it held that limitation will not apply to applications under Rules of Court.)

(1921) A I R 1921 Cal 67 (70) 48 Cal 817 : 66 Ind Cas 209, *Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dass*;
[See also (1908) 82 Bom 1 (6) 9 Bom L R 509, *Wadia Gandhi & Co. v. Purshottam Swji*]]

3. (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 426 (426, 427) 170 Ind Cas 155. 13 Luck 425, *Firm Anant Ram Mangat Ram v. Firm Ram Sarup*

(1886) 8 All 315 (319) 13 Ind App 57 4 Sar 707 (P C), *Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh*

(1920) A I R 1920 All 112 (114) 42 All 626 60 Ind Cas 81, *Sundar v. Habib Chick*

4. See Note 28 to Section 8, *ante*

[See also (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 67 (70) : 48 Cal 817 66 Ind Cas 209, *Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dass*

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 20 (20, 22) 45 Bom 648 60 Ind Cas 919, *Sonubai Daburao v. Shitajirao Krishnarao*]

[But see (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 426 (427) 170 Ind Cas 155 13 Luck 425, *Firm Anant Ram Mangat Ram v. Firm Ram Sarup*]

5. (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 622 (623) 27 Ind Cas 628, *Peary Chowdhry v. Sonooary Dass*

Note 3

1. (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 20 (20, 22) 45 Bom 649 60 Ind Cas 919, *Sonubai v. Shitajirao Krishnarao*

Article 168
Notes
3—4

under Order 41 Rule 19. A striking off of an appeal, for instance, *before* the date fixed for hearing, for default of payment of process fees is not a dismissal under Rule 18 of Order 41 and an application to re-admit such appeal is not one under Order 41 Rule 19. Under Rule 9 of the Appellate Side Rules of the Rangoon High Court, however, an application will lie for such re-admission and it has been held that the application must be regarded as one under the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 168 will apply to such an application also.³

4. Application to restore appeal rejected under Order 41 Rule 10. — Can a Court restore an appeal which has been rejected under Order 41 Rule 10 for failure to furnish security for costs? If so, what is the Article applicable to such cases? It has been held in the undermentioned case² that Section 107 read with Order 25 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code empowers the Appellate Court to set aside the rejection of an appeal under Order 41 Rule 10 and that application for that purpose would be governed by this Article. If an application does lie under Section 107 read with Order 25 Rule 2, it may be conceded that this Article will apply to such an application. But it is submitted that an application will not lie under Section 107 and Order 25 Rule 2 of the Code, to set aside a rejection of an appeal under Order 41 Rule 10. Order 25 Rule 2 refers to the *dismissal* of suits and Order 41 Rule 10 refers to a *rejection* of an appeal. The Code uses the word "rejection" in a sense different from that of "dismissal," and a Rule which applies to a *dismissal* of a suit cannot be applied by reference to Section 107 of the Code to a rejection of an appeal. This is in consonance with the general trend of opinion that the rejection of an appeal under Order 41 Rule 10 can be set aside under the *inherent power* of the Court,³ for, the Court could not act under its inherent power where there is a specific provision under the Code, namely, Section 107 under which it could act.

If, therefore, an application to set aside the rejection of an appeal can only lie under the Court's *inherent power*, is such an application governed by this Article? It is submitted that it is not. A *rejection* of an appeal cannot be considered to be a *dismissal* of the appeal within the meaning of this Article, and, secondly, it is a general principle of law that the law of limitation does not apply to the exercise by the

2. (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 228 (231) : 8 Rang 350 : 127 Ind Cas 161 (F B). *Abdul Ganny v. Mrs. I. M. Russel*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Rang 96 (97) : 142 Ind Cas 185, *Ma Sein v. S. T. R. M. Firm*. (A I R 1930 Rang 228 (F B), Followed)

Notes 4

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 812 (813) : 40 Ind Cas 234, *Goljan Dibi v. Nasar Ali*. (Question whether application under Order 41 Rule 19 lies and whether it is governed by Art. 168, was raised but was left open.)

2. *Abdul Ganny v. Mrs. I. M. Russel*, Annual R. 2 of rejected

Court of its inherent powers and an application by a party invoking the exercise of the Court's inherent powers is not therefore governed by this Article.⁴

Article 168
Notes
4—6

5. Application to restore appeal rejected for non-payment of court-fee. — A files a memorandum of appeal but fails to pay sufficient stamp fee thereon. The Court grants him some time within which he is to make good the deficiency. On his failure to so make good the deficiency, the Court rejects the memorandum of appeal. A applies for re-admission of the appeal. Does such an application lie, and if so, what is the limitation applicable to it? It has been assumed in the undermentioned case¹ that such an application would lie and that it would be governed by this Article. It is submitted that this view does not seem to be correct. Order 41 Rule 3 provides for cases in which an appeal may be rejected, but the deficiency in payment of court-fee is not one of such cases. There is a conflict of opinion on the question whether Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code read with Section 107 of that Code will enable a Court to reject an appeal for payment of insufficient court-fee, one view being that the Appellate Court can so reject an appeal,² the contrary view being that Order 7 Rule 11 does not apply to such cases.³ If the first view is assumed to be correct, then a *re-admission* of the rejected appeal can only be under the Court's *inherent* powers, there being no specific provision in the Code for such re-admission. If the second view is assumed to be correct, the Appellate Court can only *dismiss* and not reject the appeal,⁴ but a re-admission of an appeal so dismissed can only be under the Court's *inherent* powers, there being no provision in the Code for any such re-admission. In either view an application for re-admission will not be governed by the law of limitation and therefore by this Article.

6. Dismissal without jurisdiction. — Where a dismissal of an appeal purporting to be under Order 41 Rule 17 was without jurisdiction, it was held by the High Court of Lahore that the application to restore the appeal was not governed by this Article.¹ The better ground on which the decision can be rested will, it is submitted,

4. See cases cited in Foot-Note (4) to Note 2

Note 5

1. (1889) 1889 All W N 151 (151), *Bhunder Tsuars v. Thakur Tsuars*.

2. See Note 9 to S. 149 of the Authors' Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure

[See also (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 281 (282) • 63 Ind Cas 99, *Suraj Pal Pandey v. Uttim Pandey*]

(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 603 (609) 55 Ind Cas 502, *Sirdar Singh v. F. F. Christian*]

3. See Note 9 to S. 149 of the Authors' Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure

4. (1922) A I R 1922 Nag 60 (63) 18 Nag L R 11. 76 Ind Cas 884, *Seth Sagunchand v. Lala Chhabilaram*.

Note 6

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 279 (280) 69 Ind Cas 618, *Aiz Muhammad v. Shanhar Das*

Article 168
Notes
6-9

be that there is no valid dismissal in such a case, that therefore the appeal must be deemed to be pending, and that the application is really not one to restore any appeal dismissed at all, within the meaning of this Article.

7. Application made in time — Party impleaded afterwards — Effect. — There is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which provides that an application to restore an appeal under Order 41 Rule 19 should expressly implead a particular party. Ordinarily, it is advisable to mention the names of all persons on whom notices of the application should be served. But if no names are mentioned and the record enables the Court to ascertain the names of the persons on whom notices should be served and notice is, in fact, given, the application cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that the name of a party was not mentioned in the application and that an application could not be considered to have been made against him within the period of limitation.¹

8. Starting point.—Time under this Article runs from the date of the order of dismissal, and not from the date of the applicant's knowledge of the order.¹

The minority of the applicant is no answer to a plea of limitation under this Article, as Section 6 *ante* does not apply to applications contemplated by this Article.²

9. Court cannot extend time prescribed by this Article.—As has been seen in Note 3 to Section 3 *ante*, the Court has no inherent power to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the various Articles. The Court has therefore no power to entertain an application governed by this Article for re-admission of an appeal, after the prescribed period.¹ Where an application for re-admission of an appeal which could have been filed under Order 41 Rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Code is not filed within the period prescribed by this Article, the Court cannot entertain an application for re-admission, under its inherent powers.² The reason is that where a specific

Note 7

1. (1937) A I R 1937 All 362 (362) : 159 Ind Cas 246, *Mt. Kalarati v. Daya Nund*.

Note 8

1. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 309 (309) : 53 Ind Cas 789 : 1 Lah 363, *Dissa Mal v. Kesar Singh*.
2. (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 20 (20, 22) : 45 Bom 648 : 60 Ind-Cas 919, *Sonubai Daburao v. Shrivajirao Krishnarao*.

Note 9

1. (1890) 1890 All W N 196 (196), *Manrakhan Misr v. Sobha Singh*.
2. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 309 (310) : 1 Lah 363 : 53 Ind Cas 789, *Dissa Mal v. Kesar Singh*.
- (1925) 91 Ind Cas 168 (169) (Lah), *Devadas v. Anantram*. (If so entertained, it will be tantamount to overriding the express statutory provision enacted in S. 3.)
- (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 114 (116) : 76 Ind Cas 836 : 47 Mad 171, *Krishnaswamy Naidu v. Chengalroya Naidu*.

procedure is prescribed in the Code and the party neglects to avail himself of it, the inherent powers of the Court could not be invoked.³

The provisions of Section 5 of the Act have not been made applicable to applications under Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code except in the Province of Madras. In provinces, therefore, in which that Section has not been extended to applications under Order 41 Rule 19 of the Code, the Court cannot resort to its provisions for extending the period prescribed by this Article.⁴ In the under-mentioned case⁵ an application clearly governed by this Article, but filed after time, was entertained as an application for review.

10. Rangoon High Court Rules of Procedure: Rule 9 sub-rule 2.—Rule 9 sub-rule 2 of the Appellate Side Rules of Procedure of the Rangoon High Court has been held to be *ultra vires* in so far as it prescribes a period of limitation less than that prescribed by Article 168 of this Act.¹

Article 168
Notes
9—10

169.* For the re-hearing of an appeal heard <i>ex parte</i> .	Thirty days.	The date of the decree in appeal, or, where notice of the appeal was not duly served, when the applicant has knowledge of the decree
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Article 169

*

Act of 1877

169 — For a re-hearing of an appeal heard *ex parte* in the absence of the respondent

Thirty days

The date of the decree in appeal.

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision

- (1924) A I R 1924 All 446 (447) 46 All 144 78 Ind Cas 416, *Shib Prakash Joshi v Jhinguria*
 (1900) 1890 All W N 196 (196), *Manrakhan Misr v Sobha Singh*
 [But see (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 96 (98) 142 Ind Cas 185, *Ma Sein v S T R M Firm* (Submitted not correct)]
 3 See (1935) A I R 1935 Rang 466 (471) 13 Rang 595 159 Ind Cas 345, *K P L S S Cheltiar v Official Receiver, Rannad.*
 4. (1889) 1890 All W N 151 (151), *Bhundar Tiwari v Thakur Tiwari.*
 (1879) 1879 Pun Re No 141, *Mah v Jwan*
 (1882) 1892 Pun Re No 44, *Kabir v Khanuja Muhammad Khan.*
 (1925) 91 Ind Cas 168 (163) (Lah), *Devdas v Auantram*
 (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 96 (97) 142 Ind Cas 185, *Ma Sein v S T R M. Firm*
 5 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 482 (483) (Lah), *Kash Ram v Gops Mal*

Note 10

- 1 (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 223 (231, 232) 8 Rang 380 127 Ind Cas 161 (F B), *Abdul Ganny v Mrs. I M Russel*

Article 169
Notes
1—3

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. Burden of proof.
4. Starting point.

1. **Legislative changes.**—The starting point under the corresponding Article in the Act of 1877 was "the date of the decree in appeal;" so that a respondent could not apply for a re-hearing after thirty days from the date of the appellate decree even if he had not been served at all and had no knowledge of the decree till long after the expiry of the said period. He could however appeal from the decree and the Appellate Court could interfere under clause (c) of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code.¹

The words "or where notice of the appeal . . . decree" were added in the third column in the present Act to provide for such cases also.

2. **Scope of the Article.**—This Article refers to applications made under Order 41 Rule 21 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides for a re-hearing of an *appeal* heard and decided *ex parte* against a respondent. Article 164 *ante* provides for an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree in a *suit*. Where a defendant against whom a decree in the suit had been passed *ex parte* applied in *appeal* to set the *ex parte* decree aside, the application was held, assuming the Appellate Court had power to entertain it, to be governed by Article 164 and not this Article.¹

As has been seen in the Notes to Section 3 *ante*, a Court has no discretion to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the Schedule. The period of thirty days fixed by this Article cannot therefore be extended by the Court.²

3. **Burden of proof.**—It is incumbent on the applicant to show that the application is within time. Where he asserts that he had

Article 169 — Note 1

1. (1896) 19 Mad 414 (416), *Balaji Rau v. Sathabhoy*.

(1896) 19 Mad 414 (416), *Balaji Rau v. Sathabhoy*.

Note 2

- 2 (1895) 1885 Pun Re No. 66, *Sher v. Mohan Singh*.

no knowledge of the decree, he must show when he actually got the knowledge.¹

Article 169
Notes
3—4

4. **Starting point.** — The starting point under this Article is—

1. the date of the decree in appeal, or
2. where notice of the appeal was not duly served, when the applicant has *knowledge* of the decree.^{1a}

Where, under the Rules of the High Court, a first notice of the preliminary date for the appeal and a subsequent notice of the date fixed for hearing is required to be sent to the respondent, the question was raised, but not decided, whether "notice of the appeal" in the Article must be taken to refer to the first notice or to the subsequent notice.¹

As to the meaning of the words "duly served," see Notes to Article 164, *ante*

An application for re-hearing presented originally within the period of limitation but returned for amendment and presented after amendment after the period of limitation, cannot be rejected as being out of time.²

170.* For leave to appeal as a pauper. | Thirty days. | The date of the decree appealed from.

Article 170

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. Starting point.
4. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to applications under this Article.
5. Extension of time under Section 6.
6. Power to grant time for payment of court-fee.

* Act of 1877

Substantially same as above

Act of 1871

162 — For leave to appeal as a pauper | Ninety days. | The date of the decree appealed against

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision

Note 3

- 1 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 882 (883) 147 Ind Cas 268, *Ghulam Hussain v. Makhan Lal*

Note 4

- 1a (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 447 (447) 1918 Pun Re No 96 47 Ind Cas 962, *Daulat Ras v. Jagat Ram*
 1 (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 882 (882) 147 Ind Cas 259, *Ghulam Hussain v. Makhan Lal*
 2 (1905) 5 Cal W N 816 (817), *Shama Prosad Ghose v. Taji Mullik*.

Article 170
Notes
1—3

Other Topics

Leave to file cross-objections in <i>forma pauperis</i> —Article not applicable	...	See Note 2, Pt. 5
No extension of time on equitable considerations	...	See Note 2, Pt. 1
Time for copy excluded	...	See Note 3, Pt. 2

1. **Legislative changes.**—This Article is the same as Article 170 of the Act of 1877, except that the word 'from' is substituted for 'against.' It corresponds to Article 162 of the Act of 1871, but under that Act the period of limitation was ninety days.

2. **Scope of the Article.**—Order 44 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for an application for leave to appeal as a pauper. Such applications would be governed by this Article. The Court cannot extend the time for filing such applications on any equitable considerations.¹ Where an appeal is filed in time but with insufficient court-fee and, subsequently, after the expiry of the period prescribed by this Article, the Court calls upon the appellant to furnish additional stamp fee and the appellant thereupon applies to the Court for leave to continue the appeal in *forma pauperis*, it is clear that the application is barred under this Article.² In *Mnkhadev Balvant v. Lakshmin Balvant*,³ their Lordships of the Bombay High Court observed that if such applications were allowed after the period prescribed by this Article, the result would be to extend the period allowed by the Article for the benefit of an appellant who has put in insufficient stamps and then applies to appeal in *forma pauperis*. Where an appeal was filed against the preliminary decree on payment of proper court-fee, but the Appellate Court converted the same into an appeal against the final decree, which had been subsequently passed, and called upon the appellant to furnish additional stamp, and thereupon the appellant applied for leave to appeal in *forma pauperis*, it was observed by the High Court of Madras that such an application would be governed by Article 181.⁴

The Article applies only to applications for leave to appeal in *forma pauperis* and not to applications for leave to file cross-objections in *forma pauperis* in an appeal.⁵

3. **Starting point.**—Time, under this Article, runs from the date of the decree. And the period of limitation is thirty days, even though the period of limitation for the appeal itself might be ninety

Article 170 — Note 2

1 See Note 3 to Section 3 ante

2 (1915) A I R 1915 All 310 (311) : 29 Ind Cas 1003, *Gali v. Rachla Kunwar*.
(1894) 19 Bom 48 (50), *Mahader Balvant v. Lakshman Balvant*.

3 (1894) 19 Bom 48 (50).

4 (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 230 (231) : 54 Ind Cas 761, *Solayappa Chetty v. Lakshmanan Chetty*

5. (1910) 5 Ind Cas 118 (122) : 15 Cal W N 205, 12 Cal L Jour 173, *Gobinda Rani Das v. Radha Ballabh Das*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Pat 31 (32) : 119 Ind Cas 900 : 7 Pat 827, *Mt. Chander Kala Kuer v. Mt. Dulhin Raja Kuer*.

days, as in the case of an appeal to the High Court.¹ The time requisite for the copy of the decree obtained should be excluded under the provisions of Section 12 *ante*. See Notes to Section 12 and the undermentioned case.²

Article 170
Notes
3-6

4. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to applications under this Article.—See Notes 1 and 29 to Section 5 *ante*, and the undermentioned case.¹

5. Extension of time under Section 6.—Section 6, *ante*, does not apply to applications to file an appeal in *forma pauperis* and consequently, even an application by the next friend of a minor must be within the time allowed by this Article.¹

6. Power to grant time for payment of court-fee.—The rejection of an application for leave to appeal as a pauper does not *ipso facto* carry with it the rejection of the memorandum of appeal filed along with it.¹ The memorandum of appeal is a separate document before the Court which remains for disposal after the rejection of the application, and the Court has power under Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code to give further time for the payment of the requisite court fee stamp and admit the appeal.² The memorandum of appeal, though originally unstamped, is not a nullity and can be validated with effect from the date of the presentation, by the

Note 3

1. (1890) 12 All 79 (93). 1890 All W N 25, *Parbati v. Bhola*.

2 (1890) 12 All 79 (93, 95) 1890 All W N 25, *Parbati v. Bhola*.

Note 4

1 (1910) 7 Ind Cas 944 (944, 945) 34 Bom 589, *Chintaman Vyankatarao v. Ramchandra Vyankatarao*.

Note 5

1. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 1002 (1003) (Lab), *Seia Datt Perishad v. Collector of Lahore*

Note 6

1 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 1039 (1040) 40 Mad 657, 38 Ind Cas 617, *Nellatadieu Ammal v. Subramania Pillai*.

(1935) A I R 1935 All 620 (625) 157 Ind Cas 317 57 All 963 (FB), *Mt. Shahzadi Begam v. Alakh Nath*

(1918) A I R 1918 All 194 (194) 40 All 381. 45 Ind Cas 29, *Muhammad Farzand Ali v. Bahat Ali*

(1931) A I R 1931 Rang 131 (134) 9 Rang 92. 132 Ind Cas 707, *Maung San Shwe v. Hays Ko Ishag*

[But see (1919) 18 Ind Cas 518 (518) (Low Bur), *Mg Wa Tha v. Abdul Gani Osman*.]

2. (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 442 (443) 4 Pat 67 91 Ind Cas 814, *Rajendra Prasad v. Gopal Prasad*

(1898) 22 Bom 849 (857, 861), *Bas Ful v. Desai Manorbhas Dhananidas*

(1897) 21 Bom 576 (579), *Juminabai v. Vissondas Rutton Chand*

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 896 (897) 1909 Pun Re No. 94, *Hari Singh v. Gurbakhsh Singh*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 13 (14) 90 Ind Cas 371, *Sajjad Ali Khan v. Jagmohan Das*.

(1906) 26 All 329 (331) 1904 All W N 24, *Gurwarlal v. Lakshmi Narain*

[See (1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 22 (23). 154 Ind Cas 943, *Tilaya Ram v. Ghansam Das*]

Article 170
Note 6

payment of the court-fee.³ The Appellate Court can also, in a fit case, excuse the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and admit the appeal after the expiry of the limitation, on payment of the full court-fee.⁴ But where the application for leave to appeal as a pauper is itself filed after the period of limitation has expired, the subsequent payment of court-fee will not validate the appeal under any circumstances.⁵

Article 171

<p>171.* Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for an order to set aside an abatement.</p>	<p>Sixty days.</p>	<p>The date of the abatement.</p>
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope.
3. Starting point.
4. Applicability of Section 5 to applications governed by this Article.

1. Legislative changes. — See Note 1 to Article 172, *infra*.

2. Scope. — Under Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a suit may abate :

1. where the plaintiff or defendant dies and the right to sue does not survive, or
2. where the plaintiff or defendant dies and the right to sue survives, but no application is made within the time

* Act of 1877

See under Article 172, *infra*.

[But see (1935) A I R 1935 Rang 836 (339) : 13 Rang 60 : 159 Ind Cas 468, *Vertannes v. Lawson*.]

8. (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 225 (226) : 3 Lah 35 : 65 Ind Cas 741, *Dyal Das v. Sundar Das*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 124 (124) : 82 Ind Cas 630, *Suan Tes v. Ma Ngwe*.

[But see (1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 58 (59) : 82 Ind Cas 531, *Shanghai Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Helen Constance Brown*.

(1914) 22 Ind Cas 884 (884, 885) : 7 Low Bur Ral 90, *Anamally v. O. M. M. R. M. Chetty Firm*.

(1929) 115 Ind Cas 678 (678-679) (Pat), *Rajendra Prasad v. Gopal Prasad*.

(1891) 13 All 805 (303) : 1891 All W N 90, *Dishnath Prasad v. Jagarnath Prasad*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 818 (344) : 140 Ind Cas 190, *Mt. Baiyazulnissa Begam v. Mt. Akbar Begam* }

4. (1925) A I R 1925 All 499 (499) : 111 Ind Cas 655, *Ram Charan v. Dandidhar*.

6. (1904) 26 All 329 (330, 331) : 1904 All W N 24, *Girwarlal v. Lalshmi Narain*.

(1899) 26 Cal 925 (928), *Durga Charan Naskar v. Deolhiram Naskar*.

[See (1933) A I R 1933 All 808 (309) : 144 Ind Cas 70, *Mt. Shahzade Begam v. Alakh Nath*.]

limited to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on record.

Article 171
Note 2

In the first case, no question of *setting aside* the abatement arises, inasmuch as there can be no person entitled to make any such application.¹ In the second case, the legal representative can, under Order 22 Rule 9 sub-rule 2, apply for *setting aside* the abatement. This Article will apply to such applications.

Where an application is not for *setting aside any abatement*, this Article will have no application. Thus, where A institutes a *representative* suit on behalf of himself and on behalf of others, and dies pending the suit, any of the other persons who are constructively already parties to the suit can apply to *continue* the suit under the provisions of Order 1 Rules 1 and 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, independent of any question as to the applicability of Order 22 Rules 3 and 4 relating to abatement of suits.² Such applications are not for setting aside any abatement and are not governed by this Article.³ In the undermentioned case,⁴ A, the nearest reversioner, sued to set aside a widow's alienation and died pending suit. The Court declared *suo motu* that the suit abated. The next reversioner thereafter applied under Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the abatement. It was held that the application could be treated as one under Order 1 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code to continue the suit, and would be governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act.

See also Notes to Article 172, *infra*.

Article 171 — Note 2

- 1 (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 79 (50) : 131 Ind Cas 93 : 12 Lah 275, *Lachhman v. Bans Lal*.
2. (1915) A I R 1915 P C 124 (126, 127) : 38 Mad 406 : 42 Ind App 125 : 29 Ind Cas 298 (P C), *Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 79 (50) : 131 Ind Cas 93 : 12 Lah 275, *Lachhman v. Bans Lal*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 389 (390) : 34 Ind Cas 384 : 40 Mad 110, *Parameswaram v. Narayanan*. (Dissented from A I R 1915 All 59.)
- (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 244 (244) : 85 Ind Cas 666, *Gulam Gouss v. Dost Md. Khan*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 590 (591) : 132 Ind Cas 289 : 54 Mad 770, *Mahomed Kanni Routhier v. Nama Mahomed Routhier*.
- [See also (1921) A I R 1921 P C 123 (124) : 48 Cal 493 : 48 Ind App 12 : 17 Nag L R 37 : 62 Ind Cas 737 (P C), *Raja Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram*. (A suit under S 92, Civ. Pro. Code, 1908 (S. 599, Civ. Pro. Code, 1882) does not abate; it being a suit which is not prosecuted by any individuals for their own interest, but as representatives of the general public.)
- (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 389 (390) : 40 Mad 110 : 34 Ind Cas 384, *Parameswaram v. Narayanan*. (Suit under S 92 of the Civ. Pro Code, is a representative suit)]
3. (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 389 (390) : 34 Ind Cas 384 : 40 Mad 110, *Parameswaram v. Narayanan*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 590 (591) : 132 Ind Cas 289 : 54 Mad 770, *Md. Kanni Routhier v. Nama Mahomed Routhier*. (Article 181 would apply.)
4. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 479 (480) : 49 Ind Cas 265, *Krishnaswamy Iyer v. Seethalakshmi Ammal*

Article 171
Note 3

3. **Starting point.**—The *terminus a quo* under this Article is the *date of the abatement*. Under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882, an order of abatement had to be passed by the Court, before the suit could be considered as abated.¹ Under the present Code, an abatement takes place *automatically* when legal representatives of the deceased are not brought on record within the prescribed time and no formal order is necessary.^{1a} Therefore, an application for setting aside an abatement must be made within the period of sixty days from the actual abatement and not from the passing of an order declaring the abatement.² An application for substitution may, in substance, be treated as an application to set aside abatement;³ but

Note 3

- I. See (1885) 9 Bom 275 (278, 279), *Fulchhu v. Goculdas Valabhadas*.
(1901) 9 Cal W N 369 (370), *Ram Pratap v. Lal Chand*.
- 1a (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 424 (424) : 74 Ind Cas 17, *Badli v. Mt. Naraini*.
2. (1926) A I R 1926 All 217 (220) : 93 Ind Cas 313 : 48 All 334 (F B), *Churya v. Baneshwar*.
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 559 (560) : 35 Bom 393, *Lakshmichand Bewachand v. Kachubhai Gulabchand*. (In this case, even though the application under the Article was barred, the Court added the applicant as a party to the suit under its power under Order 1 Rule 10, O. P. C.)
(1915) A I R 1915 Lah 382 (383) : 81 Ind Cas 697, *Dhans Ram v. Narain Singh*. (An application should be made within sixty days from the date of the abatement.)
[See also (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 204 (295) : 51 Ind Cas 534, *Prisya Sundari v. Golapdi Sherk*. (Abatement order passed before expiry of six months—Application for setting aside order within sixty days of order is maintainable)]
- [But see (1922) A I R 1922 All 209 (210) : 66 Ind Cas 554 : 44 All 459, *Mt. Gujrati v. Sital Muvr*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 All 379 (380) : 127 Ind Cas 419, *Tulsi Ram v. Municipal Board, Shahjahanpur*. (But this automatic abatement does not follow where party dies before conclusion of hearing)
- (1920) A I R 1920 All 294 (235) : 42 All 510 : 59 Ind Cas 903, *Lachmi Narain v. Mohammad Yusuf*. (The absence of any order of abatement does not serve as an obstacle to the making of an application for substitution of name which is in effect an application to set aside the order of abatement)
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 234 (235) : 7 Lah 73 : 94 Ind Cas 422, *Qaim v. Nura*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 Nag 88 (89) : 169 Ind Cas 853, *Hansa Ratansa v. Janu*. (Application to set aside abatement within sixty days of abatement is proper and not premature even if made before order of Court that suit has abated)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 356 (358) : 14 Lah 513 : 142 Ind Cas 649, *Chuns Lal Tulsi Ram v. Amin Chand*]
3. (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 746 (747) : 112 Ind Cas 5, *Kirpa Ram v. Bhagat Chand*.
(1920) A I R 1920 All 294 (285) : 42 All 510 : 59 Ind Cas 903, *Lachmi Narain v. Mohammad Yusuf*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 424 (424) : 74 Ind Cas 17, *Badli v. Mt. Naraini*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 221 (221) : 2 Luck 592 : 101 Ind Cas 841, *Khalil Ahmad Khan v. Khatur Zaman*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 422 (424) : 57 Cal 149 : 124 Ind Cas 817, *Janak Nath Singha v. Nirodbaran Ray* (Held, in the circumstances of the case that the application for substitution could not be treated as an application for setting aside the abatement.)

not when the merits of the case are against the petitioner.⁴

4. **Applicability of Section 5 to applications governed by this Article.** — Order 22 Rule 9 sub-rule 3 provides that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to applications under sub-rule 2, i. e., to applications to set aside abatements

As to what is "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 *ante*, see Notes to that Section.

As to what is "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Order 22 Rule 9 sub-rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, see the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code, Order 22 Rule 9, Note 8

See also the undermentioned cases.¹

Article 171
Notes
3—4

172.* Under the same Code by the assignee or the receiver of an insolvent plaintiff or appellant for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit or an appeal.	Sixty days.	The date of the order of dismissal.
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Article 172

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope and applicability.
3. Starting point.

* Act of 1877		
172 — Under section 371 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or under that section and section 582 of the same Code, for an order to set aside an order for abatement or dismissal.	Sixty days	The date of the order for abatement or dismissal

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision

- (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 455 (457) 174 Ind Cas 700, *Diwan Chand Nirmal v Bhagwan Chand*
[See (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 634 (635) 119 Ind Cas 759, *Raghunath Rai v Radha Kishan Panna Lal*]
4 (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 713 (714) 80 Ind Cas 397, *Seshamma v Venkata Rao*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 422 (424) 57 Cal 149 124 Ind Cas 817, *Janalath Singh v. Niroddaran Ray*

Note 4

1. (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 404 (405) 108 Ind Cas 288, *Ramachandran v*

(1924)

- (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 218 (218) 1 L R (1938) Mad 275 174 Ind Cas 951, *Secretary of State v Aishnamacharyulu* (Ignorance of death of respondent in absence of negligence is sufficient cause to excuse delay in seeking to set aside abatement)

Article 172
Notes
1—2

1. Legislative changes.

1. There was no Article corresponding to this in the Act of 1871.
2. Article 171 of the Act of 1877 as substituted by Act VII of 1888 contained the provisions of the present Articles 171 and 172 in a combined form.
3. An application to set aside an *abatement* is separately provided for by Article 171, and this Article provides only for an application by an assignee or receiver of an insolvent plaintiff or appellant to set aside the *dismissal* of a suit or an appeal.

2. Scope and applicability. — Under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, Order 22 Rules 3 and 4, where a party to a suit dies, there can be no *dismissal* of the suit but only an *abatement*. In the case of the insolvency of the plaintiff, Order 22 Rule 8 provides that the insolvency of a plaintiff shall not cause the suit to abate "unless the receiver or assignee declines to continue the suit or (unless for any special reason the Court otherwise directs) to give security for the costs thereof within such time as the Court may direct." Sub-rule 2 of that Rule provides that where such assignee or receiver neglects or refuses to continue the suit and to give security within the time so ordered, the defendant may apply for the *dismissal* of the suit on the ground of the plaintiff's insolvency and the Court may make an order accordingly.

There is a conflict of opinion as to whether there can be an *abatement* in the case of the insolvency of the plaintiff. On the one hand it has been held by the High Court of Lahore that when the receiver or assignee declines to continue the suit, the suit will *abate* even without an application by the defendant for dismissal of the suit under sub-rule 2.¹ The High Courts of Allahabad,² Madras,³ Calcutta⁴ and Bombay⁵ are of the view that there is no *abatement* in such cases, and the suit will be pending as long as it is not dismissed under sub-rule 2.

Order 22 Rule 9 sub-rule 3 provides that where a suit has abated or has been dismissed, "the plaintiff or the person claiming to be the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or the assignee

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 132 (133) : 26 Ind Cas 472, *Kandasami Chetty v. Murugappa Chetty*. (That the plaintiff was ill-advised is not a sufficient cause to excuse delay.)

Article 172 — Note 2

1. (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 596 (596, 597) : 110 Ind Cas 910 : 10 Lah 208, *Mulchand Ganga Bishen v. R. M. Downie & Co.*
2. (1922) A I R 1922 All 361 (362) : 43 All 621 : 64 Ind Cas 52, *Khunni Lal v. Rameshar*.
3. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 735 (736) : 61 Ind Cas 300, *Official Assignee, Rangoon v. Chidambaram Chetty*.
4. (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 76 (77) : 98 Ind Cas 781 : 53 Cal 844, *Kissen Gopal Karnani v. Suklal Karnani*.
5. (1892) 16 Bom 404 (406, 407), *Lehhraj Chunilal v. Shamlal Narrondas*. (1875) 12 Bom H C R 257 (261), *Ibrahim Mahsin v. Abdul Rahman Ali*.

or the receiver in the case of an insolvent plaintiff may apply for an order to set aside the abatement or dismissal."

Order 22 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the word "suit" in that Order includes an appeal. Consequently, Rules 8 and 9 would apply to appeals also

This Article applies only to an application by the assignee or the receiver of an insolvent plaintiff or appellant for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit or appeal. In other words, it applies to an order under sub-rule 2 of Rule 9 of Order 22 to set aside a dismissal under Rule 8. Article 171 *ante* applies to applications to set aside abatements.

The Article only applies to applications by the receiver or assignee of an insolvent *plaintiff or appellant* and hence does not apply to the case of an insolvent *defendant or respondent*. For the procedure in the case of a *defendant* becoming insolvent, see the undermentioned case⁶

3. Starting point.—Time runs from the date of the order of dismissal. Under sub-rule 3 of Order 22 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code the provisions of Section 5 of this Act have been made applicable to applications under Order 22 Rule 9 sub-rule 2, i. e. to applications contemplated by this Article.

173.* For a review of judgment except in the cases provided for by article 161 and article 162.

Ninety days. The date of the decree or order.

Article 172
Notes
2—3

Article 173

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope and applicability.
3. "Review."
4. Applicability of Sections 5 and 12 of the Act to applications for review.
5. Starting point.
6. Court-fee and limitation.

* Act of 1877
Substantially same as above.

Act of 1871

164 For a review of judgment | Ninety days | The date of the decree.

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision

Article 173
Notes
1—5

1. **Legislative changes.**—In Act IX of 1871, this Article appeared as Article 164 and embraced all kinds of review as there was no provision corresponding to Articles 161 and 162 of the present Act. The Article appeared in its present form as Article 173 in Act XV of 1877, the only difference being that Article 161 was numbered Article 160A.

2. **Scope and applicability.**—This Article proscribes the period of limitation for all applications for review other than those specifically dealt with by Articles 161 and 162 *ante*. It is however only where an *application* is made for review that this Article would apply. No question of limitation would arise where a review is made by the Court under its *inherent* powers.¹

See also Note 2 to Article 162, *ante*

3. **"Review."**—See also Note 3 to Article 162, *ante*.

A review must, on the one hand, be distinguished from an *amendment* of a clerical error and on the other, from an *appeal*. The object of a review is to alter the *decision* of the Court, while the object of an amendment by correction of clerical error is to make the judgment or decree read what *it was intended to read*.¹

A review is distinguishable from an *appeal* in that the primary intention of a review is the reconsideration of the matter by the *same Judge* under certain conditions, while an appeal is a re-hearing by *another tribunal*.²

As to other points of distinction between a review and an amendment or an appeal, and also as to the circumstances under which and the cases in which a review will lie, see the Notes in the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code, Order 47 Rules 1 and 7.

4. **Applicability of Sections 5 and 12 of the Act to applications for review.**—See Notes to Sections 5 and 12, *ante*.

5. **Starting point.**—Time under this Article runs from "date of the decree or order." (For meaning of the words "date of the decree," see Note 5 to Article 156 *ante*.) Order 20 Rule 7, Civil Pro. Code,

Article 173 — Note 2

1 (1918) A I R 1918 AH 229 (230) : 49 Ind Cas 490 : 40 All 68, *Khurshed Alam Khan v. Rahmat Ullah Khan*.

[See also (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 673 (677) : 3 Pat 930 : 80 Ind Cas 667, *Mam Lal v. Durga Prasad*]

Note 3

1. See (1870) 19 Suth W R 33 (33), *Assur Ali v. Woolfutoonissa*. (But a petition for the rectification of a decree is not different from an application for a review when the object of the rectification is to alter the decision of the Court.)

(1869) 12 Suth W R 65 (66), *Modhoo Sooden Ghose v. Romanath Ghose*. (An application for review and an application for an alteration of a clerical error in a decree have not the same period of limitation.)

2. (1865) 3 Suth W R D CLAS 129, 201. 7 All Ind Cas 222. 1 C. 222. 1 Sar 645 (P)

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provides that the decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced. It follows that time runs from the date the judgment sought to be reviewed was pronounced.¹ The fact that some other proceedings in relation to the decree or order have terminated at a later date² or that the applicant had knowledge of the decree at a later date³ does not postpone the starting point to such date, though such facts may furnish a sufficient cause for extending the time under Section 5 of the Act.⁴

The mere fact that a judgment *has been written* will not start limitation running. It must be *pronounced*.⁵

Where a decree is *amended*, the date of the decree is not thereby altered,⁶ but an application for review based on the amendment may be allowed under Section 5 of the Act.

6. Court-fee and limitation.—By the application of Section 5 or Section 12 of the Limitation Act, an application for review may be within time even if it is made after ninety days. Where an application for review of judgment is filed on or after the 90th day from the date of the decree, Article 4 of Schedule 1 of the Court-fees Act provides that it should be chargeable with the full fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal. Otherwise, under Article 5 of that Act only half the fee is leviable.

But the Court-fees Act cannot enable a party to apply for a review beyond the period of limitation reckoned according to law, merely by reason of the fact that he has paid a full court-fee. Thus, where ninety days from the date of the decree have expired, and time is not extended by the application of S 5 or S 12 of the Act, no application for review will lie, even though the full court-fee leviable on the plaint is paid. The reason is that the Court-fees Act cannot

Article 173
Notes
5—6

Note 5

- 1 (1884) 1884 All W N 330 (330), *Kubber Singh v Fateh Singh*
- 2 (1884) 1884 All W N 330 (330), *Kubber Singh v Fateh Singh*
- 3 (1929) A I R 1929 All 515 (517) 119 Ind Cas 99, *Debi Dayal v Ambika Prasad*
- (1929) A I R 1929 All 485 (488) 121 Ind Cas 552, *Baldeo Prasad Shukul v. Sukhdeo Prasad Shukul*.
- 4 (1929) A I R 1929 All 485 (488) 121 Ind Cas 552, *Baldeo Prasad v Sukhdeo Prasad*
- 5 (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 129 (130) 1 Pat 771 75 Ind Cas 579, *Sagarmal Marwari v Lachmisan Misir*
- 6 (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 622 (626, 630) 5 Pat L Jour 472 57 Ind Cas 236 (FB), *Golab v Janki Kuer*
- (1917) A I R 1917 Low Pur 162 (163) 35 Ind Cas 347, *Wor Lons v G. Rainey*
- (1899) 22 Mad 364 (367), *Parameshraya v Seshagiriappa*
- (1923) A I R 1923 All 22 (22) 69 Ind Cas 199, *Ram Chandar v Jai Mal*
[But see (1915) A I R 1915 Nag 37 (39) 29 Ind Cas 589 11 Nag L R 92, *Dinaji v. Larman*.]
- (1875) 23 Suth W R 433 (431), *Dulobhuddur Mahantee v Mindhoo-soodun Pandey* (Submitted not correct)]

Article 173
Note 6

affect the period of limitation prescribed by this Act.¹ Nor, on the other hand, will Article 51 of the Court-fees Act entitle a party to pay only half the fee on the ground that the application is not barred by limitation, if actually it has been made on or after the 90th day from the date of the decree.²

Section 28 of the Court-fees Act provides that where a document is, through *mistake or inadvertence* received, filed or used in any office without being properly stamped, the presiding Judge or the head of the office, as the case may be, may, if he thinks fit, order that the document should be stamped as he may direct; and on such document being stamped accordingly, the same and every proceeding thereto shall be as valid as if it had been properly stamped in the first instance. Under Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code, where a document is presented in time with insufficient stamp, the Court may allow the deficiency to be paid and on such payment the document will have the same force as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. In the undermentioned case,³ where an application was presented with insufficient stamp but there was no mistake or inadvertence and the deficiency was made up only after the expiry of the period of limitation, it was held that Section 28 of the Court-fees Act did not apply and that the application was barred. Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code was not adverted to. It must be assumed that their Lordships did not intend to exercise their discretion in favour of the applicant under Section 149 of the Code.

Article 174

<p>174.* For the issue of a notice under the same Code, to show cause why any payment made out of Court of any money payable under a decree or any adjustment of the decree should not be recorded as certified.</p>	<p>Ninety days.</p>	<p>When the payment or adjustment is made.</p>
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*** Act of 1877**

<p>173-A. — For the issue of a notice under section 258 of the same Code, to shew cause why the payment or adjustment therein mentioned should not be recorded as certified.</p>	<p>Ninety days.</p>	<p>When the payment or adjustment is made.</p>
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Acts of 1871 and 1859
No corresponding provision.

Note 6

1. (1918) A I R 1918 AH 229 (230) 43 Ind Cas 490 : 40 All GS, *Khurshed Alam*

Bhulnath
: the 89th

v. *Dayar*.

Article 174
Note 2

or adjustment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree. Sub-rule 2 contemplates an application by the judgment-debtor to the Court to issue a notice to the decree-holder to show cause why such payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified. It thus affords protection to the judgment-debtor in the event of the failure of the decree-holder to act under sub-rule 1 and involves a judicial decision by the Court whether the payment should be recorded.¹

Under the old Civil Procedure Code, it was held by the Calcutta High Court² and the Chief Court of the Punjab³ that Section 258 (corresponding to Order 21 Rule 2 of the present Code) applied to any kind of decree and not merely to money decrees. The Madras High Court⁴ held that the Section was limited to decrees under which money was payable and did not apply to other kinds of decrees and that Article 173 A (Article 174 of the present Act) did not apply to an application by the judgment-debtor. Under the present Code of Civil Procedure, it has been held by the High Courts of Bombay⁵ and Calcutta⁶ that the addition of the words "of any kind" in sub-rule 1 makes it clear that the Rule applies to every kind of decree. But, according to the Madras High Court⁷ the change does not render the Rule applicable to all kinds of decrees and the Rule applies only to cases where money is payable under the decree, whether they are accompanied by other reliefs or not. See also the decision of the Privy Council in *Dorothy Margaret v. Henry Peter*,^{8a} which was a case under Section 349 of the Ceylon Civil Procedure Code, similar to Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure except that it does not contain the words "of any kind."

1. (1929) A I R 1929 P O 19 (22) . 114 Ind Cas 581 : 3 Luck 684 : 50 Ind App 90 (P C), *Shri Prokash Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd.*
2. (1881) 6 Cal 786 (788) . 8 Cal L R 36, *Baba Mohamed v. Webb*
3. (1906) 1906 Pun Re No. 44 (at p. 158) : 1907 Pun L R No. 82 : 1906 Pun W R 81, *Lachu v. Kishan Lal*.
4. (1899) 22 Mad 192 (194) . 8 Mad L Jour 175, *Sankaran Nambiar v. Kanara Kurup* (Decree for possession of immovable property.)
5. (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 380 (381) . 46 Bom 226 64 Ind Cas 490, *E. Enas Pavloo Gharry v. K. Phillip Gowrya*.
6. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 715 (717) : 117 Ind Cas 833, *Nisamat v. Jalil*.
7. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 749 (751) : 49 Mad 716 : 95 Ind Cas 731, *Narayana-swamy v. Rangaswamy*.
(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 360 (360) : 23 Ind Cas 530, *Abdul Latiff Sahib v. Bathula Bibi Ammal*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 751 (754) . 40 Ind Cas 620, *Seithurama Sahib v. Cholla Rajah Sahib*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 469 (470) : 43 Mad 476 : 56 Ind Cas 289, *Rama-krishna Rao v. Balakrishna Rao*.

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(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 731 (733) : 57 Ind Cas 473, *Mangar Sahu v. Bhatoo Singh*.]

7a (1936) A I R 1936 P C 126 (129, 180) . 102 Ind Cas 8 (P C).

This Article is applicable only to an application under Order 21 Rule 2 sub-rule 2, by the *judgment-debtor*. It is not applicable to certification by the *decree-holder*.⁸

Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code has been held to apply only to the case of parties who stand in the relation of judgment-debtor and judgment-creditor at the date of the transaction.⁹ This Article may not therefore apply if the payment is not by the judgment-debtor but by a stranger. But there is nothing in the Rule to limit the payment to the decree-holder only.¹⁰

Order 21 Rule 2 relates to an adjustment subsequent to the decree and not to a pre-decree arrangement. Thus, it does not apply to an adjustment made or agreement entered into after the date of the decree of the Court of first instance but before the date of the appellate decree dismissing the appeal.¹¹ Similarly, an application to record an alleged agreement not to execute the decree entered into prior to the passing of the decree cannot be entertained under this Rule and Article 174 will not govern such an application.¹²

The Article is not intended to apply to applications made under the Insolvency Acts, inasmuch as those Acts are intended to be complete Codes of the insolvency law applicable to the areas to which they apply and prescribe their own periods of limitation.¹³

The Article does not apply to adjustments made out of Court between the dates of the preliminary and final decrees for sale.¹⁴

3. Certification by decree-holder.—There is no specific Article in the Limitation Act for certification by the decree-holder under Order 21 Rule 2 sub-rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Article does not govern such certification. Nor does Article 181 apply to the case, inasmuch as such certification has been held not to

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- 8 (1929) A I R 1929 P O 19 (22) 3 Luck 684 114 Ind Cas 581 56 Ind App 80 (P C), *Shri Prokash Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd*
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 30 (31) : 68 Ind Cas 780, *Bali Mahomed Sahai v. Ajanmas*
- (1935) A I R 1935 Lnh 194 (195) : 15 Lah 910 . 155 Ind Cas 315, *Sundar Das Ver Dhan v. Dishes Das*
- 9 (1911) 85 Mad 659 (665) 12 Ind Cas 657 (661), *Ponnusamy Nadar v. Letchmanan Chettiar* (Per Sundara Iyer, J)
- (1895) 19 Mad 230 (232) 5 Mad L Jour 218, *Rama Ayyan v. Sreenivas Pattar*.
10. (1923) A I R 1923 All 271 (271) 71 Ind Cas 457 45 All 304, *Mahadeo Prasad v. Mt Hamden*. (Where a compromise decree directed the payment of money to a third person and the payment was not certified to the Court, held, it could not be relied upon in execution)
11. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 619 (620) . 72 Ind Cas 836, *Ramanathan Chettiar v. Venkatachellam*.
- 12 (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 36 (37) 107 Ind Cas 860 5 Rang 685, *M. E. Moolla & Sons Ltd v. Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China*
- 13 (1927) A I R 1927 Rang 263 (264) 5 Rang 884 101 Ind Cas 816, *Jhan Bahadur Singh v. Bailiff, Dist Court, Tanjore*
- 14 (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 105 (107) 120 Ind Cas 72, *Rasim Chettiar v. Rinjaan Chettiar*.

Article 174
Notes
3—4

be an *application* at all.¹ But a certification made after the decree is time-barred will not save limitation.²

4. Application must be made by judgment-debtor.—The application for issue of notice contemplated by this Article is to be made by the *judgment-debtor*. The word 'judgment-debtor' includes persons claiming through him or in his right. Thus, a transferee of the equity of redemption in the property in suit from the judgment-debtor is a 'judgment-debtor' within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.¹ It has also been held that a surety for a judgment-debtor can plead an uncertified payment or adjustment made by him.²

The information given to the executing Court in a *written statement* put in by the judgment-debtor in answer to an application

Note 3

1. (1929) A I R 1929 P C 19 (23) : 56 Ind App 20 : 114 Ind Cas 581 : 3 Luck 684 (P C), *Shri Prokash Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd.*
- (1928) A I R 1928 All 629 (631) : 112 Ind Cas 73 : 51 All 237 (F B), *Joti Prasad v. Srachand.*
- (1930) A I R 1930 All 123 (124) : 124 Ind Cas 22, *Ram Sarup v. Muhammad Ubaidulla Khan.*
- (1931) A I R 1931 All 219 (221) : 132 Ind Cas 426, *Joti Prasad v. Baru Singh.*
- (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 411 (412) : 45 Bom 91 : 59 Ind Cas 399, *Pandurang Balakrishna v. Jagya Bhai*
- (1920) A I R 1929 Cal 687 (689) : 57 Cal 789 : 127 Ind Cas 258, *Hridaymohan Sanyal v. Khagendranath Sanyal.*
- (1912) 17 Ind Cas 617 (618) (Mad), *Dharani Mudali v. Meenamba Bai.*
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 235 (236) : 27 Ind Cas 11, *Lakhi Narain v. Felamani Das.*
- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 181 (182) : 50 Ind Cas 242, *Bahuballav Roy v. Jogesh Chandra*
- (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 64 (65) : 126 Ind Cas 540, *Maung Tun Hlaing v. U Aung Gyaw.*
- (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 829 (331) 8 Rang 810 : 127 Ind Cas 600, *Daw Fwet v. U Tin.*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 676 (677) 75 Ind Cas 1029, *Fattu v. Nanak Chand.*
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 958 (959) : 31 Ind Cas 818, *Rajam Iyer v. Anantha-ratnam Ayyer.*
- (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 620 (621) : 41 Mad 251 : 41 Ind Cas 701, *Maslamani Mudaliar v. Sethuswamy Iyer.*
- (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 811 (811) : 117 Ind Cas 790, *Chinnaswamy Kavarayar v. Periatthambi Buller.*
- (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 922 (923) : 159 Ind Cas 33, *Gangayya v. Seshagiri Rao*
- (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 7 (11) : 98 Ind Cas 353 : 29 Oudh Cas 353 : 1 Luck 428, *Prakash Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd.*
- (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 126 (137) : 50 Ind Cas 264, *Elahi Bux v. Nawab Lall.*
2. (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 643 (644) : 64 Ind Cas 72, *Madan Mohan Banikya v. Harulal Kundu.*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 392 (392) : 79 Ind Cas 799, *Mt. Janicanti Kunwar v. Mt. Mohan Das*

Note 4

1. (1907) 30 Mad 537 (540) : 17 Mad L Jour 417 : 2 Mad L Tim 466, *Panduranga Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Reddi.*
2. (1926) A I R 1926 Sind 105 (107) : 96 Ind Cas 234 : 20 Sind L R 302, *Noor Muhammad v. Dhanuram.*

by the decree-holder for execution of the decree is a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Order 21 Rule 2 sub-rule 2 of the Code; and where such statement alleging adjustment is filed within ninety days of the alleged adjustment as required by this Article, the executing Court is entitled to go into the matter and certify it. This is the view held by the Bombay,³ Allahabad,⁴ Patna⁵ and Rangoon⁶ High Courts. The Calcutta⁷ and Madras⁸ High Courts have, on the other hand, held that to treat the statement of objection as an application would be to ignore the express language of the Rule.

An application by the judgment-debtor made six months after payment, applying for deposit of the balance and attaching a receipt for the previous payment and containing an endorsement of the subsequent payment by the decree-holder's pleader, is not an application for recording and certifying the previous payment under Order 21 Rule 2 sub-rule 2 of the Code.⁹

On dismissal for default of an application under sub-rule 2 of Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code, a fresh application by the judgment-debtor for the same purpose is not barred and he is entitled to have an adjudication on the merits subject to any objection that may be open to the decree-holder.¹⁰

5. "Adjustment," meaning of.—See Note 6 below and the undermentioned case.¹

6. Starting point.—The period of limitation for an application by the judgment-debtor under sub-rule 2 of Order 21 Rule 2 is ninety days from the time when the *payment or adjustment* is made and the parties cannot, by consent or agreement, extend or alter the period.^{1a} An application by the judgment-debtor to record satisfaction

(1928) A I R 1928 Lah 61 (63) 108 Ind Cas 376, *Thakar Datt v Ram Singh*.

3. (1935) A I R 1935 Bom 303 (304) 157 Ind Cas 646, *Kalyani Dhana v. Dharamsi Dhana & Co*

4. (1929) A I R 1929 All 79 (80) 113 Ind Cas 760, *Ganga Dihal Rai v. Ram Audh*.

5. (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 526 (527) 9 Pat 521 126 Ind Cas 159, *Chandi Charan v Panchanan Pandit*

6. (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 62 (63) 5 Rang 633 110 Ind Cas 123, *Maung Tin v Ma Ma*

(1911) 11 Ind Cas 780 (781) (Low Bur), *U Pa Thaung v Maung Ba U*.

7. (1912) 13 Ind Cas 944 (945) (Cal), *Dajrang Behari Lal v Lachmi Naram*.

8. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 752 (753) (Mad), *Loddi Gairindass v Ramdoss*

9. (1929) A I R 1929 All 674 (675) 115 Cas 139, *Frank Coombs v Mofussil Bank Ltd, Gorakhpur*

10. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 505 (505, 506) 133 Ind Cas 206, *Lakshpat Rai v. Della Mal Jamal Rai*

Note 5

1. (1938) A I R 1938 Rang 323 (329), *Chokalingam Chettyar v Narayana Chettyar*.

Note 6

1a (1938) A I R 1938 Rang 323 (330), *Chokalingam Chettyar v Narayana Chettyar*

Article 174
Notes
6-7

of a decree made by him more than three years from the date of the decree against him will be barred, even if it may be within three months from the date of a revised decree against the defendants other than himself.¹

An "adjustment" of a decree is an agreement which *extinguishes* the decree as such in whole or in part, and results in a satisfaction of the whole or a portion of the decree in respect of the particular relief or reliefs granted by the decree.² It cannot mean an adjustment, to give effect to the terms of which would be to create a new decree at variance with the decree under execution and which will again have to be executed.³ An agreement reducing the amount of the decree by reason of certain arrangements between the parties is an adjustment.⁴ Likewise, an agreement to accept a portion of the decretal amount in full satisfaction of the decree is an adjustment within Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code and need not be reduced to writing.⁵

Where the judgment-debtor under a mortgage decree agrees with the decree-holder that if the latter purchased the property in court-auction, the judgment-debtor would put him in possession, and he is so put in possession, time for an application by the judgment-debtor to have the adjustment recorded will commence to run only from the date when the decree-holder gets possession of the property.⁶

An application under Order 21 Rule 2 sub-rule 2 of the Code is maintainable even before the decree is formally drawn up, inasmuch as the date of the decree is not the date on which it is reduced to writing and signed but the date on which the Court delivers judgment and expresses what the decree is.⁷

7. Effect of fraud. — Where the judgment-debtor alleges that the decree-holder had fraudulently kept him from exercising his right to apply under Rule 2 sub-rule 2 by promising that he would himself certify the payment or adjustment, can the judgment-debtor claim an extension of time under Section 18 of the Limitation Act?

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1010 (1011) : 31 Ind Cas 917, *Sambasiva Iyer v. Muhammad Hussain Bowther*.

2. (1885) 7 All 424 (431) : 1885 All W N 76, *Fateh Muhammad v. Gopal Das*.

3. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 527 (529) : 113 Ind Cas 9, *Azizur Rahman v. Akiraja Choudhry*.

4. (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 135 (137) : 6 Pat L Jour 337 : 63 Ind Cas 535, *Radha Kant Lal v. Mt. Parbati Kuer*.

5. (1935) A I R 1935 Bom 303 (305) : 157 Ind Cas 646, *Kalyanj. Dhana v. Dharamji Dhana & Co*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 806 (807) : 14 Lah 668 : 145 Ind Cas 924, *Abdul Karim v. Hakim Mal Tan Mal*.

6. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 581 (582) : 158 Ind Cas 961, *Raghupathirayudu v. Garapati Pichayya*.

7. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 1064 (1065) : 82 Ind Cas 746, *Giribala Das v. Dishambar Haldar*.

It was held in an early Madras case¹ and in a Bombay case² that the Court executing the decree could override the provisions of this Article and would not allow a clear case of fraud to be condoned by the provisions of Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code. But later cases in Madras³ and in Bombay⁴ have taken a contrary view. The other High Courts have also taken a similar view, namely that even if fraud is imputed to the decree-holder, the Court executing the decree cannot recognize an uncertified payment, and that the judgment-debtor cannot claim an extension of time under Section 18 of the Act.⁵ The reason is that Section 18 of the Limitation Act applies only to cases where a person has been fraudulently kept from the knowledge of his right to apply and does not deal with the exercise of the right to apply. Even if the decree-holder may be guilty of fraud, where the judgment-debtor does not avail himself of the procedure laid down in Order 21 Rule 2 sub-rule 2 of the Code, he must be content to seek his remedy in damages or elsewhere.⁶ Under such circumstances, the judgment-debtor can neither override the period of limitation provided by this Article, nor secure an investigation of the very same matter and an extension of time by invoking the terms of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.⁷

Article 174
Note 7

See also Note 5 to Section 18, *ante*.

Note 7

1. (1898) 21 Mad 856 (358), *Ramayyar v. Ramayyar*.
2. (1910) A I R 1910 Bom 217 (218) . 40 Bom 333 . 33 Ind Cas 232, *Hansa Godhaji v. Bhawa Jogaji*.
3. (1906) 20 Mad 812 (313) 16 Mad L Jour 33, *Ganapathy Iyer v. Chinna Chenga Reddi*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Mad 372 (374) 55 Mad 720 : 137 Ind Cas 28 (F B), *Subramanyam v. Ramaswami*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 257 (257) . 152 Ind Cas 763, *Murugappa Chettiar v. Apparao Chettiar*.
4. (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 309 (310) 49 Bom 548 95 Ind Cas 687 (F B), *Mehbunnissa Begum v. Mehedunnissa Begum*.
[See also (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 880 (361) 46 Bom 226 64 Ind Cas 420, *E. Enas Patiloo Gharry v. K. Philip Gowrya*]
5. (1912) 13 Ind Cas 424 (425) (Cal), *Kutubullah Sarkar v. Durga Charan*.
(1912) 13 Ind Cas 63 (66) (Cal), *Bisoo Gorain v. Janurait Koer*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 342 (343) 50 Cal 468 . 76 Ind Cas 311, *Mulund Lal De v. Banshidar Marwari*.
(1915) A I R 1915 Cal 73 (73) 25 Ind Cas 884, *Golam Mujahar v. Goloke Charan*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Rang 103 (106) 68 Ind Cas 924, *P. R. P. L. Chetty Firm v. G. Lon Fow*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Upp Eur 26 (27) 52 Ind Cas 958, *Maung On Mynt v. Maung Shue Pa*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 270 (273) 162 Ind Cas 849 . 15 Pat 422, *Harishar Prasad v. Bhubneshwari Prasad*.
[See also (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 374 (375) 88 Ind Cas 48, *Maroti v. Narayan*]
6. (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 270 (273) 162 Ind Cas 849 15 Pat 422, *Harishar Prasad v. Bhubneshwari Prasad*.
7. (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 405 (406) 17 Pat 128, *Shashik Darsan Ali v. Suraj Mal*

Article 174
Note 8

8. Effect of bar.—If the judgment-debtor does not take steps to have the payment or adjustment certified within ninety days from the date on which the alleged payment or adjustment was made, it will not be open to him to prove it in the Court executing the decree. In other words, where an application under Rule 2 sub-rule 2 of Order 21 is barred by limitation, he will not be allowed to evade the provisions of this Article by securing an investigation of the same matter under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, in execution proceedings.¹ Under the same circumstances, a suit for declaration that the decree has been satisfied and is consequently incapable of execution, is not maintainable.²

As to the remedy of the judgment-debtor in such cases, see Notes 29 and 30 under Order 21 Rule 2 of the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code.

Article 175

175.* For payment of the amount of a decree by instalments.	Six months.	The date of the decree.
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* Act of 1877

Same as above.

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision.

(1925) A I R 1925 Nag 374 (375) : 88 Ind Cas 48, *Maroti v. Narayan*.
(1910) 7 Ind Cas 55 (58) (Cal), *Mon Mohan v. Dwarakanath*.

Note 8

- (1934) A I R 1934 All 209 (210) : 56 All 694 : 148 Ind Cas 1118, *Murari Lal v. Raghubir Saran*.
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 73 (73) : 25 Ind Cas 884, *Gulam Majahar Chowdry v. Coloke Charan*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 566 (567) : 87 Ind Cas 635, *Mul Chand Todar Mal v. Mt. Champa*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 105 (106) : 131 Ind Cas 216 : 1931 Cri Cas 169 : 82 Cri L Jour 617, *Lachman Singh v. Emperor*.
- (1906) 29 Mad 312 (313) : 16 Mad L Jour 39, *Ganapathy Iyer v. Chenga Reddy*.
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 135 (137, 138) : 63 Ind Cas 535, *Radha Kant Lal v. Parbati Kuer*.
- 149 : 15 Pat 422, *Harihar aikh Darsan Ali v. Suraj Mal*.
- 57 Ind Cas 593 (F B), *Ram v. Dapanna*.

Synopsis

Article 175
Notes
1—3

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope.
3. Effect of order on application made beyond six months.
4. Decree must be for payment of money.
5. Starting point.

1. Legislative changes.—This Article is the same as Article 175 of the repealed Act of 1877. There was no Article corresponding to this Article in the Act of 1871.

2. Scope.—Order 20 Rule 11 sub-rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that after the passing of decree *for the payment of money*, the Court may, on the application of the judgment-debtor with the consent of the decree-holder (in Madras, Nagpur, Rangoon and Sind, after notice to the decree-holder), order that payment of the amount decreed shall be *postponed* or shall be made *by instalments*.

This Article applies to applications under the said Rule for an order for payment of the decree *by instalments*. An application for an order for *postponement* of the payment of the decree is not within this Article.

3. Effect of order on application made beyond six months.—An application for payment of the amount of a decree by instalments will be in time if made within six months of the date of the decree or order¹ By virtue of Section 3 *ante*, a Court cannot entertain such an application after the expiry of the six months prescribed by this Article. But, as has been seen in Note 19 to that Section, where a Court decides that an application is in time, the decision would operate as *res judicata* between the parties. Where an application such as is contemplated by this Article is actually entertained by the Court after the expiry of the period of six months and an order is passed allowing the application, the Court will be considered to have decided that the application was within time and the parties would be bound by such order² The contrary view taken in some cases,³

Article 175 — Note 3

1 (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 188 (188) 34 Ind Cas 393, *Perumal Naicker v. Sheikh Dawood Rowther*

2 (1932) A I R 1932 All 273 (281) 54 All 573 138 Ind Cas 593 (F B), *Gobardhan Das v. Dan Dayal*

(1937) A I R 1937 Cal 236 (236, 237) 170 Ind Cas 767, *Manmohan Sanyal*

Durga Churn Goode

3 (1914) 1914 L J 111, *Banarsi Das v. Ram-*

(1914) 1914 L J 111, *Banarsi Das v. Ram-*

3. (1924) A I R 1924 Loh 342 (313-344) 72 Ind Cas 477, *Banarsi Das v. Ram-*

Article 175
Notes
3-5

namely, that the order is a nullity and is inoperative, does not seem to be correct.

4. Decree must be for payment of money.—Order 20 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code applies only to a decree for the payment of money¹ and consequently the application that is governed by this Article must be one in reference to a decree for the payment of money and not in respect of a decree for sale on a mortgage.

5. Starting point. — Time, under this Article, runs from the date of the decree. The word "decree" would, where the decree of the original Court is appealed against, include the appellate decree also. In such a case, time will run from the date of the appellate decree whether it merely confirms the original Court's decree or supersedes it.¹ Where, however, the appeal is not entertained at all, though filed, the original decree is and continues to be the subsisting and final decree or order for the purpose of limitation.² Similarly, the "date of the decree" will be the date of the original decree where a review petition is filed but it is dismissed.³

Article 176

176.* Under the same Code to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or of a deceased appellant made a party.	Ninety days.	The date of the death of the deceased plaintiff or appellant.
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* Act of 1877

175 A. — Under section 365 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff, or under that section and section 592 of the same Code by the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff-appellant or defendant-appellant.	Six months.	The date of the death of the deceased plaintiff or of the deceased plaintiff-appellant or defendant-appellant.
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Acts of 1871 and 1859
No corresponding provision.

- (1887) 14 Cal 348 (350) . 11 Ind Jur 377, *Abdul Rahaman Sodagur v. Bullaram Marwara*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 340 (340) : 58 Ind Cas 393, *Gobardhan Prasad v. Bishunath Prasad*.
 [See also (1900) 1900 Pan Re No. 96 : 1901 Pnn L R No. 23, *Nabi Bahsh v. Gori Mal*.]

Note 4

1. See the Authors' Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure, Order 20 Rule 11 Note 2.

Note 5

1. (1932) A I R 1932 Rang 54 (55) : 135 Ind Cas 858, *Abdul Karim v. Maung San Kyaw*.
 2. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 883 (886) : 28 Ind Cas 367 : 89 Mad 1196, *Venugopal Mudali v. Venkatasubbiah Chetty*.
 3. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 883 (885, 886) : 89 Mad 1196 : 28 Ind Cas 367, *Venugopal Mudali v. Venkatasubbiah Chetty*.

Synopsis

Article 176
Notes
1—2

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
- 2a. Death after preliminary and before final decree.
3. "Legal representative."
4. Onus of proof.
5. Starting point.
6. Extension and exclusion of time prescribed by this Article.
7. One representative applying within time —
Another, if can be brought on record afterwards.

Other Topics

Applications in execution proceedings—Article not applicable See Note 2, Pt. 2
 Proceedings for ascertainment of mesne profits .. See Note 2, F.N (3)
 Rival claimants seeking to be brought on record . . . See Note 7, Pt. 2
 Section 6 not applicable to applications under this Article ... See Note 6, Pt. 2

1. Legislative changes.

1. Article 171 of Act XV of 1877 applied only to applications by the legal representatives of a deceased *plaintiff* and the period of limitation was sixty days.¹ By Act XII of 1879, the scope of the Article was extended so as to include applications by the legal representatives of deceased appellants also
- 2 By Act VII of 1888 the number of the Article was altered to 175 A and the period of limitation was extended to *six months*.
3. By Section 2 of the *Indian Limitation and Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, XXVI of 1920*, the period of limitation under this Article was reduced to ninety days

2. **Scope of the Article.**—Order 22 Rule 3 sub-rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where,

1. *one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or*
- 2 *a sole plaintiff or sole surviving plaintiff dies and the right to sue survives,*

an application can be made for making the legal representatives of such deceased plaintiff parties to the suit

Order 22 Rule 11 of the same Code provides that in the application of the Order to appeals, the word "*plaintiff*" includes "*appellant*"

Article 176 — Note 1

1. (1878) 3 Cal L R 440 (441), *In re Fam Sunher Bhadoory*.

Article 176

Note 2

This Article applies to applications to have the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff or of a deceased appellant made parties to the suit or appeal, i. e., to applications under Order 22 Rule 3 read with Rule 11.

The Article does not apply to applications for substitution not made in *the course of the suit or appeal*.¹ Thus, it has no application to cases where the plaintiff dies after decree² or to applications made in execution proceedings.³ Nor does the Article apply where the deceased is neither a *plaintiff* nor an *appellant*, but merely an applicant for *leave to appeal*,⁴ or an assessee in a proceeding under Section 66 sub-section 2 of the Income-tax Act.⁵

There is a difference of opinion as to whether the rules as to the substitution of legal representatives contained in Order 22 apply to

Note 2

- [illegible]

appeals against orders in execution.⁶ On the view that they do apply, applications for substitution will be governed by this Article. Where the appellant has died before the appeal is dismissed for default, the legal representative's right to apply to be brought on record need not be exercised within the period limited by Article 168. The application can be made within the period prescribed by this Article.⁷

2a. Death after preliminary and before final decree. — See Note 5 to Article 177, *infra*

3. "Legal representative." — See Note 43 to Section 6 *ante*, and the undermentioned cases.¹

4. Onus of proof. — The onus is on the applicant to prove the date of the death of the deceased plaintiff or appellant, as the case may be, and that the application has been made within the period prescribed by this Article.¹

5. Starting point. — Time runs from the date of the death of the deceased plaintiff or appellant, and the period of limitation is ninety days from that date. This will be so even if the death occurred before the Amending Act 26 of 1920 came into force.¹

6. Extension and exclusion of time prescribed by this Article. — Section 5, *ante*, has no application to applications under

6 See the Authors' Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure, Order 22 Rule 12 Note 1.

7. (1918) 19 Ind Cas 526 (527). 16 Oudh Cas 194 : 40 Ind App 151 35 All 381 (P C), *Debi Baksh Singh v Habib Shah*,
(1891) 4 C P L R 189 (185), *Bhopatsingh v Gayaram*

Note 3

1 (1929) 4 I R 1929 Cal 26 (27) 115 Ind Cas 164, *Faqir Danoo v Rahim Dux* (*Dona fide* application by all the representatives who are known and willing to join in the application is sufficient compliance with Order 22 Rule 3)

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 94 (95) 100 Ind Cas 418, *Mahomed Hassan v Inayat Hussain* (The expression "legal representative" means and includes one person as well as several persons according as they represent the whole interest of the deceased person)

(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 175 (176), *Goor Bachan Singh v Guran Singh*, (Intermeddler may be representative and can be made a party in place of deceased)

[See also (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 356 (359) 14 Lah 543. 142 Ind Cas 649, *Chuni Lal Tula Ram v Amin Chand*]

Note 4

1 (1887) 1887 All W N 60 (60), *Harnandan v Durga*.

Note 5

1 (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 650 (651) 62 Ind Cas 795, *Vaithinatha Iyer v. Gopindasamy Odayar*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 416 (417) 80 Ind Cas 561, *Vijaya Singh v. Shitaji Rao*.

Article 176
Notes
6—7

Order 22 Rules 3 and 11. But where no application under Rule 3 is filed and the suit abates, the representative may, under Order 22 Rule 9, apply to set aside the abatement on showing sufficient cause for not filing the application for substitution within time. An application after the time prescribed by this Article, to bring on record the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or appellant was, in the undermentioned cases,¹ treated as one under Order 22 Rule 9 to set aside the abatement.

Section 6 of the Act is limited to applications *in execution* and does not apply to applications contemplated by this Article.²

7. One representative applying within time — Another, if can be brought on record afterwards.—Where one of two legal representatives has applied in time, to be made a party, and the application has been granted, the other legal representative may be brought on the record subsequently.¹

Where there are two *rival* claimants seeking to be brought on record, one claiming by inheritance and the other by bequest, the right to be brought on record vests in the one or the other with effect from the date of death of the deceased party. Limitation begins to run against both from that date and each will get barred by time at the expiry of the limitation prescribed by this Article. The one who has not applied to be brought on record within time cannot continue the suit revived by his rival's application in time.²

Article 177

177.* Under the same Code to have the legal representative of a deceased defendant or of a deceased respondent made a party.	Ninety days.	The date of the death of the deceased defendant or respondent.
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* 175 C. — Under section 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have the legal representative of a deceased defendant made a defendant, or under that section and section 532 of the same Code to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff-respondent or defendant-respondent made a plaintiff-respondent or defendant-respondent	Act of 1877 Six months.	The date of the death of the deceased defendant or of the deceased plaintiff-respondent or defendant-respondent.
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(1929) A I R 1923 Nag 166 (167) : 71 Ind Cas 176, *Nimba v. Mt. Janki*.

Note 6

- (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 746 (747) : 112 Ind Cas 5, *Kirpa Ram v. Bhagat Chand*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 424 (424) : 74 Ind Cas 17, *Badlu v. Mt. Naraini*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Low Bur 182 (183) : 35 Ind Cas 438, *Ma Min Thin v. Maung Po Win*.

Note 7

- (1912) 13 Ind Cas 313 (313) (Mad), *Venkata Rao v. Marikurthu Ammal*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Rang 234 (234) : 145 Ind Cas 693, *Ahmad v. Mykeshunda B. I.*
- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 345 (344) : 101 Ind Cas 393, *Amritsai v. Ratan Lal*.

Synopsis

Article 177
Note 1

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope.
3. Execution proceedings.
4. Execution appeals.
5. Death after preliminary and before final decree.
6. Legal representative.
7. Extension of time.

Other Topics

Application for leave to appeal to Privy Council	...	See Note 2, Pt. 2
Application for leave to sue as pauper	...	See Note 2, Pt. 1
Revision application	...	See Note 2, Pt. 6
Two or more legal representatives	..	See Note 7, Pt. 5

1. Legislative changes. — This Article corresponds to Article 175C of the Act of 1877 and was inserted in that Act by Act VII of 1888. Article 175C made specific mention in the first column to Sections 368 and 582 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. Reference to provisions of the Code has been omitted from the Article in its present form. Before this Article was enacted in the Act of 1877, the general Article 178 was held to govern applications to bring on record the representatives of a deceased defendant or respondent.¹

Article 175C provided a period of six months.

The Indian Limitation and Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act XXVI of 1920 provided by Section 2 that "In the third division of the First Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, in Articles 176, 178 and 179, for the word 'Ditto' in the second column, the words 'Ninety days,' 'Six months' and 'Ninety days' respectively shall be substituted." As no mention was made of Article 177 in this Section,

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision.

[See also (1926) 97 Ind Cas 142 (143) (Lab), *Gurdi Singh v Sawan Mal*

(1919) A I R 1919 Nag 150 (152) 15 Nag L R 21 • 49 Ind Cas 94, *Amolasao v. Corundao*]

Article 177 — Note 1

- 1 (1888) 10 All 270 (271) . 1888 All W N 114 (F B), *Ram Sarup v. Ram Saha*..
 (1888) 10 All 264 (267) . 1888 All W N 112 (F B), *Debi Din v Chhunna Lal*.
 (1888) 10 All 260 (263) . 1888 All W N 111 (F B), *Chajmal Das v Jagadamba Prasad*.
 (1886) 9 Mad 1 (1) (F B), *Lakshmi v Sri Devi*.

Article 177
Notes
1—2

it was held by the High Courts of Lahore,³ Madras,³ Allahabad⁴ and Patna⁵ that the Amending Act did not reduce the period of limitation under Article 177 and that it remained six months. The High Courts of Calcutta⁶ and Bombay⁷ took the opposite view. In view of this conflict of opinion the Legislature passed the Repealing and Amending Act XI of 1923, laying down definitely that the period of limitation under Articles 176, 177 and 179 is ninety days.

2. Scope.—Order 22 Rule 4 sub-rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where,

1. one of two or more *defendants* dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or
2. a sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives,

an application can be made for making the legal representatives of such deceased defendant parties to the suit.

Order 22 Rule 11 of the same Code provides that in the application of the Order to appeals the word "defendant" includes "respondent." This Article applies to applications to have the legal representatives of a deceased defendant or a deceased respondent made a party to the suit or appeal, i. e., to applications under Order 22 Rule 4 read with Rule 11 of the Code.^{1a}

Where the deceased person is not a "defendant" in a suit or a "respondent" in appeal, Order 22 Rules 4 and 11 do not apply and consequently this Article also does not apply. Thus, it does not apply to an application to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased opponent in an application for leave to sue in forma

2. (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 93 (93) : 78 Ind Cas 771, *Arjan Das v. Nanak Chand*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 65 (67) : 4 Lah 367 : 77 Ind Cas 409, *Gobind Das v. Rup Kishore*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 211 (213) : 69 Ind Cas 749, *Rup Kishore v. Bhagat Gobind Das*
3. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 65 (66) : 92 Ind Cas 566, *Subramania Iyer v. Shanmugam Chelliar*.
4. (1925) A I R 1925 All 263 (264) : 47 All 335 : 86 Ind Cas 161, *Mumtaz ud-Daula Mukarram Ali Khan v. James R. R. Skinner*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 All 77 (78) : 92 Ind Cas 330, *A. G. Skinner v. Mukarram Ali Khan*.
5. (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 142 (143) : 97 Ind Cas 316, *Brinandan Prasad v. Mahabir Prasad*
6. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 74 (79) : 50 Cal 549 : 75 Ind Cas 81, *Seodoyal Khemla v. Joharnal Manmull*
7. (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 299 (299) : 77 Ind Cas 474, *Huseinuddin Nuruddin v. Dulakshadas Keshavlal*.

Note 2

- 1a (1931) A I R 1931 Pat 164 (166) : 10 Pat 341 : 132 Ind Cas 100, *Waleyatunnissa Begam v. Chalakhi*.

pauperis,¹ or for leave to appeal to the Privy Council,² or of a person who is dead before the institution of a suit, but whose name appears as a defendant in the suit.³ Nor does the Article apply when a defendant dies after decree.⁴ But the Article applies to applications to make the legal representatives of a deceased respondent in *second appeal* parties to the appeal.⁵

A revision application is not a 'suit' or 'appeal.' There cannot be any question of abatement in such applications, the whole theory of abatement being inapplicable to such applications and hence the provisions of Order 22 do not apply to them.⁶

The Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under the Companies Act 1913 and where the respondent in an application for an order for the balance of contributions dies, it is not necessary to bring his legal representatives on record within the time prescribed by this Article.⁷

3. Execution proceedings. — Order 22 Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code specifically declares that Order 22 Rule 4, *inter alia*, does not apply to execution proceedings. This Article will not govern the case of death of a defendant or respondent in *execution proceedings* and an application for substitution in such proceedings need not

1 (1929) A I R 1929 Sind 136 (196) 116 Ind Cas 111, *Khatijabai v. Nur Muhammad*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 278 (379) 51 Mad 697; 110 Ind Cas 318, *Subbiah v. Bala Tirupura Sundra*.

(1906) 23 Cal 1163 (1169) 4 Cal L Jour 234, *Lalit Mohan v. Satish Chandra* (1893) 7 Bom 373 (376), *Janardan Vithai v. Anant Mahadevi*.

2 (1934) A I R 1934 Sind 36 (37, 39) 148 Ind Cas 819 28 Sind L R 150, *Noor Ahmed v. Chaitomal*.

3 (1907) 31 Mad 86 (84) 17 Mad L Jour 551 3 Mad L Tim 12, *Veerappan Chetty v. Tindal Ponnen*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 257 (256) 51 Ind Cas 160, *Krista Das Law v. Khirada Kanta Roy*.

[See also (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 695 (696) 24 Ind Cas 112, *Bejoy Chand v. Anulya Charan*.]

4. (1881) 3 Mad 236 (239), *Ramanada Sastri v. Minachi Ammal*.

(1904) 28 Mad 361 (362), *Sambasiva Chetty v. Veera Perumal Mudaly*.

5 (1904) 28 Mad 498 (499) 15 Mad L Jour 401, *Narasimham v. Mohamud Faltzullah*.

(1907) 29 All 535 (536) 4 All L Jour 397 1907 All W N 155, *Madhuban Das v. Naram Das*.

(1908) 10 Bom L R 509 (513), *Sheikh Adam v. Balaji Krishnaji*.

(1907) 34 Cal 1020 (1023) 11 Cal W N 1100; 6 Cal L Jour 715, *Ugendra Kumar Chakravarti v. Sham Lal Mondol*.

point JJ

6 (1920) A I R 1920 Sind 120 (120) 80 Ind Cas 456 (457), *Daksho v. Piaro*.

7. (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 287 (288); 173 Ind Cas 693, *Sumitra Kuer v. Sita-marshi Sugar Works Ltd.*

Article 177
Notes
3-5

he made within the time prescribed by this Article.¹ The proper course in such cases is to apply for execution against the legal representatives themselves.² It has, however, been held in some cases that when a judgment-debtor dies, the decree-holder should get, on the analogy of this Article, the period at least prescribed by it for applying to bring his legal representatives on the record.³

4. Execution appeals. — There is a difference of opinion as to whether the rules as to substitution of legal representatives contained under Order 22 apply to appeals against orders in execution.¹ On the view that they do apply, applications for substitution of the legal representatives of a deceased defendant or respondent will be governed by this Article.²

5. Death after preliminary and before final decree. — In suits requiring a preliminary and a final decree, can there be an abatement on the ground that no application was filed in time to implead legal representatives on the death of a plaintiff or of a defendant after the preliminary, but before a final decree? It was

Note 3

1. (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 223 (223) : 11 Pat 546 : 138 Ind Cas 91, *Sheo Gobind Ram v. Mt. Kishunbans Kuer*.
 - (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 316 (318) : 73 Ind Cas 887, *Wahid Baksh v. Lalla Parshad*.
 - (1911) 10 Ind Cas 405 (406) (Lah), *Amolak Ram v. Shanu Ram*.
 - (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 200 (200) : 117 Ind Cas 165, *Bimbadhar Panda v. Abdul Zahir*.
 - (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 184 (184) : 50 Mad 1 : 90 Ind Cas 627, *Palaniappa Chetti v. Valthammas Achi*.
 - (1923) A I R 1923 Lah 560 (563) : 74 Ind Cas 577, *Mir Khan v. Sharfu Punnun*.
 - (1879) 8 Bom 221 (222) : 4 Ind Jur 34, *Gulabdas v. Lakshman Narhar*.
 - (1880) 5 Bom 29 (37), *Kalyanbhai Dipchand v. Ghanasham Lal*.
 2. (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 544 (545, 546), *Jogendra Nath Roy v. Rasik Chandra Banerji*.
 - (1914) A I R 1914 P C 129 (131) : 42 Cal 72 : 41 Ind App 251 : 24 Ind Cas 304 (P C), *Raghunath Das v. Sunder Das Khelra*.
 - (1920) A I R 1920 All 171 (172) : 42 All 570 : 57 Ind Cas 610, *Bhagwan Das v. Jugal Kishore*.
 - (1909) 1 Ind Cas 163 (174) : 36 Cal 513, *Jogendra Chandra Roy v. Shyam Das*.
 3. (1921) 62 Ind Cas 52 (53) (Pat), *Rameshar Singh v. Mathu Misir*.
- (See also (1882) 1882 Pun Re No. 151, *Mt. Arisbibi v. Ganda Mal*. (Application for substitution of the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor is in substance an application for execution within S. 234, O. P. C. of 1882 and Art. 179, Limitation Act of 1877.))

Note 4

1. See Note 1 to O. 22 R. 12 of the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code.
- 2 (1934) A I R 1934 Mad 664 (664) : 151 Ind Cas 777, *Gangu Naidu v. Muttinna*.

held in the undermentioned cases¹ by the High Court of Allahabad that the suit would abate, the reason being that a suit is "pending" till a final decree is passed. The said Court did not accept the position that the principle laid down by the Privy Council in *Lachmi Narain v. Balmakund*, I. L. R. 4 Patna 61, was applicable to such cases. In order to avoid this difficulty, Order 22 Rule 12 has now been amended by that Court so as to make Rules 3, 4 and 8 inapplicable to proceedings after the preliminary decree.^{1a}

All the other High Courts are agreed on the authority of the said Privy Council decision that the Rule does not apply to such cases and that there can be no abatement on death after a preliminary, and before a final decree.²

6. "Legal representative."—As to the meaning of the expression "Legal Representative," see Note 43 to Section 6 *ante* and Notes to Order 22 Rules 3 and 4 of the Authors' Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code.

7. Extension of time.—Under Section 368 of the Civil Procedure Code 1882, an application for substitution could have been made beyond the period of six months prescribed by Article 175 C, if there was sufficient cause for the delay.¹ But under Order 22 Rule 4 of the present Civil Procedure Code, if no application for substitution

Note 5

- 1 (1980) A I R 1930 All 779 (192, 783) 126 Ind Cas 20 : 52 All 910, *Anmol Singh v. Hari Shankar Lal*.
(1922) A I R 1922 All 396 (397) 68 Ind Cas 251, *Jagannath Umar v. Ramkaran Singh*.
The same view was also taken by the Sind Court in the undermentioned case:
(1926) A I R 1926 Sind 20 (21) 89 Ind Cas 238, *Tulsi Dass Keshao Das v. Ramzan Abdulla*.
1a (1934) A I R 1934 All 465 (468) 151 Ind Cas 755, *Naram Das v. Bhagnath Prasad*.
2 (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 318 (319) : 11 Rang 446 147 Ind Cas 730, *Muthiah Chettiar v. Tha Zan Hla*.
(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 914 (918) : 112 Ind Cas 116 : 51 Mad 701 (F B), *Perumal Pillai v. Perumal Chetty*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Cal 648 (649) 125 Ind Cas 287, *Mohan Sardar v. Hem Chandra*.
(1928) 120 Ind Cas 77 (77) (Mad), *Peetha Suamigadu v. Ramachandrayya*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 206 (207) 122 Ind Cas 447, *Debnath v. Bisessar Das*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 142 (144) 116 Ind Cas 657 : 27 Nag L R 119 (F B), *Bapu v. Gulabchand*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 561 (561) 106 Ind Cas 332, *Kalu Ram v. Gaya Din*.
(1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 156 (157) 101 Ind Cas 174 : 2 Luck 464, *Mt. Lakshpati Kuer v. Daulat Singh*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Nag 82 (83) 17 Nag L R 81 : 64 Ind Cas 307, *Tularam v. Tularam*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 329 (330) 122 Ind Cas 227, *Rahim Baksh v. Walant Ram*.

Note 7

1. (1880) 11 All 408 (414) 1888 All W N 111 (F B), *Chajmal Das v. Jagdamba Prasad* (Held, sufficient cause within S. 368 was not shown)

**Article 177
Note 7**

is made within the period of ninety days from the death of the defendant or respondent, the suit or appeal abates and the Court has no power to enlarge the time for sufficient cause. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply.² But after abatement, it is open to the plaintiff or appellant to make an application to set aside the abatement under Order 22 Rule 9, and the Court can, on sufficient cause being shown for not applying in time for substitution, extend the time.

An application made to bring the legal representatives of the deceased defendant on record after the time prescribed therefor, may be treated as an application to set aside the abatement, and on proof of sufficient cause for delay, the application may be granted.³

Section 6 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application under Article 176 or Article 177 and hence the period of ninety days cannot be enlarged by reason of the applicant's minority.⁴

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- (1907) 29 All 535 (537) : 4 All L Jour 397 : 1907 All W N 155, *Madhuban Das v. Naram Das*.
- (1887) 1887 Pun Re No. 42, *Gaman v. Baksha*.
- (1907) 1907 Pun Re No. 113 : 1907 Pun W R 194, *Dadu v. Kadu*.
- (1903) 7 Cal W N 529 (531), *Syed Hossein Ali v. Abdur Rahim*.
2. (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 131 (131) . 65 Ind Cas 121, *Shah Muhammad v. Karam Ilahi*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 All 94 (95) . 36 All 235 . 25 Ind Cas 48, *Secretary of State v. Jawahir Lal*.
3. (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 746 (747) : 112 Ind Cas 5, *Kirpa Ram v. Bhagat Chand*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 424 (424) : 74 Ind Cas 17, *Badlu v. Mt. Naraini*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 916 (920) : 149 Ind Cas 1187, *Sham Das v. Mahabir Das*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 315 (315) : 147 Ind Cas 699, *Bhartu v. Udmu*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 129 (130) : 117 Ind Cas 884 : 10 Lah 816, *Dina Nath v. Sayad Habib*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 85 (86, 87) : 29 Nag L R 118 : 114 Ind Cas 363, *Gabru Lal Firm v. Court of Wards, Bilaspur*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 474 (475) : 94 Ind Cas 300, *Ataur Rahman v. Mushkur-un-nissa*. (Where it was found that there could not in fact be any reason for applicant to ask for excuse and there was no assertion that there had been delay due to reasonable cause. Held, the application could not be treated as one under R. 9.)
- (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 455 (457) . 174 Ind Cas 700, *Duanchand Nirmal v. Bhagwan Chand*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Smd 82 (83) . 78 Ind Cas 569, *Manager, Encumbered Estates in Sind v. Tharumal*.
- [See also (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 440 (441) . 30 Ind Cas 679, *Arunachalam Chettiar In re*.
- (1892) 16 Mad 319 (320), *Mallikarjuna v. Pullayya*.]
4. (1917) A I R 1917 Low Bur 132 (133) . 35 Ind Cas 439, *Ma Men Thin v. Maung Pa Win*.
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 366 (367) : 6 Low Bur Rul 52, *Ma Sein Hmyan Lutchman Chetty*.
- (1901) 23 Mad 359 (360), *Paru v. Raman Menon*.
- (1895) 1895 Pun Re No. 91, *Rihana v. Hardilla*.

If one of the representatives of the deceased defendant or respondent is brought on record in time, there is no bar to bring the other representatives on record subsequently.⁸

Article 177
Note 7

178. Under the same Code for the filing in Court of an award in a suit made in any matter referred to arbitration by order of the Court or of an award made in any matter referred to arbitration without the intervention of a Court.	Six months.	The date of the award.	Article 178
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. "Award."
4. Starting point.
5. Extension of time.

1. Legislative changes.

- 1 The Act of 1859 did not apply to applications. But Section 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1859 provided that an application to file an award should be made within 6 months of the award¹

✱

Act of 1877

176 —Under the Code of Civil Procedure, section 516 or 525, that an award be filed in Court	Six months	The date of the award
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Act of 1871

165 —Under the Code of Civil Procedure, section three hundred and twenty-seven, that an award be filed in Court.	Six months	The date of the award
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Act of 1859

No corresponding provision

5. (1912) 13 Ind Cas 313 (313) (Mad), *Venkata Rao v. Marikynthu Ammal* (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 276 (276) 91 Ind Cas 209, *Sadu Saran Pande v. Nanda Kumar Singh*

Article 178 — Note 1

- 1 (1865) 5 Suth W R 123 (123), *Dhyrub Jha v. Hunnoman Dutt Jha*

of the Schedule would clearly be covered by the second portion of the first column of the Article.

The Article applies only to *applications* to file an award. A party in whose favour an award is made has two remedies open to him. He may make an application to file the award in Court in which case this Article will apply. He may also institute a suit for that purpose. This Article has no application to such suits.³

3. "Award."—An award must be a single instrument complete in itself.^{1a}

Where the agreement to refer provides that the matter in dispute may be taken up and dealt with *seriatim*, and the award delivered bit by bit, a portion so decided may be taken as a distinct award.¹ An award filed without the intervention of the Court can be split up and need not be filed as a whole.² When the order filing the award and the order passing a decree in terms of it are contained in the same order, the two parts can be separated and it has been held that though there may be no appeal against the decree, an appeal can be filed against the earlier portion of the order directing the filing of the award.³

An award does not become invalid merely because it has not been made a rule of Court within the prescribed period of limitation.⁴

4. Starting point.—Time, under the Article, runs from the *date of the award*. The "date of the award" is the date when the award is published or delivered to the parties so that they may have notice of its contents and not the date when it was actually written and signed, which in many cases might be much earlier.¹ A party applied in time to file an award made without the intervention of the Court, but prayed that a decree might be granted after excluding certain

3. (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 134 (181), *Ratan Chand v. Rup Lal*.

(1909) 4 Ind Cas 821 (822) (1907-09) Upp Bur Rul Lum p. 9, *M. L. Byu v. Nga Chit Pu*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Rang 108 (109). 70 Ind Cas 517 4 Upp Bur Rul 124, *Maung Ne Dun v. Maung Cho*.

Note 3

1a (1869) 12 Suth W R 397 (400) : 8 Beng L R 319n, *Joy Mungal Singh v. Mohan Ram*.

1. (1879) 4 Cal L R 92 (93), *Sm. Shoshemulha Debia v. Nobin Chunder Roy*.

2. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 193 (195) 117 Ind Cas 523, *Kashmath Mahader v. Gangubai Keshai*.

3. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 969 (971) : 112 Ind Cas 691, *Seltarayan Samson v. Amalorpananadam*.

4. (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 51 (51) : 124 Ind Cas 448, *Thakur Din Singh v. Bhagwan Din Singh*.

Note 4

1. (1874) 21 Suth W R 248 (248), *Sreenath Chatterjee v. Kylash Chunder Chatterjee*.

(1883) 9 Cal 575 (575), *Dutto Singh v. Dosad Bahadur Singh*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Pat 63 (90) . 4 Pat L Jour 394 48 Ind Cas 711, *Kunj Lal v. Banwar Lal*.

Article 178
Notes
4-5

items of the award, on the ground of fraud practised on the arbitrators. On objection by the other side, that a part of the award cannot be filed, the party made a second application praying that the prayer in the original application for exclusion of certain items may be deleted. This application was more than six months of the date of the award. It was held that the original application was a valid application to file the award and was made in time, and that the subsequent application to amend the prior one, though beyond six months of the award, did not affect the validity of the prior application.²

5. **Extension of time.**—Time, under this Article, cannot be extended by reference to Section 5 *ante* as that Section applies only to certain specified applications and does not cover an application to file an award.¹

Section 6 *ante* applies only to suits and applications for execution and therefore does not apply to applications to file awards.³

Section 14 may, however, apply to such applications and the time spent *bona fide* in infructuous proceedings in a wrong Court may be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed by this Article.³

Article 17

179.* By a person desiring to appeal under the same Code to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal.	Ninety days.	The date of the decree appealed from.
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Synopsis

1. History of the Article.
2. Scope.
3. Starting point.
4. Extension of time.

* Act of 1877

177.—For the admission of an appeal to Her Majesty in Council.	Six months.	The date of the decree appealed against.
----------------------------------------------------------------	-------------	------------------------------------------

Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision.

² (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 682 (653) : 161 Ind Cas 543, *Bimal Pershad v. Sitat Pershad*.

Note 5

1. (1915) A I R 1915 All 369 (371) : 38 All 85 : 31 Ind Cas 699, *Ram Ugrah Pande v. Achray Nath Pande*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 161 (162) : 14 Pat 855 : 161 Ind Cas 691, *Pancha Mandal v. Gena Mander*.
2. (1923) A I R 1923 Rang 226 (226) : 1 Rang 256 : 76 Ind Cas 493, *Ma Thein Tin v. Maung Ba Than*.
3. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 157 (158) (Mad), *Anjayya v. Dapaya*.

Other Topics

Article 179.

Notes
1—2

Amendment and review of decree—EffectSee Note 3, Pts. 2, 3
Exclusion of time under Section 5See Note 4, Pts. 3, 4
Leave to appeal in criminal cases—Article not applicable	...	See Note 2, Pt. 4
Time for copiesSee Note 4, Pts. 5, 6

1. History of the Article.—There was no Article corresponding to this in the Act of 1871. Section 599 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 provided that an application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council must ordinarily be made within six months from the date of the decree complained of. By Section 2 of the Limitation Act XV of 1877, Section 579 of the Code of 1877 was repealed and by Article 177 all applications "for the admission of an appeal to Her Majesty in Council" had to be filed within six months of the date of the decree appealed against. The Civil Procedure Code of 1882 (Act XIV of 1882) however, re-enacted Section 599 of the Code of 1877 and the view was expressed in one case¹ that such re-enactment operated as a repeal of Article 177 of the Act of 1877. A contrary view was also expressed in the undermentioned case². By Section 57 of Act VII of 1888, Section 599 of the Code of 1882 was repealed and the conflict of views as to the applicability of Article 177 of the Limitation Act to applications for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was thereby removed.

The first column of the present Article follows more or less the wording of Order 45 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which runs as follows :

"Whoever desires to appeal to His Majesty in Council shall apply by petition to the Court whose decree is complained of "

As the Article stood originally, the period of limitation was six months. By Act 26 of 1920 the period of limitation was altered to ninety days.

2. Scope.—This Article applies to applications for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. Under Order 45 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, a person desiring to appeal to His Majesty in Council from a *decree or final order* passed by any Court must make an application to such Court for leave to appeal¹. This procedure has been made applicable also to certain orders passed under Special Acts. Thus, the procedure has to be followed in appeals to His Majesty in Council from the judgment of the High Court under section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and the party desirous of appealing

Article 179 — Note 1

- (1884) 6 All 250 (251) 1884 All W N 71 (F B), *Fazul-un-nissa Begam v Mulo*
- (1892) 15 All 14 (16, 17) 1892 All W N 152, *In the matter of Petition of Sita Ram Keshio.*

Note 2

- (1875) 15 Beng L R 221 (223) 2 Ind App 205 3 Suther 148 3 Sar 495 (P C), *Gajadhar Pershad v Widows of Emam Ali Beg* (Granting of leave on application for review without application for leave was held *ultra vires*)

Article 179
Notes
2—3

from such judgment has to file an application for leave to appeal. This Article will apply to all such applications.²

Where there are two appeals from two decrees though they are decided by one judgment, a party desiring to appeal from both decrees must file two separate applications for leave to appeal within the period prescribed by this Article. Where in such a case a single application only was filed within time asking for leave to appeal against both the decrees, it was held that such application was bad in law. The High Court, however, allowed the applicant to amend his application by restricting his prayer to one decree.³

The Article applies only to applications for leave to appeal made under the *Code of Civil Procedure*. It has no application to an application for leave to appeal in criminal cases.⁴

Order 22 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply to applications for leave to appeal and no question of limitation arises on the death of the applicant, any order for substitution being, however, subject to the rules of the Judicial Committee and such directions as may be given by their Lordships at the hearing of the appeal.⁵

3. Starting point.—Time, under this Article, runs from the *date of the decree*. As has been seen in Note 5 to Article 156 *ante*, the date of the decree is the date of the *judgment* and not the date on which the decree is actually drawn up and signed.¹

The *amendment* of the decree which does not have the effect of substituting a *new judgment* does not give a fresh starting point of limitation or alter "the date of the decree" as originally drawn up.² But a decree passed on *review* is a fresh decree and time for an application for leave to appeal runs from the date of the fresh decree.³ Where the High Court sends down an issue for finding of

2. (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 597 (597) : 59 Cal 251 : 199 Ind Cas 236, *Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. M. Shaw Wallace & Co*

3. (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 441 (442) : 140 Ind Cas 70, *Gopal Singh v. Mrs N. Johnstone*.

[See also (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 267 (270) : 57 Ind Cas 312, *Mahadho Prasad v. Gajadhar Prasad*.]

4. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 338 (341) : 25 Cri L Jour 1371 : 82 Ind Cas 763, *Phillip E. Billingham v. Emperor*.

5. (1910) 4 Ind Cas 454 (456) (Cal), *Jadunandan Koer v. Ramjiban Lal*.

Note 3

— — — — — *Case Debi*.

— — — — — *Mud-Din v. Gulam Rabbani*.]

2. See Note 6 to Article 156, *ante*, for a fuller discussion.

[See also (1899) 2 Oudh Cas 235 (239), *Zinat Bibi v. Jehangir Bukhs Khan*.]

3. See Note 9 to Article 156, *ante* for a full discussion.

[See also (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 62 (62) : 4 Lah 185 : 75 Ind Cas 520, *Naras Ali v. Ali*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 323 (326) : 131 Ind Cas 258, *Aditya Kumar v. Abinash Chandra*.]

the lower Court under Order 41 Rule 25 of the Civil Procedure Code and passes a decree on receipt of the finding, the order sending down the issue is not the final order and an application for leave to appeal can be made within ninety days of the final decree.⁴

4. Extension of time.

Extension under Section 4 :—Where the Court is closed on the last day prescribed for the application, it may be presented on the next re-opening day, by virtue of Section 4, *ante*.¹

Extension under Section 6 :—Section 6, *ante*, does not apply to applications contemplated by this Article and the period of limitation prescribed therefor cannot be extended by reason of any legal disability.²

Exclusion under Section 5 :—Section 5 sub-section 2 of Act of 1877 does not apply to applications for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. It was accordingly held that time cannot be extended under this Section even if there was sufficient cause for the delay.³ This sub-section has now been amended in the present Act so as to make it applicable to applications for leave to appeal. As to the circumstances under which time may be extended under Section 5, see Notes to that Section and the undermentioned cases.⁴

Exclusion under Section 12 :—Section 12 sub-section 2 of Act of 1877 does not apply to the applications contemplated by this Article and it was held that the applicant was not entitled to the exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree

4. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 251 (252) : 145 Ind Cas 258, *Jitan Lal Vrajrai v. Vrajlal Pochalal*

Note 4

1. (1871) 15 Suth W R 255 (256), *Rajah Raj Kishen Singh v. Huro Soonduree Dossee*
- (1869) 12 Suth W R 203 (294), *Luchmun Chunder Gir v. Kalee Churn Singh*
[But see (1868) 1 Beng L R O C 39 (40), *Tamtaco v. Skinner* (Six months' period expiring during holidays—Application made on the re-opening day—Leave not granted)]
2. (1891) 18 Mad 484 (486), *Thuras Rajah v. Jasmittabdeen Routhan*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 163 (166) 46 Ind Cas 68, *Narendra Bahadur Singh v. Oudh Commercial Bank of Fyzabad*
3. (1892) 15 All 14 (19) 1892 All W N 152, *In the matter of Sita Ram Kesha*
(1906) 28 All 391 (392, 393) 1906 All W N 55 3 All L Jour 165, *Shib Singh v. Gandharp Singh*.
(1895) 19 Bom 301 (302), *Moroba Ramchandra v. Ghanasham Nulkant*
4. (1923) A I R 1923 All 536 (537) 76 Ind Cas 375, *Deo Indar Singh v. Khushu Ram* (Sudden illness)
(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 309 (407, 410) 48 Bom 442 80 Ind Cas 862 (F B), *Nagindas Motilal v. Nilaji Moroba* (Mistaken advice of pleader and acting in good faith.)
(1921) A I R 1921 Pat 175 (176) 6 Pat L Jour 350 62 Ind Cas 649 (F B), *Jyotindranath Sarkar v. Lodna Colliery Co Ltd.* (Being misled by the longstanding practice of Court.)
(1929) A I R 1929 Sind 206 (207) 118 Ind Cas 212 24 Sind L R 108, *Jhamandas v. Mt Bibi Aishan*. (Negligence of party—Time cannot be extended.)

Article 179
Note 4

appealed from.⁵ This sub-section has also been amended in the present Act so as to make it applicable to applications for leave to appeal. But it is only the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree appealed against that can be excluded in computing the period prescribed by this Article.⁶ There is a conflict of opinion as to whether the time requisite in obtaining the copy of the judgment can be excluded in computing such period. See Notes 28 and 25 to Section 12, *ante*.

Article 180

180. By a purchaser of immoveable property at a sale in execution of a decree for delivery of possession.	Three years.	When the sale becomes absolute.
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. "By a purchaser."
4. Starting point.
5. Extension and exclusion of time.
6. Second application.

1. Legislative changes. — This Article was introduced for the first time in 1908. Before the 1908 Act it had been held that applications under S 318 of the Code of 1882 corresponding to the present

- (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 137 (187) : 4 — — — — —
Rustomji Mehta v Hasham I
[limitation for an application for
the time taken up for review
against should be excluded.]
- (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 253 (254) : 80 Ind Cas 786, *Kailash Chandra Nag v. Bejoy Chandra Nag*. (Do.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 225 (226) : 77 Ind Cas 869 : 4 Lah 445, *Nehi v. Chajju Ram*.
5. (1877) I All 644 (647), *Jawahir Lal v. Narain Das*
(1906) 28 All 891 (392, 393) : 1906 All W N 55 : 3 All L Jour 165, *Shiv Singh v. Chandarp Singh*.
(1895) 19 Bom 301 (302), *Moroba Ramchandra v. Ghanasham Nilkant*.
(1887) 10 Mad 373 (377), *Lakshmanan v. Peryasamy*.
(1892) 15 Mad 169 (169), *Anderson v. Pervasami*.
6. (1915) A I R 1915 All 335 (336) : 38 All 82 : 31 Ind Cas 906, *Ram Sarup v. Jaswant Rai*.
(1914) A I R 1914 Cal 679 (681) : 42 Cal 35 : 24 Ind Cas 273, *Abdullah Hussain v. Ananda Chandra Roy*.
(1928) A I R 1928 Nag 63 (61) : 105 Ind Cas 852 : 24 Nag L R 97, *Gulab-chandji v. Ghulab Singh*.
[See however (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 841 (341) : 158 Ind Cas 120, *Hars Ram v. Prem Nath*. (It was held that if decree is not necessary to be filed, then no exclusion will be made for obtaining the copy—This is not correct—See Note 7 to Section 12, *ante*)]

Rule 95 of Order 21, were governed by Article 178 of the Act of 1877 corresponding to the present Article 181, and that time for such applications ran from the date when the certificate of sale was granted.¹ In the undermentioned case² it was held that time ran from the confirmation of the sale. It was also held by the High Court of Calcutta in a case under Section 319 of the old Code that it was the duty of the Court to order symbolical delivery of possession and that there was no period of limitation for delivery of such possession.³

The insertion of the words "on the application of the purchaser" in Rules 95 and 96 of Order 21 of the Code and the enactment of this new Article have made it clear that such applications should be made within three years from the date when the sale becomes absolute.

2. Scope of the Article.—This Article governs an application made under Order 21 Rules 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by a purchaser of immovable property at a sale in execution of a decree for delivery of possession.

It, however, applies only to applications. A suit for the same relief is governed, for purposes of limitation, by Article 138 *ante*. Where the purchaser is a stranger, he is not bound to apply under Order 21 Rule 95, but may institute a suit for possession for which the period of limitation is prescribed by Article 138.⁴ But there is a conflict of opinion as to the maintainability of the suit when the decree-holder is himself the auction-purchaser. According to the High Courts of Madras,² Calcutta,³ and the Courts of the Judicial

Article 180
Notes
1—2

Article 180 — Note 1

- 1 (1879) 3 Bom 433 (436) 4 Ind Jur 187, *Nasapa v. Maysa*.
(1884) 8 Bom 257 (258) 8 Ind Jur 578, *Hanumantrao Pandurang v. Sudaji*.
(1892) 17 Bom 228 (229), *Kashinath Trimbak v. Dunning Zuran*.
(1909) 1 Ind Cas 993 (999) 32 Mad 136, *Sultan Sahib Marakayar v. Chidambaram Chettiar*.
- 2 (1908) 30 All 390 (392) 5 All L Jour 516 1903 All W N 162, *Ranjit Singh v. Baldeo Singh*.
3. (1918) 4 I R 1918 Cal 545 (546) 40 Ind Cas 605 (606), *Harish Chandra Roy v. Sarat Chandra*.

Note 2

Bhagoban Dm Pandey
Chander Nath Pal
126 Ind Cas 849, *Ram Kumar*

- (1931) A I R 1931 Pat 241 (253) 133 Ind Cas 337 . 10 Pat 670 (F B), *Tribeni Prasad v. Bunasray Prasad*.
- 2 (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 569 (570) 144 Ind Cas 472, *Mahomed Eouther v. Maideen Pichai Sahib*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 283 (290) 50 Mad 403 99 Ind Cas 677, *Kannau v. Ati alla Haji*.
- (1901) 25 Mad 529 (532) 12 Mad L Jour 1, *Kasimatha Ayyar v. Uthumansa Rowthan*.
- (1904) 28 Mad 87 (89) 14 Mad L Jour 474, *Sandhu Taraganar v. Hussain Sahib*.
- (1902) 26 Mad 740 (741) 13 Mad L Jour 237, *Kattayat Pathumayi v. Ramai Menon*.
3. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 798 (802) 53 Cal 781 . 95 Ind Cas 494 (F D), *Kailash Chandra v. Gopal Chandra*.

Article 180
Notes
2—3

Commissioners of Nagpur⁴ and Sind,⁵ a question relating to delivery of possession is one relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, and hence where the decree-holder purchases the property in court-auction, his remedy for recovery of possession is only by way of an application contemplated by Article 180 and a separate suit will not lie. The High Courts of Allahabad,⁶ Bombay,⁷ Patna,⁸ Lahore⁹ and Raigoo,¹⁰ and the Chief Court of Oudh¹¹ hold, on the other hand, that the remedies are concurrent and that the purchaser has an additional remedy by suit.

A purchaser at a court sale of the interest of an undivided member of a joint Hindu family acquires only a right to sue for partition and for delivery of what may be allotted as the share of such undivided member. He cannot apply under Order 21 Rule 95.¹²

3. "By a purchaser." — The word 'purchaser' includes both a decree-holder purchaser and a stranger purchaser.¹ See also Note 2

- (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 586 (587) : 129 Ind Cas 244, *Jadav Chandra v. Ahrur Chandra*
 (1900) 27 Cal 34 (37) : 4 Cal W N 417, *Madhusudan Das v. Gobinda Prio Chowdhurani*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 541 (542) : 150 Ind Cas 813, *Indra Dhusan v. Ram Kissen Bindhani*.
 4. (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 294 (295) : 103 Ind Cas 335, *Balaji Kashinath v. Anand Rao*.
 5. (1925) A I R 1925 Sind 171 (173) : 78 Ind Cas 990 : 18 Sind L R 84, *Pirimal v. Sanghar*.
 6. (1907) 29 All 463 (466) : 4 All L Jour 434 : 1907 All W N 181, *Sheo Naram v. Nur Muhammad*.
 (1900) 1 Ind Cas 416 (424) : 31 All 82 (F B), *Mt. Bhagwati v. Danwari Lal*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 All 368 (370) : 60 All 670 : 115 Ind Cas 869, *Mohsin Raza Khan v. Haider Baksh*.
 7. (1898) 22 Bom 939 (944), *Shwajiram Sakebram v. Waman Narayan Joshi*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 527 (528) : 86 Ind Cas 503, *Lakshman Sadashiv v. Gotind Ganesh*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Bom 375 (377) : 125 Ind Cas 703 : 54 Bom 479, *Hiralal Mohanlal v. Ramchandra Kundanmal*.
 8. (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 297 (304) : 52 Ind Cas 711, *Sridhar Sardar v. Jageshwar Singh Maha Patra*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 546 (546, 547) : 47 Ind Cas 844, *Jagesur Singh v. Sridhar Sardar*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 308 (310) : 9 Pat 332 : 125 Ind Cas 516, *Jadab Chandra v. Rameshwar Marwari*.
 9. (1918) A I R 1918 Lah 204 (207, 210) : 1918 Pun Re No. 8 : 41 Ind Cas 169, *Chotha Ram v. Mt. Karmon Bai*.
 10. (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 61 (63) : 8 Rang 162 : 126 Ind Cas 209, *J. A. Martin v. S. M. Hashim*.
 (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 281 (282) : 127 Ind Cas 476, *Ma Hla May v. Nyangledin Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd.*
 11. (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 192 (203) : 3 Luck 182 : 110 Ind Cas 83 (F B), *Gaya Baksh Singh v. Rajendra Bahadur*.

Note 3

- 1 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 801 (807) : 53 Mad 893 : 159 Ind Cas 279 (F B), *Abdul Aziz v. Chokhan Chettiar*.

above. A transferee from an auction-purchaser is competent to apply under Order 21 Rules 95 and 96 of the Civil Procedure Code and his application also would be governed by this Article.²

Article 180
Notes
3-5

4. Starting point. — Time, under this Article, runs from the date when the sale becomes absolute. In *Chandra Mani v. Anarjan Bibi*,¹ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that in construing the words "when the sale becomes absolute" in Article 180, regard must be had not only to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 92 sub-rule 1, but also to the other material Sections and Orders of the Code including those which relate to appeals from orders made under Order 21 Rule 92 sub-rule 1, and that consequently, where there has been an appeal from an order of the Judge disallowing the application to set aside the sale, the sale will not become absolute within the meaning of Article 180 until the disposal of the appeal, even though the Court of first instance may have confirmed the sale, as it was bound to do, when it decided to disallow the application.

There is no provision of law for excluding in favour of the auction-purchaser the period of the pendency of a suit filed by the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale.²

5. Extension and exclusion of time. — Neither Section 5 nor Section 14 of the Limitation Act applies to an application governed by this Article.¹ Section 15 also does not apply as that Section refers to a suit or an application for execution, and an application for

2 (1918) A I R 1918 All 405 (405) : 40 All 216 • 42 Ind Cas 936, *Budhu Meier v. Bhagirath Kuar*.

Note 4

1 (1934) A I R 1934 P C 134 (136) 61 Ind App 248 61 Cal 945 150 Ind Cas 11 (P C) (Reversing the decision in A I R 1932 Cal 75)

[See (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 86 (89) 56 Cal 608 120 Ind Cas 107, *Neckbar v. Prakash Nag* (This case must be deemed to be overruled by A I R 1931 P C 131)]

[See also (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 333 (335), 62 Cal 66 159 Ind Cas 191, *Jateendra Chandra v. Rebates Mohan Das* (When, by reason of a competent Court, there is a cancellation of the cause of action for delivery, operating to suspend the rights of the auction purchaser, he is entitled, on the removal of such cancellation by a Court of appeal, to await a fresh cause of action, which arises by reason thereof)]

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 311 (311) 147 Ind Cas 981, *Chhogan Lal v. Behari Lal*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Mad 391 (393) 99 Ind Cas 632, *Thayyammuthu v. Odayappan*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 1 (7) 43 Mad 185 54 Ind Cas 66 (F B), *Muthu Korah Chetty v. Mahamad Madar Annal*

(1914) A I R 1914 Cal 893 (893) 22 Ind Cas 497, *Jauah Prosad v. Net Ram* (Appeal against confirmation—Compromise—Installation payment agreed to—Default clause—Limitation counts from date of default and not from date of first confirmation of sale)]

2. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 857 (859) 96 Ind Cas 637, *Sornam Pillai v. Tiru-tazhiperumal Pillai*

Note 5

1. (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 75 (76) : 134 Ind Cas 1188, *Sm Anarjan Bibi v. Chandramani Shaha*.

Article 180
Notes
5—6

delivery of possession by an auction-purchaser, although it may be treated as an application in an execution proceeding, cannot be treated as an application for execution.²

6. Second application.—An order for delivery of possession is not a decree for possession and therefore cannot be kept alive by periodical applications.³ Where an application for delivery of possession filed in time is dismissed or struck off or closed for statistical purposes, it will be deemed to be pending and a subsequent application for delivery, though made beyond three years after the confirmation of the sale, will be considered as a reminder to the Court to continue the pending application.³ Where on an application for delivery an order for delivery is passed, but the property is not delivered owing to no fault of the applicant, but to the obstruction of the judgment-debtor and the petition is therefore dismissed, the dismissal must be considered to be one for statistical purposes only.³ But, where the delivery is not made owing to the laches of the applicant himself, and the petition is dismissed, the dismissal cannot be considered to be one for statistical purposes and the subsequent application for delivery can only be considered as a fresh application.⁴ Where the order on an application filed in time is not on merits and does not amount to refusal of the relief claimed and does not therefore compel the applicant to appeal, a subsequent application within a year of the first has been held to be in continuation of the first and hence in time.⁵

2. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 333 (331) : 62 Cal 66 : 158 Ind Cas 191, *Jateendra Chandra v. Babatee Mohan Das*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 1001 (1002) : 43 Ind Cas 155, *Subbayya v. Venkata-ramayya*. (32 Mad 196 and A I R 1917 Mad 979, Followed.)

Note 6

Sundara Rao v.
1 Mad 1001, Fol-

ania Chelliar v.

Angappa Isara

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 745 (748) : 145 Ind Cas 397, *Apparao Nainar v. Lakshmana Reddi*. (Closed.)

3. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 745 (748) : 145 Ind Cas 397, *Apparao Nainar v. Lakshmana Reddi*. (See Per Oldfield J.'s opinion in A I R 1919 Mad 1001.)

(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 1001 (1003) : 43 Ind Cas 155, *Subbayya v. Venkata-ramayya*. (See Per Oldfield J.)

v. Padi-

v. Padi-

5. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 807 (809) : 53 Mad 897 : 150 Ind Cas 279 (F B), *Abdul Jaz v. Chokkan Chelliar*

[See also (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 425 (430) : 49 Ind Cas 150 (F B), *Baghunandan v. not the decree holder of possession and reason of obstruction, is entitled to make a fresh writ of possession within the period of limitation allowed for such application without applying under Order 21 Rule 97.]*

181.* Applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.	Three years.	When the right to apply accrues.	Article 181
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Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope.
3. "Or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
4. Application for final decree in mortgage suits under Order 34 Rules 3 and 5, Civil Procedure Code.
5. Application for final decree in redemption suits — Order 34 Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code.
6. Application for personal decree — Order 34 Rule 6, Civil Procedure Code.
7. Application for restitution — Section 144, Civil Procedure Code.
8. Application for execution.
9. Application to set aside sale.
10. Applications under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code.
11. Application for refund of purchase money — Order 21 Rule 93, Civil Procedure Code.
12. Application by auction-purchaser for possession — Order 21 Rule 95, Civil Procedure Code.
13. Application to bring on record legal representatives.
14. Application to rescind leave to sue.
15. Miscellaneous applications under the Civil Procedure Code.
16. Application for final decree in partition and partnership suits.
17. Application for ascertainment of mesne profits.
18. Certification of payment by decree-holder under Order 21 Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code.
19. Application to amend decree.

* Act of 1877

178 — Applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule, or by the Code of Civil Procedure, section 230.	Three years.	When the right to apply accrues.
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Acts of 1871 and 1859

No corresponding provision.

Article 181
Notes
1—2

20. Application to add parties.
21. Application for sale certificate.
22. Applications under other Acts.
23. Applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
24. Enlargement of time.

Other Topics

- Applicability of this Article—Test ... See Note 2, Pts. 5, 6
- Applicability of Article to applications under O. 21 R. 100, C. P. C. ... See Note 10
- Application in pending suit—Article not applicable ... See Note 16, Pt. 1
- Application to do act of purely ministerial character—Article does not apply ... See Note 2, Pts. 4, 4a; Note 21
- Application under Original Side Rules of High Court—Article not applicable ... See Note 2, F.N (2), (3)
- Applications under Provincial Insolvency Act: See Note 2 F.N (3), Note 22, Pt. 1
- Article applies only to applications under C. P. C. ... See Note 2, Pt. 3

1. **Legislative changes.** — There was no provision in the Limitation Acts of 1859 and 1871 corresponding to this Article. Applications which would now fall under this Article were not then subject to any rule of limitation. See also the undermentioned cases.¹

In the Act of 1877, Article 178 corresponding to this Article was introduced for the first time.

2. **Scope.** — The language of the Article makes it clear that it is restricted to *applications*,¹ and only to such applications as are *not provided for* elsewhere in the First Schedule of this Act or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

An examination of the Articles of the First Schedule relating to applications shows that in every one of those cases, the application is made under the Code of Civil Procedure. It has been held that a residuary Article like the present one must be construed *ejusdem generis* with the other Articles dealing with applications.² It would follow that this Article also applies only to applications which are

Article 181 — Note 1

1. (1874) 22 Suth W R 211 (211), *Muthoor Pershad Singh v. Mohunt Shumboo Geer*.
- (1879) 4 Cal L R 577 (579, 580), *Allij Hossein v. Mushur Hossein*.

Note 2

1. (1883) 5 All 297 (298); 1883 All W N 41, *Muzaffir Hussain v. Ali Hussain*. (It does not apply to *suits*.)
- (1906) 33 Cal 891 (883, 896); 4 Cal L Jour 162, *Dhajahari Saha v. Behary Lal*.
2. (1888) 10 All 350 (353); 1888 All W N 92; 19 Ind Jur 36, *Queen-Empress v. Ajudha Singh*.
- (1890) 7 Bom 213 (214), *Dai Manekbai v. Manekji Karasji*.
- (1923) A 1 R 1923 Bom 268 (269); 77 Ind Cas 497, *Thana Zalalji v. Dhana Jauchrji*.
- (1881) 6 Cal 707 (708); 8 Cal L R 52; 5 Ind Jour 474, *In the matter of the Petition of Ishan Chunder Roy*.

made under the Code of Civil Procedure.³ It is not, however, every application under the Code that would be necessarily governed by this Article. Where it is the duty of the Court to do a particular thing *suo motu* independently of any application that may be made, or where the thing to be done is purely of a ministerial character, an application though made is not governed by this Article.⁴ Thus, a Court is bound, whether an application is or is not made, to pass a decree in accordance with the judgment or to dispose of a pending suit. No application need be made asking the Court to do its duty. If such an application is made, it would be considered to be merely

- (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 345 (346). 46 Cal 249. 51 Ind Cas 941, *Lakhtmon Dassi v. Duryendra Nath* (Application under R. 27, Ch. 38 of the Original Side Rules, Calcutta High Court, is not governed by Art 181.)
- (1894) 17 Mad 379 (381), *Gnanamuthu Upadesi v. Vana Kosi Pillai Nadan*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 262 (263). 102 Ind Cas 543, *Balaji v. Gopal Mah*.
- (1894) 16 All 23 (25). 1893 All W N 199, *Ranbir Singh v. Drigpal*.
See also Note 31 to Preamble.
3. (1933) A I R 1933 P C 63 (64). 60 Ind App 13. 142 Ind Cas 7. 54 All 1067 (P C), *Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussorie Electric Tramway Co., Ltd*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 974 (974). 60 Ind Cas 123, *Duraiyya Solagan v. Venkatarama Naicker* (Application under Sec. 36, Provincial Insolvency Act of 1907).
- (1908) 32 Bom 1 (5). 9 Bom L R 508, *Wadia Gandhi & Co. v. Purshottam*. (Under R. 839 of Bombay High Court Rules.)
- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 67 (70). 48 Cal 317. 66 Ind Cas 209, *Narendra Lal Khan v. Tarubala Dassi* (Under R. 69, Ch. 33 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court.)
- (1901) 1901 All W N 46 (47), *Brynmohan Singh v. Kishan Mohan Singh*. (Under R. 8 D of the Allahabad High Court dated 18th January 1898.)
- (1893) 7 Bom 546 (551), *Collector of Broach v. Desai Raghunath*. (Proceedings under Dhagdari Act, Bombay Act 5 of 1862).
- (1907) 34 Cal 672 (675). 6 Cal L Jour 119. 11 Cal W N 674, *Rahamat Karim v. Abdul Karim*.
[See also (1895) 18 All 12 (15). 1895 All W N 136, *Connell v. Himalaya Bank Ltd* (Application to proceed under S. 214 of Act 6 of 1882).
(1895) 20 Bom 543 (546), *Queen-Empress v. Nageshappa Pai*.]
4. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 231 (232). 29 Ind Cas 211, *Dens Singh v. Barhamdeo Singh*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 P C 204 (206). 59 Mad 910. 163 Ind Cas 4. 63 Ind App 304 (P C), *Venkata Jagannath Rao v. Venkata Kumara Mahipati Surya Rao* (The law does not prescribe any special period for an application for an order of confirmation of court-sale).
- (1906) 30 Bom 415 (420). 8 Bom L R 218, *Balaji v. Kushaba*.
- (1881) 6 Cal 60 (63). 6 Cal L R 345, *Gowind Chunder Goswami v. Rungunmony* (Application to transfer a case from one Board to another, to transfer a case to the bottom of the Board, change of attorneys and so forth—Acts of ministerial character).
- (1881) 4 Mad 172 (173), *Kylasa Goundan v. Ramasamy Ayyan*.
- (1882) 6 Bom 586 (587). 7 Ind Jur 35, *Vithal Janardhan v. Vithojirav Puttajirav*. (Acts of ministerial character.)

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- (1887) 9 All 364 (365). 1887 All W N 79, *Darbo v. Kesho Rai*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 268 (269). 77 Ind Cas 497, *Thana Zalalji v. Dhana Jauhrji*.

Article 181
Notes
2—3

drawing the attention of the Court to do what it is bound to do, and would not be governed by this Article.^{4a}

The test therefore to see whether this Article applies to a particular application is :

Firstly, whether the application is made under the Civil Procedure Code, that is, *authorized by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code*,⁵ and *secondly*, whether the Court is not bound to exercise its powers and do the particular thing, unless moved by an application.⁶

Column 3 of the Article providing that time runs from the date when the right to apply accrues is only the expression of the broad common law principle that for the purpose of any particular application, time is to run from the moment at which the applicant first had the right to make it.⁷

3. "Or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."—The words "or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" occur not only in this Article but also in Article 182, *infra*, the first column of which runs as follows :—

"For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by article 183 or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."

Taken literally, Article 182 could not apply to any application for the execution of a decree except a decree for injunction, inasmuch as every decree except a decree for injunction is provided for by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has, therefore, been held by the High Court of Madras that the words must be read with Section 3 of the Act, that the periods of limitation set out in the different Articles are only to be taken in reference to the question of dismissal and that this Article should consequently be read as follows :—

"Application for which no period of limitation for the purpose of dismissal is provided elsewhere in this schedule or by section 48, Civil Procedure Code."¹

4a (1889) 7 Bom 316 (322) . 7 Ind Jur 609, *Ishwardas Jagjitandas v. Dombai*, (Application to pass judgment in terms of an award)

(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 231 (232) : 28 Ind Cas 211, *Bena Singh v. Barkhamdeo Singh*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Cal 29 (32) : 20 Ind Cas 910, *Barkhamdeo Missir v. Krishna Sahay*. (Under S 158, Ben. Ten. Act, to have rent assessed)

5. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 51 (53) : 1 Lah 167 : 55 Ind Cas 820, *Hindustan Bank, Ltd. v. Mehraj Din*. (Art. 181, Limitation Act, refers to all applications for the making of which the Civil Procedure Code gives authority)

6. (1882) 4 Mad 172 (173), *Kylasa Goundan v. Ramasamy Ayyan*.

7. (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 251 (253) : 60 Cal 19 : 143 Ind Cas 679, *Pradyumna-kumar Mallik v. Gopendra Mallik*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Cal 616 (619) : 56 Cal 61 : 117 Ind Cas 543 (S D), *Harri Mohan v. Parameshwar Sahu*.

Note 3

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 995 (998) : 54 Mad 806 : 128 Ind Cas 713, *Deivanthamani Annamalai, Dentar v. Raju Pillai*.

4. Applications for final decree in mortgage suits under Order 34 Rules 3 and 5, Civil Procedure Code. — Before the passing of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it was held in one class of cases¹ that an application for an order absolute for sale under Sections 87 and 89 of the Transfer of Property Act (4 of 1882) was one for an order for sale and would, therefore, be governed by Article 179 of the Act of 1877 (corresponding to the present Art. 182). In another class of cases,² the view was held that Article 179 of the Act of 1877 would not apply as there was no decree capable of execution and that consequently Article 178 (now Article 181) would apply. A third view expressed was that even Article 178 would not apply inasmuch as an application for an order absolute was not one "under the Code of Civil Procedure."³

Note 4

1. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 66 (67) : 36 All 350 : 23 Ind Cas 649 (P C), *Chandri Abdul Majid v. Jauahar Lal*.
 (1914) A I R 1914 P C 65 (66) : 36 All 284 : 41 Ind App 104 : 23 Ind Cas 644 (P C), *Batuk Nath v. Mt. Munni Devi*.
 (1898) 20 All 302 (304) : 1898 All W N 40, *Chunnu Lal v. Harnam Das*.
 (1898) 20 All 357 (358) : 1898 All W N 71, *Parmeshwari Lal v. Mohan Lal*.
 (1907) 29 All 279 (281) : 1907 All W N 45 : 4 All L Jour 145, *Sri Ram v. Het Ram*.
 (1899) 23 Bom 644 (653) : 1 Bom L R 136, *Bhagwan v. Ganu*.
 (1910) A I R 1916 Mad 288 (290) : 89 Mad 541 : 29 Ind Cas 237, *Mahammad Husam v. Abdul Kareem*.
 (1900) 25 Mad 244 (258) : 12 Mad L Jour 279 (F B), *Mallikarjanudu Selli v. Lingamurthi Pantulu* (Per Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.).
 (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 286 (288) : 56 Ind Cas 568, *Ganapathia Pillai v. Gopala Iyer*. (Period of limitation obtaining under the old Act is not taken away by the passing of the new Civil Procedure Code.)
 (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 126 (128, 131) : 61 Ind Cas 979, *Visuanatha Sastri v. Sitalakshmi Ammal* (Do).
 (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 315 (316) : 32 Ind Cas 39, *Dalaja Rao v. Harivrama Chetty* (Do).
 (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 969 (970) : 48 Ind Cas 732, *Ramaswami Reddy v. Solkappa Reddy* (Do).
 (1893-1900) 1893-1900 Low Bur Rul 588 (590), *Ayalaano Padayachi v. R M A. R. Mutu Curpen Chetty*.
 [See also (1911) 9 Ind Cas 337 (338) : 14 Oudh Cas 10, *Jageshar Singh v. Bhagwan Baksh Singh*].
2. (1902) 24 All 542 (546) : 1902 All W N 160, *Ali Ahmad v. Nazran Bibi*.
 (1905) 27 All 625 (628) : 2 All L Jour 371 : 1905 All W N 136, *Baldeo Prasad v. Ibn Haidar*.
 (1904) 1 All L Jour 15 (17), *Udit Narain v. Jagannath*.
 (1903) 26 Mad 780 (792) : 13 Mad L Jour 412, *Rungiah Govindan & Co v. Nanjappa Row*.
 (1908) 31 Mad 68 (69) : 3 Mad L Tim 254 : 17 Mad L Jour 596, *Ramayyan v. Kadir Bacha Sahib*.
 [See also (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 15 (16) : 22 Ind Cas 40, *Ramanna v. Narayanastami*].
3. (1895) 22 Cal 924 (927), *Teluck Singh v. Parsoteen Pershad*.
 (1894) 16 All 23 (25) : 1893 All W N 198, *Randir Singh v. Drigpal*.
 (1903) 16 C P L R 114 (116), *Jaka Patel v. Mt Jamna*.
 (1892) 5 C P L R 61 (62), *Tallappa Wani v. Dattu Kotual*.
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 587 (539) : 37 Cal 796, *Madhubmoni Das v. Pamela Lambert*.
 (1903) 5 Bom L R 540 (541), *Ganu v. Narayan Vishal*.
 (1910) 8 Ind Cas 986 (987) (Low Bur), *Ahmed Ali v. Maung Ton*.

Article 181

Note 4

With a view to put an end to this conflict of decisions, it has now been provided that the application which follows a preliminary decree for sale or foreclosure is not for an order for sale, but for a decree for sale and the relevant provisions as to mortgage suits have been removed from the Transfer of Property Act to the Civil Procedure Code, so that it is no longer possible to contend that such an application is not one under that Code.⁴ An application under Order 34 Rules 3 and 5, Civil Procedure Code, is an application in the suit itself and not one for execution.⁵ Under those Rules the plaintiff has to make an application for a final decree.⁶ Therefore, an application for a final decree in a suit for sale or foreclosure is governed by this Article.⁷ Even where the mortgage suit is on the Original Side of a Chartered High Court, the application would be governed by this Article and not by Article 183 *infra*.⁸ The reason is that the application is not one to enforce a preliminary decree within the meaning of Article 183 *infra*. This Article will also apply to an application in respect of a compromise decree, where such decree contemplates the passing of a final decree.⁹

88 ; 27 Ind Cas
Mukerji.
1914, Venkataiah v.

(1918) A I R 1918 Nag 63 (64) . 15 Nag L R 86 : 49 Ind Cas 934, Vinayak Rao v. Dayanath.

[See also (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 231 (233) : 28 Ind Cas 211, Beni Singh v. Berhamdeo Singh.]

1916, L Jour 864, Bala
177 Ind Cas 470,

(S B), Gajadhar

1916, 15 Ind Cas 76, Pattabhirama Naidu v.

kshmi

Bala-

1915

1909—

and

Article 181.]

(1915) A I R 1915 All 336 (337) : 39 All 21 : 30 Ind Cas 491, Madho Ram v. Nihal Singh.

(1911) 11 Ind Cas 913 (916) : 39 Cal 913, Amolak Chand v. Sharat Chandra.

[See also (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 215 (217) : 102 Ind Cas 811 : 6 Pat 760, Somar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad Singh. (Application to enforce a final decree is governed by Article 182 and not by Article 181.)]

[But see (1910) 6 Ind Cas 537 (511) : 37 Cal 796, Madhab Moni Dasi v. Pamela Lambert. (Obiter.)]

1917, 177 Ind Cas 470,

Ind Cas 781, M. A. L.

(1917) A I R 1917 Cal 175 (175) : 37 Ind Cas 802, Sashi Dhusan v. Pratur Chandra. (Consent decree for foreclosure)

Article 181
Note 4

Time for an application for a final decree under Order 34 Rules 3 and 5, Civil Procedure Code, starts from "when the right to apply accrues," that is to say, from the day fixed in the preliminary decree for payment of the mortgage money.¹⁰ When time has once begun to run, it cannot be suspended by any proceedings in any Court, such as a suit in which the title of the mortgagor to the mortgaged property is in question,¹¹ or on account of the pendency of proceedings to set aside the preliminary decree passed *ex parte*,¹² unless an injunction or an order of stay is obtained from the proper Court.^{12a} As to enlargement of time under the relevant Sections, see Note 24 *infra*. Where a preliminary decree has been amended on account of some error in respect of the amount declared to be due, the date of such amendment cannot furnish a fresh starting point for an application

- (1923) A I R 1923 All 29 (29) 70 Ind Cas 640, *Baldeo Das v. Pstambar*,
(1917) A I R 1917 All 119 (119) : 39 All 532 : 40 Ind Cas 424, *Ramji Lal v. Karan Singh*.
(1914) A I R 1914 Bom 263 (263) : 38 Bom 32 21 Ind Cas 318, *Datto Atmaram v. Shankar Dattatraya*.
- 10 (1923) A I R 1923 All 22 (22) 60 Ind Cas 199, *Ramachandrar v. Jaimal*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 65 (66) 69 Ind Cas 366, *Mummad Venkatesh v. Venkata Subbiah*.
(1918) A I R 1918 All 285 (286) : 43 Ind Cas 518 : 40 All 235, *Ahmed Khan v. Mt. Gaura*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Pat 131 (131) : 50 Ind Cas 514 : 4 Pat L Jour 523, *Ras Behari Singh v. Juman Lal*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Sind 14 (15) 73 Ind Cas 311 : 17 Sind L R 255, *Sakerchand Narsidas v. Jacob*. (An application put in as one for execution cannot be treated as one for final decree)
(1938) A I R 1938 Oudh 112 (118) 173 Ind Cas 956, *Ram Dutta v. Mahpal Singh* (Preliminary decree on basis of compromise—Amount payable in instalments—On default of any one instalment, whole unpaid amount becoming payable and decree holder entitled to obtain final decree—Decree holder held entitled to apply for final decree on any default and not necessarily on the first default)
(1914) A I R 1914 Bom 263 (263) 21 Ind Cas 318 (319) : 38 Bom 32, *Datto Atmaram v. Shankar Dattatraya*. (Instalment decree)
(1913) 18 Ind Cas 731 (732) : 35 All 178, *Badri Narayan v. Kunji Behari Lal*. (Do.)
(1918) A I R 1918 Bom 217 (219) 42 Bom 309 : 46 Ind Cas 107, *Narasing Rao v. Bandu Krishna* (Decree before 1903—Article 181 applied and right to apply accrued only on the coming into force of the new Civil Procedure Code)
(1923) A I R 1923 All 29 (30) 70 Ind Cas 640, *Baldeo Das v. Pstambar*. (Even where there is a condition in the decree that until one judgment-debtor's share is found insufficient, no steps are to be taken against the other, right to apply for final decree accrues at the same time)
(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 12 (12) 91 Ind Cas 617, *Rudra Pratap Singh v. Suraj Kuer*.
11. (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 331 (338) : 85 Ind Cas 272, *Ammathay Ammal v. Sivarama Pillai*.
12. (1936) 1936 Mad W N 146 (146), *Thangal Rowther v. Naina Muhammad Rowther*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1030 (1031) : 87 Ind Cas 746, *Mahamed Kamel v. Ahmad Ali*.
- 12a (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 331 (338) 85 Ind Cas 272, *Ammathay Ammal v. Sivarama Pillai*.

Article 181
Note 4

for final decree.¹³

Where there has been an appeal from a preliminary decree and the Appellate Court has not extended the time for payment, the period of three years for an application for a final decree runs from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court and not from the date fixed for payment in the preliminary decree, whether the decree of the lower Court has been varied or affirmed.¹⁴ The reason is stated

(See also (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 381 (382) : 62 Ind Cas 418, *Hemendra Mohan v. Dharamnath Chandra*. (After preliminary decree in favour of a third mortgagee, a second mortgagee obtained a

13. (1923) A I R 1923 All 22 (22) : 69 Ind Cas 199, *Ram Chandar v. Jai Mal*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Nag 217 (219) : 18 Nag L R 58 : 68 Ind Cas 919, *Nanhe-lal v. Gulshan Rai*.

Singh v. Kishen Juwan Lal.

- (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 899 (391) : 75 Ind Cas 2, *Uma Charan v. Nibaran Chandra*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 414 (415) : 44 Mad 714 : 64 Ind Cas 470, *Venkayya v. Sathiraju*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 442 (446) : 56 Mad 520 : 143 Ind Cas 412, *Jujuti Mahapatrao v. Magata Patra*. (Appeal formally brought before Court withdrawn and dismissed.)
(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 356 (360) : 123 Ind Cas 199, *Dakshinamoorthi Pathan v. Krishnasami Kadararan*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 853 (354) : 125 Ind Cas 95, *Venkatarama Reddi v. ...* question of law and second a decree on merits and time
263, *Nimmala Mahankali v.*
(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 938 (939) : 48 Ind Cas 185, *Subbarayalu Nayudu v. Sundararaya Nayudu*.
(1934) A I R 1934 Mad 65 (69) : 147 Ind Cas 1179, *Ramaswami Iyer v. Palluri Pathar*. (Where however pending appeal a final decree is passed and the appeal is dismissed, the decree-holder has a right within 3 years of the appellate decree to have the final decree amended so as to bring it in conformity with the appellate decision.)
(1912) 16 Ind Cas 799 (800) (Mad), *Thathara Nannabha Chetty v. Kuppal Krishnammal* (Plaintiff is not however entitled to calculate time allowing for period of grace from date of appellate decree.)
(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 93 (99) : 47 Bom 956 : 76 Ind Cas 1023, *Dattatraya Yithal v. Wasudeo Anant*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 582 (583) : 81 Ind Cas 619 : 5 Lah 257, *Fitchholmes v. Bank of Upper India Ltd*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Pat 205 (207) : 1 Pat 444 : 66 Ind Cas 790, *Jawad Hussain v. Gendun Singh*.

by Mr. Justice Banerji in *Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal*,¹⁵ as follows:

Article 181
Note 4

"It seems to me that this rule contemplates the passing of only one final decree in a suit for sale upon a mortgage. The essential condition to the making of a final decree is the existence of a preliminary decree which has become conclusive between the parties. When an appeal has been preferred, it is the decree of the Appellate Court which is the final decree in the cause."

But where the appeal is dismissed under Order 41 Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code,¹⁶ or for want of prosecution,¹⁷ time would start from the date fixed in the decree of the lower Court. Where a decree in a suit for sale is against separate sets of defendants for different amounts and one set of defendants appeals against the decree so far as the decree against them is concerned, the starting point for an application for final decree as against the non-appealing defendants is the date of the original decree and not that of the appellate decree.¹⁸

It has been already seen that an application for a final decree is an application in a suit and not one in execution. Therefore, where an application for final decree is properly disposed of or is dismissed for default or non-prosecution, a second application made out of time cannot be treated as a continuation of the former application and will be barred.¹⁹ But, where the application is adjourned at the request of the defendant or is not judicially disposed of, a second application would be deemed to be an application asking the Court

(1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 878 (376) 21 Oudh Cas 176 47 Ind Cas 206, *Lallu Ram v. Jot Singh*

(1920) A I R 1920 Nag 52 (53) 54 Ind Cas 323, *Nithanth v. Madho Rao*.

(1918) A I R 1918 All 76 (77) 40 All 203. 48 Ind Cas 870, *Nizamuddin Shah v. Bohra Bhim Sen*

[But see (1915) A I R 1915 All 836 (337) : 38 All 21 : 30 Ind Cas 494, *Madho Ram v. Nihal Singh*

(1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 91 (92) : 20 Oudh Cas 205 : 41 Ind Cas 858, *Jagdish Singh v. Ram Adhin Singh*.]

15. (1917) A I R 1917 All 163 (163) 42 Ind Cas 93 : 39 All 641 (S B).

16 (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 98 (99) 96 Ind Cas 1023 47 Bom 956, *Dattatraya Yethal v. Wasudeo Anant*.

17. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 442 (446) . 56 Mad 520 : 143 Ind Cas 412, *Jyoti Mahapatrao v. Magata Patro*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Pat 201 (202) 66 Ind Cas 97 . 1 Pat 435, *Chhotey Narain Singh v. Kedar Nath Singh*

18. (1921) A I R 1921 All 56 (58) 43 All 320 : 60 Ind Cas 817, *Gayan Singh v. Ata Husain*

19. (1918) A I R 1918 All 285 (296) : 40 All 235 : 43 Ind Cas 518, *Ahmad Khan v. Gaura*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 420 (421) : 73 Ind Cas 187, *Haryawan Deoraj v. Gajanan Kashinath*

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 65 (66) : 69 Ind Cas 866, *Mummad Venkatesh v. Venkata Subbiah*

(1937) A I R 1937 Sind 273 (275, 278) 172 Ind Cas 520 31 Sind L R 160, *Premomal Daomal v. Khudabux*

(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 890 (891) 85 Ind Cas 808, *Athamsa Rowther v. Ganesan*.

Article 181
Notes
4—5

to continue the prior application.²⁰

5. Application for final decree in redemption suits — Order 34 Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. — An application by a mortgagee for a final decree under Order 34 Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code, in a suit for redemption is governed by this Article.¹ Sub-rule 3 of Order 34 Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code, requires an application to be made by the mortgagee.

Before the amendment of Order 34 Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code, by Act 21 of 1929, there was a difference of opinion as to whether an application by a mortgagor under that Rule was governed by any period of limitation. It was held in the undermentioned cases² that as the Rule, as it then existed, did not require the mortgagor to make an application, it was the duty of the Court to pass a final decree when the amount due was paid into Court and that, therefore, this Article would not apply to such an application. It was, however, held in other cases³ that an application made under that Rule should be regarded as an application for extension of time for payment and

[See however (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 98 (91) : 159 Ind Cas 248 : 15 Pat 51, *Harial Kamti v. Jhari Singh*. (First application dismissed for non-payment of batta—Dismissal not proper—Even then if second application is out of time, Court has inherent power to restore original application.)]

20. (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 816 (817) : 147 Ind Cas 206, *Menaka Dala Dasi v. Hiratal Gobindlal*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Nag 291 (292) : 21 Nag L R 47 : 88 Ind Cas 901, *Chimnaji Raibhanji v. Sonaji*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 971 (972) : 109 Ind Cas 875, *Mallikaraja Pudu v. ...*

(1922) A I R 1922 All 446 (447) : 68 Ind Cas 175, *Kallu Mal v. Kashi Nath*. (Application for final decree returned for want of correct statement of amount due and description of property—No time fixed for amendment—Re-presented after expiry at three years—Held to be in time)

[See also (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 1092 (1094). 45 Ind Cas 657, *Makunda Lal Kundu v. Priya Nath Motra*.]

Note 5

1. (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 255 (256) : 29 Oudh Cas 46 : 80 Ind Cas 706, *Mad Begar Khan v. Jagat Narain Lal*.

(1927) A I R 1927 All 505 (505) : 100 Ind Cas 324, *Abdul Karim v. Durga Prasad*.

2. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 592 (393) : 23 Ind Cas 233, *Dohi Khodalo Patro v. Lingaraj Vadya Bhushana*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 649 (650) : 29 Oudh Cas 261 : 90 Ind Cas 419, *Bhawani Prasad v. Ram Rati Kunwar*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 255 (256) : 29 Oudh Cas 46 : 80 Ind Cas 706, *Mad Begar Khan v. Jagat Narain Lal*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 33 (34) : 66 Ind Cas 944, *Banks Behari Lal v. Ghani Ahmad*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 156 (157) : 74 Ind Cas 102, *Ram Rup v. Ghani Ahmad*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Bom 82 (84) : 50 Bom 730 : 99 Ind Cas 913, *Moru Narayesh v. Gangabai*.

3. (1919) A I R 1919 Bom 53 (56) : 43 Bom 639 : 51 Ind Cas 924, *Varudev Vishnu v. Gopal Parashram*.

would be governed by this Article. The amendment of Order 34 Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code, in 1929 by inserting the words "on application made by the plaintiff" in sub-rule 1 makes it clear that an application by a mortgagor would also now be governed by this Article.

6. Application for personal decrees—Order 34 Rule 6, Civil Procedure Code. — Before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1909, there was a difference of opinion as regards the applicability of Article 178 (corresponding to this Article) to an application under Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held in some cases¹ that the application could not be considered to be one for the execution of a decree within the meaning of Article 179 (corresponding to the present Article 182) and that, therefore, Article 178 would apply. In some cases,² on the other hand, it was held that as the application was not one under the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 178 did not apply. This conflict of opinion has been removed by the transfer of the provision relating to personal decrees, to Order 34 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires the Court to pass a decree for the balance due on an application made by the plaintiff. Such an application is one made in a suit for a fresh decree and is clearly one under the Code of Civil Procedure within the meaning of this Article.³ Even where the mortgage decree is passed by a Chartered High Court on its Original Side, an application for a personal decree is governed by this Article

(1929) A I R 1929 Rang 304 (305). 124 Ind Cas 260, *Maung Saw v Ma Shin*

Note 6

- 1 (1899) 21 All 453 (454) 1899 All W N 166, *Ram Sarup v Ghaurani*.
(1903) 6 Oudh Cas 114 (118), *Ram Bhaghubir v Mt. Zahurun nissa*.
(1911) 10 Ind Cas 21 (22) (Oudh), *Amir Chand v Narsingh Narain*.
2. (1907) 84 Cal 672 (675) 11 Cal W N 674 6 Cal L Jour 119, *Sheik Rahama. Karim v Sheikh Abdul Karim*.
(1898) 11 C P L R 141 (143), *Nathuram v. Raja Seth Gokuldas*.
- 3 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 834 (836, 838, 842) 52 Cal 826 89 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Francis Higgins Pell v Minnie Gregory*. (Overruling 42 Cal 294 A I R 1915 Cal 725.)

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 251 (252) 60 Cal 19 143 Ind Cas 679, *Pradyumna Kumar v Gopendra Mallick*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Bom 323 (325) 113 Ind Cas 515, *Harj Janardhan v. Krishnaji Balkrishna*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Nag 1 (3) 13 Nag L R 76 . 39 Ind Cas 854, *Chunni Lal v Trikamdas*

(1920) A I R 1920 Upp Bur 21 (23) 60 Ind Cas 23 3 Upp Bur Rule 261, *Yinke Supaya v. Maung Ken*

[But see (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 725 (726) 42 Cal 294 30 Ind Cas 719, *Dishwambhar Saha v. Ram Sundar Karbarla Das* (Overruled in A I R 1925 Cal 834 without adverting to this argument. The difficulty has been removed by the insertion of the words "on application by him" in O. 34 R 6 by Act 21 of 1929)]

Article 181
Note 6

and not by Article 183, *infra*.⁴ The reason is that it is an application for a new decree in the suit and cannot be said to be one for enforcing a judgment or decree within the meaning of Article 183. This Article will also apply to an application under Order 34 Rule 8A, Civil Procedure Code, a provision newly introduced by Act 21 of 1929.

The starting point of time for an application for personal decree is the date of the confirmation of the sale held in execution of the mortgage decree.⁵ Where an appeal is preferred against an order confirming a sale after dismissing an application to set aside the sale and such appeal also is dismissed, the period of three years under this Article begins to run from the date when the sale was confirmed by the Appellate Court and not from the date of confirmation of the sale by the lower Court.⁶ As to when time starts where mortgaged property has been ordered by Court to be sold privately, see the undermentioned case.⁷ Where a decree by mistake included a non-hypothecated property and the decree-holder applied for sale of such property after the sale of the properties covered by the mortgage and thereupon the judgment-debtor applied for and succeeded in getting the decree amended, it was held that, for an application for a personal decree, time must be deemed, under the circumstances of the case, to run from the date of such amendment.⁸

Where an execution sale of the mortgaged property is held and the decree is thereby fully discharged, but thereafter, in a separate suit, it is held that the mortgagor had no title to the mortgaged property and, therefore, the sale is void and the mortgagee applies for a personal decree, when does time begin to run? The High Court of Madras has held that the right to a personal decree accrues on the date when the sale is declared to be void.⁹ But the High Court

4. (1935) A I R 1935 Rang 187 (188) : 13 Rang 305 : 156 Ind Cas 701, *Chokalingam Chettiar v. Maung Tun Yin*.

5. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 166 (167) : 58 Cal 741 : 130 Ind Cas 815, *Krishna Bondhu Ghatak v. Panchlari Saha*. (Time runs not from the date of sale.)

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 251 (252) : 60 Cal 19 : 143 Ind Cas 679, *Pradyumna-kumar v. Gopendra Mallick*. (Fact of decree-holder's costs not having been taxed will not delay starting point.)

(1913) 21 Ind Cas 630 (530) (Mad), *Rama Venkata Subba Iyer v. Shanmukham Pillai*.

(1906) 29 All 660 (664) : 3 All L Jour 445, *Gajadhar Lal v. Alliance Bank of India*.

[See also (1912) 14 Ind Cas 591 (592) (All) *Behary Lal v. Basheswar*

8. (1902) 1902 All W N 50 (51), *Fazal Hussain Khan v. Shohrat Singh*.

9. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 911 (912) : 97 Ind Cas 302, *Siva Subramania Pillai v. Peraralingam Pillai*.

of Allahabad has taken the view that time runs from the date when the purchase-money is refunded.¹⁰

An application for a personal decree which has been dismissed, cannot furnish a starting point for a fresh application, since the application is not one for execution of a decree.¹¹

7. Application for restitution—Section 144, Civil Procedure Code.—There is a great divergence of judicial opinion as to whether this Article or Article 182 applies to an application for restitution. Under Section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, an application for restitution was regarded as being in execution of the appellate decree and was held governed by Article 179 (now Article 182) of the Act of 1877.¹ Applications for restitution, not falling within that Section, were not treated as execution applications but were held to be governed by Article 178.²

Under the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908, the High Courts of Madras, Bombay, Patna and Rangoon and the Chief Court of Oudh have held that an application for restitution is one in execution of a decree within the meaning of Article 182 *infra*.³ But the High

10. (1927) A I R 1927 All 895 (306) · 49 All 506 · 100 Ind Cas 775, *Dadal Singh v. Debi Saran*.

11. (1918) A I R 1918 All 105 (106) · 40 All 551 · 47 Ind Cas 562, *Mohammad Iltifat Hussain v. Allimunnessa*.

Note 7

1. (1897) 20 Mad 448 (449) : 8 Mad L Jour 79, *Venkayya v. Ragavachariu*.
(1910) 7 Ind Cas 886 (889) (Cal), *Amulya Ratan v. Pree Nath Dutt*.
(1886) 8 All 545 (549) : 1886 All W N 178, *Nand Ram v. Sita Ram*.
[But see (1887) 10 Mad 66 (67), *Kurupam Zamindar v. Sadashu*.
(Dissented from in 20 Mad 448.)]
2. (1912) 16 Ind Cas 238 (239) (Cal), *Massirunnissa Khatun v. Joy Chand Lal*.
(1900) 28 Cal 118 (115), *Harish Chandra Shaha v. Chandra Mohan Dass*.
[See also (1908) 30 All 476 (479) · 5 All L Jour 527 · 1908 All W N 206, *Bithaldas v. Jamna Prasad*.]
3. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 150 (150) : 167 Ind Cas 258, *Kandaswami Mudali v. Annamalai Reddy*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 813 (814) · 95 Ind Cas 587, *Panchapakesa Ayyar v. Natesa Pattar*.
(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 194 (195) : 42 Ind Cas 530, *Unnamalai Ammal v. Mathan*.
(1931) 1931 Mad W N 1006 (1007), *Muniah v. Gangamma*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 67 (67) : 45 Bom 1137 · 62 Ind Cas 233, *Hamidalli Kadamalli v. Ahmadalli Mhibuballi*.
(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 246 (248, 251, 253) · 13 Pat 411 · 143 Ind Cas 1160 (F B), *Bhau Nath Singh v. Kedar Nath Singh*. (Overruling A I R 1925 Pat 1.)
(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 646 (647) · 152 Ind Cas 944, *Lokenath Singh v. Mahabir Singh*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 371 (374) · 72 Ind Cas 912 : 2 Pat 277, *Basanta Kumari Dasi v. Holmahund Marwari*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Rang 180 (183) : 11 Rang 275 · 143 Ind Cas 869, *Muthu-Varappan Chettyar v. Annamalai Chettyar*.

Article 181
Note 7

Courts of Calcutta, Allahabad and Lahore and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur have held that such an application is not one in execution of a decree but is one governed by this Article.⁴ Even according to the latter view, however, where restitution is claimed on the reversal by the Privy Council, of a decree of a High Court, the application is one to enforce the decree of the Privy Council within the meaning of Article 183 *infra*, and is governed by that Article.⁵

- (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 51 (52) : 130 Ind Cas 78 : 6 Luck 448, *Chandika Singh v. Bithal Das*.
[See also (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 199 (199, 200) : 1 Luck 40 : 92 Ind Cas 23, *Sani Sahai v. Ohkulai Kurms*. (Benefit of S. 6 given.)]
(1917) A I R 1917 Bom 210 (211) : 41 Bom 625 : 41 Ind Cas 233, *Kurgoda Gauda v. Nangan Gauda*, (Do.)
(1919) A I R 1919 Bom 175 (176) : 43 Bom 235 : 48 Ind Cas 180, *Shrivastav Babya Swami v. Yeshu Cheoo Nayakim*.]
[But see (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 1 (8, 14) : 78 Ind Cas 200 : 3 Pat 371 (F B), *Balmakunda Marwari v. Basanta Kumari Dassi*.]
(1928) A I R 1928 Pat 598 (599) : 114 Ind Cas 478 : 7 Pat 794, *Rambu Jhaswan Thakur v. Bankey Thakur*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Pat 52 (53) : 89 Ind Cas 653 : 2 Pat L Jour 206, *Jagdish Narain Singh v. F. H. Holloway*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Pat 396 (398) : 47 Ind Cas 47 : 3 Pat L Jour 367, *Krupansindhu Roy v. Balbhadra Das*.
(1915) A I R 1915 Low Bur 141 (142) : 8 Low Bur Rul 262 : 30 Ind Cas 680, *Asha Bibi v. Nuruddin*.]
4. (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 808 (310) : 59 Cal 337 : 137 Ind Cas 802, *Saraj Bhuxan Ghosh v. Debendra Nath Ghosh*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 931 (932) : 92 Ind Cas 960, *Fazalar Rahaman v. Abdul Samad*.
(1917) A I R 1917 Cal 168 (193) : 38 Ind Cas 17, *Asutosh Goswami v. Upendra Prosad*.
(1938) A I R 1938 All 552 (554) : 177 Ind Cas 695, *Rama Kant v. Satya Narain*.
(1934) A I R 1934 All 626 (645) : 57 All 26 : 150 Ind Cas 1096 (F B), *Parmeshwar Singh v. Sitalam Dube*.
(1922) A I R 1922 All 223 (225) : 44 All 407 : 66 Ind Cas 144, *Jiva Ram v. Nand Ram*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Lah 456 (457) : 177 Ind Cas 430, *Tetu v. Raja Ram*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Lah 685 (686) : 96 Ind Cas 804, *Gujar Mal v. Narain Singh*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Lah 166 (166) : 76 Ind Cas 501, *Chanda Singh v. Bishen Singh*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Lah 378 (379) : 1918 Pun Ra No. 67 : 44 Ind Cas 301, *Ram Singh v. Sham Parshad*.
(1935) A I R 1935 Nag 76 (77), *Babu Lal Brahmam v. Mt. Govindbhai Mura*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Nag 112 (113) : 54 Ind Cas 664 : 17 Nag L R 62, *Mt. Radha v. Mt. Sakhu*.
[But see (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 101 (101) : 76 Ind Cas 255 : 18 Nag L R 200, *Sonda v. Parashram* (Art 182 applies.)]
(1923) A I R 1923 Nag 94 (94) : 71 Ind Cas 42, *Laxman v. Bishram*. (Governed by Art. 120).]
5. (1928) A I R 1928 All 293 (294, 297) : 50 All 767 : 112 Ind Cas 876, *Sohan Bibi v. Baijnath Das*.
(1922) A I R 1922 All 238 (239, 240) : 66 Ind Cas 545 : 44 All 555, *Brij Lal v. Damodar Das*.
(1923) 44 Mad L Jour 47 (48) (N 1 C) (Critical Note on 44 All 555 : A I R 1922 All 238, *Brij Lal v. Damodar Das*).
(1921) 61 Ind Cas 806 (807) (All), *Madhusudan Das v. Brij Lal*.

According to the Courts taking the second of the two views mentioned above, the right to apply for restitution accrues on the date when for the first time a decision is given entitling the party to apply for restitution.⁶ Thus, where a decree reversing that of a trial Court is confirmed in second appeal, the period of limitation for an application for restitution begins to run from the date of the decree of the lower Appellate Court and not from the date of the decree in second appeal confirming the reversing decree.⁷ Similarly, where an *ex parte* decree is set aside after a sale in execution thereof and the suit is subsequently dismissed after trial, time for an application for restitution runs from the date of the order setting aside the *ex parte* decree and not from the date of the dismissal of the suit.⁸ It has, however, been held in the undermentioned cases⁹

6. (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 422 (423) : 144 Ind Cas 150, *Ashutosh Choudhury v. Sm. Kumed Kamini Dass*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 159 (193) : 33 Ind Cas 17, *Ashutosh Goswamy v. Upendra Prosad*.
7. (1934) A I R 1934 All 626 (645) : 57 All 26 : 150 Ind Cas 1096 (F B), *Parmeshar Singh v. Silla Din Dube*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 All 609 (610) : 141 Ind Cas 121 : 54 All 770, *Mt. Dhapo v. Bahridi*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 203 (310) : 50 Cal 337, 137 Ind Cas 302, *Saraj Bhusan Ghosh v. Debendra Nath Ghosh*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 616 (651) : 56 Cal 61 : 117 Ind Cas 543 (S B), *Hari Mohan Dalal v. Parameshwar Sahu*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 422 (424) : 144 Ind Cas 150, *Ashutosh Choudhry v. Sm. Kumed Kamini Dass*. (Execution sale—Decree-holder withdrew amount due to him—Later on, sale set aside and decree holder refunded the money and auction-purchaser withdrew it—Decree-holder appealed and sale confirmed in appeal—A defendant preferred a second appeal therefrom which was dismissed—Time runs from date of first appellate order)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 166 (167) : 76 Ind Cas 501, *Chanda Singh v. Bishen Singh*
[But see (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 981 (982) : 92 Ind Cas 960, *Fazlar Rahman v. Abdul Samad*.]
- (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 457 (458) : 43 Ind Cas 775, *Atul Chandra Singh v. Kunja Behari Singha*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 225 (227) : 62 Cal 299 : 155 Ind Cas 991, *Krishna Chandra v. Pabna Dhanabhandar Co., Ltd.*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 180 (182) : 11 Rang 275 : 149 Ind Cas 699, *Muthukarappan Chettyar v. Annamalai Chettyar*. (Assuming Art 181 applies time starts from date of decree in second appeal)
- (1928) A I R 1928 Pat 593 (599) : 7 Pat 791 : 114 Ind Cas 476, *Rambujawan Thakur v. Bankey Thakur*. (Do.)]
8. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 504 (504) : 134 Ind Cas 206, *Gujar Mal v. Narain Singh* (No fresh accrual of right after dismissal of suit.)
- (1900) 28 Cal 113 (115), *Harish Chandra Shaha v. Chandra Mohan Dass*.
9. (1934) A I R 1934 All 626 (645) : 57 All 26 : 150 Ind Cas 1096 (F B), *Parmeshar Singh v. Silladin Dube*.

(But see (1935) A I R 1935 Nag 76 (77), *Babulal v. Mt. Gorindi Bai*.)

Article 181
Notes
7—11

that where the application for restitution is for *mesne* profits, time does not begin to run until possession of the property has been restored to the successful applicant.

In cases of applications for restitution governed by this Article, a second application made after the prescribed period cannot be treated as a continuation of, or kept alive by, the earlier application.¹⁰ Where a restitution application is stayed and consigned to the record room without final orders being passed on it, the application must be deemed to remain pending and after the order of stay is discharged, no question of any limitation under the Article can arise.¹¹

8. Application for execution.—See Notes to Article 182, *infra*.

9. Application to set aside sale.—See Notes 1, 2, 8 and 10 to Article 166, *ante*.

10. Applications under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code.—Where a decree-holder recovers in execution, more in excess of what is due to him or to his share or in excess of the decree as amended later on, an application by the judgment-debtor under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, for the refund of such excess amount is governed by this Article.¹

As to the applicability of this Article to applications under Order 21 Rule 100, Civil Procedure Code, by judgment-debtors, see Note 3 to Article 165, *ante*.

11. Application for refund of purchase money — Order 21 Rule 93, Civil Procedure Code.—An application by an auction-purchaser in an execution sale for the refund of purchase money under Order 21 Rule 93, Civil Procedure Code, is governed by this

10. (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 685 (686) : 96 Ind Cas 804, *Gujar Mal v. Narain Singh*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 456 (457) : 177 Ind Cas 430, *Telu v. Raja Ram*.

11. (1938) A I R 1938 All 552 (551) : 177 Ind Cas 695, *Rama Kant v. Satya Narain*.

Note 10

1. (1885) 7 All 371 (372) : 1885 All W N 61, *Mula Raj v. Debi Dhal*. (Right to apply accrues when the account was taken and stated on the application of the judgment-debtor.)

(1908) 80 All 476 (479) : 1908 All W N 206 : 5 All L Jour 527, *Bithal Das v. Jamna Prasad*. (*Ex parte* decree set aside and a fresh decree for a smaller sum passed after trial.)

(1905) 27 All 485 (487) : 2 All L Jour 169 : 1905 All W N 63, *Harnam Chandar v. Muhammad Yar Khan*. (Decree awarding larger sum than was due under judgment—Amount recovered—Subsequent amendment of decree and application for refund of excess—Time starts from date of amendment.)

decree.)

[See also (1920) A I R 1920 Bom 208 (209) : 44 Bom 97 : 55 Ind Cas 967, *Ganpatrao Sultanrao v. Anandrao Jagdeo Rao*.]

Article,¹ and time runs from the date of the order setting aside the sale.²

12. Application by auction-purchaser for possession — Order 21 Rule 95, Civil Procedure Code.—See Notes to Article 180, *ante*.

13. Application to bring on record legal representatives.—Applications to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased party are governed by Articles 176 and 177, *ante*. But this Article will govern an application to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased person who was not a defendant or respondent on the date of his death.¹

A decree of the Privy Council has full force and effect notwithstanding the death, before the date of judgment or hearing, of a respondent in the appeal before it and against whom a decree is passed. An application to bring on record his legal representatives in such a case falls within this Article.²

Where a plaintiff, who is suing in a representative capacity, dies, an application by a person who is one of those represented by the deceased is governed by this Article.³

See also the undermentioned cases.⁴

As regards the applicability of this Article to applications to bring on record the legal representatives of a deceased person in

Article 181
Notes
11—13

Note 11

- 1 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 353 (355) 40 Mad 1009 45 Ind Cas 109, *Tirumalaisamy Naidu v Subramaniam Chettiar*
(1889) 11 All 372 (374) 1889 All W N 113, *Guridhari v Sital Prasad*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Cal 85 (88) 50 Cal 115 70 Ind Cas 606, *Mahar Ali v Sarfaddin*.
[See also (1910) 6 Ind Cas 804 (806) (Cal), *Gopal Saran Narain Singh v. Mahomed Sheshh Ashham*]
2. (1889) 11 All 372 (374) 1889 All W N 113, *Guridhari v Sital Prasad*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 353 (355) 40 Mad 1009 45 Ind Cas 109, *Tirumalaisamy Naidu v. Subramaniam Chettiar*.

Note 13

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 316 (318) 73 Ind Cas 397, *Wahid Bakhsh v. Lalita Pershad*
2. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 695 (695) 47 Mad 618 80 Ind Cas 85, *Kalyani Pillai v. Thiru Venkataswami Iyengar*.
3. (1931) A I R 1931 Mad 590 (591) 54 Mad 770 132 Ind Cas 259, *Mahomed Kanni Rowther v. Nana Mahomed Rowther*
(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 479 (480) 49 Ind Cas 263, *Krishnaswami Iyer v. Seethalakshmi Ammal*. (Reversioner)
(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 124 (124) 62 Ind Cas 360, *Saminatha Pillai v. Rajagopala Mudaliar*. (Application by co-trustee after death of trustee)
4. (1882) 8 Cal 837 (847) 10 Cal L R 449 7 Ind Jur 26, *Benode Mohini Chowdhram v. Sharat Chunder Dey Chowdhury*
(1903) 30 Cal 609 (612) 7 Cal W N 517 (F B), *Surendra Keshub Roy v. Khetter Krishno Mitter*.

Therefore, an application for a final decree in a suit for partition,² or in a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts, is not governed by this Article.³

17. Application for ascertainment of mesne profits.—Under Section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, mesne profits were to be ascertained in execution. Nevertheless, the general trend of opinion was that proceedings for the ascertainment of mesne profits under Sections 211 and 212 of that Code were not proceedings in execution of a decree, but proceedings in continuation of a suit, and that, therefore, neither Article 178 nor Article 179 was applicable to such proceedings.¹ Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, clearly provides that such proceedings are to be regarded as made in the suit itself and casts a duty upon the Court to pass a final decree after ascertaining the mesne profits. Therefore, an application for determination of mesne profits is not governed by

- (1892) 19 Cal 132 (138) (F B), *Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen*. (A case of mesne profits)
2. (1895) 22 Cal 425 (434), *Duarka Nath Misser v. Barinda Nath Misser*.
(1905) 28 Mad 127 (129) 14 Mad L Jour 436, *Latchmana Chetty v. Ramathan Chetty*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 609 (810) 30 Ind Cas 380, *Srinivasa Mudali v. Ramaswamy Mudali*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 751 (755) 40 Ind Cas 320, *Sethurama Sahib v. Chotta Raja Sahib*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Oudh 229 (230) 177 Ind Cas 556, *Chintaman Tewari v. Bhagirathi Tewari*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 456 (457) 121 Ind Cas 287. 5 Luck 280, *Lalta Prasad v. Brahma Din*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Oudh 231 (232) 60 Ind Cas 433 23 Oudh Cas 281, *Tajammul Husain v. Bande Raza*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Pesh 101 (103) 146 Ind Cas 201, *Faqir Chand v. Mahmomed Akbar Khan*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Nag 206 (207) 122 Ind Cas 411 26 Nag L R 166, *Mt. Lazmidas v. Tukaram*.
(1906) 1906 Pun Re No 47 1907 Pun L R No. 86 1906 Pun W R No. 94, *Durga Das v. Faqir Chand*.
[But see (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 117 (120) 112 Ind Cas 205, *Bisheshwar Gir v. Satish Chandra*]
3. (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 528 (533) 53 Mad 378 131 Ind Cas 160, *Ramathan Chetty v. Alagappa Chetty*.

Note 17

1. (1892) 19 Cal 132 (138) (F B), *Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen*.
(1897) 25 Cal 203 (206), *Pryag Singh v. Raju Singh*.
(1904) 26 All 623 (625) 1904 All W N 146 1 All L Jour 311, *Walia Bibi v. Nazar Hasan*.
[See also (1879) 4 Cal 629 (633), *Dildar Hossein v. Mujeeddunnissa*.
(1874) 22 Suth W R 328 (329), *Bunsee Singh v. Mirza Nuzuf Ali Beg.*]
[See however (1881) 8 Cal 89 (91) 10 Cal L R 272, *Hem Chunder Chowdhry v. Brojo Soondury Debee* (Art 162 applies)]
(1887) 14 Cal 50 (54) 11 Ind Jur 143, *Anando Kishore Dass Bakhshi v. Anando Kishore Bose*. (Art. 178 applies.)
(1900) 24 Bom 149 (155) 1 Bom L R 639, *Uttama Ram v. Kishore Das*

Article 181
Notes
17—18

this Article.² But the High Court of Madras has added a sub-rule to Order 20 Rule 12, Civil Procedure Code, providing for an application being made by the decree-holder for a final decree. Therefore, such an application in Madras would be governed by this Article.³

18. Certification of payment by decree-holder under Order 21 Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. — It has been already seen in Note 2 *ante* that, in order that this Article may apply, there must be an application to the Court to exercise its judicial powers. The certification by a decree-holder under Order 21 Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, of a payment made out of Court towards the decree by the judgment-debtor is not an "application" within the meaning of this Article and is not therefore governed by the period prescribed in this Article.¹ Even where the decree-holder makes an application for such a purpose, the mere fact that the document is called an application and is in the form of a petition cannot alter the real nature of the procedure and convert what was really no more than

2. (1928) A I R 1928 Bom 236 (238) : 109 Ind Cas 734 : 52 Bom 360, *Shanker Appaji v. Gangaram Bapuji*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 All 465 (469) : 151 Ind Cas 755, *Narain Das v. Bhagwati Prasad*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 263 (270) : 77 Ind Cas 497, *Thana Zalalji v. Dhana Jauchrji*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 368 (369) : 8 Pat 482 : 117 Ind Cas 647, *Kammakhya Narain Singh v. Ahloo Singh*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 141 (143) : 92 Ind Cas 629 : 5 Pat 223, *Bhatu Ram Modi v. Fogal Ram*.
- (1913) 20 Ind Cas 685 (697) (Cal), *Prasanna Kumar v. Asutosh Roy*.
[See (1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 197 (198) : 25 Oudh Cas 132 : 68 Ind Cas 896, *Kuber Singh v. Mt. Raj Kunwar*. (Decree directing ascertainment of mesne profits in execution — Assuming any limitation is applicable, application must be made within three years of date of appellate decree.)]
[But see (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 404 (406) : 61 Ind Cas 449 : 45 Bom 819, *Gangadhar Manika v. Balakrishna Soiroba*.]
- (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 366 (367). 47 Bom 778 : 73 Ind Cas 233, *Usuf Ali v. Sayad Amin*]
3. (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 801 (804) : 164 Ind Cas 670, *Rama Rao v. Sree Ramamoorthy*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 522 (522) : 109 Ind Cas 523, *Temmaraju v. Narasimha Raju*.

Note 18

1. 531 : 3 Luck
1051, *Jalim Chand v. Yusufali Choudhury*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 350 (351) : 153 Ind Cas 1018, *Madan Singh v. Kammakhya Narain Singh*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 7 (11) : 29 Oudh Cas 353 : 1 Luck 423 : 93 Ind Cas 353, *Prakash Singh v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd.*
- (1936) A I R 1936 Nag 281
Bajina'k v. Kanhanu
- (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 922
Rao.

a certificate of certain payment into an application within the meaning of this Article.²

Article 181
Notes
18—20

19. Application to amend decree.—An application to amend a decree so as to bring it in conformity with the judgment, or on account of arithmetical or clerical errors, is not governed by this Article or by any other Article.¹ The reason is that this Act relates to the action of parties, but not to the action of the Court. And it is the duty of the Court to amend the decree whenever it becomes aware of its variance with the judgment or of the clerical or arithmetical errors in it. When the parties move the Court for such a purpose, they are only bringing the variance or error to the notice of the Court, so that there is no application properly so called.²

20. Application to add parties.—Rules of limitation do not preclude a Court from acting under Order 1 Rule 10,¹ or Order 41 Rule 20² of the Code of Civil Procedure in adding a person as a necessary party to a suit or to an appeal. It is a power which may be exercised by the Court *suo motu* so long as the Court is seized of

(1921) A I R 1021 Bom 411 (412) : 45 Bom 91 59 Ind Cas 309, *Pandurang Balkrishna v. Jagya Bhau*

(1929) A I R 1929 Cal 687 (689). 57 Cal 769 127 Ind Cas 258, *Hridaymohan Sanyal v. Khagendra Nath*.

[But see (1925) A I R 1925 Rang 26 (27) . 84 Ind Cas 369 . 2 Rang 393, *Maung Law San v. Maung Po Thein*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 30 (31) : 68 Ind Cas 760, *Bali Mahammad Sahi v. Ajanmai*]

2 (1929) A I R 1929 P C 10 (23) 114 Ind Cas 581 56 Ind App 30 8 Luck 684 (P C), *Shri Prakash Singh v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd*

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 922 (923) 159 Ind Cas 38, *Gangayya v. Seshagiri Rao*

Note 19

1 (1884) 7 All 276 (280) 1885 All W N 13, *Raghunath Das v. Raj Kumar*.

(1886) 8 All 519 (584) . 1886 All W N 182, *Dhan Singh v. Basant Singh*.

(1887) 11 Bom 284 (285), *Shitapa v. Srepanch Lingapa*.

(1887) 9 All 364 (365) 1887 All W N 79, *Darbo v. Kesho Rai*.

(1888) 11 All 267 (291) 1889 All W N 53 13 Ind Jur 427 (F B), *Muham-*
med v. ... (Per Mahmood J)

erial function)

ished

(1897) 1897 Pun Re No 12, *Devi Das v. Ourdatta*.

(1911) 12 Ind Cas 151 (154) (Cal), *Langat Singh v. Janki Koor*

(1913) 21 Ind Cas 540 (541) 7 Sind L R 53, *Bikhmal Lalchand v. Rajah-*
mal Manomal.

[But see (1882) 4 All 23 (24) 1881 All W N 114, *Gaya Prasad v. Shikhar Prasad*.

(1886) 8 All 492 (495) 1886 All W N 156, *Tarsi Ram v. Van Singh*]

2 (1886) 11 Bom 284 (285), *Shitappa v. Shrepanch Lingapa*

Note 20

1. (1892) 14 All 524 (528) . 1892 All W N 104, *Imamuuddin v. Laladhar*

(1886) 12 Cal 642 (652), *The Oriental Bank Corporation v. J. A. Charriot*

2 (1889) 18 All 78 (85) 1891 All W N 1, *Sohna v. Khalat Singh*

Article 181
Notes
20—22

the case and is empowered by that Code to so act. Therefore, even if an application is made for such a purpose by a party, it is not governed by this Article. But it does not mean that a suit cannot be dismissed under Section 22 *ante*, as against that party on the ground of limitation. The power of a Court to add a party and the duty of the Court to dismiss the suit as barred by limitation are two different questions.³

An application by a person to get himself added as a party to a suit under Order 22 Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, is not also governed by this Article.⁴ The right of an assignee *pendente lite* to apply in a pending suit is a right which accrues from day to day.

21. Application for sale certificate.— This Article does not apply to an application for grant of a certificate of sale under Order 21 Rule 94, Civil Procedure Code.¹ The reason is that it is an application for the exercise of a function of a purely ministerial character.

22. Applications under other Acts.— As has been seen in Note 2 *ante*, this Article applies only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, it does not apply to applications under the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920), for which no period of limitation is prescribed,¹ or under the Indian Companies Act,² or to

3. (1892) 14 All 524 (523) : 1892 All W N 104, *Imamuddin v. Lalladhar*.

4. (1913) 20 Ind Cas 635 (637) (Cal), *Prasanna Kumar v. Asutosh Roy*.

Note 21

1. (1882) 4 Mad 172 (173), *Kylasa Goundan v. Ramasami Ayyan*.
 (1882) 6 Bom 586 (587), *Vithal Janardhan v. Vithojirav Pullajirav*.
 (1883) 1893 All W N 262 (262), *Petition of Kishen Singh*.
 (1884) 8 Bom 377 (380), *Devidas Jagjivan v. Pirzada Begam*.
 (1910) 5 Ind Cas 263 (264) (All), *Salig Ram v. Narain Das*.
 [But see (1880) 5 Bom 206 (207), *Tukaram v. Satraji Khanduji*.
 (1880) 5 Bom 202 (206), *In re Khaja Patthanjali*.]

Note 22

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 163 (167) : 47 Mad 120 : 75 Ind Cas 572, *Sivasubramania Pillai v. Theethiappa Pillai*. (Application to prove debt in insolvency.)
 (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 974 (974) : 60 Ind Cas 123, *Durasya Solagan v. Venkatarama Nascher*. (Application to avoid a transfer made by insolvent before insolvency.)
 (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 553 (554) : 75 Ind Cas 995, *Daryas Singh v. Kunj Lal*. (Do.)
 (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 172 (173) : 79 Ind Cas 443, *Ramaswamiah v. Subramania Ayyar*. (Do.)
 (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 470 (470) : 52 Ind Cas 188 : 1919 Pun Re No. 151, *Nikka Mal v. Marwar Bank Ltd.* (Do.)
 (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 331 (333) : 69 Ind Cas 403, *Pirthi Nath v. Basheswar Nath*. (Do.)
2. (1933) A I R 1933 All 789 (791) : 55 All 912 : 145 Ind Cas 893 (F B), *Shiam Lal v. Official Liquidators, U. P. Oil Mills Co., Ltd.* (Application by a liquidator under S. 235, Companies Act.)

applications for the grant or revocation of probate or letters of administration.^{2a} But where an application, though made under an Act other than the Code of Civil Procedure, is made to the Court asking it to exercise its jurisdiction by putting in motion the machinery of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will be an application falling within the scope of this Article.³

See also the undermentioned cases⁴ where this Article has been applied without adverting to the fact that the application is not one under the Code of Civil Procedure.

23. Applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure. — Applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure (5 of 1898),

(1933) A I R 1933 P C 63 (64, 65) : 142 Ind Cas 7 : 54 All 1067 . 60 Ind App 13 (P C), *Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co., Ltd.*

[But see (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 194 (196) . 109 Ind Cas 550 : 24 Nag L R 100, *Sheikh Kandu v. Berar Ginning Co., Ltd.* (Application for winding up of a company is governed by this Article.)]

2a (1883) 7 Bom 213 (214), *Bai Manekbai v. Manekji Karasji.*

(1882) 6 Cal 707 (708) 8 Cal L R 52 5 Ind Jur 474, *In re Ishan Chander Roy.*

(1892) 19 Cal 48 (50), *Kashi Chundra Deb v. Gopikrishna Deb.*

(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 717 (718) . 135 Ind Cas 286, *Assoni Kumar v. Sukhaharan.*

(1931) A I R 1931 Csl 713 (714) : 135 Ind Cas 282, *Haimabati Mitra v. Kunja Mohan.* (For revocation of probate.)

(1918) A I R 1916 Cal 938 (942) . 33 Ind Cas 273, *Shyam Lal Ghose v. Ramswari Basu.* (Do.)

(1894) 17 Mad 379 (381), *Gnanamuthu Upadesi v. Vana Koli Pillai Nandan.*

(1895) 8 Mad 207 (208), *Janaki v. Kesatalu.* (For succession certificate.)

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 130 (131) 1912 Pun Re No 20, *Inder Narain v. Onkar Lal.*

(1868) 9 Suth W R 342 (343), *Puroma Soonduree Dossee v. Tara Soonduree Dossee* (Letters of administration.)

(1901) 4 Oudh Cas 224 (226), *Bichana v. Hira Lal* (Do.)

[See (1916) A I R 1916 Low Bur 10 (11) 35 Ind Cas 950 . 6 Low Bur Rul 422, *Moolia Cassim v. Moolia Abdul Rahim* (Application under S 98 of Probate and Administration Act of 1881 for inventory)]

3 (1908) 31 Mad 24 (28) 3 Mad L Tim 19 . 17 Mad L Jour 441, *Sambasita Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai.* (Application to Court for delivery of possession under S. 40 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act.)

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 31 (32) 167 Ind Cas 223 1 L R (1937) Mad 495, *Co-operative Credit Society, Arungunam v. Chinnaswami Udayan.* (Application to enforce award of Registrar under the Co-operative Societies Act.)

4. (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 991 (983) 17 Lah 391 160 Ind Cas 636, *Hussain Bakhsh v. Secretary of State.* (Proceedings under the Indian Telegraph Act for the determination of compensation.)

(1934) A I R 1934 Cal 396 (397) 149 Ind Cas 1134, *Saktisaran Sinha v. Radha Raman Mandal* (Application under S 26-J, Ben Ten Act.)

(1914) A I R 1914 Lah 209 (209) 28 Ind Cas 397, *Afsal Ali v. Aman Ali.* (Sale by the Insolvent Court.)

Article 181
Notes
23—24

such as under Section 195¹ or Section 517² or application for revision to the High Court against the order of an inferior Criminal Court,³ are not governed by this Article, not being applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, rules of limitation are foreign to the administration of criminal justice and it is only by specific legislation that periods of limitation can be rendered applicable to criminal proceedings.⁴

23. Enlargement of time.—In respect of an application falling within the scope of this Article, the period of limitation prescribed by this Article may be enlarged or a fresh period computed by the application of Sections 14, 18, 19 or 20, *ante*.¹ Where a minor's next friend obtains a preliminary mortgage decree and the minor, on attaining majority, applies for a final decree after the period prescribed by this Article has expired, the application will be barred by time.² The reason is that Section 6 *ante* applies only to suits and to applications for execution.

As regards the application of Section 15 *ante* to an application falling under the scope of this Article, see Note 5 to Section 15 *ante* and the undermentioned case.³

Note 23

1. (1888) 10 All 350 (353) : 1888 All W N 92 (93) : 18 Ind Jur 86, *Queen-Empress v. Ajudhia Singh*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1110 (1118) : 39 Mad 750 : 14 Ind Cas 305 : 18 Ori L Jour 209 (F B), *Bapu v. Bapu*.
2. (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 75 (75) : 4 Lah 49 : 73 Ind Cas 937 : 24 Ori L Jour 713, *Kanshi Ram v. Emperor*.
3. (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 401 (401) : 126 Ind Cas 395 : 1930 Ori Cas 941 : 31 Ori L Jour 1012, *Naim Ata v. Emperor*.
4. (1886) 10 All 350 (352) : 1888 All W N 92 : 13 Ind Jur 86, *Queen-Empress v. Ajudhia Singh*.

Note 24

1. (1920) A I R 1920 Bom 208 (209) : 44 Bom 97 : 55 Ind Cas 967, *Ganpatrao Sultanrao v. Anandrao Jagdeorao* (Benefit of B. 14 given)
- (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 381 (382) : 187 Ind Cas 378, *Surja Kanta Das v. Jogendra Nath Dutt*. (Sec. 18 applied to an application to set aside a sale not falling within the scope of Art. 106.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 859 (859) : 84 Ind Cas 970, *Kallepalli Pallayya v. Bhimaraju*. (Do.)
- (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 709 (710) : 42 Mad 52 : 48 Ind Cas 298, *Subbalakshmi Ammal v. Ramalinga Chetty*. (Do)
- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 21 (22, 23) (Oudh), *Amir Chand v. Narsingh Naram*. (Case did not satisfy conditions of Section 14 and therefore time not enlarged.)
- 2 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 508 (509) : 144 Ind Cas 768, *Pulin Chandra Sen v. Amin Miah*.
3. (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 105 (107) : 99 Ind Cas 959, *Mahabir Prasad Narayan Deo v. Chhota Nagpur Banking Association, Ltd.*

182.* For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by article 183 or by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.	Three years; or, where a certified copy of the decree or order has been registered, six years.	1. The date of the decree or order, or 2. (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, or 3. (where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review, or	Article 182
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Act of 1877, Article 179.

- 179.—For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by No 180 or by the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 230
- Three years, or, where a certified copy of the decree or order has been registered, six years.
1. The date of the decree or order, or
 2. (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court, or
 3. (where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review, or
 4. (where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of applying in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step-in-aid of execution, of the decree or order, or
 5. (where the notice next hereinafter mentioned has been issued) the date of issuing a notice under the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 248, or
 - 6 (where the application is to enforce any payment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date) such date

Explanation 1.—Where the decree or order has been passed severally in favour of more persons than one, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable to each, the application mentioned in clause 4 of this number shall take effect in favour only of such of the said persons or their representatives as it may be made by. But when the decree or order has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, such application, if made by any one or more of them, or by his or their representatives, shall take effect in favour of them all.

Where the decree or order has been passed severally against more persons than one, distinguishing portions of the subject-

Article 182

4. (where the decree has been amended) the date of amendment, or
5. (where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of the final order passed on an application made in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step in aid of execution of the decree or order, or

matter as payable or deliverable by each, the application shall take effect against only such of the said persons or their representatives as it may be made against. But where the decree or order has been

their representatives, shall take effect against them all.

Explanation II.—“Proper Court” means the Court whose duty it is (whether under Sections 226 or 227 of the Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise) to execute the decree or order.

Act of 1871, Articles 167 and 168.

- 167.—For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by No. 169.
- Three years
- The date of the decree or order, or (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court,
- or (where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review,
- or (where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of applying to the Court to enforce, or keep in force, the decree or order,
- or (where the notice next hereinafter made has been issued) the date of issuing a notice under the Code of Civil Procedure, section two hundred and sixteen,
- or (where the application is to enforce payment of an instalment which the decree directs to be paid at a specified date) the date so specified.
- 168.—For the execution of any such decree or order of which a certified copy has been registered under the Indian Registration Act.
- Six years
- The date of the decree or order, or (where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court,
- or (where there has been a review of judgment) the date of the decision passed on the review.

6. (in respect of any amount, recovered by execution of the decree or order, which the decree-holder has been directed to refund by a decree passed in a suit for such refund) the date of such last-mentioned decree or, in the case of an appeal therefrom, the date of the final decree of the Appellate Court or of the withdrawal of the appeal, or ~

7. (where the application is to enforce any payment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date) such date.

Act of 1859 — Sections 20, 22 and 23.

Time for enforcing execution of judgment, &c., of a Civil Court not established by Royal Charter.

20. No process of execution shall issue from any Court not established by Royal Charter to enforce any judgment, decree or order of such Court, unless some proceeding shall have been taken to enforce such judgment, decree or order, or to keep the same in force, within three years next preceding the application for such execution

Time for execution of a summary award of Civil Court or Revenue Authority

22. No process of execution shall issue to enforce any summary decision or award of any of the Civil Courts not

Preceding Section not to apply to summary awards in force at the passing of this Act.

23. Nothing in the preceding Sections shall apply to any summary decision or award in force at the time of the passing of this Act, but process of execution may be issued either within the time now limited by law for issuing process of execution thereon or within two years next after the passing of this Act, whichever shall first expire

* Before the amendment of the Act by Act 9 of 1927, Clauses 5 and 6 of the third column were as follows

Clause 5. (where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of applying in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution, or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree or order, or

G (where the notice next hereinafter mentioned has been issued) the date of issue of notice to the person against whom execution is applied for to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him, when the issue of such a notice is required by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or

Article 182

Explanation I. — Where the decree or order has been passed severally in favour of more persons than one, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable to each, the application mentioned in clause 5 of this article shall take effect in favour only of such of the said persons or their representatives as it may be made by. But where the decree or order has been passed, jointly in favour of more persons than one, such application, if made by any one or more of them, or by his or their representatives, shall take effect in favour of them all.

Where the decree or order has been passed severally against more persons than one, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable by each, the application shall take effect against only such of the said persons or their representatives as it may be made against. But where the decree or order has been passed jointly against more persons than one, the application, if made against any one or more of them, or against his or their representatives, shall take effect against them all.

Explanation II. — “Proper Court” means the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree or order.

Synopsis

Article 182

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope of the Article.
3. Applications by Government.
4. Extension of time under the Sections of the Act.
5. Exclusion of time by reason of adjudication in insolvency.
6. Exclusion of time under Para. 11 of Schedule III of the Code of Civil Procedure.
7. Exclusion of time under Section 3 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act (6 of 1876).
8. Application to execute decrees of Native States.
9. Transfer of decree from one Court to another—Limitation for execution of.
10. "Application for the execution of any decree or order."
 11. Decree must be capable of execution.
 12. Application for final decree in suits for sale or foreclosure.
 13. Application for final decree in redemption suits.
 14. Application for ascertainment of mesne profits.
 15. Application for personal decree against mortgagor under Order 34 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code.
 16. Application by auction-purchaser for possession.
 17. Application for final decree in partition suit.
 18. Application for restitution.
 19. "Civil Court."
 20. "Decree."
 21. "Order."
22. "Not provided for by article 183."
23. "Not provided for by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."
24. Registered decree.

CLAUSE 1. .

25. Date of decree.
 26. Clause 1 not applicable where decree is not immediately capable of execution.
 27. Combined decree against person and property, when capable of execution.
 28. Decree partly executable at once and partly not.
 29. Decree for injunction.

Article 182

30. Decree on which court-fee or stamp-duty is payable.
31. Decree becoming unexecutable by reason of subsequent events.
32. Decree on condition to be performed by the decree-holder himself.

CLAUSE 2.

33. Appeal.

34. Appeal, whether should be against the decree or order sought to be executed.
35. Appeal against portion of decree, if savee limitation for execution of whole decree.
36. Appeal by or against one person, whether saves limitation for execution by or against another.
37. Irregular or incompetent appeal.
38. Appeal should have been admitted.
39. Appeal from amended decree.
40. "Final decree or order."
41. Abatement of appeal.
42. Dismissal of appeal for default, whether gives a fresh start of limitation for execution.
43. Order returning appeal for presentation to proper Court.
44. "Appellate Court," meaning of.
45. Withdrawal of appeal.
46. Starting point under clause 2.
47. Who is entitled to benefit of clause 2.

CLAUSE 3.

48. "Where there has been a review of judgment."
49. Review in part.

CLAUSE 4.

50. "Where decree has been amended."
51. Where amended decree is appealed against.

CLAUSE 5.

- 51a. Where a previous application has been made.
52. "Application in accordance with law."
53. Application for relief not granted by decree.
54. Application against person against whom execution could not issue.

55. Application barred by limitation.
- 55a. Application in respect of person or property outside jurisdiction.
- 55b. Application for transfer of decree to non-existent Court or to Court without jurisdiction.
56. Unstamped applications and applications without the payment of court-fees necessary.
57. Application for relief in mode not permitted by law.
58. Application in respect of decree incapable of execution.
- 58a. Application for execution of conditional decree without performing condition.
59. Application not accompanied by certificate required by law.
60. Omission to sign or verify application.
61. Error in description of suit and names of parties.
62. Omission to give, or error in, date of decree.
63. Omission to state whether appeal has been preferred and its result.
64. Omission to state previous adjustments.
65. Particulars of previous applications not given.
68. Omission to mention costs and interest.
67. Omission to state mode in which execution is sought.
68. Failure to file copy of decree.
69. Failure to produce encumbrance certificate.
70. Omission to give description of property sought to be proceeded against.
71. Defects in vakalatnama.
72. Other defects.
73. Application valid only if made by decree-holder or his representative.
 74. Application by attaching creditor.
 - 74a. Application by decree-holder of attached decree or his transferee.
 75. Application by Court-of-Wards.
 78. Application by person represented in representative suits.
 77. Application by stranger claiming to be representative.
 78. Application by transferee of decree.

Article 182

79. Application by agent.
80. Application by pleader.
81. Application by executor of decree-holder without probate.
- 81a. Application for execution need not be against the same person or property.
82. Application against legal representative of judgment-debtor.
83. Application where judgment-debtor is a minor.
84. Application against trustee judgment-debtor who has ceased to be trustee subsequently.
85. Application against judgment-debtor who was dead at that date.
86. Application, if need be bona fide.
- 86a. Effect of return, amendment, and rejection of application for execution.
- 86b. Withdrawal of application.
87. "Proper Court" — General.
 88. Execution beyond local jurisdiction—Application to Court passing decree, if one made to proper Court.
 89. Transfer of decree to another Court for execution — Jurisdiction of transferring Court.
 90. Transfer of decree to another Court — Jurisdiction of transferee Court.
 91. Change in territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction of Court which passed the decree — Effect.
 92. Court passing decree, ceasing to exist — Effect.
 93. Appellate Court.
 94. Temporary Court, decree passed by.
 95. Court in Native State.
 96. Application to Collector.
 97. Insolvency Court, application to.
 98. "Proper Court" — Other illustrative cases.
99. "Application to take some step in aid of execution."
 100. The step must be in furtherance of execution.
 101. The application for step-in-aid must be one in accordance with law and to the proper Court.
 102. Step must be one to be taken by the Court.
 103. There should be an application.

104. Plaint, if can be treated as an application.
105. Appeal, whether can be treated as an application.
- 108. Application for review of order in execution.
- 106a. Re-submission of a returned application.
107. The step asked for, whether should be in aid of a British Indian Court.
108. The step must be with reference to the decree sought to be executed.
109. Application for execution, not in accordance with law, may still be regarded as application for step-in-aid.
110. Application for step-in-aid does not lie where execution is barred.
111. Application for order absolute or for final order.
112. Application to appoint a receiver.
113. Application for succession certificate.
114. Application for confirmation of sale.
115. Application for postponement of execution proceedings.
116. Application for issue of notice under Order 21 Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code.
- 116a. Application for proclamation of sale under Order 21 Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code.
117. Resistance by decree-holder to objections raised by judgment-debtor to execution proceedings.
118. Payment of process-fee, if step-in-aid.
- 118a. Payment of allowance for the subsistence of the judgment-debtor.
119. Application by decree-holder for copies.
120. Application for execution of attached decree.
121. Application for transfer or re-transfer of decree, if a step-in-aid.
122. Application by decree-holder for leave to bid, if step-in-aid.
123. Application for delivery of possession by decree-holder auction-purchaser.
124. Certification under Order 21 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.
125. Application for payment out of monies lying in Court.

Article 182

- 126. Application for substitution of representatives.
- 127. Application for substitution of names of transferees of decree.
- 128. Other illustrative instances of step-in-aid.
- 129. "Final order."
- 130. Order transferring decree for execution.
- 130a. Order returning application.
- 131. Final order need not be in accordance with law.
- 131a. Retrospective operation of amendment of clause 5.

CLAUSE 6.

- 132. Clause 6.

CLAUSE 7.

- 133. Clause 7 — General.
 - 134. "Payment which this decree or order directs to be made at a certain date."
 - 135. "Certain date."
 - 136. Instalment decree.

EXPLANATION I.

- 137. Decree in favour of several persons.
- 138. Decree against several persons.
- 139. Judgment-debtor and his surety — Whether application for execution against one will save limitation against the other.
- 140. Decree for partition.
- 141. Decree partly joint and partly several against several defendants.
- 142. Several persons becoming entitled to, or liable under, decree after it is passed — Effect of application by or against one.

EXPLANATION II.

- 142a. Explanation II.

MISCELLANEOUS.

- 143. Revival of application.
- 144. Onus.
- 145. Local or special law.
- 146. Effect of bar of limitation.
- 147. Res judicata as applied to questions of limitation in execution proceedings.

Other Topics

Article 182

- Amendment of decree—Whether includes amendment of verbal and clerical errors ... See Note 50, Pts. 3 to 7
- Amendment of decree after it is barred—Whether gives fresh start ... See Note 50, Pts. 9 to 16
- Amendment of decree without jurisdiction—Effect ... See Note 50, Pt. 20
- 'Appeal' in clause 2 need not be *bona fide* one ... See Note 33, Pt. 4
- Application by transferee of decree merely for being recognized as transferee ... See Note 18, Pts. 10, 11
- Application for execution—Meaning of ... See Note 10, Pt. 4
- Application for execution—What is not—Instances ... See Note 10, Pts. 5 to 9 & F.N. (10)
- Application for execution by secured creditor—Not affected by insolvency proceedings against judgment-debtor ... See Note 5, Pt. 3
- Application for passing of final decree—Not an application in execution ... See Notes 11, 12, 13, 111
- Application to British Indian Court to transfer decrees to foreign Court for execution according to laws of the foreign State—Whether step-in-aid ... See Note 107
- Application to take step-in-aid—Article 181 and not this Article applies ... See Note 2, Pt. 4
- Article 181 and this Article ... See Note 2, Pts. 1 to 3
- Clause 2—Appeal need not be decided on merits ... See Note 40, Pts. 8 to 10
- Clause 3—Review should have been granted for applicability of clause 3 ... See Note 48, Pts. 4, 5
- Clause 5—Applicability of—Conditions necessary ... See Note 51a
- Construction of this Article ... See Note 2, Pts. 7 to 13
- 'Date of amendment'—Meaning ... See Note 50, Pt. 19
- Decree against several defendants—Appeal by one of them alone—Effect ... See Note 35, Pt. 4
- Decree directing payment 'within' a certain period—Whether comes within clause 7 ... See Note 185, Pt. 8
- Decree not capable of execution—Article 182 does not apply ... See Note 11, Pt. 1a
- Decree not capable of execution on date of decree but becoming executable subsequently—Limitation ... See Note 26, Pts. 2 to 4
- Decree of Revenue Court—Application for execution—Whether Art. 182 applies ... See Note 19
- Ex parte* decree—Application to set aside dismissed—Appeal from anchorder—Limitation for execution of *ex parte* decree—Starting point ... See Note 34, Pts. 6, 7
- Insolvency of decree-holder—Period of insolvency proceedings cannot be excluded ... See Note 5, Pt. 2
- Instalment decree with default clause—Application for enforcement of default clause—Clause 7 does not apply ... See Note 136, Pts. 3, 4
- Instalment decree with default clause—Application for enforcement of default clause—Starting point ... See Note 136, Pts. 6 to 8
- Instalment decree with default clause—Application for instalments within three years of application but after three years of earliest default ... See Note 136, Pts. 9 to 11 and 13 to 15
- Limitation suspended against one of judgment-debtors on account of his insolvency—It will not be suspended against others also ... See Note 133, Pt. 13
- Order returning application for amendment—Whether 'final order' within clause 5 ... See Note 129, Pts. 16 to 20
- Order striking off proceedings—Effect ... See Note 143, Pts. 8 to 14
- Proceeding against wrong person as legal representative of judgment debtor ... See Note 82, Pts. 1a to 4
- Relief not possible to be granted for want of particulars—Application not one in accordance with law ... See Notes 52, 72
- Revenue Court—Whether Civil Court ... See Note 19
- Step-in-aid—Whether pending execution application necessary ... See Note 100, Pts. 5 to 9
- Step-in-aid of execution—Essentials ... See Note 99

Article 182
Note 1

1. Legislative changes.

1. Law prior to 1859 :

Before the Act of 1859 was passed, there was no specific provision in any of the Regulations in force in the various Provinces prescribing any period of limitation for applications for the execution of decrees and orders. But the Courts adopted, as a matter of practice, a twelve years' rule of limitation in such cases.¹

2. Law under the Act of 1859 :

The Act of 1859 introduced provisions prescribing period of limitation for the execution of judgments, decrees and orders. By Section 20, it was provided that no process of execution should issue to enforce any judgment, decree or order unless the application for execution was made within three years —

(a) of some proceeding taken to enforce such judgment, decree or order, or

(b) of some proceeding taken to keep the same in force.²

Article 182 — Note 1

1. (1865) 5 Suth W R (Misc) 8 (9), *Prosunno Coomar Ghose v. Sham Lal Gungopadhyay*.

(1818) Select Reports by Macnaghten, Volume 2, page 360.

2. (1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 17 (18), *Kool Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Rumul Chunder Roy*.

(1876) 1876

(1867) 7 S.

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1 appeal

(1860) 2 All 792 (798) . 6 Cal L R 561 . 7 Ind App 167 : 3 Shome L R 211 : 4 Ind Jur 426 . 3 Suther 761 : 4 Sar 157 (P C), *Hira Lal v. Badri Das*.

(1874) 21 Suth W R 97 (100) : 13 Beng L R 169 (P C), *Benoderam Sen v. Brojendra Naram Roy*.

(1874) 22 Suth W R 512 (516, 517) : 14 Beng L R 143 (F B), *Eshen Chunder Bose v. Prannath Nag*.

(1870) 13 Suth W R 44 (48) : 4 Beng L R 101 (F B), *Kristo Komul Singh v. Hurree Sirdar*.

(1870) 13 Suth W R 3 (4, 5) : 4 Beng L R 82 (F B), *Rhedoy Krishna Ghose v. Koylash Chunder Bose*.

As to what are proceedings in that Section, see the following cases :

(1870) 13 Moo Ind App 479 (488) . 14 Suth W R 21 : 5 Beng L R 611 : 2

1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111

1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111

1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111

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1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111

1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111

1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111 : 1870 Cal L R 111

In the case of *summary* decisions and awards of Civil Courts, an exactly similar provision was made by Section 22 but with

Article 182
Note 1

1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 63 (63), <i>Luckhee Narain v. Ram Chand.</i> (An application for execution followed by issue of notice was a proceeding to keep alive the decree.)	King of n due
1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 37 (37, 38), <i>Chunder Coomar Roy v. Ranee Shurut Soonduree Debia</i> (An application for execution merely, without even notice of it to the other party, is not a proceeding which keeps the decree alive.)	(Do) ullick "pro- barred might

Roy.

(A decree-holder should do something more than the mere presentation of a petition for execution to keep alive his decree.)

- (1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 63 (63), *Luckhee Narain v. Ram Chand.* (An application for execution followed by issue of notice was a proceeding to keep alive the decree.)
- (1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 37 (37, 38), *Chunder Coomar Roy v. Ranee Shurut Soonduree Debia* (An application for execution merely, without even notice of it to the other party, is not a proceeding which keeps the decree alive.)
- (1861) 1861 Bom P J 151, *Sabaji v. Ganesh* (An application only for costs cannot be deemed to be a *bona fide* endeavour to get the decree enforced.)
- (1872) 18 Suth W R 190 (191), *Kalla Chand Paul v. Maharajah Dheeraj Mahatab Chand Bahadur.* (A "proceeding" under S 20 of Act 14 of 1859 must be a proceeding which is not at the time barred by limitation.)
- (1869) 11 Suth W R 209 (209), *Radhoo Chowdhram v. Heet Lall Roy.*
- (1871) 19 Suth W R 255 (260), 14 Beng L R 425 (Note), *Nadir Hossein v. Pearoo Thoudarnee.* (The proceeding need not be by a person legally and rightfully entitled to the decree.)
- (1869) 12 Suth W R 436 (438) : 4 Beng L R A C 1, *Khaja Abdool Ganns v. N. P. Pogose.*
- (1871) 5 Mad H C R 453 (456), *Kendiga Modi Chetta v. Soobhamma.*
- (1874) 21 Suth W R 188 (188) : 18 Beng L R App 1, *Sheikh Irshad Ali v. Radhu Shah*
- (1868) 10 Suth W R 1016 (1017), *Mahomed Saïed Khan v. Ash Chowdhry*
- (1866) 5 Suth W F , *Chowdhry* (served on a judgment-debtor is not a process to enforce a decree.)
- (1869) 3 Beng L R App 33 (34), *Bhubaneswari Debi v. Mahendra Nath Chowdhry.* (Resistance to appeal or review is a proceeding.)
- (1866) 5 Suth W R (Misc) 19 (19), *Syud Khan v. Jamal Bibee.* (Do.)
- (1868) 4 Mad H C R 32 (40), *Vrasamy Mudali v. Manomany Ammal.* (Decree-holder resisting an application by judgment-debtor to set aside decree is not proceeding to keep decree alive.)
- (1870) 18 Suth W R 208 (208), *Poornanund Surkhel v. Huro Soonduri*
- (1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 95 (95, 96), *Ram Ruttien Banerjee v. Maharajah Amneroolmolk Bunnaree Gotsind Bhadur*
- (1872) 18 Suth W R 7 (8), *Bukronath Chuckerbutty v. Rajah Nilmonce Singh Deo*
- (1871) 16 Suth W R 299 (300), *Kuttyanund Koondoo v. Nugendro Chunder Ghose.*
- (1867) 7 Suth
- (1866) 6 Suth
- Bullub*
- (1865) 2 Suth W R (Misc) 3 (4), *Kashee Pershad Roy v. Shib Chunder Deb.* (Do.)
- (1867) 7 Suth W R 515 (519) : 10 Beng L R Sup Vol 709 (F B), *Kangaleechurn Ghosal v. Bonomallee Mullick.* (Do.)

not three.³

Article 182
Note 1

The said two provisions were not to apply to judgments, decrees and orders in force at the time of the passing of the Act of 1859. As to these, process of execution could issue either within the time limited by law then in force or within three years (two years in the case of summary decisions and awards), next after the passing of the Act, whichever should first expire⁴ (Sections 21 and 23.)

(1873) 5 N W P H C R 100 (101), *Abou Imam v. Bence Ram*. (Uncertified payment of instalments is not a proceeding.)

(1873) 19 Suth W R 226 (227), *Baboo Nath Jha v. Khuggut Doss*.

(1868) 3 Agra (Misc) 5 (5), *Nawab Ammenood Deen Khan v. Mooruffur Hussein Khan*.

(1869) 11 Suth W R 210 (211), *Prasunno Chunder Roy v. Mookoond Pershad Roy*. (Defending claim suit.)

As to the starting point under that Section, see the following cases:

(1866) 4 Mad H C R 260 (261), *Ramanuja Aiyangar v. Venkatachary*. (Limitation runs not from the date of a former application for process of execution to enforce the decree but from the date of the order upon the application.)

(1871) 15 Suth W R 51 (51), *Brojungona Dassee v. Shona Mookhee Dassee*. (Do.)

(1872) 18 Suth W R 76 (77) 11 Beng L R 23 (P C), *Dhunput Singh Roy v. Mudhomottee Debia*. (Do.)

(1868) 5 Bom H C R A C 214 (215), *Bapurau Krishna v. Madhattrav Ramrau*. (Time would run from date of appellate order where there has been appeal.)

(1866) 2 Agra 237 (239), *Sheo Jalum v. Gunesh*.

(1886) 8 Suth W R (Misc) 63 (63), *Maharajah Dhuraj Mahatab Chund Bahadoor v. Baboo Buloram Singh*. (But the striking off of a case is not an act in furtherance of execution.)

(1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 63 (64), *Tarnee Churn Gangolly v. Tuluck Chunder Ghose*.

3. (1884) 10 Cal 196 (204) 7 Ind Jnr 550 13 Cal L R 385. 10 Ind App 119 4 Sar 454 (P C), *Mina Kanwars v. Juggat Selani*.

General of India)

(1868) 5 Bom H C R A C 102 (107), *Makunda Balacharya v. Silaram*. (Do.)

(1870) 13 Suth W R (F B) 3 (5) 4 Beng L R 82 (F B), *Rhedoy Krishna Ghose v. Koylash Chunder Bose* (Do.)

(1866) 5 Suth W R (Misc) 20 (21), *Baroda Debia v. Sreeram Chowdhry*.

Article 182
Note 1

this difference that the period of limitation was one year and

- (1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 14 (15), *Ram Coomar Chowdhry v. Brojessuree Chowdhraim.* (Do.)
- (1872) 1872 Pun Re No. 9, *Ram Singh v. Badan Singh.* (Do.)
- (1865) 4 Suth W R (Misc) 24 (24), *Shureefoonissa v. Raj Kishen.* (Do)
- (1874) 23 Suth W R 31 (33), *Pearce Soonduree Debia v. Bhubo Soonduree Debia.* (Do.)
- (1871) 15 Suth W R 207 (208), *Radha Gobind Shaha v. Brojendro Coomar Chowdhry.* (Do.)
- (1869) 11 Suth W R 205 (206); 7 Beng L R 706 (Note), *Tufuzzul Hossein Khan v. Bahadur Singh.* (Do.)
- (1874) 1874 Pun Re No. 16, *Hansraj v. Harbakhsh.* (Do)
- (1868) 9 Suth W R 240 (241), *Mohesh Chunder Biswas v. Taramonee Dasses.* (Proceeding against some only of judgment-debtors.)
- (1874) 1874 Pun Re No. 38, *Sarjan Mal v. Mamu.* (Do.)
- (1868) 9 Suth W R 330 (331), *Obhoy Churn Dutt v. Modhoo Soodun Chowdhry.* (Notice under S. 216, Civil Procedure Code of 1859.)
- (1866) 5 Suth W R (Misc) 5 (5), *Girjanund Oopadhya v. Chuder Binode Oopadhya.* (Do.)
- (1866) 5 Suth W R (Misc) 5 (5), *Sham Chand Bysack v. Lucas Theodore Lucas.*
- (1884) 11 Cal 55 (59, 60), *Becha Ram Dutt v. Abdul Wahed.* (Proceedings in resistance of a claim to attach properties are proceedings.)
- (1872) 18 Suth W R 463 (463), *Khajah Mahomed Hossein Khan v. Syud Loof Ali Khan.*
- (1869) 11 Suth W R 8 (9), *Ram Soondur v. Ram Kanto.* (Rateable distribution — Proceedings in.)
- (1868) 9 Suth W R (Misc) 43 (43), *Fuzceluloonissa v. Chuttur Dharee Singh.* (Attempt at settlement of accounts in Court is sufficient to keep a decree alive.)
- (1870) 18 Suth W R 141 (142); 4 Beng L R A C 153, *Naunhee Koonwar v. Kustoorce Koonwar.* (Precept to the Collector under clause 2 of S. 24, Regulation 48 of 1793, for mutation of names in the terms of a decree was a process to enforce the decree.)
- (1869) 10 Suth W R 337 (338), *Leak v. Daniel.* (Transmission of decree for execution)
- (1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 60 (60), *Maharajah Dheraj Mahatab Chund Dahadoor v. Dmo Moyee Debia.* (Do.)
- (1867) 8 Su see. (Do)
- (1866) 5 Su rma Mojomdar
- (1879) 2 All 285 (286), *Raghu Ram v. Dammu Lal.* (Do.)
- (1867) Agra F B 156 (157) (F B), *Telley v. Peet Singh.* (Consent of the decree-holder to the striking off of an attachment is not a proceeding to enforce a decree.)
- (1867) 7 Suth W R 100 (100), *Mohammed v. Ghulam Hussain.* (An edings
- see.
- with
- keep
- alive the decree)
- (1868) 10 Suth W R 240 (210), *Naram Acharjee Chowdhry v. Mohamaya Debia Chowdhraim.* (Proceedings between assignee of decree against third party.)
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- to

not three.³

Article 182
Note 1

The said two provisions were not to apply to judgments, decrees and orders in force at the time of the passing of the Act of 1859. As to these, process of execution could issue either within the time limited by law then in force or within three years (two years in the case of summary decisions and awards), next after the passing of the Act, whichever should first expire.⁴ (Sections 21 and 23.)

(1873) 5 N W P H C R 100 (101), *Aboo Imam v. Benes Ram*, (Uncertified payment of instalments is not a proceeding)

(1873) 19 Suth W R 226 (227), *Baboo Nath Jha v. Khugput Doss*,

(1868) 3 Agra (Misc) 5 (5), *Nawab Ammenood Deen Khan v. Mooruffur Hussein Khan*.

(1869) 11 Suth W R 210 (211), *Prosunno Chunder Roy v. Mookoond Pershad Roy*. (Defending claim suit.)

As to the starting point under that Section, see the following cases:

(1868) 4 Mad H C R 260 (261), *Ramanuja Aiyangar v. Venkatachary*, (Limitation runs not from the date of a former application for process of execution to enforce the decree but from the date of the order upon the application.)

(1871) 15 Suth W R 51 (51), *Brojungona Dassee v. Shona Mookhee Dassee*, (Do.)

(1872) 18 Suth W R 76 (77) - 11 Beng L R 23 (P C), *Dhunput Singh Roy v. Mudkomottee Debia*, (Do.)

(1868) 5 Bom H C R A C 214 (215), *Bapurau Erishna v. Madhorav Ramrau*, (Time would run from date of appellate order where there has been appeal.)

(1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 63 (63), *Maharajah Dhiraj Mahatab Chund Bahadur v. Baboo Buleram Singh*. (But the striking off of a case is not an act in furtherance of execution.)

(1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 63 (61), *Tarinee Churn Gangolly v. Tuluck Chunder Ghose*.

3. (1884) 10 Cal 196 (204) 7 Ind Jur 550 13 Cal L R 335 10 Ind App 119 : 4 Sar 454 (P C), *Mina Kantwar v. Juggat Setani*.

passing of Act 14, or without curtailing the period within which limitation under that Act bars a claim to revive a decree passed before the passing of the Act.)

(1866) 3 Bom H C R A C 175 (176), *Ex parte Kalidas Damodhar*. ("At the time of the passing of this Act" in Act 14 of 1859, must be construed to mean the time when the Act received the assent of the Governor-General of India.)

(1868) 5 Bom H C R A C 102 (107), *Makunda Balacharya v. Sitaram*. (Do.)

(1870) 13 Suth W R (F B) 3 (5): 4 Beng L R 62 (F B), *Rhedoy Erishna Ghose v. Koylash Chunder Bose* (Do.)

(1866) 5 Suth W R (Misc) 20 (21), *Baroda Debia v. Sreeram Chowdhry*.

Article 182
Note 1

3. Act of 1871 :

Articles 167 and 168 of the Act of 1871 dealt with the limitation for the execution of decrees. The former dealt with the limitation for the execution of unregistered decrees, and the latter for the execution of registered decrees and orders.

The fourth clause of Article 167 corresponded to Section 20 of the Act of 1859 and provided that where an application "next hereinafter mentioned has been made," time ran from "the date of applying to the Court to enforce or to keep in force the decree or order."

It may be noted that both the Acts of 1859 and 1871 recognized applications *merely to keep in force* a decree or order, as furnishing a starting point of limitation.⁵ Such an application could not be made under the later Acts.⁶

4. Act of 1877 :

The words "or by the Code of Civil Procedure, section 230" in the first column of Article 179 of the Act of 1877 were newly added. In clause 4 in the third column of Article 179 of the Act of 1877, the words "in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution" were substituted for the words "to the Court to enforce or to keep in force." The words "payment of an instalment" which occurred in clause 6 of the Act of 1871 were substituted in the Act of 1877, by the words "any payment."

5. Act of 1908 :

The words "or the withdrawal of the appeal" were newly added at the end of clause 2 of the Act of 1908. Clause 4 of

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- (1867) 7 Suth W R 330 (330), *Nowaraja Chowdhry v. Ram Kanaye Doss*.
 (1867) 8 Suth W R 88 (88), *Deegendur Narain Ghose v. Hurkishore Dutt*.
 (1867) 7 Suth W R 515 (518) : Beng L R Sup Vol 709 (F B), *Kangalcechurn Ghosal v. Bonomallee Mullick*.
 (1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 39 (40), *Huro Nath Doss v. Muddun Mohan Chuckerbutty*. (Section 21, Act 14 of 1859, was passed to give extension of time to decree-holders whose decrees would have been barred under the new law.)

The three years' period was from the date of the passing of the Act and not the date of the coming into force thereof. See the following cases :

- (1864) 1864 Suth W R (Misc) 27 (27), *Baboo Roghoonath Pershad v. Mt. Velaetee Begum*.
 (1864) 1 Suth W R (Misc) 9 (9), *Lulleet Ram v. Saligram Singh*.
 (1868) 4 Mad II O R 148 (149), *Vrbhadra Rau v. M. Ramasaya*.
 (1872) 1872 Bom P J 46, *Jethalal v. Naran*.
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 363 (369) : 3 Beng L R A C 40, *Buthu Narayan Dandopadhyo v. Ganga Narayan Biswas*.
 [See also (1866) 6 Suth W R (Misc) 14 (14), *Doorgachurn Roy v. Dno Moyes Debn*.
 (1866) 5 Suth W R (Misc) 17 (17), *Greggory v. Juggat Chuder Dannerjee*]
 5. (1876) 25 Suth W R 546 (547), *Nilmoney Singh v. Nilcomul Tuppadar*.
 6. (1902) 26 Mad 780 (782, 783) : 19 Mad L Jour 412, *Rungiah Gounden & Co. v. Nanjappa Row*.

the Act of 1908 is *oew*. Clause 5 of the Act of 1877 was re-enacted as clause 6 of the Act of 1908 with certain amendments.

6. *Amendments after 1908 :*

In clause 5, the words "the final order . . . made" were substituted by Act 9 of 1927 for the word "applying."⁷ Clause 6 was substituted for the old clause 6, which was deleted, in view of the amendment of clause 5 making time run from the date of the final order on applications for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution.

Act 9 of 1927 came into force on the 1st January 1928. The amendment will not disturb vested rights. An application for execution of a decree after that date would be governed by the amended provisions, if the right of the decree-holder to execute his decree did not become barred on the 1st January 1928.⁸

2. *Scope of the Article.*—Article 181, *ante*, is a general Article applicable to applications for which no period of limitation is provided for elsewhere in the First Schedule. This Article is a special Article dealing with applications for the execution of decrees and orders. Where this Article is applicable, Article 181 cannot be resorted to, the general principle of interpretation of statutes being that a special provision will prevail over a general one.¹ Normally, an application for the execution of a decree or order will be governed by this Article and not by Article 181,² and it is only where there are definite circumstances which make this Article inapplicable that Article 181 may apply.³

An application for execution is not the same thing as an application to take a *step-in-aid of execution*. This Article does not govern the latter application which will, if no other Article is applicable to it, be governed by Article 181.⁴ Further, this Article is not exhaustive of all applications for execution.⁵ An application, though for execution, may yet not be covered by any of the clauses in the third

7. (1910) 7 Ind Cas 859 (859) (Mad), *Subramania Pillai v. Sankara Subbu*

8. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 85 (85) 140 Ind Cas 500, *Nagalingam Pillay v. Sivachudambara Sabapathy*.

(1930) 34 Cal W N 733 (734), *Kanas Lall Sabu v. Purnachandra Chatterjee*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Pat 207 (207) 127 Ind Cas 572, *Sapani Patra v. Damodar Kar*.

Note 2

1. See Note 24 of the Preamble to this Act.

2. (1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 129 (130) 158 Ind Cas 517, *Budhu Ram v. Mush-taq Shah*.

3. (1929) A I R 1929 All 606 (608) 114 Ind Cas 894, *Mahammad Ishaq v. Baldeo Prasad*.

4. (1905) 10 Cal W N 354 (360) (FB), *Apurba Krishna Roy v. Chundermoney Deb*.

5. (1903) 26 Mad 780 (784) 13 Mad L Jour 412, *Ranjiah Goundan and Co. v. Nanjappa Row*.

**Article 182
Note 2**

column of the Article. In such cases, as has been seen in Note 25 to the Preamble, this Article cannot apply, with the result that Article 181 may apply.⁶

The Article should receive a fair and liberal and not too technical a construction so as to enable a decree-holder to obtain the fruits of his decree.⁷ Its language ought not to be strained in favour of the judgment-debtor who has not paid his just debt.⁸ Where words are fairly capable of two interpretations, one of which assists the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of his decree, and the other prevents him from obtaining the fruits of his decree, that interpretation which assists the decree-holder should be accepted.⁹ As a general rule, the Courts should lean to the view that the application is not barred.¹⁰ But Courts should not, in their anxiety to prevent justice being defeated by technicalities, overlook the danger of introducing uncertainty in the law by reason of such interpretation,¹¹ or condone the laches of the decree-holder when the application is clearly barred by limitation.¹² In the words of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratab Narain Singh*,¹³ "it is impossible

(1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 209 (212, 213) : 143 Ind Cas 803 : 8 Luck 427, *Shyam Lal v. Nasruddin Beg.*

6. (1903) 26 Mad 760 (789) : 13 Mad L Jour 412, *Rungiah Goundan and Co. v. Nanjappa Row.*

See also Note 26, *infra*.

7. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 323 (324) : 178 Ind Cas 749, *Annapurnamma v. Venkamma.*

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 728 (730) : 39 Mad 923 : 30 Ind Cas 707, *Varadaraja Mudali v. Murugesam Pillai.*

(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 308 (309) : 103 Ind Cas 279 : 24 Nag L R 86, *Ramchandra v. Uka.*

(1919) A I R 1919 All 390 (390) : 41 All 479 : 50 Ind Cas 143, *Babu Ram v. Pearey Lal.*

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 620 (621) : 41 Mad 251 : 41 Ind Cas 701, *Masilamani Mudaliar v. Sethuswami Iyer.*

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 723 (730) : 39 Mad 923 : 30 Ind Cas 707, *Varadaraja Mudali v. Murugesam Pillai.*

(1900) 27 Cal 709 (712) : 4 Cal W N 681, *Sarsatoolia Molla v. Raj Kumar.*

(1912) 16 Ind Cas 370 (371) (Cal), *Balaram Das Bhagat v. Raja Mukanada Deb.*

(1882) 5 Mad 141 (143), *Kunhi Mannan v. Seshagiri Bhalathan.*

8. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 323 (324) : 178 Ind Cas 749, *Annapurnamma v. Venkamma.*

(1907) 1 Ind Cas 57 (60) (Cal), *Manorath Das v. Ambica Kanta Dose.*

See also cases cited in Foot-Note (7) above.

9. (1936) A I R 1936 Sind 138 (139) : 30 Sind L R 53 : 161 Ind Cas 1011, *Kishinchand Butamal v. Dhaniram Jamnadas.*

10. (1913) 18 Ind Cas 236 (237) (Lah), *Wali Ram v. Bhagwan Das.*

11. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 620 (621) : 41 Mad 251 : 41 Ind Cas 701, *Masilamani Mudaliar v. Sethuswami Iyer.*

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 79 (81) : 45 Mad 466 : 70 Ind Cas 321, *Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Iyer.*

[See also (1918) 35 Mad L Jour 38 (38) (N 1 C). (Critical Note on (1918) 41 Mad 251. A I R 1918 Mad 620.)]

12. See (1923) A I R 1923 Sind 14 (15) : 73 Ind Cas 311 : 17 Sind L R 255, *Sakerchand Narasid v. Yacoob.*

13. (1935) A I R 1935 P C 85 (88) : 155 Ind Cas 205 : 62 Ind App 80 : 37 All 212 (P C).

to hold that in a matter which is governed by Act, an Act which in some limited respects, gives the Court a statutory discretion, there can be implied in the Court, outside the limits of the Act, a general discretion to dispense with its provisions "

Article 182
Notes
2—4

3. Applications by Government. — Section 17 of the Act of 1859 exempted from the operation of the Act, "any public claim whatever." Such claims continued, by the terms of the Section, to be governed by "the rules and laws of limitation now in force" It was held in the undermentioned case,¹ under the Act of 1859, that an application by the Government for the recovery of stamp duty by attachment and sale of the property of the person liable to pay such duty, was governed by the old rules of limitation in force at the time of the passing of the Act, which provided a period of sixty years for such matters,² and was therefore not barred.

There is no reservation in the later Acts in favour of the Government in the matter of execution proceedings. An application by the Government for execution must be made within the period prescribed by this Article.³ Thus, an application by the Government to recover court-fees from a party is subject to the same period of limitation as the right of a subject to enforce a decree or order.⁴

4. Extension of time under the Sections of the Act. — The Articles in the Schedule must be read subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 25 of the Act (see Section 3). In computing the period of limitation prescribed by this Article, therefore, regard must be had to the provisions of Sections 4 to 25, where such provisions are applicable to the particular application.¹

Note 3

1. (1875) 8 Mad H C R 40 (43), *Collector of South Arcot v. Thathacharry*.
2. See Madras Regulation II of 1805, Section 2, clause 1.
3. (1874) 22 Suth W R 512 (512) (F B), *Collector of Deerbhoom v Sreehury Chuckerbutty*
4. (1883) 7 Bom 552 (553) (Notes), *Venubai v Collector of Nasik*
(1881) 4 Mad 155 (156), *Appaya v. Collector of Vizagapatam*.

Note 4

1. *Applicability of Section 4 :*

See Note 1 to Section 4.

Applicability of Section 5

See Note 3 to Section 5.

Applicability of Section 6 :

See Notes 14, 15 and 35 to Section 6 and Notes 5, 6 and 15 to Section 7 and also the undermentioned cases.

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1216 (1218) 85 Ind Cas 1007, *Bijoy Chand Mahatab v. Nilmoni Lahiri* (Disability must exist when cause of action arises)

(1902) 1902 Pun L R No 131 1902 Pun Re No 100, *Allah Bakhsh v Bha-*
wans (Subsequent disability does not affect the running of time)

arswami Ayya v.
if a guardian has

nd Cas 372, *Sain-*

Article 182
Note 5

5. Exclusion of time by reason of adjudication in insolvency.—Section 78, sub-section 2 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 5 of 1920, provides as follows :

"Where an order of adjudication has been annulled under this Act, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree (other than a

(1911) 12 Ind Cas 503 (505) (Mad), *Duraiswami Sastrial v. Venkatarama Iyer*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Cal 1 (3) : 149 Ind Cas 1062, *Satis Chandra Sen v. Jivan Lal Daga*.

Applicability of Section 12 :

See Note 3 to Section 12.

Applicability of Section 14 :

See Note 5 to Section 14, *ante* and the undermentioned cases :

(1890) 1890 Pun Re No. 154, *Mshr Jang Khan v. Faizulla Khan*. (Proceeding must be between the same parties)

(1923) A I R 1929 Rang 98 (98) : 79 Ind Cas 234, *F. N. Burn v. G. H. Paul*. (Proceeding must be for the same relief.)

(1887) 1887 All W N 198 (199), *Madho Rai v. Rajkari Kuar*. (The previous application must have been infructuous by reason of want of jurisdiction.)

(1901) 29 Cal 293 (241) : 5 Cal W N 150, *Sheik Jafar v. Kamalini Debi*. (Do.)

(1880) 2 All 792 (797) : 7 Ind App 167 : 6 Cal L R 561 : 4 Sar 157 : 3 Shome L R 211 : 4 Ind Jur 426 : 3 Suther 761 (P O), *Hira Lal v. Badri Das*. (Do.)

(1917) A I R 1917 All 370 (370) : 39 Ind Cas 796, *Ram Jas v. Ram Narain*. (Do.)

(1909) 2 Ind Cas 102 (105) : 1909 Pun Re No. 52, *Peachey v. Punjab Banking Company, Limited, Lahore*.

Applicability of Section 15 :

See Notes under Section 15, *ante* and the undermentioned cases :

(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 693 (699) : 95 Ind Cas 718, *Lalumia v. Masur Hannisa*. (Collateral proceeding—Time taken cannot be deducted.)

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 418 (420) : 56 Mad 490 : 143 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Tripura Sundaramma v. Abdul Khader*. (Do.)

Dhar. (Do.)

(1884) 1884 Pun Re No. 77, *Kurta Ram v. Karthi Mal*. (Order granting time for payment is not order staying execution.)

Applicability of Section 19 ante :

See Note 63 to Section 19 and the undermentioned cases :

(1924) A I R 1924 Nag 147 (148) : 79 Ind Cas 66, *Daji Mahar v. Mahader Kunbi*. (A letter by judgment-debtor to decree-holder acknowledging his liability to pay the decretal amount is an acknowledgment within Section 19 and saves limitation for execution.)

(1933) A I R 1933 All 364 (366) : 55 All 393 : 146 Ind Cas 836, *Adya Prasad Singh v. Lal Gvish Bahadur Pal*. (Do.)

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 501 (305) : 124 Ind Cas 830, *Hatimulla v. Sukhamoy Chaudhuri*. (Acknowledgment of portion of the amount will save limitation as to whole.)

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 603 (604) (Cal), *Ram Pal Singh v. Nandlal Marwari*. (Insolvency petition specifying debt is a sufficient acknowledgment.)

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 760 (763) : 174 Ind Cas 23, *Appaji Chetti v. Corundam Reddi*. (Oral admission of payment in Court, and recorded by Court is not sufficient.)

suit or application in respect of which the leave of the Court was obtained under sub-section 2 of Section 28) which might have been brought or made but for the making of an order of adjudication under this Act, the period from the date of the order of adjudication to the date of the order of annulment shall be excluded :

"Provided that nothing in this Section shall apply to a suit or application in respect of a debt provable but not proved under this Act."

It follows that in cases of intervening insolvency of the judgment-debtor the period during which the adjudication lasts will be excluded in computing the period of limitation for the execution of the decree against him.¹ But the benefit of the exclusion of time under the said Section is available only where execution is sought against an insolvent *judgment-debtor* and not where the insolvent is a *decree-holder* whose decree is sought to be executed.² An application for execution by a *secured* creditor is not affected by the insolvency proceedings against the judgment-debtor and consequently the period of insolvency cannot be excluded under Section 78 in computing the period of limitation for the application for execution.³

6. Exclusion of time under Para. 11 of Schedule III of the Code of Civil Procedure. — Paragraph 11 of Schedule III of the Code of Civil Procedure runs as follows :

"1. So long as the Collector can exercise or perform in respect of the judgment-debtor's immoveable property, or any part thereof, any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed on him by paragraphs 1 to 10, the judgment-debtor or his representative in interest shall be incompetent to mortgage, charge, lease or alienate such property or part except with the written permission of the Collector, nor shall any Civil Court issue any

Applicability of Section 20 :

See Note 30 to Section 20 and also the following cases

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 674 (674) 147 Ind Cas 586, *Chathukutty v. Raman* (Payment by one of several judgment-debtors on behalf of

others)

Note 5

1. (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 69 (70) 134 Ind Cas 676 7 Luck 397, *Nalched Shah v. Kashmir Bank, Fyzabad.*
- (1930) A I R 1930 All 580 (582) 126 Ind Cas 16, *Sita Ram v. Kishan Lal.*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 40 (40) 79 Ind Cas 696, *Akhaj, Khalifa v. Ram Lal Marwari.*
- (1931) A I R 1931 Pat 357 (358, 359) 131 Ind Cas 633 10 Pat 422, *Hat Narayan Singh v. Brij Nandan Singh.*
2. (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 715 (716, 717) 121 Ind Cas 455, *Rama Pillay v. Kasamuthu Nadar.*
3. (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 71 (72) 113 Ind Cas 86 1 Luck 241, *Sita Ram Kuar v. Ram Prasad Ghosh.*

Article 182
Notes
6-8

process against such property or part in execution of a decree for the payment of money.

"2. During the same period no Civil Court shall issue any process of execution either against the judgment-debtor or his property in respect of any decree for the satisfaction whereof provision has been made by the Collector under paragraph 7.

"3. The same period shall be excluded in calculating the period of limitation applicable to the execution of any decree affected by the provisions of this paragraph in respect of any remedy of which the decree-holder has been temporarily deprived."

It was held in the undermentioned cases¹ that where the immovable property of the judgment-debtor was placed under the management of the Collector under the above paragraph, limitation for execution would be suspended for the period during which the property was under such management.

7. Exclusion of time under Section 3 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act (6 of 1876).—Section 3 of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, 1876, provides that as soon as an estate is taken charge of under the said Act, all proceedings pending in Civil Courts in respect of the debts of the disqualified owner shall be barred. But, under Section 12 of the Act, the debts so barred are revived when the estate is released. A decree-holder obtained a decree against the judgment-debtor on 19th April 1905. The estate of the judgment-debtor was in charge of the Encumbered Estates Department from 23rd May 1906 to 21st April 1908, on which last date it was released. The decree-holder applied for execution of his decrees on 13th February 1909. It was held that the application was within time.¹

8. Application to execute decrees of Native States.—It is a general principle of international law that all *matters of procedure* are governed only by the *lex fori*, or the law of the *forum* in which the action is brought. Questions of limitation, being essentially matters of procedure, are governed only by the *lex fori*. Thus, if an application for execution of a decree, passed in a Native State, is made to a British Indian Court, it will be governed by this Act, and if it is barred thereunder, will be dismissed even though it may be within time according to the law of limitation applicable in the Native State in which the decree was obtained.

Note 6

1. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 377 (378) : 13 Oudh Cas 303, *Mohammad Abdul Karim Khan v. Naras Singh*.
- (1910) 7 Ind Cas 860 (860) (Mad), *Damara Kumara Thimmanayannu v. Ranga Bhupala*.
- (1893) 20 All 533 (335) : 1893 All W N 82, *Girdhar Das v. Har Shan'ar Prasad*.

Note 7

1. (1910) 7 Ind Cas 787 (789) : 33 Cal 239, *Protap Uday Narain v. Madan Mohan Nath*.

For further discussion, see Section 11 Note 2 *ante* and also the undermentioned case.¹

Article 182
Notes
8—10

9. Transfer of decree from one Court to another—Limitation for execution of.—Where a decree is transferred for execution to another Court under Section 43, Civil Procedure Code, and the two Courts are governed by different rules of limitation, the law applicable to an application for execution made to the transferee Court depends not on the character of the Court which *executes* the decree, but of the Court which passed it, though the manner of execution is that of the Court which executes the decree.¹ Thus, where a decree of a mufassil Court is transferred for execution to the Original Side of a Chartered High Court, the application for execution of such decree is governed by this Article and not by Article 183, *infra*.² As to the converse case of a decree passed on the Original Side of the High Court transferred to a mufassil Court, see Note 2, Pt. (1) to Article 183, *infra*.

10. "Application for the execution of any decree or order."—Execution is the enforcement of decrees and orders by process of Court so as to enable the judgment-creditor to recover the fruits of the judgment.¹ The modes in which the Courts can execute their decrees and orders are set forth in Part II and Order 21, Schedule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Acts of 1859 and 1871 referred to applications "to enforce" the decree or order. It was held in cases coming under those Acts that an application to "enforce a decree" was an application "under Section 212 (of the Code of 1859, now Order 21 Rule 11) or otherwise by which proceedings in execution are commenced and not applications of an incidental nature made during the pendency of such proceedings."² Thus, an application for the issue of a warrant pending an application for execution, was held not to be an application to "enforce the decree."³ An "application for the execution of a

Note 8

- (1868) 10 Suth W R 10 (12) . Beng L R Sup Vol 970 (F B), *T. Leake v. W. Daniel*.

Note 9

- (1890) 17 Cal 491 (497), *Tincowrie Dasu v. Debendra Nath Mookerjee*.
(1896) 24 Cal 473 (491), *Jogemaya Dasu v. Thackomoni Dasu*.
(1868) 10 Suth W R 10 (12) . Beng L R Sup Vol 970 (F B), *Leake v. Daniel*.

- (1890) 17 Cal 491 (497), *Tincowrie Dasu v. Debendra Nath Mookerjee*.

Note 10

- (1882) 9 Cal 773 (776, 777) : 7 Ind Jur 650, *Sreenath Roy v. Radhanath Mookerjee*.
- (1878) 2 Mad 1 (4) 3 Ind Jur 208, *Prabakara Row v. Potannah*.
(1877) 3 Cal 235 (242) : 1 Cal L R 23 2 Ind Jur 460 (F B), *Chunder Coomar Roy v. Bhogobutty Proscanno Roy*.
- See cases cited under Foot-Note (2).

Article 182
Note 10

decree or order" must, it is conceived, be similarly interpreted, and must be taken to mean an application under Order 21 Rule 11, or otherwise by which proceedings in execution are initiated,⁴ and not other applications made pending an execution proceeding, though such applications may operate as steps-in-aid of execution.

It has been held that an application under the Civil Procedure Code, Order 21 Rule 50, sub-rule 2 for leave to execute a decree (obtained against a firm) against a partner who was not personally served in the suit, is merely ancillary to an application for execution against him, that the latter application is governed by Article 182 and that so long as such application is not time-barred under that Article, the application for leave also will not be barred.^{4a} In the undermentioned case,^{4b} an application for leave itself was held to be an application for execution within Article 182.

The following applications are not applications for the execution of a decree or order :—

1. Application by a person merely for his being recognized as a transferee of a decree without a prayer for execution.⁵
2. Application for the transfer of a decree.⁶
3. Application by the decree-holder for the postponement of the execution sale on the ground that he had given time to the judgment-debtor.⁷
4. Application to Court to direct Collector to expedite partition proceedings.⁸

4. (1896) 18 All 482 (491) : 1896 All W N 142 (F B), *Rahim Ali Khan v. Phul Chand*.

4a (1932) A I R 1932 Bom 516 (519) : 140 Ind Cas 519, *Bhagwan Manaji v. Hiraji Premaji*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 736 (739) : 13 Lah 327 : 131 Ind Cas 1026, *Bombay Company Limited, Karachi v. Kahan Singh*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 926 (926) : 158 Ind Cas 907, *Kuppuswamy Iyer v. Ratilal Somabhai and Company*.

4b (1936) A I R 1936 Sind 133 (133, 139) : 30 Sind L R 69 : 164 Ind Cas 1011, *Kishin Chand Boota Mal v. Dhanram Jamnadas*. (Dissenting from A I R 1936 Sind 180.)

5. (1912) 14 Ind Cas 704 (705) (Mad), *Somamma v. Dasamma*.

6. (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 508 (510) : 17 Lah 13 : 158 Ind Cas 127, *Dera Das v. Mohammad Akbar Khan*.

(1926) A I R 1926 All 93 (91) : 90 Ind Cas 274 : 48 All 121, *Mt. Begam Sultan v. Mt. Saris Begam*.

(1926) A I R 1926 All 473 (474) : 91 Ind Cas 482, *Mt. Sahodra v. Bhagwandas*.

(1911) 9 Ind Cas 246 (216, 247) (Cal), *Raj Kumar Sen v. Annoda Charan*.

(1897) 20 All 78 (79) : 1897 All W N 168, *Sundar Singh v. Doru Shankar*.

(1895) 22 Cal 921 (923), *Suja Hossein v. Manohur Das*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 3 (1) : 63 Ind Cas 116, *Harari Lal v. Baulyanath Saha*.

(1929) A I R 1929 All 390 (392) : 115 Ind Cas 865, *G. Atherton & Co. v. Hakim Bakhs*.

7. (1881) 3 All 757 (755) : 1881 All W N 56, *Mamath Kuari v. Debi Bakhs Rai*.

8. (1914) A I R 1914 Sind 97 (98) : 8 Sind L R 335 : 29 Ind Cas 58, *Harun Khan Rahim Khan v. Tejmal Parmal*.

5. Application for attachment under Section 46 of the Civil Procedure Code.⁹

See also the undermentioned cases.¹⁰

Under the provisions of some special Acts, some demands have to be recovered "as if such demand is a decree of a Civil Court." In such cases the said words have been held to attract the whole procedure in execution with the result that the execution of orders would be governed by this Article.¹¹

11. Decree must be capable of execution.—If a decree is not in a form capable of execution, Article 182 does not apply and time does not run under the Act.¹² In *Rameshwar Singh v. Homeshwar*

Article 182
Notes
10—11

9 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 249 (250). 90 Ind Cas 527, *Kanwar De v. Aswini Kumar Pal*.

10. (1925) A I R 1925 All 646 (647); 87 Ind Cas 745, *Jaideo Prasad v. Ghosi*. (The deposit of process fees for the issue of attachment in execution of a decree is not an application for execution.)

(1879) Bom P J 574, *Laldas Gokaldas v. Bhagwanji Jugaji*. (Do.)

(1878) 12 Cal W N 101 (102). 12 Cal W N 101 (102). 12 Cal W N 101 (102).

(1883) 5 All 596 (598); 1883 All W N 143, *Shankaran v. Parris*.

(1880) 7 Cal L R 424 (428), *Jacobraj Singh v. Buhooria Alumbasee Koor*. (Application for sale of property under attachment is not an application for execution.)

(1868) 9 Suth W R 390 (391), *Ramdhun Roy v. Abdool Gunnee*. (Application for restoration of execution case is not an application for execution.)

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 779 (782, 784). 172 Ind Cas 468, *Ramaswami Chettiar v. Meyappan Sertas*. (Application for refund of purchase money is governed by Art 181 and not by Art. 182.)

(1904) 27 All 378 (380); 2 All L Jour 16; 1905 All W N 9, *Godu Ram v. Suraj Mal*.

11. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 217 (218). 156 Ind Cas 747. 58 Mad 760, *President of the Board of Commissioners for H. R. E., Madras v. Shrirur Mutt*. (Recovery of contributions under Section 70 (2) of Madras Religious Endowments Act.)

(1939) A I R 1939 Mad 304 (304, 305), *Subba Rao v. Calicut Co-operative Urban Bank, Ltd.* (Award passed by the Registrar under Co-operative Societies Act.)

(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 289 (289). 93 Ind Cas 631. 1 Luck 153, *People's Industrial Bank Ltd., Allahabad v. Mahesh Charan Sinha*. (Enforcement of order for contribution under the Companies Act.)

(1933) A I R 1933 Sind 78 (79). 142 Ind Cas 489. 27 Sind L R 109, *Achraj Singh Ram Singh v. Achrajram Sahni*.

Note 11

1a (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 260 (261). 45 Bom 952. 61 Ind Cas 159, *Dayabhai v. Das Ujam*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Pat 215 (217). 6 Pat 780. 102 Ind Cas 811, *Somar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad*.

(1898) 1898 Pun Re No 47, *Buta Singh v. Chand Singh*.

[See (1868) 4 Mad H C R 173 (174), *Gopala Setty v. Damodara Setty*. (Case under the Act of 1859)]

Article 182
Notes
11-12

Singh,¹ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

"In order to make the provisions of the Limitation Act apply, the decree sought to be enforced must have been in such a form as to render it capable, in the circumstances, of being enforced."

Applications in respect of a decree which is not in a form capable of execution, as for instance applications for the passing of a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree, are not applications in execution of the preliminary decree and are not governed by this Article. See Notes 12 to 18, *infra*.

12. Application for final decree in suits for sale or foreclosure. — Where a decree was passed, prior to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, under Sections 86 or 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an application for an order absolute for sale of the mortgaged property under Sections 87 or 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, was regarded as one for the execution of the decree under Sections 86 or 88, and was held governed, for purposes of limitation, by Article 179 of the Act of 1877 corresponding to the present Article.¹ Under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, a preliminary

1. (1921) A I R 1921 P C 31 (32) : 49 Ind App 17 : 59 Ind Cas 636 (P C).

Note 12

1. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 66 (67) : 36 All 350 : 23 Ind Cas 649 (P C), *Chaudri Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal*.
(1922) A I R 1922 P C 167 (190) : 49 Cal 203 : 49 Ind App 335 : 74 Ind Cas 660 (P C), *Sachindra Nath Roy v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh*.
(1890) 13 All 278 (280) : 1891 All W N 63 (F B), *Oudh Behari Lal v. Nageshwar Lal*.
(1902) 25 Mad 244 (265, 269, 298) : 12 Mad L Jour 279 (F B), *Mallikarjunadu Setti v. Lingamurti Pantulu*.
(1902) 4 Ind Cas 42 (43) (Mad), *Veera Reddy v. Ramalinga Mudaly*.
(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 669 (669) : 34 Ind Cas 756, *Natesa Udayan v. Annasami Udayan*.
(1908) 31 Mad 68 (69, 70) : 3 Mad L Tim 254 : 17 Mad L Jour 596, *Ramayyan v. Kadir Bacha Sahib*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 289 (289, 290) : 29 Ind Cas 237 : 39 Mad 544, *Mahomed Husain v. Abdul Kareem*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 126 (131) : 61 Ind Cas 979, *Fuswanatha Sastriar v. Seetalakshmi Ammal*.
(1901) 24 Mad 695 (702), *Venkatarama v. Chinna Ramayya*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 286 (287) : 56 Ind Cas 563, *Ganapathiya Pillai v. Gopala Aiyar*.
(1898) 20 All 302 (304) : 1899 All W N 40, *Chunni Lal v. Harnam Das*.
(1899) 23 Bom 644 (650, 653) : 1 Bom L R 136, *Dhagwan v. Ganu*.
(1889) 12 All 61 (62) : 1889 All W N 193 (F B), *Kedar Nath v. Lalji Shahai*.
(1896) 20 All 357 (358) : 1898 All W N 71, *Parmeshri Lal v. Mohan Lal*.
(1892) 1892 All W N 5 (3), *Ram Kripal v. Sheo Shai*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 909 (970) : 49 Ind Cas 732, *Ramaswami Reddy v. Sakkappa Reddy*.
(1906) 16 Mad L Jour 503 (504) : 1 Mad L Tim 294, *Appiah v. Rama Reddy*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 937 (937) : 31 Ind Cas 9, *Singaravelu Pillai v. Sathalakshmi Mudalar*.
(1907) 29 All 279 (280, 281) : 1907 All W N 45 : 4 All L Jour 145, *Sri Ram v. Het Ram*.
(1903) 27 All 625 (625, 629) : 2 All L Jour 371 : 1905 All W N 186, *Baldeo Prasad v. Ilm Handar*.

decree for sale or for foreclosure is not capable of execution.^{1a} It is now obligatory on the part of the holder of a preliminary decree to obtain a final decree, before he can proceed to execution. An application for a final decree in a mortgage suit under Order 34 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is now an application in the suit itself and is not one for execution of the preliminary decree.²

Article 182
Note 12

- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 185 (186) . 61 Ind Cas 4, *Kedar Nath Goenka v. Tarini Prasad Singh*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 816 (817) . 49 Mad 691 : 96 Ind Cas 607, *Ellarayan v. Rangaswami Iyer*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 315 (316) . 32 Ind Cas 39, *Balaji Rao v. Harirama Chetty*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 541 (542) . 29 Ind Cas 120, *Krishna Bar v. Ranamoy Deb*.
 (1906) 33 Cal 867 (875, 876) . 4 Cal L Jour 141, *Purna Chandra Mandal v. Radha Nath Dass*.
 (1895) 22 Cal 931 (934), *Tara Prasad Roy v. Bhobodeb Roy*.
 (1895) 22 Cal 425 (431), *Dwarka Nath Misser v. Barinda Nath Misser*.
 (1895) 22 Cal 924 (927), *Tiluck Singh v. Parsotam Proshad*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 217 (222) 42 Bom 309 . 46 Ind Cas 107, *Narsinga Rao v. Bandu*.
 (1901) I All L Jour 15 (17), *Udit Narain v. Jagannath*.
 [But see (1902) 24 All 542 (545) 1902 All W N 100, *Ali Ahmed v. Nasiran Biba*. (But since preliminary decree was not capable of execution, Art. 179 does not apply but Art. 178 applies)]
 (1891) 21 Cal 818 (823), *Ajudhia Pershad v. Baldeo Singh*.
 (1902) 26 Mad 780 (784) : 13 Mad L Jour 412, *Rungiah Gounden and Co. v. Nanjappa Row*. (Do)]
- 1a (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 415 (416) : 93 Ind Cas 99, *Bulker Bee v. Md Umar*.
 2. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 150 (152) 42 Cal 776 42 Ind App 88 27 Ind Cas 693 (P C), *Munna Lal Farruck v. Sarat Chunder Mukerjee*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 All 163 (163) 39 All 641 42 Ind Cas 93 (S B), *Gajadhar Singh v. Kishen Jivan Lal*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 All 883 (883) 44 All 668 75 Ind Cas 485, *Sital Singh v. Baijnath Prasad*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 All 76 (77) 40 All 203 . 43 Ind Cas 870, *Nisamuddin Shah v. Bohra Bism Sen*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 All 119 (119) 39 All 532 . 40 Ind Cas 424, *Ramji Lal v. Karan Singh*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 All 836 (337) . 38 All 21 : 30 Ind Cas 494, *Madho Ram v. Nihal Singh*.
 (1913) 18 Ind Cas 731 (732) . 35 All 178, *Badri Narayan v. Kunj Dehari Lal*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Bom 32 (35) 50 Bom 730 98 Ind Cas 943, *Moru Narushet Gujar v. Gangabas Rama Chandra*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 420 (421) 73 Ind Cas 187, *Harjwan Deiraj v. Gajanan Khashinath*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 798 (799) . 147 Ind Cas 249, *Harihar Prasad Das v. Umesh Chandra Das*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 551 (552) 50 Ind Cas 177, *Bhutanath Jana v. Tara-chand Jana*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 175 (175) 37 Ind Cas 602, *Sashi Bhusan Das v. Pratur Chandra Roy*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 541 (542) . 29 Ind Cas 120, *Krishna Bar v. Sm. Ranamoy Deb*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 231 (233) . 28 Ind Cas 211, *Beni Singh v. Barhamdeo Singh*.
 (1902) 29 Cal 651 (653), *Framatha Chandra Roy v. Khelra Mohan Ghose*.
 (1926) 92 Ind Cas 299 (299) (Lab), *Mohan Singh v. Nathumal*.

**Article 182
Note 13**

13. Application for final decree in redemption suit.—An application for a final decree in a redemption suit is, as in the case of an application for a final decree in a suit for sale or foreclosure, one in the suit itself and not one for the execution of the preliminary decree.¹ But, is an application by the *mortgagor* praying that he may be allowed to make the payment and for recovery of the mortgaged property, one in execution of the preliminary decree? It was held in the undermentioned case² by the High Court of Bombay that the preliminary decree is, so far as the mortgagor himself is concerned, capable of execution, and that his application for recovery of possession on payment is one for execution of the preliminary decree governed by Article 182 of the Act. In the undermentioned cases³ arising under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a similar view was held. But a contrary view has been expressed in the case noted below.⁴ It was held that the preliminary decree in a suit for

- (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 890 (891) : 85 Ind Cas 808, *Athamsa Rowther v. Ganesan*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 65 (66) : 60 Ind Cas 866, *Venkataiah v. Venkata Subbiah*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 919 (920) : 41 Ind Cas 268, *Nimmala Mahankali v. Kallakuri Subba Rao*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 856 (356) : 45 Ind Cas 76, *Pattabirama Naidu v. Subramania Chetti*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 523 (528) : 39 Mad 488 : 29 Ind Cas 142, *Lakshmi Achi v. Subbarama Aiyar*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Nag 63 (63) : 15 Nag L R 36 : 48 Ind Cas 934, *Vinayak Rao v. Baijnath Prasad*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 91 (92) : 41 Ind Cas 858 : 20 Oudh Cas 205, *Jagdish Singh v. Ram Adhin Singh*.
 (1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 209 (209) : 17 Oudh Cas 347 : 25 Ind Cas 752, *Vidya-sagar v. Ratipal*.
 (1910) 8 Ind Cas 986 (987, 988) (Low Bur), *Ahmad Ali v. Maung Ton*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 508 (508) : 144 Ind Cas 768, *Pulin Chandra Sen v. Amin Mea Muzaffar Ahmad*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 134 (134) : 50 Ind Cas 544, *Ras Behari Singh v. Juman Lal*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 All 285 (286) : 45 Ind Cas 518 : 40 All 235, *Ahmad Khan v. Mt. Gaura*.

Note 13

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 353 (353) : 125 Ind Cas 95, *Venkatarama Reddi v. Doddachariar*.
2. (1919) A I R 1919 Bom 53 (56) : 43 Bom 689 : 51 Ind Cas 924, *Vasudeo v. Gopal*. (Application for extension of time is not one for execution but one for possession.)
3. (1904) 28 Mad 211 (213), *Pooparambul Dava v. Krishna Menon*. (Application for extension of time for payment is itself one for execution of the decree.)
 (1911) 9 Ind Cas 337 (338) : 14 Oudh Cas 10, *Jageshar Singh v. Dhagwan Bakhsh Singh*.
 (1892) 14 All 350 (353) : 1892 All W N 40, *Bandhu Dhagat v. Muhammad Taqi*.
 (1891) 16 Bom 490 (485, 486), *Narayan Gorind v. Anandram Kojiram*.
 [But see (1907) 4 Low Bur Rul 83 (85, 86), *Maung Pe v. Ma Daw*. (Application for possession under S. 89, T. P. Act, is not one for execution nor one in execution—Nor is it under the Civil Procedure Code.)]
4. (1920) A I R 1920 Upp Bur 43 (44, 45) : 54 Ind Cas 607 : 3 Upp Bur Rul 193, *Maung Tun Maung v. Ma Ywe*.

redemption is provisional and until it is made final, redemption cannot be permitted, that the Court is not absolved from the necessity of passing a final decree, and that there is no provision for the execution of the preliminary decree before it has been made final. It is submitted that this last view is correct.

Where a decree in a redemption suit is not drawn up in the form specified by Order 34 Rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, the decree will not be considered to be a preliminary decree, and time for the execution of such decree will run from the date thereof.⁵

14. Application for ascertainment of mesne profits.— Under the provisions of Section 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, any question relating to the ascertainment of mesne profits as to which the decree directed an inquiry, was to be determined by the *executing* Court.^{1a} The said provisions have been omitted in the present Civil Procedure Code, with the result that such inquiry is no longer a proceeding in execution but is one in the *suit* itself. The award of mesne profits in all cases is to be by a *preliminary* decree, and when ascertained, they are to be embodied in a *final* decree. An application for the ascertainment of mesne profits is therefore not an application for execution of a decree.¹

Article 182
Notes
13—14

5. (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 635 (635, 636) 76 Ind Cas 144, *Mahabir Pershad v. Kartar Singh*. (Decree for possession on payment of a certain amount within a certain time is not a preliminary decree.)
(1918) 18 Ind Cas 48 (49): 1913 Pun Re No. 68, *Naram Das v. Uddham Singh*, (Decree not providing any period for payment — Order 34 Rule 7, C. P. C., not complied with.)
(1909) 1 Ind Cas 71 (72) (Cal), *Krishna Chandra Mandal v. Jakeral Haq*.

Note 14

- 1a (1925) A I R 1925 P C 117 (117) 88 Ind Cas 492 4 Pat 507: 52 Ind App 188 (P C), *Kedar Nath Goenka v. Anani Prasad Singh*.
(1907) 7 Cal L Jour 301 (302) 12 Cal W N 3, *Upendra Chandra Singh v. Sakhi Chand*.
(1900) 28 Cal 242 (245), *Ram Kishore Ghose v. Gopi Kant Shaha*.
(1887) 8 Cal 89 (91) 10 Cal L R 272, *Hem Chunder Chowdhry v. Brojo Soondury Debee*.
(1875) 24 Suth W R 339 (340), *Weddy Tara Chowdrain v. Syud Abdool Jubbah Chowdhury*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 866 (867) 75 Ind Cas 233 47 Bom 778, *Sayad Yusuf Ali v. Sayad Amin*.
(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 526 (531) 37 Mad 186 18 Ind Cas 596, *Ramana Reddy v. Babu Reddy*.
1. (1891) 19 Cal 182 (189) (F B), *Puran Chand v. Roy Radha Kishen*.
(1934) A I R 1934 All 465 (467) 151 Ind Cas 755, *Naram Das v. Bhagwati Prasad*.
(1925) A I R 1925 All 588 (590) 47 All 543 87 Ind Cas 322, *Rudra Pratap Singh v. Sarada Mahesh Prasad Singh*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 80 (81) 53 Mad 838 124 Ind Cas 200, *Kemgam Swamy v. Subbamma*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Ponn 217 (218) 118 Ind Cas 700, *Lakshmi Bai Anant v. Rarji Bhikaji*.
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 939 (940) 39 Cal 220, *Madnapore Zamindary Co., Ltd. v. Kumar Naresk Narain Roy*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 801 (804) 164 Ind Cas 670, *Rama Rao v. Sree. ramamurthi*.

Article 182
Notes
15—16

15. Application for personal decree against mortgagor under Order 34 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code.—An application for a personal decree against the mortgagor under Order 34 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is not one for the execution of any decree against him.¹

16. Application by auction-purchaser for possession.—An application by a court auction-purchaser of property for possession of the property purchased, is not one for the execution of the decree within the meaning of this Article and is not governed by it.¹ This would be so even if the purchaser were the decree-holder himself.²

- (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 368 (368) : 8 Pat 482 : 117 Ind Cas 647, *Kamakhya Narain Singh v. Alloo Singh*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 268 (269) : 77 Ind Cas 497, *Thana Zalalji v. Dhana Jachrya*.
 (1916) 24 Cal L Jour 23n (2Sn) (Jour).
 (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 781 (782) : 4 Pat 57 : 84 Ind Cas 272, *Harakhon Missur v. Jagdeo Missur*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 404 (404) : 61 Ind Cas 448 : 45 Bom 819, *Gangadhar Manila v. Balakrishna Soreba*.
 (1910) 5 Ind Cas 272 (273) (Cal), *Debendra Nath Goswami v. Khirode Chandra Bandopadhyaya*.

Note 15

1. (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 34 (38) : 59 Mad 188 : 160 Ind Cas 270 (F B), *Palaniappa Chettiar v. Narayanan Chettiar*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 203 (204) : 79 Ind Cas 85, *Raj Narain Mal v. Sanli Lal*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 All 71 (72) : 50 All 321 : 108 Ind Cas 459, *Bisheshar Nath v. Chandu Lal*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 All 105 (106) : 40 All 551 : 47 Ind Cas 562, *Mohamad Illifat Husain v. Almununnissa*.
 (1906) 28 All 660 (664) : 8 All L Jour 445, *Gajadhur Lal v. Alliance Bank of Simla, Ltd.*
 (1919) 21 Ind Cas 530 (530) (Mad), *Rama Venkatasubba Iyer v. Shanmukam Pillai*.
 (1899) 21 All 453 (454) : 1899 All W N 166, *Ram Sarup v. Ghaurani*.
 (1906) 83 Cal 867 (870, 876) : 4 Cal L Jour 141, *Purna Chandra Mandal v. Radha Nath Das*.
 (1892) 14 All 513 (517) : 1892 All W N 80, *Musaheb Zaman Khan v. Inayat-ullah*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 831 (836) : 52 Cal 828 : 89 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Francis Higgins Pell v. Minnie Gregory*.
 (1911) 10 Ind Cas 21 (22) (Oudh), *Amir Chand v. Narsingh Narain*.

Note 16

1. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 603 (608) : 59 Mad 893 : 159 Ind Cas 279 (F B), *Abdul Aziz Sahib v. Chokkan Chettiar*.
 (1909) 1 Ind Cas 993 (993, 999) : 32 Mad 136, *Sultan Sahib Marikayar v. Chidambaram Chettiar*.
 2. (1909) 1 Ind Cas 416 (419) : 31 All 82 (F B), *Mt. Bhagwati v. Banwari Lal*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 603 (608) : 59 Mad 893 : 159 Ind Cas 279 (F B), *Abdul Aziz Sahib v. Chokkan Chettiar*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 All 368 (370) : 50 All 670 : 115 Ind Cas 869, *Mohann Parakkhan v. Haider Baksh*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 1001 (1002) : 43 Ind Cas 155, *Nandur Sultayya v. Venkatramayya Apparao*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 979 (979) : 32 Ind Cas 993, *Ramaswami Aiyar v. Abdul Aziz Sahib*.

17. Application for final decree in partition suit. — Order 20 Rule 18, Civil Procedure Code, provides that the Court may, in respect of immovable property not being an estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the Government, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the several parties interested in the property and giving such further directions as may be required. After such a preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit, the proper course for the plaintiff desiring an absolute separation of his share, is to apply for a final decree.¹ Such an application is not one for execution.² There is in fact no limitation for such an application, inasmuch as the Rule does not contemplate any such application being made by the party, it being the duty of the Court to pass the final decree after the necessary enquiries.³

18. Application for restitution. — See Note 7 to Article 181, *ante*, and the undermentioned cases.¹

19. "Civil Court." — This Article will apply only where the decree or order sought to be executed is that of a Civil Court. Is a Revenue Court a Civil Court within the meaning of this Article?

(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 429 (431) . 48 Bom 550 . 63 Ind Cas 932 (F B), *Hargound Fulchand v. Dhudar Raoji*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 745 (746) ; 145 Ind Cas 397, *Apparao-Nannar v. Lakshmana Reddi*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 294 (295) . 103 Ind Cas 335, *Balaji Kashinath v. Anandrao*.

(1902) 28 Mad 740 (741) : 13 Mad L Jour 237, *Kattayat Pathumay v. Raman Menon*.

Note 17

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 456 (457) . 5 Luck 290 . 121 Ind Cas 287, *Latta Prasad v. Brahma Din*.

2 (1938) A I R 1938 Pesh 101 (104) . 146 Ind Cas 201, *Faqirchand v. Mohamad Akbar Khan*.

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 117 (120) . 112 Ind Cas 205, *Bisheshwar Gir Goshain v. Satish Chandra Chatterjee*.

(1898) 20 All 311 (314) . 1898 All W N 45, *Shah Muhammad Khan v. Hanwant Singh*.

(1907) 1907 Pun L R No. 86 . 1906 Pun Re No 47, *Durga Das v. Fakir Chand*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 528 (533) . 53 Mad 378 . 131 Ind Cas 160, *Ramathan Chetty v. Alagappa Chetty*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 751 (755) . 40 Ind Cas 820, *Sethurama Sahib v. Chotta Raja Sahib*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 809 (810) . 30 Ind Cas 350, *Srinivasa Mudali v. Ramaswamy Mudali*.

(1907) 17 Mad L Jour 20 (20) (N R C)

(1921) A I R 1921 Pat 296 (297) . 59 Ind Cas 672, *Krishna Lal Jha v. Mandeswar Jha*.

(1904) 2 Mad L Tim 265 (266), *Ramaswamy Nacker v. Ramaswamy Kamaya Nacker*.

3. (1933) A I R 1933 Pesh 101 (104), 146 Ind Cas 201, *Faqirchand v. Mohamad Akbar Khan* (A I R 1920 Oudh 231 (232), Followed)

Note 18

1 (1939) A I R 1939 Lah 73 (76) . I L R 1938 Lah 571, *Punjab National Bank, Ltd., Delhi v. Firm Nanhe Mal Janhidas*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Nag 101 (101) : 18 Nag L R 200 . 76 Ind Cas 255, *Sonba v. Parasharam*.

Article 182
Notes
15-16

15. Application for personal decree against mortgagor under Order 34 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code.—An application for a personal decree against the mortgagor under Order 34 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is not one for the execution of any decree against him.¹

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(1929) A I R 1929 Pat 368 (368) : 8 Pat 482 : 117 Ind Cas 647, *Kamakhya Narain Singh v. Akloo Singh*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 268 (269) : 77 Ind Cas 497, *Thana Zalalji v. Dhand Jachryj*.

(1910) 21 Cal L Jour 23n (28n) (Jour).

(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 781 (782) : 4 Pat 57 : 84 Ind Cas 272, *Haralohan Misur v. Jagdeo Misur*.

(1921) A I R 1921 Bom 404 (404) : 61 Ind Cas 446 : 45 Bom 819, *Gangadhar Manila v. Balakrishna Siroda*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 272 (273) (Cal), *Debendra Nath Goswami v. Khirde Chandra Bandopadhyay*.

Notes 15

1. (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 34 (35) : 59 Mad 188 : 160 Ind Cas 270 (F B), *Palaniappa Chettiar v. Narayanan Chettiar*.

(1923) A I R 1923 All 203 (204) : 79 Ind Cas 85, *Raj Narain Mal v. Santi Lal*.

(1928) A I R 1928 All 71 (72) : 50 All 321 : 108 Ind Cas 459, *Bisheshwar Nath v. Chandu Lal*.

(1918) A I R 1918 All 105 (106) : 40 All 551 : 47 Ind Cas 562, *Mohamad Ilfat Husain v. Alimunnissa*.

(1906) 28 All 660 (664) : 3 All L Jour 445, *Gajadhar Lal v. Alliance Bank of India, Ltd.*

(1913) 21 Ind Cas 530 (530) (Mad), *Rama Venkatasubba Iyer v. Shanmukam Pillai*.

(1899) 21 All 453 (454) : 1899 All W N 100, *Ram Sarup v. Ghaurani*.

(1906) 33 Cal 867 (870, 876) : 4 Cal L Jour 141, *Purna Chandra Mandal v. Radha Nath Das*.

(1892) 14 All 513 (517) : 1892 All W N 80, *Musahab Zaman Khan v. Inayat-ullah*.

828 : 89 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Francis*

Chand v. Narsingh Narain.

Notes 16

1 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 803 (808) : 58 Mad 893 : 159 Ind Cas 279 (F B), *Abdul Aziz Sahib v. Chokkan Chettiar*.

(1907) 1 Ind Cas 993 (998, 999) : 32 Mad 136, *Sultan Sahib Marlayar v. Chidambaram Chettiar*.

2. (1907) 1 Ind Cas 416 (419) : 31 All 82 (F B), *Mt. Bhagwati v. Danwari Lal*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 803 (808) : 58 Mad 893 : 159 Ind Cas 279 (F B), *Abdul Aziz Sahib v. Chokkan Chettiar*.

(1926) A I R 1929 All 368 (370) : 50 All 670 : 115 Ind Cas 869, *Mohana Ravalhan v. Haider Balhsh*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 1001 (1002) : 43 Ind Cas 155, *Nandur Subbaya v. Venkataramayya Apparao*.

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18. Application for restitution. — See Note 7 to Article 181, *ante*, and the undermentioned cases.¹

19. "Civil Court." — This Article will apply only where the decree or order sought to be executed is that of a Civil Court. Is a Revenue Court a Civil Court within the meaning of this Article?

(1924) A I R 1924 Bom 429 (431) • 48 Bom 550 • 63 Ind Cas 932 (F B), *Hargovind Fulchand v. Bhudar Raoji*.

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(1927) A I R 1927 Nag 294 (295) • 103 Ind Cas 335, *Balaji Kashmath v. Anandrao*.

(1902) 26 Mad 740 (741) • 13 Mad L Jour 237, *Kattayat Pathumay v. Raman Menon*.

Note 17

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 456 (457) • 5 Luck 280 • 121 Ind Cas 287, *Lalta Prasad v. Brahma Din*

2 (1933) A I R 1933 Pesh 101 (101) • 146 Ind Cas 201, *Faqirchand v. Mohammad Akbar Khan*

(1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 117 (120) • 112 Ind Cas 205, *Disheshwar Gir Goshain v. Satish Chandra Chatterjee*.

(1898) 20 All 311 (314) • 1898 All W N 45, *Shah Muhammad Khan v. Hanwant Singh*

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(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 809 (810) • 30 Ind Cas 380, *Srinivasa Mudali v. Ramaswamy Mudali*

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(1923) A I R 1923 Nag 101 (101) • 18 Nag L R 200 • 76 Ind Cas 255, *Somba v. Parasharam*.

Article 182
Notes
19—21

Though there is a certain distinction between the terms "Civil Courts" and "Revenue Courts" in that the former means Courts exercising all the powers of a Civil Court, as distinguished from Revenue or Rent Courts which only exercise powers over suits of a limited class, the latter are also Civil Courts in the sense that they decide civil questions between persons seeking their civil rights.¹ It is therefore conceived that an application for the execution of a decree of a Revenue Court will be governed by this Article, provided that the special or local law, if any, governing the case, does not prescribe any period of limitation for such an application. For, if such special or local law does prescribe a period of limitation different from that prescribed in this Article, it is that period that will apply, having regard to Section 29, *ante*, and not the period prescribed by this Article.

20. "Decree."—A "decree" is defined as follows by Section 2 sub-section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure :

"'Decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within Section 47 or Section 144 but shall not include —

(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or

(b) any order for dismissal for default.

Explanation.—A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final."

21. "Order."—The word "order" has been defined by Section 2 sub-section 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure as meaning "the

Note 19

1. (1882) 9 Cal 295 (300, 301) : 12 Cal L R 311 : 9 Ind App 174 : 4 Sar 392 : 6 Ind Jur 547 : 5 Shome L R 130 (P C), *Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mulherjee*.
- (1910) 7 Ind Cas 767 (768) : 38 Cal 283 (292), *Protap Udai Narain v. Madan Mohan Nath*.
- (1902) 26 Mad 518 (520) : 13 Mad L Jour 296, *Veerasamy v. Manager, Pottapur Estate*.
- (1883) 5 All 406 (411) : 1883 All W N 92 (F D), *Madho Prakash Singh v. Muris Manohar*.
- (1900) 1 Ind Cas 933 (934) : 36 Cal 252 (254), *Ram Lochan Singh v. Dasi Prasad Kumra*.

...
v. Dikup Singh.
 (1908) 31 Mad 24 (26, 27) : 17 Mad L Jour 441 : 3 Mad L Tim 19, *Sambanta Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai*.]

formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree." The word occurs both in the first and the third columns of this Article. In the first column of the Article it obviously refers to orders *capable of execution*, for otherwise an application for execution cannot lie at all. The "order" referred to in the second clause of the third column need not be one capable of execution. See Note 40 *infra*. As to the meaning of the word "order" occurring in clause 5 of the third column, there is a conflict of opinion for which see Note 129 *infra*.

22. "Not provided for by article 183."—See Note 2 to Article 183 *infra*.

23. "Not provided for by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."—The words "provided for" in column 1 of this Article do not apply so clearly to Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, as they apply to Article 183, because Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, does not deal with decrees of Courts to which this Article does not apply.^{1a} Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, only prescribes a maximum limit of time for execution and does not prescribe the period within which each application for execution is to be made.¹ The words mentioned above must therefore be construed to mean that where execution is barred by Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, execution cannot be allowed under this Article.² That is to say, if the question of absolute bar under Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, does not arise, then the ordinary limitation prescribed under this Article is applicable.³

See also Note 3 to Article 181 *ante*.

Note 23

1a. (1932) A I R 1932 All 351 (352) 54 All 622 138 Ind Cas 93, *Faqir Chand v. Kundan Singh*.

[See also (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 269 (270) 45 Mad 785 70 Ind Cas 396, *Subbarayan v. Natarajan*]

1. (1924) A I R 1924 All 263 (265) . 46 All 73 . 79 Ind Cas 603, *Surajman Chaudh v. Anjore Shukla*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Pat 401 (402) . 175 Ind Cas 558, *Ram Ranbajaya Prasad Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 220 (221) 138 Ind Cas 149, *Jag Mohan Tewari v. Mahadeo Prasad*.

(1889) 1889 Pun Re No. 109, *Behari Lal v. Baness*.

(1891) 1891 Pun Re No. 9, *Gholam Jilani v. Ganga Ram*

(1918) A I R 1918 All 216 (218) 40 All 198 . 44 Ind Cas 24, *Jurawan v. Mahabir Dube*.

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3. (1879) 1879 Bom P J 573, *Mayaram v. Lalbhas*.

(1879) 1879 Bom P J 574, *Laldas v. Bhagwanji*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Bom 40 (41) 39 Bom 256 28 Ind Cas 478, *Dalaram Fathchand v. Maruti Deyji* (Fresh periods obtainable under Article 182 are controlled by S. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code)

[See also (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 526 (527) 37 Mad 156 18 Ind Cas 586, *Ramana Reddi v. Babu Reddi*]

[See (1894) 1894 Pun Re No. 128, *Jhanda v. Mohan Lal*.]

Article 182
Notes
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- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or
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Notes 19

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- (1910) 7 Ind Cas 787 (788) : 33 Cal 288 (292), *Protap Uday Narain v. Madan Mohan Nath*.
- (1902) 26 Mad 518 (520) : 13 Mad L Jour 296, *Veerasamy v. Manager, Pittapur Estate*.
- (1883) 5 All 406 (411) : 1883 All W N 92 (F D), *Madho Prakash Singh v. Muri's Manohar*.
- (1900) 1 Ind Cas 933 (934) : 36 Cal 252 (254), *Ram Lochan Singh v. Beni Prasad Kumra*.

1902 Ind Cas 583 (F D).
v. Bhup Singh.
 (1908) 31 Mad 24 (26, 28) : 17 Mad L Jour 441 : 3 Mad L Tim 10,
Sambasra Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai.]

formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree." The word occurs both in the first and the third columns of this Article. In the first column of the Article it obviously refers to orders *capable of execution*, for otherwise an application for execution cannot lie at all. The "order" referred to in the second clause of the third column need not be one capable of execution. See Note 40 *infra*. As to the meaning of the word "order" occurring in clause 5 of the third column, there is a conflict of opinion for which see Note 129 *infra*.

22. "Not provided for by article 183."—See Note 2 to Article 183 *infra*.

23. "Not provided for by section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."—The words "provided for" in column 1 of this Article do not apply so clearly to Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, as they apply to Article 183, because Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, does not deal with decrees of Courts to which this Article does not apply.^{1a} Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, only prescribes a maximum limit of time for execution and does not prescribe the period within which each application for execution is to be made.¹ The words mentioned above must therefore be construed to mean that where execution is barred by Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, execution cannot be allowed under this Article.² That is to say, if the question of absolute bar under Section 48, Civil Procedure Code, does not arise, then the ordinary limitation prescribed under this Article is applicable.³

See also Note 3 to Article 181 *ante*.

Note 23

1a (1932) A I R 1932 All 351 (352) 54 All 622 138 Ind Cas 93, *Faqir Chand v. Kundan Singh*

[See also (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 268 (270) 45 Mad 785 70 Ind Cas 396, *Subbarayan v. Natarajan*]

1. (1924) A I R 1924 All 263 (265) 46 All 73 : 79 Ind Cas 605, *Surajman Chaube v. Anjore Shukla*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Pat 401 (402) 175 Ind Cas 553, *Ram Ranbijaya Prasad Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 220 (221) 138 Ind Cas 149, *Jag Mohan Tewari v. Mahadeo Prasad*.

(1889) 1889 Pun Re No. 109, *Behari Lal v. Baness*.

(1891) 1891 Pun Re No. 9, *Gholam Jilani v. Ganga Ram*.

(1918) A I R 1918 All 216 (216) 40 All 193 44 Ind Cas 21, *Jurairan v. Mahabir Dube*

2. (1932) A I R 1932 All 351 (352) 54 All 622 138 Ind Cas 93, *Faqir Chand v. Kundan Singh*

3. (1879) 1879 Bom P J 573, *Mayaram v. Lalbhai*

(1879) 1879 Bom P J 574, *Laldas v. Bhagwanji*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Bom 40 (41) 39 Bom 256 23 Ind Cas 478, *Dalaram Vithalchand v. Maruti Deji* (Fresh periods obtainable under Article 182 are controlled by S. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code)

[See also (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 526 (527) 37 Mad 156 18 Ind Cas 586, *Ramana Reddi v. Babu Reddi*]

[See (1894) 1894 Pun Re No. 128, *Jhanda v. Mohan Lal*]

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 24-25

24. Registered decree. — Where a certified copy of a decree or order has been registered, column 2 of this Article provides for a period of six years for an application for execution of the decree. The word "registered" in that column means registered under the Indian Registration Act, 16 of 1908.¹

In order therefore that the decree-holder may have the six years' period under this Article, the registration must have been made in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act.² Thus, where a copy of a decree is registered on being presented by an unauthorised person, the registration is invalid and the decree-holder cannot avail himself of the longer period given by this Article.³

Section 23 of the Indian Registration Act provides that a copy of a decree may be presented for registration within four months from the date on which the decree was made. In computing this period of four months, "the date on which the decree was made" should be taken to be the date on which the decree was signed and not the date on which the judgment was pronounced.⁴

CLAUSE 1.

25. Date of decree. — Order 20 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows :

"The decree shall bear date the day on which the judgment was pronounced, and, when the Judge has satisfied himself that the decree has been drawn up in accordance with the judgment, he shall sign the decree."

The words "date of the decree" in clause 1 of the third column of this Article, must therefore mean the date on which the judgment was pronounced and not the date on which the decree is actually drawn up and signed.¹ An application for execution of a decree must

Note 24

1. (1937) 41 Cal W N 915 (916), *Abdur Rahim v. Chhamiruddin*.
 [See (1875) 21 Suth W R 372 (372), *Ilagho Nandun Singh v. Cochran*. (This Article will not apply to a decree of which only a memorandum was registered under Act 20 of 1866 which did not contain a provision for registration of a copy of a decree or order.)
- (1883) 1883 Bom P J 168, *Bhagwant v. Janki Bai*. (Do.)
2. (1937) 41 Cal W N 915 (916), *Abdur Rahim v. Chhamiruddin*.
- 3 (1903) 6 Oudh Cas 9 (14, 15), *Atal Bihari Lal v. Hiranchal Singh*.
4. (1937) 41 Cal W N 915 (916), *Abdur Rahim v. Chhamiruddin*.

Note 25

1. See the cases cited in Foot-Notes (2) and (3), *infra*.
 [See also (1937) 41 Cal W N 915 (916), *Abdur Rahim v. Chhamiruddin*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 1061 (1065) : 82 Ind Cas 746, *Giribala Dasi v. Bisrambar Halder*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 614 (611) : 59 Ind Cas 81, *Nooloor Chandra Mullick v. Rajani Kanta Ghose*.
 (1921) 51 Cal L Jour 491 (497), *Ram Kana Pal v. Punna Chandra*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 511 (512) : 82 Ind Cas 744, *Anandram v. Nityananda Barkham*.

be made within three years of the "date of the decree" as explained above, if the case is governed by clause 1 of this Article. It is not open to the parties in such cases to extend, by their agreement, the period of limitation with regard to its execution. Consequently, where a decree, the execution of which is governed by clause 1 of this Article, is adjusted between the parties and it is agreed that it should be executable as adjusted, an application for execution of the decree will be time-barred if made beyond three years of the date of the decree.²

Where, however, by the mistake of the Court, a decree bears a date different from the date of the judgment, and being misled thereby the decree-holder applies for execution within three years of the date as found in the decree, the execution application will be regarded as being in time on the principle of the maxim *actus curiæ neminem gravabit*—an act of the Court shall prejudice no man.³

"The date of the decree" has reference to the decree sought to be executed. Where there is a preliminary and a final decree in the case,

(1909) 8 Ind Cas 391 (392) (Cal), *Choto Rakhal Das Mazumdar v. Joyendra Narain Mazumdar*.

(1906) 3 Cal L Jour 291 (292), *Madan Mohan Das v. Nobin Kishore Deb*.

(1890) 1 Cal W N 93 (94), *Afzal Hossein v. Mt. Umda Bibi*.

(1897) 25 Cal 109 (110, 111), *Gulam Gaffar Mandai v. Goljan Bibi*.

(1889) 17 Cal 817 (357) 16 Ind App 195. 13 Ind Jur 449 5 Sar 463 (P C), *Munghiram Marwari v. Gursahai Nand*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 129 (130). 1 Pat 771. 75 Ind Cas 679, *Sagarmal Marwari v. Lochmisaran*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 803 (308) 25 Ind Cas 67, *Narayanaswamy Thevar v. Krishnasami Pillai*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 111 (111) 57 Ind Cas 531 5 Pat L Jour 490, *Hira Lal Sahu v. Jamuna Prasad Singh*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Pat 235 (236) 34 Ind Cas 501 1 Pat L Jour 359, *Surajdeo Narain Singh v. Musahao Pant*.

(1896) 1886 Bom P J 162, *Madhaurai v. Vithu I*.

2. (1915) A I R 1915 All 231 (232) 29 Ind Cas 391, *Ibrahimji v. Hasanuddin Khan*.

(1883) 6 All 623 (625) 1884 All W N 207, *Ramlakhan Rai v. Bakhtaur Rai*.

(1881) 1881 All W N 118 (118), *Jeta Ram v. Husam Ali*.

(1935) 164 Ind Cas 416 (417) (Cal), *Sarada Prasad Ghose v. Rokeya Khatun Bibi*.

(1874) 23 Suth W R 129 (130), *Ram Runjam Chuckerbutty v. Rajah Jowhurnumrah Khan*.

(1872) 17 Suth W R 936 (393), *Bibee Meheroonissa v. Eanee Rowshan Jehan*.

(1870) 13 Suth W R 44 (48) 4 Beng L R 101 (F B), *Kristo Komul Singh v. Hurce Sirdar*.

(1870) 13 Suth W R 164 (166), *Medhoomootty Debia v. Dhunput Singh*.

(1882) 1882 Pun Re No 190, *Basawa Mal v. Sirdar Amar Singh*.

(1876) 1876 Pun Re No 46, *Dwarha Das v. Ram Sarn*.

(1880) 1880 Pun Re No 48, *Sirdar Amar Singh v. Jonahur Singh*.

(1905) 1905 Pun L R No. 27, *Naman Ram v. Muhammad Nawaz Khan*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Pat 615 (618) 10 Pat 173 123 Ind Cas 786, *Ganga v. Bishun Marwari v. Bhagunath Prasad*.

3 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 239 (240) 141 Ind Cas 114 *Nalini Karti Ray v. Kamaraddi*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Pat 149 (150) 174 Ind Cas 397, *Kali Prasad v. Bibi Aziz Fatma*.

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Note 25

Article 152
(Clause 1)
Note 28

and the decree sought to be executed is the final decree, the preliminary decree being incapable of execution, time will run from the date of the *final* and not from the date of the preliminary decree.⁴

X obtained a decree against A, B and C, the decree so far as C was concerned being *ex parte*. C applied thereafter to set aside the *ex parte* decree against him, and on rehearing the suit, the Court restricted itself to the case of C. Ultimately a decree was passed against all the defendants. Within three years thereafter but after three years from the date of the original decree, the decree-holder applied for execution. A and B contended that as against them the application was barred by limitation. It was held by the High Court of Allahabad that when the decree was set aside at the instance of C, it must be deemed to have been set aside in its *entirety* (it being one and indivisible), that the subsequent decree passed was one against all the defendants, and that the application for execution being within three years of the date of that decree was not barred.⁵ The same view was expressed by the High Court of Madras also.⁶ A very similar case came before the Privy Council in *Ashfaq Hussain v. Gauri Sakai*.⁷ In that case X obtained a decree against B, C and D on the 25th August 1900. D subsequently applied to set aside the decree which had been passed *ex parte* against him. It was set aside against him but subsequently a decree was passed against him also on 16th November 1904. The decree was made absolute on 17th November 1905. The decree-holder applied on 21st December 1905 for execution of both the decrees. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the second decree must be taken to have supplemented and completed the first decree and it was from the date that it was made absolute that the statute began to run. It was

4. (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 699 (703) : 70 Ind Cas 6, *Sashikanta Acharya v. Sarat Chandra Rai Chaudhari*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 181 (192) : 50 Cal 743 : 74 Ind Cas 1017, *Hayatunnessa Chowdhurani v. Achia Khatun*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Bom 191 (193) : 51 Bom 125 : 100 Ind Cas 956, *Chhagan Lal Sakar Lal v. Jayaram Deoraj*. (Where there was a preliminary decree passed and there was an order making the decree for sale absolute, but there was no formal final decree drawn up : Held, that an omission to draw up a formal decree may be condoned where the terms of the decree sought to be executed are otherwise ascertained or clearly ascertainable and Section 99, O. P. Code, would cover such an error or irregularity if it does not affect the merits of the case or jurisdiction of the Court.)
- (1897) 19 All 520 (520, 521) : 1697 All W N 137, *Mahabir Prasad v. Sital Singh*.
- (1896) 1896 All W N 100 (100), *Mulchand v. Muktapal Singh*.
- (1912) 15 Ind Cas 732 (733) (Mad), *Yemani Chinna Sethayya v. Varanasi Pappayya*.
- (1912) 17 Ind Cas 750 (759) (Mad), *Venkata Perumal Raju v. Audileswaraiah Reddi*.
- (1913) 18 Ind Cas 10 (10) (Mad), *Ramasami Iyengar v. Chinna Thambi*.
- (1916) 18 Bom L R 41 (43) (Jour).
5. (1910) 5 Ind Cas 284 (285) (All), *Samodh Dhar Dube v. Dhuladhar Dube*.
6. (1919) 37 Mad L Jour 2 (2, 3, 4) (N I C) (Critical Note on 46 Cal 25 : A I R 1919 Cal 253 : 50 Ind Cas 15, *Umesh Chandra v. Akur Chandra*.)
7. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 975 (977) : 33 Ind App 37 : 33 All 264 (I C)

then that the plaintiff was justified in applying for the joint execution of the decree to which he was entitled. In the under-mentioned case,⁸ A obtained a decree for money against B, C and D. On the application of D for setting aside the decree, the Court ordered that the suit as against D should be dismissed, but should be decreed *ex parte* against A and B. It was held by the High Court of Calcutta, distinguishing the Privy Council case referred to above, that the order so far as it purported to be against A and B was a nullity, that the only decree enforceable against them was the original decree and that time under this Article ran from that date.

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 25-26

26. Clause 1 not applicable where decree is not immediately capable of execution.—Where a decree is immediately capable of execution, an application for the execution thereof is clearly governed by clause 1 of this Article. The clause will not, however, apply where the decree in respect of which the application for execution is made, is not, on the date of its passing, immediately capable of execution. In the case of such a decree, time cannot, as has been seen in Note 11 *ante*, run against the decree-holder until the decree becomes capable of execution.¹ It is a fundamental principle of law that, for the purpose of any particular application, time will run only from the moment at which the applicant first becomes entitled to make it.² Since "the date of the decree" can, as seen in Note 25 *ante*, mean only the date of the judgment, clause 1, which makes time run from the date of the decree, cannot be applied to applications for the execution of decrees which are not capable of execution on the date on which they are passed, but which subsequently become capable of execution. It has accordingly been held in numerous cases that such applications (where they do not also fall under any other clause of this Article), would be governed by the general Article 181.³ Thus, where a decree was for possession of immovable property,

8. (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 253 (254) . 46 Cal 25 : 50 Ind Cas 15, *Umesh Chandra Roy v. Alkur Chandra Sirdar*.

Note 26

- (1884) 8 Mad 137 (139), *Krishnan v. Nilakandan*.
(1906) 29 Mad 46 (47), *Rafrachalam Ayyar v. Venkatarama Ayyar*.
2. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 646 (648) : 56 Cal 61 : 117 Ind Cas 543 (S B), *Hari Mohan Dalai v. Parameswar Shau*.

3.

Ground.

- (1885) 8 All 56 (57) : 1885 All W N 327, *Thalur Das v. Shadial*.
(1924) A I R 1924 All 263 (264) : 46 All 73 : 79 Ind Cas 605, *Surajman Chaudh v. Anjourn Shulal*.

capable of being proceeded against, was governed by Article 181.⁶ Mr. Justice Wallace observed as follows :

**Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 26-27**

"It had been held in several cases that the immediate non-executability of a decree must be inherent in the decree itself, that is, that the mere reading of the decree would show that it was unexecutable at once. But the decree in *Rameshwar Singh v. Homeshwar Singh*⁷ did not, on the face of it, imply any such non-executability since, for all that the Court passing the decree knew, the judgment-debtor might be already in possession of Janeshwar's property and therefore the decree would be enforceable as soon as passed. The general principle laid down by the Privy Council is, that in order to make a provision of the Limitation Act, namely, Article 182 apply, the decree sought to be enforced must have been in such a form as to render it capable 'in the circumstances' of being enforced. I would stress the words 'in the circumstances' as implying that the Court is to be guided by the circumstances of the case in deciding whether the decree could not have been enforced at once, that is, whether any right to execute it had, or had not, accrued. Part of the circumstances which their Lordships considered relevant in that case was whether or not the decree-holder was responsible for the delay which had taken place in giving effect to his title, that is, his right to execute."

27. Combined decree against person and property, when capable of execution.—Where a combined decree was passed under the old Code of Civil Procedure against the person and the property of the mortgagor, it was held that time would, even in respect of the former relief, run from the date of the decree under clause 1 of this Article.¹ Where a mortgage decree directed that the mortgaged property should be sold and that if the sale proceeds

(1911) 10 Ind Cas 552 (554) : 36 Mad 104, *Vydanatha Aiyar v. Subramania Pattar* (Decree awarding certain sums of money and also certain other sums to be ascertained and taxed by the Court later on—Decree held to be capable of execution as a whole when the sums were so ascertained.)

(1928) 109 Ind Cas 829 (830) (Mad), *Annamalai Chettiar v. Rajappier*. (Where a preliminary decree in a partition suit directed partition and possession of a share to the plaintiff and also awarded past mesne profits. Held, that limitation for an execution application for the mesne profits only commenced to run from the date of the final decree and not from the date of the preliminary decree.)

6. (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 931 (933) : 88 Ind Cas 204, *Mangamma Nayaalurai v. Ramdasappa Nayanmataru*.

7. (1921) A I R 1921 P C 31 (32) : 49 Ind App 17 : 59 Ind Cas 636 (P C).

NOTE 27

1. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 954 (955) : 92 Ind Cas 846 : 50 Mad 5, *Swaminatha Odayar v. Thiagarajaswami Odayar*. (Case under Section 49, Civil Procedure Code, but the principle is the same.)

[See also (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 456 (456) : 66 Ind Cas 753, *Baranash Koer v. Bhabadab Chatterjee*.]

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 27-29

proved insufficient, the balance should be realized from the mortgagor personally, it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that time, for an application for execution of the latter part of the decree, ran from the date of the decree, and not from the date when the sale proceeds proved insufficient.²

28. Decree partly executable at once and partly not.—Where a decree is partly preliminary and partly final, and the latter part is separately executable at once, time for an application for execution of that part will run from the date of the decree.¹ In the undermentioned case,² a preliminary decree was passed for partition of certain properties, and along with it a decree was also passed for costs to be paid by the judgment-debtor. It was held that the order for costs was separately executable and that an application for execution must be filed within three years of the date of the decree. It was also held, however, that the decree-holder might apply for the incorporation of the previous order in the final decree, although the execution of such order independently was barred by limitation.

Where an interlocutory judgment was passed against one of two defendants, and a final judgment was passed later on against both, it was held that time began to run, so far as the former was concerned, from the date of the interlocutory judgment as if there were two decrees, one bearing the former date.³

29. Decree for injunction.—It has been held by the Chief Court of Lower Burma that an application to enforce a decree for injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, would be governed by the provisions of this Article.¹

A contrary view, viz., that this Article will not apply, has been taken by all the other Courts.²

According to the High Court of Allahabad,³ the disobedience to an injunction is a contempt of Court and can be punished at any time. It would seem, according to this Court, that there is no limitation applicable to such cases.

2. (1917) A I R 1917 P O 85 (85) : 45 Ind Cas 436 (437) (P C), *Khulna Loan Co. Ltd. v. Jnanendra Nath Bose*.

Note 28

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 393 (393, 394) : 118 Ind Cas 852, *Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Sarai Kamini Devi*.
2. (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 188 (189) : 175 Ind Cas 45, *Salahuddin Ahmad v. Imamuddin*.
3. (1936) A I R 1936 Rang 318 (314) : 164 Ind Cas 718, *Hock Sein v. Kyaukseik Municipality*.

Note 29

1. (1912) 15 Ind Cas 945 (946) : 6 Low Bur Rul 85, *Haji Ahmed Moola Dawood v. Paker Mull*.
2. See the cases cited in Foot-Notes (3) to (6).
3. (1901) 23 All 465 (466) : 1901 All W N 142, *Ram Saran v. Chata Singh*.
(1905) 28 All 300 (302) : 1906 All W N 10 : 3 All L Jour 636, *Bhagwan Das v. Sukh Das*.

According to the High Court of Madras,⁴ none of the paragraphs of the third column of the Article can apply to the first application for the enforcement of a decree granting a prohibitory injunction, inasmuch as there may be nothing enforceable at the date of the decree and the disobedience itself may take place more than three years after that date. The Article applicable, therefore, would be not Article 182 but Article 181. This view has been adopted by the High Courts of Calcutta and Lahore also.⁵

On each successive breach of the injunction, the decree may be enforced, according to this view, by an application made within three years from such breach.⁶

30. Decree in which court-fee or stamp duty is payable.—

Under the Stamp Act, 1899, a decree for partition is chargeable with duty to the amount prescribed by Article 45 of Schedule 1 of that Act, and the expense of providing the proper stamp is to be borne by the parties to the decree in such proportion as the Court directs. The result is that a decree for partition is not formally drawn up until paper bearing the proper stamp is supplied to the Court. The decree is then engrossed on the stamp paper and signed by the Judge. It was held in *Kishori Mohan v. Provasch Chandra*,¹ that the date of the decree under the Article is the date of the judgment and limitation begins to run from that date, although no formal decree can be drawn up until paper bearing a proper stamp is supplied to the Court. "The delay in signing the decree," said their Lordships, "was due not to any fault of the Court or to any cause beyond the control of the parties, but solely to the delay of the parties in supplying the requisite stamped paper. Any party desiring to have the decree executed might have furnished the stamp paper at any time leaving the expense of providing it to be adjusted by the Court in connexion with the costs of the execution. The circumstances disclose no ground for saying that limitation did not run from the date of the decree as provided by Article 182 of the Limitation Act."² This decision was followed by the High Court of Allahabad in a case where the Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff but made an order that the decree will not issue until a certain amount of additional court-fee was deposited by the plaintiff into Court, and

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 29-30

4. (1903) 26 Mad 780 (786) 13 Mad L Jour 412, *Rungasah Goundan & Co v. Nanjappa Row.*

(1905) 29 Mad 314 (317), *Venkatachalam Chetty v. Veerappa Pillai*.

5. (1935) 13 Ind Cas 100 (101) (Cal) *Bhajan Dehari v. Gouri Chandra*.
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 100 (101) (Cal) *Bhajan Dehari v. Gouri Chandra*.

As

6. (1922) 66 Ind Cas 166 (167) (Lah), *Udmi v. Sohan Lal*.

(1905) 29 Mad 314 (317), *Venkatachalam Chetty v. Veerappa Pillai*.

Note 30

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 351 (352) 52 Ind Cas 646.

2. See also (1913) 19 Ind Cas 410 (410) (Cal) *Bhajan Dehari v. Gouri Chandra*.

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 30-31

that when it was deposited, it will be included in the costs. It was held that the date of the decree was the starting point of limitation for an application for execution of the decree.³

In a suit *for mesne profits* or for an account, where the amount decreed is in excess of the amount claimed, Section 11 of the Court-fees Act expressly provides that the decree *shall not be executed* until the additional court-fee on the excess amount shall have been paid to the proper officer. Such a decree would clearly be incapable of execution until the additional fee is paid, and it has been held accordingly in the undermentioned cases⁴ that time will run only when the court-fee is actually paid. On the principles discussed in Note 26, *ante*, the Article applicable to an application for the execution of such decrees would be Article 181. A contrary view, namely that the decree cannot be said to be not capable of execution in such cases, has been held by the cases⁵ cited below.

31. Decree becoming inexecutable by reason of subsequent events. — A obtained a decree for money against B on 20th April 1922. On 3rd May 1924, B put in a petition stating that he had discharged the debt and praying that satisfaction of the decree might be entered up. An order was made to that effect by the Court on 23rd December 1924. A appealed from the said order and the Appellate Court, on the 26th February 1926, reversed it and held that the decree was unsatisfied. The decree-holder A applied on 9th June 1928 for execution. It was held that the application was not barred.¹ As has been seen in Note 11 to Section 9 *ante*, where a cause of action is, through Court or otherwise, satisfied or discharged, limitation stops running in regard to such cause of action on the fundamental principle that limitation always implies an existing cause of action, and in such cases where the satisfaction or the discharge of the cause of action is nullified by subsequent events, the plaintiff or the applicant, as the case may be, is entitled to a *fresh* cause of action, consequent on such nullification, and a fresh period of limitation in respect of such cause of action. The decision referred to above seems to have proceeded only on this principle. The Article applicable to the application based on the fresh right to

3. (1927) A I R 1927 All 335 (336) : 100 Ind Cas 476, *Buddhu Khan v. A. Bener*.

4. (1904) 1 All L Jour 350 (352), *Subhagga Singh v. Shri Nath Singh*.

[See also (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 970 (972) : 59 Ind Cas 385, *Natharso Rowther v. Muhammad Rowther*.

5 (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 326 (327) : 178 Ind Cas 202, *Uttam Chand Kapur & Sons v. Sayad Hamed Ali*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Nag 241 (241) 122 Ind Cas 438, *Mt. Bhuribi v. Rahmatbi*.

Note 31

1. (1934) 67 Mad L Jour 24 (N B C), (Affirming on appeal A I R 1933 Mad 785 (787).)

apply, would be Article 181, as none of the clauses of the third column of Article 182 would apply to such a case.

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 31-32

32. Decree on condition to be performed by the decree-holder himself.—There is a conflict of opinion on the question whether a decree in favour of A, on payment by him to the judgment-debtor of a certain sum of money, is a decree which is capable of immediate execution, and in respect of which time for an application for execution will run from the date thereof. According to the High Courts of Allahabad¹ and Bombay² and the Chief Court of Oudh,³ such a decree is not capable of immediate execution, even though the payment had to be made by the decree-holder himself. On the other hand, it has been held by the High Court of Madras⁴ and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur⁵ that such a decree is capable of immediate execution, and that time will run under Article 182 clause 1 from the date of the decree. In *Rungiah Gounden & Co. v. Nanjappa Row*,⁶ their Lordships of the Madras High Court observed: "It may well be doubted whether a decree in a pre-emption suit is not one enforceable at its date, inasmuch as it is perfectly open to the decree-holder to pay the amount into Court on the date of the decree and apply for execution." In *Ramappayya v. Charda Bhatta*,⁷ where the decree directed the judgment-debtor to surrender the garden claimed in the suit on the plaintiff paying him a certain sum of money for improvements, their Lordships of the Madras High Court observed that the decree-holder might have paid this at any time after the decree, and his application for delivery more than three years from the date of the decree was therefore time-barred.

Note 32

1. (1902) 24 All 300 (302) 1002 All W N 60, *Chhedri v. Lulu* (Article 181 applied)
- (1910) A I R 1910 All 224 (225) 51 Ind Cas 576, *Mt. Rukmina Kuar v. Shoo Dat Eas* (Do)
- (1931) A I R 1931 All 326 (327) 131 Ind Cas 559, *Siri Narain Tewari v. Brij Narain Rai*
(But see (1892) 14 All 350 (354) 1892 All W N 40, *Bandhu Bhagat v. Shah Muhammad Taqi*)
2. (1939) A I R 1939 Bom 367 (369) 177 Ind Cas 499 I L R (1939) Bom 649, *Gopal Sattu v. Dnyanu Maruti*
(But see (1899) 23 Bom 592 (594) 1 Bom L R 31, *Maruti v. Krishna*)
3. (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 892 (392) 22 Oudh Cas 82 52 Ind Cas 156, *Chandika Prasad Singh v. Kalu*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 286 (287) 110 Ind Cas 77. 3 Luck 578, *Irshad Ahmad v. Mt. Saidunnisa*.
- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 187 (188) 14 Oudh Cas 100, *Ajudhia Singh v. Dnyupal Singh*.
4. (1903) 26 Mad 780 (786) 17 Mad L Jour 412, *Rungiah Gounden & Co v. Nanjappa Row*.
- (1910) 7 Ind Cas 568 (568) (Mad), *Ramappayya v. Charda Bhatta*.
5. (1931) A I R 1931 Nag 54 (56) 26 Nag L R 333 130 Ind Cas 148, *Dada v. Ganpatrao*
6. (1902) 26 Mad 780 (786) : 13 Mad L Jour 412.
7. (1910) 7 Ind Cas 568 (568) (Mad).

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 30-31

that when it was deposited, it will be included in the costs. It was held that the date of the decree was the starting point of limitation for an application for execution of the decree.³

In a suit *for mesne profits* or for an account, where the amount decreed is in excess of the amount claimed, Section 11 of the Court-fees Act expressly provides that the decree shall not be executed until the additional court-fee on the excess amount shall have been paid to the proper officer. Such a decree would clearly be incapable of execution until the additional fee is paid, and it has been held accordingly in the undermentioned cases⁴ that time will run only when the court-fee is actually paid. On the principles discussed in Note 26, *ante*, the Article applicable to an application for the execution of such decrees would be Article 181. A contrary view, namely that the decree cannot be said to be not capable of execution in such cases, has been held by the cases⁵ cited below.

31. Decree becoming inexecutable by reason of subsequent events. — A obtained a decree for money against B on 20th April 1922. On 3rd May 1924, B put in a petition stating that he had discharged the debt and praying that satisfaction of the decree might be entered up. An order was made to that effect by the Court on 23rd December 1924. A appealed from the said order and the Appellate Court, on the 26th February 1926, reversed it and held that the decree was unsatisfied. The decree-holder A applied on 9th June 1928 for execution. It was held that the application was not barred.¹ As has been seen in Note 11 to Section 9 *ante*, where a cause of action is, through Court or otherwise, satisfied or discharged, limitation stops running in regard to such cause of action on the fundamental principle that limitation always implies an existing cause of action, and in such cases where the satisfaction or the discharge of the cause of action is nullified by subsequent events, the plaintiff or the applicant, as the case may be, is entitled to a fresh cause of action, consequent on such nullification, and a fresh period of limitation in respect of such cause of action. The decision referred to above seems to have proceeded only on this principle. The Article applicable to the application based on the fresh right to

3. (1927) A I R 1927 All 335 (336) : 100 Ind Cas 476, *Buddhu Khan v. A. Boner*.

4 (1904) 1 All L Jour 350 (352), *Subhagga Singh v. Shiva Nath Singh*.

[See also (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 970 (972) : 59 Ind Cas 885, *Natharsa Rowther v. Muhammad Rowther*.

(1938) A I R 1938 All 539 (540). I L R 1938 All 848 : 177 Ind Cas 875, *Babu Ram v. Gopal Sahas*. (Suit for account — Article applicable seems to have been assumed to be Art. 182 — It is submitted this is not correct.)]

5 (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 326 (327) : 178 Ind Cas 202, *Uttam Chand Kapur & Sons v. Sayad Hamid Ali*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Nag 241 (241). 122 Ind Cas 438, *Mt. Bhurib v. Rohmatbi*.

Note 31

1. (1934) 67 Mad L Jour 24 (N R C), (Affirming on appeal A I R 1933 Mad 785 (787).)

apply, would be Article 181, as none of the clauses of the third column of Article 182 would apply to such a case.

Article 182
(Clause 1)
Notes 31-32

32. Decree on condition to be performed by the decree-holder himself. — There is a conflict of opinion on the question whether a decree in favour of A, on payment by him to the judgment-debtor of a certain sum of money, is a decree which is capable of immediate execution, and in respect of which time for an application for execution will run from the date thereof. According to the High Courts of Allahabad¹ and Bombay² and the Chief Court of Oudh,³ such a decree is not capable of immediate execution, even though the payment had to be made by the decree-holder himself. On the other hand, it has been held by the High Court of Madras⁴ and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur⁵ that such a decree is capable of immediate execution, and that time will run under Article 182 clause 1 from the date of the decree. In *Rungiah Gounden & Co. v. Nanjappa Row*,⁶ their Lordships of the Madras High Court observed: "It may well be doubted whether a decree in a pre-emption suit is not one enforceable at its date, inasmuch as it is perfectly open to the decree-holder to pay the amount into Court on the date of the decree and apply for execution." In *Ramappayya v. Charda Bhatta*,⁷ where the decree directed the judgment-debtor to surrender the garden claimed in the suit on the plaintiff paying him a certain sum of money for improvements, their Lordships of the Madras High Court observed that the decree-holder might have paid this at any time after the decree, and his application for delivery more than three years from the date of the decree was therefore time-barred.

Note 32

1. (1902) 24 All 300 (302) 1902 All W N 60, *Chhedi v. Loin*. (Article 181 applied.)
- (1910) A I R 1919 All 224 (225) 51 Ind Cas 576, *Mt. Rukmina Kuar v. Sheo Dat Rai* (Do.)
- (1931) A I R 1931 All 326 (327) 181 Ind Cas 559, *Sri Narain Tewari v. Drij Narain Rai*
[But see (1892) 14 All 350 (354) 1892 All W N 40, *Bandhu Bhagat v. Shah Muhammad Taqi*]
2. (1938) A I R 1938 Bom 367 (369) 177 Ind Cas 499 I L R (1938) Bom 649, *Gopal Sattu v. Dnyanu Maruti*
[But see (1890) 23 Bom 592 (594) : 1 Bom L R 31, *Maruti v. Krishna*]
3. (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 392 (392) : 23 Oudh Cas 82 : 52 Ind Cas 156, *Chandika Prasad Singh v. Kolu*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 286 (287) : 110 Ind Cas 77 : 3 Luck 578, *Irshad Ahmad v. Mt. Saidunnisa*.
- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 187 (189) : 14 Oudh Cas 100, *Ajudhia Singh v. Drigpal Singh*.
4. (1903) 26 Mad 780 (786) 13 Mad L Jour 412, *Rungiah Gounden & Co v. Nanjappa Row*.
(1910) 7 Ind Cas 568 (568) (Mad), *Ramappaya v. Charda Bhatta*.
5. (1931) A I R 1931 Nag 54 (56) : 26 Nag L R 333 : 130 Ind Cas 148, *Dada v. Ganpatrao*.
6. (1902) 26 Mad 780 (786) : 13 Mad L Jour 412.
7. (1910) 7 Ind Cas 568 (568) (Mad).

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Notes 32-33

The High Courts of Allahabad and Bombay have held in the undermentioned cases,⁸ that though a decree in favour of the plaintiff on condition of his paying a sum of money to the defendant is not a decree capable of execution at its date and therefore Article 182 is inapplicable, time will, nevertheless, run under Article 181 from the date of the decree itself, as there is nothing preventing the plaintiff in such cases from paying the amount at once and applying for execution.

CLAUSE 2.

33. Appeal. — This clause provides for a fresh starting point of limitation for execution in cases where there has been an appeal. The expression "appeal" in this clause will include civil revision petitions also.¹ In *Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey*,² their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows: "There is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that my application by a party to an Appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate Court is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term. . . ." See also *Raja Rajeshwara Setupati Avergal v. Kamid Rowthen*,³ where their Lordships observed as follows: "From this judgment an appeal in the form appropriate to such a case from the Munsif's Court, i. e., civil revision petition, was preferred to the High Court of Madras."

It has been held that "appeal" in this clause does not necessarily mean a *bona fide* appeal.⁴

An application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council is not an appeal.^{4a}

8. (1931) A I R 1931 All 826 (327) : 131 Ind Cas 559, *Siri Narain Tewari v. Brij Narain Rai*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Bom 967 (369) : 177 Ind Cas 499 : I L R (1938) Bom 649, *Gopal Sattu v. Dnyanu Maruti*.

Note 33

1. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 365 (390) : 163 Ind Cas 561 : I L R (1937) Mad 616 (F B), *Chudambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar*. (Overruling 36 Mad 185.)

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 866 (868) : 44 Ind Cas 141, *Gurupada Halder v. Tarit Bhusan Roy Chowdhury*.

[See (1909) 4 Ind Cas 629 (631) (Lah), *Mastan Shah v. Pahiwan Shah* (Where a petition for revision has been rejected by an appellate court, without examining the record, and similarly

[But see (1913) 20 Ind Cas 563 (564) (Lah), *Fusa v. Surjan*]

2 (1932) A I R 1932 P O 165 (167) : 137 Ind Cas 529 : 59 Ind App 283 : 60 Cal 1 (P C).

3 (1926) A I R 1926 P C 23 (24) : 53 Ind App 74 : 49 Mad 335 : 94 Ind Cas 522 (P C).

4. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 349 (350) : 74 Ind Cas 679, *Basanta Kumar Roy v. Manguri Das*.

4a. (1900) 24 Mad 1 (12) : 2 Bom L R 771 : 27 Ind App 197 : 10 Mad L Jour 221 : 4 Cal W N 725 : 7 Sar 676 (P C), *Venkata Subbamma v. Venkata Rama Rao*.

See also the undermentioned case ⁵

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Notes 33-34

34. Appeal, whether should be against the decree or order sought to be executed. — The appeal referred to in clause 2 need not necessarily be against the decree or order sought to be executed. The words of the clause would cover any appeal which is *capable of affecting* the decree or order sought to be executed.¹ In *Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey*,² their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows: "It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question *sub judice* between any of the parties, those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage." Hence, where, pending an appeal from a preliminary decree, a final decree is passed, and *thereafter*, a decree is passed in the appeal, limitation for the execution of the final decree will only run from the date of the decree passed in the appeal and not from the date of the final decree.³ So also, where an application for review of a decree is allowed and an appeal is preferred against the order allowing the review application, limitation for the execution of the decree will run from the date of the final order of the Appellate Court in such appeal.⁴

A decree was passed in review, altering the decree originally passed in the suit. There was an appeal against the decree on review and such decree was set aside in the appeal with the result that the decree originally passed in the case was restored. It was held that limitation for the execution of such decree ran from the date of the appellate decision setting aside the decree passed on review.⁵

Suppose an application to set aside an *ex parte* decree is dismissed and an appeal is proffered against the order dismissing such application, which appeal is also dismissed. It will be clear from the above discussion that limitation for the execution of the *ex parte* decree will run, in such a case, not from the date of the

5 (1909) :

... ..

Note 34

1. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 421 (422) : 171 Ind Cas 960, *Koyalutti v. Veerankutti*.
2. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 165 (167) : 59 Ind App 293 : 60 Cal 1 : 137 Ind Cas 599 (P C).
3. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 421 (423) : 171 Ind Cas 990, *Koyalutti v. Veerankutti*. (Dissenting from A I R 1933 Mad 315.)
(1928) A I R 1928 Pat 581 (581) : 110 Ind Cas 483, *Samar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad Singh*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 215 (218) : 6 Pat 780 : 102 Ind Cas 811, *Samar Singh v. Deonandan Prasad Singh*.
4. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 255 (257) : 57 Bom 338 : 147 Ind Cas 1227, *Nayappa Bandappa v. Gurushantappa Shankappa*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Bom 162 (163) : 162 Ind Cas 223, *Narayan Ganpat v. Radhabai Krishnaji*.
5. (1882) 4 All 274 (276) : 1882 All W N 25 : 6 Ind Jur 597, *Nannabh Sewak v. Madho Das*.

Articles 182
(Clause 2)
Notes 34-35

decree but from the date of the appellate order dismissing the appeal from the order refusing the application to set aside the *ex parte* decree,⁶ for if the appeal from such order succeeds, the *ex parte* decree itself would cease to exist.

But it has been held in some decisions that in such cases, limitation for the execution of the *ex parte* decree, runs from the date of the *ex parte* decree and not from the date of the appellate order.⁷ These decisions proceed on the view that an appeal within this clause is an appeal against the decree or order sought to be executed. It is submitted that this view is not correct.

An appeal against an order passed in proceedings for the execution of a decree cannot affect the *decree* in any way and such an appeal, therefore, cannot give a fresh starting point of limitation for execution in respect of the decree.⁸

35. Appeal against portion of decree, if saves limitation for execution of whole decree.—In *Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra Dey*,¹ A and B were co-mortgagees under a mortgage. A brought a suit on the mortgage claiming that B had assigned his interest in the mortgage to him. This claim was overruled and a decree for sale was passed in which it was provided that B was entitled to receive a certain amount from the sale proceeds of the mortgaged property. A appealed against B in respect of this provision in the decree. The judgment-debtor was not joined as a party to this appeal. The appeal was dismissed. Then B applied for execution of the mortgage decree. It was contended that limitation for the application ran not from the date of the dismissal of the appeal but from the date of the original decree. The contention was based, *inter alia*, on the following two grounds: 1. that an appeal in order to save limitation under clause 2 of the Article must be one to which the persons affected

6. (1939) A I R 1939 Mad 157 (158), *Sri Ramchandra Rao v. Venkateswara Rao*

(1881) 8 Cal 248 (250); 10 Cal L R 143; 6 Ind Jur 357, *Lutful Huq v. Sumbhu Din Pattuck*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Pat 337 (340); 16 Pat 306; 169 Ind Cas 581, *Firm D. B. & Co. v. D. B. & Co.*

Sukhnandan Singh v.

..

v. Anrudh Singh.

(1891) 16 Bom 123 (124), *Jivaji v. Ramchandra*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 332 (333); 131 Ind Cas 263, *Profulla Kumar Basu v. Sorojibala*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 904 (905); 54 Cal 1053; 104 Ind Cas 466, *Fakir*

.. *Raj v. Gurditta*

1 Cas 728, *Jabar-*

khan v. Bahim Khan

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 157 (158); 44 Ind Cas 575; 3 Pat L Jour 119, *Rasbiraj v. Nauratanlal*.

8. (1883) 5 All 236 (237). 1883 All W N 5, *Hulas v. Manu*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Pat 129 (130); 89 Ind Cas 886, *Ibrahim Hussain Khan v. Sheopratap Narain*.

Note 35

1. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 165 (167); 137 Ind Cas 529; 59 Ind App 283; 60 Cal 1 (P C).

i. e., in the present case the judgment-debtors, were *parties*; and 2. that it must also be one in which the *whole decree* was imperilled. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in repelling the above contentions observed that the questions raised had been the subject of much difference of opinion in India. After referring to certain decisions to illustrate their statement, their Lordships proceeded as follows :

"Their Lordships think that nothing would be gained by discussing these varying authorities in detail. They think that the question must be decided upon the plain words of the Article: 'where there has been an appeal,' time is to run from the date of the decree of the Appellate Court. There is, in their Lordships' opinion, no warrant for reading into the words quoted any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it; the words mean just what they say. The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. It is at least an intelligible rule that so long as there is any question *sub judice* between any of the parties, those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage. Nor in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors, and if he is virtuously inclined, there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Court. But whether there be or he not a theoretical justification for the provision in question, their Lordships think that the words of the Article are plain, and that there having been in the present case an appeal from the mortgage decree of the 24th June 1920, time only ran against the appellants (the applicants for execution) from 24th August 1922, the date of the Appellate Court's decree."

It is clear from the above that although an appeal may have been preferred only against a portion of the decree, limitation will be saved under clause 2 in respect of the *whole decree*.² Similarly,

2. (1895) 17 All 103 (105) : 1895 All W N 20, *Badi un-nissa v. Shams-uddin*.

(1877) 1 All 503 (509), *Imam Ali v. Dasaundi Ram*.

(1893) 18 Bom 203 (205) : 1893 Bom P J 79, *Sathalchand Rikhardas v. Velchand Gujar*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 89 (90) : 53 Cal 901 : 97 Ind Cas 838, *Abdul Alim v. Abdul Hafiz*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 318 (318) : 15 Lah 267 : 117 Ind Cas 639, *Ghulam Hussain Shah v. Riddha Ram*.

**Article 182
(Clause 2)
Note 35**

for the clause to apply it is not necessary that the person by or against whom execution is sought should have been a party to the appeal.³ Thus, where a decree is passed against several defendants and one of them alone appeals against the decree without impleading the others, limitation for execution of the decree against the non-appealing defendants also will run from the date of the appellate decree.⁴ So also, where a suit by A against B and C is decreed against B but dismissed against C, and A appeals against the dismissal of his suit against C without impleading B as a party to the appeal, limitation for execution of the decree against B will run only from the date of the decree in the appeal against C.⁵

- (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 557 (558, 559) : 156 Ind Cas 1029, *Kanniammal v. Balakrishna Tharadhy*. (In all cases, what Art. 182 (2), Limitation Act, refers to is a decree, viz. one decree, and it is not permissible for Courts in execution to look into the matter and say that, as there are several reliefs which are severable, what is nominally one decree, consists of several decrees.)
- (1902) 25 Mad 91 (92) (F B), *Krishnamachariar v. Mangammal*.
(1879) 23 Mad 69 (67) : 9 Mad L Jour 254, *Vararaghava Iyengar v. Ponnammal*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 40 (43) : 79 Ind Cas 794 : 3 Pat 227, *Somar Singh v. Mt. Premdei Kuer*.
3. (1886) 8 All 573 (575) : 1556 All W N 237, *Nur-ul-Hasan v. Muhammad Hasan*.
(1896) 22 Bom 500 (505) : 1896 Bom P J 679, *Abdul Rahiman v. Maidin Saika*. (Appeal means any appeal by any party and not an appeal by which the whole decree is imperilled.)
(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 565 (567) : 91 Ind Cas 308 : 4 Pat 844, *Hu Lal Kumar v. Ganu Mahto*.
4. (1906) 3 All L Jour 231 (232) : 1906 All W N 155, *Dhiman Mal v. Panna Lal*.
(1883) 6 All 14 (15) : 1883 All W N 179, *Basant Lal v. Najmunnissa Bibi*.
(1881) 4 All 137 (140) : 1881 All W N 152, *Kishen Sahai v. Collector of Allahabad*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 331 (331) : 44 Bom 34 : 53 Ind Cas 187, *Chollapa v. Ramachandra*. (Decree against principal debtor and surety—Principal debtor alone appealing—Surety not made party—Still, time saved even against surety.)
(1903) 1 Ind Cas 459 (460) : 33 Bom 33, *Shitram v. Sakharam*.
(1898) 25 Cal 594 (602) : 2 Cal W N 556 (F B), *Gopal Chunder Manna v. Gossain Das Kalay*.
(1880) 6 Cal 194 (196) : 6 Cal L R 573, *Mullick Ahmed Zumma v. Mahomed Syed*.
(1878) 3 Cal L R 430 (431), *Gungamoyee Dassie v. Shih Sunkur Bhutta-charjee*.
(1908) 1909 Pun L R No. 8 : 1907 Pun Re No. 32 : 1906 Pun W R 155, *Anwar Ali v. Anayat Ali*.
(1898) 8 Mad L Jour 228 (230), *Venkata Chinnaya Rau v. Krishna Charayalu*.
(1899) 23 Mad 60 (67) : 9 Mad L Jour 254, *Vararaghava Ayyangar v. Ponnammal*.
(1902) 5 Oudh Cas 217 (219, 220), *Someshur Dat v. Dunia Prasad*.
5. (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 160 (161) : 2 Pat 712 : 77 Ind Cas 357, *Panchu Bania v. Anand Thakur*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 840 (841) : 47 Cal 818 : 60 Ind Cas 915, *Satish Chandra Chaudhuri v. Girish Chandra Chakravarty*.
(1884) 1884 All W N 138 (138), *Ram Lal v. Jagannath*.
(1896) 22 Bom 500 (505, 508) : 1896 Bom P J 679, *Abdul Rahiman v. Maidin Saika*.

Some decisions proceed on the view that where all the parties to the decree have not been parties to the appeal, the applicability of the clause as regards persons who have not been parties to the appeal depends on whether the appeal imperils the whole decree.⁶ The clear pronouncement of the Privy Council above referred to shows that this view is not correct. As observed by the Madras High Court in *Ari Chetty v. Theerthamalai Chetty*,⁷ "the question of limitation ought not to be made to depend upon the other question (which is almost always a very difficult and doubtful one) whether the appeal by one of the defendants or as regards a part of the decree of the first Court imperils the decree passed against the other defendants, or the other portion of the decree"⁸ It may also be noted that under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code (a provision which was newly introduced in the Code of 1908) the Appellate Court has the power to pass any decree or order which the justice of the case may require, notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree, and that this power may be exercised in favour of parties who have not themselves filed any appeal or objection against the decree.

36. Appeal by or against one person, whether saves limitation for execution by or against another. — See Note 35 above.

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6. (1914) A I R 1914 Cal 583 (584, 585) : 22 Ind Cas 695, *Mrs. Christiana Ben-shawn v. Benarsi Prasad Chowdhury*. (Appeal not imperilling whole decree—Time runs only from the lower Court's decree.)
 (1887) 14 Cal 26 (33), *Raghunath Pershad v. Abdul Hye*. (Do.)
 (1904) 1 All L Jour 409 (410, 411), *Ganga Kuar v. Keshar Kuar*. (Do.)
 (1881) 4 All 36 (37) : 1881 All W N 129 : 6 Ind Jur 381, *Sangram Singh v. Dujharat Singh*. (Do.)
 (1889) 13 All 1 (12, 13, 16) 1889 All W N 207 (F B), *Mashiat-un-Nissa v. Rani*. (Do.)
 (1930) A I R 1930 All 636 (637) : 128 Ind Cas 399, *Jadu Nandan Ram v. Parshotam Ginning Co. Ltd.* (Do.)
 (1878) 2 Cal L R 471 (473), *Hur Prasad Roy v. Enayat Hussain*. (Do.)
 (1889) 16 Cal 598 (602, 603), *Nundun Lall v. Rai Joykishen*. (Appeal imperilling whole decree—Time runs from appellate decree.)
 (1926) A I R 1926 All 145 (146) : 48 All 6 : 89 Ind Cas 286, *Kashi Prasad v. Mathura Prasad*. (Do.)
 (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 177 (178) : 37 Ind Cas 583, *Jagat Mohini Das v. Mahmud Ibrahim Hussain*. (Do.)
 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 783 (786) : 31 Ind Cas 426, *Loke Nath Singh v. Gaju Singh*. (Do.)
 (1903) 5 Bom L R 735 (737), *Ramchandra v. Anataji*. (Do.)
 (1880) 6 Cal 194 (196) : 6 Cal L R 573, *Mullick Ahmed Zamma v. Mahomed Syed*. (Do.)
 (1874) 21 Suth W R 243 (244), *Dhoobunessurree Debia v. Chunder Moones Debia*. (Do.)
7. (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 691 (692) : 34 Ind Cas 791.
8. See also (1899) 23 Mad 60 (67, 68, 69) : 9 Mad L Jour 284, *Viravaghata Ayyangar v. Ponnammal*. (The question whether a decree or a portion thereof was or was not imperilled by an appeal need not be taken into consideration.)

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Notes 37-40

37. Irregular or incompetent appeal.—In *Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey*,¹ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows: "There is no definition of appeal in the Civil Procedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that any application by a party to an Appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent." Hence, an appeal, though incompetent, will save limitation under clause 2.²

38. Appeal should have been admitted.—The words "where there has been an appeal" contemplate cases where the appeal has been *admitted*. Where the appeal has been rejected before admission, this clause will not apply.¹

39. Appeal from amended decree.—Where a decree is amended and an appeal is preferred against the amended decree, limitation for execution of the decree will run under this clause from the date of the appellate decree.¹

40. "Final decree or order."—These words are not used in contradistinction to any *preliminary* decree or order of the Appellate Court. The words only indicate the decree or order by which the Appellate Court *finally disposes of* the appeal. The words will clearly cover any decree or order of the Appellate Court in which the decree

Note 37

1. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 165 (167) : 137 Ind Cas 529 : 59 Ind App 283 : 60 Cal 1 (P C)

— (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 1227, *Nagappa*

(Pat 430, *Kameswarhar*)

- (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 548 (548) : 131 Ind Cas 80, *Sarat Chandra v. Joy Shankar Roy* (Appellate Court erroneously treating appeal as competent and passing decree—Time for execution runs from appellate decree.)

- (1921) A I R 1921 Sind 132 (134) : 79 Ind Cas 477 : 16 Sind L R 245, *Donald Graham & Co. v. Kewatram*.

Note 38

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[But see (1889) 16 Cal 250 (252), *Akshoy Kumar Nundi v. Chunaraj Mohun Chaitani*. (The words "where there has been an appeal" mean when a memorandum of appeal has been presented in Court)]

Note 39

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 676 (677) : 122 Ind Cas 634 : 57 Cal 549, *Nagendra Nath v. Ambica Charan*.

or order of the lower Court is merged and which becomes the only executable decree or order in the case. Thus, where the decree is confirmed by the decree of the Appellate Court, the appellate decree will be a final decree within clause 2¹ But the expression is not confined to such decrees or orders but will also apply to other orders by which the appeal is finally disposed of.² In other words, the order of the Appellate Court need not be an *executable* order. But it must be a *judicial* order.

**Article 182
(Clause 2)
Note 40**

In *Abdulla Ashgar Ali v Ganesh Das Vig*,³ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:

"Their Lordships think that when an order is judicially made by an Appellate Court which has the effect of finally disposing of an appeal, such an order gives a new starting point for the period of limitation prescribed by Article 182 clause 2 of the Act of 1908."

In that case, the Privy Council held that an order of an Appellate Court declaring an appeal to have abated and refusing to set aside the abatement, was a final order within the meaning of clause 2, although it is clear that such an order cannot supersede the decree of the lower Court and become the executable decree in the case. Similarly, in *Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra*,⁴ the Privy Council held that although an appeal may be irregular or incompetent, clause 2 would apply, although it is clear that where an appeal is *incompetent*, the appellate decree cannot supersede the decree of the lower Court.

In *Abdul Majid v. Jawahr Lal*,⁵ the Privy Council held that an order dismissing an appeal to the Privy Council for *want of prosecution* was not a final order within clause 2 and proceeded further to hold that the decree of the lower Court had not been constructively turned into a decree of the Privy Council by such order so as to make the period of twelve years under Article 183 applicable to the case. In giving reasons for the latter view, the Privy Council observed that the order of dismissal did not deal *judicially* with the matter of the suit and could, in no sense, be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. In *Sachindra Nath v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh*,⁶ the Privy Council

Note 40

1. (1894) 19 Bom 258 (260), *Nanchand v. Vithu*.
(1874) 23 Suth W R 57 (57), *Distoo Pershad Chuckerbutty v. Ishan Chunder Roy*
2. (1933) A I R 1933 P C 68 (70) : 142 Ind Cas 326 : 60 Ind App 63 : 60 Cal 662 (P C), *Abdulla Ashgar Ali v. Ganesh Das Vig*.
(1892) 9 Cal 100 (102), *Wazir Mahton v. Lulit Sing*.
3. (1933) A I R 1933 P C 68 (70) : 142 Ind Cas 326 : 60 Ind App 63 : 60 Cal 662 (P C).
4. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 165 (167) : 137 Ind Cas 529 : 60 Cal 1 : 59 Ind App 283 (P C).
5. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 66 (67) : 36 All 350 : 23 Ind Cas 649 (P C)
6. (1922) A I R 1922 P C 187 (190) : 49 Cal 203 : 49 Ind App 335 : 74 Ind Cas 660 (P C).

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Note 40

again held that an order dismissing an appeal to the Privy Council for want of prosecution was not a final order within clause 2. In doing so, it relied on the earlier decision in *Abdul Majid v. Jawahir*.⁷ After stating that it had been held in that case that the period of three years under Article 182 ran, in such cases, from the date of the decree appealed against and not from the date of dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution, the Privy Council referred with approval to the ground on which, according to it, the decision in the earlier case had been based. This ground was expressed to be contained in the passage in the earlier decision, wherein it had been held that inasmuch as the order of dismissal for want of prosecution did not deal judicially with the matter of the suit and could in no sense be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from, the decree of the

Article 183

in *Sachindra Nath's case*,⁸ that the Privy Council held in that case that an order of an Appellate Court, to come within the purview of clause 2, must be one dealing judicially with the matter of the suit and superseding the decree or order appealed from so as itself to become the executable decree or order in the case. But, as already pointed out, the later decision of the Privy Council in *Abdulla Ashgar Ali v. Ganesh Das Vig*⁹ clearly shows that this is not the view of the Privy Council. It will be seen from the decision in that case that the emphasis, in the view of the Privy Council, is not on the order of the Appellate Court dealing judicially with the matter of the suit but is on the order dealing judicially with the matters before the Appellate Court.

It will follow from the above discussion that the view expressed in some decisions⁷ that clause 2 only applies to cases where the decree or order of the Appellate Court confirms, modifies or reverses the decree or order of the lower Court and does not apply where an appeal is simply dismissed as being incompetent, is not correct.

On the principles discussed above, although the appeal is not decided on the merits and is simply dismissed as barred by limitation,⁸ or as being insufficiently stamped,⁹ clause 2 will apply

7. (1926) A I R 1926 All 440 (441) : 48 All 377 : 91 Ind Cas 961, *Nandlal v. Dharam Kish*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 288 (289) : 68 Ind Cas 727, *Ram Ratan Chowdhury v. Upendra Chandra Das*.
8. (1931) A I R 1931 Pat 422 (423) : 134 Ind Cas 425 : 11 Pat 430, *Kameshwar Singh Bahadur v. Beni Madho Singh*.
- (1908) 30 All 290 (295) : 1908 All W N 109 : 5 All L Jour 594, *Asma Bibi v. Ahmad Husain*.
- (1934) 1934 All W N 46 (47), *Murlihar Singh v. Tapeshri Rai*.
- (1889) 16 Cal 250 (252), *Akshoy Kumar Nundy v. Chunder Mohun Chathath*.
9. (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 79 (80) : 173 Ind Cas 615, *Krushna Kant Prasad v. Radhey Singh*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 349 (350) : 74 Ind Cas 679, *Basanta Kumar Roy v. Manjuri Dasi*.

and time will run only from the date of the appellate order. Similarly, where an appeal is dismissed on the representation of the appellant's counsel that he is unable to support the appeal, time for execution of the decree appealed against runs only from the dismissal of the appeal.¹⁰

Where, on appeal, the decree of the Court below is reversed and a fresh decree is directed to be prepared by the lower Court, the fresh decree prepared is really and only the decree of the Appellate Court and must be taken to bear the date on which the appellate judgment was pronounced.¹¹

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Notes 40-41

41. Abatement of appeal. — Where an appeal from a decree abates and the Appellate Court passes an order declaring the appeal to have abated, such order is the final order of the Appellate Court within the meaning of clause 2 and, as such, will furnish a new starting point of limitation for execution of the decree.¹ In *Abdulla Ashgar Ali v. Ganesh Das Vig*,² their Lordships of the Privy Council observed, with reference to such an order of abatement, as follows :

"In the case now before their Lordships it is manifest that there was an order of the Appellate Court, and that it did deal judicially with the matters before it. The Judicial Commissioner (the Appellate Court in question) considered the judgment-debtor's contention (the judgment-debtor was the appellant in the Judicial Commissioner's Court) that his appeal had not

- (1885) 7 All 887 (888) • 1885 All W N 260, *Rup Singh v. Mukhruf Singh*.
10. (1908) 80 All 385 (386) • 1908 All W N 161 : 5 All L Jour 580, *Fazlur Rahman v. Shah Muhammad Khan*.
11. (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 223 (229) 103 Ind Cas 112, *Jai Lal v. Mahomed Haroon*

Note 41

1

- (1905) 9 Cal W N 67 (67) (S N) : 1 Cal L Jour 17n, *Ramgati Dhur v. Narendralal Chowdhry*.

application for execution brought within three years of the decree is not barred.)]

- (But see (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 280 (283, 284), 53 Ind Cas 977, *Krishna Prasad Singh v. Wajir Narain Singh*. (The test appears to be whether there is a final decree or order of the appellate Court which can be executed and in the case of abatement there is not.))

- (1897) 20 All 124 (126) : 1897 All W N 218, *Fazal Hussain v. Raj Bahadur*.
2. (1933) A I R 1933 P C 68 (70) : 142 Ind Cas 326 : 60 Ind App 83 : 60 Cal 662 (P C)

Article 182
(Clause 2)
; Note 41

abated and held that it had He rejected the application to set aside the abatement. Whether the order made was right or wrong is immaterial : there was no appeal against it, and it was, in the circumstances, clearly final. Their Lordships think that when an order is judicially made by an Appellate Court, which has the effect of finally disposing of an appeal, such an order gives a new starting point for the period of limitation prescribed by Article 182, clause 2 of the Act of 1908."

Pending an appeal by a judgment-debtor, the decree-holder dies. A wrong person is brought on the record as the legal representative of the deceased respondent and the Appellate Court, on the consent of such person, passes a decree setting aside or modifying the decree of the lower Court. The true legal representative of the deceased person then applies for the execution of the decree of the lower Court on the ground that the appellate decree does not bind him. In *Balaram Das Bhagat v. Raja Mukunda Deb*,³ it has been held by the High Court of Calcutta that in such a case the applicant for execution will be entitled to compute limitation from the date of the appellate decree, as the case comes within the plain grammatical meaning of clause 2. With reference to the contention that the clause applies only to cases where the application for execution is made in respect of the final decree of the Appellate Court and not to cases where the application relates to the decree of the lower Court, the High Court observed as follows :

"In our opinion, the second clause should not be interpreted to the detriment of the decree-holder in the case before us, because, as stated in *Nundun Lal v. Rai Jaykishan*,⁴ in a question of limitation, the Court will adhere as strictly as possible to the terms of the law. It has not been disputed, and it cannot be seriously disputed, that the phraseology of the clause in question, strictly construed, completely covers the case before us. It is further clear that the first clause of Article 182 applies to cases in which the application is made for execution of the decree of the Court of Appeal, because that decree, whether made in affirmance, or reversal or modification of the decree of the primary Court, is the only decree capable of execution, on the principle explained by this Court in *Ramcharan v. Lakhikant*⁵ and by the Judicial Committee in *Kistokinkur v. Burrodacaunt*.⁶ If this view is adopted, it is clear that Clause 2 ought not to be interpreted in the sense suggested by the appellants, because it is well settled, as was pointed out by Sir George Jessel, M R, in *Boatwright v. Boatwright*,⁷ that a Court would be slow to interpret a statute of limitation so as to affect

3. (1912) 16 Ind Cas 370 (372) (Cal).

4. (1889) 16 Cal 598 (602)

5. (1871) 16 Suth W R 1 (4, 5) 7 Beng L R 701 (F B)

6. (1872) 14 Moo Ind App 465 (463, 484) 10 Beng L R 101 : 17 Suth W R 292 : 2 Suth 564 : 3 Sar 62 (P C).

7. (1873) 43 L J Ch 12 (14) . L R 17 Eq 71 : 23 L T 603 . 22 W R (Eng) 147.

rights as to the enforcement of which there was no doubt. In the case before us, the liability of the appellant has been established by the decree, and we are not inclined to put a narrow construction upon clause 2 with a view to assist him to avoid payment of his just dues "

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Notes 41-42

See also the undermentioned case ⁸

42. Dismissal of appeal for default, whether gives a fresh start of limitation for execution. — There is a conflict of views among the decisions of the High Courts in India as to whether an order of an Appellate Court dismissing an appeal for default is a final order of an Appellate Court within the meaning of clause 2 so as to give a new starting point of limitation for execution of the decree or order appealed against. According to one view, such an order is not a *judicial* order and hence does not satisfy the requirements of clause 2.¹ The other view is that such an order *does* constitute a final order of the Appellate Court within the meaning of clause 2.² An examination of the decisions of the Privy Council indicates that the Privy Council favours the former view.

The question first came up for decision by the Privy Council in *Batuk Nath v. Munni Desi*.³ In that case, an appeal to the Privy Council had been dismissed for default of prosecution not by an order of the Privy Council but by the *office* of the Privy Council under the rules of the Privy Council. It was held that as there was no order of the *Appellate Court*, the dismissal did not furnish a fresh start of limitation.

8. (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 686 (687) 51 Cal 342 : 81 Ind Cas 569, *Erishna Lal Burman v. Satyabala Devi*. (In this case, on the consent of the person who was erroneously brought on the record as the legal representative of the deceased decree-holder respondent, the decree passed by the lower Court was set aside and the true legal representative applied for execution of the decree passed by the lower Court on the ground that

Note 43

1. (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 251 (252) : 189 Ind Cas 198 : 11 Pat 477, *Hirday Narayan Singh v. Maheshwari Prasad Singh*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Lah 479 (480) : 167 Ind Cas 477, *Secretary of State v. M. Reshma*.
2. (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 6 (8) 53 Ind Cas 696, *Ragha Prasad Singh v. Jadunandan Prasad Singh*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 771 (774) : 16 Lah 564 : 161 Ind Cas 122, *Bank of Upper India Ltd. v. Sri Kishan Das*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 199 (129, 130) : 158 Ind Cas 517, *Budhu Ram v. Mushtaq Shah Singh*.
- (1902) 5 Oudh Cas 143 (145), *Raghunath v. Farukhnd Ali*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 146 (148) : 123 Ind Cas 415, *Gurwal Raut v. Evgu Raut*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 401 (402) : 175 Ind Cas 558, *Ram Rantijaya Prasad Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh*.
3. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 65 (66) : 36 All 284 : 41 Ind App 104 : 23 Ind Cas 644 (P C).

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Note 42

To the next case, viz. *Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal*,⁴ the question again was with regard to the dismissal of an appeal to the Privy Council and it was held by the Privy Council that such dismissal did not operate to give a fresh starting point of limitation under clause 2. But it is not clear whether the order of dismissal in this case was one by the Judicial Committee itself or one by the office of the Privy Council as in the case of *Batuk Nath v. Munni Dei*.⁵

In the third case which came before the Privy Council in regard to this question, *Sachindra Nath v. Maharaj Bahadur*,⁶ the dismissal for want of prosecution was in respect of an appeal to the Privy Council and the dismissal order was not by the Privy Council itself but by the office of the Privy Council. Their Lordships held that such an order of dismissal was not the final order of an Appellate Court within the meaning of clause 2. But the observations of their Lordships are general and are not confined to cases where the dismissal of the appeal is by the office of the Court and not by an order of the Appellate Court.

In *Abdulla Ashgar Ali v. Ganesh Das Vig*,⁶ the question was as to whether an order of an Appellate Court declaring an appeal to have abated was a final order within clause 2. The Privy Council held that such an order was a judicial order of an Appellate Court which came within the purview of clause 2. In doing so, the Privy Council distinguished the case of *Abdul Majid v. Jawahir*.⁴ The observations made by their Lordships with regard to this case indicate that in the view of the Judicial Committee, an order dismissing an appeal for default of prosecution, although such an order is passed by the Appellate Court itself and not by the office of the Court, is not a judicial order and hence is not capable of furnishing a fresh starting point of limitation under clause 2. After distinguishing the case of *Batuk Nath v. Munni Dei*,⁵ their Lordships in referring to the case of *Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal*⁴ observed as follows:

"In the second case the question was again as to the effect of the dismissal of an appeal in this Board for want of prosecution. No reference was made to *Batuk Nath's case*,⁵ which had been decided less than a month before, and it does not appear whether the dismissal had been under the Order in Council, but the effect of the decision was the same. Lord Moulton in delivering the judgment of the Board, says. 'The chief matter of argument before this Board was a contention that the decree which it is sought to enforce had been constructively turned into a decree of His Majesty in Council and assigned to the date of 13th May 1901, by virtue of the dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution on that date, and that therefore the period

4. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 66 (67) : 36 All 350 : 23 Ind Cas 649 (P C). (Reversing 7 Ind Cas 926.)

5. (1922) A I R 1922 P C 187 (190) : 49 Cal 203 : 48 Ind App 335 : 74 Ind Cas 660 (P C).

6. (1933) A I R 1933 P C 68 (70) : 142 Ind Cas 326 : 60 Ind App 83 : 60 Cal 662 (P C).

of limitation was twelve years from 13th May 1901, by virtue of Article 180, Limitation Act (1877). [Under Article 180, twelve years were allowed for the execution of an order of His Majesty in Council.] Their Lordships see no foundation for this contention which appears to have been the basis of the decision of the Courts below. The order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution did not deal judicially with the matter of the suit, and could in no sense be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. It merely recognized authoritatively that the appellant had not complied with the conditions under which the appeal was open to him and that therefore he was in the same position as if he had not appealed at all.

"In the case now before their Lordships it is manifest that there was an order of the Appellate Court and that it did deal judicially with the matters before it"

Thus, it would appear that in the view of the Board as expressed above, even on the assumption that the order dismissing the appeal for want of prosecution which was in question in the case of *Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lai*¹ had been passed by the Judicial Committee (the Appellate Court in question in the case) itself, it was not a 'judicial order' of the Appellate Court so as to give a fresh starting point of limitation under clause 2.

43. Order returning appeal for presentation to proper Court.—Where an appeal is presented to a wrong Court and is returned by such Court for presentation to the proper Court, the order returning the appeal is not the final order of an Appellate Court within clause 2¹

44. "Appellate Court," meaning of.—The words "Appellate Court" in clause 2 refer to the Court to which the appeal has been preferred and such Court is no less an "Appellate Court" because the appeal has been rejected as incompetent.¹ But where the Court to which an appeal is presented has (independently of the question of the competency of the appeal) no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, as where an appeal from the decree of a Civil Court is presented to a Revenue Court, the Court to which the appeal has been preferred will not be an "Appellate Court" within the meaning of the clause. Thus, where an appeal is presented to a wrong Court and is returned for re-presentation to the proper Court, the order returning the appeal will not be the order of an Appellate Court within this clause.² In other words, the term "Appellate Court" in the clause

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Notes 42-45

Note 43

1. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 592 (593) 43 Mad 835 60 Ind Cas 267, *Mahomed Abdul Kadir Marahayar v. Sarus Pandia Tettar*

Note 44

1. (1882) 9 Cal 100 (102), *Wazir Mahdon v. Lulit Singh*.
2. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 592 (593) 43 Mad 835 60 Ind Cas 267, *Mahomed Abdul Kadir v. Sarus Pandia Tettar*.

Article 182
(Clause 2)
Notes 44-46

refers to a Court to which the appeal in question has been presented and which, apart from the question of the competency of the appeal, has jurisdiction to dispose of it.

45. Withdrawal of appeal.— Under the Acts of 1871 and 1877, there was a conflict of decisions as to whether a fresh period of limitation could be counted under clause 2 where the appeal was withdrawn.¹ This conflict has been set at rest by the insertion of the words "or the withdrawal of the appeal" in clause 2 in the Act of 1908 and it is now clear that the fresh starting point of limitation under clause 2 will be available even where the appeal is withdrawn.²

46. Starting point under clause 2.— Under this clause, where there has been an appeal, limitation for execution runs from the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court.¹

A decree for possession was passed by the trial Court. The decree gave the defendant one month from the date of the decree to vacate

Note 45

1. (1876) 1 All 293 (295) : 1 Ind Jur 450, *Hingan Khan v. Ganga Parsad*. (No
(Do)
Ishwargar Budhagar. (Do)
(1890) 15 Bom 370 (375) : 1890 Bom P J 336, *Patil v. Ganu*. (Do)
(1908) 1908 Pun L R No. 87 : 1908 Pun Re No. 54 : 1908 Pun W R No. 40,
Bhagwan Singh v. Mohan Lal. (Do)
(1891) 1 Mad L Jour 745 (746), *Kanara Kurup v. Govinda Kurup*. (Do.)
(1907) 80 Mad 1 (2) : 16 Mad L Jour 393 : 1 Mad L Tim 293 (F B), *Sada-
gopa Ramanuja Periya Jeeyangar v. Lakshmi Doss*. (Fresh starting-
point apphes.)
2. (1928) 94 Ind Cas 890 (891) (All), *Ramchandra Nair v. Nasar Ali*

Note 46

1. (1905) 1905 Pun L R No. 154 : 1905 Pun Re No. 8 : 1905 Pun W R 22,
Ralla Mal v. Mt. Malan (When an application for revision is
admitted by the Chief Court, not as a petition for revision but as a
further appeal, the ultimate order, passed therein rejecting the appli-
cation, ought to be treated as the final order or decree of the Appellate
Court for the purpose of clause 2.)
- (1880) 2 Mad 174 (175), Venkatrayalu v. Narasimha. (Time runs from
appellate decree, though an application for the execution of the lower
Court's decrees has been already filed before the appellate decree is
passed.)
- (1880) 5 C.L.J. 604 (from Calcutta High Court - Har Devedas (Trial
Judge))
- (1876) 25 SutH WR 309 (310), Mullick Mahomed Yakub v. Chowdhry
Shahk Zuhoorul Hug. (Application for refund of money deposited as
costs—Limitation for such an application runs from the date of trial
order in appeal entitling the applicant to a refund and not from the
date of original order entitling him to such refund.)
- {1871} 22 C.L.J. 604 (from Calcutta High Court - Ben Kant

the land. The defendant appealed against the decree. The appeal was dismissed. It was held that limitation ran from the date of the appellate decree and not from the expiry of one month from such decree.²

Article 182
(Clause 3)
Notes 46-46

47. Who is entitled to benefit of clause 2. — Pending an appeal against a decree, the decree was assigned to another. But the assignee was not brought on the record of the appeal. It was held that nevertheless the assignee was entitled to calculate limitation for his application for execution, from the date of the appellate decree.¹

CLAUSE 3.

48. "Where there has been a review of judgment." — There is a difference of opinion on the question whether the expression "review of judgment" in clause 3 of this Article is restricted to the meaning it has under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or whether it will include any proceeding by which a Court reconsiders its own judgments, such as a proceeding to set aside a decree passed *ex parte* or a dismissal for default. It was held in some cases under the Act of 1877 which did not contain any clause corresponding to the present clause 4, that where a decree had been amended, it might be regarded as a review of judgment within the meaning of clause 3 of Article 179, corresponding to the present clause 3.¹ Those cases are no longer law in view of the introduction of clause 4 in the present Article providing for limitation in the case of amended decrees. The High Court of Allahabad has, in a case under the present Article, held that the words "review of judgment" must be applied strictly to a "review of judgment" as used in other portions of the same Schedule.² Pullan, J., observed as follows

"The Limitation Act is of the year 1908, the same year in which the Civil Procedure Code was amended, and there is no reason to suppose that the words "review of judgment" have a different significance in the Limitation Act from that which they bear in the Civil Procedure Code, and we find that Articles 161 and 162 provide for limitation for applying for a review of judgment, whereas Article 164 deals with an application for setting aside an *ex parte* decree"

The High Court of Patna has taken a contrary view.³ According to it, all cases in which the Court reconsiders its own judgment are cases of review within the meaning of clause 3, and consequently

2 (1937) A I R 1937 Cal 729 (729) I L R (1938) 1 Cal 171 173 Ind Cas 535, *Basanta Kumar Pal v. Bailey Bahaman Nasrkar*

Note 47

1. (1930) A I R 1930 All 880 (882) 122 Ind Cas 189, *Banke Dharai Lal v. Raghubar Dayal*

Note 48

1. See Note 50 *infra*

2. (1932) A I R 1932 All 601 (602) 138 Ind Cas 692, *Sushnandan Singh v. M. Ramdass Auniar*

3 (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 337 (341) 16 Pat 306 169 Ind Cas 581, *Firm Dedhray Lachmi Naram v. Bhagwan Das*

Article 182
(Clause 3)
Note 48

a restoration of a suit or appeal dismissed, will be a review of judgment within the meaning of clause 3. Courtney-Terrell, C. J., observed as follows:

"Now there is no essential difference between orders for restoration and orders for review. Notwithstanding the heading in Order 47, the matters dealt with in that Order are reviews for which applications are made on certain specified grounds and it is true that in common parlance the term "review" is used for applications based upon the grounds specified in that Order. No Court, having once passed a judgment, can alter the terms of that judgment save upon specified grounds, and one of those grounds is dealt with under the term "restoration." In both cases, however, the Court has first to decide whether on the ground specified it is justified in law in reconsidering its own decision, and it either allows or refuses the application for reconsideration.

"In some cases, after the decision to reconsider it may be necessary, at a subsequent and separate hearing, to deal with the fresh case on its merits. In some cases, the matter is dealt with at the same hearing and in one judgment the Court decides, firstly, whether the case should be reconsidered and secondly, the result of its reconsideration. But all cases in which the Court reconsiders its own judgment are cases of review within the meaning of clause 3 of Article 182, Limitation Act. Applications for restoration and applications for review (using the word in the narrower sense) are, it is true, separately dealt with in the Orders appended to the Civil Procedure Code. These are mere questions of procedure and may be altered by any particular High Court; but the entire jurisdiction of any Court to interfere with its own decision once given is derived from Section 114 of the Code itself where the single word "review" is used."

It is submitted that the Allahabad view is to be preferred. According to the reasoning of the High Court of Patna, even an amendment of the decree will be a review. This view, however, which, as seen already, had been held under the Act of 1877, has been impliedly negatived by the Legislature by the introduction of clause 4 of the present Article.

There is also a difference of opinion on the question as to whether clause 3 applies only where a review has been *granted* or whether it will apply even where the review has been *refused*. The words "where there has been a review of judgment" make it quite clear that it is only where a review has been *granted* by the Court that the clause applies, and this is the general trend of opinion.⁴ A contrary view has, however, been held by the High Court of Patna.

4 (1866) 5 Sath W R (Misc) 45 (46), *Chowdhry Junnensjoy Mullick v. Dissambhur Panjah*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Oudh 148 (148) : 24 Oudh Cas 280 : 66 Ind Cas 205, *Raja Bhagwan Baksh Singh v. M. Manraj Kunwar*.

namely, that the clause will apply even where an application for review has been *dismissed*, and that time for an application for execution of the decree will run from the date of the dismissal of the application for review.⁵ It is submitted that this view is not correct.

Where an application for review has been *granted*, but the order granting the review is appealed against, clause 2 must be applied along with clause 3, and time for an application for execution will run from the date of the decision in appeal. See Note 34 *ante*

49. Review in part. — Where a decree is reviewed at the instance of some of the defendants, limitation for the execution of the decree runs from the date of the revised decree even as against the defendants who are not parties to the review proceedings.¹ This is in accordance with the principle of interpretation laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra*² in construing clause 2 of this Article which contains the expression "where there has been an appeal" Their Lordships there observed as follows :

"There is no warrant for reading into the words quoted any qualification either as to the character of the appeal or as to the parties to it, the words mean just what they say "

CLAUSE 4.

50. "Where the decree has been amended." — There was no provision corresponding to clause 4 of this Article, in Article 179 of the Act of 1877, and there was a conflict of opinion as to whether a fresh starting point for execution was furnished by the amendment of a decree. According to one class of cases, the amendment of a decree was regarded as a review of judgment within the meaning of clause 3 of Article 179 and was held to furnish a fresh starting point under that clause.³ A contrary view was taken in another class of cases, namely that an amendment could not be

(1886) 10 Mad 66 (67), *Krupam Zamindar v. Sadasuta*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 157 (158) . 44 Ind Cas 575 3 Pat L Jour 119, *Ras Briraj v. Nauratan Lal*.

(1932) A I R 1932 All 601 (602) 135 Ind Cas 692, *Sukhnandan Singh v. Mt. Randers Kunuar*.

5 (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 337 (339, 341) 16 Pat 306 160 Ind Cas 541, *Firm Dadhraj Lachminarain v. Bhagwan Das*

Note 49

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 276 (277) 141 Ind Cas 175, *Vasudeddy Ramayya v. Melugu Kotayya*.

(1912) 12 Ind Cas 679 (682) 35 Mad 670, *Abdul Kadir v. Ajgur Ahammed* (Per Sundara Iyer, J. approved in A I R 1916 Mad 1)

2. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 165 (167) 137 Ind Cas 529 59 Ind App 253 60 Cal 1 (P C).

Note 50

1. (1897) 25 Cal 254 (261, 262) 2 Cal W N 219, *Kali Prasanno Das v. Lal Mohan Guha*

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 140 (142) (Cal), *Rameswar Singh v. Terept Singh*

(1881) 4 All 137 (141) 1881 All W N 152, *Kishen Sahai v. Collector of Allahabad*.

Article 182
(Clause 4)
Nota 80

regarded as a review, and that it did not furnish any fresh starting point for execution.²

The introduction of clause 4 in the present Article has now set the conflict at rest. The Legislature must be taken to have impliedly negated the view that an amendment might be considered to be a review of judgment, though it considered that an amendment should furnish a fresh starting point for execution.

There is a difference of opinion on the question whether the amendment referred to in the clause includes amendments of *verbal* and *clerical* errors, and amendments in respect of matters which do not stand in the way of execution of the decree. It was held in the undermentioned cases³ that the amendment of a mere clerical or verbal error will not furnish a fresh starting point under the Article.

It was assumed in *Mt. Maharani v. Debi Das*,⁴ that an amendment will not furnish a fresh starting point, unless, in the absence of it, the decree was incapable of execution. A contrary view, namely, that time will run from the date of the amendment irrespective of the character or nature of the amendment, has been held in other cases.⁵

(1901) 24 Mad 25 (26), *Venkata Jogayya v. Venkatasimhadri Jagapathi Razu*.

2. (1905) 27 All 575 (577) : 1905 All W N 108 : 2 All L Jour 287, *Asham-Ullah v. Dalakkhidin*.

(1898) 20 All 304 (307) : 1898 All W N 48, *Daya Kishan v. Nanhi Begum*.

(1891) 18 All 124 (126) : 1891 All W N 32, *Kallu Rai v. Fakirman*.

(1900) 3 Ind Cas 391 (392) (Cal), *Chhoto Bahadur Das v. Jogendra Narain*. (Quere Whether an application for amendment of a decree so as to bring it into conformity with the judgment is an application for review.)

(1907) 1907 All W N 169 (169) : 4 All L Jour 469, *Arcadh Bihari Pande v. Mahadeo Sahi*.

3 (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 57 (59) 16 Pat 453 : 174 Ind Cas 418, *Rameshwar Narain v. Raghunandan*. (Amendment must be one in the real sense of the term in order to give a fresh start.)

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 293 (296) : 140 Ind Cas 412, *Mohammad Mumtas Ali v. Mohammad Saadat Ali*

.. D. S. Das.
 88-
 263

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 517 (518) . 39 Ind Cas 624 . 2 Pat L Jour 296, *Aalanand Singh v. Rajkumar Singh*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Cal 581 (583) : 173 Ind Cas 584, *Sureshwar Prasad v. Maharaj Bahadur Sinha* (Mere verbal corrections which are unnecessary—No amendment within Cl. 4.)

reshwar

Abinash

Chandra.

(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 442 (448) 3 Luck 719. 116 Ind Cas 49, *Narolam Das v. Sukhray Singh*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 97 (98) . 53 Mad 748: 154 Ind Cas 847, *Lakshminanta Rao v. Ramayya*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 289 (291) . 150 Ind Cas 947, *Narottam Das v. Atul Chandra*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 43 (44) : 147 Ind Cas 815, *Haidri Khanam v. Dhanwan Shanlar*. (Assumed.)

In *Aditya Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Abinash Chandra*,⁶ the Calcutta High Court observed as follows :

Article 182
(Clause 4)
Note 60

"That time should run from the date of the decree as amended has been recognized by the Legislature by the amendment of the Limitation Act in 1908. With regard to the time from which limitation for execution of a decree should be counted, there was a great divergence of opinion between the Allahabad High Court on the one side and almost all the other High Courts on the other. The conflict was set at rest by adding clause 4 to Article 182, Limitation Act, 1908, which says that limitation for purpose of execution should commence from the date of the amended decree. It does not specify the nature of the amendment and therefore it must be said to include all kinds of amendments, whether under Section 152 or under Order 47, Civil Procedure Code, or any other provision of law."

In *Lakshmikanta Rao v. Ramappa*,⁷ Beasley, C. J., observed as follows

"It is argued that the amendment of the decree was merely a formal one and that the final decree was an executable one even in its unamended form. In our view we are not concerned with that. The words of Article 182 clause 4, Limitation Act, are where a decree has been amended, a period of three years' limitation is given starting from the date of the amendment of the decree. It was the amended decree that the decree-holder sought, by his subsequent application, to execute. We propose to give the words of that Article of the Limitation Act their plain meaning, following the principle of construction laid down by the Privy Council in A I R 1932 P C 165."

It is submitted that the view last stated is correct and is in consonance with the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Nagendranath v. Suresh Chandra*,⁸ that the language of the

(1886) 8 All 492 (493) 1886 All W N 156, *Tarsi Ram v. Man Singh* (Do)

(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 511 (513) 32 Ind Cas 741, *Anandram v. Nityananda Barham* (Do)

[See also (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 392 (393) 22 Ind Cas 283, *Doka Khodalo Patro v. Lunjarapudya Bhushano* (Nature of amendment not clear)]

(1917) A I R 1917 Lah 719 (720) 100 Ind Cas 164, *Partm Chand v. Budha* (Do)

(1917) 99 Ind Cas 201 (203) (Oudh), *Narotam Dass v. Narain Das* (Do)

(1931) 60 Ind Cas 318 (319) (Pat), *Baldeo Shukul v. Syed Yusuf* (Do)

(1934) A I R 1934 Mad 283 (285) 57 Mad 795 113 Ind Cas 1083, *Thiagaraya Thevar v. Sambasiva Thevar*

(1935) A I R 1935 All 606 (607) 153 Ind Cas 493, *Bahal Singh v. Mt. Chanoli* (Fresh decree passed by way of amendment—Time runs from date of amended decree)]

6. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 323 (326) 131 Ind Cas 258.

7. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 97 (98) 59 Mad 743 154 Ind Cas 847.

8. (1932) A I R 1932 P C 165 (167) 137 Ind Cas 529 59 Ind App 283; 60 Cal 1 (P C)

Article 182
(Clause 4)
Note 50

Article must be given its plain meaning, that in construing its provisions equitable considerations are out of place, and that the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide.

There is also a difference of opinion as to whether a fresh starting point is given by the amendment of the decree *after* it is barred by limitation.

One view is that at the date of the amendment the decree must have been alive and that otherwise clause 4 will not apply.⁹ Thus, it was observed in *Haidri Khanam v. Bhawaní Shankar*¹⁰ as follows:

"It seems to us that clause 4, Article 182, presupposes that at the time of amendment the decree is alive.. The basic idea underlying Article 182 is that the decree is subsisting at the various points of time from which the limitation starts to run under the provisions of column 3 of the Article. It would not be consistent with the obvious intention of the Legislature to hold that the decree-holder can get a start for limitation from the date of amendment even in a case where the decrees had already been barred by time when the amendment was made."

In *Rahuddin v. Ram Kanai Sen*,¹¹ their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court held that a "decree which is capable of execution and is not executed within three years from its date becomes dead and cannot be revived by a subsequent application for amendment." The High Court of Madras also observed in the undermentioned case¹²: "If the literal construction of Article 182 clause 4 is to be accepted, then it would enable a decree-holder to execute a barred decree."

A *second* view is that if the *application* for amendment was made within three years of the decree, clause 4 will apply even though the actual amendment is ordered after three years of the decree.^{12a}

9. (1924) A I R 1924 Lah 329 (329) 73 Ind Cas 461, *Jhamman Lal v. Daulat Ram*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 815 (319) . 56 Mad 458 : 148 Ind Cas 58, *Ahmad Kutty v. Kottakkat Kutty*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 511 (513) : 32 Ind Cas 744, *Anandram v. Nityananda Barham*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 769 (769) . 59 Ind Cas 186, *Rahuddin v. Ram Kanai Sen*.

(1886) 8 All 492 (494) : 1886 All W N 156, *Tarsi Ram v. Man Singh*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Pat 517 (518) . 39 Ind Cas 621 : 2 Pat L Jour 296, *Kalanand Singh v. Rajkumar Singh*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 43 (44) 147 Ind Cas 815, *Haidri Khanam v. Bhawaní Shankar*.

10. (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 43 (44) 147 Ind Cas 815.

11. (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 769 (769) . 59 Ind Cas 186.

12. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 315 (318) : 56 Mad 458 : 148 Ind Cas 58, *Ahmad Kutty v. Kottakkat Kutty*.

12a (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 285 (288) 9 Pat 782 : 125 Ind Cas 785, *Mt. Bhagwati Kuer v. Narsingh Narayan Singh*.

A third view contrary to the first view has been held in other cases.¹³ In *Lakshmikanta Rao v. Ramayya*,¹⁴ it was observed that the fact that the decree had already become barred at the date of the amendment or that the amendment applied for was unnecessary, were matters to be dealt with by the Court to which the application had been made for the amendment and that the effect of Article 182 clause 4 is that it is a complete answer to any objection taken with regard to the plea of limitation so far as the earlier decree was concerned. In *Narottam Dass v. Atul Chandra*,¹⁵ it was held that it was not within the province of the executing Court to question whether or not the amendment was properly made, that its duty was confined to execution only and that if it found that an application for execution had been made within three years of the date of the amended decree, then its duty was to proceed with the execution. In *Magan Lal v. Sitaram*,¹⁶ Wort, J., observed as follows :

"The question is in a sense determined on the principle of *res judicata*. When the application for amendment was made, it would have been a complete answer by the judgment-debtor to the application that the decree was already dead in the sense of its being barred by limitation, and the amendment having been made, it must be presumed that that question had no substance. As held by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court, it was not competent for the Court below in this case to sit in appeal on the decision of the Court amending the decree "

It is submitted that the third view is correct on principle

Where a decree, as framed, is incapable of execution, it has been seen already that time does not run against the decree-holder. Where such a decree is amended and thus becomes capable of execution, it is clear that limitation will, under clause 4, run from the date of the amendment.¹⁷

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13. (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 289 (291) 150 Ind Cas 947, *Narottam Dass v. Atul Chandra*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 650 (651) 125 Ind Cas 292, *Durga Prasad Das v. Kedarnath Nayak*
 (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 316 (316) 167 Ind Cas 134 16 Pat 290, *Magan Lal Marwari v. Sitaram Panna Lal* (A I R 1917 Pat 517 held overruled by A I R 1932 P C 165)
 (1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 442 (448) 3 Luck 719 116 Ind Cas 49, *Narottam Das v. Sukhray Singh*
 (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 57 (59) 16 Pat 453 174 Ind Cas 418, *Rameshwar Narain v. Raghunandan*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 97 (97) 58 Mad 743 151 Ind Cas 847, *Lakshmikanta Rao v. Ramayya*
14. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 97 (97) 58 Mad 743 151 Ind Cas 847
15. (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 289 (291) 150 Ind Cas 947
16. (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 316 (316) 16 Pat 290 167 Ind Cas 134.
17. (1926) A I R 1926 All 884 (386) 48 All 281 94 Ind Cas 677, *Delhi Das v. Shambhu Dyal Ganji Prasad*
 (1913) 21 Ind Cas 615 (616) (Cal), *Maharajya Prasad Singh v. Abdul Hamid*

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 50-51a

Where an execution petition is filed beyond time and subsequent thereto the decree is amended, the amendment will not save the application already made from the bar of limitation, though the case may be different where another application for execution is made after the amendment.¹⁸

The words "date of amendment" refer to the date of the Court's order directing the amendment and not the date on which the decree is actually altered or corrected.¹⁹

It has been held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the undermentioned case²⁰ that where an amendment is made by a Court *without jurisdiction*, the amendment has no operation, and time for execution will run only from the date of original decree.

51. Where amended decree is appealed against. — See Note 39, *ante*.

CLAUSE 5.

51a. Where a previous application has been made. — Clause 5 provides that where there is a previous application for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution, time runs from the date of the final order on such application. Before the amendment of the clause by Act 9 of 1927, time ran from the date of the application and not from the date of the final order on the application.¹

- (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 89 (90) : 64 Ind Cas 622, *Sanaton Sant v. Dnabandhu Giri*
(1907) 11 Oudh Cas 22 (25), *Mt. Zubra Bibi v. Mt. Zulashka Bibi*.
(1908) 5 All L Jour 403 (404) : 1908 All W N 191, *Bihari v. Rusal*.
18. (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 434 (431) : 161 Ind Cas 909, *Administrator-General, Madras v. Radhakrishna Chelthar*.
19. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 747 (747) : 49 Mad 807 : 95 Ind Cas 196, *Venkataswami Naidu v. Venkatasubba Naidu*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Pat 278 (278) : 36 Ind Cas 533, *Nirit Lal Jha v. Kalanand Singh*
20. (1900) 24 Mad 1 (13) : 2 Bom L R 771 : 27 Ind App 197 : 10 Mad L Jour 221 : 4 Cal W N 725 : 7 Sar 678 (P C), *Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Venkatarama Rao*

Note 51a

1. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 14 (16) : 61 Ind App 62 : 147 Ind Cas 823 : 55 All 993 (P C), *Khalilur Rahman Khan v. Collector of Etah*.
(1915) A I R 1915 All 231 (232) : 26 Ind Cas 391, *Ibrahimji v. Hasamuddin Khan*.
(1882) 5 All 236 (237) : 1883 All W N 5, *Hulasi v. Marku*.
(1877) 1 All 580 (582) (F B), *Fakir Mahammad v. Gulam Hussain*.
(1897) 22 Bom 722 (725), *Trimbak Bapuji v. Kashmath Vidyadhar*.
(1899) 1 Bom L R 84 (86), *Krishna v. Vithal*.
(1874) 11 Bom H O R 111 (116), *Gobind Lakshuman v. Narayan Moreshwar*.
(1895) 1895 Bom P J 129, *Mancha Kasa v. Amtha Hira*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 22 (24) : 54 Ind Cas 1, *Krishna Prasad v. Dharendra Nath*.
(1880) 7 Cal L R 424 (427, 428), *Jacobraj Singh v. Duhooria Alumbaset Koer*.
(1877) 1 Cal L R 252 (253), *Giri Dhari Singh v. Ram Kishore Narain Singh*.
(1897) 1 Cal W N 260 (262), *Sarat Kumar Das v. Jagat Chandra Roy*.
(1876) 25 Suth W R 91 (94), *Abdool Helim v. Shaikh Ascentoolah*.

This was considered to be harsh,² and the clause was amended so as to make time run from the date of the final order on the application. As to the retrospective effect of the amendment, see the unmentioned case.^{2a}

In order that the clause may apply, the following conditions are necessary

1. the application must be one for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution,
2. the application must be in accordance with the law,
3. the application must be made to the proper Court;
4. there must be a final order on the application.³

The clause will apply only where there has been an application. Hence, where no application has been made to any Court but there has been simply a payment made to the decree-holder out of Court, there is nothing to attract the operation of this clause⁴

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- (1876) 25 Suth W R 546 (517), *Rajah Nilmony Singh Deo Bahadoor v. Nilcomul Tuppadar*.
- (1875) 23 Suth W R 282 (282), *Fair Bakhsh Chowdhry v. Sadut Ali Khan*.
- (1874) 22 Suth W R 512 (515) 14 Beng L R 143 (T B), *Eshan Chander Bose v. Prannath Nag*.
- (1874) 21 Suth W R 147 (147, 148), *Hunkur Singh v. Madho Lall*.
- (1881) 5 Ind Jur 72 (72), *Vijayarayudu v. Thathayya*.
- (1894) 1894 Pun Re No 89, *Sardar v. Fatteh Chaud*.
- (1894) 1894 Pun Re No. 106, *Ghulam Jilani v. Yusuf Shah*.
- (1882) 1882 Pun Re No 151, *Mt. Anis Bibi v. Gauda Mal*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 1178 (1180) 50 Mad 49 98 Ind Cas 156, *Krishna Pattar v. Seetharama Pattar*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 686 (687) 75 Ind Cas 489, *Parthasarathi Chetty v. Abdul Rahman*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 86 (87) 58 Ind Cas 536, *Rangachariar v. Subramania Chetty*.
- (1891) 7 Ind 80 (82), *Sabhanatha v. Lakshmi*.
- (1931) 1931 Mad W N 413 (414), *Raghava Ayyangar v. Natesan Chettiar*.
- (1875) 8 Mad II C R 97 (98), *Naranappa Aiyar v. Nanna Annal*.
- (1875) 8 Mad II C R 105 (107), *Mahalakshmi Annal v. Lakshmi Annal*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 148 (149) 7 Luck 500 137 Ind Cas 768 (T B), *Ram Bharose v. Ramman Lal*.
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 576 (578) 8 Pat 506 78 Ind Cas 766, *Mt Bhagwantha Kuer v. Zamir Ahmad*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 Ring 152 (153) 117 Ind Cas 578 7 Ring 132, *Somasundaram Chettiar v. Ma Shue Thul*.
- (1912) 14 Ind Cas 335 (337) (Lab), *Ram Das v. Kausht Ram*.
- (1912) 13 Ind Cas 189 (190) (Cil), *Madan Mohan Day v. Gangachandra Ray*.
- (1911) 9 Ind Cas 213 (215) (Cal), *Mochai Mandal v. Meseruddin Vellah*.
- (1909) 3 Ind Cas 336 (337) (Cil), *Ray Behari Chakravarti v. Kalihar Gupta*.
2. (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 344 (345) 34 Mad 295 23 Ind Cas 533, *Abdul Kadir Boucher v. Krishna Malamal Naw Karnaran*.
- 2a. (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 207 (207) 127 Ind Cas 572, *Sapana Pa'ra v. Damodar Kar* (Where the decree is not time barred on 1st Jan 1928, the clause applies although the previous application was before that date.)
3. (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 148 (149) 137 Ind Cas 768 7 Luck 500 (F B), *Ram Bharose v. Ramman Lal*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Rang 271 (272) 163 Ind Cas 403 14 Rang 550, *Arjundas Bismatal v. U Ka Ya*.
4. (1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 356 (357) 132 Ind Cas 797 7 Luck 34, *Mata Deen v. Mt. Kausilla*.
- See also Note 121 *infra*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 51a

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 51a-52

Similarly, a suit to set aside an adverse order against the decree-holder in a claim case cannot evade limitation under this clause.⁵

52. "Application in accordance with law."—The word "law" in the expression "application in accordance with law" means not only the law to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure, but the whole body of law in general applicable to such application.¹

An omission to conform to *any* of the requirements of the law in regard to the particular application may, in one sense, be said to render the application not one in accordance with law. This however is not the view adopted by the generality of decisions. An examination of the cases shows that in order that an application may be considered to be in accordance with law, two elements must exist—

1. the application must be one asking the Court to do something which, by law, that Court is *competent to do*; and
2. apart from the question of competency of the Court to grant the relief claimed, it must be *possible* for the Court, on the particulars furnished by the applicant in his application, to proceed to grant the relief claimed.

1. *Competency to grant relief.* The leading case on the point is *Chattar v. Nawal Singh*,² where the High Court of Allahabad observed as follows.

"I think the term "applying in accordance with law" must mean applying to the Court to do something in execution which, by law, that Court is competent to do. I do not think that it means applying to the Court to do something which, either to the decree-holder's direct knowledge in fact or from his presumed knowledge of the law, he must have known the Court was incompetent to do."

This view has been followed in numerous cases.³ An executing Court, for instance, is not competent to grant a relief *not granted by*

⁵ (1889) 17 Cal 268 (271), *Raghunandan Pershad v. Bhugoo Lall*.

(But see (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 9 (12) : 69 Ind Cas 660 : 26 Oudh Cas 71, *Sheo Ram v. Ram Barosey*. (Submitted not correct))

Note 52

1. (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 522 (523) : 171 Ind Cas 99, *Firm Johar Mal Paran Ram v. Budeswar Prasad Singh*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 9 (13) : 26 Oudh Cas 71 : 69 Ind Cas 660, *Sheo Ram v. Ram Barosey*.

[See also (1890) 13 All 211 (213) : 1890 All W N 230, *Bansi v. Sukree Mal*.]

2. (1889) 12 All 64 (65) : 1889 All W N 200.

3. (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 522 (523) : 171 Ind Cas 99, *Firm Johar Mal Paran Ram*

ly against the father is not der applies for application so

made for execution is not one in accordance with law, inasmuch as the Court is not competent to grant the relief prayed for by virtue of the decree.)

(1939) A I R 1939 All 57 (58) : 180 Ind Cas 407 : I L R (1939) All 97, *Sita Ram Rai v. Madho Prasad*.

the decree or which is prohibited by law. Thus, Section 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act prohibits any proceeding being taken against a person who has been adjudicated an insolvent, except with the leave of the Court. Similarly, under Section 58 of the Civil Procedure Code, a judgment-debtor who has once been arrested in execution of a decree and released from detention under that Section, cannot be re-arrested in execution of the same decree. Again, Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that every application made after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor shall be dismissed. An application for a relief not granted by the decree (see Note 53), or which is barred by limitation (see Note 55), or for the re-arrest of the judgment-debtor who has been released from detention under Section 58 of the Civil Procedure Code (see Note 54), or against an adjudicated insolvent without the leave of the Court (see Note 54), cannot therefore be considered to be one in accordance with law within the meaning of this Article. See also the undermentioned case^{3a}

2. Relief not possible to be granted for want of particulars It is obvious that, in order that the Court may act upon an application

(1906) 28 All 387 (389) 3 All L Jour 143 1906 All W N 51, *Langtu Pande v. Baijnath Saran Pande*.

(1905) 1 Nag L R 61 (63), *Khet Singh v. Onkar Seth*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Pat 274 (275) : 10 Pat 183. 131 Ind Cas 815, *Durga Prasad Sahu v. Mt. Poudharo Kuer*. (Relief, though granted by decree, could not be given owing to subsequent orders)

(1922) A I R 1922 Pat 188 (191) : 67 Ind Cas 533 : 1 Pat 651, *Amrit Lal v. Murkhdhar*.

(1926) A I R 1926 All 345 (345, 346) 93 Ind Cas 292, *Ramraj v. Mt. Umraji* (Application to Court without jurisdiction is not one in accordance with law)

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 728 (730) 30 Ind Cas 707 39 Mad 923, *Varadaraja Mudali v. Murugesam Pillai* (An application made to a Court having no jurisdiction will be treated as waste paper, and such an application to such a Court is also of no value in the eye of law)

(1926) A I R 1926 All 95 (100) 43 All 468 90 Ind Cas 939, *Sheo Prasad v. Mt. Naram Das* (Do)

Chandra Kanta,

id.

N 132, *Munawar*

(1918) A I R 1918 Bom 236 (237) 46 Ind Cas 56. 42 Bom 420, *Janardan Goind v. Narayan Krishnaji*.

(1906) 33 Cal 867 (871) 4 Cal L Jour 141, *Purna Chandra Mandal v. Radha Nath Das*.

(1900) 1 Ind Cas 57 (59) (Cal), *Manorath Das v. Ambica Kanta Bose*.

[See also (1881) 4 All 31 (35) 1881 All W N 123, *Muhammad Umar v. Kamila Bibi*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Cal 44 (45) 61 Ind Cas 571, *Sadaya Chandra Jana v. Paresh Nath Ghose*]

[But see (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 77 (78) 79 Ind Cas 880, *Rudra Pratap Singh v. Sheo Prasad* (Application for relief that could not be granted by the Court under the *bona fide* belief that they could be granted held to be in accordance with law)]

3a. (1885) 10 Bom 91 (93), *Chatur Khushkhar v. Mahadu* (An application forbidden by Section 22 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act.)

Article 162
(Clause 8)
Note 52

for relief, sufficient particulars must be stated therein to enable it to do so. Otherwise, it cannot be said to be in accordance with law.

In the case of applications for execution, Order 21 Rules 11 to 13 of the Civil Procedure Code specify the manner in which such applications should be made, the particulars necessary to be stated and the documents that should accompany the application. But it is not every omission to comply with the said Rules that will disable the Court from proceeding with the execution. The omission to give, for example, the number of the suit or the date of the decree as required by clauses (a) and (c) of sub-rule 2 of Order 21 Rule 11, will not disable the Court from proceeding with the execution of the decree. On the other hand, the omission to give, as required by Rule 13 of Order 21, a description of the property sought to be attached, or the omission to state the mode in which the assistance of the Court is sought, as required by clause (j) of Order 21 Rule 11 sub-rule 2, may make it impossible for the Court to proceed to execute the decree.

In the latter case, clearly, the application cannot be considered to be one in accordance with law.⁴ In the former case, that is, where the omission consists of particulars which are required to be given by Order 21 Rules 11 to 13, but which do not prevent the Court from proceeding with the application, there is a difference of opinion among the High Courts. In *Gopal Sah v. Janki Koer*,⁵ Mr. Justice Prinsep observed as follows:

"It was not an application in accordance with law, because it did not fulfil the requirements of the law. No Court can do otherwise than determine that fact. To find that what the law requires on matters of form need not be complied with to make an application one in accordance with law, seems to me to allow a transgression of the law and yet to find that it has been complied with."

This view has however not been shared in the generality of cases. The test generally applied is, 'Could the Court have proceeded with the execution notwithstanding the defect?' If it could, then the application can be considered to be one in accordance with law, but not otherwise.⁶ In *Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Gachait*,⁷ Mr. Justice Suhrawardy observed as follows:

4 (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 1090 (1093) : 40 Mad 949 : 38 Ind Cas 136, *Natesa Pillai v. Ganapathya Pillai*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Pat 75 (75) : 174 Ind Cas 355, *Lachmi Prasad v. Kapil Deo Ojah*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Nag 154 (155, 156) : 28 Nag L R 7 : 131 Ind Cas 681 (F B), *Gulamali v. Rajkumar Chatterji*.

5. (1895) 23 Cal 217 (223).

6. (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 307 (310) : 153 Ind Cas 273 : 59 Bom 1, *Ramgopal Shrivastav v. Ramgopal Bhutada*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 233 (235) : 167 Ind Cas 34 : 13 Luck 162, *Chandila v. Kamla Prasad*.

See also Notes 53 to 72, *infra*.

7 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1077 (1081) : 53 Cal 661 : 98 Ind Cas 166. (20 Cal 388 and 16 Mad 142, *Rehob on*)

"The conclusion at which I have arrived is that the expression 'in accordance with law' in Article 182 clause 5 should be taken to mean that the application though defective in some particulars was such upon which execution could be issued. If the omissions were such as to make it impossible for the Court to issue execution upon it, as was the case in *Asgarali v. Troilokyanath Ghose*⁸ where the list of the properties to be attached and sold was not supplied with the application for execution, it should be held that such an application is not in accordance with law. But where the application is such as to enable the Court to take further steps in execution, it cannot generally be said that such an application, if not defective in material and substantial matters, is an application not in accordance with law."

It would follow from the above discussion that the applicability of the test referred to above for seeing whether an application is or is not in accordance with law has to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case.⁹ It is, however, necessary to remember that the question whether an application is in accordance with law must be determined with regard to what the law requires to be done *at the time* the application is made. It is not permissible to consider what the law requires to be done *after* the application is made,¹⁰ and a valid application which is in accordance with law at the time it is made cannot be invalidated by any subsequent act of default by the decree-holder.¹¹

8. (1890) 17 Cal 637 (639) (F B).

9. (1898) 25 Cal 591 (597) 2 Cal W N 556 (F B), *Gopal Chunder Manna v. Gosain Das Kalay*

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1077 (1080) 53 Cal 661 98 Ind Cas 166, *Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Gachait*

(1934) A I R 1934 Bom 807 (810) 153 Ind Cas 273 59 Bom 1, *Ramgopal Shriram v. Ramgopal Bhutada*

(1919) A I R 1919 Lah 95 (96) 49 Ind Cas 982, *Kanji Mal v. Emdar Nath*

(1933) A I R 1933 Sind 341 (343) 27 Sind L R 314 147 Ind Cas 470, *Devraj Multani Sahas v. Fateh Chand Ram Chand*

(1922) A I R 1922 Sind 29 (30) 65 Ind Cas 14 15 Sind L R 156, *Suhajram Tahilram v. Tower*

(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 399 (400) 66 Ind Cas 591 29 Oudh Cas 332, *Durga Prasad Singh v. Jakhoo Ram*

10. (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 517 (518) 47 Ind Cas 993, *Arjun Naik v. Lalhan*. (28 Mad 557 and A I R 1918 All 242, Followed)

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 172 (172) 55 Ind Cas 231, *Aptapuddin Ahmed v. Jogendra Narain Tewari*.

11. (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 513 (514) 178 Ind Cas 621, *Kameshwar Prasad Singh v. Lala Mal* (Failure of decree holder to get mistake in certificate of non-satisfaction of decree corrected)

(1935) A I R 1935 Nag 1 (9) 153 Ind Cas 955 31 Nag L R 126, *Pulcasao v. Mt. Khairunnissa* (Failure to file succession certificate.)

(1927) A I R 1927 Pat 374 (325) 6 Pat 440 101 Ind Cas 218, *Mt Anha Bibi v. Mahabir Prasad* (Failure to produce succession certificate.)

(1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 233 (235) 167 Ind Cas 94 13 Luck 162, *Chandila v. Kamla Prasad* (Omission to produce copies ordered to be produced under Rules 187 and 188, Oudh Civil Rules.)

(1923) 16 All 26 (24) 1923 All W N 197, *Mangal Khan v. Salim uliah Khan* (Application unaccompanied by succession certificate)

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 52-53

It is also to be remembered that the determination of the question whether an application is in accordance with law does not, in any way, depend upon the *result* of the application on the merits.¹²

53. Application for relief not granted by decree.—Execution implies the activity of Courts in assisting the decree-holder to realize the *fruits of his decree*.¹ Where, therefore, the decree does not grant a particular relief, the executing Court is not competent to grant it. An application praying for a relief not granted by the decree is therefore one not in accordance with law.¹³ In *Bando Krishna Kanbargi v. Narsinha Konher*,² Mr. Justice Chandavarkar observed:

"If the person entitled applies for execution in a mode and for a relief outside the decree, the application is not in accordance with law, for the plain reason that the decree of which the execution is sought is not in reality the decree to which the application professes to relate, but some other decree, one not existing, and therefore, incapable of execution according to law. The decree in such a case not existing, the application made as to it shares its fate and is treated as non-existent."

In *Ramakrishna Kadirvelusami v. Eastern Development Corporation*,³ where in a suit on a mortgage there was a decree

- (1893) 1893 Pun Re No 54, *Sobha Singh v. Fatta* (Execution application by heir of deceased decree-holder unaccompanied by a succession certificate.)
- (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 172 (172) : 55 Ind Cas 231, *Aftapuddin Ahmed v. Jogendra Naram Tewari*.
[See also (1932) A I R 1932 AH 484 (484) : 139 Ind Cas 201, *Dambar Lal v. Chand Mal.*]
12. (1927) 52 Mad L Jour 1 (2) (N 1 C) Critical Note on 53 Cal 604 : A I R 1925 Cal 1077 : 98 Ind Cas 166, *Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Gachait*. (Result of application is not the test.)
- (1897) 24 Cal 778 (783) . 1 Cal W N 676, *Adhar Chandra Dass v. Lal Mohun Das*.
- (1912) 17 L C 210 (213) : 37 Bom 42, *Bando Krishna v. Narsinha Konher*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 233 (235) : 167 Ind Cas 84 : 13 Luck 162, *Chandika v. Kamla Prasad*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 616 (617) : 93 Ind Cas 33 : 1 Luck 569, *Gobardhan Dass v. Jang Bahadur*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 597 (597) : 1 Pat 609 : 69 Ind Cas 663, *Gobardhan Das Dwarka Prasad v. Satishchandra Rai*.
- (1900) 4 Ind Cas 1154 (1155) : 3 Sind L R 171, *People's Bank of India v. Mahomed Ali*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 160 (161) . 90 Ind Cas 847, *Jogendra Prasad Narayan Sinha v. Mangal Prasad Sahu*.

Note 53

1. (1888) 13 Bom 237 (239), *Pandharinath Bapnji v. Lilachand Hatibhai*.
(1909) 4 Ind Cas 1154 (1155, 1156), . 3 Sind L R 171, *People's Bank of India v. Mahomed Ali*. (Application for arrest of legal representative in accordance with law.

W R No. 95, *Ganga Ram*

v. Ali Buzurg.

[See also (1899) 1 Bom L R 84 (86), *Krishna v. Vithal*]

2. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 210 (212) : 37 Bom 42.
3. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 396 (397) : 43 Ind Cas 537.

against the mortgaged property but no personal decree against the mortgagor, and the decree-holder filed an application for the attachment and sale of non-mortgaged properties of the mortgagor, the High Court of Madras held that the application was not one in accordance with law. Their Lordships observed :

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 53-54

"Under the Limitation Act, the application must be one to execute a decree; but, if that decree is non-existent, there can be no application in accordance with law. We are unable to hold that the nature of the relief is immaterial so long as the tabular form is properly filled up."

See also the undermentioned cases.^{3a}

A contrary view, namely, that an application even for a relief not granted by the decree may be one in accordance with law, has been held in the undermentioned case.⁴ It is submitted that this view is not correct.

Where some of the reliefs claimed in the application are granted by the decree, and some not, the application in so far as the former reliefs are concerned, would be in accordance with law, though as to the latter it would not be so.⁵

54. Application against person against whom execution could not issue. — An application for execution in a particular mode against a person who cannot, in law, be so proceeded against, cannot, as has been seen in Note 52 *ante*, be considered to be one in accordance with law. Thus, an application for execution against a discharged insolvent judgment-debtor,¹ or an application for execution against an adjudicated insolvent without the leave of the Court,² is not one in accordance with law. Similarly, an application for execution against a judgment-debtor who is dead on the date of the application,³ or for the *re-arrest* of a judgment-debtor who

3a (1905) 27 All 619 (621) 2 All L Jour 376 : 1905 All W N 132, *Munawar Hussain v. Jani Bhai Shankar*.

(1901) 1901 Pun Re No. 99, *Sri Ram v. Majuddin*.

4. (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 623 (623) 35 Ind Cas 614, *Ramchandra Naidu v. Tirupathi Naidu*.

5. (1918) 17 Ind Cas 210 (212) 37 Bom 42, *Banda Krishna v. Narasimha Konher*.

Note 54

1. (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 180 (181) 77 Ind Cas 747, *Ghanshamdas Balkrishna-das v. Motichand Horakchand*.

(1939) A I R 1939 Mad 193 (196), *Nagaratnam Pillai v. Ramaswami Iyer*.

2. (1939) A I R 1939 Mad 193 (196), *Nagaratnam Pillai v. Ramaswami Iyer*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 284 (286) 59 Mad 759 162 Ind Cas 376, *Jagdisson Pillai v. Narayanan Chettiar*. (An execution petition filed after the institution of insolvency proceedings without the leave of insolvency Court cannot be said to be an application in accordance with law.)

3. See Note 55 *infra*.

(1934) A I R 1934 All 463 (464) 56 All 463 148 Ind Cas 1181, *Ram-lali v. Bir Bhadarman Tewari*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Pcm 215 (216) 153 Ind Cas 181, *Manjula-bai Kashi Nath v. Pandurang Jajaram*.

(1903) 13 Mad L Jour 37 (37) (N B C).

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 54-55a

has been already released from detention under Section 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure,⁴ is not one in accordance with law. But a judgment-debtor, who has been arrested and released pending insolvency proceedings under the provisions of the Insolvency Act, is not exempted from re-arrest after the obstruction is removed, and therefore an application for the re-arrest of the judgment-debtor under such circumstances cannot be said to be not one in accordance with law.⁵

55. Application barred by limitation. — As has been seen in Note 52, *ante*, 'law' means the *whole body of law* applicable to the particular application in question. An application for execution which is barred by limitation cannot be said to be in accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act governing such applications and cannot therefore be considered to be one 'in accordance with law.'¹ In *Neelmoney Singh v. Ramjeebun*,² their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows :

"The application mentioned as a starting point for a period of limitation in Article 179 clause 4 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act of 1877, must be an application 'in accordance with law.' In this case the application of 16th February 1877, from which it is contended that the period should be computed, was not 'in accordance with law,' as it was made after the period prescribed by the law then in force. It cannot therefore constitute a fresh starting point for limitation."

55a. Application in respect of person or property outside jurisdiction. — A, a decree-holder, applied for execution against B, the judgment-debtor, and stated in his application that B was residing within the jurisdiction of the Court and had also moveable property within such jurisdiction. This was found to be untrue and the application was dismissed. It was held that the application could not, by reason only of the said facts, be considered as not in accordance with law.¹ The Court observed as follows :

(1897) 7 Mad L Jour 840 (840) (N I C), Critical Notes on 19 All 337, *Madho Prasad v. Kesho Prasad*

(1897) 19 All 337 (339) 1897 All W N 75, *Madho Prasad v. Kesho Prasad*.
[But see (1893) 17 Mad 76 (78) : 4 Mad L Jour 8, *Samsa Pillai v. Chockalinga Chettiar*. (Following 6 Mad 250 and 10 Cal 541.)

(1933) A I R 1933 Cal 684 (687) : 149 Ind Cas 1024, *Abdus Sattar v. Mohini Mohan Das*]

4. (1889) 12 All 64 (65) : 1889 All W N 200, *Chattar v. Newal Singh*.

5. (1910) 8 Ind Cas 743 (745) : 33 All 279, *Suraj Din v. Mahabir Prasad*.
(25 Bom 652, Followed, 12 Cal 652, Not followed.)

Notes 55

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: 69 Ind

2. (1881) 8 Cal L R 335 (336).

Note 55a

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Sind 78 (81) : 142 Ind Cas 480 : 27 Sind L R 109, *Achraj-sing Ramsing v. Achrajram Sahani*. (6 Cal 519, Followed.)

"Assuming for a moment that the averment that the judgment-debtor was in Karachi and had moveable property in his possession in Karachi was not true, still the Court was not asked to do that which it was not competent to do. The Court was asked to attach property within its jurisdiction, which it was perfectly competent to the Court to order. If it had been proved by the judgment-debtor to the satisfaction of the Court that there was, as a matter of fact, no property within its jurisdiction to be attached, the applicant would not have been able to secure effective execution of his decree. But that would not vitiate the validity or legality of the application for execution as such. An application is what the applicant asks the Court to do; not what it might turn out to be in the light of the evidence recorded subsequently in connexion with another matter."

Where an application for the attachment of property *bona fide* believed to belong to the judgment-debtor was made, it was held that the fact that, on inquiry it turned out that the property did not belong to the judgment-debtor, will not render the application not one in accordance with law.²

55b. Application for transfer of decree to non-existent Court or to Court without jurisdiction.—An application to Court *A* for the transfer of a decree to Court *B* which has no jurisdiction to execute such decree is not an application in accordance with law.¹ The reason is that a Court is not *competent* to transfer a decree to another Court which has no jurisdiction to execute the decree, and that an application to a Court to do that which it is not competent to do is not one in accordance with law. According to the High Court of Madras, these cases must be distinguished from a case where a Court is asked to transfer a decree for execution to a Court *which does not exist at all*, and the application in the latter case would be one in accordance with law.² Their Lordships observed as follows.

"This is not, we think, the same as applying for transmission to a Court which does not exist but which the petitioner wrongly believes to exist. That is a mistake of fact in our opinion There is no ground for holding that the decree-holder was applying for transmission of his decrees for execution to a Court without jurisdiction to execute them. It is not disputed on behalf of the appellants that the decree-holder

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 55a-55b

2. (1895) 1895 Pan Re No. G, *Prabhu Singh v. Bal Kishan*

Note 55b

1. (1939) A I R 1939 All 57 (5-6) 1 L R 1939 All 97 1-0 Ind Cas 403 *Sita Ram v. Madho Prasad*
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 1-8 (192) 1 Pat 651 67 Ind Cas 538, *Amrit Lal v. Murlidhar*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 309 (310) 11 Pat 7-5 142 Ind Cas 155 *Sital Prasad Shukul v. Balu Lal Shukul*.
2. (1939) 1939 Mad W N 11 (12), *Shanthappa v. Escarppe*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 55b-56

wanted his decrees to be transferred to the Bellary District so that they could be executed. He wanted them to be transferred to a Court with jurisdiction to execute them. The sole mistake which he made was not a mistake of law but a mistake in the description of the Court to which he requested that his decrees might be transferred."

It is difficult to see, however, how the *knowledge* of the decree-holder or his *belief* would affect the question whether the application was or was not one in accordance with law.

56. Unstamped applications and applications without the payment of court-fees necessary.—It has been held by the High Court of Madras in *Ramaswami Ayyan v. Sesa Aiyangar*,¹ that the affixing of an insufficient stamp on the application for execution did not render the application illegal and that it would, consequently, give a fresh starting point of limitation. In *Krishnayya v. Sriramulu*,² the same High Court held that an *unstamped* execution application was not necessarily one not in accordance with law. Neither of these decisions made any reference to the provisions of Section 28 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, which enacts that no document which ought to bear a stamp under the Act shall be of *any validity* unless and until it is properly stamped.

Where a decree for partition provided that the plaintiff was not entitled to execute the decree unless he paid the full court-fee on the claim made by him in his suit, and the plaintiff applied for execution without making any such payment, it was held by the High Court of Bombay that the application could not be said to be one not in accordance with law by reason of such non-payment.³ The Court observed :

"It was within the competence of the Court to order partition on court-fee being paid as directed by the decree . . . Upon the plaintiff's application it was competent for the Court to order that the execution should begin on court-fee being paid within a certain date."

This view has been dissented from by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind.⁴ In that case a decree was passed in a suit falling under Section 11 of the Court-fees Act, 1870, for a larger amount than was claimed in the plaint, and without paying the extra court-fee as required by that Section, the plaintiff applied for execution. It was held that the application was not one in accordance with law, the reason given being that since it was not the duty of any Court to execute the decree where the deficit court-fee was not paid,

Note 56

1. (1893) 6 Mad 181 (182).

2. (1926) A I R 1928 Mad 142 (142) : 106 Ind Cas 485

3. (1909) 5 Ind Cas 601 (602) : 34 Bom 132, *Nathu Bai Karsandas v. Pranji-tan Lalchand*.

4. (1937) A I R 1937 Sind 103 (110) : 31 Sind L R 14 : 170 Ind Cas 493, *Lakshmi Chand Chandamal v. Firm Gokaldas Ranchordas*.

the application could not be said to have been made to the *proper Court* at all as explained in Explanation II of the Article.

Article 182
(Clause 6)
Notes 56-58a

57. Application for relief in mode not permitted by law.—

An application for a relief, even though granted by the decree, in a *mode which the law does not permit*, cannot be said to be one in accordance with law.¹ Thus, where the decree itself directed the sale of the property in suit, and the application was for the *attachment* of the said property, the High Court of Madras² observed :

"An application for attachment of certain property cannot be treated as an application to execute a decree which directs the sale of that property. As pointed out in *Jogemaya Dassi v. Thackomoni Dassi*,³ the properties attached being mortgaged properties could not be brought to sale under the attachment, and the attachment must therefore be treated as ineffective and infructuous."

An application for execution against the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor, by *arresting and imprisoning* them, has been held to be not one in accordance with law, on the ground that the legal representatives are not liable to be arrested and imprisoned for debts due by the deceased judgment-debtor.⁴

56. Application in respect of decree incapable of execution.

—It was held in the undermentioned case¹ that an application for execution of a decree at a time when it is incapable of execution cannot be considered to be one in accordance with law. The decree in that case was one falling under Section 11, Court-fees Act, and was held incapable of execution until the additional court-fee was paid. This latter view has not been followed in other cases (see Note 56 *ante*).

58a. Application for execution of conditional decree without performing condition. — It has been seen in Note 32 *ante*, that there is a conflict of opinion on the question whether a decree on condition that the plaintiff decree-holder should before execution pay a certain sum of money, is a decree that is immediately capable of execution. According to the High Courts which have taken the view that the decree is immediately capable of execution, an application for execution of such decree without performing the condition

Note 57

3. (1896) 24 Cal 473 (480)

4. (1900) 4 Ind Cas 959 (959) (Lah), *Raichand v. Jhande Khan*

[See also (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 522 (523) 171 Ind Cas 92, *Firm Johar Mal-Paran Ram v. Budeswarji Prasad* (Decree not binding on sons—Application for arrest of sons)]

Note 58

1. (1937) A I R 1937 Sind 108 (110) 31 Sind L R 14 170 Ind Cas 493, *Lathimchand Ghandamal v. Firm Gotaldas Rarchordas*.

59. Application not accompanied by certificate required by law.—It was held in *Manohar v. Gebiappa*,¹ that an application for execution not accompanied by the Conciliator's certificate as required by the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1879, was not one in accordance with law. This view has however been dissented from in a later case of the same High Court and it has been held that such an application, if it is otherwise in accordance with law, does not become one not in accordance with law by reason of the fact that the certificate does not accompany it.²

The failure to produce a *succession certificate* along with an application for execution made by the legal representatives of a deceased decree-holder will not, according to the cases noted below, render the application not one in accordance with law, the reason being that the Court was in such cases not prohibited from *entertaining* the application, but only from *proceeding* with the execution of the decree.

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(1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 129 (130) . 158 Ind Cas 517, *Budhu Ram v. Mushtaq Shah*.

1. (1881) 6 Bom 31 (32).
2. (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 46 (47) . 28 Ind Cas 493, *Sadashiv Venkaji v. Narasing Rao*
3. (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 73 (75, 76) . 47 Ind Cas 726 . 43 Bom 44.
- 4 (1937) A I R 1937 Sind 108 (110) : 31 Sind L R 14 : 170 Ind Cas 493, *Lakshmichand Ghandamal v. Firm Gokaldas Ranchordas*.
5. (1894) 20 Bom 76 (78), *Balkishan Shiwa Bahas v. Wagarsing*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Nag 1 (2) 153 Ind Cas 955 : 81 Nag L R 126, *Pulrasao v. Mt. Khairunnissa*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 821 (325) : 6 Pat 410 : 104 Ind Cas 218, *Mt. Bibi Aisha v. Mahabir Prasad*.
- (1893) 1893 Pnn Kc No 54, *Solba Singh v. Fatta*.

60. Omission to sign or verify application.—Sub-rule 2 of Rule 11, Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, requires that every application for execution should be signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. An omission to *verify* the application is only an immaterial defect which will not vitiate the application.¹ There is a difference of opinion as to whether an omission by the decree-holder to *sign* the application is a material defect vitiating the application. In the undermentioned cases² an application neither signed nor verified by the decree-holder but which was signed by his vakil who, however, did not profess to be acquainted with the facts of the case, was held to be not in accordance with law. Where an application was signed only by the pleader of the party and he was acquainted with the facts of the case, it was held that the application was not vitiated.³ An application presented by a Mooktear on behalf of all the judgment-creditors, one of whom had signed it, the names of the rest having been appended thereto by the Mooktear, was held by the Calcutta High Court to be one on behalf of all the judgment-creditors, especially where no objection to the form of the application was taken by the Court at its presentation.⁴

Where an application was made by the mother as guardian of the minor decree-holder when he was really a major, it was held by the High Court of Madras that the application was not one in accordance with law.⁵

61. Error in description of suit and names of parties.—Order 21 Rule 11, sub-rule 2 clauses (a) and (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure require a statement of the number of the suit and the names of the parties. But an omission to state these, or an error in stating them, does not render the application invalid.⁴

Note 60

- 1 (1906) 8 Cal L Jour 44 (44) (8 N), *Jyot Kumar Mukerji v. Natabar Bose*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 62 (63) 159 Ind Cas 491, *Sheonath Prasad v. Benares Bank, Ltd.*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 23 (24) 2 Pat 809 74 Ind Cas 174, *Bhagwat Prasad Singh v. Bwarka Prasad Singh* (Verification by one only of several applicants)
- 2 (1930) 195 Ind Cas 15 (15) (Mad), *Sangulaya Pillai v. Muthu Chettiar*
(1936) A I R 1936 All 17 (18) 159 Ind Cas 752, *Raja Ram Gopal Singh v. Harish Chandra Lal*
(See also (1903) 26 All 19 (21) 1903 All W N 172, *Kasumji v. Beni Prasad*)
- 3 (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 196 (196) 117 Ind Cas 526, *Hassan Saheb v. Ramchandra Appaya*
(1903) 26 All 154 (155) 1903 All W N 209, *Bikar Sajjad v. Udit Narain Singh*
- 4 (1879) 4 Cal 605 (606), *Autao Misree v. Bidhoomoolkee Dabee*
- 5 (1905) 29 Mad 396 (396) 1 Mad L Tim 113, *Saramma v. Sethayya*

Note 61

- 1 (1935) 42 Cal W N 842 (843), *Brin Khan Behari Bose v. Menmotha Nath Duari*. (Execution application otherwise correct, wrongly describing a suit to be a small cause case)

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 60-61

59. Application not accompanied by certificate required by law.—It was held in *Manohar v. Gebiappa*,¹ that an application for execution not accompanied by the Conciliator's certificate as required by the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1879, was not one in accordance with law. This view has however been dissented from in a later case of the same High Court and it has been held that such an application, if it is otherwise in accordance with law, does not become one not in accordance with law by reason of the fact that the certificate does not accompany it.²

The failure to produce a *succession certificate* along with an application for execution made by the legal representatives of a deceased decree-holder will not, according to the cases noted below, render the application not one in accordance with law, the reason being that the Court was in such cases not prohibited from *entertaining* the application, but only from *proceeding* with the execution of the decree.

Note 58a

Chettiar v. Rajapper,
 438, *Mt. Bhurda v. Rakamattu,*
Sab Rawlthen v. Rajapopala

Mudaliar.

(1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 129 (130) • 158 Ind Cas 517, *Budhu Ram v. Mushtak Shah.*

Note 59

1. (1881) 6 Bom 31 (32).
2. (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 46 (47) . 28 Ind Cas 493, *Sadashiv Venkaji v. Nar-sing Rao*.
3. (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 73 (75, 76) : 47 Ind Cas 726 : 43 Bom 44
4. (1937) A I R 1937 Sind 108 (110) : 31 Sind L R 14 : 170 Ind Cas 485, *Lec. v. Ranchordas*.
5. (1894) 20 126, *Fulchand*
 (1935) A
 v
 (1927) A 215, *M. F.*

Alima v. Mahabir Prasad.

(1893) 1893 Bom 2, *M. F. C. v. Patta.*
al Khan v. Salim-ullah Khan.
v. Brahmdoo.

(1933) 20 Cal 755 (757), *Hafizuddin Chowdhry v. Abdulool Asa*.
(1892) 19 Cal 482 (484), *Brownath Surma v. Issar Chandra D*

60. Omission to sign or verify application.—Sub-rule 2 of Rule 11, Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, requires that every application for execution should be signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. An omission to *verify* the application is only an immaterial defect which will not vitiate the application.¹ There is a difference of opinion as to whether an omission by the decree-holder to *sign* the application is a material defect vitiating the application. In the undermentioned cases² an application neither signed nor verified by the decree-holder but which was signed by his *vakil* who, however, did not profess to be acquainted with the facts of the case, was held to be not in accordance with law. Where an application was signed only by the pleader of the party and he was acquainted with the facts of the case, it was held that the application was not vitiated.³ An application presented by a Mooktear on behalf of all the judgment-creditors, one of whom had signed it, the names of the rest having been appended thereto by the Mooktear, was held by the Calcutta High Court to be one on behalf of all the judgment-creditors, especially where no objection to the form of the application was taken by the Court at its presentation.⁴

Where an application was made by the mother as guardian of the minor decree-holder when he was really a major, it was held by the High Court of Madras that the application was not one in accordance with law.⁵

61. Error in description of suit and names of parties.—Order 21 Rule 11, sub-rule 2 clauses (a) and (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure require a statement of the number of the suit and the names of the parties. But an omission to state these, or an error in stating them, does not render the application invalid.¹

Note 60

1. (1906) 3 Cal L Jour 44 (44) (S N), *Jyot Kumar Mukerji v. Nataraj Lax.*
(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 62 (63) 159 Ind Cas 491, *Sheonath Prasad v. Bank of India Bank, Ltd.*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 23 (24) 2 Pat 809 74 Ind Cas 174, *Bhagwan Singh v. Dwarka Prasad Singh* (Verification by one only of the applicants)
- 2 (1930) 185 Ind Cas 15 (15) (Mad), *Sanguliyappa Pillai v. Muthu Chettiar*
(1936) A I R 1936 All 17 (18) 159 Ind Cas 752, *Raja Ram Gopal Lal Harish Chandra Lal*
[See also (1903) 26 All 19 (21) 1903 All W N 172, *Kasuram v. Prasad*]
- 3 (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 196 (196) 117 Ind Cas 526, *Hassan Bhai v. Chandra Appaya*
(1903) 26 All 154 (155) 1903 All W N 209, *Bakur Sajjad v. U. S. Singh*
4. (1878) 4 Cal 605 (606), *Autoo Visree v. Budhoomoolhee Dabee.*
- 5 (1905) 23 Mad 396 (398) 1 Mad L Tim 113, *Saramma v. Seshappa*

Note 61

- 1 (1938) 42 Cal W N 842 (843), *Brindaban Behara Das v. M. S. D. D. D.*
[Execution application otherwise correct, with a suit to be a small cause case.]

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 60-61

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 58a-59

cannot be said to be not in accordance with law by reason of the non-performance of the condition.¹

59. Application not accompanied by certificate required by law.—It was held in *Manohar v. Gebiappa*,¹ that an application for execution not accompanied by the Conciliator's certificate as required by the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, 1879, was not one in accordance with law. This view has however been dissented from in a later case of the same High Court and it has been held that such an application, if it is otherwise in accordance with law, does not become one not in accordance with law by reason of the fact that the certificate does not accompany it.²

Section 29F of the Bombay Gujarat Talukhdars' Act, 1888, provides that on the publication of a notice under Section 29B, no proceeding in execution shall be instituted or continued until the decree-holder files a certificate from the managing officer that the decree claim has been duly submitted or until the expiration of a specified period. In *Hargovind v. Naja Sura*,³ it was held that an application not accompanied by such a certificate was nevertheless one in accordance with law. A contrary view was expressed by Mr. Justice Marten in the same case. In the undermentioned case,⁴ the Sind Judicial Commissioner's Court expressed its preference to Mr. Justice Marten's view.

The failure to produce a *succession certificate* along with an application for execution made by the legal representatives of a deceased decree-holder will not, according to the cases noted below,⁵ render the application not one in accordance with law, the reason being that the Court was in such cases not prohibited from *entertaining* the application, but only from *proceeding* with the execution of the decree

Note 58a

1

Rajappan.
v. Rahamatbi.
v. Rajagopala

(1935) A I R 1935 Pesh 129 (130) . 153 Ind Cas 517, *Budhu Ram v. Mushtaq Shah*.

Note 59

1. (1881) G Bom 31 (32).

2. (1915) A I R 1915 Bom 46 (47) 20 Ind Cas 493, *Sadashiv Venkaji v. Narasing Rao*.

3 (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 73 (75, 76) : 47 Ind Cas 726 : 43 Bom 41.

4 (1937) A I R 1937 Sind 103 (110) : 31 Sind L R 14 : 170 Ind Cas 493, *Lakshmichand Ghandamal v. Firm Gokaldas Ranchordas*.

5 (1894) 20 Bom 76 (78), *Balkishan Shiva Bakas v. Wagarsing*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Nag 1 (2) 153 Ind Cas 935 : 31 Nag L R 126, *Pilwasao v. Mt. Khairunnissa*

(1927) A I R 1927 Pat 324 (325) 6 Pat 440 . 104 Ind Cas 218, *Mt. Dibi Aisha v. Mahabir Prasad*.

(1893) 1893 Pun Re No 54, *Solba Singh v. Fatta*.

(1904) 10 All 1001, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1009, 1010, 1011, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1093, 1094, 1095, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1099, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1158, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265, 1266, 1267, 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1333, 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1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 2681, 2682, 2683, 2684, 2685, 2686, 2687, 2688, 2689, 2690, 2691, 2692, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2696, 2697, 2698, 2699, 2700, 2701, 2702, 2703, 2704, 2705, 2706, 2707, 2708, 2709, 2710, 2711, 2712, 2713, 2714, 2715, 2716, 2717, 2718, 2719, 2720, 2721, 2722, 2723, 2724, 2725, 2726, 2727, 2728, 2729, 2730, 2731, 2732, 2733, 2734, 2735, 2736, 2737, 2738, 2739, 2740, 2741, 2742, 2743, 2744, 2745, 2746, 2747, 2748, 2749, 2750, 2751, 2752, 2753, 2754, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2758, 2759, 2760, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2764, 2765, 2766, 2767, 2768, 2769, 2770, 2771, 2772, 2773, 2774, 2775, 2776, 2777, 2778, 2779, 2780, 2781, 2782, 2783, 2784, 2785, 2786, 2787, 2788, 2789, 2790, 2791, 2792, 2

60. Omission to sign or verify application.—Sub-rule 2 of Rule 11, Order 21, Civil Procedure Code, requires that every application for execution should be signed and verified by the applicant or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. An omission to *verify* the application is only an immaterial defect which will not vitiate the application¹. There is a difference of opinion as to whether an omission by the decree-holder to *sign* the application is a material defect vitiating the application. In the undermentioned cases² an application neither signed nor verified by the decree-holder but which was signed by his vakil who, however, did not profess to be acquainted with the facts of the case, was held to be not in accordance with law. Where an application was signed only by the pleader of the party and he was acquainted with the facts of the case, it was held that the application was not vitiated³. An application presented by a Mooktear on behalf of all the judgment-creditors, one of whom had signed it, the names of the rest having been appended thereto by the Mooktear, was held by the Calcutta High Court to be one on behalf of all the judgment-creditors, especially where no objection to the form of the application was taken by the Court at its presentation.⁴

**Article 182
(Clause 8)
Notes 60-61**

Where an application was made by the mother as guardian of the minor decree-holder when he was really a major, it was held by the High Court of Madras that the application was not one in accordance with law.⁵

61. Error in description of suit and names of parties.—Order 21 Rule 11, sub-rule 2 clauses (a) and (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure require a statement of the number of the suit and the names of the parties. But an omission to state these, or an error in stating them, does not render the application invalid.¹

Note 60

1. (1906) 3 Cal L Jour 44 (44) (S N), *Jyot Kumar Mukherji v Natabar Bose*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 62 (63) 159 Ind Cas 494, *Sheonath Prasad v. Benares Bank, Ltd*
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 23 (24) 2 Pat 809 74 Ind Cas 174, *Bhagwat Prasad Singh v Dwarka Prasad Singh* (Verification by one only of several applicants)
2. (1930) 135 Ind Cas 15 (15) (Mad), *Sangliya Pillai v Muthu Chettiar*.
(1936) A I R 1936 All 17 (18) 158 Ind Cas 752, *Raja Ram Gopal Sing v. Harish Chandra Lal*
[See also (1903) 26 All 19 (21) 1903 All W N 172, *Easumra v Beni Prasad*]
3. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 196 (196) 117 Ind Cas 526, *Hassan Saheb v. Ramchandra Appaya*
(1903) 26 All 154 (155) 1903 All W N 209, *Bakar Sayyad v Udit Narain Singh*
4. (1878) 4 Cal 605 (606), *Autoo Misree v Budhoomookhes Dabre*
5. (1905) 29 Mad 396 (398) 1 Mad L Tim 113, *Savamma v Seshayya*.

Note 61

1. (1938) 42 Cal W N 842 (843), *Brindaban Behari Bose v. Monmotha Nath Dwari*. (Execution application otherwise correct, wrongly describing a suit to be a small cause case)

Articles 182
(Class 5)
Notes 61-64

An omission to mention the names of persons interested in the decree will not make the application not one in accordance with law if it is otherwise in accordance with law.²

62. Omission to give, or error in, date of decree.—Order 21 Rule 11, sub-rule 2 clause (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the date of the decree to be given. But the omission to give it or an error in giving it is not a material defect which will render the application invalid.¹

63. Omission to state whether appeal has been preferred and its result.—Order 21 Rule 11, sub-rule 2 clause (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that the application should state whether an appeal has been preferred from the decree. An omission to comply with this requirement does not render the application one not in accordance with law.¹

64. Omission to state previous adjustments. — Clause (e) of Order 21 Rule 11, sub-rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that previous adjustments, if any, should be stated in the application. But an omission to comply with this is not a material omission which would vitiate the application, according to the High Courts of Madras,¹ Calcutta^{1a} and Lahore.² According to the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur,³ if a decree-holder deliberately omits to mention a certified adjustment, the application is not one in accordance with law.

(1898) 25 Cal 594 (597) : 2 Cal W N 556 (F B), *Gopal Chunder Manna v. Gosain Das Kalay*. (Omission to put the right number of suit.)

(1937) A I R 1937 All 397 (398) : 169 Ind Cas 225, *Hafeez Uddin v. Ram Chander Das*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Mad 172 (173) : 119 Ind Cas 596, *Balambhattu v. Bapanamma*.

(1918) A I R 1918 All 289 (289) : 43 Ind Cas 519, *Ram Lakhan Das v. Shankar Singh*. (Application for execution of the decrees in which all the defendants were named, but the minor and his guardian who were both defendants were not described as such)

Misser. (Trivial mistake in writing name of party.)

2. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 600 (601) : 185 Ind Cas 207, *Ohanaya Lal v. Madho Farshad*.

Note 62

1. (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 41 (51) : 48 Ind Cas 245 : 4 Pat L Jour 213, *Kesh-wesarindra Sahi v. Debendra Bala Dass*.

Note 63

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 872 (874) : 147 Ind Cas 386, *Palli Vittal Reddy v. Sheenappa Shetty*.

Note 64

1. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 256 (256) : 51 Ind Cas 114, *Marimuthu Naicker v. Ramaswamy Padayachi*.

1a (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 465 (466) : 151 Ind Cas 1015, *Kangal Chandra v. Nandlal*.

2. (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 95 (96) : 49 Ind Cas 932, *Kanji Mai v. Kaidarnath*.

3. (1924) A I R 1924 Nag 185 (187) : 78 Ind Cas 291, *Mt. Pira Bai v. Bhawan Prasad*.

65. Particulars of previous applications not given.—Order 21 Rule 11, sub-rule 2 clause (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the application for execution should state whether any and, if any, what previous applications have been made for the execution of the decree, the dates of such applications and their results. It has been held that the omission to state particulars of all the previous applications except the immediately preceding one is not a material omission such as would render it not one in accordance with law.¹ But where particulars of the *immediately previous application* were omitted to be given, it was held in the under-mentioned case² that the defect was a material one as, in the absence of such particulars, it was not possible to say whether the application was within the period of limitation.

Where in mentioning the particulars of the last prior application its date was wrongly given but the mistake did not affect the merits of the application, it was held that the defect was immaterial, especially if it was amended by the party though two days after the time granted by the Court.³

See also the undermentioned case.⁴

66. Omission to mention costs and interest.—Clauses (g) and (h) of Order 21 Rule 11 sub-rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure require that the interest and costs awarded by the decree should be stated in the application for execution. An omission to state these is only an immaterial defect and will not invalidate an application.¹ A contrary view has, however, been taken in the undermentioned cases.²

67. Omission to state mode in which execution is sought.—An execution application which does not specify the manner in

Note 65

- (1920) A I R 1926 Cal 1146 (1147, 1148) 96 Ind Cas 551, *Saudamini Ghose v. Jessoro Registered Loan Co., Ltd.*
(1892) 16 Mad 142 (143), *Rama v. Varada*,
(1892) 1892 All W N 114 (114, 115), *Madho Singh v. Ram Bharoze Das*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Sind 29 (31) 15 Sind L R 156 65 Ind Cas 14, *Sahjram Tahsilram v. Tower*
- (1901) 23 All 162 (163) 1901 All W N 31, *Kalka Dube v. Bisheshar Patai*.
- (1891) 1891 All W N 154 (155), *Ashraf Begam v. Muhammad Safdar Ali Khan*. (Misdescription of former records referred to in application is not material error.)

Note 66

- (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 440 (444) 112 Ind Cas 36, *Abdul Kharim Sahab v. Lakshmanaswami*
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1077 (1081) 53 Cal 664 93 Ind Cas 166, *Pitambar-jana v. Dimodhar Gachait*
(1931) A I R 1931 Oudh 512 (513) 182 Ind Cas 262, *Kishun Dutt v. Chheda*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Sind 29 (30) 15 Sind L R 156 65 Ind Cas 14, *Sahjram Tahsilram v. Tower*
(1921) A I R 1921 All 208 (209) 43 All 550 63 Ind Cas 302, *Jamilunnissa Bibi v. Mathura Prasad*.
- (1922) 65 Ind Cas 120 (120) (Pat), *Guru Mahadara Ashram Prasad Sahi v. Mahabir Sukul* (Costs)
(1890) 1890 All W N 93 (93), *Nathu Ram v. Tufail Ahmad*. (Interest.)

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 67-68**

which the assistance of the Court is required is not an application in accordance with law.¹ The reason is that it will not be possible in such a case to proceed with the execution. But where, though the mode of assistance sought was not distinctly specified, it was clear from other circumstances what kind of assistance was really sought by the decree-holder, it was held by the High Court of Lahore that the application could not be said to be not in accordance with law.²

68. Failure to file copy of decree.—Sub-rule 3 of Order 21 Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, provides as follows:—

"The Court to which an application is made under sub-rule 2 may require the applicant to produce a certified copy of the decree."

The question of the production of the decree thus arises only *after* the application for execution is filed, and, as has been seen in Note 52 *ante*, is not a valid consideration in deciding the question whether the application itself is in accordance with law. It is not imperative that an application for execution should in all cases be accompanied by a copy of the decree.¹ The Court can order the execution to proceed without a copy of the decree being filed.² It has therefore been held in numerous cases that an application not accompanied by a copy of the decree cannot be said to be not in accordance with law,³ and this would be so even if it is dismissed

Note 67

1. (1893) 19 Bom 34 (95), *Sha Karamchand Gokaldas v. Ghelabhai Chhalaldas*.
(1934) A I R 1934 Bom 119 (114) : 150 Ind Cas 866, *Ratanchand v. Chandu Lal*.
(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1135 (1136) : 93 Ind Cas 364, *Maharaj Bahadur v. Basiruddin Ahmed*.
(1875) 7 N W P H C R 79 (81), *W. A. Franks v. Nuneh Mal*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Nag 148 (150) : 25 Nag L R 94 : 116 Ind Cas 655, *Balaji v. Gopal*.
2. (1932) A I R 1932 Lah 534 (534) : 138 Ind Cas 249 : 14 Lah 6, *Ghanaya Lal v. Punjab National Bank Ltd., Lahore*.

Note 68

1. (1910) 5 Ind Cas 660 (662) (Cal), *Raj Gir Sahay v. Ishwardhar Singh*.
(1907) 31 Bom 162 (165) : 8 Bom L R 892, *Ramachandra Sadashiv v. Larman Shadashiv*.
2. (1910) 5 Ind Cas 660 (662) (Cal), *Raj Gir Sahay v. Ishwardhar Singh*.
3. (1907) 31 Bom 162 (165) : 8 Bom L R 892, *Ramachandra Sadashiv v. Larman Shadashiv*. (5 Bom L R 894, Not followed, 28 Mad 557, Followed.)
(1905) 28 Mad 557 (559), *Pachappa Achari v. Poojali Seenan*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Bom 196 (196) : 117 Ind Cas 526, *Hasan Sahib v. Ramachandra Appayya*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 440 (442) : 112 Ind Cas 36, *Abdul Kharim Sahib v. Lakshmanaswami*.
(1916) A I R 1916 AH 242 (243) : 40 AH 209 : 43 Ind Cas 914, *Raghunandan Lal v. Badan Singh*.

for non-compliance with the order of the Court requiring the copy to be produced.⁴

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 68-70

69. Failure to produce encumbrance certificate.— Order 21 Rule 106 (Allahabad), Civil Procedure Code, requires an encumbrance certificate to be filed *along* with the application. But it has been held that the non-observance of this requirement will not vitiate the application, which will nevertheless be one in accordance with law.¹ There is no such Rule in Madras where such a certificate is to be filed only *after* an application for execution is filed. The non-production of such certificate will not therefore render the application not one in accordance with law.²

70. Omission to give description of property sought to be proceeded against.— Order 21 Rule 12 of the Civil Procedure Code requires, in an application for execution against *moveable* property belonging to the judgment-debtor but not in his possession, that an *inventory* of the property to be attached should be given. The omission to give such an inventory is a material defect rendering the application not one in accordance with law.¹

Rule 13 of Order 21 provides that an application for the attachment of immovable property belonging to the judgment-debtor shall contain at its foot a description of the property. An application not containing such description has been held to be not in accordance with law.² Where, however, a previous application had given such description and the previous application was referred to in the later application, it was held in the undermentioned case³ that the omission to actually give the description of property in the later application did not render it not one in accordance with law.

(1869) 11 Buth W R 271 (272), *Khettur Mohun Chuttopadhya v. Ishur Chunder Surma*.

4. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 144 (144) . 175 Ind Cas 627, *Venkatarama Sastri v. Venkata Narasimham*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Pat 517 (518) . 47 Ind Cas 993, *Arjun Nair v. Lakkhan*.

Note 69

1. (1930) A I R 1930 All 188 (189) 122 Ind Cas 179, *Dharamdeo Ilai v. Jwala Prasad*.

2. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 1031 (1032) . 40 Mad 919 : 38 Ind Cas 136, *Katesa Pillai v. Ganapathia Pillai*.

Note 70

1. (1915) A I R 1915 All 320 (321) 29 Ind Cas 479 : 37 All 527, *Abdul Rasfi Khan v. Maula Balsh*.

(1892) 1892 All W N 47 (47), *Lachmi Kuar v. Dal Chand*.

(1892) 1892 All W N 70 (71), *Mangal Sen v. Baldea Prasad*.

[See however (1894) 1894 All W N 51 (51), *Mahabir Singh v. Saira Bibi*]

2. (1890) 1890 All W N 22 (22), *Ishri v. Serhmal*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Bom 128 (129) 129 Ind Cas 159, *Sakkargauda v. Bhimappa*.

(1892) 1892 All W N 8 (8), *Hira Lal v. Dulari Kuar*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 260 (260) : 92 Ind Cas 109, *Santaran v. Ambu*. (But if remedied by amendment it, will be one in accordance with law.)

3. (1891) 18 Cal 462 (465), *Wajahan v. Bishwanath Pershad*.

Articolo 182
(Clausula 5)
Nota 71

71. Defects in vakalatnama. — Where a pleader is not authorized by any vakalatnama to act for a party, an application for execution presented by him on behalf of the party cannot be said to be in accordance with law.¹ So also, where a vakalatnama is not signed by the pleader and does not contain his name, an application on the authority of such a vakalatnama is not one in accordance with law.² Similarly, where at the time of the application the decree-holder who has given the vakalatnama is dead, the application presented by the vakil is not one in accordance with law.^{3a} But immaterial defects in the vakalatnama will not render the application not one in accordance with law. Thus, the mere fact that the name of the pleader is wrongly mentioned,³ or the fact that the agent of the party giving the vakalatnama does not describe himself as agent,⁴ or the omission to give the date of the execution of the vakalatnama,⁵ will not render the application not one in accordance with law. Thus, in *Thiruvengadasami Iyengar v. Pavadai Pillai*,^{5a} the decree-holder had appointed X as his agent to file execution petitions and the latter gave a vakalatnama to a pleader "on his behalf" in the said matter. It was held by the Privy Council that the appointment of the pleader must be taken to be on behalf of the principal decree-holder and that the presentation of the petition by the pleader was a valid presentation for purposes of limitation.

Where once a vakalatnama is executed authorizing a vakil to execute a decree, no further authority is required to be shown by a separate vakalatnama for applying for taking steps-in-aid of execution.⁶

Nota 71

- [illegible]

72. Other defects.—The asking of a prayer which is superfluous or which cannot be granted will not render the application invalid.¹ Thus, an application by the transferee of a decree which is in accordance with Order 21 Rule 16, Civil Procedure Code, is not invalidated by the addition of a prayer for the attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor's property without giving an inventory of the property as required by Order 21 Rule 12.² Similarly, an application for execution of a decree, which is final, duly praying for execution thereof, is not invalidated by the addition of a prayer for the passing of a final decree under Order 34 Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code.³

The omission to specify the assessment of the land brought to sale is not a material defect vitiating the application.⁴

A applied for execution against the same judgment-debtor in respect of two decrees X and Y. The application was rejected on the ground that it was materially defective as to decree X. It was held that the application must be considered to have been in accordance with law so far as decree X was concerned for the purpose of a subsequent application for execution in respect of decree Y.⁵

An application cannot be considered not to be one in accordance with law because it has been drafted on a flimsy paper.⁶

An omission to pray for notice to be sent under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a material error which would vitiate an application. It is in fact the duty of the Court to issue the notice.⁷

Where the plaintiff obtained a decree under which he was to produce, within a date fixed, a certain amount of money into Court for payment to the defendant, but he applied for execution against the defendant without complying with the condition, and the application was struck off, it was held that this did not render the application one not in accordance with law.⁸

See also the undermentioned cases⁹

Note 72

1. (1930) A I R 1930 All 225 (244) 52 All 619 : 125 Ind Cas 477 (F B), *Santha Nand Gvr v. Basudevanand*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 160 (161) 90 Ind Cas 847, *Jogendra Prasad Narayan Sinha v. Mangal Prasad Shau* (Decree holder entitled to one third of the decretal amount asking for execution of the whole decree.)
- (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 471 (473) 5 Pat 42 : 75 Ind Cas 312, *Kishore Mal v. Jagdish Narain*.
2. (1890) 1890 All W N 245 (246), *Hayat Ali v. Rup Chand*.
3. (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 401 (406) 173 Ind Cas 185, *Jodh Singh v. Bhagwan Das Nanak Chand*.
4. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 1090 (1092) 40 Mad 919. 38 Ind Cas 136, *Natesa Pillai v. Ganapathia Pillai*.
5. (1936) A I R 1936 All 467 (468) 163 Ind Cas 841, *Mohammad Shahr Dad Khan v. Sahu Nand Kishore*.
6. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 1154 (1155) 3 Sind L R 171, *People's Bank of India v. Mahomed Ali*.
7. (1909) 2 Ind Cas 941 (942, 943) (Cal), *E. H. Stevens v. Kamta Pershad*.
8. (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 64 (64), *Mahomed Shaidul v. Mahomed Hassan*.
9. (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 87 (88, 89) 142 Ind Cas 435, *Kadiresan Chettiyar v. Maung San Ya*. (Omission to state form of notice is a formal defect.)

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 73

73. Application valid only if made by decree-holder or his representative.—Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that, subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, *on the application of the decree-holder*, order execution of the decree. Section 146 of the same Code provides that, save as otherwise provided by the said Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding may be taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him.

It follows that an application for execution can be made only by

1. the decree-holder¹ or
2. his representative.^{1a}

The decree-holder *on record* is entitled to apply for execution² and his application would be in accordance with law even if his interest in the decree has been transferred to another,³ and even if another person who is a joint decree-holder with him is not made a party.^{3a} A defendant in a partition suit in which a decree has

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 240 (242) : 5 Nag L R 8, *Vithal v. Gopal Rao*. (Omission to specify the Court which passed the decree sought to be executed.)

(1916) A I R 1916 Lah 316 (316) : 34 Ind Cas 955, *Baldeo Sahai v. Kanhaiyalal*.

(1901) 4 Oudh Cas 333 (338), *Ujagar Lal v. Shankar Dayal*. (Where an application is made to execute the original decree and afterwards that decree is confirmed in appeal, and a fresh application is made to

Note 73

1. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 443 (446) : 52 Ind Cas 356, *Ram Rattan v. Datar Kaur*.

(1875) 24 Suth W R 10 (11), *Duriao Roy v. Doolia Roy*. (Application by person not then a decree-holder *on the record*, is not an application for execution.)

1a (1907) 31 Mad 77 (79, 80) : 17 Mad L Jour 506, *Alayirisamy Naidu v. Venkatachellapathy Ayyar*.

2. (1917) A I R 1917 Oudh 182 (185) : 37 Ind Cas 133, *Dil Akra Begam v. Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich*.

3. (1913) 18 Ind Cas 97 (93) : 16 Oudh Cas 70, *Ejaz Hussain v. Shah Zaman Mirza*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 383 (384, 395) : 159 Ind Cas 589, *Jayanarayana v. Polayya*.

(1931) 67 Mad L Jour 63 (64) (8 N).

(1931) A I R 1931 Pesh 40 (43) : 132 Ind Cas 443, *Ahmad Ali v. Mt. Fatima Sultan*.

(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 691 (692) : 34 Ind Cas 791, *Ara Chetty v. Teerthamalai Chetty*.

(See also (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 279 (283) : 118 Ind Cas 694, *Nadirshah Jamshedji v. Purshottamdas Ganpatdas*.)

3a (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 216 (218) : 54 Bom 429 : 153 Ind Cas 176, *Babamayi v. Abdul Karim* (A I R 1931 Lah 600, Followed.)

(1927) A I R 1927 Lah 106 (107) : 100 Ind Cas 475, *Amin Chand v. Khalif*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Nag 40 (41) : 54 Ind Cas 924, *Amir Ali v. Gopaldas*.

(See also (1909) 5 Ind Cas 120 (120) (Mad), *Yasha Kuthiyalath v. Asha Kalathath* (Other decree-holders were made party respondents.)

been passed is in the position of a decree-holder and will be entitled to apply for execution.⁴ A joint Hindu family consisted of a father and his sons. Partition was effected by metes and bounds between them by a decree passed on an award. The father subsequently obtained a decree against a stranger in respect of a joint family debt. Subsequently, one of the sons applied for execution of the latter decree. It was held by the Patna High Court that the son was a person interested in and was the holder of the decree sought to be executed and that his application for execution was in accordance with law.⁵

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 73-74a**

As to applications by representatives, see Notes 74 to 80 *infra*.

74. Application by attaching creditor. — Sub-rule 3 of Order 21 Rule 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the holder of a decree sought to be executed by the attachment of another decree, shall be deemed to be the representative of the holder of the attached decree and to be entitled to execute such attached decree in any manner lawful for the holder thereof.¹ An application by the attaching decree-holder to execute the attached decree would therefore be one in accordance with law.

74a. Application by decree-holder of attached decree or his transferee. — Under the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, it was held in some cases that after attachment of the decree the decree-holder could not apply for execution and that such an application was not in accordance with law,² while a contrary view was taken in other cases.^{3a} The addition of the words "or his judgment-debtor" in sub-rule 1, clause (h) of Order 21 Rule 53 of the present Code now makes it clear that the decree holder of the decree attached is not prevented from applying for execution thereof. An application by the decree-holder of the attached decree would therefore be one in

(1933) A I R 1933 Lah 655 (656) 14 Lah 212 139 Ind Cas 151,
Nasiruddin v. Dost Mohammad]

But an order that such an application is not competent is a finding that it is not in accordance with law

(1921) A I R 1921 Sind 18 (14) 62 Ind Cas 507 15 Sind L R 11, *Ibrahim v. Firm of Gulam Hussain*

4. (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 23 (23) 46 Bom 937 67 Ind Cas 417, *Chunnilal Jamnadas v. Mulchand Harjandas*

(1924) A I R 1924 P C 198 (198) 4 Pat 61 51 Ind App 321 61 Ind Cas 747 (P C), *Lachmi Narayan Marwary v. Balmakund Marwary*

5 (1937) A I R 1937 Pat 607 (609) 173 Ind Cas 100, *Akhori Ramcharan Prasad v. Saran Singh*.

Note 74

1. (1888) 15 Cal 871 (875, 876), *Peary Mohun Chowdhry v. Romesh Chunder Nundy*

(1892) 16 Mad 20 (22), *Shah Man Mull v. Kanagasabapathi*

Note 74a

1 See (1911) 9 Ind Cas 786 (787) 35 Mad 622, *Thuchaloul Unni Aeyal v. Arayatil Pathuili* (7 Bom 459 27 All 119, 83 Cal 867, Followed.)

11 (1903) 13 Mad L Jour 10 (10) (S R C)

(1903) 13 Mad L Jour 265 (265), *Patamma v. Idity Bears*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 74a-77

accordance with law if it is otherwise in accordance with law.²

The question has arisen whether a *transferee* of the attached decree can apply for execution under Order 21 Rule 53 of the Code. According to the High Courts of Madras,³ and Rangoon,⁴ and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur,⁵ a transferee *prior to attachment* can apply. The High Court of Patna⁶ has held that even a transferee *after attachment* is entitled to apply for execution by virtue of Order 21 Rule 16 of the Code. In all such cases the application would be in accordance with law.

75. Application by Court-of-Wards.—Where a decree is passed in favour of an estate under the management of the Court of Wards, the Court of Wards, as representing the estate, is the proper person to take out execution of the decree.¹

76. Application by person represented in representative suits.—In the case of representative suits, a person not on the record but who was represented in the suit by the decree-holder on record, can apply to be brought on the record and to execute the decree.¹

77. Application by stranger claiming to be representative.—*B* and *R* were rival claimants to the interest of the deceased decree-holder. *B* filed an execution application on 5th May 1930. In a suit filed by *R*, it was held that *R* was the person entitled to execute the decree and not *B*. *R* then filed an application within three years of *B*'s application but beyond three years of the decree. It was held that *B*'s application was not one in accordance with

2. (1912) 13 Ind Cas 179 (180) (Mad), *Gopala Menon v. Manavikraman*.

3. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 323 (325) (Mad), *Arumugha Mudaliar v. Yagamba Bas Amman*.

[See also (1910) 5 Ind Cas 92 (94) (Mad), *Venkatrama Iyer v. Esumda Rowthen*.]

[But see (1912) 13 Ind Cas 659 (660) (Mad), *Thiruvengadam Pillai v. Doradla Subbiah*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 1010 (1016) (Mad), *Musala Reddi v. Ramaiya*.

(1909) 3 Ind Cas 938 (939) (Mad), *Sadagopachariar v. Raghunada-chariar*.]

4. (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 25 (26) : 5 Rang 595 : 106 Ind Cas 853, *Co-operative Town Bank of Padigan v. Raman Chettyar*.

5. (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 182 (193) : 23 Nag L R 20 : 99 Ind Cas 635, *Aimar v. Ganpati*.

6. (1929) A I R 1929 Pat 1 (3) : 7 Pat 726 : 113 Ind Cas 673, *Harariram v. Kedar Nath Maricari*.

Note 75

1. (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 216 (217) : 43 Ind Cas 701, *Chandrika Prasad Singh v. Kesho Prasad Singh*.

Note 76

1. See (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 472 (473) : 72 Ind Cas 291, *Sivaminatha Mudaliar v. Kumarasami Chettyar*.

law and *R*'s application was barred by limitation.¹ See also the undermentioned case.²

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 77-78

78. Application by transferee of decree.—The transferee of a decree is a representative of the decree-holder and would, under Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, be entitled to apply for execution.¹ That provision should, however, be read subject to the other provisions of the Code one of which is Order 21 Rule 16, which provides that a transferee *in writing or by operation of law* may apply for execution in the same manner as the decree-holder himself.² An application by a person in whose favour there has been an oral assignment of the decree cannot, therefore, be said to be in accordance with law.³ Where an assignment is refused to be recognized by the Court as being a colourable one, the application by the assignee for execution is not one in accordance with law.⁴ But except in such a case as the last mentioned one, an application by a transferee *claiming to be such* would be one in accordance with law, even though the assignment is not proved or recognized⁵ and even

Note 77

1. (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 531 (532) : 178 Ind Cas 750, *Achutanand Girs v Saran Singh*
2. (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 2 (3) : 37 Ind Cas 750, *Saminatha Asari v. Gopala-*

judgment debtor.)

Note 78

1. (1909) 2 Ind Cas 493 (434) (Mad), *Venatasubbiah v. Dade Sahib*.
2. (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 252 (256) : 52 Mad 590 : 118 Ind Cas 775, *Palaniappa Chettiar v Vallhammai Achi* (Court recognizing assignment of decree and allowing assignee to execute gives fresh start of limitation)
- (1894) 16 All 483 (492) : 1894 All W N 181, *Badri Narain v Jas Kishen Das*
- (1911) 9 Ind Cas 349 (350) (Bom), *Salekhan v Viswanath*.
- (1909) 5 Ind Cas 120 (120) (Mad), *Vasha Kuthiyalath v Ashi Kalakath*
- (1937) A I R 1937 Bom 365 (370) : 170 Ind Cas 877 : I L R (1937) Bom 691, *In re Janaki Prasad Poddar*.
- (1902) 26 Mad 258 (259), *Chathoth Kunhi Pakki v. Sandindatide Kunhammad*
- (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 216 (218, 219) : 58 Bom 428 : 153 Ind Cas 176, *Babamya v Abdul Karim*.
- (1899) 1899 All W N 16 (16), *Imdad Hussain v Latta Prasad* (An application for execution of a decree made by a transferee under Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1892, though unsuccessful, is a step-in-aid of execution)
3. (1912) 16 Ind Cas 807 (807) (Mad), *Ramanathan Chettiar v. Raghatendra Row*
- (1912) 13 Ind Cas 78 (79) (Mad), *Ramanathan Chettiar v Suklanatha Gounden*.
4. (1907) 1907 All W N 39 (39), *Intillah Hussain v Rafunnissa*
5. (1938) A I R 1938 Bom 809 (311) : 176 Ind Cas 152, *Dayalhai v Dayalhai*, (1909) 4 Ind Cas 582 (582) : 31 Bom 68 *Vinayak Vaman v. Ananda Ramji*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 78

though the assignment is, in subsequent proceedings, found to be invalid.⁶

Where a transfer of a decree has to be registered under the law in order to pass a title, an application by the transferee under an unregistered transfer cannot be considered to be one in accordance with law.⁷ Where, however, in such a case the application is made both by the decree-holder and the transferee, the application would be one which will save time for a later execution petition by the transferee who has obtained a second assignment of the decree and got it duly registered.⁸ In the undermentioned case,⁹ where the transferee of the decree under an unregistered transfer made his application, but subsequently got the assignment registered within the time prescribed by the Registration Act, it was held that the registration would date back to the date of the execution and that the application made by him must be considered as one in accordance with law.

There is a conflict of opinion on the question whether an application by the transferee of the decree *merely* for his being recognized as a transferee without any prayer for execution is one in accordance with law. According to one view, there is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code enabling the transferee to make such an application, that such an application is therefore legally incompetent, and is not in accordance with law either as an application for execution or as an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.¹⁰ A contrary view, namely, that it will be in accordance with law to take a step-in-aid of execution, has been taken in the undermentioned cases.¹¹

- C. (1910) 5 Ind Cas 120 (120) (Mad), *Vasha Kuthiyalath v. Ashi Kalalath*.
 (1902) 12 Mad L Jour 348 (349), *Sreepada Brahmayya Pantulu v. Parasuramayya*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 673 (675) : 47 Mad 641 : 60 Ind Cas 103, *Rajitagitpathy v. Bhatani Sankaran*.
 (But see (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 1204 (1204) : 89 Ind Cas 950, *Kailasa Pandaram v. Ramanuja Naidu*)
 7. (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 264 (264), *Lakshmana Pattar v. Suppayya Pandaram*.
 8 (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 264 (264), *Lakshmana Pattar v. Suppayya Pandaram*.
 9. (1890) 13 All 83 (92) . 1890 All W N 186, *Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Farullah*.
 10. (1935) A I R 1935 Sind 26 (26) : 159 Ind Cas 607, *Mt. Memoo Mahomed Ismail v. Mahomed Sidik Pir Mahomed*. (A I R 1933 Sind 341, Followed.)
 (1933) A I R 1933 Sind 341 (341) : 27 Sind L R 314 : 147 Ind Cas 470, *Derraj Mullani Sahai v. Fateh Chand Ram Chand*.
 (1937) A I R 1937 Bom 365 (367) : 170 Ind Cas 877 : I L R (1937) Bom 691, *In Re Janki Prasad Poddar*.

 (1925) A I R 1925 Nag 362 (363) : 63 Ind Cas 112, *Jagannath v. Shrinivas*.
 (1907) 23 All 201 (302) : 4 All L Jour 181 : 1907 All W N 74, *Pitam Singh v. Tota Singh*.
 (1906) 81 Mad 234 (235) : 4 Mad L Tim 72 : 18 Mad L Jour 24, *Annammaiah Mudaliar v. Ramauer*.

The fact that the transferee is a *benamidar* for another person will not prevent the application from being one in accordance with law, for the purpose of a subsequent application by the true transferee.¹²

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 78**

N obtained a transfer of a decree from the heir of the deceased decree-holder and made several applications for execution. *G* purporting to be a legatee of the deceased decree-holder sued *N* and obtained a decree that he was entitled to the decree amount. Then he applied for execution and claimed the applications of *N* as giving him starting points of limitation. It was held by the High Court of Madras that *N*'s applications were in accordance with law as, at the time they were made, *N* was the only person who was, on the face of the decree, entitled to execute it, and that the executing Court had no concern with the rights of any person other than the person appearing on the face of the decree as the decree-holder.¹³

H obtained a decree in his favour as the manager of a joint Hindu family consisting of himself and his sons. *H* took out execution and recovered a portion of the decree amount, and then disappeared. *N*, a son of *H*, applied for execution subsequently alleging that after the disappearance of *H*, he was the manager of the family. It was held that as manager of the family he was entitled to execute the decree without any question of assignment of the decree, that even otherwise *N* may be considered to be a transferee by operation of law of the decree from *H*, and that therefore his application was one in accordance with law.¹⁴

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- (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 191 (192) 174 Ind Cas 243, *Tanda Yadavao v. Chandrashankar Balkrishnappa*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 55 (56) 144 Ind Cas 310, *Moidoo v. Mahomed*
 12 (1907) 10 Oudh Cas 263 (267), *Abdul Wahid Khan v. Nawab Bazar Ali Khan*
 (1892) 20 Cal 398 (395), *Dalishen Das v. Dedmati Koer*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 110 (110) 8 Lah 85 100 Ind Cas 515, *Gurdial Singh v. Gurbakhsh Singh*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 701 (701, 702) 49 Mad 553 68 Ind Cas 409, *Palaniappa Chetty v. Subramania Chettiar*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 All 264 (264) 37 All 414 29 Ind Cas 593, *Kamta Prasad v. Indomati*.
 (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 457 (459) 17 Pat 223 177 Ind Cas 992, *Mohammad Anas v. Bhupendra Prasad*.
 (1890) 6 Mad L Jour 31 (32), *Arasappan v. Pulugasary*.
 (1870) 4 Beng L R App 40 (40), *Purnachandra Roy v. Abhaya Chandra Roy*.
 (1935) 39 Cal W N 1073 (1074), *Tahir Ali v. Abdul Goni*.
 [But see (1914) 25 Ind Cas 555 (556) (Cal), *Ramlal Pahari v. Dabulal Bari*.
 (1892) 9 Cal 633 (634) 12 Cal L R 146, *Denonath Chuckerbutty v. Lalit Coomar Gangopadhyay*.
 (1889) 16 Cal 355 (362) 13 Ind Jur 381, *Gour Sundar Lahiri v. Hem Chunder Choudhry*.]
 13 (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 135 (135) 43 Mad 424 57 Ind Cas 753, *Hari Krishnamurthi v. Suryanarayanamurthi*.
 14 (1938) A I R 1938 All 256 (258, 259) 1 I L R (1938) All 425 175 Ind Cas 590, *Narain Sarup v. Daya Shantler*.

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 78-79**

A person who has only a right against the decree-holder to obtain an assignment of the decree from him, but who has actually got no assignment, is not entitled to apply for execution and his application would not be one in accordance with law.¹⁵

Where a decree is transferred to another Court for execution, an application by the assignee to that Court requesting it to send back the records of the case to the Court which passed the decree "for the purpose of further conducting the suit" is a step-in-aid of execution.¹⁶ The reason is that his claim as assignee can be recognized only by the Court which passed the decree and for that purpose it is necessary to send back the records to that Court.¹⁷

79. Application by agent. — Order 3 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that an application required or authorized to be made or done by a party in Court may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made by the party in person or by his *recognized agent* or by a *pleader* on his behalf. Rule 2 of the same Order states who are to be considered recognized agents for such purposes. A person so authorized to act for the person entitled to execute the decree can apply for execution, and if such application is made by him, it would be one in accordance with law.¹

The mere fact that the authorization such as the power of attorney is not filed in Court along with the application for execution does not vitiate the application.² Nor will immaterial defects in the power of attorney render the application not one in accordance with law.^{3a}

In *Chhajju v. Lekna*,³ where an application was presented by a person who had no power of attorney from the decree-holder, and, on objection being raised, obtained a power of attorney and filed it in Court within the period of limitation, it was held that there was then a proper application before the Court on which the Court could

15. (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 472 (472) : 90 Ind Cas 561, *Pandujoti v. Sarla Piraji*.

(1916) A I R 1916 P C 147 (147, 148) : 43 Cal 990 : 43 Ind App 108 : 31 Ind Cas 69 (P C), *Jatindra Nath Dasu v. Peyer Deye Debi*.

16. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 431 (432) : 92 Ind Cas 770, *Ayyaru Pillai v. Varadh-raya Pillai*.

17. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 431 (432) : 92 Ind Cas 770, *Ayyaru Pillai v. Varadh-raya Pillai*.

Note 79

1 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 601 (603) : 18 Ind Cas 135 : 33 Mad 131, *Venkata-ramana Aiyer v. Narasinga Row*.

2. (1927) 52 Mad L Jour 23 (23) (S N C)
(1913) 18 Ind Cas 526 (526, 527) : 1912 Pun Ro No. 118, *Ganga Ram v. Dina Nath*.

2a. (1914) 1914 Mad W N 43 (43) (S N).

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 632 (633) : 23 Ind Cas 69, *Srinivasa Iyengar v. Thirumala Chetty*.

3. (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 478 (479) : 113 Ind Cas 781.

act. Where *A*, a decree-holder, attained majority on 17th July 1925, and on 10th December 1925 one *X* applied on *A*'s behalf for execution of the decree, without any power of attorney from *X* but *A* ratified *X*'s act within three years of his attaining majority, it was held that the ratification rendered the application valid with effect from the date of the ratification.⁴

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 79-81.

Where an agent held a power of attorney under two joint decree-holders, and he applied for execution not knowing that one of the decree-holders was dead at the time of the application, it was held that it was an application in accordance with law.⁵

Under the old Civil Procedure Code, Sections 36 and 37, it was held that where the decree-holder at the time of the application was resident within the local limits of the Court, an application presented by his agent even though properly armed with the power of attorney was not in accordance with law.⁶ This, however, is no longer law in view of the present Rules 1 and 2 of Order 3 of the Code.⁷

80. Application by pleader. — See Note 71 *ante*.

81. Application by executor of decree-holder without probate. — It was held in the undermentioned case that an application for execution by the executors of the original decree-holder, if in proper form, is a step-in-aid of execution even though probate was not obtained at the date of the application.¹ In support of this view the decision in *Hafizuddin Chowdhry v. Abdul Aziz*,² which held that the omission to produce a *succession certificate* did not render the application by the heirs ineffectual, was relied upon.

81a. Previous application for execution need not be against the same person or property or for the same relief. — Where the decree grants a *single relief*, piecemeal execution thereof will not be permitted.³ But, where the decree grants different reliefs or grants relief against different persons jointly, the application for execution in respect of one or more of such reliefs or against one or more of such

4. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 600 (601) 135 Ind Cas 207, *Ghanaya Lal v. Madho Prashad*

(1930) A I R 1930 Lah 603 (604), *Madho Prashad v. Ghanaya Lal*

5. (1893) 18 Cal L R 18 (22), *Amirunnissa Choudhry v. Ahsanulla Choudhry*.

6. (1901) 23 All 499 (500, 501) 1901 All W N 161, *Murari Lal v. Umrao Singh*.

7. See Order 3 Rule 2, Note 2, Point (1) of the Authors' Civil Procedure Code

Note 81

1. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 118 (118) (Cal), *Hari Badani Das v. Gobinda Chandra Das*
2. (1893) 20 Cal 755 (757)

Note 81a

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Bom 364 (366) 57 Bom 468 146 Ind Cas 243, *Panaji Gurihar Lal v. Ratanchand Hajarimal*.
- (1913) 19 Ind Cas 304 (304) 35 All 204, *Ram Chander Nath Kalia v. Abdul Hakim*
- (1873) 19 Suth W R 417 (418), *Romananath Jha v. Dny Luchmeeput Singh Bahadur*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 114 (119) 154 Ind Cas 634, *Kusum Kamini Datta v. Sailesh Chandra Chakravarty*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 81a-82

persons, will be in accordance with law and will save time for a subsequent application in respect of any relief granted by the decree and against all the judgment-debtors.² It is not necessary that, in order to save limitation, the application should have been directed to the same property which is the subject-matter of the subsequent application or to the same person against whom proceedings are sought to be taken in the subsequent application. Thus, an execution application against the principal debtor has been held to save limitation against the surety.³

On the same principle, execution by the arrest of the judgment-debtor will save time for a subsequent application for execution by sale of the property of the judgment-debtor. Conversely, an application for execution by attachment and sale of some of the properties of the judgment-debtor will save time for a subsequent application for proceeding against his other properties or against his person.⁴

82. Application against legal representative of judgment-debtor. — The Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate any specific application to bring on record the legal representative of the judgment-debtor, though, in practice, it is usual to add a prayer to that effect. The omission, therefore, of an express prayer to bring the legal representatives on record will not render the application against the legal representatives one not in accordance with law.¹

2 (1893) 19 All 93 (100) 1893 All W N 57 (F B), *Sadho Saran v. Hol Pande*.

(1897) 1897 All W N 31 (31), *Bhishahari Lal v. Ali Mardan Khan*.

(1867) 8 Suth W R 99 (100), *Burodakant Roy v. Ram Kishore Dutt*.

(1891) 18 Cal 515 (517), *Radha Kishen Lal v. Radha Pershad Singh*.

(1875) 7 N W P H C R 95 (96, 97), *Ram Daksh Singh v. Madat Ali*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 611 (612) : 21 Ind Cas 32 : 33 Mad 199, *Balanubramania Chetty v. Swaranammal*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Nag 153 (160) : 89 Ind Cas 135 : 21 Nag L R 118, *Jairam v. Adku*.

(1890) 15 Bom 212 (211), *Dalchand Bhudar v. Bai Shikhar*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1019 (1021) : 53 Cal 582 : 96 Ind Cas 562, *Upendra Nath Bose v. K. P. Dutt*.

(1899) 26 Cal 888 (890), *Nepal Chandra Sadoo Khan v. Amrita Lal Saib Khan*.

(1888) 1888 All W N 95 (96), *Narain v. Gohal*.

(1867) 8 Suth W R 274 (274), *Jayesh Prakash Ganguly v. Kalle Coomiar Roy*.

(1923) A I R 1922 All 383 (389) : 41 All 166 : 65 Ind Cas 358, *Ravi Dutt Lal Roy v. Deo Tiwari*.

(1866) 5 Suth W R (Misc) 40 (41), *Ospendur Mohun Mustafee v. Tripp*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 124 (125) : 67 Ind Cas 169 : 46 Bom 712, *Sitappa Zuhappa v. Keshatrao Parattrao*.

3 (1923) A I R 1923 All 381 (385) : 74 Ind Cas 1011, *Gopinath Shukul v. Sat Narain Shukul*.

4 (1877) 2 Bom 291 (292), *Jamnadas v. Lalharari*.

Note 82

1 (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 563 (568, 569) : 113 Ind Cas 614, *Thirupathi Srinagar v. Venganammal*. ((1904) 31 Mad 77 : A I R 1925 Mad 701 : A I R 1932 Mad 73 : A I R 1931 Mad 303, Relied on)

There is a difference of opinion as to whether a proceeding taken against a *wrong* person as the legal representative of the judgment-debtor is one in accordance with law which will give a fresh starting point for a subsequent application against the proper representatives. It has been generally held that such an application, if made *bona fide*, is a good application and that even if it is not a proper application for execution, it would still be a valid application to take a step-in-aid of execution.^{1a} A contrary view has been held in the undermentioned case.² In view of the clear pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Khalil Ur Rahman v. Collector of Etah*,³ that the question of bona fides of the decree-holder is not a material consideration in deciding the question whether an application is in accordance with law, it seems doubtful whether the first of the two views stated above is not open to reconsideration. Where there are two *rival claimants* to the estate of the judgment-debtor, each claiming to be the true representative, and the decree-holder in good faith chooses one of them and proceeds against him, it has been held that the person chosen would be deemed to represent the estate, and the application against him would thus be regarded as being one in accordance with law.⁴

As to the validity of applications for the arrest and detention of the legal representatives in execution of the decree against the deceased judgment-debtor, see Note 57 *ante*.

83. Application where judgment-debtor is a minor.—Where a decree was obtained against a minor *A* represented by his mother *B* as guardian ad litem, and an application for execution of the decree was made against *B* herself and not as guardian of *A*, and the application was granted and certain property of the minor *A* was attached, it was held that the application could not, by reason only of the said mistake, be regarded as one not in accordance with law.¹ See also the undermentioned case.²

1a (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 161 (162) 155 Ind Cas 327, *Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Rangaswami Chettiar*

(1938) 40 Pun L R 25 (26), *Mt. Harbanso v. Munshi Ram*.

(1892) 1892 All W N 241 (242), *Gopal v. Har Prasad*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Pat 92 (93) 99 Ind Cas 501, *Ganeshwar Singh v. Than Mal*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Pat 906 (907) 11 Pat 503 139 Ind Cas 610, *Brijasunder Das v. Radha Prasad Bhagat*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Lah 34 (35) 90 Ind Cas 1050, *Mt. Begum Bibi v. Bulaqi Shah*.

(1908) 35 Cal 1047 (1019) *Bipin Behari Mitter v. Bibi Zohra*.

(1892) 20 Cal 888 (896), *Balkishen Das v. Kedmati Keer*.

2. (1910) 6 Ind Cas 38 (40) 32 All 404, *Gyanendranath Dasu v. Rani Nihal Jihi*.

3. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 14 (16) 61 Ind App 62 147 Ind Cas 373 55 All 993 (P C).

4. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 1059 (1060) 33 Mad 6, *Ramaswamy Chettiar v. Oyyala-mani Chetti*.

Note 83

1. (1887) 12 Bom 427 (430), *Hari v. Narayan*.

2. (1918) A I R 1918 All 289 (289) 43 Ind Cas 519, *Ram Lalhan Das v. Shankar Singh*.

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 83-85**

Where an application for execution prayed for the attachment and sale of the minor judgment-debtor's property but it was subsequently found that the guardian ad litem was dead at the date of the application, it was held that the irregularity was not material and that the application should be considered to be in accordance with law.³

84. Application against trustee judgment-debtor who has ceased to be trustee subsequently. — Where a decree was obtained against A as trustee, but subsequently A was removed from the trusteeship, and the decree-holder, not knowing the fact of such removal, applied for execution against A, it was held that the application must be considered to be one in accordance with law in the absence of proof that at the date of the application, A had been removed from the trusteeship.¹

85. Application against judgment-debtor who was dead at that date. — There is a difference of opinion as to whether an application for execution against a judgment-debtor who is dead at the time the application is made can be considered to be one in accordance with law. On the one hand, it has been held that a *bona fide* application of that kind would give a fresh starting point of time.¹ On the other hand, a contrary view has been taken, namely, that such an application cannot be considered to be one in accordance with law.² In *Mt. Ram Kali v. Bir Bhadarman*,³ it was held by

3. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 636 (637) : 184 Ind Cas 1107, *Ghulam Hussain v. Narain Singh*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 696 (697) : 145 Ind Cas 714, *Jagannatha Rao v. Narayanamurti*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 333 (334) : 72 Ind Cas 1003, *Puran Mall v. Mt. Dilwa*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Nag 77 (78), *Prathad v. Mohanlal*.

Note 84

1. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 321 (322) : 93 Ind Cas 709, *Trustees, Parakkat Devaswom v. Venkatachalam Vadhyar*.

Note 85

1. (1893) 17 Mad 76 (79) : 4 Mad L Jour 8, *Samia Pillai v. Chockalinga*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Mad 161 (162) : 155 Ind Cas 327, *Ananasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Rangaswami Chettiar*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Pat 222 (221) : 11 Pat 516 : 133 Ind Cas 91, *Sheojobind Ram v. Mt. Kushnabansi Kuer*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 333 (334) : 72 Ind Cas 1003, *Puran Mall v. Mt. Dilwa*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 321 (322) : 93 Ind Cas 709, *Parakkat Devaswom v. Venkatachalam*.

(1908) 35 Cal 1017 (1019), *Bipin Behari Mitter v. Bibi Zohra*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Lah 55 (55) : 154 Ind Cas 307, *Maula Dakhsh v. Mohamad Ikram*.

2. (1934) A I R 1934 All 463 (464) : 149 Ind Cas 1131 : 56 All 463, *Mt. Ram Kali v. Bir Bhadarman Tewari*.

(1934) A I R 1934 Bom 215 (216) : 153 Ind Cas 191, *Manjula Bai Kashinath v. Pandurang Jayaram*.

(1903) 13 Mad L Jour 37 (37) (N 1 C).

(1897) 7 Mad L Jour 310 (310) (N 1 C). (Critical Note on (1897) 19 All 337 : 1897 All W N 75, *Madho Prasad v. Kesho Prasad*.)

(1897) 19 All 337 (239) : 1897 All W N 75, *Madho Prasad v. Kesho Prasad*.

3. (1934) A I R 1934 All 463 (164) : 56 All 463 : 149 Ind Cas 1131.

the High Court of Allahabad that an application for *execution* against a judgment-debtor who is dead would not be in accordance with law, but that an application for *transfer of the decree* to another Court for execution would be a valid step-in-aid of execution. In *Manjula-bai Kashinath v. Pandurang Jayaram*,⁴ the High Court of Bombay held that an application against a deceased judgment-debtor, *whether for execution or for a step-in-aid of execution*, would be not in accordance with law. The same High Court held in a later case^{4a} that an application for transfer of the decree for execution in ignorance of the death of the judgment-debtor, would be a valid step-in-aid of execution. The reasoning of the decisions holding that such applications are in accordance with law is not clear. In *Abdus Sattar v. Mohini Mohun*,⁵ it was observed that the rule that when a suit is filed against a dead person it is a nullity, did not apply to execution proceedings. If the principle is that a proceeding against a non-existing person is a nullity, it is difficult to see why execution proceedings should be excepted from the operation of the rule.

86. Application, if need be bona fide.—Section 20 of the Act of 1859 provided that no process of execution should issue to enforce any judgment, decree or order unless the application for execution was made within three years of "some proceeding" to enforce such judgment, decree or order, or to keep the same in force. It was held in cases under that Act that the words "some proceeding" meant some *bona fide* proceeding. The Courts were therefore held bound to decide in each case whether the previous application was a *bona fide* one or was merely a colourable one.¹

4 (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 215 (216) 153 Ind Cas 181.

4a (1934) A I R 1931 Bom 266 (270) 151 Ind Cas 767, *Gopal Shankar v. Rav-sing Premji*.

5 (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 634 (637) 140 Ind Cas 1024

Note 86

1. (1870) 13 Moo Ind App 479 (488) 5 Beng L R 611 14 Suth W R 21 : 2 N W P H C R 402 2 Suther 351 2 Svt 597 (P C), *Maharajah Dheraj Mahtab Chund Bahadoor v. Bulram Singh*.

(1872) 18 Suth W R 76 (77) . 11 Beng L R 23 (P C), *Roy Dhunput Singh v. Madhomotee Dabia*

(1874) 21 Suth W R 97 (100) 13 Beng L R 169 (P C), *Benoderam Sein v. Brojendra Narain Roy*.

(1869) 2 Beng L R App 24 (25), *Gholam Ashgar v. Lakhman Dibi*

(1869) 2 Beng L R App 45 (46), *Ganga Narayan Choudhry v. Mohammad Sirkar*.

(1869) 3 Beng L R App 142 (143), *Adina Bibi v. Sububunnissa Bibi*

(1871) 6 Beng L R App 146 (146, 147), *Maharaja Dhuraj Mahtab Chand Bahadur v. Lakh Bibi*.

(1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 76 (77), *Maharaj Injurjeet Kooncur v. Mas im Ali Khan*

(1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 91 (92), *Tiluck Chunder Gooho v. Gourmance Debee*

(1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 97 (97) *Bhugobutty v. Mohun Chunder Puteedundo*
(1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 98 (101) Beng L R Sup Vol 492 1 Ind Jur (N 4) 421, *Ram Sahaye Singh v. Degun Singh*

(1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 101 (106) 2 Ind Jur (Xs) 1, *W G N P y se v. Lantub Lal*.

(1867) 7 Suth W R 10 (10), *Shoo Chand Chunder v. Mr. D Grant*.

(1867) 8 Suth W R 93 (98, 99), *Ishan Chunder Bose v. Jug Sundhoo Ghose*.

Article 182
(Clause 6)
Note 86

Under the later Acts the *date of applying* was made the starting point of limitation. There has been a conflict of opinion on the question whether, under these Acts, the application should be bona

- (1867) 8 Suth W R 199 (199), *Ameerun Dibe v. Shih Pershad Thakoor*.
 (1867) 8 Suth W R 268 (268), *Kista Kant Bural v. Nistarinee Debia*.
 (1867) 8 Suth W R 306 (307), *Tabbur Singh v. Motee Singh*.
 (1868) 9 Suth W R 443 (444, 445), *Tabbur Singh v. Motee Singh*.
 (1868) 9 Suth W R 565 (566), *Rajah Sutto Churn Ghosal v. Dhyrub Chunder Brohma*.
 (1868) 10 Suth W R 224 (224) : 12 Beng L R 506n, *Gunga Bishen Chund v. Maharajahdhiraj Mahalab Chund Bahadur*.
 (1868) 10 Suth W R 248 (248), *Kalee Kishore Bose v. Prosunno Chunder Roy*.
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 70 (71) : 2 Beng L R A C 191, *Luchmeeput Singh & 7 v. Waked Ali*.
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 80 (80) : 2 Beng L R A C 196, *Raja Sutto Surn Ghosal v. Dhyrab Chunder Brohma*.
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 269 (269), *Brojendro Narain Roy v. Binode Ram Sen*.
 (1869) 11 Suth W R 567 (569) : 3 Beng L R App 17, *Gaur Mohan Banerjee v. Tara Chand Banerjee*.
 (1869) 12 Suth W R 281 (281), *Mahomtd Daler Khan v. Sham Dey Kier*.
 (1869) 12 Suth W R 337 (338), *Juttadharee Singh v. Wuzzer Singh*.
 (1869) 12 Suth W R 436 (437) : 4 Beng L R A C 1, *Khaja Abdul Ganne v. N. P. Poyose*.
 (1870) 13 Suth W R 40 (41), *Ram Dhun Goor v. Gooroo Dessee Dessee*.
 (1870) 13 Suth W R 164 (166), *Madhoometty Debia v. Dhunput Singh*.
 (1870) 14 Suth W R 112 (113), *Raj Coomar Baboo v. Judeo Bungshree*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 162 (162), *Maharajah Dhiraj Mahalab Chand Bahadur v. Madhoo Soodun*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 203 (201), *Meer Looft Ali v. Abco Dibe*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 356 (356), *In the matter of Kaleedass Ghose*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 449 (450), *Koylas Nath Ghose v. Nitya Shama Dessee*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 473 (473), *Tarnek Chunder v. Huro Chunder*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 530 (531), *Moonsher Syud Ameer Ali v. Sahab Singh*.
 (1871) 16 Suth W R 267 (268), *Iran Kishore Deb v. Kishen Chunder Choudhry*.
 (1871) 16 Suth W R 296 (297), *Uddovto Churn Sahoo v. Ram Dhun Roy*.
 (1872) 17 Suth W R 99 (99), *Jado Lall v. Radha Kishen Muser*.
 (1872) 17 Suth W R 335 (335), *Joykishen Shaha v. Bishola Moyes Choudram*.
 (1872) 18 Suth W R 193 (191), *Rajreeb Leechun Saha Choudhry v. Mr. James Wilford Massey*.
 (1873) 18 Suth W R 254 (255), *Bullohee Kant Bhattacharjee v. Kojlash Chunder Roy*.
 (1873) 19 Suth W R 102 (103), *Moleend-math Bhadoory v. Shih Chunder Bhadoory*.
 (1873) 19 Suth W R 301 (302), *Mr. T. C. Leithbridge v. Franklaid Sen*.
 (1873) 20 Suth W R 31 (31) : 12 Beng L R 500, *Choudhry Waked Ali v. Mullick Fnyet Ali*.
 (1874) 21 Suth W R 244 (244), *Hur Sahay Singh v. Gobind Sahay*.
 (1874) 21 Suth W R 418 (418), *Gossain Gopal Dutt Pundit v. The Court of Wards*.
 (1878) 3 Cal 47 (57) : 4 Ind App 127 : 3 Sar 721 : 3 Suther 423 : 1878 Pan No. 7 : 1 Ind Jur 437 (P.C.), *Delhi and London Bank v. Orchard*.
 (1879) 1 N W P H C R 145 (145), *Kishun Chund v. Koorur Alexander Gar*.
 (1879) 4 Bom H C R A C 84 (87), *D. A. Dalvi v. Lakshuman Hari Patil*.
 (1873) 1875 Bom P J 222 *Rajho v. Appa*.

fide, one class of cases holding that it should be² and another class of cases that it need not be so.³ The conflict must now be taken to have been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Khalil Ur Rahman v. Collector of Etah*,⁴ that it is not necessary for an application to be in accordance with law that it should have been made *bona fide*. In that case an application for execution was made on 2nd June 1925 in respect of a mortgage decree dated 29th June 1922, praying for the sale of the mortgaged properties. The Court ordered certain copies to be filed in answer to which the vakil stated that he simply wanted in that application to get the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor brought on the record. Notices were ordered to the alleged legal representatives but were returned unserved and the decree-holder taking no further steps, the application was struck off. The decree-holder again applied on 8th July 1926 for sale of the property. On this application, the legal representatives were brought on the record, but no further steps being taken this application also was struck off. Their Lordships, approving of the view taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in *Kayastha Co. Ltd v. Sitaram Dubey*,⁵ observed as follows

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2. (1926) A I R 1926 All 95 (90) . 48 All 468 . 90 Ind Cas 938, *Sheo Prasad v. Mt. Narain Bai*
 (1926) A I R 1926 All 376 (376) . 93 Ind Cas 369, *Ram Bahadur v. Rahat Ali*. (Bogus application)
 (1931) A I R 1931 Bom 425 (425) . 134 Ind Cas 699, *Hari Mahadev v. Vishnu Balakrishna*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Sind 160 (161) . 134 Ind Cas 1182 . 25 Sind L R 528, *Volkart Brothers v. Achrayram*.
 3. (1874) 22 Suth W R 512 (516) (F B), *Eshan Chander Dose v. Prannath Nag*.
 (1874) 22 Suth W R 154 (155) . 14 Beng L R 144n, *Rohsnee Nundan Miller v. Bhagwan Chander Roy*
 (1875) 24 Suth W R 459 (460), *Mt. Moracho Kooer v. Chutoorbhooj Sahay*.
 (1877) 3 Cal 518 (521) . 1 Cal L R 409, *Unnoda Persad Roy v. Koorpan Ali*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 All 625 (650) . 118 Ind Cas 17 . 52 All 11 (F B), *Kayastha Co. Ltd v. Sita Ram Dubey*.
 (1875) 23 Suth W R 327 (328), *Shurut Chunder Sen v. Abdool Khyr Mahmood Mohulesur Dillah*
 (1883) 1883 Pun Re No. 23, *Baness v. Turton*
 (1878) 2 Md 1 (3) . 3 Ind Jur 208, *Prabhacora Row v. Potannah*
 (1891) 1891 All W N 148 (148), *Debi Dass v. Umrao Singh*.
 (1890) 1890 All W N 77 (78), *Halima Bibi v. Nishan Bibi*.
 (1930) 131 Ind Cas 678 (679) (All), *Rupas Bai v. Murat Tewari*
 (1930) A I R 1930 All 814 (814) . 124 Ind Cas 231, *Ram Nath v. Ram Sahai*
 (1929) A I R 1929 Oudh 337 (338) . 110 Ind Cas 701 . 3 Luck 5-0, *Rupaya Bibi v. Prag Tewari*
 (1930) A I R 1930 All 188 (189) . 122 Ind Cas 179, *Dharamdeo Rai v. Jwala Prasad*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Nag 131 (132) . 31 Nag L R 333 . 156 Ind Cas 111, *Hannuman Lala Katar v. Sheonarayan Somar*
 (1933) A I R 1933 Sind 78 (81) . 27 Sind L R 109 . 142 Ind Cas 4-0, *Achray-sing Ram Sing v. Achrayram Sahni*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 289 (289) . 149 Ind Cas 102, *Sri Bai v. Shrobeni Mehar*.
 4. (1934) A I R 1934 P C 14 (16) . 147 Ind Cas 323 . 61 Ind App 62 . 55 All 993 (P C).
 5. (1929) A I R 1929 All 625 (650) . 118 Ind Cas 17 . 52 All 11 (F B).

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 86a

while in the former case it will not.⁴

Where a defective application, instead of being returned or rejected is *accepted* by the Court and action taken, it has been held that the application must be taken to have been in accordance with law.⁵

Where an application is *rejected* by the Court on the ground that it has not complied with the requirements of Order 21 Rules 11 to 14, it has been held that it cannot be considered to be one in accordance with law even though the omission was an immaterial one.⁶ Various reasons have been advanced for this view, but the true reason seems to be that a Court cannot reconsider at a subsequent stage of the execution proceedings its own order that such an application was not in accordance with law.

(1883) 6 Mad 250 (251), *Ramanandan v Periatambi*.

(1908) 31 Mad 68 (69) : 17 Mad L Jour 596 : 3 Mad L Tim 251, *Ramayyan v. Kadir Baoha Sahib*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1077 (1081) : 53 Cal 604 : 98 Ind Cas 160, *Pitambar*

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. Ghose. (List of

(1932) 135 Ind Cas 15 (15) (Mad), *Sangliya Pillai v. Muthu Chettiar*. (Party not signing and verifying application)

(1920) A I R 1920 Pat 615 (616) : 54 Ind Cas 933, *Sobran Mahton v. Mt. Sibdas Kuer*. (Decree-holder failing to comply with a conditional order of Court.)

(1922) 65 Ind Cas 120 (120) (Pat), *Guru Mahadeva Ashram Prasad Sahi Bahadur v. Mahabir Sukul*. (Amount of the decree and costs not shown—Held, material defect.)

.. .. . 598, Telai

. Lellanund.
ndra

.. .. . am Degam v.

(1900) A I R 1900 Bom 310 (310) : 25 Bom 950 : 23 Ind Cas 844, *Gulappa*

. Gurja Kant

and acted upon by a Court does not preclude it from looking behind to see whether the decree was barred at the date of the application.)

G. (1931) A I R 1931 Nag 154 (155) : 134 Ind Cas 681 : 28 Nag L R 7 (F D), *Gulamali v. Hajkumar Chatterji*. (If the rejection is on other grounds, the Court dealing with the subsequent application must look to the previous application itself to see whether it was in accordance with law.)

(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 466 (467) : 41 Ind Cas 220, *Ishan Chandra Samui v. Dulal Chandra De*. (Amount which had been recovered in course of some previous proceedings was not correctly stated—Not in accordance with law.)

(1934) A I R 1934 Cal 1077 (1081) : 53 Cal 604 : 98 Ind Cas 160, *Pitambar*

.. .. .
.. .. .

(1935) A I R 1935 Nag 131 (132) : 31 Nag L R 333 : 156 Ind Cas 111, *Hankman Lala Kalar v. Sheo Narayan Sonar*.

(1931) A I R 1931 All 722 (723) : 131 Ind Cas 33, *Sudeshwakari Prasad Narain Singh v. Palyhan Dule*.

(See also (1926) A I R 1926 All 376 (376) : 93 Ind Cas 302, *Ram Bahadur Singh v. Bahat Ali Khan*.)

fide, one class of cases holding that it should be² and another class of cases that it need not be so.³ The conflict must now be taken to have been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Khalil Ur Rahman v. Collector of Etah*,⁴ that it is not necessary for an application to be in accordance with law that it should have been made *bona fide*. In that case an application for execution was made on 2nd June 1925 in respect of a mortgage decree dated 29th June 1922, praying for the sale of the mortgaged properties. The Court ordered certain copies to be filed in answer to which the vakil stated that he simply wanted in that application to get the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor brought on the record. Notices were ordered to the alleged legal representatives but were returned unserved and the decree-holder taking no further steps, the application was struck off. The decree-holder again applied on 8th July 1926 for sale of the property. On this application, the legal representatives were brought on the record, but no further steps being taken this application also was struck off. Their Lordships, approving of the view taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in *Kayastha Co. Ltd. v. Sitaram Dubey*,⁵ observed as follows:

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 86

2. (1926) A I R 1926 All 95 (99) . 48 All 468 . 90 Ind Cas 939, *Sheo Prasad v. Mt. Narain Bai*
(1926) A I R 1926 All 376 (376) 93 Ind Cas 369, *Ram Bahadur v. Rahaat Ali*. (Bogus application)
(1931) A I R 1931 Bom 425 (425) . 134 Ind Cas 699, *Hari Mahadev v. Yashnu Balakrishna*.
(1931) A I R 1931 Sind 160 (161) . 134 Ind Cas 1182 25 Sind L R 528, *Vohari Brothers v. Achrajram*.
3. (1874) 22 Suth W R 512 (516) (F B), *Eshan Chander Bose v. Prannath Nag*.
(1874) 22 Suth W R 154 (155) 14 Beng L R 144n, *Rohinee Nandan Mitter v. Bhagwan Chander Roy*.
(1875) 24 Suth W R 459 (460), *Mt. Moracho Koor v. Chutoorbhooj Sahoy*.
(1877) 3 Cal 518 (521) 1 Cal L R 408, *Unnoda Persad Roy v. Koorpan Ali*.
(1920) A I R 1920 All 625 (650) 118 Ind Cas 17 52 All 11 (F B), *Kayastha Co., Ltd. v. Sita Ram Dubey*
(1875) 23 Suth W R 827 (328), *Shurut Chunder Sen v. Abdool Khyr Mahmood Mohntesur Dillahi*.
(1883) 1883 Pun Re No. 23, *Baness v. Turton*
(1878) 2 Mad 1 (3) 8 Ind Jur 208, *Prabhatara Roy v. Potannah*.
(1891) 1891 All W N 148 (148), *Debi Dass v. Umrao Singh*
(1890) 1890 All W N 77 (78), *Halima Bibi v. Nishan Bibi*
(1930) 131 Ind Cas 678 (679) (41), *Rupai Rai v. Murat Tewari*
(1930) A I R 1930 All 814 (814) 128 Ind Cas 231, *Ram Nath v. Ram Sahai*
(1928) A I R 1928 Oudh 337 (338) 110 Ind Cas 701 . 3 Luck 500, *Rupaya Bibi v. Prag Tewari*
(1930) A I R 1930 All 188 (189) 122 Ind Cas 179, *Dharamdeo Rai v. Jucala Prasad*
(1935) A I R 1935 Nag 131 (132) 31 Nag L R 333 156 Ind Cas 114, *Hannuman Lal Kalar v. Sheonarayan Sonar*.
(1933) A I R 1933 Sind 78 (81) 27 Sind L R 109 142 Ind Cas 409, *Achraj-sing Ram Sing v. Achrajram Sahni*
(1931) A I R 1931 Pat 289 (289) 149 Ind Cas 102, *Sri Rai v. Sheobens Meher*.
4. (1931) A I R 1931 P C 14 (16) 147 Ind Cas 323 61 Ind App C2 55 All 923 (P C).
5. (1929) A I R 1929 All 625 (650) 118 Ind Cas 17 52 All 11 (F B).

Article 182
(Clause 6)
Notes 86-86a

"The applications were made in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore in accordance with the law applicable thereto; they were made to the proper Court. They were obviously steps-in-aid of execution and they were made in time.

"To hold that it was necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the said applications were made *bona fide* and that the decree-holder had the intention of proceeding to execution in pursuance of each of the said applications, would be to import words into the terms of the Article which are not to be found therein and would necessitate the Court embarking upon the difficult and in some cases the impossible task of finding the motive of the decree-holder in making the applications."

86a. Effect of return, amendment, and rejection of application for execution. — Order 21 Rule 17 sub-rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide as follows :

"(1) On receiving an application for the execution of a decree as provided by Rule 11 sub-rule 2, the Court shall ascertain whether such of the requirements of Rules 11 to 14 as may be applicable to the case have been complied with ; and, if they have not been complied with, the Court may reject the application, or may allow the defect to be remedied then and there or within a time to be fixed by it.

"(2) Where an application is amended under the provisions of sub-rule 1, it shall be deemed to have been an application in accordance with law and presented on the date when it was first presented."

Where the application is *amended*, under the provisions of sub-rule 1, then the application will be deemed to be in accordance with law when it was first presented, irrespective of the question whether the defect in the application as it was first presented was a *material one*^{1a} (i. e. a defect by reason of which it is not possible for

Note 86a

- 1a(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 260 (260, 261) • 92 Ind Cas 109, *Sankaran Nair v. Ambu*. (Description of property omitted.)
(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 826 (836) • 35 Ind Cas 876, *Kamatchi Ammal v. Pitchu Iyer*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 220 (221) • 52 Ind Cas 765, *Balasubramania Pillai v. Chit Co., Yela Nidhi Ltd*.
(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 94 (92) • 59 Mad 303 • 161 Ind Cas 93, *Kenchada Dalayya v. Sundara Narayana*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Pat 23 (24) • 2 Pat 609 • 74 Ind Cas 174, *Bhagwat Prasad v. Dwarika Prasad*.
(1923) 45 Mad L Jour 7 (7) (N N C)
(1930) A I R 1930 Outh 65 (66) • 5 Luck 433 • 124 Ind Cas 415, *Dryasias Singh v. Bhajwan Dass*.
(1910) 7 Ind Cas 19 (20) (Cal), *Kalanun I Singh v. Chandra Kishore Jai*.
(1912) A I R 1912 Pat 222 (224) • 234 Ind Cas 91 • 11 Pat 516, *Shree Ganes Jai v. Mt. Kishun Bann Kuer*.

the Court to proceed with the application) or an *immaterial* one.^{1b} It does not follow from this that where an application is returned for amendment, but is not amended, the application must necessarily be considered to be *not* in accordance with law.¹ In *Kamachi Ammal v. Pichu*,² their Lordships of the High Court of Madras observed :

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 86a

"We think that an execution petition returned for amendment but not re-presented, may yet give fresh starting point for limitation. We do not consider that Order 21 Rule 17, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, was intended to affect the construction put upon the words 'applying in accordance with law' in the Limitation Act by this Court and by other High Courts in dealing with defects in form occurring in execution applications. The Rule is an enabling one which allows certain defective applications subsequently amended to be deemed 'applications in accordance with law' with effect from the date of their first presentation."

See also the undermentioned cases^{2a} to the same effect.

The question, then, whether such an application is in accordance with law, depends upon the answer to another question whether the defect, for the amendment of which the application was returned, was a *material* defect, without the amendment of which further proceedings could not be taken, or was only a *formal* defect. In the latter case, the application will be one in accordance with law,³

1b(1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 899 (400) 86 Ind Cas 591 28 Oudh Cas 392, *Durga Prasad v. Jolhu Ram*.

(1006) 8 Cal L Jour 41 (44) (S N) (Verification omitted)

(1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 65 (67) 5 Luck 458 124 Ind Cas 445, *Durgibai Singh v. Bhagwan Dass*.

1. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 385 (391) I L R (1937) Mad 616. 168 Ind Cas 561 (F B), *Chidambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar*

(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 23 (24) 2 Pat 609 74 Ind Cas 174, *Dhaquat Prashad v. Dwarika Prashad*.

2. (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 636 (636) 35 Ind Cas 676.

2a(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 958 (958) 82 Ind Cas 691, *Narayanaraswami Naidugaru v. Ganaiyys*

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 1201 (1204) 29 Ind Cas 16, *Seshayya v. Venkatasubbiah*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 568 (569) 148 Ind Cas 611, *Thirupathi Ayyangar v. Yegnammal* (Case before amendment by Act 9 of 1927)

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 1090 (1090, 1091) 40 Mad 919 38 Ind Cas 136, *Natesa Pillai v. Ganapathia Pillai*.

(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 1012 (1013) . 26 Ind Cas 413, *Vadivelu Pillai v. Marudai Pillai*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 510 (510) 27 Ind Cas 611, *Mootha v. Sanlunni Nair*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 579 (581) (Cil), *Mathura Prasad v. Anurago Koer*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1155 (1156) 32 Ind Cas 816, *Narayanaraswami Naidu v. Muthalaya Venkataratnam*

[See also (1882) 12 Cal L R 279 (280), *Syud Mohamed v. Abedecollah*.]
[But see (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 401 (102) 42 Ind Cas 671, *Doortas*

Seshadri Iyer v. Ananthayya]

3. (1892) 1892 All W N 111 (114), *Madho Singh v. Eari Bharese Das*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 440 (443) . 112 Ind Cas 36, *Abdul Kharim Sahib v. Lalshrinaraswami*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 86a

while in the former case it will not.⁴

Where a defective application, instead of being returned or rejected is *accepted* by the Court and action taken, it has been held that the application must be taken to have been in accordance with law.⁵

Where an application is *rejected* by the Court on the ground that it has not complied with the requirements of Order 21 Rules 11 to 14, it has been held that it cannot be considered to be one in accordance with law even though the omission was an *immaterial* one.⁶ Various reasons have been advanced for this view, but the true reason seems to be that a Court cannot reconsider at a subsequent stage of the execution proceedings its own order that such an application was not in accordance with law.

(1883) 6 Mad 250 (251), *Ramanandan v. Periatambi*.

(1908) 31 Mad 69 (69) : 17 Mad L Jour 596 : 3 Mad L Tim 251, *Ramayyan v. Kadir Baoha Sahib*.

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 1077 (1081) : 53 Cal 664 : 98 Ind Cas 166, *Pitambar Jana v. Damodar Gachari*.

... v. Janhi Koer.]
... ya Nath Ghose. (List of

lai v. Muthu Chettiar.

Sobran Mahton v. M.
nply with a conditional

order of Court.)

(1922) 65 Ind Cas 120 (120) (Pat), *Guru Mahadeva Ashram Prasad Sahi Bahadur v. Mahabir Sukul*. (Amount of the decree and costs not shown—Held, material defect.)

5. (1920) A I R 1920 Pat 180 (181) : 58 Ind Cas 223 : 5 Pat L Jour 593, *Telait*

... Hanund.

Begam v.

(1922) A I R 1922 Bom 118 (119) : 46 Bom 269 : 63 Ind Cas 811, *Gulappa Rudrappa v. Erava Dasangawda*.

[But see (1870) 3 Cal L R 572 (573), *Ishana Dabra v. Girsja Kant Lahiry*. (The fact that a previous application was accepted and acted upon by a Court does not preclude it from looking behind to see whether the decree was barred at the date of the application.)]

G. (1931) A I R 1931 Nag 151 (155) : 134 Ind Cas 681 : 29 Nag L R 1 (F 1). *Gulamali v. Rajkumar Chatterji*. (If the rejection is on other grounds, the Court dealing with the subsequent application must look to the previous application itself to see whether it was in accordance with law.)

(1919) A I R 1919 Cal 466 (467) : 41 Ind Cas 220, *Ishan Chandra Samus v. Dulai Chandra De*. (Amount which had been recovered in course of some previous proceedings was not correctly stated—Not in accordance with law.)

... Pat Kumar,
... amount
... on notes

(1935) A I R 1935 Nag 131 (132) : 31 Nag L R 333 : 156 Ind Cas 114, *Hannu-man Lala Katar v. Shro Narayan Sonar*.

(1931) A I R 1931 All 722 (723) : 131 Ind Cas 33, *Sudeshavari Prasad Narain Singh v. Palshan Dube*.

[See also (1926) A I R 1926 All 376 (376) : 93 Ind Cas 302, *Bahadur Singh v. Rahat Ali Khan*.]

Order 21 Rule 17 sub-rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates the amendment of an application *before admission and registration*. It gives a *discretion* to the Court to allow or refuse amendment of the application.⁷ If the Court overlooks the defects and registers the application, the question whether the defects can subsequently be amended depends on whether the decree is or is not barred on the date of the amendment. If there is no bar of limitation, the application can be amended,⁸ as a substantive fresh application can be entertained on that date and there is nothing in the Code to prevent the Court from treating it as a fresh application.

Suppose, on the date when the defect is sought to be remedied the decree is barred by limitation. There is a conflict of opinion as to whether an amendment can be allowed in such a case. According to the Calcutta High Court no such amendment is permissible, the reason being that the Court is not empowered under the Rule to allow the amendment.⁹ The Madras High Court¹⁰ has held that the Court has a discretion to allow an amendment under sub-rule 1 of Order 21 Rule 17, even if the application for amendment is made after the expiry of the statutory time, the reason being that the law casts a duty upon the Court to notice the defects in the application before

Prasad.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 532 (535) : 37 Cal 899, *Chhayunnessa Dibi v. Kazi Basirar Rahaman*.

8 (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 806 (907) : 11 Pat 508 : 139 Ind Cas 840, *Braja Sunder Das v. Radha Prasad Bhagat*.

(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 224 (225) : 2 Pat 828 : 71 Ind Cas 741, *Ram Sumran Prasad v. Ram Bahadur*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 532 (535) : 37 Cal 899, *Chhayunnessa Dibi v. Kazi Basirar*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 663 (664) : 21 Ind Cas 782, *Varadiah v. Kumara Venkata Perumal Raja Bahadur Varu*.

6 : 139 Ind Cas 91, *Sheogobind*

: 119 Ind Cas 411, *Jagannath*

Cas 337, *Salimulla Bahadur v.*

Saimuddin Surkar.

(1900) 17 Cal 631 (636) (F B), *Asgar Ali v. Trulokya Nath Ghose*. (Overruling 14 Cal 124.)

(1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1048 (1050) : 85 Ind Cas 742, *Abul Hasmat Ahmad*

: Cas 1017,

v. Sobay.

10. (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 24 (25) : 107 Ind Cas 303, *Maheshwaran Nambudri-*

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Notes 86a-86h

admission, and if the Court or its officer had done such duty properly, the defects could have been remedied within time. The Bombay High Court has expressed the view that if the application for execution is within time, but the application for amendment is made after the twelve years have expired, the application for amendment should not be straightway rejected but must be considered on its merits, and that the matter being in the discretion of the Court, it would depend upon the nature of the amendment whether it should or should not be allowed.¹¹ The High Courts of Allahabad,¹² Lahore¹³ and Patna,¹⁴ and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Peshawar¹⁵ have also allowed the defects to be remedied though the decree was barred on the date of the amendment.

Where the Court grants time for amendment under the provisions of sub-rule 1 of Rule 17 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it can subsequently enlarge the time so granted.¹⁶

86h. Withdrawal of application.—Before the date of decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Thakur Prasad v. Fakir Ullah*,¹ there was a conflict of opinion as regards the effect of withdrawal of an execution application. According to one view, the application withdrawn was to be treated as non-existent and the question of limitation with regard to a subsequent execution application was to be determined as if the first application had never been made at all.² According to the other view, the application which was withdrawn was not to be treated as a nullity, but would furnish a fresh starting point of limitation.³ The decision of the Privy Council

11. (1937) A I R 1937 Bom 365 (370) : 170 Ind Cas 877 : I L R (1937) Bom 691, *In re Janki Prasad Poddar*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 Bom 405 (407, 408) : I L R (1938) Bom 706 : 177 Ind Cas 989, *Mahomed Bhai v. Dawoodbhai & Co.*
12. (1896) 20 All 478 (480) 1893 All W N 123, *Jiwai Dube v. Kati Charan Ram*.
- (1893) 1893 All W N 112 (113), *Ajudharam v. Muhammad Munir*.
[See (1905) 2 All L Jour 367 (369), *Muhammad Ras v. Ali Sajjad*.]
13. (1920) A I R 1920 Lah 122 (122) : 55 Ind Cas 16, *Ganesh Das v. Fattah Chand*.
14. (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 222 (223) 11 Pat 546 : 133 Ind Cas 91, *Sheogobind Ram v. Mt. Kshunbanu Kuer*.
15. (1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 40 (42) : 152 Ind Cas 443, *Ahmad Ali v. Mt. Fatima Sultan*.
16. (1882) 8 Cal 479 (481) : 10 Cal L R 519, *Kamini Mohun v. Gopal*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 356 (357) : 34 Ind Cas 625, *Gopal Prashad v. Rajendra Lal*.

Notes 86b

1. (1895) 17 All 106 (111, 112) : 22 Ind App 44 : 5 Mad L Jour 3 : 6 Sar 526 (P C).
2. (1885) 7 All 359 (361, 362) : 1885 All W N 51, *Kifayat Ali v. Ram Singh*.
(1887) 10 All 71 (78) : 1888 All W N 1, *Sarju Prasad v. Sita Ram*.
(1881) 6 Bom 681 (683), *Pirjade v. Pirjade*.
(1888) 1888 All W N 272 (273), *Mahlab Kuar v. Shamsundar Lal*.
3. (1885) 10 Bom 62 (65), *Tarachand Megraj v. Kashinath Trimbal*.
(1887) 11 Bom 467 (469) : 1887 Bom P J 23, *Shankar Bisto Nadgir v. Nar-singh Rao Ramchandra*.
(1910) 8 Ind Cas 833 (831) (Cal), *Musaraf Ali v. Amir Jan Dube*.

in *Thakur Prasad's case*¹ set the conflict at rest by upholding the view that the withdrawal did not prevent the application from furnishing a fresh starting point

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 86b-87

Alter the amendment of 1927, the starting point under clause 5 of the Article is the date of final order on the application. An application withdrawn without leave can only be dismissed, and the dismissal will be a final order on the application which will give a fresh starting point of time.

87. "Proper Court"—General.—Under Explanation II, "proper Court" has been defined as meaning the Court whose *duty* it is to execute the decree or order.¹ This necessarily implies that unless a Court has the jurisdiction to execute the decree or order, it will not be a proper Court within the Explanation, as a Court cannot be under a *duty* to do a thing which it has no *jurisdiction* to do

The word "execute" in Explanation II would seem to be used in a liberal sense as including the power to *entertain* an application for execution, so that an application for execution made to a Court which can only entertain the application and transfer it to another Court for execution, but cannot itself proceed to execute the decree in the manner asked for, may be an application made to a "proper Court."²

Further, if the application contemplates execution in any particular manner, the Court that is competent to entertain an application for execution in *that* manner, will alone be a proper Court within Explanation II. Thus, in *Maharaja of Bobbili v. Sri Raja Narasaraaju Peda Baliara Simhulu*,³ a decree passed by a Court at V was transferred for execution to a Court at P. The latter Court attached the property of the judgment-debtor which was within its jurisdiction, in execution of the decree. Then, before the Court at P sent to the Court at V a certificate under Section 41 of the Civil Procedure Code reporting the result of the execution, an application was made to the Court at V for *sale* of the property attached. It was held by the Privy Council that the application was not made to a proper Court within the meaning of clause 5.

Under clause 5, *both* an application for execution and an application to take a step-in-aid of execution must be made to a proper Court, in order to save limitation under the clause. Hence, in view of the definition of the expression "proper Court" in Explanation II, even an application to take a *step-in-aid* of execution must be made

Note 87

1. See (1874) 21 Suth W R 410 (411), *Prokhash Chunder Lahory v. Poorno Chunder Roy* (Under Article 167 of the Act of 1871, the term was defined as Court whose duty it was, by transfer or otherwise, to execute the decree.)

3. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 16 (19): 39 Mad 640: 43 Ind App 239: 36 Ind Cas 682 (P C).

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 87-88

to a Court whose duty it is to *execute* the decree.^{3a}

In the undormentioned case⁴ it was doubted by Marten, J., of the Bombay High Court whether an application for execution made against a talukdar without a certificate under Section 29 E of the Gujarat Talukdhars' Act (1888) is one made to a proper Court, because in the absence of such certificate there is no duty resting on any Court to execute the decree. It is submitted that the learned Judge has not applied a correct test in determining whether a Court is a proper Court within the meaning of Explanation II. Clause 5 clearly makes a distinction between the question of an application being in accordance with law and that of the application being presented to the proper Court. Hence, the definition in Explanation II must be taken to refer to a Court whose duty it is to execute the decree or order if an application in accordance with law is presented to it. A defect on account of which *no* Court is competent to deal with an application must, it is conceived, be held to be a matter which makes the application not one in accordance with law and not a defect which makes the Court to which the application is presented not a proper Court.

The expression "Court whose duty it is to execute the decree" occurs also in the Civil Procedure Code, Order 21 Rule 2. Hence, it is conceived that decisions bearing on the interpretation of the expression in the above provision may also be referred to for the purpose of determining what is a "proper Court" as defined in Explanation II.

88. Execution beyond local jurisdiction — Application to Court passing decree, if one made to proper Court.— Even in cases where the property sought to be proceeded against is outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree, or the judgment-debtor resides outside such limits, the Court which passed the decree has jurisdiction to *entertain* an application for execution and hence is a proper Court within the meaning of Explanation II.¹

3a. See Note 101 *infra*.

4. (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 73 (78) : 43 Bom 44 : 47 Ind Cas 726, *Hargound Fulchand v. Naja Sura*.

Note 88

1. (1897) 2 Cal W N 415 (417), *Rama Nath Sen v. Gouri Sankar*. (Application for transfer of decree.)
- (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 9 (12) : 69 Ind Cas 660 : 26 Oudh Cas 71, *Shoo Ram v. Ram Bharosey*.
- (1936) A I R 1936 Rang 271 (274) : 14 Rang 550 : 163 Ind Cas 403, *Arjundas Bisumal v. U Ka Ya*. (Application for execution in respect of property outside jurisdiction.)
- (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 312 (317) : 53 Cal 832 : 132 Ind Cas 149, *Sreenath Chakravarti v. Priyanath Bandopadhyay*. (Do.)
- (1923) A I R 1923 T-L 155 (156) : 154 T-L 300 : 200 Moiraj Bakhsh v. Maholive in it juris- Court

89. Transfer of decree to another Court for execution — Jurisdiction of transferring Court.—In *Maharajyn of Bobbili v. Sri Rajn Nnrasaraju Peda Baliara Simhulu Bnhndur*,¹ a money decree was passed by a Court at V. The decree was transferred for execution to the Court at P. The latter Court attached in execution of the decree certain property belonging to the judgment-debtor which was within its jurisdiction. Then, before the decree was returned to the Court at V with the certificate of non-satisfaction by the Court at P, an application was made to the former Court for sale of the property that was within the jurisdiction of the Court at P and had been attached by such Court. In holding that the application was not made to a proper Court, the Privy Council observed as follows :

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Note 89

"As the decree of the 5th April 1904 had by order of the Court of the District Judge been sent on the 30th September 1904 to the Court of the Munsif of Parvatipur for execution by the latter Court, and as the copy of the decree with the non-satisfaction certificate was not returned to the Court of the District Judge until the 3rd August 1910, and as the petition of the 13th December 1907 was for execution of the decree by sale of the immovable property of the respondents which was within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Munsif's Court, their Lordships having regard particularly to Sections 223, 224, 228 and 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, are satisfied that when that petition of the 13th December 1907 was presented to the Court of the District Judge, that Court was not the proper Court to which the application to execute the decree by sale of the immovable property which had been attached by the Court of the Munsif should have been made, and that the proper Court to which that application should have been made was the Court whose duty it then was to execute the decree so far as it could be executed by that Court."

There is a conflict of judicial opinion about the interpretation of the above ruling of the Privy Council. According to some decisions,

(1929) A I R 1929 Rang 95 (95) : 116 Ind Cas 474, *Kathirasan Chettyar v. Ma E*
to the
although
Court's jurisdiction.)

(1934) A I R 1934 Pat 192 (194) : 13 Pat 21 : 155 Ind Cas 769, *Chandan Mal Marwari v. Shub Prasad Singh*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Cal 267 (268) : 162 Ind Cas 777, *Amarendra Nath v. Balai Chand*.

[But see (1926) A I R 1926 All 95 (97) : 48 All 468 : 90 Ind Cas 938, *Sheo Prasad v. Mt. Narayans Bai*.]

Note 89

1. (1916) A I R 1916 P C 16 (18) : 89 Mad 640 : 43 App 238 : 86 Ind Cas 682 (P C).

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Note 89

the above ruling lays down that till the return of the decree with the certificate of non-satisfaction by the Court to which the decree has been transferred, the Court which has passed the decree has no jurisdiction to execute the decree or to entertain an application for the execution of the decree.² But according to other decisions,³ the above ruling of the Privy Council must be confined to the peculiar facts of the case and must be held to lay down only that the Court passing the decree cannot entertain an application for the sale of the property which has been attached by the Court to which the decree has been transferred, and not that in every case the Court passing the decree will have no jurisdiction to execute the decree till the certificate of non-satisfaction is sent by the Court to which the decree has been transferred.

It is submitted that the latter view is correct. Hence, where Court A passes a decree and transfers it for execution to Court B an application made to the former Court for transfer of the decree to

- 2, (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 906 (908) : 60 Cal 1176 : 149 Ind Cas 17, *Jatendrakumar Das v. Mahendrachandra Banikya*.
- (1930) 43 Cal W N 185 (186), *Ram Kishan Ram Bhakat v. Satya Narain*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Lah 728 (729) : 152 Ind Cas 128 : 16 Lah 80, *Rulia Ram v. Divan Chand*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 14 (14) : 130 Ind Cas 521, *Dwanchand v. Rallia Ram*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 233 (235) : 78 Ind Cas 241, *Firm Sheru Mal Chhina Mal v. Firm Hira Lal Anant Rani*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 580 (582) : 40 Mad 1069 : 42 Ind Cas 204 (F B), *Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd. v. Perumal*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 492 (493) : 28 Oudh Cas 169 : 85 Ind Cas 455, *Mahomed Shakir v. Jugal Kishore*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 384 (384) : 2 Pat 247 : 74 Ind Cas 608, *Jnanendra Nath Ghose v. Jogendra Narain Sinha*.

See also the following cases which were decided before the above Privy Council decision and which proceeded on the view that the transferring Court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree before the return of the decree with the certificate of non-satisfaction by the Court to which the decree has been transferred :

- (1882) 1882 All W N 171 (171), *Budhi Bibi v. Indar Koer*. (A second application by the decree-holder to the original Court to give him a second certificate of transfer, the first being still subsisting and operative, would not be an application made in accordance with law, nor was it made to the proper Court.)
- (1900) 1900 All W N 88 (89), *Har Sahai v. Sham Lal*. (Do.)
3. (1935) A I R 1935 Cal 99 (100) : 154 Ind Cas 731, *Rajani Kanta v. Golam Mahnuddin*.
- (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 465 (473) : 157 Ind Cas 483 (F B), *Kanti Narain v. Madan Gopal*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Lah 199 (201) : 121 Ind Cas 68, *Hanuman Balsh v. Chunna Mal*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 433 (494) : 110 Ind Cas 829, *Mehadum Beg Sahib v. Muhammad Meera Sahib*. (A I R 1922 Bom 359, Dissented from.)
- (1937) A I R 1937 Nag 305 (308) : I L R (1937) Nag 440 : 173 Ind Cas 51, *Thakur Vishwanath Singh v. Mahabir Prasad*.
- (1939) A I R 1939 Pat 144 (145) : 17 Pat 617 : 180 Ind Cas 311, *Firm Dwarladas Gobindram v. Firm Saligram Rekhraj*.

See also cases in Foot-Notes 4 and 5 below.

another Court,⁴ or for the recall of the decree to itself,⁵ is an application made to a proper Court.

Where an application for execution is made to the transferring Court before the transferee Court sends the certificate of non-satisfaction but such certificate is sent subsequently, it was held in the undermentioned cases⁶ that the defect is not cured and the application must be regarded as not made to the proper Court. But if the view that the transferring Court continues to have jurisdiction to execute the decree even after the transfer of the decree is accepted as correct, the above question cannot arise.

Even assuming that once a decree has been transferred to another Court for execution the Court which passed the decree has no jurisdiction to execute it until the decree comes back to it in some way, it has been held that where a Court which passed a decree has ordered it to be sent to another Court for execution but the decree has not been actually transferred in accordance with the order, the Court which passed the decree continues to be the "proper Court" for receiving applications for execution.⁷

90. Transfer of decree to another Court — Jurisdiction of transferee Court. — Under Section 38 of the Civil Procedure Code, a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. Hence, a Court to which a decree has been sent for execution is a "proper Court" within the meaning of Explanation II. The jurisdiction of such Court to execute the decree continues until it sends (under Section 41, Civil Procedure Code) to the Court which passed the decree the certificate reporting the result of the execution by it or until the execution proceedings are withdrawn or transferred from it. Hence, an application for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution made to the transferee Court at any time before such certificate is sent or the execution proceedings are withdrawn or transferred from the transferee Court,

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 89-90**

4. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 113 (115) : I L R (1938) Mad 926 : 176 Ind Cas 753, *Muthu Rama Reddi v. Motilal Daga*
- (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 493 (494) : 110 Ind Cas 629, *Mahadum Beg Sahib v. Md. Meera Sahib*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 367 (367), *Gowind v. Larman*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Nag 29 (30) : 23 Nag L R 126 : 101 Ind Cas 279, *Gowind v. Larman*.
5. (1939) A I R 1939 Pat 144 (146) : 17 Pat 617 : 180 Ind Cas 311, *Firm Dwarkadas Gobindram v. Firm Saligram Rekhranj*.
6. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 14 (14) : 130 Ind Cas 521, *Dewan Chand v. Rallia Ram*. (Confirmed on Letters Patent Appeal in A I R 1934 Lah 728.)
- (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 906 (906) : 60 Cal 1176 : 149 Ind Cas 17, *Jatindra Kumar Das v. Mohendra Chandra Banikya*.
[But see (1926) A I R 1926 Lah 113 (114) : 89 Ind Cas 958, *Firm Hira Lal Anant Ram v. Firm Sheru Mal-China Mal*.]
7. (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 301 (303) : 1 Pat 328 : 65 Ind Cas 332, *Ramachandra Marwari v. Krishana Lal Marwari*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Sind 78 (80) : 27 Sind L R 109 : 142 Ind Cas 489, *Achraj Sing Ram Sing v. Achrajram Sahni*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 90-91

is an application made to a "proper Court."¹ But, where the transferee Court has returned the decree to the Court by which it was passed, the transferee Court has no longer any jurisdiction to execute the decree and an application made to it will not be one made to a proper Court.² In some decisions, however, the view has been expressed that the return of the decree by the transferee Court does not make it anytheless a Court to which the decree has been sent for execution within the meaning of Section 38 of the Civil Procedure Code and therefore, such Court continues to be a "proper Court" notwithstanding the return of the decree.³ It is submitted that the view is not correct.

It has been held that where a decree has been ordered to be transferred for execution to another Court, the latter Court is competent to entertain an application for the execution of the decree though it has not actually received the copy of the decree at the time of the application.⁴

91. Change in territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction of Court which passed the decree—Effect.—It is a general principle of law that when once a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit, it does not ordinarily lose such jurisdiction by reason of subsequent events.¹ On this principle, where a decree is passed in respect of certain property and subsequently the area in which the property is situated is transferred to the local jurisdiction of another Court, the Court which passed the decree can entertain an application for the execution of the decree. Hence, an application for execution or to

Note 90

1. (1935) A I R 1936 Cal 571 (572) : 166 Ind Cas 374, *Keshirode Chandra v. Brahmanath Pal*. (The irregularity in the mode of transfer of a decree, in that the transfer is not made on an express prayer made by the decree-holder, does not prevent the transferee Court from having the seisin over the execution and hence it is a proper Court.)

(1929) A I R 1929 Bom 418 (420) : 53 Bom 844 : 123 Ind Cas 507, *Fatechand*

Court.)

(1932) A I R 1932 Pat 296 (297) : 11 Pat 518 : 189 Ind Cas 843, *Seshaiyer Rajamannar Iyer v. Madan Mohan Patnank*.

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 57 (61) (Cal), *Manorath Das v. Ambica Kanta Bose*. (The mere striking off of an execution proceeding does not indicate its final determination.)

2. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 1209 (1209) : 93 Ind Cas 455, *Mir Mahomed Noor-ulla Sahib v. Hasarath Kebulai Sayyad Ghulam Ghouse Sha Sahib Kadvi*.

3. (1888) 1883 Pun Re No. 168, *Harbhaj Rai v. Mahand Lal*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Nag 212 (212) : 63 Ind Cas 657 : 18 Nag L R 178, *Indra Raj Singh v. Murad Khan*.

4. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 627 (628) : 56 Mad 692 : 144 Ind Cas 923, *Modals Ademma v. Lanka Venkata Subbayya*. (35 Mad 588, Followed; A I R 1923 Mad 496, Dissented from.)

Note 91

1. See Authors' Civil Procedure Code, 2nd Edition, Section 37 Note 5.

take a step-in-aid of execution, made to the Court which passed the decree in such a case would be an application made to a proper Court within Explanation II.² As the Court which passed the decree does not cease to have jurisdiction in such cases, the Court to whose jurisdiction the area is transferred does not become the Court which passed the decree under Section 37 of the Civil Procedure Code, and hence, an application made to the Court to whose jurisdiction the area is transferred is not made to the proper Court.³

A decree, say, for Rs 1500, is passed by a Court whose presiding officer has jurisdiction to try suits upto Rs. 2000. He is succeeded by an officer who is invested only with jurisdiction to try suits upto the value of Rs 1000. An application for execution made to the successor is one made to a proper Court, the reason being that in such circumstances the Court does not cease to have jurisdiction to execute the decree passed by it.⁴

92. Court passing decree ceasing to exist — Effect. — Where the Court by which the decree was passed has ceased to exist, the application for execution may be made to the Court which, if the suit had been instituted at the time of making the application, would have jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence, such Court would be a "proper Court" within the meaning of Explanation II.¹ (See Civil Procedure Code, Sections 37 and 38.)

93. Appellate Court. — It is the duty of the Court of first instance to execute a decree. So, an application made to a Court to which an appeal against the decree has been preferred is not one

2. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 427 (436) : 42 Mad 821 : 53 Ind Cas 213 (F B), *Seeni Nadan v. Muthuswamy Pillai*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Bom 414 (414) : 89 Ind Cas 87, *Jagannath Nathu v. Ichharam Naroba Vani*.

(1890) 6 Cal 513 (515, 516, 519) : 7 Cal L R 521 : 5 Ind Jur 414, *Luchman Pundeh v. Maddan Mohan Shye*.

[See (1906) 30 Mad 537 (539, 540) : 17 Mad L Jour 417 : 2 Mad L Tim 466, *Panduranga Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Reddi*]

Murmu & mut.

(1917) A I R 1917 Mad 257 (258) : 35 Ind Cas 237, *Penugonda Rattan v. Koranka Thata*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 401 (401) : 42 Ind Cas 671, *Doorvas Seshadri Iyer v. Ananthayee*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Mad 162 (166, 168) : 22 Ind Cas 899 : 37 Mad 462, *Subbiah Nascker v. Ramanathan Chettiar*.

3. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 935 (935) : 158 Ind Cas 811, *Palani Velu v. Somasundaram Pillai*.

4. (1933) A I R 1933 Cal 684 (687) : 149 Ind Cas 1024, *Abdus Sattar v. Mohini Mohan Das*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Pat 3 (3) : 39 Ind Cas 63 : 3 Pat L Jour 113, *Isuani Prasad Singh v. Farhat Hussain*.

Note 92

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 312 (316) : 58 Cal 832 : 132 Ind Cas 149, *Sreenath Chakravarti v. Priyanath Bandopadhyaya*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 93-95

made to a proper Court.¹ See also Note 105 *infra*.

94. Temporary Court, decree passed by.—A Court is established temporarily for a period of one year. The Court passes a decree during that year. After the expiry of the year, the Court is continued for a further period. In such a case, even with regard to an application for execution made *after* one year from the establishment of the Court, such Court is the "proper Court" to which the application should be made. The reason is that the Court does not cease to be the "Court which passed the decree" merely because the period for which it was originally established has expired.¹

95. Court in Native State.—In *Pierce Leslie and Co., Ltd. v. Perumal*,¹ the question arose as to whether an application made to a Court in British India to send to a Court in a Native State (between which and the British Government there existed a reciprocal arrangement for the execution of each other's decrees) the necessary papers to enable the latter Court to execute a decree passed by the Court in British India, was an application to take a step-in-aid of execution. It was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that such an application was not one to take a step-in-aid of execution. In giving reasons for the decision, Wallis, C. J., observed as follows :

"First with regard to clause 5 in column 3 : an application to the Travancore (the Native State in question) Court to execute the decree of a British Court under powers conferred upon it by the Legislative authority in Travancore would not, in my opinion, be an application "in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution" within the meaning of the Article so as to create a fresh starting point for the execution of the decree by the executing Court in British India. The proper Court, in my opinion, for such an application is the executing Court under the law of British India, which, as already shown, is not the Travancore Court. The Limitation Act extends only to British India and has no operation *proprio vigore* in Travancore. It prescribes periods of limitation as to the filing of suits and the execution of decrees in British India, and when it makes an application in accordance with law to a proper Court a fresh starting point, it must be taken to mean an application in accordance with the provisions of the law in British India to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure to which the Article refers or elsewhere. It cannot have been the intention of the Legislature

Note 93

1. (1913) 21 Ind Cas 639 (641) (Mad), *Kelu Nair v. Meenakshi*. (Decision bearing on Civil Procedure Code, O. 21, R. 2.)

Note 94

- 1 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 849 (849, 850) - 58 Mad 1009 : 159 Ind Cas 835, *Ramanathan Chettiar v. Muthayyan Chettiar*.

Note 95

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 560 (564) : 40 Mad 1069 : 42 Ind Cas 294 (F B).

to make an application for execution to a Court in a foreign State, under the law of that State and governed by the law of limitation there in force, a fresh starting point under our Limitation Act for the execution of our own decrees in our own Courts. If this be so, I am equally of opinion that an application to a British Court to take a step-in-aid of the execution by a Travancore Court of the decree of a Court in British India would not be an application to take some step-in-aid of the execution of the decree within the meaning of clause 5 of the Article."

The opinion above expressed, viz. that a Court in a Native State cannot be a proper Court within the meaning of clause 5 was, however, dissented from in a later ruling of the same High Court² in which it was held that an application made to a Court in a Native State for transmission of papers to a British Indian Court to enable the latter Court to execute a decree passed by the Court in the Native State, was an application to take a step-in-aid of execution capable of saving limitation under clause 5. The view taken was that the question whether the application to the Court in the Native State was an application according to law made to a proper Court must be determined with reference to the law in force in the Native State. The earlier Full Bench decision in *Pierce Leslie and Co.'s case*¹ was distinguished on the ground that in that case, the question was with regard to an application to a British Indian Court for transmission of papers to a Court in a Native State, whereas in the later case the question was with reference to an application to a Court in a Native State for transmission of papers to a Court in British India.

The Bombay High Court has also proceeded on the view that a Court in a Native State may be a proper Court within the meaning of Explanation II. Thus, it has been held that where a decree passed by a Court in a Native State (as to which action has been taken by the Government under Section 44 of the Civil Procedure Code and which is executable by Courts in British India), is transferred for execution in British India, proceedings before the Court in the Native State must be held to be proceedings taken before a "proper Court" within the meaning of Explanation II so as to save limitation under clause 5.³ Similarly, it has been held that where a decree passed by a Court in British India has been transferred for execution to a Court in a Native State, an application to the Court in the Native State for the return of the decree to the Court in British India is an application to take a step-in-aid of execution and will save limitation under clause 5.⁴

95. Application to Collector. — A Collector or Tahsildar enforcing a decision of an Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies

2. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 72 (73, 74) : 45 Mad 1014 . 69 Ind Cas 932, *Srinivasa Iyengar v. Narayana Rao*.

3. (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 256 (257) : 59 Ind Cas 747 : 45 Bom 453, *Prabhulingappa v. Gurunath Balaji*.

4. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 418 (420) : 53 Mad 844 : 123 Ind Cas 507, *Fatechand v. Jitmal*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 96-98

under the rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act is not a *Court* and an application made to him does not save limitation for execution of the decision by a Civil Court.¹ Similarly, an application made to the Collector to enforce an award under Section 59 sub-section 1 clause (b) of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 7 of 1925, is not one made to a *Court* and cannot save limitation under clause 5.²

A decree for sale on a mortgage was passed in favour of *A. B.*, the holder of a money decree against the same judgment-debtor, attached the mortgaged property. The money decree was transferred to the Collector for execution. *A.*, the mortgage decree-holder, applied to the Collector praying that the property should be sold subject to his lien. It was held that the application was not one made to the proper Court as the Collector was not a Court whose duty it was to execute the mortgage decree.³

See also the undermentioned case.⁴

97. Insolvency Court, application to.—An application to an Insolvency Court under Section 28 sub-section 2 of the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1920 for leave to execute the decree against the insolvent is not an application made to the proper Court within the meaning of Explanation II. The mere fact that the presiding officer of the Insolvency Court and the Court which is entitled to execute the decree is one and the same person will not make the two Courts the same so as to make the application to the Insolvency Court one to the Court entitled to execute the decree.¹

98. "Proper Court"—Other illustrative cases.—A Conciliator appointed under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act of 1879 is not a *Court* and so an application for execution made to him does not save limitation under clause 5.¹

A decree was passed by an Additional Munsiff of a certain place. An application for execution was made to the principal Munsiff of the place. It was held that it was made to a proper Court as the Courts of the two Munsiffs were the same.²

Note 96

1. (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 150 (151) : 59 Mad 257 : 160 Ind Cas 520, *Abdul Razak Sahib v. Kulpatti Co-operative Society*
2. (1938) A I R 1938 Bom 424 (425) : 177 Ind Cas 897, *Maratha Co-operative Credit Bank of Dharwar v. Keshav Trimbak Hunte*.
3. (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 564 (566) : 146 Ind Cas 805 : 9 Luck 273, *Tilla Singh v. Tirbhawan Singh*.
4. (1882) 1882 Pun Re No 190, *Basotra Mal v. Sirdar Amar Singh*. (An application to any Revenue Officer, other than the Court passing the decree, to give effect to the agreement intended to modify the decree of a Civil Court, is not one made to a proper Court.)

Note 97

1. (1934) A I R 1934 Mad 392 (394) : 57 Mad 808 : 150 Ind Cas 113, *Caruchan v. Kunkamu*.

Note 98

- 1 (1881) 6 Bom 81 (82), *Manohar v. Gehappa*.
2. (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 199 (199) : 151 Ind Cas 375 : 13 Pat 5, *Manogi Lal Sah v. Jag Sah*.

See also the undermentioned cases.³

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 98-100

99. "Application to take some step-in-aid of execution."—Under clause 5 of the Article, the person entitled to the execution of the decree or order gets a fresh starting point not only from the date of the final order on an application for execution, but also from the date of the final order on an application to take a step-in-aid of execution of the decree. In order, however, that the decree-holder may get a fresh starting point under the latter head, it is essential that—

1. The step asked for should be in furtherance of execution of the decree. (See Note 100.)
2. The application must be in accordance with law and to the proper Court. (See Note 101.)
3. The step must be one to be taken by the Court. (See Note 102.)
4. There should be an application for such step. (See Note 103.)
5. The step asked for must be in aid of a British Indian Court (See Note 107.)
6. The step must be with reference to the decree sought to be executed and not to some other matter. (See Note 108.)

100. The step must be in furtherance of execution.—The words "step-in-aid" must be liberally construed.¹ But it is essential that the step contemplated should be in furtherance of the execution of the decree.² Unless therefore the step asked for advances

3. (1918) A I R 1918 Low Bur 103 (103) : 42 Ind Cas 100, *Curpen Chetty v Ana Mahalingam*, (Suit against A—Attachment before judgment—Attachment removed on B executing a bond as surety for the decree amount—Suit then transferred to another Court and decreed by such Court—Application for execution against surety to latter Court not one made to proper Court—The reason apparently is that as the bond by the surety was executed to the Court wherein the suit was first instituted, that Court was the proper Court wherein to apply for execution against the surety.)

(1929) A I R 1929 Mad 787 (789) 119 Ind Cas 398, *Govindarao v. Jagannadham* (Additional District Munsif ordered by proceeding under Madras Civil Courts Act, S 11, not to receive execution application—Decree by Additional District Munsif—Execution applications filed in Principal District Munsif's Court are steps-in-aid.)

Note 100

1. (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 314 (315) 25 Ind Cas 58, *Desireddi Yellamander v. Chinna Pitchai*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 116 (119) 159 Ind Cas 544 : 59 Mad 424, *Union Board, Pentapadu v. Srinivasacharyulu*.

2 (1903) 30 Cal 761 (772) . 8 Cal W N 251, *Trylokhyanath Bose v Jyoti, Prokash Nandi*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 118 (119) 159 Ind Cas 544 59 Mad 424, *Union Board, Pentapadu v. Srinivasacharyulu*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 719 (725) 184 Ind Cas 922 59 Cal 760 (F B), *Amar Krishna v. Jagat Bandhu*.

(1896) 22 Bom 340 (343), *Dapuchand v. Muguttrao*.

(1889) 12 All 399 (403) . 1890 All W N 125 (F R), *Sujan Singh v. Hara Singh*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Lah 404 (407) 173 Ind Cas 185, *Jodh Singh v. Bhagwan Das Nanak Chand*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 100

or *further* execution of the decree to some extent, it cannot be held to be a step-in-aid of execution.³ The question whether a particular proceeding is, or is not a step-in-aid of execution depends largely upon the circumstances of the particular case. If the facts show that the proceeding has the effect of facilitating or advancing the execution to any extent or removing some obstacle from the way of execution, it may well be regarded as a step-in-aid of execution.⁴

There is a difference of opinion as to whether, in order to constitute a step a step-in-aid of execution, it is necessary that an execution application should already be *pending*, which it is intended to be aided. In *Chowdhry Paroosh Ram Das v. Kali Puddo Banerjee*,⁵ it was held that an application for execution is an application to set the Court in motion to execute a decree in any manner prescribed by law, and that, having so set the Court in motion, "any further application during the continuance of the same proceeding is an application to take some step-in-aid of execution within the terms of clause 4 in the last column of Article 179 Schedule 2 of the Limitation Act." In *Kuppusami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Iyer*⁶ it was observed "A man cannot be said to take some step in aid of a petition which has not been initiated." In *Abdul Karim Saheb v. Lakshmanaswami*,⁷ it was held that apart from a few exceptions, an application to take a step-in-aid of execution necessarily presupposes a pending application for execution. See also the undermentioned cases⁸ to a similar effect. The general trend of opinion, however, including that of the High Court of Madras, is that it is *not* necessary that an application for execution should be pending before an application can be regarded as one to take a step-in-aid of execution.⁹

3. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 81 (82) : 131 Ind Cas 100 : 12 Lah 153 (F B), *Ghanaya Lal v. Nathu Ram*.
- (1892) 20 Cal 255 (259), *Abdul Hussem v. Faridun*. (Application by decree-holder for release of portion of attached property and striking off an execution case is not a step-in-aid.)
- (1911) 10 Ind Cas 182 (183) : 14 Oudh Cas 124, *Juggi Lal v. Ganga Prasad*. (Ordinary applications supplementary to an application for execution are not in themselves applications to take steps-in-aid.)
4. (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 148 (149) : 137 Ind Cas 768 : 7 Luck 590 (F B), *Ram Bharose v. Ramman Lal*.
5. (1889) 17 Cal 53 (57).
6. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 79 (81) : 70 Ind Cas 324 : 45 Mad 466.
7. (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 440 (444) : 112 Ind Cas 86.
8. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 220 (221) : 52 Ind Cas 765, *Balasubramania v. Chit Company Yela Nidhi Ltd.*
- (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 703 (704) : 67 Ind Cas 989, *Balagurusami v. Gurusami*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 1178 (1182) : 98 Ind Cas 156 : 50 Mad 49, *Krishna Pattar v. Sitarama Pattar*.
9. (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 191 (192) : 174 Ind Cas 243, *Tanba Yadrao v. Chandrasankar*.
- (1938) A I R 1938 All 210 (211) : I L R 1938 All 342 : 175 Ind Cas 196 : *Latafat Ali Khan v. Kalyan Mal*.
- (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 654 (655) : 39 Ind Cas 101, *Mt. Phul Koeri v. Bajorang Ram*.

Where the execution of the decree is itself barred by limitation, there can be no step-in-aid of execution. As stated by their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court, "a step-in-aid of execution can only be taken in the course of an execution proceeding which is pending or *capable of being kept alive*, and there can be no step-in-aid of execution where the execution itself is already barred."¹⁰

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 100-101

101. Application for step-in-aid must be one in accordance with law and to the proper Court. — The phrase "in accordance with law" is adjectival, not only to the words "to the proper Court for execution," but also to the words "to take some step in aid of execution" In *Bhagwan Jethram v. Dhondi*,¹ the High Court of Bombay observed: "We think that ordinary syntax would treat the phrase as adjectival to both and that the reason of the law would acquiesce in this view of the meaning." See also the undermentioned cases² to the same effect. As to the meaning of the words "in accordance with law," see Note 52, *ante*.

The application for step-in-aid must also, in order to save time, be made to the *proper Court*.³ Where a decree-holder remitted by postal money order to the Superintendent of Jail, subsistence allowances necessary for the detention of the judgment-debtor in jail, it was held by a single Judge of the High Court of Madras that the remittances must not only be considered to be applications, but also that they were made to the *proper Court* within the meaning of

(1934) A I R 1934 Mad 302 (304) . 57 Mad 808 . 150 Ind Cas 113, *Carichan v. Khunhamu*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 247 (248) . 45 Mad 202 . 70 Ind Cas 333, *Sankara Nannar Pillai v. Puthia Veetil Thangamma*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Lah 7 (9) . 111 Ind Cas 259, *Ghanayalal v. Punjab National Bank Ltd*

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 326 (327) . 178 Ind Cas 202, *Uttarchand Kapur & Sons v. Sayed Hameed*, (17 Cal 53 held no longer good law)

¹ *Iathon*.

A I R

10. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 719 (725) . 134 Ind Cas 922 . 59 Cal 700 (F B), *Amar Krishna v. Jagat Bhandu*.

Note 101

1. (1898) 22 Bom 83 (85)

2. (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 9 (13) . 69 Ind Cas 600 . 26 Oudh Cas 71, *Sheo Ram*

(1933) A I R 1933 Sind 341 (343) . 27 Sind L R 14 . 147 Ind Cas 470, *Devraj v. Fatehchand*

3. (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 257 (257, 258) . 35 Ind Cas 237, *Penugonda Rattam v. Korasika Thata*.

(1891) 6 Bom 31 (32), *Manohar v. Gebiapa*

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 451 (452) . 177 Ind Cas 483, *Firm Abdur Rahim-Mohammad Gultar v. Firm Fate Mohammad Dan Mohammad*.

(1913) 20 Ind Cas 252 (252) . 37 Bom 559, *Murgesappa Madhwallappa v. Basawantrao Khalilappa*

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 101-102

this Article.⁴ An application to the Court of a Native State to transmit the decree of *that Court* to a British Indian Court for execution has been held to be an application to the proper Court to take some step-in-aid of execution of such decree within the meaning of this Article.⁵ According to the High Court of Bombay, an application to a Court of a Native State between whom and the British Government there exists an agreement to execute each other's decrees, to return the decree (of a British Indian Court) which had been sent to it back to the British Indian Court, is one made to the proper Court within the meaning of this Article.⁶ See also Notes 87 to 98.

102. Step must be one to be taken by the Court.—The words "application to take a step in aid" refer to the steps to be taken by the *Court* on the application of the party. The acts of a party himself will not therefore constitute a *step-in-aid of execution* within the meaning of this Article.¹ Thus, the act of a party in getting the necessary encumbrance certificate, or copies of other documents,² or the filing of certain papers in Court to be kept in the record,³ or the act of accompanying the process peon of the Court in order to identify the judgment-debtor,⁴ are not steps-in-aid of execution within the meaning of this Article. Where the decree-holder asked for time to enable him to take out substituted service of the notice ordered to be taken to the judgment-debtor, it was held by the High Court of Madras that the act for which the time was asked for, namely the making of the application to take out substituted service, was one to be done by the party and not by the Court and

(1933) A I R 1933 All 756 (756) : 145 Ind Cas 915, *Narayana Dass v. M. Taratati*.

[See also (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 286 (286) : 11 Pat 513 : 189 Ind Cas 843, *Seshaiyer Rajamanner Aiyer v. Madan Mohan Palnank*.

(1927) A I R 1927 Cal 952 (953) : 55 Cal 608 : 104 Ind Cas 663, *Jugal Kishori Deb v. Baidya Nath Roy*.]

4. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 83 (84, 85) : 56 Mad 320 : 140 Ind Cas 499, *Raja Rajeswara Sethupathi v. Kuppusami Pillai*.

5. (1923) A I R 1923 Mad 72 (73, 76) : 69 Ind Cas 932 : 45 Mad 1014, *Srinivasa Aiyengar v. Narayana Rao*.

6. (1929) A I R 1929 Bom 418 (420) : 53 Bom 844 : 123 Ind Cas 507, *Fatechand Rampratap v. Jitmal Rupchand*.

Note 102

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 675 (676) : 145 Ind Cas 933, *Ramaswamy Chetty v.*

'rao,
of postage)

2. (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 426 (427) : 9 Luck 283 : 147 Ind Cas 706, *Suraya Begam v. Trilok Nath*.

(1886) 12 Cal 441 (441), *Rajkumar Banerjee v. Rajlakhi Dasi*. (Applying for copy of decree.)

3. (1928) A I R 1928 Lah 443 (443) : 110 Ind Cas 691, *Das Ram v. Mahab Chhabbar Singh*.

4. (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 180 (181) : 27 Ind Cas 225, *Jugal Kishore v. Chintamoney*.

that consequently it was not a step-in-aid of execution⁵ It was not considered whether the grant of time which was prayed for was itself a step-in-aid of execution or not. In the undermentioned case⁶ it was held by a single Judge of the Allahabad High Court that a step-in-aid of execution must be an act to be done by the decree-holder *in Court*, and that a certification of a payment made by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder *out of Court* was not a step-in-aid of execution. The reasoning that it is not a step-in-aid of execution *by reason of the fact* that the payment was made *out of Court* does not seem to be correct.

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Notes 102-103

103. There should be an application. — In order to give a fresh starting point under clause 5, it is not only necessary that the step-in-aid of execution asked for must be a step to be taken by the Court, but also that there should be an *application* to the Court for that purpose.¹ It is really the vigilance of the party in making the

5. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 675 (676) : 145 Ind Cas 933, *Ramaswami Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty*.

6 (1933) A I R 1933 All 49 (49) : 143 Ind Cas 324, *Jas Karam v Nana Shahi*.

Note 103

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 83 (84, 85) : 140 Ind Cas 498 : 56 Mad 320, *Rajeswara Sethupathi v. Kuppuswami Pillai*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Lah 233 (235) : 78 Ind Cas 241, *Firm Sherumal-Chinamai v. Fim Hira Lal-Anant Ram*

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 81 (81, 82) : 131 Ind Cas 100 : 12 Lah 153 (F B), *Ghanaya Lal v. Nathu Ram*.

(1918) 18 Ind Cas 236 (237) (Lah), *Wali Ram v. Bhagwan Das*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 906 (907) : 82 Ind Cas 497, *Arunachalam Chettiar v. Lakshmanan Chettiar*.

(1894) 20 Bom 179 (180), *Dwarhanath Appaji v. Anand Row Ram Chandra*.

(1910) 7 Ind Cas 759 (760) (All), *Bhavani Prasad v. Iftikhar Hussain*.

(1908) 30 All 179 (181) : 1908 All W N 74 : 5 All L Jour 258, *Sheo Prasad v. Indar Bahadur Singh*.

(1901) 25 Bom 639 (644) : 3 Bom L R 275 (F B), *Maluckchand v. Bechar*.

(1903) 13 Mad L Jour 33 (38) (N R C)

(1900) 22 All 358 (360) : 1900 All W N 106, *Thakur Ram v. Katwaru Ram*.

(1901) 1901 All W N 42 (42), *Nath Mal v. Zahur Muhammad*.

(1897) 22 Bom 722 (726), *Trimbak v. Kashinath*

(1900) 1900 All W N 88 (89), *Har Sahas v. Sham Lal*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 674 (674) : 147 Ind Cas 596, *Chathu Kutty v. Raman*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 597 (598) : 144 Ind Cas 66, *Ramanathan Chettiar v. Estate Collector of Snaganga*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Cal 113 (113) : 54 Ind Cas 613, *Amritlal Mookerjee v. Hiralal Mookerjee*.

(1889) 16 Cal 747 (748), *Umesh Chunder Dutta v. Soonder Narain Deo*

(1927) A I R 1927 Pat 113 (113) : 99 Ind Cas 669 : 6 Pat 280, *Baldeo v. Lachman*.

(1883) 9 Cal 730 (732) : 5 Shome L R 21 : 18 Cal L R 91, *Toree Mahomed v. Mahomed Mahood Bur*.

(1912) 13 Ind Cas 189 (189) (Cal), *Madan Mohan Dey v. Ganga Chandra Roy*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 231 (232) : 73 Ind Cas 211, *Mahomed Alam v. Bachchu*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 103

application that gives him the benefit of a fresh starting point.^{1a} But an application made for a purpose for which no such application is necessary under the law, cannot furnish a fresh starting point.^{1b} Thus, an application asking the Court to confirm an execution sale under Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not furnish a fresh starting point of limitation.² Similarly, where an application is made for a particular relief and has been ordered, a repetition of the application subsequently, which is unnecessary, will not give a fresh starting point.³ So also an application for the amendment of an execution application which is already in proper form cannot be said to be a step-in-aid of execution.⁴

There is no form prescribed for an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.⁵ The question whether a particular act or

(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 879 (880) : 94 Ind Cas 44, *Jadu Nath Singha v. Krishna Rangam Dassya*, (Issue of notice under O. 21 R. 66, Civil Pro. Code, to the judgment-debtor in order that he might be present to assist the Court in drawing up the sale proclamation, not on the motion of the decree-holder, but of its own accord is not a step-in-aid of execution. Nor does the swearing in of an affidavit by the decree-holder's identifier to the effect that the notice had been served, unaccompanied by any application, oral or written, give a fresh start to limitation.)

[See also (1909) 3 Ind Cas 336 (337) (Cal), *Raj Behari v. Kali Har Gupta*.]

1a. See also (1866) 5 Suth W R Misc 43 (43), *Hemraj Chowdhry v. Asoodun*. (The act which the law requires one man to do to save his limitation as to his decree of one date and character, cannot be considered the same act which another is required to do to save his limitation in respect to that other man's decree of a totally different date and character.)

1b. (1904) 31 Cal 1011 (1013) : 9 Cal W N 193, *Umesh Chandra Dass v. Shub Narain Mondul*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Mad 620 (622) : 41 Mad 251 : 41 Ind Cas 701, *Maslamani Mudahar v. Sethuswami Aiyar*.

(1886) 12 Cal 441 (444), *Rajkumar Banerji v. Rajlal, Dabi*. (Order of Court which requires no application does not give starting point.)

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 30 (31) : 70 Ind Cas 80, *Krishna Aiyer v. Mayankutti*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Rang 406 (407) : 172 Ind Cas 775, *Ko Po Shev v. M. J. Keekeebhai & Co*.

[But see (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 134 (134, 135) : 100 Ind Cas 303 : 2 Luck 419, *Ramlal v. Udit Narain Singh*.

(1901) 29 Cal 580 (583), *Jagannath Khan v. Brojonath Pal*.]

2. (1901) 31 Cal 1011 (1013) : 9 Cal W N 193, *Umesh Chandra Dass v. Shub Narain Mondul*.

(1870) 13 Suth W R 315 (315), *Mullick Enaet Ali v. Wahed Ali*.

(1881) 10 Cal L R 330 (330), *Motendro Chandra Ghose v. Mohendro Nath Ghose*.

(1868) 9 Suth W R 100 (101), *Juggut Mohinee Bibee v. Ramchand Ghose*.

(1867) 8 Suth W R 359 (360), *Maharaja of Burdwan v. Luckee Monnee Debee*.

(1869) 11 Suth W R 117 (117) : 2 Beng L R A C 235, *Shib Ram Dev v. Banee Madhub Mitter*.

3. (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 86 (87) : 58 Ind Cas 536, *Rangachariar v. Subramaniam Chetty*. (A I R 1918 Mad 620, Referred to.)

4. (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 804 (305) : 124 Ind Cas 830, *Hatimullah v. Sukhamoy Chaudhury*.

5. (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 309 (311) : 11 Pat 785 : 142 Ind Cas 155, *Sital Prasad Shukul v. Babu Lal Shukul*.

proceeding amounts to an application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.⁶ The Article must be construed so as to prevent, as far as possible, the defeat of *bona fide* endeavours of the decree-holder to secure the fruits of the decree.⁷ The word "application" has therefore been liberally construed as including any document containing a request.⁸ It is not necessary that the application should be in writing unless required by the Code.⁹ It may be *oral*.¹⁰ Where the facts and circumstances raise the pre-

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Note 103

6. (1925) A I R 1925 All 391 (395) : 83 Ind Cas 271 : 47 All 667, *Raghunath Prasad Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Singh*.
7. (1882) 5 Mad 141 (142, 143), *Kunhi v. Seshagari*.
8. (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 9 (13) : 69 Ind Cas 660 : 26 Oudh Cas 71, *Sheo Ram v. Ram Bharosey*. (In so far as these decisions suggest that an application means a document, they cannot however be accepted as correct.)
- (1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 468 (470, 471) : 128 Ind Cas 728, *Hasan Shah v. Mohammad Amir Mirza*. (Do)
9. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 30 (31) : 70 Ind Cas 80, *Krishna Aiyar v. Veetsi Mayyankuti*.
- (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 266 (272) : 151 Ind Cas 767, *Gopal Shankar v. Raising Premji*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 375 (376) : 22 Oudh Cas 75 : 52 Ind Cas 116, *Gulsari Lal v. Ram Dhajan*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 384 (384) : 23 Ind Cas 533 : 38 Mad 695, *Abdul Kadir Bowther v. Krishna Malamal Nair Karnatan*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 Rang 152 (153) : 7 Rang 132 : 117 Ind Cas 578, *Somasundaram Chettyar v. Ma Shwe Thit*.
- (1907) 22 Bom 722 (725, 726), *Trimbak v. Kashinath*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 620 (621) : 41 Mad 251 : 41 Ind Cas 701, *Masilamani Mudalsar v. Sethuswami Aiyar*.
- 10 (1927) A I R 1927 Oudh 134 (134) : 2 Luck 419 : 100 Ind Cas 308, *Ram Lal v. Udit Narain Singh*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Nag 11 (11) : 67 Ind Cas 899, *Narayan Rao v. Balakrishna*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 443 (443) : 89 Ind Cas 238, *Mulchand Manaji v. Jamanbhai Abdul Kabir*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 384 (385) : 38 Mad 695 : 23 Ind Cas 533, *Abdul Kadir Bowther v. Krishna Malamal Nair Karnatan*.
- (1880) 3 All 139 (140) : 5 Ind Jur 430, *Amar Singh v. Tala*.
- (1882) 1882 All W N 169 (169), *Khanan Singh v. Daya Ram*.

s 114, *Hanu*.

- (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 698 (699) : 38 Ind Cas 540, *Surajmal v. Saryoog Prasad Singh*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 453 (454) : 88 Ind Cas 232, *Perth Nath v. Ram Saran*.
11. (1925) A I R 1925 Bom 443 (443) : 89 Ind Cas 228, *Mulchand Manaji v. Jamanbhai Abdul Kabir*.
12. (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 186 (186) : 76 Ind Cas 769, *Lakshmi Narasa Raju v. Ganganna*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 148 (150) : 137 Ind Cas 768 : 7 Luck 590 (F B), *Ram Bharose v. Ramman Lal*.
- [See also (1918) 18 Ind Cas 236 (236, 237) (Lah), *Wali Ram v. Bhagvan Das*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 103-104

order made is of such a nature that, without an application the Court would not have made it, an application would be presumed to have been made.¹³

The application for step-in-aid need not be *bona fide*.¹⁴

104. Plaint, if can be treated as an application.—There is a conflict of opinion as to whether a suit filed for a declaration that certain property is liable to be proceeded against in execution of the decree, can be considered to be an application within the meaning of this Article. Under the Code of 1859 such a suit was held to save time as being "some proceeding" to keep the decree in force.¹⁵ In *Raghunandun Pershad v. Bhugoo Lall*,¹ it was held by the Calcutta High Court that the Limitation Act draws a clear distinction between suits and applications and that a plaint in a suit such as that above-mentioned could not be said to be an application within the meaning of this Article. In *Kuppuswami v. Rajagopala*,² it was held by the High Court of Madras that a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to set aside an alienation by the judgment-debtor as being fraudulent, could not be treated as an application to take a step-in-aid of execution of the decree which would give a fresh starting point of limitation for a subsequent application for execution against the moveable property of the judgment-debtor. According to the Chief Courts of Oudh³ and the Punjab,^{3a} a suit for a declaration

(1927) A I R 1927 Pat 323 (324) : 103 Ind Cas 37, *Kara Fan v. Ram Nath Singh*]

13. (1913) 19 Ind Cas 394 (395) (Bom), *Chinnappa Karbasappa v. Ladasahab Babasahab*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Cal 302 (302) : 109 Ind Cas 588, *Mohan Lal v. Kasimuddin*.

(1919) A I R 1919 Low Bur 117 (118) : 52 Ind Cas 656; 10 Low Bur Rul 34, *Adimuthu Pillai v. Adiappa*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Nag 94 (95, 96), *Laxmi Narayan v. Bhicraj*.

14. (1868) 4 Mad H C R 75 (76), *Konda Raju Venkata Subbaya v. Ramakrishnamma*.

(1934) A I R 1934 P C 14 (16) : 55 All 993 (1000, 1001) 61 Ind App 63 : 147 Ind Cas 323 (P C), *Khalil-ur Rahman v. Collector of Etah*.

[See also (1929) A I R 1929 All 625 (630) : 118 Ind Cas 17 : 52 All 11, (F B), *Kayastha Co. Ltd v. Sita Ram Dubey*.]

Note 104

1a(1867) 6 Suth W R 99 (99), *Akbur Gasee v. Bibee Nufesun*.

1. (1889) 17 Cal 268 (271, 272).

2. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 79 (81) : 45 Mad 466 : 70 Ind Cas 324.

3. (1923) A I R 1923 Oudh 9 (14) : 69 Ind Cas 660 : 26 Oudh Cas 71, *Sheo Ram v. Ram Bharsey*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Oudh 463 (470) : 123 Ind Cas 725, *Hasan Shah v. Mohammad Amir Mirza*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 246 (249, 250) : 160 Ind Cas 465 : 11 Luck 716, *Rudra Narain v. Maharaja of Kapurthala*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 430 (432) : 155 Ind Cas 605 : 11 Luck 266, *Khushi Ram v. Ram Somer*. (Suit in Court different from executing Court—No fresh starting point.)

3a(1875) 1875 Pun Re No. 5, *Delhi and London Bank v. Captain A. H. Floueden*.

that certain properties are liable to be proceeded in execution of the decree, can be treated as an application to take a step-in-aid of execution provided it is filed in the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree. The decisions proceed on the view that clause 5 does not use the word "application" in any restricted sense or in antithesis to a "plaint" or any other document such as a memorandum of appeal, but merely in the sense of a document containing a request. The High Courts of Nagpur and Allahabad have held that such a suit cannot be treated as an application.⁴ It is submitted that the view of the Chief Courts of Oudh and Punjab stated above is not correct. Section 2 sub-section 10 *ante* provides that a "suit" does not include an appeal or an application. The First Schedule of the Act deals separately with "suits," "appeals" and "applications." To construe the word "application" in clause 5 as including a "suit" would seem to be an obvious disregard of the intention of the Legislature.

105. Appeal, whether can be treated as an application.— There is also a difference of opinion on the question whether an appeal by the decree-holder against an order affecting the execution of his decree can be considered to be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution. It has been held in the undermentioned cases¹ that on appeal by the decree-holder to the Appellate Court cannot be held to be an application to the *proper Court* to take a step-in-aid of the execution of the decree. (See also Note 93, *ante*.) A contrary view, namely that an appeal by the decree-holder would be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution of the decree, has been taken in the undermentioned cases.² It is submitted that this view cannot be supported on principle. The decisions have not considered the aspect that obviously the Appellate Court is a Court different from the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree and is therefore not a proper Court. The question whether an appeal is an application really does not arise at all under this clause.

106. Application for review of order in execution.— An application for review of an order "striking off" an execution case and for its restoration to the file, has been held to be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of this clause.¹

4. (1938) A I R 1938 Nag 534 (536, 537), *Rajaram v. Patku*.
(1887) 1887 All W N 193 (198), *Madho Rao v. Rajkari Kuar*.

Note 105

1. (1904) 26 All 608 (610) 1904 All W N 139 1 All L Jour 336, *Nand Kishore v. Sipahi Singh*
(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 431 (431) 73 Ind Cas 1030 47 Bom 783, *Govinddas Rajaram v. Ganpat Das Narottam*
(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 419 (419) 74 Ind Cas 379, *Rajani Dandhu v. Kali Prasanna*.
- 2 (1901) 4 Oudh Cas 333 (339), *Ujagar Lal v. Shankardayal*.
(1921) A I R 1921 All 174 (175) 64 Ind Cas 598, *Baldeo Singh v. Ramsarup*
(1914) A I R 1914 Bom 247 (247) 39 Bom 20 26 Ind Cas 262, *Laxmiram Lalubhai v. Bhalshankar Venuram*.

Note 106

1. (1900) 27 Cal 265 (288), *Kartick Nath Pandey v. Juggernath Ram Marwari*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 106a-109

106a. Re-submission of a returned application. — Where an application for execution is returned for amendment and is subsequently re-submitted after compliance with the order of the Court, the act of re-submission cannot be considered to be an application for a step-in-aid within the meaning of this Article.¹

107. The step asked for, whether should be in aid of a British Indian Court.—It has been held by a Full Bench of the High Court of Madras that the step asked to be taken by the Court must be a step-in-aid of the execution by a British Indian Court, and that consequently an application to a British Indian Court asking it to send the papers to the Court of Native State for execution there is not a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of clause 5 so as to give a fresh starting point for a subsequent application in the British Indian Court.¹ A Bench of the Punjab Chief Court has also held that the words "step in aid of execution" refer to steps in aid of the execution of the decree which may be taken under the Code of Civil Procedure or any other provision of law in force in British India regulating the execution of decrees, and that an application to a British Indian Court to transfer the decree to a foreign Court for execution there according to the laws of the foreign State, is not an application for a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of this Article.² The High Court of Bombay has, on the other hand, taken a contrary view, namely, that such an application would be a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of this Article. According to that High Court, the word "execution" is a word of general meaning and is not confined to execution authorized only by the Civil Procedure Code; it would include execution which under agreement between the foreign States and the British Government, a foreign Court is entitled to levy.³

108. The step must be with reference to the decree sought to be executed. — The step which is requested to be taken must be in furtherance of the decree sought to be executed and not to other matters. Thus, where costs are incurred in the course of execution proceedings and applications are made for the recovery of such costs, they cannot be considered to be applications to take steps-in-aid of the execution of the decree itself.¹

109. Application for execution, not in accordance with law, may still be regarded as application for step-in-aid. — An application merely to execute the decree cannot be considered to be

Note 106a

1. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 1131 (1134) (Mad), *Raja Rathna Karundan v. Dorasami*.

Note 107

1. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 580 (584); 40 Mad 1069; 42 Ind Cas 234 (F D).
Pierce Leslie & Co. Ltd. v. Perumal
2. (1881) 1881 Pun Re No. 107, *Saadat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Ali Khan*.
3. (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 236 (237); 42 Bom 420; 46 Ind Cas 56, *Jenardas Govind v. Narayan Krishnaji*.

Note 108

1. (1901) 21 Mad 672 (674), *Appu Rao v. Ramakrishna Chettiar*.

an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.¹ But, where an application for execution contains prayers for the execution of the decree and also for certain matters which would be steps-in-aid of the execution, the application, though it may fail to be in accordance with law as an application for execution, may still be regarded as an application in accordance with law to take a step-in-aid of execution of the decree.² In *Sadaya Chandra v. Pares Nath*,³ an application which was defective in material particulars as an application for execution contained prayers that the applicant, a legal representative of the decree-holder, might be permitted to proceed with the execution. It was held by the High Court of Calcutta that the application, though not in accordance with law as an application for execution, was yet an application in accordance with law to take a step-in-aid of execution.

110. Application for step-in-aid does not lie where execution is barred.—An application for a step-in-aid of execution can only be taken where either an execution application is pending or the decree is capable of being kept alive. Where the execution of the decree is barred by limitation and the decree thus ceases to be capable of being kept alive, there cannot be any step-in-aid of execution subsequently which would enable the decree to be executed.¹

111. Application for order absolute or for final order.—Before the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, proceedings to obtain an order absolute for sale or foreclosure were regarded as proceedings in execution. An application for an order absolute for sale under Section 87 of the Transfer of Property Act or for foreclosure under Section 89 of the said Act was held to be one to take a step-in-aid of execution.¹

(1926) A I R 1926 All 440 (444) 48 All 377 94 Ind Cas 961, *Nandlal Saran v. Dharam Kirti Saran*

Note 109

1. (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 440 (442) 112 Ind Cas 36, *Abdul Karim Sahib v. Lakshmanaswami*.
2. (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 44 (45) 64 Ind Cas 571, *Sadaya Chandra Jana v. Pares Nath Ghose*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Bom 52 (52, 53) 98 Ind Cas 911, *Birdichand v. Badesaheb*.
- (1930) A I R 1930 Bom 65 (66) 122 Ind Cas 656, *Gopalrao v. Hari* (Application for execution without inventory of property may be regarded as step-in-aid of execution.)
- (1905) 28 Mad 557 (559), *Pachappa Isari v. Poojab Seeran*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 286 (288) 11 Pat 513 : 139 Ind Cas 813, *Sheshayyer v. Madanmohan*
3. (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 44 (45) 64 Ind Cas 571

Note 110

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 719 (725) 50 Cal 760 134 Ind Cas 912 (F B), *Amar Krishna Chaudhury v. Jagat Bandhu Biswas*

Note 111

- 1 (1892) 1892 All W N 5 (5), *Ram Krupal v. Sheo Sahas*
- (1920) A I R 1920 Mad 256 (258) 56 Ind Cas 563, *Ganpathia Pillai v. Gopala Iyer*

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 111-113

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an application for a final decree for sale or for foreclosure is an application in the suit and not for the execution or to take a step-in-aid of the execution of any decree.² So also an application for a final decree in a *partition* suit is not one to take a step-in-aid of execution.³

Suppose now that in a case where a final decree has *already* been passed the decree-holder, under a mistaken view, applies for final decree. Can such an application be treated as one to take a step-in-aid of the execution of the decree? It has been held by the High Court of Lahore that it cannot be so treated, the reason being that the decree-holder contemplated by such application merely a step to further his *suit* and not the *execution* of any decree.⁴ The High Court of Madras has, on the other hand, held that the decree-holder must be regarded, by such application, to have endeavoured to get an order which he thought was necessary before executing the decree, that the ultimate object of the application was to hasten the actual realisation of the decree amount, and that, as such, the application was a step-in-aid of execution.⁵ According to the High Court of Bombay, there is no rigid rule to be laid down in such cases and that such applications may, in some cases, be regarded as being steps-in-aid of execution, although in other cases they may not be so regarded.⁶

112. Application to appoint a receiver.—An application by the decree-holder for the *appointment* of a receiver is an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.¹ An application by the decree-holder praying that the receiver who has been appointed in execution proceedings should pay money to him, is also one to take a step-in-aid of execution.²

113. Application for succession certificate.—An application to obtain a succession certificate is not one to execute a decree. It is also not an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.¹ The

2. (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 33 (39) : 106 Ind Cas 395, *Kunhammad Haji v. Kothurammal*.

3. (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 260 (261) : 45 Bom 952 : 61 Ind Cas 159, *Dayabhai Chunilal v. Bas Ujam*.

4. (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 117 (118, 119) : I L R (1937) Lah 671 : 175 Ind Cas 816, *Jodh Singh v. Firm Bhagwan Das*.

5. (1928) A I R 1928 Mad 33 (39) : 106 Ind Cas 395, *Kunhammed Haji v. Kothurammal*.

6. (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 71 (72) : 79 Ind Cas 407, *Dindhu Gorind v. Hanmat Gorind*.

[See also (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 95 (95) : 46 Bom 761 : 67 Ind Cas 153, *Hirachand Khemchand v. Aba Lala Patil*.]

Note 112

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 57 (58) : 113 Ind Cas 909, *Ghannaya Lal & Co. v. Jassa Ram Hiranand*.

(1900) 5 Ind Cas 758 (759) (Mad), *Sambasuta Mudali v. Krishnan*.

2. (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 56 (56) : 42 Ind Cas 802, *Raghunandan Singh v. Jugul Kishore Trigunait*.

Note 113

1. (1913) 20 Ind Cas 252 (252) : 37 Bom 359, *Murgeppa Madivalappa v. Basavantrao Khalappa*.

reason is that it is perfectly independent of, and has nothing to do with the execution of a decree, although the ultimate object of it may be to use the certificate in furtherance of execution. It is impossible to say that the application to get the certificate is an application to the proper Court to take some step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of clause 5, Article 182. The words "proper Court" in the Article also tend to support this conclusion. An application to obtain a succession certificate may be made in one of several Courts. Obviously, it could not be such an application as clause 5 Article 182 contemplates.²

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 118-115

114. Application for confirmation of sale.—It has been seen in Note 103 *ante*, that an application for a purpose for which no application is necessary under the law cannot furnish a starting point of limitation. A Court is bound to confirm a sale under Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where no application has been made under Rules 89, 90, 91 of the same Order. An application made in such a case praying that the Court might confirm the sale will not be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution of the decree within the meaning of clause 5.¹ Nor will the order of the Court confirming the sale without any application save time.²

115. Application for postponement of execution proceedings.—There is a difference of opinion on the question whether an application for the postponement of execution proceedings is an application for a step-in-aid of execution. The general trend of opinion in the High Court of Madras is that such an application is not one to take a step-in-aid of execution. Thus, an application for time to enable the decree-holder to file the necessary encumbrance

[See also (1868) 4 Mad H C R 148 (149), *Virabhadra Rau v. Ramaiya*
(1868) 4 Mad H C R 89 (90), *Lakshammamma v. Venkataraj Gava-chariar*.]

2. (1913) 20 Ind Cas 252 (253) - 37 Bom 559, *Murgeppa Madiwallappa v. Basawantrao Khalilappa*.

Note 114

1. (1904) 31 Cal 1011 (1013) - 9 Cal W N 193, *Umesh Chandra v. Shub Narain*.
(1910) 6 Ind Cas 264 (264) (Cal), *Panchanan Chowdhry v. Nrisingha Prasad Roy*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Pat 22 (22, 23) - 2 Pat 249 : 72 Ind Cas 938, *Triloke Nath Jha v. Bansman Jha*.

2.

(1869) 11 Suth W R 117 (117) - 2 Beng L R A C 235, *Shub Ram Dey v. Banee Madhub Mitter*.

(1870) 13 Suth W R 88 (39) 4 Beng L R A C 115, *Maharajadhiraj Mahatab Chund Bahadur v. Ram Brahma Mullick*.

[See also (1806) 10 Suth W R 224 (224) 12 Bom L R 506 (Note), *Gunga Bishen Chund v. Maharajadhiraj Mahatab Chand Bahadur*.]

[But see (1872) 13 Suth W R 156 (157), *Gobind Chunder Chowdhury v. Juhoorul Nissa Bibee*.]

**Article 152
(Clause 8)
Note 115**

certificate,¹ or to apply for substituted service,² is not a step-in-aid of execution. In *Balasubramania Pillai v. T. A. B. Chit Company*,³ where an application which was defective had been returned for correction and the decree-holder applied for extension of time to carry out the correction, it was held that the application was not one to take a step-in-aid of execution, inasmuch as there was no previous application for *execution pending* when the application for time was made. As to the correctness of this reasoning, see Note 100 *ante*. In *Sankaran Nair v. Puthiya Veetil Thangamma*,⁴ where a mortgagor applied for extension of time to pay money due under a decree for redemption which also provided for sale on default, it was held that the application was one to take a step-in-aid of execution of that portion of the decree which related to redemption.

According to the High Court of Bombay, an application for time to do something which would assist the decree-holder in furthering the execution of the decree would be one to take a step-in-aid of execution, but an application which is intended as a step, which, if successful, would avoid the necessity of execution is not one to take a step-in-aid of execution.⁵ Thus, an application made by both the parties to the Court to postpone the application for execution with a view to a compromise being arrived at, would not be one to take a step-in-aid of execution.⁶ But an application for time to produce an extract from the Collector's Record to be filed in the pending execution proceedings,⁷ or to ascertain the share of the judgment-debtor in the property to be put up for sale,^{7a} or an application for time to produce copies of the decree and judgment to be filed in the execution proceedings,⁸ would be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.

Note 115

- NOTE 110
1. (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 143 (141) : 106 Ind Cas 618, *Ramaswami v. Veeranna*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 1197 (1196) : 93 Ind Cas 163, *Katifi Muhammad Hamiduddin v. Muhammad Ghose*.
(1931)
 - (1911) A I R 1911 Mad 555 (554) : 33 Ind Cas 19, *Fandala Muthial Naidu*. (A I R 1914 Mad 381, Followed. This case has been dissented from in A I R 1929 Mad 143.)
 2. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 675 (676, 677) : 145 Ind Cas 933, *Ramaswamy Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty*.
 3. (1919) A I R 1919 Mad 220 (222) : 52 Ind Cas 765.
 4. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 217 (217) : 70 Ind Cas 333 : 45 Mad 202.
 5. (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 461 (462) : 73 Ind Cas 1011, *Vishnu Nagappa v. Narasinha Pandurang*.
 6. (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 461 (462) : 73 Ind Cas 1011, *Vishnu Nagappa v. Narasinha Pandurang*.
 7. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 969 (969) : 37 Bom 317, *Sheshdasacharya v. Dhima-charya*.
 - 7a (1921) A I R 1921 Bom 33 (33) : 60 Ind Cas 916, *Vishwanath v. Narsu*.
 8. (1912) 17 Ind Cas 30 (30) : 36 Bom 634, *Haridas v. Vethaldas*.

It has been held by the High Court of Calcutta that an application for time to produce evidence to prove service of notice,⁹ or a joint application by the parties reporting part satisfaction of the decree and asking for time to pay the balance of the decree amount,¹⁰ or a joint compromise reporting satisfaction of part of the decree and praying for time to have the rest of the decree executed at a future time,¹¹ is an application to take a step-in-aid of execution. The High Court of Allahabad has also taken a similar view. Thus, it has been held that an application for time for ascertaining the correct address of the judgment-debtor,¹² or for postponement of sale in execution,¹³ is one for a step-in-aid of execution. See also the undermentioned cases.¹⁴

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Notes 115-116

116. Application for issue of notice under Order 21 Rule 22, Civil Procedure Code.—Clause 6 of the Article, as it stood before the amendment of the Act in 1927, provided that a fresh starting point would accrue from the date of issuing a notice under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the Article as it stands at present, the mere issue of a notice by the Court under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not stated as a starting point of limitation. An application for the mere issue of a notice to the judgment-debtor is not contemplated by the Code and, consequently, will not be an application in accordance with law to

9. (1909) 5 Ind Cas 147 (148) (Cal), *Narsingh Dayalsingh v. Kali Chaman Singh*.
 10. (1893) 20 Cal 696 (698, 699), *Wasi Imam v. Poonit Singh*.
 11. (1910) 6 Ind Cas 365 (367) (Cal), *Bindeswari Koer v. Anand Dehari*.
 12. (1916) 4 I R 1916 All 33 (34) 33 All 690 35 Ind Cas 698, *Dhawan Prasad v. Amna Begam*.
 - (1919) 4 I R 1919 All 447 (447, 448) . 50 Ind Cas 278, *Sheo Shankar Lal v. Radhe Shyam*.
 - (1907) 29 All 801 (302) 4 All L Jour 181 1907 All W N 74, *Pitam Singh v. Tota Singh*.
 13. (1881) 4 All 60 (63) . 1881 All W N 113, *Sula Din v. Sheo Prasad*.
 14. (1929) 4 I R 1929 Lah 335 (336) 119 Ind Cas 228, *Ram Chand v. Dayal Singh Chanda Singh* (An application for extension of time in complying with the orders of the Court thereafter is a step-in-aid.)
 - (1900) 27 Cal 285 (288), *Karticknath Pandey v. Juggernath Ram Marwari*. (An application for time to pay a decree amount is not a step in aid of execution.)
 - (1908) 35 Cal 1060 (1063) 8 Cal L Jour 193, *Umed Ali v. Abdul Karim*. (An application for time is not a step-in-aid of execution and does not prevent subsequent applications from being barred.)
 - (1923) 4 I R 1923 Cal 572 (574) 76 Ind Cas 455, *Rajendra Lal Sha v. Abdul Karim Abu Ahmed Ghusnari Choudhary*. (Although an appli-
- so or not is not a step-in aid of execution)
- (1930) 4 I R 1930 Mad 995 (996) 54 Mad 306 129 Ind Cas 718, *Demasikam Annamalai Denkar v. Raju Pillai*. (Where decree is passed in favour of plaintiff for recovery of property subject to payment by him of certain amount for improvement to defendant, application by plaintiff for extension of time to enable him to raise money is not step-in aid.)

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 116-116a

take a step-in-aid of execution.¹ Where, however, there is an *application for execution* containing also a prayer for the issue of a notice under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the application, in so far as the prayer for notice is concerned, will be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of clause 5 of this Article.²

There is a difference of opinion on the question whether the filing of an *affidavit of proof of service* of the notice issued under Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code can give a fresh starting point under clause 5. According to the undermentioned cases³ of the Calcutta High Court, the filing of such an affidavit must be regarded as an application to take a step-in-aid of execution. The High Court of Patna has, in one case,⁴ followed the above view of the Calcutta High Court, but in a later case⁵ has held that the question whether the filing of such affidavit would save time must depend upon the question whether an application should be presumed to have been made in the particular circumstances of the case, and that where such presumption cannot, under the circumstances, be made, the filing of the affidavit will not save time. The same view has been taken in the undermentioned case⁶ of the Calcutta High Court. According to the High Court of Bombay,⁷ an affidavit cannot, under any circumstances, be regarded as an application and cannot save time under clause 5.

116a, Application for proclamation of sale under Order 21 Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code. — An application for the issue of a proclamation of sale in respect of property already attached in

Note 116

1. (1939) A I R 1939 Mad 195 (195) : 180 Ind Cas 674, *Nagaratnam Pillai v. Ramaswami Iyer*.
- (1894) 9 C P L R 154 (16), *Rai Bahadur Mukund Balkrishna Dutt v. Lakhy Mahar*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Cal 3 (4) : 63 Ind Cas 116, *Hazari Lal v. Baidyanath Saha*.
[See however (1878) 1 All 675 (680), *Behari Lal v. Saluk Ram*.
(Application for mere notice without application for execution in accordance with law is a proceeding to keep the decree in force under the Act of 1871)]
- [But see (1905) 1905 Pun Re No. 22 : 1905 Pun L R No. 57 : 1905 Pun W R No. 33, *Muhammad Nawas Khan v. Ram Das*]
2. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 553 (555) : 178 Ind Cas 525, *Subramanyam Tirumuruguppu v. Naraina Tirumuruguppu*.
- (1905) 28 Mad 557 (559, 560), *Pachaippa Achari v. Poojali Seenan*.
3. (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 227 (228) : 38 Ind Cas 536, *Pran Krishna Das v. Partab Chandra Dalal*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 302 (303) : 109 Ind Cas 683, *Mohan Lal v. Kasimuddin Sheikh*.
4. (1919) A I R 1919 Pat 424 (425) : 49 Ind Cas 892 : 4 Pat L Jour 521, *Thakur Singh v. Shea Dhanjan Singh*.
5. (1928) A I R 1928 Pat 145 (146) : 6 Pat 691 : 108 Ind Cas 430, *Fateh Bahadur Singh v. Parmeshwar Prasad Sahu*.
6. (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 22 (24) : 54 Ind Cas 1, *Krishna Prasad Maatra v. Dharendra Nath Chakravarty*.
7. (1909) 3 Ind Cas 771 (772) (Bom), *Mohan Laldas v. Bapuji Ghelabhai*.

execution of a decree is one to take a step-in-aid of execution.¹ So also is an application for the issue of a notice to the judgment-debtor under Order 21 Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code,² or to have a date fixed for the settlement of the terms of the proclamation.^{2a} But the mere swearing of an affidavit proving the service of such notice unaccompanied by any application is not to take a step-in-aid of execution.³

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 116a-117

117. Resistance by decree-holder to objections raised by judgment-debtor to execution proceedings.—As has been seen in Note 103 *ante*, there can be no fresh starting point available under clause 5 unless an *application* has been made to the Court for execution or step-in-aid of execution. It follows that a mere opposition to an application by the judgment-debtor which has the effect of obstructing the execution proceedings cannot give a fresh starting point of limitation.¹ But, where an *application* is made or may be presumed to have been made by the decree-holder asking the Court to do something which, if done by the Court, would have the effect of removing the obstacle to the execution placed by the judgment-debtor, the decree-holder will get a fresh starting point of limitation. Thus, where a judgment-debtor applies to the Court for recording

Note 116a

1. (1884) 10 Cal 651 (856) (F B), *Ambica Pershad Singh v. Surdhari Lal*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 375 (376) : 22 Oudh Cas 75 : 52 Ind Cas 116,
Guljhar Lal v. Ram Bhajan.
(1911) 9 Ind Cas 634 (634) (All), *Raj Kishore Upadhyaya v. Gurcharan Lal*.
2. (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 180 (181) : 68 Ind Cas 337, *Goud Chundra Ray v. Janardan Prasad Thakur*.
- 2a (1917) A I R 1917 Pat 698 (699) : 33 Ind Cas 510, *Suraj Mal v. Sarjoog Prasad Singh*.
3. (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 879 (880) : 94 Ind Cas 44, *Jadunath Singha v. Krishna Banowti Dassya*.

Note 117

1. (1929) A I R 1929 Lab 529 (529) : 115 Ind Cas 24, *Madho Parshad v. Ghanaya Lal*,
"at Krishna Nandi,
application under
Court) is not step-
(1926) A I R 1926 Mad 1178 (1182) : 98 Ind Cas 156 : 50 Mad 49, *Krishna Pattar v. Seetharama Pattar*. (Statement by decree-holder objecting to judgment-debtor's application to record satisfaction is not a step-in-aid.)
(1926) 60 Mad L Jour 55 (55) (N R C).
(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 79 (81) : 45 Mad 466 : 70 Ind Cas 324, *Kuppuswami Chettiar v. Rajagopala Iyer*.
(1905) 28 All 387 (390) : 1906 All W N 54 : 3 All L Jour 143, *Langtu Pande v. Baiyath Saran Pande*.
[See also (1895) 7 All 898 (899) : 1885 All W N 287, *Shib Lal v. Radha Kishen*. (A decree-holder should make a direct and

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 117

satisfaction of the decree and the decree-holder contests such application and attends Court with his witnesses or files a list of his witnesses, an application by him requesting the Court to examine those witnesses would be presumed to have been made and the implied application would be considered to be one to take a step-in-aid of execution.² An application by the decree-holder to send for certain records,³ or to summon witnesses,⁴ or to receive *batta* for summoning witnesses,⁵ for the purpose of resisting the judgment-debtor's application objecting to the execution of the decree, would be one to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of this clause. It has been held in the undermentioned cases⁶ that an application by the decree-holder asking the Court to reject the objections of the judgment-debtor to the execution is a step-in-aid of execution.

Where the judgment-debtor prefers an appeal against an order passed against him in an execution proceeding, the fact that the decree-holder resists the appeal will not give him a fresh starting point under this clause.⁷

2. (1930) A I R 1930 Cal 304 (305) : 124 Ind Cas 830, *Hatimullah v. Sulhamoy Chaudhury*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 976 (977) : 44 Ind Cas 601, *Brojendra Kishore Roy v. Din Muhammad Sarkar*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Pat 612 (614) : 7 Pat 708 : 118 Ind Cas 582, *Jagdeo Narain Singh v. Bhubaneswari Kuer*.

3. (1925) A I R 1925 All 394 (395) : 47 All 667 : 88 Ind Cas 271, *Raghunath Prasad v. Lachmi Narain*.

4. (1927) A I R 1927 Lah 653 (654) : 103 Ind Cas 712, *Umar Din v. Ghulam Muhammad*.

(1923) A I R 1923 All 415 (416) : 79 Ind Cas 411, *Abdul Quddus v. Sayad Ahmad Husain*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 432 (432) : 64 Ind Cas 524, *Mahomed Siddiq Khan v. Masri Lal*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 292 (293) (All), *Shugan Chand v. Ramjas*.

(1883) 5 All 344 (345) : 1633 All W N 57 : 8 Ind Jur 53, *Alli Muhammad Khan v. Gur Prasad*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 635 (636) : 40 Ind Cas 1005, *Kedar Nath v. Lalhi Kanta*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Pat 459 (459, 460) : 4 Pat 202 : 88 Ind Cas 807, *Sheo Sahay v. Jamuna Prasad Singh*.

5. (1934) A I R 1934 Mad 710 (710) : 58 Mad 801 : 154 Ind Cas 593, *Veerappa Setty v. Munsami Achary*. (Reversing A I R 1933 Mad 403 (405).)

6. (1918) A I R 1918 All 92 (92) : 40 All 668 : 49 Ind Cas 38, *Tamin-un-nissa Bibi v. Najju*.

(1883) 5 All 576 (577) : 1883 All W N 112, *Kewal Ram v. Khadim Husain*.

(1921) A I R 1921 All 119 (120) : 63 Ind Cas 907, *Ishri Rai v. Raghupat Narain Rai*.

(1910) 5 Ind Cas 292 (293) (All), *Shugan Chand v. Ramjas*.

(1894) 21 Cal 23 (26), *Gobind Pershad v. Runglal*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Pat 612 (613) : 7 Pat 708 : 118 Ind Cas 582, *Jagdeo Narain Singh v. Bhubaneswari Kuer*. (Application for step-in-aid need not necessarily be made in the course of execution proceedings.)

7. *See* *supra* *note* 2. It may be taken in any pro-

supra *note* 2.

Hari Charan Ray.

(1880) 5 Cal 595 (597), *Krista Kumar Nay v. Mahabat Khan*.

118. Payment of process fee, if step-in-aid. — Under the Act of 1859, an application for execution and an order to deposit *talbana* followed by the deposit of *talbana* and service of notice were held sufficient to keep the decree alive ¹

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 118**

The mere payment of process fee on an application for execution unaccompanied by any application asking the Court to take some specific action is not a step-in-aid of execution ². But, where a *batta* memorandum is not a mere memorandum of the deposit of the *batta*, but asks for a certain process to be issued, or there are sufficient indications in the process application that the applicant in effect asked for some process to be issued, it is an application to take a step-in-aid of execution ³. It has been held by the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur that an application for issue of process to a *witness*

Note 118

1. (1866) 6 BnH W R M-c 74 (74), *Treelochun Chatterjee v. Radha Monee Dossee*.
2. (1908) 30 All 179 (180) 1908 All W N 74 5 All L Jour 253, *Sheo Prasad v. Indar Bahadur Singh*.
(1901) 25 Bom 639 (643) 3 Bom L R 275 (F B), *Malulchand v. Dechar Natha* (From a mere payment to the Nazir no application can be inferred.)
(1926) A I R 1926 Oudh 289 (290) 1 Luck 153 · 93 Ind Cas 631, *People's Industrial Bank, Ltd. Allahabad v. Mahesh Charan Sinha*.
(1912) 13 Ind Cas 189 (190) (Cal), *Madan Mohun Dey v. Ganga Chandra Roy*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Oudh 64 (65) · 20 Oudh Cas 332 : 43 Ind Cas 342, *Manna Lal v. Sardar Singh*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 906 (907) : 82 Ind Cas 497, *Arunachalam Chettiar v. Lalshamanan Chettiar*.
(1897) 22 Bom 722 (726), *Trimbal v. Kashmath*. (Mere payment of *batta* under circumstances from which no application can be inferred is not step-in aid.)
(1900) 10 Mad L Jour 329 (Jour).
- 3 (1905) 28 Mad 399 (399, 400), *Vajayaghatalu Naidu v. Srinmasulu Naidu*.
(1910) 7 Ind Cas 859 (860) (Mad), *Subramania Pillai v. Sanlara Subbu Naidu*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 30 (30) · 70 Ind Cas 60, *Krishna Aiyar v. Mayan Kutti*. (An application to the Court to receive railway charges for taking the judgment-debtor to the civil prison and subsistence money for his maintenance while in prison is a step-in-aid of execution.)

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 118-119**

in an execution proceeding is only an application for a step of an incidental nature and would not constitute an application for a step-in-aid of execution.^{3a}

To render the batta memo an application which would give a fresh starting point of limitation, it is however essential that the application in which it is filed should itself be one in accordance with law.⁴

118a. Payment of allowance for the subsistence of the judgment-debtor. — An application to the Court to receive the subsistence allowance and the railway fare for sending the judgment-debtor to the civil jail is one to take a step-in-aid of execution.¹ In *Ramudu v. Varadaraja*,² it was held that the mere payment of subsistence allowance cannot operate

*Kuppuswamy*³

of the subsistence allowance by money-order to the jail authorities was an application to the proper Court to take some step-in-aid of execution.

119. Application by decree-holder for copies. — A copy of decree can be applied for a variety of purposes and not necessarily for execution. Therefore, an application by the decree-holder for a copy of decree cannot be necessarily one to take a step-in-aid of execution.¹ An application by the decree-holder for the return of the

(1921) 100 I.L.R. 1311, Ramudu v. Varadaraja

Varadaraja Mudaliar v. the sale warrant is a

Natu Dutt. Where payment of postage has been made and the filing of notice of sale imported a request to the Court to proceed in the matter and was equivalent to an application to take some step-in-aid.)

[See (1883) 7 Mad 307 (309), *Vellaya v. Jaganatha*. (If, when postage is paid for the transmission of the records to a Court and his decree transferred for to take some step-in-aid of to give a new period of

limitation.)]

3a (1926) A I R 1926 Nag 250 (251) : 91 Ind Cas 1010, *Shrinivas v. Jagannatha*.

4. (1934) A I R 1934 M: *Bheema Rao*. holder and per dance with law within the meaning of Article 104, a application can hardly furnish a starting point of limitation)

Note 118a

1. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 30 (30, 31) : 70 Ind Cas 60, *Krishna Aiyar v. Vettal Mayankutti*.

2. (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 532 (532) : 62 Ind Cas 460.

3. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 83 (84, 85) : 140 Ind Cas 498 : 56 Mad 320.

Note 119

1. (1933) A I R 1933 All 756 (756) : 145 Ind Cas 915, *Narayan Das v. M. Taravati*.

(1920) A I R 1920 Mad 224 (224) : 60 Ind Cas 117, *Puthia Fetal Mohidin v. Raman Nayar*.

copy of the decree filed in previous execution proceedings (even for the purpose of filing subsequent execution application) does not imply any step-in-aid of execution of the decree.² An application by the decree-holder for a copy of the list of properties attached in previous execution proceedings is not one to take a step-in-aid of execution.³

120. Application for execution of attached decree.—*A* obtains a decree *X* against *B*, and in execution thereof attaches a decree *Y* which *B* has obtained against *C*. Under the provisions of Order 21 Rule 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure, *A* would be entitled to execute decree *Y*. *B* also would, notwithstanding the attachment, be entitled to execute the same decree.^{1a} *A*'s application to execute the decree *Y* would be one to take a step-in-aid of execution of decree *X*.¹ If *B* applies to execute his decree *Y*, his application will keep alive his decree under the first portion of clause 5.² *A*'s application to attach decree *Y* will however not be a step-in-aid of the execution of the attached decree *Y*.³

121. Application for transfer or re-transfer of decree, if a step-in-aid.—An application to have a decree transferred to another Court for execution, though not an application for execution (see Note 10 *ante*), will be an application to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of clause 5.¹ An application, however, for transfer of a decree to a Court which has no jurisdiction to execute it is not

(1886) 12 Cal 441 (444), *Rafkumar Banerji v. Rajlakh Dabi*.

(1888) 11 Mad 336 (339), *Copilandhu v. Domburu*. (Step means necessary steps.)

2. (1896) 6 Mad L Jour 23 (24), *Mahalinga Chelttar v. Narayana Padayachi*.

(1893) 23 Bom 311 (312), *Rajaram v. Banaji Mavral*.

(1885) 11 Cal 227 (229), *Gunga Pershad Bhoomick v. Debi Sundar Dabee*.

(1895) 22 Cal 827 (829), *Aghore Kali Debi v. Prosunna Coomar Banerjee*.

3. (1898) 21 Mad 400 (401) 8 Mad L Jour 53, *Rangachariar v. Balaramasami Cheltti*.

Note 120

1a(1897) 24 Cal 778 (783) . 1 Cal W N 676, *Adhar Chandra Das v. Lal Mohun Das*.

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 705 (706) : 132 Ind Cas 667, *Bishan Sahai v. Amir Singh*.

(1914) A I R 1914 All 296 (298) . 25 Ind Cas 738, *Maharaja of Jaipur v. Lalji Sahas*.

(1910) 8 Ind Cas 675 (676) (Cal), *Gaya Loan Office Co. Ltd. v. Dhirst Kundal Lal*.

(1885) 7 All 382 (383, 384) . 1885 All W N 64 : 9 Ind Jur 363, *Lachman v. Thonda Ram*.

2. (1903) 13 Mad L Jour 265 (265, 266), *Patamma v. Idnu Dears*.

3. (1934) A I R 1934 Cal 234 (235) : 149 Ind Cas 999 : 60 Cal 1357, *Anil Kumar Ghosh v. Hemanta Kumar Ghose*.

Note 121

939] All 97 : 180 Ind Cas 403, *Sita*

nd Cas 225, *Sheikh Hafeezuddin v.*

(1936) A I R 1936 All 369 (369, 370) : 163 Ind Cas 231, *Manza Ram v. Badri Prasad*.

(1926) A I R 1926 All 600 (600) : 95 Ind Cas 26, *Saklu Chaudhari v. Harbansdeo Rai*.

**Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 121**

one in accordance with law even as a step-in-aid of execution.² As to whether an application for the transfer of a decree, against the judgment-debtor who is dead, is one in accordance with law as a step-in-aid of execution, see Note 85 *ante*. See also the undermentioned cases.^{2a}

(1916) A I R 1916 All 293 (291) : 33 Ind Cas 523, *Mt. Larets v. Hazari Lal*.
(1916) A I R 1916 All 24 (25) : 32 Ind Cas 1005, *Sant Lal v. Sri Newas Das*
(1913) 19 Ind Cas 664 (665) : 35 All 389, *Todarmal v. Phoola Kuar*.

(1879) 2 All 284 (284), *Collins v. Maula Bakhsh*.

(1877) 1 All 525 (526), *Hussain Duksh v. A. D. Madge*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Bom 365 (368) : 170 Ind Cas 877 : I L R (1937) Bom 691,
In re Janki Prasad Foddar.

(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 640 (640) : 158 Ind Cas 590, *Ahad Bux Jamadar v. Kinkar Chandra Pal*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Cal 312 (318) : 58 Cal 832 : 132 Ind Cas 149, *Sreenath Chakravarti v. Priyanath Bandopadhyaya*.

(1904) 8 Cal W N 575 (577), *Bhabani Churn Dutt v. Partap Chandra Ghosh*.

(1897) 2 Cal W N 415 (416), *Roma Nath Sen v. Gouri Sanhar Khatri*.
unno Ghose.

nan Pundeh

(1931) A I R 1931 Lah 736 (738) : 13 Lah 327 : 184 Ind Cas 1026, *Bombay Company Ltd. Karachi v. Kahan Singh*.

1902.

Seeni

678, *Shanta Dutt Ram v.*

Lal Basant Singh v. Lal

has Husam v. Shaksaman

(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 313 (314) : 162 Ind Cas 984, *Bhagwat Sahay v. Ram Sukrit Ram*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Pat 301 (302) : 1 Pat 328 : 65 Ind Cas 332, *Ramchandra Marwari v. Krishna Lal Marwari*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Rang 477 (480) : 1937 R L R 287 : 173 Ind Cas 160,

27 Sind L R 109, *Achraj*

Ind Cas 399, *Bhagwat*

(1935) A I R 1935 Cal 640 (640) : 158 Ind Cas 590, *Ahad Bux v. Kinkar Chandra*.

[But see (1934) A I R 1934 Pat 663 (663) : 152 Ind Cas 987, *Gopal Tewari v. Ramdhari Pandey*.]

2 (1939) A I R 1939 All 57 (59) : 180 Ind Cas 403 : I L R (1939) All 97, *Sita Ram Rai v. Madho Prasad*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Pat 309, (311) : 11 Pat 785 : 142 Ind Cas 155, *Sital*

: A I R

See also Note 84 *ante*.

Cas 403 : I L R (1939) All 97, *Sita*

Pat 651 : 67 Ind Cas 538, *Amrit Lal*

As to whether an application for the transfer of a decree to a foreign Court is a step-in-aid of execution, see Note 107 *ante*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Notes 121-122

An application to the transferee Court to send a certificate of the result of the execution and to return the decree to the Court which passed the decree for further execution, is a step-in-aid of execution.³

Where a decree is transferred to another Court for execution, an application to the Court which passed the decree to recall it for execution to the parent Court itself, is a step-in-aid.⁴

122. Application by decree-holder for leave to bid, if step-in-aid.—There is a diversity of opinion among the High Courts on the question whether an application by the decree-holder for leave to bid at the execution sale is one to take a step-in-aid of execution. The Allahabad¹ and Bombay² High Courts and the Chief Court of Oudh³ hold that it is. In *Dalel Singh v. Umrao Singh*,⁴ their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court observed as follows :

"The fact that a decree-holder is prepared to bid for property and is anxious to purchase is, in the absence of a fraud which cannot be presumed, distinctly an act which modifies the conditions of the sale to the obvious benefit both of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, and brings the decree within nearer distance of complete execution and satisfaction."

The High Court of Calcutta has expressed conflicting views on the point. According to the cases cited below,⁵ an application of this

- 3. (1883) 6 Mad 81 (82), *Krishnayyar v. Venkayyar*.

(1898) 2 Cal W N 271 (271) (Notes), *Chandranath v. Dhudhar*.

[See however (1906) 3 Cal L Jour 94 (94) (S N), *Sayaram Chatterji v. Haridas Chatterji*. (An application made to the Court which originally passed the decree, for an order that execution costs might be received and for recalling the decree from the Court to which it was sent for execution, is not to be considered as a step-in-aid of execution)]

4. (1939) A I R 1939 Pat 144 (146) : 17 Pat 617 (621) : 180 Ind Cas 311, *Dwarkanadas Gobindram v. Saligram Rekhraj*.

(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 493 (494) : 113 Ind Cas 829, *Mahadum Beg Sahib v. Md. Meera Sahib*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Lah 465 (474) : 157 Ind Cas 488 (F B), *Kanti Narain v. Madan Gopal*. (Decree transferred to another Court for execution—Application to Court which passed decree to transfer it for execution to same Court before proceedings in that Court have been reported and certified by that Court is a valid application and is step-in-aid.)

[But see (1922) A I R 1922 Bom 359 (360) : 68 Ind Cas 506 : 47 Bom 56, *Rangaswami Shetty v. Sheshappa*. (Decree transferred to another Court—Application for further transfer made to transferor Court is not step-in-aid as it ceases to be proper Court.)]

NOTE 122

1. (1900) 22 All 399 (400) : 1900 All W N 129, *Dalel Singh v. Umrao Singh*.
(1891) 18 All 211 (213) : 1891 All W N 230, *Bans v. Sikree Mal*.

2. (1895) 21 Bom 331 (333), *Vinayakran Gopal v. Vinayak Krishna*.

3. (1905) 8 Oudh Cas 161 (166), *Nawab Safia Begam v. Nawab Raisunnissa*.

4. (1900) 22 All 399 (400) : 1900 All W N 129.

5. (1896) 23 Cal 690 (692), *Raghunundun Misser v. Kalyadut Misser*.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 122

kind is not an application seeking the aid of the Court in execution of a decree, and though it may be in no sense a step-in-aid of execution of the decree, it is not a step by the Court, and before a judgment-creditor can get any benefit, he must show that he asks the Court to take some step-in-aid of execution. A somewhat different view has been taken in other cases. In *Troyloky Nath v. Jyoti Prakash*,⁶ Bannerjee, J., observed as follows :

"An application to the Court by the decree-holder to give him leave to bid is to my mind an application to the Court to take some step, that is, to do something which would aid execution, that is, make it effective by securing a higher price for the property to be sold."

In *Hira Lal Bose v. Dwija Charan Bose*,⁷ Rampini, J., held that such an application would not be a step-in-aid of execution, but Mookerjee, J., observed as follows :

"I do not think it can be rightly affirmed as an inflexible rule of law that the granting of leave to a decree-holder to bid at the sale must in every case, or may not in any case, amount to an aiding of the execution. In determining whether a particular step which the Court is invited to take is or is not a step-in-aid of execution, regard must be had not merely to the nature of the step to be taken, but also to the surrounding circumstances."

The said view of Mr. Justice Mookerjee has been adopted by a Full Bench of the High Court of Lahore.^{7a}

There is no reported decision of the Madras High Court directly on the point, but in *Vappu Rowther v. Sivakataksham Pillai*,⁸ the observations of Mr. Justice Venkatasubba Rao, though *obiter*, tend to support the view that an application for leave to bid is a step-in-aid of execution.

An application for leave to bid at the auction sale coupled with a request to set off the purchase money against the decretal amount has been held to be one to take a step-in-aid of execution on the ground that the request to the Court to set off the purchase money against the decretal amount is one in furtherance of the execution.⁹

(1917) A I R 1917 Cal 422 [424] : 37 Ind Cas 733, *Jogendra Prasad Mitra v. Asutosh Goswami*.

6. (1903) 30 Cal 761 (769, 770, 771) : 8 Cal W N 251.

7. (1905) 3 Cal L J 240 [246, 249] : 10 Cal W N 209.

7a (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 81 [83] : 131 Ind Cas 100 : 12 Lah 153 (F B). *Ghanaya Lal v. Nathu Ram*. (1884 Pan. Re. No. 88 and 14 Ind Cas 468, Referred to.)

[See however (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 57 (58) : 113 Ind Cas 909, *Ghanayya Lal & Co. v. Jassa Ram Hira Nand*. (Quare—Whether an application by a decree-holder for leave to bid is an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.)]

8. (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 588 (589) : 53 Mad 390 : 123 Ind Cas 677.

9 (1930) A I R 1930 Mad 588 (589) : 53 Mad 390 : 123 Ind Cas 677, *Vappu Rowther v. Sivakataksham Pillai*.

(1929) 57 Mad L J 2 [2] (N R C).

(1908) 12 Cal W N 621 [623], *Nabadip Chandra Maiti v. Depin Chandra Pal*.

123. Application for delivery of possession by decree-holder auction-purchaser. — The decisions of the High Courts are not uniform on the question whether, where the decree-holder himself purchases the property in execution and applies for delivery of possession of the property to him, the application is a step-in-aid of execution. According to the High Courts of Madras,¹ Bombay,² Calcutta³ and the Punjab Chief Court,^{3a} such an application is one to take a step-in-aid of execution. They proceed on the view that until possession is secured to the decree-holder, the execution is not complete and the decree cannot be said to be satisfied. The Judicial Commissioner's Court of Nagpur⁴ is also inclined to the same view. On the other hand, the High Courts of Patna⁵ and Allahabad⁶ have held that such an application is not one to take a step-in-aid of execution. The reasoning on which this view is based is that execution comes to an end with the sale of the property and that the question whether or not the auction-purchaser obtains possession of the property sold is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the decree and does not in any way affect it.

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 123

(1905) 8 Oudh Cas 161 (166), *Nawab Safia Begam v. Nawab Rasmunissa*.
[But see (1895) 23 Cal 196 (199), *Ananda Mohan Roy v. Hara Sundaree*.]

Note 123

1. (1929) 122 Ind Cas 526 (526) : 57 Mad L Jour 468 (469), *Appathurai Iyer v. Panayappan*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 298 (290, 291) : 99 Ind Cas 677 : 50 Mad 403, *Mathankandi Kannan v. Arulla Raju*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 745 (746) : 145 Ind Cas 397, *Apparao Nainar v. Lakshmana Reddi*.
- (1901) 24 Mad 185 (188), *Lakshmana Chettiar v. Kannammal*.
- 2 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 987 (989) : 35 Bom 452, *Sadashiv Mahadu v. Narayan Vithal*.
- 3 (1900) 27 Cal 709 (712, 713) 4 Cal W N 681, *Sariatoola Molla v. Raj Kumar Roy*.
- (1909) 1 Ind Cas 430 (431) (Cal), *Pran Krishna Dhar v. Juramon Chowli-dar*.
- (1909) 9 Cal L Jour 67 (67) (S N).
- (1920) A I R 1920 Cal 230 (231) : 54 Ind Cas 639, *Annada Prasanna Sen v. Somoruuddi Mirdha*. (Per Newbould, J.)

3a (1904) 1904 Pun Re No. 18, *Mt. Lal Deb v. Karim Bakhsh*.

4. See (1933) A I R 1933 Nag 369 (370) : 147 Ind Cas 582, *Nathu Harishanker v. S. Fatma*.
5. (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 310 (311) : 1 Pat 701 : 68 Ind Cas 638, *Kamal Nain Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur Kesho Prasad Singh*.
- (1923) A I R 1923 Pat 22 (25) : 2 Pat 249 : 72 Ind Cas 933, *Trilok Nath Jha v. Bansman Jha*.
[See (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 266 (267) : 11 Pat 513 : 139 Ind Cas 843, *Seshasayer Rajamanner v. Madanmohan Pattnaik*.]
6. (1928) A I R 1928 All 368 (370) : 50 All 670 : 115 Ind Cas 869, *Mohsin Raza Khan v. Haider Bakhsh*.
- (1909) 1 Ind Cas 416 (419, 420) : 31 All 82 (F B), *Bhagwati v. Banwari Lal*.
[But see (1897) 19 All 477 (478) : 1897 All W N 117, *Moti Lal v. Makund Singh*. (Overruled by 1 Ind Cas 416 (F B).]

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 124

124. Certification under Order 21 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.—Before the decision of the Privy Council in *Raja Sri Prakash Singh v. The Allahabad Bank*,¹ there was a difference of opinion on the question whether a certification under Order 21 Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, by the decree-holder, of a payment made to him out of Court was firstly an "application" and secondly a step-in-aid of execution. It was held in some cases that the act of certification was itself an application to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of this Article.² It was held in other cases that an application made by the decree-holder to record a certification was an application to take a step-in-aid of execution.³ In the undermentioned case⁴ an oral application was presumed to have been made from the act of certification and it was held that it was one to take a step-in-aid of execution. In the cases cited below,⁵

(1919) A I R 1919 All 890 (390) : 41 All 479 : 50 Ind Cas 143, *Babu Ram v. Pearey Lal*.]

Note 124

1. (1929) A I R 1929 P O 19 (23) : 114 Ind Cas 581 : 8 Luck 684 : 56 Ind App 30 (P O).

2. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 1023 (1024) : 33 All 529, *Lecky v. Bank of Upper India, Ltd.*

(1906) 1906 Pun L R No. 84, *Berkat Ali v. Ganga Ram*.

3. (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 131 (132) : 82 Ind Cas 743, *Narayan Nair v. Kunhi Raman Nair*.

(1904) A I R 1904 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1903) 26 All 19 (20) : 1903 All W N 172, *Kasumri v. Beni Prasad*.

(1924) A I R 1924 Nag 185 (186) : 78 Ind Cas 291, *Mt. Perabai v. Bhavan Prasad*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Nag 166 (167) : 18 Nag L R 62 : 65 Ind Cas 681, *Lachman v. Gahreshwar*.

(1925) A I R 1925 Rang 26 (27) : 2 Rang 393 : 84 Ind Cas 369 and 473, *Maung Law Sen v. Maung Po Thin*.

(1886) 12 Cal 608 (609), *Tarna Das Bandopadhyaya v. Bishoo Lal Mukhopadhyaya*.

(1919) 30 Cal L Jour 15 (S N).

(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 356 (357) : 34 Ind Cas 625, *Gopal Prasad v. Rajendra Lal*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

(1900) 1900 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

[But see (1888) 1888 All W N 23 (24), *Kankia Lal v. Rudar Sahai*. (An untrue certificate by a decree-holder under Section 253 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a step-in-aid of execution.)

4. (1910) 1910 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

5. (1910) 1910 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

5. (1910) 1910 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

5. (1910) 1910 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

5. (1910) 1910 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

5. (1910) 1910 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

5. (1910) 1910 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

5. (1910) 1910 P O 12 172 (173) : 33 All 172 : 33 Ind Cas 172, *Hira*.

the view was taken that the act of certification was not an application at all. The decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Sri Prakash Singh's case* referred to above must now be taken to have set the conflict at rest. The question in that case was whether the mere certification by the decree-holder should be considered to be an application so as to be governed by the provisions of Article 181. After a review of the provisions of Order 21 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, their Lordships have held that a mere certification by the decree-holder of a payment made to him out of Court is not an "application" within the meaning of Article 181 and further, the fact that an application is actually filed for the recording of such certification did not really alter the nature of the procedure and convert what was really no more than a certificate into an "application" within the meaning of Article 181.

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Note 124

Their Lordships, however, did not in the case referred to above think it necessary to express any opinion as to whether a certification would amount to "an application to take a step in aid of execution of the decree" within the meaning of clause 5 of this Article. But it has been held in cases decided after the date of the said Privy Council decision that the same reasoning would apply in interpreting the word "application" occurring in this Article and that, therefore, a certification would not be an application at all.⁶ It has further been held that the act of certification is not a step-in-aid of execution as, firstly it is not a step to be taken by the Court, and secondly that such step does not in any view *further* the execution of the decree.⁷

But though a certification may not operate so as to give a fresh starting point under clause 5 of this Article, it may enable a fresh

- (1929) A I R 1929 All 629 (635) 51 All 237 112 Ind Cas 73 (F B) *Joti Prasad v. Srishchand.*
6. (1930) A I R 1930 All 461 (461) 127 Ind Cas 424, *Bansigopal v. Mewa Ram.*
(1933) A I R 1933 All 364 (365, 366) 55 All 393 146 Ind Cas 836, *Adya Prasad Singh v. Lal Girish Bahadur Pal.*
- (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 719 (724) 59 Cal 760 134 Ind Cas 922 (F B), *Amar Krishna Chaudhury v. Jagat Bandhu Biswas.*
- (1930) A I R 1930 Rang 64 (65) 126 Ind Cas 540, *Maung Tun Hlaing v. U Aung Gyaw.*
- (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 896 (388) 163 Ind Cas 915, *Maheshwar Charan v. Dineshwari Charan*
- (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 426 (427) 9 Luck 298 147 Ind Cas 766, *Suratya Begam v. Triloki Nath.* (There cannot be any "final order" in such cases.)
- (1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 148 (151) 137 Ind Cas 768 7 Luck 590 (F B), *Ram Bharose v. Ramman Lal*
7. (1931) A I R 1931 Cal 719 (725) 134 Ind Cas 922 59 Cal 760 (F B), *Amar Krishna Chowdhury v. Jagat Bandhu Biswas.*
(1933) A I R 1933 All 364 (365, 366) 55 All 393 146 Ind Cas 836, *Adya Prasad Singh v. Lal Girish Bahadur Pal.*
- (1935) A I R 1935 All 259 (261) 157 Ind Cas 1052, *Har Ram v. Human Lal.*
- (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 118 (119) 159 Ind Cas 544 59 Mad 424, *Union Board, Pentapadu v. Venkata Srinivasa Charyalu.*
- [But see (1933) A I R 1933 All 49 (50) 143 Ind Cas 324, *Jai Karan v. Panchaiti Akhara Chota Naya Udas Nana Shahi.* (Assumed for purposes of argument.)]

Article 152
(Clause 5)
Notes 124-125

period of limitation to be computed under the provisions of Section 20 *ante*. See Note 30 to Section 20 and the undermentioned cases.⁸

125. Application for payment out of monies lying in Court.—Where money is paid into Court in satisfaction of a decree or where money is lying in Court as a result of the realizations in execution of a decree and the decree-holder applies for the payment out to him of such monies in *pro tanto* satisfaction of the decree, the question arises whether the application for such payment out is one to take a step-in-aid of execution. The general trend of opinion of all the Courts except the High Courts of Calcutta and Lahore is that such an application is one to take a step-in-aid of execution within the meaning of this Article.¹ The reason for this view has been explained in some cases as being that the execution of a decree is not complete

- S. (1927) A I R 1937 All 527 (525) : 100 Ind Cas 574, *Jatrala Sahas v. Bhim Singh*.
 (1912) 15 Ind Cas 523 (524) : 15 Oudh Cas 284, *Ram Sarup v. Jagannath Prasad*.
 (1917) A I R 1917 Cal 422 (425) : 37 Ind Cas 783, *Joyendra Prasad Mitra v. Ashutosh Goswami*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Oudh 297 (297, 298) : 162 Ind Cas 717, *Maya Pralash v. Tulsi Ram*.
 (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 66 (66) : 65 Ind Cas 830, *Arunachalam Chettiar v. Panchali Padayachi*.
 (1935) 39 Cal W N 961 (966), *Shamsul Hug v. Abdul Rahman*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 All 211 (212) : 52 Ind Cas 362, *Qadam Singh v. Nathu Singh*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Nag 251 (252) : 165 Ind Cas 804 : ILR (1937) Nag 105, *Baynath v. Kanhasyolal*.
 (1915) A I R 1915 Sind 48 (49) : 30 Ind Cas 51 : 9 Sind L R 27, *Naraxmal v. Tirathmal*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Sind 365 (366) : 147 Ind Cas 30, *Kalandas Balchand v. Mahomed Khan*.

Note 125

1. (1955) A I R 1955 All 210 (212); I L R (1935) All 342: 175 Ind Cas 153, *Latafat Ali Khan v. Kalyan Mal*.
(1901) 1901 All W N 29 (29), *Kali Charan v. Hardeo Das*.
(1883) 6 All 366 (367) 1884 All W N 118, *Paran Singh v. Jawahar Singh*.
(1882) 1882 All W N 154 (154), *Kishori Lal v. Sham Karan*.
(1901) 24 Mad 188 (193, 194): 10 Mad L Jour 342, *Venkataramanamma v. Purushottam*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 229 (330): 45 Ind Cas 226, *Thangi Shettathi v. Dujis Shetti*.
(1898) 17 Mad 165 (166): 8 Mad L Jour 296, *Koormayya v. Krishnamma*.
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(1895) 22 Bom 340 (343), *Bapuchand v. Mugutras*.
(1894) 19 Bom 261 (267): 1894 Bom P J 64, *Kesharilal v. Petamberdas*.
(1923) A I R 1925 Bom 443 (443, 444): 89 Ind Cas 228, *Mulchand v. Jamanb*. (Application need not be in writing)
(1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 153 (154): 18 Oudh Cas 359: 28 Ind Cas 557, *Dharam Raj Kuwar v. Lachhman Bhuji*.
(1927) 11 C P L R 161 (163), *Lachman Jai v. Hara Darsi*.
(But see (1883) 5 All 239 (242, 238): 1883 All W N 33, *Radha Prasad Singh v. Bhagwan Rao*.
1911) 12 Ind Cas 734 (734) (All), *Behari Lal v. Raghunandan*.)

until the decree-holder actually withdraws the amount from Court in satisfaction of his decree.² In the undermentioned cases³ the reason for this view was stated to be that, in order to make the amount available to the decree-holder, an order of the Court was necessary after a consideration of various questions such as the sufficiency of the amount of decretal money deposited by the judgment-debtor, whether the deposit was made on any condition, whether there are any petitions for rateable distribution, etc.

The High Courts of Calcutta⁴ and Lahore⁵ have, on the other hand, held that, as a general rule, such an application is not one to take a step-in-aid of execution, where the judgment-debtor does not contest the withdrawal of the amount. The ground of this view is that as soon as the amount is realized in execution or received by the Court in satisfaction of the decree, the decree is to that extent satisfied and the execution complete,⁶ that the order for the payment of the amount is merely a ministerial act,⁷ and further that a person who takes steps to acquire the fruits of the execution of the decree

2. (1938) A I R 1938 All 210 (212). I L R (1938) All 342. 175 Ind Cas 186, *Latafat Ali Khan v. Kalyan Mal*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 153 (153): 18 Oudh Cas 359: 33 Ind Cas 557, *Dharam Raj Kuar v. Lachhman Bhuj*.
(1896) 22 Bom 340 (343), *Bapuchand Jotiram Gujar v. Mugul Rao*.
3. (1916) A I R 1916 Oudh 153 (153): 18 Oudh Cas 359: 33 Ind Cas 557, *Dharamraj Kuar v. Lachman Bhuj*.
(1919) A I R 1919 Mad 929 (930): 48 Ind Cas 226, *Thangi Shettishi v. Buja Shetti*.
4. (1834) 10 Cal 549 (550, 551), *Fazal Imam v. Metta Singh*.
(1885) 11 Cal 227 (229), *Gunga Pershad Bhoomick v. Debi Sundari Datta*.
(1891) 8 Cal 89 (91). 10 Cal L R 272, *Hem Chunder Chowdhry v. Brojo Soondary Dabee*.
(1875) 24 Suth W R 839 (340), *Woodo Tara Chowdhraan v. Abdul Jubbur Chowdhry*.
(1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 49 (49), *Kishen Mohun Jush v. Chunder Kant Chuckerbutty*.
(1906) 10 Cal W N 354 (358) (F B), *Apurba Krishna Roy v. Chundermoney Debi*.
[But see (1867) 6 Suth W R 274 (275), *Jogesh Prokash Gangooly v. Kales Koomar Roy*.]
5. (1912) 14 Ind Cas 335 (337) (Lah), *Ram Das v. Kanshe Ram*.
(1903) 1903 Pun Re No. 103 1903 Pun L R No. 207. 1903 Pun W R No. 142 (F B), *Kasu v. Atar Singh*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 138 (139) 175 Ind Cas 260, *Amolachand v. Hoshnar Singh*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 678 (679) I L R (1938) Lah 586 178 Ind Cas 995, *Hira Lal v. Mohna Singh*.
(1881) 1881 Pun Re No. 107, *Nawab Saadat Ali Khan v. Nawab Muham-mad Ali Khan*.
(1888) 1888 Pun Re No. 27, *Mulchand v. Kour Singh*.
6. (1908) 1908 Pun Re No. 103 1908 Pun L R No. 207. 1903 Pun W R No. 142 (F B), *Kasu v. Atar Singh*.
(1881) 1881 Pun Re No. 107, *Nawab Saadat Ali Khan v. Nawab Muham-mad Ali Khan*.
7. (1908) 1908 Pun Re No. 103 1908 Pun L R No. 207 1903 Pun W R No. 142 (F B), *Kasu v. Atar Singh*.
(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 138 (139) 175 Ind Cas 260, *Amolachand v. Hoshnar Singh*.

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Notes 128-126

cannot possibly be said to take a step-in-aid of the execution of the decree.^{7a} It was held in the undermentioned case⁸ that where the payment out to the decree-holder is contested by the judgment-debtor, then a judicial order would be necessary for paying the amount to the decree-holder and that, in such a case, the application by the decree-holder would be one to take a step-in-aid of execution.

In the cases cited below,⁹ the guardian of the judgment-debtor under a mortgage decree obtained the sanction of the Court to raise money by mortgaging the mortgaged property, and mortgaged the property to a third person who paid into Court a certain amount towards the decree. The decree-holder applied for payment out of this amount. It was held that the money was paid into Court *to the credit of the suit* and was not realised in execution of the decree and that the application for the payment of such money was not one in aid of the execution of the decree.

It is submitted that the true test seems to be to see whether in the particular case the decree-holder could, at the time of his application, *have executed his decree for such amount*. If he could not, then the application cannot be a step-in-aid of execution. If, on the other hand, he could execute the decree, then the application for payment out would be a step-in-aid of execution of the decree. In *Khajah Mahomed Hossein Khan v. Syud Looft Ali Khan*,¹⁰ a case under the Act of 1859, certain monies were deposited in satisfaction of the decree but, for a considerable time, the Court declined to pay the money out to the decree-holder. It was held that under such circumstances the decree-holder could have executed the decree for this amount and that the application for payment out was a proceeding to enforce the decree.

In view of the above discussion, it is submitted that the views of the Calcutta and Lahore High Courts appear to be sound on principle.

An application by the holder of a decree, A, for the rateable distribution of monies received in execution of another decree against the same judgment-debtor and for payment out of the amount distributable to him is a step-in-aid of execution of the decree of A.¹¹

126. Application for substitution of representatives. — The Code of Civil Procedure does not specifically provide for or contemplate an application being made merely to bring on record the legal

7a. (1908) 1908 Pun Re No. 103 : 1908 Pun L R No. 207 : 1908 Pun W R No. 142 (F B), *Kasu v. Atar Singh*. (12 All 899, Dissented from.)

[See also (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 138 (139) : 175 Ind Cas 260, *Amolakchand v. Hoshwar Singh*]

8. (1908) 1908 Pun Re No. 103 : 1908 Pun L R No. 207 : 1908 Pun W R No. 142 (F B), *Kasu v. Atar Singh*.

9. (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 703 (704) : 87 Ind Cas 989, *Balaguruswami Naicken v. Guruswami Naicken*.

[See also (1899) 22 Mad. 448 (452), *Appasami Naicken v. Jotha Naicken*.]

10. (1872) 18 Suth W R 463 (463).

11. (1903-04) 8 Cal W N 392 (385), *Basj Nath Prosad v. Ghanshyam Dass*.

representatives of the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor, as the case may be.

But such an application, if made, would be one in accordance with law inasmuch as it does not contravene the law, and would be one to take a step-in-aid of execution of the decree.¹

Where an application for execution contains also a prayer for the substitution of the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor, and the application is not one in accordance with law in so far as it is one for execution, it may nevertheless operate to save time as an application to take a step-in-aid of execution, having regard to the prayer for substitution.² See also Note 109, *ante*.

127. Application for substitution of name of transferee of decree, if step-in-aid. — See Note 78, *ante*.

126. Other illustrative instances of step-in-aid. — The following applications have been held to be to take steps-in-aid of execution —

1. Application for the substituted service of notice of execution.¹

Note 126

1. *Independent application to substitute legal representative of judgment-debtor:*

- (1927) A I R 1927 Nag 808 (309, 310); 24 Nag L R 36; 103 Ind Cas 279, *Ramchandra v. Uka*
 (1907) 30 Mad 511 (543); 17 Mad L Jour 485; 3 Mad L Tim 21, *Mahalinga Moopanar v. Kuppanchariar*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Oudh 77 (76); 79 Ind Cas 880, *Rudra Pratab Singh v. Sheo Prasad*.

Application for substitution of legal representative of judgment debtor pending execution application

- (1927) A I R 1927 All 698 (698, 699); 103 Ind Cas 244, *Manmohan Das v. Rashiduddin*.

Application for substitution of legal representatives of decree-holder

- (1906) 17 Mad L Jour 475 (475), *Shrinivasa Iyengar v. Dharni Mudaly*.
 (26 All 301, Followed.)
 (1894) 1894 Pun Re No. 27, *Kundanlal v. Mt. Makhani*
 (1906) 9 Oudh Cas 261 (282), *Makrand v. Ramcharan*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 267 (270). 85 Ind Cas 657, *Dhirendra Chandra Singh Bahadur v. Tulsi Charan Ghose*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 All 293 (303). 103 Ind Cas 412. 50 All 621, *Mohan Singh v. Jagat Singh*.

Dewan Chand.

berdas Tribuvandas,

2. (1932) A I R 1932 Mad 19 (20). 134 Ind Cas 59. 51 Mad 852, *Chinna Vel Naick v. Venkatarama Naick*.

(1906) A I R 1906 Cal 84 (193). 20 Cal 308. 24 Cal 308. *Dibi v. Bulaga*

ish v. Kumara
ing for the legal
on the record is

sufficient to give a fresh starting point for limitation even if it contains errors in the matter of relief)

Note 128

1. (1914) A I R 1914 All 392 (393); 36 All 439; 24 Ind Cas 200, *Amina Bidi v. Danarasi Prasad*.

Article 162
 (Clause 6)
 Notes 126-128

Article 182
(Clause 8)
Note 128

2. Application for summoning a necessary witness in execution proceedings,² or an application for the attachment of the judgment-debtor's property in execution,³ or an application for issue of any other process.⁴
3. Application to allow the sale of the property of the judgment-debtor subject to the mortgage of the third party-claimant.⁵
4. Application in a pending application for execution to supply certain defects in the latter in respect of the mode of execution.⁶
5. Application to stay the sale in execution but to continue the attachment.⁷
6. Memo praying the Court to hold a sale in connexion with a pending execution.⁸
7. Application for continuation of an execution sale in order to secure the proper attendance of bidders.⁹
8. Application for the correction of a decree by the addition of interest omitted to be mentioned in the decree.¹⁰
9. Application by holder of decree for redemption to send notice to judgment-debtor asking him to withdraw the money deposited by the former in Court.¹¹
10. Application for revival of previous execution proceedings.¹²

The following have been held not to constitute steps in aid of execution—

1. Application for stay of proceedings pending appeal.¹³

2. (1924) A I R 1924 Oudh 177 (178) : 74 Ind Cas 816, *Mathura Singh v. Kandhas Pathak*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 635 (636) : 40 Ind Cas 1005, *Kedar Nath Dey v. Lakhi Kanta Dey*.

See also Note 117 Foot-Note (4).

4. (1906) 3 All L Jour 815 (816, 818) : 1906 All W N 269, *Lachman Das v. Narain Das*.

5. (1888) 15 Cal 363 (365), *Lalraddi Mullick v. Kala Chand Bera*.

6. (1905) 1905 Pun L R No. 79 : 1905 Pun Re No. 27 : 1905 Pun W R No. 2, *Sardar Bishen Singh v. Ganga Ram*.

7. (1881) 2 Mad 218 (219), *Nukanna v. Ramasami*.

8. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 1140 (1141) : 38 Ind Cas 152, *Ghulam Karusha v. Bhuvvaraha Iyengar*.

9. (1915) A I R 1915 Mad 314 (315) : 25 Ind Cas 58, *Devidreddi Yellamandar v. Chinna Pitsah*.

10. (1929) A I R 1929 Lah 103 (104) : 114 Ind Cas 55, *Nanak Chand Rama Nand v. Jas Gopal Gokal Chand*.

11. (1911) 9 Ind Cas 337 (339) : 14 Oudh Cas 10, *Jageshar Singh v. Bhugwan Bakhs Singh*.

12. (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 703 (710) : 61 Ind Cas 727, *Chandra Kumar Dhar v. Ramdin Dhar*.

(1894) 1894 Pun Re No. 106, *Ghulam Jalani v. Yusuf Shah*.

13. (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 218 (223) : 76 Ind Cas 317, *Pandey Dagadu v. Samnadas Chelu Mal*.

2. Application for a reconstruction of a decree destroyed by fire.¹⁴
3. Mere filing of an affidavit by the decree-holder that there are no incumbrances on the property to be sold.¹⁵
4. Application for an ejectment of a tenant against whom a decree for arrears of rent had been passed.¹⁶
5. Application for the amendment of the order absolute for sale.¹⁷
6. Application to withdraw a pending execution petition with leave to institute another at some future time.¹⁸
7. Application by a decree-holder purchaser to receive from him the poundage fee in respect of the property purchased and an application to be allowed to set off the purchase money against the decree.¹⁹
8. Deposit of pre-emption amount.²⁰

129. "Final order." — Under clause 5 of the Article as it stood prior to 1927, *the date of the application* in accordance with law to the proper Court for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution, furnished a fresh starting point of limitation independent of the *result* of the application.¹ Under the amended Article, time has been made to run from the date of the *final order* on such an application.² In *Khalil Ur Rahman Khan v. Collector of Etah*,³

14. (1934) A I R 1934 Bom 113 (114) : 150 Ind Cas 866, *Ratanchand v. Chandu Lal*.
(1909) 5 Ind Cas 660 (661) (Cal), *Raj Gur Sahay v. Ishwardhari Singh*.
15. (1924) A I R 1924 All 811 (812) : 78 Ind Cas 631, *Chiranj Lal v. Ganga Sahai*.
16. (1905) 28 All 131 (133) 2 All L Jour 661 • 1905 All W N 219, *Maharani of Dumraon v. Buddha Kunwari*.
17. (1905) 27 All 575 (577) 1905 All W N 108 2 All L Jour 237, *Ahsan-ul-lah v. Dakhini Din*.
18. (1896) 23 Cal 617 (621), *Tarak Chunder Sen v. Gyanada Sundari*.
(1910) A I R 1919 Pat 188 (189) 50 Ind Cas 444, *Syed Rafakat Hussain v. Syed Mehdi Hussain*.
[But see (1893) 16 All 75 (77) 1893 All W N 219, *Ram Narain Rai v. Bahktu Kuar*.]
19. (1895) 23 Cal 196 (199), *Ananda Mohan Roy v. Hara Sundari*.
20. (1929) A I R 1929 All 953 (957) 51 All 998 • 122 Ind Cas 604, *Anrup Missir v. Ram Harakh*.

Note 129

1. (1914) 1914 Mad W N 64 (64) (S N).
(1891) 13 All 343 (345) 1691 All W N 119, *Jawahir Mal v. Kestur Chand*.
(1896) 1896 Bom P J 753, *Premraj Chandrabhan v. Abdul Rahman*.
(1876) 25 Suth W R 106 (106, 107), *Lala Hurree Sunkur Sahoy v. Krishna Kant Dutt*.

dar Kar.

- (1936) A I R 1936 Rang 271 (272) 163 Ind Cas 403 • 14 Rang 550, *Arjundas Bismalal v. U Ka Ya*.
- (1937) A I R 1937 Cal 16 (18) 169 Ind Cas 739, *Ananda Lal Chakravarthi v. Sm Katyan Deb*.

—nd Cal 747, *Nourangs*

Article 182
(Clause 5)
Note 129

their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

"It is to be noted that by the said Article, before amendment, the date of the application for execution was the time from which the period of limitation was to run, and it was not until the amending Act of 1937 was passed that the result of the application, viz., the final order passed on the application, became the material time."

It follows that what is material under the amended Article is thus the date of the *final order* on the application and not the date of the *application* itself.⁴ The question consequently arises as to what is the meaning of the expression "final order" for the purpose of clause 5 of this Article. The word "order" has been defined in Section 2 sub-section 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure as meaning the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. The Code and the Limitation Act being enactments in *pari materia*, the word "order" in this Act must be construed as having the same meaning as it has under the Code, unless, of course, there are sufficient reasons to the contrary.⁵ It has been held that the "order" need not be one passed on the merits;⁶ nor need it be a *judicial determination* of the matter involved in the application.⁷ The contrary view which has been held in some cases,⁸ namely, that the order must be a judicial one is, it is submitted, not correct.

But, in order to give a fresh starting point of limitation under clause 5, it is necessary that the order must be a "final" one. The word "final" means "pertaining to the end or conclusion" and refers to that which brings with it an end.⁹ In other words, it is used in

4. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 113 (115) : I L R (1938) Mad 826 : 176 Ind Cas 735, *Maikurama Reddi v. Motilal Daga*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 585 (592) : I L R (1937) Mad 616 : 168 Ind Cas 561 (F F), *Chidambaram Nadar v. Ramas Nadar*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 513 (514) : 162 Ind Cas 984, *Shayram Sahay v. Ram Sahay Ram*.

(1935) A I R 1935 All 757 (757) : 154 Ind Cas 715, *Hafiz Uddin v. Faris Shahi Lal-Mowoker Lal*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 148 (149) : 7 Luck 590 : 137 Ind Cas 765 (F F), *Ram Ekram v. Ramman Lal*.

5. See Note 15 of the Preamble to this Act.

6. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 113 (115) : I L R (1938) Mad 826 : 176 Ind Cas 735, *Maikurama Reddi v. Motilal Daga*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 585 (592) : I L R (1937) Mad 616 : 168 Ind Cas 561 (F F), *Chidambaram Nadar v. Ramas Nadar*.

(1936) 1936 Mad W N 547 (548), *Mettaya Padapacki v. Rajagopalram*.

7. (1938) A I R 1938 Mad 113 (115) : I L R (1938) Mad 826 : 176 Ind Cas 735, *Maikurama Reddi v. Motilal Daga*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 585 (592) : I L R (1937) Mad 616 : 168 Ind Cas 561 (F F), *Chidambaram Nadar v. Ramas Nadar*, (Per Pandurang Rao J J).

(1936) A I R 1936 All 529 (534) : I L R (1937) All 572 : 166 Ind Cas 106 (F F), *Mohammad Daga Khan v. Rafiq Ram*.

8. (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 615 (514) : I L R (1937) Mad 112 : 168 Ind Cas 544, *Kesarnad v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Pat 513 (514) : 162 Ind Cas 984, *Shayram Sahay v. Ram Sahay Ram*.

9. Webster's Dictionary.

contradistinction to the word "interlocutory."¹⁰ It has accordingly been held generally that a final order implies that the *proceeding has been terminated* so far as the Court passing it is concerned, though the order need not be a judicial determination of the rights of the parties.¹¹ In *Mohammad Taqi v. Raja Ram*,¹² an order was made in the following terms: "Execution struck off for partial satisfaction of the decree. Costs on the judgment-debtors." The question was whether the order was a final one or was merely a provisional one suspending the application for a time. It was held by the Full Bench that the question whether an execution case is still pending or has been terminated by an order must depend upon an interpretation of the order and the inference to be drawn as to the Court's intention and that the order striking off in the particular case was one which terminated the proceeding and was therefore a final order. Their Lordships observed as follows:

"We are unable to hold that the words "final order" must mean the order which finally adjudicates upon the rights of the decree-holder on the one hand and the rights of the judgment-debtor on the other

"If that were the meaning, then it may in some cases work hardship on the decree-holders themselves. In the absence of any such order, time would still begin to run from the date of the last application made in accordance with the law or step taken in aid of execution, whereas the amended clause 5 appears to have been intended to give to the decree-holder a fresh start from the date when the last execution matter or proceeding terminated. Again, there may be cases where the decree-holder may himself not like to go on with the application and may get it dismissed. It would be too much to hold that in such a case, as there has been no proper adjudication upon the rights of the parties, he cannot have a fresh start for purposes of limitation. Again, the application may be dismissed on account of want of prosecution or default or for some other reason. In all such cases the execution proceeding must be deemed to have terminated and the order passed thereon a final order, though there

10 Wharton's Law Lexicon.

(1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 23 (24) 149 Ind Cas 136, *Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. Dina Nath*.

11. (1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 23 (24) . 149 Ind Cas 136, *Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. Dina Nath*.

(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 613 (614) I L R (1937) Mad 112 . 163 Ind Cas 354, *Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Rang 87 (88) : 142 Ind Cas 435, *Kadvesan Chettiyar v. Maung San Ya*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Mad 113 (115) I L R (1938) Mad 326 : 176 Ind Cas 753, *Muthurama Reddi v. Motilal Daga*

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 395 (392) I L R (1937) Mad 616 : 168 Ind Cas 561 (F B), *Chidambara Nadar v. Rama Nandar*. (Per Venkataramana Rao, J)

(1932) A I R 1932 Oudh 148 (151) 7 Luck 590 187 Ind Cas 768 (F B), *Ram Bharosey v. Ramman Lal*.

12. (1936) A I R 1936 All 820 (824) . I L R (1937) All 272 166 Ind Cas 106 (F B).

Article 182
(Clause f)
Note 129

has been really no adjudication upon the rights of the parties, and the matter can be re-agitated on a fresh application being made to the execution Court. *We think that where the Court intends to dispose of the matter completely and no longer keep it pending on its file, and does not merely suspend the execution or consign the record to the record room for the time being, the order must be deemed to be a final order which will give a fresh start for purposes of limitation, and that the proceeding not being pending, there would in such a case be no question of revival.*"

Thus, where the decree-holder applied for execution asking for issue of a notice to the judgment-debtor and an order is made issuing such notice which was made returnable twelve days later and on the said date the case was closed at the decree-holder's request, it was held by the High Court of Rangoon that the final order was the order closing the case which terminated the proceedings and not the order issuing the notice.¹³ Where a petition was returned for amendment and on re-presentation it was rejected, it was held by the High Court of Madras that the order of rejection terminated the proceedings so far as the Court was concerned and that it was final order.¹⁴

See also the case cited below.¹⁵

There is a conflict of opinion on the question whether an order returning an application for amendment constitutes a "final order" within the meaning of clause 5 of this Article. It has been held in the undermentioned cases¹⁶ that it is a final order, the ground of such view being that the expression "final order" meant the *last order in point of time*. But this view has been dissented from in other cases¹⁷ which, as has been seen already, hold that the words "final order" refer to an order which terminates the proceeding so far as the Court passing it is concerned and that an order returning the application for correction does not terminate the proceeding. In *Municipal*

13. (1933) A I R 1933 Rang 67 (38) : 142 Ind Cas 435, *Kadiresan Chettyar v. Maung San Ya*.

14. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 385 (392) : 1 L R (1937) Mad 616 : 168 Ind Cas 561 (F B), *Chidambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar*.

15. (1935) A I R 1935 All 909 (910) : 157 Ind Cas 273, *Maresh Prasad v. Shyam Lal*. (Petition dismissed after recording part payment—Decree-holder granting two months' time—Date of final order is of date of dismissal and not that at the end of two months.)

16. (1936) 1936 Mad W N 547 (547), *Shunmuga Pathar v. Swaminatha Pathar*.
(1936) 1936 Mad W N 547 (548), *Mottayya Padayachi v. Rajagopalan*.
(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 385 (392) : 1 L R (1937) Mad 616 : 163 I. C. 561 (F B), *Chidambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar*. (Per Pandrang Row, J.)

17. See cases cited in Foot-Note (11) above.
(1936) A I R 1936 Mad 613 (614) : 1 L R (1937) Mad 112 : 163 Ind Cas 354, *Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore*.

[See also (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 540 (540) 144 I. C. 167, *Muhammad Abu Baitar Maracair v. Ramakrishna Chettyar*. (Assumed).]

Council, Tanjore v. Sundaresan,¹⁸ it was held that where a petition is returned and not re-presented, the proper way to deal with it is to treat it as not having come into existence at all. In *Kesavuloo v. Official Receiver, West Tanjore*¹⁹ it was held that when an order is made returning the application, it does not deal judicially with the matter of the petition but contemplates a final order to be passed at a subsequent stage when the defects are remedied and the petition is re-presented and that consequently it is not a final order within the meaning of this clause. It is submitted that the last two views are not correct. As to the first of the two views, it may be stated that before the amendment of 1927, an application was considered to have been presented notwithstanding it was returned and not re-presented at all. It is not clear why, under the Article as amended, an application, returned for correction, should be regarded as not having been presented at all. As to the view in *Kesavuloo's case*,¹⁹ it has been seen already that it has been held in a number of cases that the order need not be a judicial determination of the matter in dispute.

Article 182,
(Clause 5)
Notes 129-130

But, though a final order means an order that terminates the proceeding so far as the Court passing it is concerned, it is not clear why an order returning the application should not be regarded as terminating the proceeding. In the undermentioned case,²⁰ no doubt, it was held that an application returned for amendment and not re-presented must be considered to be pending till re-presented by the decree-holder, but this view has not been accepted in a number of other cases.²¹ It is difficult to regard a petition that has been returned as being a pending one as long the decree-holder considers it convenient not to re-present it. If then, it is not pending, it must necessarily have been disposed of and the order that disposed of it was the order returning the petition, which would therefore be a final order. The fact that when the petition is re-presented it would be deemed to have been presented on the date when it was first presented, does not necessarily raise the inference that the application was pending during the interval.

Where the final order on an application is appealed against, the order of the Appellate Court in such appeal will be the final order under the clause which will give a fresh starting point of time.²²

130. Order transferring decree for execution. — An order transferring a decree for execution to another Court is a "final order"

18. (1939) 1939 Mad W N 426 (427).

19. (1936) A I R 1936 Mad 618 (614) I L R (1937) Mad 112 163 Ind Cas 354.

20. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 540 (540) 144 Ind Cas 167, *Muhammad Abu Bakkar Maracair v. Ramakrishna Chelliar*

21. (1936) 1936 Mad W N 547 (547), *Shanmuga Pathar v. Suaminatha Pathar*.

(1939) 1939 Mad W N 426 (427), *Municipal Council, Tanjore v. Sundaresan*.

[See also (1936) 1936 Mad W N 547 (548), *Mottaya Padayachi v. Rajagopalan*. (Assumed)]

22. (1935) 157 Ind Cas 604 (604) (Lab), *Abhe Ram v. Bhola*.

Article 182
(Clause 6)
Notes 130-132

within the meaning of clause 5 of the Article, inasmuch as so far as the Court transferring the decree is concerned, the proceeding is terminated by the order.¹ In *Bhagwat Sahay v. Ram Sukrit Ram*,² Wort, J., while feeling himself bound by the previous decisions of the Patna High Court to the above effect, expressed his own view that such an order would not be a "final order" on the ground that a "final order" meant a judicial order. In *Hafiz Uddin v. Parshadi Lal Manohar Lal*,³ it was held that the date of the final order in such cases was the date on which the certificate of transfer was handed over to the decree-holder and not the date on which the Court directed the office to prepare the certificate of the transfer.

130a. Order returning application.—See Note 129 *ante*.

131. Final order need not be in accordance with law.—Clause 5 merely requires that there should be a final order on an application in accordance with law. Where there is no application in accordance with law, no fresh starting point is given by any order passed on such application.¹ It is, however, only the application that should be in accordance with the law. It is not necessary that the order on the application should be in accordance with law in order to give a fresh starting point of limitation.²

131a. Retrospective operation of amendment of clause 5.—The amendment of the year 1927 will not operate retrospectively so as to affect vested rights, but will otherwise govern all applications filed after the date of the amendment. Where an application, filed on 24.4.1925 was dismissed on 8.8.1925 and the next application for execution was filed on 8.8.1928, the amendment having come into force in the meanwhile on 1.1.1928, it was held by the High Court of Patna that the application was within time having been made on the last day of the period of three years calculated from 8.8.1925, the date of the final order on the last application.¹

CLAUSE 6.

132. Clause 6.—This clause was substituted by Act 9 of 1927 for the old clause which ran as follows :

"(Where the notice next hereinafter mentioned has been issued) the date of issue of notice to the person against whom

Note 130

1. (1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 23 (24) : 149 Ind Cas 136, *Punjab National Bank, Ltd. v. Dina Nath*.
2. (1936) A I R 1936 Pat 313 (314) : 162 Ind Cas 984.
3. (1935) A I R 1935 All 757 (758) : 154 Ind Cas 718.

Note 131

1. (1937) A I R 1937 Mad 760 (762) : 174 Ind Cas 28, *Appaji Chetti v. Gocindaswami Reddi*.
2. (1934) A I R 1934 Rang 101 (103) : 149 Ind Cas 98, *U Nyo v. U Po Hlaing*.

Note 131a

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 207 (207) : 127 Ind Cas 572, *Sapani Patra v. Damodar Kar*.

execution is applied for to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him, when the issue of such a notice is required by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908."

In view of the fact that by the same Act clause 5 was amended so as to make time run from the date of the *final order* on an application for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution, and not from the date of the application as the case was before, the above clause 6 was repealed and in its place was enacted the present clause 6. As to the cases decided under the repealed clause 6, see the undermentioned decisions.¹

CLAUSE 7.

133. Clause 7—General.—This clause provides that where the application is for the enforcement of a payment which the decree or

Article 182
(Clause 7)
Notes 132-133

Note 132

1. (1893) 1893 Bom P J 112, *Dattu v. Narayan Balaram*.
- (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 222 (224) 138 Ind Cas 91 11 Pat 546, *Sheogobind Ram v. Mt. Kishunbansi Kuer*.
- (1933) A I R 1933 Pat 653 (662) 13 Pat 66 147 Ind Cas 101, *Mrs Lal v. Rajkshore Narain Singh*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 728 (730) 30 Mad 923 30 Ind Cas 707, *Varadaraja Mudali v. Murugesan Pillai*.
- (1922) A I R 1922 Pat 597 (598) 1 Pat 609 69 Ind Cas 668, *Gobardhan Das v. Satish Chandra*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Pat 160 (162) 90 Ind Cas 647, *Jogendra Prasad Narayan Sinha v. Mangal Prasad Sahu*.
- (1892) 1892 All W N 71 (72), *Fazl ullah Khan v. Amin-ud-din Khan*.
- (1910) 8 Ind Cas 877 (378) 13 Oudh Cas 303, *Mohammad Abdul Karim Khan v. Nawaz Singh*.
- (1929) A I R 1929 All 795 (797) 118 Ind Cas 237, *Moti Lal v. Champa Lal*.
- (1905) 1905 Pun L R No 57 1905 Pun Re No 22 1905 Pun W R No. 33, *Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Ram Das*.
- (1897) 11 C P L R 157 (160), *Mukund Ram Sukal v. Harnaram*.
- (1894) 1894 All W N 96 (96), *Parmeshri Das v. Baij Nath*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 580 (584) 40 Mad 1069 42 Ind Cas 294 (F B), *Pierce Leslie & Co Ltd v. Perumal*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Oudh 370 (371) 51 Ind Cas 549 22 Oudh Cas 32, *Gaya Prasad v. Gur Dayal*.
- (1876) 1876 Pun Re No. 89, *Sulekh Chand v. Adjudhia Pershad*.
- (1914) A I R 1914 All 296 (297) 25 Ind Cas 738, *Maharaja of Jaipur v. Lalji Sahai*.
- (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 218 (219) 103 Ind Cas 39 6 Pat 277, *Biswambar Nath v. Mahesh Sahi*.
- (1918) A I R 1918 Pat 457 (457) 45 Ind Cas 203, *Khoda Bulsh v. Bahadur Ali*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 474 (476) 87 Ind Cas 531 5 Pat 1 (F B), *Adaya Prasad Singh v. Ram Narayan Das*.
- (1916) A I R 1916 Pat 205 (206) 36 Ind Cas 999, *Ram Kumar Lal v. Kesheo Prasad Singh*.
- (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 241 (242), *Sultan Hasan v. Nanki Bibi*.
- (1905) 27 All 575 (576) 1905 All W N 108 2 All L Jour 287, *Ahsan-ul-lah v. Dakkini Din*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Lah 233 (235) 78 Ind Cas 241, *Firm Sheru Mal Chima Mal v. Firm Hira Lal Anant Ram*.
- (1894) 9 C P L R 15 (16), *Rai Bahadur Mukund Balakrishna Buty v. Lahya Mahar*.
- (1919) A I R 1919 Low Bur 132 (132) 52 Ind Cas 937, *Isakut v. Mt. Hla Mo We*.

See also the Authors' Civil Procedure Code, Order 21 Rule 22 Note 13.

Article 182
(Clause 7)
Notes 133-134

order directs to be made on a certain date, the period of limitation under this Article will begin to run from such date. Hence, where different dates are provided in the decree, for the payment of different portions of the decretal amount, there will be a distinct and separate starting point of limitation in regard to each of such portions of the decretal amount, so that in such cases there will be different starting points of limitation in regard to the same decree. In this respect, this clause differs from the other clauses of the Article under all of which limitation runs in respect of the decree as a whole and not in regard to particular portions of it alone at a time.¹

This clause applies only to the first application for the recovery of a payment due under a decree. A subsequent application in respect of the same payment will come under clause 5, *supra*.²

The Act of 1859 did not contain any provision analogous to this clause. Still, it was held under that Act that limitation for the execution of an instalment decree ran in respect of each instalment from the date on which such instalment fell due.³

134. "Payment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date."—A decree directing maintenance to be paid annually on a certain date is an instance of a decree directing payment to be made on a certain date within the meaning of clause 7.¹

A decree provided that a sum of Rs. 1650 should be paid to the plaintiff at the end of five years from the decree. It was further provided that in lieu of the interest on Rs. 1200 out of this sum, the plaintiff should be in possession of a certain house belonging to the defendant and that the defendant should pay annually to the plaintiff the interest on the remaining Rs. 450 at a certain rate. The decree also contained a provision that if the defendant failed to pay the interest as provided, the plaintiff might execute the decree in respect of the Rs. 450 and the interest due thereon. It was held

Note 133

1. (1911) 10 Ind Cas 552(554): 35 Mad 101, *Vaidyanatha Iyer v. Subramania Pattar*.
2. (1938) A I R 1938 All 210 (211): 1 L R (1938) All 342: 175 Ind Cas 156, *Latafat Ali Khan v. Kalyan Mal*.
3. (1867) Agra F B 83 (85), *Ullaf Ali Khan v. Ram Lal*.
 (1869) 6 Bom H O R 45 (48), *Ullam Ram Manik Ram v. Girdharul Motiram*.
 (1865) 1685 Bom P J 22, *Ramapa v. Krishnaya*.
 (1871) 15 Suth W R 547 (547), *Ram Sudoy Ghose v. Raj Bullubh Saha*.
 (1875) 23 Suth W R 41 (41), *Tincowree Dosses v. Umbika Chunder Roy Chowdhry*.
 (1870) 1870 Pun Re No. 52, *Chundoo Lall v. Mt. Surjeas Mehal Begam*.
 [But see (1869) 4 Mad H O R 275 (276), *Lakshmi Ammal v. Seshadri Iyengar*.]

Note 134

1. (1894) 16 Mad 452 (453), *Kuppu Ammal v. Saminatha Ayyar*.

by the Punjab Chief Court that the provision enabling the decreeholder to realize a portion of the amount decreed on failure by the judgment-debtor to pay the stipulated interest on that portion at the stipulated time, did not amount to a direction in the decree within the meaning of the clause that the said portion was to be paid on the failure to pay interest.²

A decree provided that if the decretal amount was paid on a certain date, no interest would be payable, that if the decretal amount was paid on a certain other date, interest at a certain rate would be payable and that if the sum was paid on a still other date which was mentioned, interest at a certain other rate would be payable. It was held that the terms of the decree regulating the rate of interest payable thereunder with reference to certain dates could not be deemed to be a direction by the Court for payment on specified dates.³

An order subsequent to a decree postponing the date on which payment under the decree should be made or providing for the payment of the decretal amount by instalments, must be held to modify the decree, and an application for the enforcement of payment in accordance with such order will be an application for the enforcement of payment which the decree directs to be made at a certain date.⁴ But, where subsequent to the decree the parties presented a petition to the Court stating that they had entered into a compromise under which the decretal amount was to be paid in certain instalments and the Court directed the petition to be filed, it was held that the order did not amount to one directing the decretal amount to be paid by instalments.⁵ In the undermentioned case⁶ it was held that an order staying execution of a decree till the disposal of a suit between the same parties pending in the same Court, cannot be treated as having the effect of *varying* the decree so as to make it one directing the payment of the decretal amount at a certain date.

A decree directing a certain sum to be paid at a certain date and providing that in default certain properties which were in the possession of the defendant must be made over to the plaintiff, will come within this clause.⁷

But, it has been held that a decree on a mortgage directing the sale of the mortgaged properties in default of payment of the mortgage money on or before a certain date, is not a decree *directing* any payment to be made at a certain date.⁸

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Article 182
(Clause 7)
Note 135

135. "Certain date." — These words refer to a date which, at the date of the decree or order, is certain. A date which can become certain only at a future time will not be a "certain" date within the meaning of clause 7. Thus, where a mortgage decree provides that if on the sale of the mortgaged properties the sale proceeds are not sufficient to cover the decretal sum, the balance should be realized from the person of the judgment-debtor and from his other properties, the decree cannot be regarded as directing such balance to be paid at a "certain" date.¹ Similarly, where a decree provides for the payment of the decretal amount by certain instalments but contains a clause that if default be made in regard to one or more instalments the entire amount remaining due under the decree should become immediately payable, the provision as to the payment of the entire decretal sum on default in the payment of instalments cannot be treated as a direction for the payment of such sum at a "certain" date. (See Note 136 *infra*.)

The undermentioned decision,² which is inconsistent with the above principle, is, it is submitted, not correct.

In *Joti Prasad v. Srichand*,³ Sulaiman, Ag. C. J., observed as follows :

"The corresponding clause in the Act of 1871 contained the expression 'specified date'. That necessarily connoted the idea that the exact date should be mentioned in the decree. The substitution of the word "certain" in place of "specified" widens the scope of its meaning. It is no longer necessary to mention by the year, month and day the exact date in the decree. All the same the date fixed for payment must be a certain date. In my opinion, the word "certain" is used in contradistinction to "uncertain." It is not used in the sense in which one might say that a certain man came to see me. It obviously means a date, which, though not expressly mentioned or ascertained, must certainly occur. The word "certain," in my opinion, is a contrast of the word "uncertain" as that word is used, for instance, in Sections 32 and 33, Contract Act, or Sections 21 and 23, Transfer of Property Act.

"In the present case (which was a case of an instalment decree with a default clause providing that on two consecutive defaults being made the whole amount must become payable) at the time when the decree was passed, it could not be known definitely and it was not at all certain whether two consecutive defaults would be made by 1921. If the judgment-debtors went on paying the instalments regularly, there would never be any

Note 135

1. (1917) A I R 1917 P C 85 (85) : 45 Ind Cas 436, *Khulna Loan Co Ltd. v. Janendra Nath*. (Affirming A I R 1915 Cal 8)
- (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 8 (8) : 24 Ind Cas 25, *Janendra Nath Doss v. Khulna Loan Co. Ltd.*
2. (1933) A I R 1933 Lah 590 (592), *Nanu Mal v. Amar Nath*.
3. (1926) A I R 1928 All 629 (634) : 112 Ind Cas 73 : 51 All 237 (F B).

default. It is therefore impossible, in my opinion, to say that the decree had fixed a 'certain' date for the payment of the whole amount in a lump sum. Such a date was not at all certain. It was dependent on the contingency of two consecutive defaults happening. The date might or might not come at all. No doubt it is now known that the defaults were made and a date arrived when the default clause could be enforced, but this was not certain *when the decree was passed*."

But, as pointed out in the above passage, the decree need not expressly specify the exact date by the year, month and day. The date may be indicated in any way by the decree.⁴ Thus, a decree directing the payment of money on the plaintiff attaining his majority will come under this clause.⁵ Similarly, it has been held that a decree directing a certain sum to be paid to the plaintiff annually or monthly, without specifying the exact date, will be governed by this clause.⁶ It has been held that in such cases the decree must be deemed to direct the payment to be made on the day year or the day month (as the case may be) from the date of the decree and thenceforward on the corresponding date year after year or month after month.^{6a}

A simple decree for money which does not fix, expressly or impliedly, any date for the payment of the money will not come within this clause, although in such cases the money is payable immediately on the decree being passed.⁷

4. (1890) 14 Mad 396 (399), *Katers v. Venkamma*.

5. (1936) A I R 1936 P C 309 (311) 161 Ind Cas 337 63 Ind App 429 (P C), *Murugesam Pillai v. Minakshisundara Ammal*. (Confirming A I R 1935 Mad 107.)

6. (1897) 12 Bom 65 (69), *Lakshmidas Bapuji v. Madharav Bapuji*.

(1896) 1896 Bom P J 493, *Dhondo v. Chinto*. (A decree for one half share in a Varsashan must be construed as a decree ordering payment to be made annually.)

(1906) 80 Mad 504 (506) 17 Mad L Jour 402, *Astamma v. Narayana Bhatta*. (A decree directing the defendants to pay plaintiff's maintenance at a certain rate per annum or mensem from the date of the plaint is a decree for payment on the corresponding date or month every year.)

(1890) 14 Mad 396 (398), *Katers v. Venkamma*, (Do.)

(1892) 1892 Pun Re No 13 (F B), *Nawabzada Muhammad Kamaruddin Khan v. Piar Lal*.

[See (1870) 1876 Bom P J 277, *Malhar Rajaram v. Ahmed Sahab*. (Decree for payment of annuity—Clause in Art 167 of the Act of 1871 was held to apply—It is treated as a decree directing the payment of an instalment at a specified date.)]

[But see (1894) 7 Mad 83 (84), *Yusuf v. Sardar* (Following 7 Mad 80.)]

6a (1888) 12 Bom 65 (67), *Lakshmidhas Bapuji v. Madharav Bapuji*.

out altering the effect, so that such payment is one to be made at a certain date.]

7. (1928) A I R 1928 All 629 (636) 112 Ind Cas 73 51 All 237 (F B), *Joti Prasad v. Srichand*, (Per Mukerji J.)

Article 132
(Clause 7)
Notes 135-136

In the undermentioned case¹ it was held that a decree directing the payment of money "within" a certain period will not come within this clause. It is submitted that the correctness of this view is open to question, inasmuch as in such cases the decree may be deemed to direct the payment to be made on the last day of the period.

See also the undermentioned decision.²

135. Instalment decree.—Where the decretal amount is directed to be paid in certain instalments at certain dates, an application for the enforcement of the payment of any of the instalments will be governed by this clause as being an application for the enforcement of a payment which the decree directs to be paid at a certain date. Hence, each instalment is recoverable under this clause by an application made within three years of the date on which such instalment falls due under the decree. The fact that the application is made after three years from the date on which earlier instalments fell due will not bar the application.³

The above principle applies also to cases in which the instalment decree provides that on default being made in regard to one or more instalments, the entire amount under the decree should become payable. Hence, even in such cases an application for the enforcement of the payment of each instalment will be governed by this clause and time in respect of each instalment will run from the date on which such instalment falls due.⁴

But, where the application is not for the enforcement of the payment of any instalment under the decree but for the enforcement of the default clause which makes the entire amount under the decree payable immediately without reference to the instalments,

1. (1895) 1895 All W N 103 (1901), *Chaita Prasad v. Sita Saha*.

2. (1899) 28 Bom 522 (524) 1 Bom L B 31, *Munshi v. Keshava*. (Where a decree directs payment to be made within a month or at a time in succeeding years without mentioning any time for that time in default of payment, it must be taken as expiring from its date and to be enforceable only within three years from that time unless kept alive by applications for execution made according to law within the prescribed periods.)

Note 135

1. (1891) 1891 All W N 171 (172), *Chaita Gop v. Chaita Prasad*.
 (1921) 47 Ind Cas 291 (292) (Cal), *Gopa Das Chaita Das v. Sarda Das*
Sri Krishna Das.
 1905, 1905 Fm L B No. 57. 1905 Fm Sd No. 22. 1905 Fm W B No. 55.
Maharajah Narain Kaur v. Bawa Das.
 1900, 1900 Fm L B No. 45, *Raja Ram v. Margopal Sarda*.
 1900, 1900 Fm L B v. 415. 1900 Fm Sd No. 45, *Kamrupa Lal v. Math*.
 1927, A I R 1927 Cal 371 (372). 1927 Ind Cas 625. 13 Luck 342, *Chaita Prasad Prasad v. Krishna Prasad*.
 2. (1921) A I R 1921 All 629 (631, 632, 633) : 51 All 627 : 111 Ind Cas 74 (75) 76
Chaita Prasad v. Sri Chaita.
 1918, A I R 1918 All 217 (218). 278 Ind Cas 126 : 11 L B (1918) All 342.
Chaita Prasad Prasad v. Krishna Prasad.
 1927, A I R 1927 Cal 473 (474). 1927 Ind Cas 714. 11 Luck 373 (734).
Chaita Prasad Prasad v. Sarda Das.

the application will not come under this clause.³ The reason is that in such a case the amount, the payment of which is sought to be enforced, is not directed by the decree to be paid at a certain date. Such amount becoming due under the decree only on the default being made, the question whether it *will* become due or *when* it will become due cannot, at the date of the decree, be capable of a certain answer. The view taken in some decisions that this clause applies even to an application for the enforcement of the *default clause* in such cases is, it is submitted, not correct.⁴ On the principles discussed in Note 26 *ante*, clause 1 also will not apply to such an application and it will therefore come under Article 181.⁵

Article 182
(Clause 7)
Note 136

The question has arisen as to when limitation *begins to run* for such an application. The general trend of decisions is to the effect that time begins to run from the *earliest* default,⁶ unless the decree-holder has waived the benefit of the provision with reference to such default, in which case time will begin to run from the next default with reference to which there is no such waiver.⁷ The correctness of this view is, however, thrown into doubt, by the decision of the Privy Council in *Maung Sin v. Ma Tok*.⁸

3. (1928) A I R 1928 All 629 (634, 636) : 51 All 237 : 112 Ind Cas 73 (F B), *Joti Prasad v. Sri Chand*.
4. (1916) A I R 1916 All 239 (240) : 38 All 204 : 32 Ind Cas 590, *Chattar Singh v. Amir Singh*. (Confirming in Letters Patent Appeal : A I R 1915 All 311.)
5. (1928) A I R 1928 All 629 (635) : 51 All 237 : 112 Ind Cas 73 (F B), *Joti Prasad v. Sri Chand*.
6. (1935) A I R 1935 All 259 (261) : 157 Ind Cas 1052, *Hari Ram v. Himan Lal*.
(1934) A I R 1934 All 534 (538) : 149 Ind Cas 598, 56 All 921, *Ram Prasad v. Jadhunandan Upadhyay*.
(1916) A I R 1916 All 239 (240) : 38 All 204 : 32 Ind Cas 590, *Chatter Singh v. Amir Singh* (Confirming in Letters Patent Appeal in A I R 1915 All 311.)
7. (1877) 2 Bom 356 (360), *Dulsook Rattanchand v. Chugon Narrun*.
(1881) 7 Cal 56 (60) : 5 Ind Jur 525, *Asmutullah Dalal v. Kally Churn Mitter*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Sind 68 (69) : 11 Sind L R 120 : 45 Ind Cas 324, *Firm of Bhawandas Ferromal v. Meghraj*.
[But see (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 334 (336) : 149 Ind Cas 603 : 9 Luck 602, *Lal Bahadur v. Mathura Prasad*]
8. See (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1012 (1015) : 86 Ind Cas 1051 : 54 Cal 143, *Jahim Chand v. Yusufali Choudhury*.
(1903) 27 Bom 1 (10, 12, 13) : 4 Bom L R 688 (F B), *Kashiram v. Pandu*
(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 71 (73) : 44 Bom 840 : 53 Ind Cas 65, *Amrit Khanderao Rango v. Govind Ramachandra*.
(1883) 5 All 289 (292, 293) : 1883 All W N 33, *Radha Prasad Singh v. Bhagwan Rai*.
(1889) 11 All 482 (483) : 1889 All W N 186, *Buddhu Lal v. Rakhhab Das*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 212 (213) : 85 Ind Cas 784, *Kalucharan Roy v. Mohesh Chandra Ghosh*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Sind 25 (26) : 59 Ind Cas 607 : 14 Sind L R 123, *Bahadur Dino v. Galomal*.
(1869) 11 Suth W R 570 (571) : 2 Beng L R A C 345, *Upendra Mohan Tagore v. Takalia Depara*.
8. (1927) A I R 1927 P G 146 (147) : 101 Ind Cas 736 : 5 Rang 422 : 54 Ind App 272 (F O).

Article 182
(Clause 7)
Notes 135-136

In the undermentioned case⁸ it was held that a decree directing the payment of money "within" a certain period will not come within this clause. It is submitted that the correctness of this view is open to question, inasmuch as in such cases the decree may be deemed to direct the payment to be made on the last day of the period.

See also the undermentioned decision.⁹

136. Instalment decree.—Where the decretal amount is directed to be paid in certain instalments at certain dates, an application for the enforcement of the payment of any of the instalments will be governed by this clause as being an application for the enforcement of a payment which the decree directs to be paid at a certain date. Hence, each instalment is recoverable under this clause by an application made within three years of the date on which such instalment falls due under the decree. The fact that the application is made after three years from the date on which earlier instalments fell due will not bar the application.¹

The above principle applies also to cases in which the instalment decree provides that on default being made in regard to one or more instalments, the entire amount under the decree should become payable. Hence, even in such cases an application for the enforcement of the payment of each instalment will be governed by this clause and time in respect of each instalment will run from the date on which such instalment falls due.²

But, where the application is not for the enforcement of the payment of any instalment under the decree but for the enforcement of the *default clause* which makes the entire amount under the decree payable immediately without reference to the instalments,

8. (1885) 1885 All W N 193 (193), *Lalla Prasad v. Shro Sahas*.

9. (1899) 29 Bom 592 (594). 1 Bom L R 81, *Maruti v. Krishna*. (Where a decree directs payment to be made within a month or at a time in succeeding years without mentioning any limit for that time or directing foreclosure in default of payment, it must be taken as operating from its date and to be enforceable only within three years from that time unless kept alive by applications for execution made according to law within the prescribed periods.)

Note 136

1. (1881) 1881 All W N 171 (171), *Chedu Gir v. Chotu Panda*.
(1931) 187 Ind Cas 292 (292) (Iah), *Gopi Ram Jaithu Ram v. Ramji Das Sri Krishan Das*.
(1905) 1905 Pun L R No. 57 : 1905 Pun Re No. 22 : 1905 Pun W R No 33, *Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Ram Das*.

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Prasad Khanna v. Mathura Prasad.

2. (1928) A I R 1929 All 629 (631, 637, 638) : 51 All 237 : 112 Ind Cas 73 (F F)
Joti Prasad v. Sri Chand.
(1939) A I R 1939 All 210 (211) : 175 Ind Cas 186 : I L R (1938) All 312,
Latafat Ali Khan v. Kalyan Mal.
(1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 465 (467) : 156 Ind Cas 764 : 11 Luck 276 (F D).
Ajodhya Prasad v. Bans Lal.

the application will not come under this clause.³ The reason is that in such a case the amount, the payment of which is sought to be enforced, is not directed by the decree to be paid at a certain date. Such amount becoming due under the decree only on the default being made, the question whether it *will* become due or *when* it will become due cannot, at the date of the decree, be capable of a certain answer. The view taken in some decisions that this clause applies even to an application for the enforcement of the *default clause* in such cases is, it is submitted, not correct.⁴ On the principles discussed in Note 26 *ante*, clause 1 also will not apply to such an application and it will therefore come under Article 181.⁵

The question has arisen as to when limitation *begins to run* for such an application. The general trend of decisions is to the effect that time begins to run from the *earliest* default,⁶ unless the decree-holder has waived the benefit of the provision with reference to such default, in which case time will begin to run from the next default with reference to which there is no such waiver.⁷ The correctness of this view is, however, thrown into doubt, by the decision of the Privy Council in *Maung Sin v. Ma Tok*.⁸

3. (1928) A I R 1928 All 629 (634, 636) . 51 All 237 . 112 Ind Cas 73 (F B), *Joti Prasad v. Sri Chand*.
4. (1916) A I R 1916 All 239 (240) : 38 All 204 . 32 Ind Cas 590, *Chatter Singh v. Amir Singh*. (Confirming in Letters Patent Appeal . A I R 1915 All 311.)
5. (1928) A I R 1928 All 629 (635) : 51 All 237 : 112 Ind Cas 73 (F B), *Joti Prasad v. Sri Chand*.
6. (1935) A I R 1935 All 259 (261) . 157 Ind Cas 1052, *Hari Ram v. Hsman Lal*.
(1934) A I R 1934 All 534 (538) . 149 Ind Cas 598, 56 All 921, *Ram Prasad v. Jadhunandan Upadhy*.
(1916) A I R 1916 All 239 (240) . 38 All 204 : 32 Ind Cas 590, *Chatter Singh v. Amir Singh* (Confirming in Letters Patent Appeal in A I R 1915 All 311.)
7. (1877) 2 Bom 356 (360), *Dulsook Rattanchand v. Chugon Narrun*.
(1891) 7 Cal 56 (60) . 5 Ind Jur 525, *Asmutullah Dalal v. Kally Churn Miller*.
(1918) A I R 1918 Sind 68 (69) . 11 Sind L R 120 . 45 Ind Cas 324, *Farm of Bhawandas Feroomal v. Meghraj*.
(But see (1934) A I R 1934 Oudh 334 (336) : 149 Ind Cas 603 . 9 Luck 602, *Lal Bahadur v. Mathura Prasad*)
7. See (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 1012 (1015) . 86 Ind Cas 1051 . 54 Cal 143, *Jahm Chand v. Yusufali Choudhury*.
(1903) 27 Bom 1 (10, 12, 13) . 4 Bom L R 688 (F B), *Kashiram v. Pandu*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Bom 71 (73) . 44 Bom 840 . 58 Ind Cas 65, *Amrit K han derao Kango v. Govind Ramachandra*.
(1883) 5 All 289 (292, 293) . 1883 All W N 83, *Radha Prasad Singh v. Bhagwan Rao*.
(1889) 11 All 482 (485) . 1889 All W N 186, *Buddhu Lal v. Rakhhab Das*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 212 (213) . 85 Ind Cas 784, *Kalicharan Roy v. Mohesh Chandra Ghosh*.
(1920) A I R 1920 Sind 25 (26) . 59 Ind Cas 607 . 14 Sind L R 123, *Bahadur Dino v. Galomal*.
(1869) 11 Suth W R 570 (571) . 2 Beng L R A O 315, *Upendra Mohan Tagore v. Takalsa Bepari*.
8. (1927) A I R 1927 P O 146 (147) . 101 Ind Cas 736 . 5 Rang 422 . 54 Ind App 272 (P C).

Article 182
(Clause 7)
Note 136

In that case, a decree was passed for the payment of money in certain instalments. It was provided in the decree that on default in the payment of any instalment the decree-holder would be entitled to take possession of certain properties. It was held by the Privy Council that the default of the judgment-debtor in regard to each instalment would entitle the decree-holder to apply for possession under the decree and an application for possession within three years of the date on which any of the instalments fell due would be in time although it may be made more than three years from the date of the earliest default.

But, assuming that an application for the enforcement of the *default clause* must be made within three years from the earliest default, the question arises whether the fact that such application is barred by limitation necessarily involves the consequence that an application for the enforcement of the payment of the *instalments* that have fallen due will also be barred. In other words, suppose an application for the enforcement of certain instalments which fell due within three years of the application is made *after three years from the earliest default*. Will such an application be barred merely because an application for the enforcement of the *default clause* claiming the entire decretal amount without regard to the instalments would have been barred? On this question there is a conflict of decisions

The following three views have been expressed on the question—

1. The application for the enforcement of the payment of the instalments which fell due within three years of the application will not be barred though the application for the enforcement of the *default clause* may be barred.⁹ This view proceeds on the ground that the clause entitling the decree-holder to execute for the whole amount is only intended for the benefit of the decree-holder and therefore his failure to avail himself of that benefit cannot deprive him of his right to the payment of the instalments under the decree.

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9. (1926) A I R 1928 All 629 (640) : 51 All 237 : 112 Ind Cas 73 (F B), *Joti Prasad v. Srichand*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 All 259 (261) : 157 Ind Cas 1052, *Hari Ram v. Himman Lal*.
 (1934) A I R 1934 All 531 (538) : 149 Ind Cas 598 : 56 All 921, *Ram Prasad Ram v. Jadunandan Upadhyay*.
 (1879) 2 All 291 (293), *Kanchan Singh v. Sheo Prasad*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Bom 263 (270) : 163 Ind Cas 937, *Bomalal Bhabu Ghatole v. Govardandas Nanabhai*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Bom 17 (19) : 60 Bom 62 : 160 Ind Cas 527, *Yeherbhas Vallabhai v. Jater Soma*. (Dissenting from A I R 1918 Bom 163.)
 (1887) 14 Cal 352 (354, 355), *Ram Culpoo Bhattacharya v. Ram Chunder Shome*.
 (1883) 9 Cal 857 (860), *Nalmadhubi Chakerbutty v. Ram Saday Ghosh*.
 (1883) 13 Cal L R 213 (216), *Chunder Komal Dass v. Bissasurree Dass*.
 (1970) 14 Suth W R 414 (415) : 6 Beng L R App 31, *Krishna Chandra Shaha v. Omed Ali*.
 (1860) 12 Suth W R 71 (72). 3 Beng L R App 112, *Mt. Khedu v. Kalu Sahu*.
 (1928) 103 Ind Cas 272 (272) (Lab), *Raja v. Hazari*.

2. An application for the execution of the decree made after three years from the date of the earliest default will be barred not only with reference to the *default clause* making the whole amount payable but also with reference to the *instalments*, so that even the instalments which fell due within three years of the application cannot be recovered¹⁰ This view proceeds on the ground that in such cases, on default occurring, the decree ceases to be an *instalment decree*.

3. The question whether the application for the enforcement of the payment of instalments due under a decree will be barred even with reference to the instalments which fell due within three years of the application, depends on the *terms* of the default clause.¹¹ If the clause leaves it to the *option* of the decree-holder to execute for the whole amount on default taking place, his application for the instalments will not be barred although made more than three years after the first default. But, if the clause makes it *obligatory* on the decree-holder to execute for the whole amount on default taking place, then his application for execution made more than three years from the

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- (1912) 16 Ind Cas 842 (842, 843) 1913 Pun Re No. 6, *Kishen Chand v. Bhai Gopal Singh*.
 (1902) 1902 Pun Re No. 100 . 1902 Pun LR No. 131, *Allah Bakhsh v. Bhasani*.
 (1881) 8 Mad 256 (258) . 6 Ind Jur 190, *Appayya v. Papayya*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 465 (467) . 156 Ind Cas 764 . 11 Luck 278 (F B), *Ajodhya Prasad v. Dansi Lal*.
 (1933) A I R 1933 Pesh 14 (15, 16) 141 Ind Cas 745, *Mt Koran v. Bhai Namah Singh*.
 (1939) A I R 1939 Sind 49 (51), *Lekhraj Sirumal v. Khubchand*.
 10. (1890) 12 All 569 (571) 1890 All W N 19, *Muthu Lal v. Khairati Lal*.
 (1885) 7 All 827 (830) 1885 All W N 26, *Zakur Khan v. Bakhtawar*.
 (1879) 2 All 443 (444) 4 Ind Jur 580, *Shib Dal v. Kalka Prasad*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 Bom 207 (208) 72 Ind Cas 275, *Hansraj Godhaji v. Bapu*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Bom 163 (164) 42 Bom 728 47 Ind Cas 313, *Raichand Motichand Gujar v. Dhondo Laxuman Baure*.
 (1894) 1894 Bom P J 407, *Haji Detchend v. Naraji*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 212 (212, 213) 85 Ind Cas 784, *Kalicharan v. Mohesh Chandra*.
 (1918) A I R 1918 Cal 245 (246) 37 Ind Cas 916, *Joyanuddin Khan v. Jamiruddin Sarkar*.
 (1901-02) 6 Cal W N 348 (350), *Bholanand Jha v. Padmanund Singh*.
 (1901) 31 Cal 297 (299, 300), *Jadab Chandra Dakshi v. Bhavrab Chandra Chukerbutty*

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11. (1917) A I R 1917 All 351 (352) 39 Ind Cas 634 39 All 230, *Lachmi Narain v. Sarju Parshad*.
 (1894) 16 All 371 (374) 1894 All W N 115, *Shankar Prasad v. Jalpa Prasad*.
 (1883) 5 All 201 (206) 1882 All W N 221, *Janki Prasad v. Ghulam Ali*.
 (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 322 (323) : 49 Ind Cas 497, *Dama Sundari Dasya v. Kuran Chandra*.

Article 182
(Clause 7)
Note 136

earliest default will be barred not only with regard to the *default clause* but also with reference to the *instalments*, so that even his right to recover the instalments which fell due within three years of the application will be barred.

An analysis of the decisions cited in Foot-Notes 9 to 11 above will show that the general trend of opinion of all the High Courts except those of Calcutta and Patna is in favour of the *first* view, that the general trend of decisions of the High Court of Calcutta is in favour of the *second* view and that the *third* view has been adopted by the Patna High Court and in certain decisions of other High Courts.

Where an instalment decree with a default clause making the whole amount payable on one or more defaults has been passed and the decree-holder, on a default taking place, elects to enforce the default clause by applying for execution in respect of the whole amount without regard to the instalments, his subsequent application for execution must be treated only as an application in respect of the whole decree and not as one in respect of the instalments under the decree. Hence, where such an application is made more than three years from the final order on the previous application, it will be barred even with regard to the instalments falling due under the decree within three years of the application.¹² If the application is made within three years of the final order on the prior application, it will be within time under clause 5 of this Article.

Where a decree provides for payment by instalments and contains a clause that if default is made in regard to one or more instalments the decree-holder should be entitled to the possession of certain lands, an application for the enforcement of the payment of any of the instalments will come within this clause, and the decree-holder will be entitled to recover such instalments as fell due within three years of the application although such application has been made more than three years after the *earliest* default.¹³ Even with regard to an application for possession to which the decree-holder becomes entitled on default, it has already been seen that under the Privy Council decision in *Maung Sin v. Ma Tok*,¹⁴ limitation for such application will run from each default and not from the earliest

(1886) 13 Cal 73 (75), *Judhistr Patro v. Nobin Chandra Khela*.

(1934) 6 Ind Rul Oudh 592 (594), *Lal Bahadur v. Mathura Prasad*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Pat 253 (255) : 11 Pat 440 : 139 Ind Cas 203, *Braham Kishun Narain Deo v. Harishar Munder*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Pat 95 (97) : 48 Ind Cas 728 : 4 Pat L Jour 865, *Manindra Nath Roy v. Kankai Ram Marwari*.

12. (1907) 1 Sind L R 252 (254), *Jethanand Topandas v. Lalamal Sitalmal*.

(1931) A I R 1931 Bom 263 (263, 264) : 132 Ind Cas 437, *Pandurang v. Mahadev*.

(1905) 23 All 249 (251) : 2 All L Jour 628 : 1905 All W N 263, *Bhagwan Das v. Janki*.

13. (1927) A I R 1927 P C 146 (147) : 101 Ind Cas 736 : 54 Ind App 272 : 5 Rang 422 (P C), *Maung Sin v. Ma Tok*.

14. (1927) A I R 1927 P C 146 (147) : 101 Ind Cas 736 : 54 Ind App 272 : 5 Rang 422 (P C).

default. The undermentioned decisions,¹⁵ which have taken a contrary view, must be held to be not good law.

Article 182
(Expln. I)
Notes 136-137

EXPLANATION I.

137. Decree in favour of several persons. — A decree in favour of several persons may be passed either jointly or severally, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as deliverable or payable to each. In the former case, an application for execution by any one of the decree-holders will save limitation for execution, in favour of all the joint decree-holders. In the latter case, an application for execution by one of the decree-holders will save limitation only in favour of the applicant and not in favour of any other decree-holder.

In the case of a joint decree, an application for execution by a *representative* of one of the joint decree-holders will also save limitation in favour of all the decree-holders.¹

There is a conflict of decisions as to whether a joint decree-holder can apply for execution in respect of what he conceives to be his own share of the decree.² But, if it is held that such an application is in accordance with law, it will save limitation not only in favour of the particular decree-holder who applies for execution but also in favour of the other decree-holders.³

A decree under which the plaintiff is entitled to recover a certain sum from the defendant and the latter is entitled to obtain possession from the plaintiff, is a decree passed severally in favour of more persons than one and an application for execution by the plaintiff or the defendant will not save limitation for execution by the other.⁴

There was no provision corresponding to Explanation I in the Limitation Act of 1859. It was nevertheless held in decisions passed under that Act that an application for execution of a joint decree made by one of the decree-holders would save limitation in favour of all.⁵

15. (1891) 4 All 83 (85). 1891 All W N 124, *Ugrah Nath v. Lagan Mani*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Lah 66 (68). 36 Ind Cas 978. 1917 Pun Re No. 8, *Mt. Kirpa Devi v. Dasaundhi Ram*.

Note 137

1. (1899) 22 All 199 (204). 1900 All W N 8 (F B), *Zamir Hasan v. Sundar*.
(1910) 7 Ind Cas 939 (940). 34 Bom 672, *Mulchand v. Kesar, Khupchand*.

2. See the Authors' Civil Procedure Code, Order 21 Rule 15 Note 11.

3. (1928) A I R 1928 Cal 861 (862). 118 Ind Cas 537, *Kanak Prata Devi v. Dharendra Nath*.
[See also (1871) 16 Suth W R 29 (30), *Shub Chunder Doss v. Ram Chunder Poddar*]

[But see (1934) A I R 1934 Pesh 40 (42). 152 Ind Cas 443, *Ahmad Ali v. Mt. Fatima Sultan*]

4. (1897) 22 Bom 998 (1001), *Jeddi Subraya v. Ramrao Ram Chandra*

5. (1869) 11 Suth W R 421 (421), *Mt. Dhunessuree v. Goodhur Sahoy*.
(1869) 11 Suth W R 343 (344). 2 Beng L R App 47, *Azizunnissa Khatun v. Shashibhusan Bose*

(1867) 8 Suth W R 100 (101), *Roy Preonath Chowdhry v. Prannath Roy Chowdhry*

Article 182
(Expln. I)
Notes 137-188

See also the undermentioned decisions.⁶

138. Decree against several persons.—A decree may be passed against several persons, either jointly or severally, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as deliverable or payable by each. In the former case, an application for execution against one of the judgment-debtors will save limitation as against all of them.¹ In the latter case, an application for execution will save limitation only as against the particular judgment-debtor against whom it has been made and not against others.²

Where a decree is passed jointly against *A* and *B*, the fact that it is provided in the decree that it should be first executed against

- (1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 59 (59), *Johsroonissa Khatoun v. Ameeroonissa Khatoun*.
 (1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 76 (77), *Maharane Indurjeet Kunwur v. Marun Ali Khan*.
 (1864) 1 Suth W R Misc 1 (2), *Brojo Coomar Mullick v. Ram Bulsh Chateerjee*.
 (1870) 13 Suth W R 128 (128) : 4 Beng L R App 41, *Aodh Behari Lal v. Brojomohun Lall*.
 6. (1870) 12 Suth W R 128 (128), *Chand Sahai v. Marun Ali Khan* (Decree for a

the decree-holders could not benefit the other set of decree-holders.)

- (1889) 13 Mad 236 (239), *Seshan v. Rajagopala*. (A decree in a partition suit, in favour of two Hindu minor brothers and another brother acting as their next friend which declares the rights of the three brothers to redeem a certain property is not a decree passed severally in favour of the plaintiffs.)

Note 138

1. (1909) 2 Ind Cas 88 (88) (All), *Lachmimakuer v. Sampat Rai*.
 (1907) 29 All 623 (626) : 1907 All W N 204 : 4 All L Jour 552, *Gauri Sahai v. Ashfaq Hussain*. (Decree for sale against all defendants—Decree against one set aside—Suit against that defendant subsequently decreed—Second order absolute—The two orders operate as one decree—Decree made absolute.)
 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 86 (87) : 88 Ind Cas 1039, *Tara Prasanna v. Jnanendra Narayan*.
 (1909) 4 Ind Cas 403 (409) (Cal), *Barada Kinkar v. Nabin Chandra*.
 (1931) A I R 1931 Lah 116 (117) : 134 Ind Cas 194, *Gopi Chand v. Meher Chand*.
 (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1 (2) : 90 Ind Cas 423 : 38 Mad 419, *Abdul Khadir v. Ahammad Shawwa Ravuther*.
 (1910) 5 Ind Cas 800 (800) : 13 Oudh Cas 48, *Kabilasi Kunwar v. Rudr Pratap Sahi*.
 (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 416 (417) : 103 Ind Cas 867, *Ramasray Chaudhari v. Lachhmi Narayan Ojha*. (Decree joint and several—Application against one judgment-debtor is step against all.)
 [See also (1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 25 (25), *Shaukh Bunecad Ali v. Juggessur Singh*. (Cases under Section 20 of Act XIV of 1859)]
2. (1918) A I R 1918 All 330 (330) : 46 Ind Cas 669 : 40 All 206, *Ghulam Muhiuddin Khan v. Dambar Singh*.
 (1926) A I R 1926 Cal 267 (270) : 85 Ind Cas 657, *Dhirendra Chandra v. Tulsi Charan*. (Simply mentioning the name of the other judgment-debtor will not make it one against both.)
 (1935) A I R 1935 Lah 919 (950) : 162 Ind Cas 203, *Umrao Singh v. Hafiz Muhammad Abdullah*.
 (1931) A I R 1934 Lah 637 (639) : 153 Ind Cas 238, *Hafiz Mahomed Abdullah v. Amrao Singh*.

A does not make it other than a joint decree against them both.³ Similarly, the fact that a joint decree differentiates between the several judgment-debtors as regards the *mode of execution* does not affect its character as a joint decree.⁴ So also, the fact that subsequent to the passing of a joint decree against several persons the liability of one of them is limited by an adjustment with the decree-holder, does not alter the character of the decree as a joint decree.⁵ An application for execution against one of several joint judgment-debtors under a decree will save limitation for execution against the other judgment-debtors, although, as against the former the decree is subsequently set aside or declared inoperative.⁶

A decree passed against several persons as the legal representatives of a deceased person is passed against them *jointly* and severally and an application for execution made against one of the judgment-debtors will save limitation for execution against the others also.⁷

A decree against the manager of a Hindu joint family carrying on business is a decree passed against several persons *jointly* within the meaning of Explanation I and an application for execution against any of the members of the family will save limitation for execution against other members also.⁸

In a suit for sale on a mortgage, it was found that one of the properties had been previously sold for arrears of revenue. Hence, a decree was passed for the realization of the total amount due by the sale of the other properties and out of a certain amount of cash in the hands of one of the defendants which had been received by him as the surplus proceeds of the revenue sale. It was held that the decree was one passed jointly against all the defendants and that an application for execution by sale of the properties would save limitation for execution against the surplus sale proceeds of the revenue sale.⁹

Where a mortgage decree does not apportion the mortgage debt as among the different items of property mortgaged, it is a joint

(1935) A I R 1935 Oudh 9 (11) 152 Ind Cas 457. 10 Luck 260, *Sahai Lal v. Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur*.

[See also (1873) 19 Suth W R 30 (32) 10 Beng L R 253 (F B), *Wise v. Rajnarain Chuckerbutty* (Case before enactment of Explanation I)]

(1868) 10 Suth W R 10 (11) 10 Beng L R 259 [Note], *Khemadibia v. Kumala Kant Bakshee* (Do)]

3 (1937) A I R 1937 Lah 792 (793), *Murilmall & Sons v. Bhawan Dass*.

4. (1929) A I R 1929 All 795 (796) 118 Ind Cas 237, *Moti Lal v. Champa Lal*.

5 (1921) A I R 1921 Sind 132 (134) 79 Ind Cas 477 16 Sind L R 245, *Donald Graham & Co. v. Kewalram*

6 (1900) 1 Ind Cas 330 (340) 31 All 309, *Lalla Prasad v. Suraj Kunwar*

7. (1934) A I R 1934 Rang 101 (102) 149 Ind Cas 98, *U Nyo v. U Po Hlaing*.

8 (1922) 67 Ind Cas 56 (57) (Lah), *Kidar Nath v. Radha Kishen*.

9. (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 700 (702, 703) 76 Ind Cas 452, *Bishun Chand v. Abhoykumar Chand*.

Article 182
(Expln. I)
Notes 138-139

decree passed against the mortgagor and a subsequent mortgagee of some of the items.¹⁰

An application for execution against one joint judgment-debtor will save limitation not only against the other judgment-debtors but also against the legal representatives of the other judgment-debtors.¹¹

But an application for execution against a joint judgment-debtor will save limitation for execution against other joint judgment-debtors only where such application has been one in accordance with law and made to the proper Court.¹²

It is an application for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution against a joint judgment-debtor that will save limitation against the other judgment-debtors. The mere fact that as against one joint judgment-debtor limitation is *suspended* in consequence of his adjudication as an insolvent, limitation will not be suspended in respect of the other joint judgment-debtors also.¹³

Explanation I only provides that an application for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution against one joint judgment-debtor will save limitation for execution against the other joint judgment-debtors. The Explanation has nothing to do with the question whether an order of revivor of a decree of the Original Side of a High Court passed against one joint judgment-debtor will be operative against other joint judgment-debtors also.¹⁴

139. Judgment-debtor and his surety—Whether application for execution against one will save limitation against the other.—Where a person, either before or after a decree is passed, stands surety for the satisfaction of the decree by the judgment-debtor and the decree is executable against the surety also under the provisions of Section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code, an application for execution against him will be governed by this Article.¹⁵ The question, however, arises whether an application for execution either against the surety or the judgment-debtor alone will save limitation

10. (1903) 30 Cal 761 (769) 8 Cal W N 251, *Troylokya Nath Bose v. Jyoti Prakash Nandis*.

11. (1927) A I R 1927 Mad 1103 (1104); 106 Ind Cas 391, *Kotigadu v. Subbaya*.
 (1905) 2 Cal L Jour 544 (545), *Jogendra Nath Roy v. Rank Chandra Banerjee*.

12. (1899) 27 Cal 210 (213), *Harendra Lal Roy v. Sham Lal Sen*.

13. (1938) A I R 1938 Pat 395 (396); 176 Ind Cas 876, *Ram Ran Bijoy Prasad v. Nageshwar Tewary*.

14. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 518 (514); 40 Mad 1127; 40 Ind Cas 608, *Krishnaia v. Gajendra*.

Note 139

1a. See also Note 13 to Section 145 of the Authors' Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure.

(1937) A I R 1937 Cal 452 (454); 173 Ind Cas 183, *Harendra Kumar v. Gurupada Bhowmik*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 219 (220); 142 Ind Cas 368, *Rami Reddi v. Gurusurthi*.

(1932) A I R 1932 P C 181 (183); 136 Ind Cas 629 (P C), *Raghunandan Prasad Singh v. Kalyanand Singh Bahadur*.

(1938) A I R 1938 Lah 590 (592), *Nanu Mal v. Amar Nath*.

against both of them. On this question there is a conflict of decisions. One view is that such application will save limitation only against the judgment-debtor or the surety, as the case may be, and not against both of them.¹ The view is based on the ground that in such cases the judgment-debtor and the surety are not persons against whom the decree has been passed jointly within the meaning of the latter part of the 2nd paragraph of Explanation I. The other view is that in such cases the application for execution will save limitation against both the judgment-debtor and his surety.² According to the decisions which take this view, Explanation I does not apply at all to such cases. Hence, as an application for execution against either the judgment-debtor or the surety alone will be one quite in accordance with law under clause 5, such application will save limitation against both. It is submitted that the latter set of decisions is correct.

Where a decree has been passed jointly against a judgment-debtor and his surety, the case will clearly come within the latter part of the 2nd paragraph of Explanation I and an application for execution against either of them will save limitation against both. In such cases, the mere fact that the decree provides that it should be executed against the surety if the amount was not realized from the principal debtor, does not make the decree other than a joint decree for the purpose of the Explanation.³

1. (1906) 81 Bom 50 (54) : 8 Bom L R 807, *Narayana v. Timmaya*.
(1926) A I R 1926 Cal 267 (269) . 85 Ind Cas 657, *Birendra Chandra Singha v. Tulsi Charan*.
(1922) A I R 1922 Lah 203 (209) 60 Ind Cas 265, *Wazir Baksh v. Har Ram*.
(1914) 1914 Mad W N 64 (64) (Jour), C. M S A. No. 62 of 1913.
(1929) A I R 1929 Pat 597 (601) 120 Ind Cas 315, *Kiryanand v. Parthachand*.
(1929) A I R 1929 Pat 595 (597) 120 Ind Cas 309 8 Pat 310, *Raghunandan Prasad v. Kiryanand*.
(1928) A I R 1928 Rang 282 (283) 111 Ind Cas 479 . 6 Rang 334, *Mohamed Kassim v. Janila Beebee*.
(1923) A I R 1923 Bom 866 (367, 368) 73 Ind Cas 233 47 Bom 778, *Usuf Ali v. Syed Amin*
[See also (1898) 23 Bom 478 (483), *Kusaji v. Vinayak R. Parbhu*.
and so, application for execution against him does not save limitation against the principal debtor]
2. (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 188 (189) 58 Mad 276 : 155 Ind Cas 664, *Gangaraju v. Subbayya*
(1921) A I R 1921 All 291 (293) 43 All 152 58 Ind Cas 794, *Md. Hafis v. Md. Ibrahim*.
(1922) A I R 1922 All 481 (483) 44 All 743 77 Ind Cas 129, *Badrud din v. Md. Hafis*
(1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 351 (353) 168 Ind Cas 600 13 Luck 353, *Bachchu Singh v. Radhe Lal*.
3. (1922) A I R 1922 Lah 457 (458) 67 Ind Cas 301, *Honda Ram v. Firm Seth Kanwar Bhansukhnand*

Article 182
(Expln. I)
Notes 139-140

Steps taken for the enforcement of a surety bond against a surety for a judgment-debtor *otherwise than by the execution of the decree* against the surety under Section 145 of the Civil Procedure Code, will not save limitation for execution of the decree against the judgment-debtor.⁴ The reason is that in such cases the steps taken for the enforcement of the surety bond will not come within the description of an application for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution of the decree.

See also the undermentioned cases.⁵

140. Decree for partition.—With regard to decrees for partition passed before the coming into force of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, which merely declared the respective rights of the parties leaving it to be determined in execution what properties were to be allotted to each, it has been held that such decrees were *joint* decrees for the purpose of the Explanation and that an application for execution by any one of the parties will save limitation in favour of all.¹ The basis of these decisions is that such decrees contained a *joint declaration* of the rights of the parties. But this principle will not apply to a final decree for partition passed after the coming into force of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, specifying the particular properties to be allotted to the different parties. Such a decree will clearly be a decree passed *severally* in favour of more persons than one, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable to each. Hence, in such a case an application for execution made by one of the parties to the decree will not save limitation in favour of any other party.² But where a decree, while awarding to

(1920) A I R 1920 Upp Bur 21 (23) : 3 Upp Bur Rul 261 : 60 Ind Cas 23, *Finke Supaya v. Maung Kim*.

4. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 722 (724) : 145 Ind Cas 1001, *Jamunadas Baruji Sast v. Krishnan*.

5. (1933) A I R 1933 Oudh 209 (213) : 8 Luck 427 : 143 Ind Cas 608, *Shyam Lal v. Nasiruddin Beg.* (Article 182 does not apply at all to an application for execution of the decree guaranteeing payment of interest when the decree was for interest on the principal in the last application.)

(1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 44 (44), *Hurkhoo Singh v. Baboo Ram Kishen.* (Decision under Act of 1859—Execution against principal debtor will not keep alive decree against surety.)

Note 140

1 (1875) 8 Cal 551 (552) : 2 Cal L R 187, *Sheikh Khورشيد Hossein v. Nubbe Fatima*.

(1882) 9 Cal 568 (570), *Mohun Chunder Kurmohar v. Mohesh Chunder Kurmohar*.

(1896) 1896 Bom P J 271, *Coccardandas v. Ghonashandas*.

(1886) 1886 Bom P J 287, *Narayan v. Vithal*.

(1922) A I R 1922 Mad 327 (328) : 65 Ind Cas 990, *Ramammami Iyengar v. Narayana Iyengar*.

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the different sharers their respective shares, declares certain property to be joint, it has been held that such a decree is *joint* and that an application for execution by one of the parties will save limitation in favour of all.³ The reason given is that a decree cannot be joint and several at the same time.

Article 182
(Explan. I)
Notes 140-141

Where a decree consisted of two parts, one in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendant, entitling them to have their share in the property in the suit to be set apart, and the other, enabling them to have a partition *inter se* of such joint share on the younger of them coming of age, it was held that a joint application for the execution of the former part will not afford a fresh starting point for the period of limitation in respect to an application by one of the plaintiffs in execution of the latter part of the decree.⁴

141. Decree partly joint and partly several against several defendants.—A decree passed against several persons may be partly joint and partly several. Thus, it may be passed jointly against all the persons in regard to a certain matter, while in regard to some other matter the decree may be passed severally against them, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable by each. For instance, a decree may be passed against several persons, jointly for possession and severally for costs, specifying the amount of costs to be paid by each. Is such a decree a joint decree or a several decree for the purpose of the second paragraph of Explanation I? On this question, there is a conflict of decisions. The following two views have been expressed on the question—

1. Such a decree is a joint decree. According to this view, a decree is joint if any one of the reliefs granted under the decree is granted against the defendants jointly, even though some other relief may be given against each of the defendants separately.¹
2. In such cases, the decree must be treated as a joint decree in regard to the reliefs granted jointly against the defendants and as a decree passed severally against them in regard to the reliefs granted against each of them separately. Under this view, if the previous application related to a relief granted against a

(1932) A I R 1932 Cal 869 (870) 139 Ind Cas 786, *Mon Mohan Gope v. Madhusudan Gope*.

3. (1932) A I R 1932 Cal 869 (870) 139 Ind Cas 786, *Mon Mohan Gope v. Madhusudan Gope*.

(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 789 (791) : 145 Ind Cas 968, *Mahomed Sahood Lera; Sayabu v. Mayamad Ammal*

4. (1897) 1887 Bom P J 72, *Yashwantrao v. Krishnabai*.

Note 141

1. (1906) 30 Mad 268 (269) 2 Mad L Tim 183, *Subramania Chettiar v.*

**Article 182
(Expln. I)
Notes 141-142**

defendant separately, it would not save limitation in regard to any other defendant. But, if such application related to a relief granted jointly against the defendants, the application will save limitation for execution in regard to such relief, not only against the particular defendant against whom the application was made but also against the other defendants.²

Where a relief has been granted by a decree against several persons jointly and another relief has been granted by the same decree against one of them separately, a previous application against *all* the judgment-debtors for execution in respect of the joint relief will save limitation in respect of an application for the enforcement of the separate relief against the *particular* defendant against whom it has been granted.³

142. Several persons becoming entitled to or liable under decree after it is passed — Effect of application by or against one. — Explanation I only contemplates cases in which the decree, when it is passed, is passed in favour of or against more persons than one.¹ Hence, where at the time when a decree is passed there is only one decree-holder or judgment-debtor but, subsequently, more than one person become entitled to the decree or become liable under the decree, the Explanation does not apply. But, in such cases, under the terms of clause 5 itself, an application for execution or to take a step-in-aid of execution made by any of the persons entitled to the decree or against any of the persons liable under the decree, will save limitation with regard to *all* of them, provided the application is in accordance with law and is made to the proper Court.

Illustrations

1. A sole decree-holder dies. An application for execution made by one of his legal representatives will save limitation for the benefit of all the legal representatives.²
2. A sole decree-holder transfers a part of his decree to another. An application for execution by the transferee will save limitation for an application by his transferor also.³

(1937) A I R 1937 Mad 385 (391) : I L R (1937) Mad 616 : 163 Ind Cas 351 (F B). *Chandambara Nadar v. Rama Nadar*.

2. (1926) A I R 1926 All 440 (444) : 48 All 377 : 94 Ind Cas 961, *Sahu Nandlal Saran v. Sahu Dharan Kirti Saran*.

[See also (1876) 25 Sath W R 310 (311), *Chowdhry Hareeshur Singh v. Baloo Hriday Narain*.]

3. (1922) A I R 1922 All 388 (389) : 44 All 166 : 65 Ind Cas 352. *Ram Dinkar Das v. Deo Tekari*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Cal 547 (548) : 114 Ind Cas 184, *Charn Chandra Ray v. Hrushikesh Ray*.

Note 142

1. (1937) A I R 1937 Oudh 331 (333) : 163 Ind Cas 600 : 13 Luck 333, *Rushikesh Singh v. Radhe Lal*.

2. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 919 (919) : 31 Ind Cas 833, *Mahs Patro v. Narayana-pansyakti*.

(1924) A I R 1925 Oudh 30 (32) : 105 Ind Cas 611 : 3 Luck 126, *Md. Saif Ali v. Sajjad Muzza*.

3. (1890) 14 Mad 257 (254) : 1 Mad L Jour 210, *Ramasami v. Andu Pillai*.

3. A decree-holder assigns different parts of the decree to different persons. An application for execution made by any of the assignees will save limitation for the benefit of all.⁴
4. A sole judgment-debtor dies. An application made against one of his legal representatives will save limitation against all of them.⁵

It will be noticed that in illustrations 2 and 3 above the decree vests in severalty in different persons. Still, an application for execution by one of them saves limitation for the benefit of all.

EXPLANATION II.

142a. Explanation II. — See Notes 87 to 98, *ante*.

MISCELLANEOUS.

143. Revival of application. — An execution application must be deemed to be pending so long as no final order disposing of it judicially has been passed thereon. A subsequent application in such a case for execution will be deemed to be one merely for the continuation of the original proceeding.¹ On the other hand, where a final judicial order terminating the proceeding has been passed on the application, it cannot be revived, and a subsequent application for execution will be regarded as a fresh application and not as one for a revival or continuation of the original proceeding.³

4. (1922) A I R 1922 Mad 129 (130) : 69 Ind Cas 277 : 45 Mad 85, *Venkata Reddayya v. Parahayya*.
(1921) A I R 1921 Mad 415 (417), *Venkata Reddayya v. Parahayya*.
5. (1881) 8 All 517 (519) . 1881 All W N 16, *Ram Anuj Sewak v. Hingu Lal*,
(1887) 12 Bom 48 (50), *Krishnaji Janardhan v. Marrarav*.
(1912) 13 Ind Cas 818 (818) (Mad), *Adusupalli Venkata Rao v. Marikurthu*.

Note 143

1. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 418 (421) 143 Ind Cas 1 56 Mad 490 (FD), *Triguna Sundaramma v. Abdul Khader*
(1915) A I R 1915 Mad 407 (411) : 26 Ind Cas 244, *Venkatamma v. Manikam Nayan Varu*.
(1928) A I R 1928 Mad 971 (971) : 109 Ind Cas 375, *Mallikaraja Pudu v. Nalla Venkaya*.
(1926) A I R 1926 All 510 (511) : 94 Ind Cas 869, *Mt. Bittes v. Kanhaiyalal* {Application for execution ordered to be simply "filed"—Fresh application is to be treated as one for revival}
(1906) 16 Mad L Jour 503 (504, 505) 1 Mad L Tim 291, *Talapoorn Appiah v. Maram Reddi Ram Reddi*.
(1926) 94 Ind Cas 80 (81) (Cal), *Akshoy Kumar v. Nalini Kumar*. (No fresh execution application is necessary to revive the first application which is pending before the Court and where there has been no dismissal of the original application for execution)
(1891) 1894 Pun Re No. 27, *Kundan Lal v. Mt. Mahhanti*.
(1934) A I R 1934 All 481 (486) 56 All 791 . 146 Ind Cas 1017 (F B), *Shiva Shankar Das v. Mufti Syed Yusuf Hasan*.
2. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 418 (421) 143 Ind Cas 1. 56 Mad 490 (FD), *Triguna Sundaramma v. Abdul Khader*.
(1937) A I R 1937 All 513 (514) 170 Ind Cas 507, *Zuladar Singh v. Brijlal Singh*.
(1879) 4 Cal 877 (881) : 8 Cal L R 161 4 Ind Jnr 236, *Murronath Bhunja v. Chumilal Ghose*

Article 182¹
Notes
142—143

Article 182
Note 143

The question whether or not an execution proceeding has been finally disposed of so as to be incapable of being revived or continued, is a question of fact which has to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The form of the order passed on the application is not sufficient to determine the question. The question is really one of substance and not of form.³

Where an execution proceeding is *suspended by no act or default on the part of the decree-holder*, the latter has a right to ask the Court to revive and carry through the execution proceeding.⁴ The leading case on the point is *Qamaruddin Ahmed v. Jawahir Lal*.⁵ In that case an order was made on an execution application dated 24th of August 1888, to the effect that the property to be sold in execution being ancestral, the case should be struck off the file and the papers transferred to the Court of the Collector for the completion of the sale proceedings. A further order was later on passed to the effect that as a fee of Rs. 1 had not been paid by the decree-holder on account of the order for sale by auction, the case should not be transferred to the Collector. More than three years after the date of the original application the decree-holder applied for the revival of the application. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows :

"Their Lordships are of opinion that the execution proceedings commenced by the petition of the 24th August 1888 were never finally disposed of and that the application now under consideration was in substance as well as in form, to revive and carry through a pending execution suspended by no act or default of the decree-holder and not an application to initiate a new one."

Where an order purporting to dispose of an execution proceeding finally is made *behind the back of the decree-holder* without giving

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- (1908) 5 All L Jour 622 (625) : 1908 All W N 253, *Safia Begam v. Shiam Prasad*.
 (1912) 13 Ind Cas 160 (160) (Mad), *Parry & Co. v. Vadivelu Pillai*. (Petition dismissed though attachment continued.)
 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 48 (50) (Cal), *Krdar Nath v. Prodyot Kumar (Do.)*
 [See also (1891) 1881 All W N 47 (47), *Bhola Dat v. Tulsi Singh*]
 3. (1916) A I R 1916 All 21 (26) : 32 Ind Cas 1005, *Sant Lal v. Sri Nevas Das*.
 (1905) 7 Bom L R 819 (820, 821), *Mahomed Iscof Sahib v. Bachelappa Taleppa*.
 4. (1921) A I R 1921 All 99 (100) : 61 Ind Cas 417 : 43 All 883, *Madho Prasad v. Darupadi Bibi*.
 (1905) 27 All 334 (338) : 32 Ind App 102 : 1 Cal L Jour 381 : 2 All L Jour 397 : 15 Mad L Jour 258 : 7 Bom L R 433 : 9 Cal W N 601 : 8 Sar 910 (P C), *Qamar-ud-din Ahmad v. Jawahir Lal*.
 (1921) A I R 1921 Cal 472 (473) : 63 Ind Cas 207, *Ajodhya Nath v. Srinath Chandra*.
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 600 (601) : 77 Ind Cas 871, *Mahomed Hadi v. Debi Prasad*.
 [See also (1923) A I R 1923 All 471 (472) : 71 Ind Cas 963, *Amjad Ali Khan v. Md. Usman*.]
 5. (1905) 27 All 334 (338) : 32 Ind App 102 : 1 Cal L Jour 381 : 2 All L Jour 397 : 15 Mad L Jour 258 : 7 Bom L R 433 : 9 Cal W N 601 : 8 Sar 910 (P C).

him an opportunity of being heard, it cannot be regarded as a judicial determination of the proceeding on the merits, and, consequently, the proceeding will be regarded as *pending*. A subsequent application will lie for the revival and continuance of the proceeding so disposed of.⁶

Where an order is made purporting to dispose of a matter against the decree-holder at the request of the decree-holder or on the ground of the *default of the decree-holder* in carrying on the proceedings, the proceeding cannot be revived.⁷ But, where such an order is made in a case in which the *decree-holder could not take further proceeding owing to circumstances beyond his control*, the order will be regarded as merely suspensory in its nature and a fresh application will be regarded as one for the revival and continuation of the original proceeding. Thus, where the execution is *stayed* or is prevented by *injunction*, or becomes impossible to be proceeded with, owing to a claim being advanced to the property which is the subject of the execution, or owing to some other obstacle placed by the judgment-debtor in the way of execution, and the application is "dismissed" or "struck off" or "consigned to the record room," the order will not be regarded as having finally disposed of the petition, and a subsequent application will be regarded as one for the revival and continuation of the original proceeding.⁸ On the same principle,

Article 182
Note 153

G. (1927) A I R 1927 All 16 (17) 100 Ind Cas 692 : 49 All 276 (F B), *Chatter Singh v. Kamal Singh*.

(1927) A I R 1927 All 165 (167) : 49 All 509 : 104 Ind Cas 116 (F B), *Baij Nath v. Ram Bharos*.

7. (1913) 20 Ind Cas 563 (564) (Lah), *Phusa v. Surjan*

(1924) A I R 1924 Cal 419 (420) 74 Ind Cas 279, *Rajani Bandhu v. Kali prasanna*.

(1918) A I R 1918 Cal 332 (332) 45 Ind Cas 712, *Midnapore Zamindari Co Ltd. v. Dina Nath Sahu*

(1896) 5 Cal W N 347 (348), *Dhukiram Srimani v. Joyendra Chunder Sen*.

(1915) A I R 1915 All 231 (232) 28 Ind Cas 381, *Ibrahimji v. Hasinuddin Khan*.

(1899) 21 Mad 257 (260) 8 Mad L Jour 25, *Suryanarayana Pandarathar v. Gurunada Pillai*.

8. (1918) 20 Ind Cas 439 (441) (Cal), *Lal Govindnath v. Bhikar Sahu* (Order must be regarded as suspensory though in form final)

(1904) 29 Mad 50 (53) 14 Mad L Jour 401 (F B), *Suppa Reddiar v. Andas Annai* (Claim.)

(1937) A I R 1937 All 513 (514) 170 Ind Cas 507, *Zuladar Singh v. Brij Lal*.

(1932) A I R 1932 Cal 19 (20) 59 Cal 1113 184 Ind Cas 939, *Radha Ballau Khan v. Peary Lal Ghosh* (Stay)

(1891) 21 Cal 387 (391), *Balranta Nath Mitta v. Jughore Bore*. (Do.)

(1875) 23 Suth W R 183 (184), *Booboo Pyaroo Tukobildarnee v. Syud Nazir Hossein*. (Claim)

(1934) A I R 1934 All 294 (296) 148 Ind Cas 525, *Mt Nabhan v. Mt. Moti*. (Injunction.)

(1890) 5 Bom 29 (34), *Kalyanbhai Dipchand v. Ghanasham Lal*. (Do.)

(1906) 83 Cal 689 (692), *Guru Deo Narayan Sinha v. Amrit Narayan Sinha*. (Do)

Article 182
Note 143

where the Court purports to dispose of a matter against the decree-holder for no act or default of his, the order cannot be considered to have finally disposed of the application.⁹

- (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 178 (179) : 76 Ind Cas 126, *Aisamma Ayyas Umma v. P. K. Abdulla*.
 (1898) 21 Mad 262 (263) : 8 Mad L Jour 18, *Sasivarna Tetar v. Arulandam Pillas*. (Stay.)
 (1896) 23 Cal 437 (440), *Rudra Narain Guria v. Pachu Marly*. (Claim.)
 (1912) 16 Ind Cas 484 (484) (Mad), *Krishna Doss v. Mahommed Mian Rowthen*. (Do.)
 (1924) A I R 1924 Mad 210 (211) : 47 Mad 176 : 79 Ind Cas 779, *Surayya v. Venkataratnam*. (Do.)
 (1921) 61 Ind Cas 817 (818) (Lah), *Shib Das v. Ram Nath*. (Do.)
 (1877) 1 All 355 (357) (F B), *Paras Ram v. Gardner*. (Do.)
 (1868-69) 4 Mad H C R 261 (262, 263), *Ragara Pishardi v. Valia Thambakale*. (Do.)
 (1924) A I R 1924 Cal 419 (420) : 74 Ind Cas 279, *Rajani Bandhu Chatterjee v. Kals Prasanna Chatterjee*.
 (1903) 26 All 156 (159) : 1903 All W N 221, *Buddar Singh v. Dhanpal Singh*.
 (1903) 26 All 140 (143) : 1903 All W N 211, *Beni Prasad v. Sarju Prasad*.
 (1936) A I R 1936 Cal 239 (241) : 63 Cal 57 : 162 Ind Cas 654, *Krislo Kamini Debi v. Girish Chandra Mondal*.
 (1887) 14 Cal 385 (387), *Chandra Prodhan v. Gopi Mohun Shaha*.
 (1886) 8 All 545 (548) : 1886 All W N 178, *Nandram v. Sitaram*.
 (1900) 23 All 18 (20) : 1900 All W N 178, *Thakur Prasad v. Abdul Husain*.
 (1910) 6 Ind Cas 537 (539) : 37 Cal 796, *Madhabmoni Das v. Pamela Lambert*.
 (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 576 (578) : 8 Pat 596 : 78 Ind Cas 766, *Bhagwanla Keer v. Zamir Ahmad Khan*.

- (1922) A I R 1922 All 433 (433) : 65 Ind Cas 76, *Ramalakhan Singh v. Lala Mewa Lal*. (Execution proceedings consigned to record room without any default on part of decree-holder and without decision—Further application is really one in continuance of the prior one.)
 (1919) A I R 1919 Cal 1054 (1055) : 47 Ind Cas 911, *Mohini Mohan Sirlar v. Naradwip Chandra Biswas*.
 (1920) A I R 1920 All 174 (175) : 42 All 564 : 56 Ind Cas 1006, *Dalwant Singh v. Budh Singh*. (Execution restrained by injunction.)
 (1923) A I R 1923 All 600 (601) : 77 Ind Cas 871, *Mahammad Hadi v. Debi Prasad*.
 (1895) 17 All 425 (427, 428) : 1895 All W N 82, *Lakshmi Chand v. Ballam Das* (Stayed by injunction.)
 (1926) A I R 1926 All 331 (331, 332) : 91 Ind Cas 618, *Giridharilal v. Ram Charan Lal*.
 (1909) 2 Ind Cas 76 (77) : 1909 Pun Re No. 45, *Mulchand v. Muhammad*. (Blocked by claim proceedings.)
 (1902) 30 Cal 407 (411), *Ashrafuddin Ahmed v. Depin Behari Mullich*. (Attachment released owing to insolvency of judgment-debtor.)
 (1912) 13 Ind Cas 140 (141) (Cal), *Rameswar Singh v. Turpit Singh*.
 (1935) A I R 1935 Mad 803 (803) : 58 Mad 893 : 159 Ind Cas 279 (F B), *Abdul Aziz Sahib v. Chokkan Chettiar*. (Order "possession obstructed, petition dismissed")
 (But see (1917) A I R 1917 Mad 447 (448) : 35 Ind Cas 591, *Yellampalle Venkatappa v. Matam Nanjappa*. (Dismissal of first application for non-payment of batta—Subsequent suit operating as obstacle—Second application after removal of obstacle is not one for continuation.)
 9. (1915) A I R 1915 All 410 (411) : 30 Ind Cas 677 : 37 All 518, *Yakub Ali v. Durga Prasad*.

An order striking off a proceeding is not sanctioned by any rule of law.¹⁰ But, nevertheless, Courts very often do pass such orders and the question arises as to the effect of such orders. A "striking off" of a proceeding may, under certain circumstances, amount to a final disposal of the proceeding, in which case the proceeding so disposed of cannot be revived.¹¹ On the other hand, a proceeding may be struck off which has not the effect of finally disposing of the proceeding. The question depends upon the intention of the Court in making the order and the construction of the order itself.¹² In *Puddomonee Dossee v. Roy Muthooranath*,^{12a} their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that "the striking an execution proceeding off the file in India may admit of different interpretations according to circumstances." When a very long time had elapsed between the original execution and the date on which it was struck off, their Lordships held that it should be presumed that the execution was abandoned and ceased to be operative unless the circumstances were otherwise explained. Where the Court makes an order striking off the case "for the present," or the circumstances show that the order striking off must have been only a temporary one, the order will not be deemed to be one finally disposing of the proceeding which will consequently be deemed pending.¹³ Similarly, an order striking off a proceeding for administrative or statistical purposes, is not a final disposal of the proceeding which must therefore be considered pending.¹⁴

10. (1891) 10 Cal 416 (423), *Bisua Sonan Chunder v. Binanda Chunder Disingar Adhikar*.

(1927) A 1 R 1927 All 16 (19) 100 Ind Cas 692 49 All 276 (F B), *Chhattar Singh v. Kamal Singh*.

(1926) A 1 R 1926 All 409 (409) 94 Ind Cas 1005, *Sat Narain Lal v. Ganga Jal*.

(1897) 10 Mad 270 (271), *Aluar Ayyangar v. Seshammal*.

(1872) 17 Suth W R 219 (220), *Khoob Lal Singh v. Toolsce Singh*.

11. (1879) 4 Cal 877 (881) 3 Cal L R 161 4 Ind Jur 236, *Hurrenath Bhunjo v. Chunni Lal Ghose*.

12. (1936) A 1 R 1936 All 820 (823) : 166 Ind Cas 106 (F B), *Md. Taqi v. Raja Ram*.

12a (1873) 20 Suth W R 183 (186) 12 Beng L R 411. 3 Sar 268 (F C)

13. (1893) 21 Cal 887 (391), *Bashanta Nath Mitta v. Aghore Nath Bose*.

(1923) A 1 R 1923 All 471 (472) 71 Ind Cas 963, *Amyad Ali Khan v.*

(1891) 16 Bom 294 (302), *Ohntamani Damodar Agashe v. Balshastri*.

(1931) A 1 R 1931 All 458 (460) 133 Ind Cas 316, *Prem Narain v. Ganga Ram* (Struck off "for the present")

(1930) A 1 R 1930 Mad 328 (329) 116 Ind Cas 769, *Subramania Chettiar v. Angappa Asari*

Article 182 Note 143

Even where an execution proceeding is *properly* disposed of by a final order, it may be revived, where, for some reason not due to any default or neglect on the part of the decree-holder, it subsequently turns out that the order is untenable, inoperative or ineffective.^{14a} Thus, where property is sold in execution, the decree is satisfied and the execution struck off or closed, but the sale is subsequently set aside at the instance of the judgment-debtor, it has been held that the decree-holder can apply for the revival and continuation of the earlier proceeding.¹⁵

Where the circumstances are such that the decree-holder can ask for a revival of an earlier proceeding, even an application, in form one for *execution*, will be considered to be one for revival or continuation of earlier proceeding.¹⁶ For all intents and purposes there is not much difference between revival and continuation of the former application. The " It is, however,

(1909) 3 Ind Putti Kollaya.
(Order

14a(1933) A I R 1933 Mad 418 (422) : 143 Ind Cas 1 : 56 Mad 490 (F B), *Bala Tripura Sundaramma v. Abdul Khader*.

15. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 398 (399, 400) : 32 Ind Cas 699, *Krishna Prasad Singh v. Matichand*.

(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 329 (332) : 57 Cal 860 : 126 Ind Cas 208, *Alshoy*

v. *Abdool Khalaf*
Huq v. Reajuddin.
Pat 829, *Radhakrishnan*

(11) Cas 707 : 10 Low Dur Rul 84,

(1) Cas 89 : 2 Pat L Jour 115, *Mi*.

our 815, *Bihari Lal*

. *Khair-un-nissa v.*
in execution of his
decree, purchases property as belonging to judgment debtor and
is made to pay in a suit by the real owners of the property, a
subsequent application for execution is not a revival or continu-
uation of the previous one which resulted in the abortive sale.)

(1918) A I R 1918 All 401 (403) : 45 Ind Cas 531, *Sundar Lal v.*

182.]

16. (1927) A I R 1927 All 16 (18) : 100 Ind Cas 692 : 49 All 276 (F B), *Chhattar Singh v. Kamal Singh*.

(1922) A I R 1922 All 433 (433) : 65 Ind Cas 78, *Ram Laxhan Singh v.*

ul Khalaf.
v. *Syud Nasir*

(1921) A I R 1921 Oudh 31 (31) : 26 Oudh Cas 206 : 80 Ind Cas 775, *Mahar Hussain v. Qudrat Ali*.

(1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 430 (432) : 17 Oudh Cas 169 : 25 Ind Cas 160, *Girdhari Lal v. Damodar Doss*.

[See also (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 367 (369) : 72 Ind Cas 562, *Dharohar Singh v. Ram Prasad Narain Sahai*.]

17. (1933) A I R 1933 Mad 418 (422) : 143 Ind Cas 1 : 56 Mad 490 (F B), *Tripura Sundaramma v. Abdul Khader*.

necessary before an application can be considered to be one for the revival or continuation of the previous proceeding, that the subsequent application must be of the *same nature as the previous one*. It must be for the same relief and against the same persons. Where the character of the subsequent application is different from that of the prior one in the above particulars, the later application will not be regarded as one for revival but as a fresh application.¹⁸

An application for revival or continuation of a previous proceeding is not governed by this Article,¹⁹ but by Article 181 which is a residuary Article governing all applications not provided for elsewhere in the First Schedule.²⁰ It was held in the undermentioned

18. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 449 (449) : 43 Ind Cas 122, *Thiagrayan v. Kannuswami Pillai*.
(1884) 7 Mad 595 (596, 597) : 8 Ind Jur 613, *Virasami v. Athi*. (First

- (1923) A I R 1923 Cal 572 (574, 575) 76 Ind Cas 455, *Rajendra v. Abdul*
(1932) A I R 1932 All 278 (278) 54 All 573 139 Ind Cas 583 (F B), *Gobardhan Das v. Dau Dayal*.
(1883) 7 Bom 293 (296), *Krishnaya Raghunath Kothavle v. Anandran Ballal Kothakar*.
(1895) 18 All 9 (11) : 1895 All W N 133, *Har Sarup v. Balgobind*.
(1912) 14 Ind Cas 172 (173) 34 All 896, *Khetpal v. Tikam Singh*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Pat 367 (369, 370) : 72 Ind Cas 862, *Dharohar Singh v. Ram Prasad Narayan Sahai*.
19. (1912) 14 Ind Cas 264 (265) : 36 Mad 553, *Subbachariar v. Muthuceram Pillai*.
20. (1934) A I R 1934 All 294 (296) : 148 Ind Cas 525, *Mt. Nabban Begam v. Mt. Moti Begam*
(1906) 28 All 651 (653) 1906 All W N 152 3 All L Jour 845, *Bihari Lal Missir v. Jagannath Prasad*
(1893) 6 All 23 (24) 1893 All W N 181, *Basant Lal v. Datul Bibi*
(1883) 5 All 243 (245) 1883 All W N 8, *Raghubans Gir v. Sheosaran Gir*.
(1931) A I R 1931 All 458 (460) 133 Ind Cas 316, *Prem Narain v. Ganga Ram*. (Assumed)
(1880) 5 Bom 29 (35, 37), *Kalyanbhai Dipchandbhai v. Ghansham Lal Jadunathji*.
(1930) A I R 1930 Cal 329 (332) 57 Cal 860 : 126 Ind Cas 268, *Akshoy Kumar Roy v. Abdul Kader Khan*
(1913) 20 Ind Cas 439 (441) (Cal), *Lal Gobind Nath Shah Deo v. Bhikar Sahu*.
(1911) 11 Ind Cas 972 (973) (Cal), *Sheikh Mahomed v. William Alfred Thomas*
(1925) A I R 1925 Mad 981 (984) 88 Ind Cas 201, *Manganamma Nayakurathi v. Ramdasappa*.
(1924) A I R 1924 Mad 210 (211) 79 Ind Cas 779 47 Mad 176, *Manyam*

[But see (1910) 6 Ind Cas 537 (541) 37 Cal 796, *Madha Moni Dass v. Pamela Lambert*. (There is no rule of limitation applicable)]
(1878) 3 Cal L R 261 (263), *Golam Sahu v. Chutterbhooj Patuck*
(1909) 1 Ind Cas 341 (343) (Cal), *Abdul Khayar v. Rearuddin*. (Question of limitation does not arise)]

Article 182
Notes
143—146

cases²¹ that the starting point of time under that Article for an application for revival and continuation of a pending proceeding accrued day by day.

On the other hand, in the cases cited below²² it has been held that where the execution has been arrested by some obstacle for which the decree-holder is not responsible, time for application for revival will begin to run from the date when the obstacle is removed.

144. Onus. — The burden of proving that an application for execution is not time-barred is on the applicant.¹ But where *prima facie* it is within time, it is for the opponent to show how it is not within time.² It was held in the undermentioned case³ that the onus of proving that the previous application was *in accordance with law* was also on the applicant. A contrary view, namely that the presumption is that an application is in accordance with law and that the onus of proving that it is not so is on the judgment-debtor, has been taken by the High Court of Madras.⁴

145. Local or special law. — A special or local law may prescribe a period of limitation for an application for execution different from that prescribed by this Article. In such cases, it is the period prescribed by such local or special law that will govern the application. See Section 29, *ante*.

146. Effect of bar of limitation. — The effect of not filing an execution application governed by this Article within the time prescribed by it is to render the decree or the order inoperative and unenforceable thereafter.¹ No Court can be called upon to take action

21. (1907) 31 Mad 71 (73, 76) : 18 Mad L Jour 46 : 8 Mad L Tim 329, *Chalacadi Koliath v. Poloori Alamelammal*.
- (1925) A I R 1925 Mad 152 (152, 153) : 81 Ind Cas 897, *Pullaya Krishnayya Shanbaga v. Pullannayya*.
- (1912) 14 Ind Cas 261 (265) : 36 Mad 553, *Subba Chariar v. Muthuveeram Pillai*.
22. (1914) A I R 1914 Oudh 430 (432) : 17 Oudh Cas 160 : 25 Ind Cas 160, *Giridhari Lal v. Damodar Das*.
- (1931) A I R 1931 All 294 (296) : 148 Ind Cas 525, *Mt. Nabban Begam v. Mt. Moti Begam*. (A I R 1927 All 16 (F B), Followed.)
- (1927) A I R 1927 All 802 (803) : 100 Ind Cas 700, *Mt. Basanti v. Sirdar Mat Hardat Ras*.
- (1920) A I R 1920 All 174 (175) : 42 All 564 : 56 Ind Cas 1006, *Dalwant Singh v. Budh Singh*.
- (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 409 (410) : 91 Ind Cas 1005, *Sat Narain Lal v. Gangajai*.

Note 144

1. (1931) A I R 1931 Sind 160 (161) : 131 Ind Cas 1182 : 25 Sind L R 523, *Volkart Brothers v. Achrajram*.
- (1866) 5 Suth W R Misc 20 (20), *Dharut Singh v. Sadut Ali*.
2. (1913) 19 Ind Cas 481 (485) (Lah), *Fateh Chand v. Mt. Menghi Bai*.
3. (1931) A I R 1931 Sind 160 (161) : 131 Ind Cas 1182 : 25 Sind L R 523, *Volkart Brothers v. Achrajram*.
4. (1926) A I R 1926 Mad 321 (322) : 92 Ind Cas 700, *Trustees, Parakkal Perasum v. Venkataschalam Vadhyar*.

Note 145

1. (1868) 10 Suth W R 215 (215) : 14 Peng L R 371 (Note), *Ram Soondar Tevarce v. Sreenath Dewan*.

on such a decree,² even under its inherent powers³ Nor can such a decree be revived by any subsequent proceeding taken by the decree-holder,⁴ and it is immaterial that such proceeding is *bona fide*,⁵ or is permitted by the Court by inadvertence or is not opposed by the judgment-debtor.⁶

A decree-holder whose rights are barred cannot revert to the position which he held prior to the institution of the suit and bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action⁷ Such a suit would be barred on the principle of *res judicata*. This bar, however, will not apply where the subsequent suit is based on a cause of action arising subsequent to the date of the decree.⁸

If the execution of a decree against several judgment-debtors is time-barred as regards some judgment-debtors, it does not thereby become necessarily time-barred against others.⁹

147. Res judicata as applied to questions of limitation in execution proceedings. — See Note 19 to Section 3, *ante*.

(1880) 5 Cal 894 (897). 6 Cal L R 437, *Shumbhoonath Shaha v. Guruchurn Lahiri*

(1925) A I R 1925 All 6 (S) · 83 Ind Cas 1033, *Md. Abdul Rahim Khan v. Ram Dharos*.

(1893) 1833 All W N 165 (163), *Sahibzadi v. Aziz Bibi*.

(1867) Agra F B 78 (81) (1874 Edition p. 60), *Ramjeevarun Rai v. Deep Narain Rai*.

(1900) 33 Cal 679 (682), *Oman Sheikh v. Halakuri Sheikh*.

2 (1890) 1 Bom L R 84 (86), *Krishna Timmabhatta v. Fithal Gound Bhat*.

3 (1935) A I R 1935 Rang 406 (471) 13 Rang 595. 159 Ind Cas 945, *K P L S S Chettyar v. Official Receiver, Ramnad*

4 (1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 118 (118), *Luchmun Sukoy v. Bhuguan Chunder*.
(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 723 (729) 80 Ind Cas 707 39 Mad 923, *Varadaraja Mudali v. Murugesam Pillai*

Bhagwan v. Dhondi.

Iar v. Asseemooddeen Sirdar.

Grija Kant Lahiry

23 Ind Cas 649, *Chandri Abdul*

5. (1879) 4 Cal 703 (709), *Mungol Prashad Dicht v. Shama Kanto Lahory Chowdhry*.

6. (1866) 9 Suth W R 390 (390, 391), *Ram Dhun Roy v. Khaynah Abdool Gunnee*.
(1880) 5 Cal 894 (897) 6 Cal L R 437, *Shumbhoonath Shaha v. Guruchurn Lahiri*

7.

8. See Notes 33 to 40 to S. 11 of the Authors' Civil Procedure Code.

9. (1900) 1 Ind Cas 18 (49) (Lah), *Banwari Lal v. Abdul Gaffer*.

Article 183

183.* To enforce a judgment, decree or order of any Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, or an order of His Majesty in Council.

Twelve years. When a present right to enforce the judgment, decree or order accrues to some person capable of releasing the right: Provided that when the judgment, decree or order has been revived, or some part of the principal money secured thereby, or some interest on such money has been paid, or some acknowledgment of the right thereto has been given in writing signed by the person liable to pay such principal or interest, or his agent, to the person entitled thereto or his agent, the twelve years shall be computed from the date of such revivor, payment or acknowledgment or the latest of such revivors, payments or acknowledgments, as the case may be.

Synopsis

1. Legislative changes.
2. Scope.
3. Application by notice of motion: when deemed to be made.
4. "Enforce."
5. "Established by Royal Charter."
6. "In the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction."
7. Order of His Majesty in Council.
8. Starting point.
9. Person capable of releasing the right.
10. Revivor.
11. Acknowledgments and payments.

✱

Act of 1877, Article 180

Same as above.

Act of 1871, Article 169

Same as above except that the words "or an order of His Majesty in Council" were absent.

Act of 1859

No corresponding provision.

Other Topics

Article 183 Note 1

Application for final or personal decree in mortgage suit—Article not applicable	See Note 4, Pts. 3a, 4
Application for restitution as a result of order of His Majesty in Council	See Note 4, Pt. 6, 7
Application for transmission of decree does not amount to revivor	See Note 10, Pt. 7
Article not controlled by Section 48, C P C.	See Note 2, Pt. 8
Article 182 and this Article—Difference	...	See Note 2, Pts 1, 3, Note 4, Pt. 1	...	
Order recognizing assignment of decree	See Note 10, Pt. 11	
Revivor of decree against one judgment-debtor inoperative against others	See Note 10, Pt. 12	
Sections 6, 7 and 6—Not applicable	See Note 9

1. Legislative changes.—Section 19 of the Act of 1859 corresponded to this Article but did not contain the expressions "*in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction*" and "*or an order of His Majesty in Council*" In view of the absence of the former expression, it was held in a number of cases,¹ that the execution of decrees etc., of a Chartered High Court passed in the exercise of its *appellate jurisdiction* also would be governed by Section 19 referred to above. A Full Bench of the High Court of Calcutta,² on the other hand, held that Section 19 was never intended to apply and did not apply to decrees etc., passed by Chartered High Courts in the exercise of their *appellate jurisdiction*. In the undermentioned case³ their Lordships of the Privy Council observed that the preponderance of authority in India^{3a} was in favour of the proposition that the execution of the decrees of the High Court made on its Appellate Side was subject to three years' rule of limitation, and that the High Courts, though unquestionably "Courts established by Royal Charter" in the broad and general sense of the term were not, when exercising their appellate jurisdiction from the moffusil Courts, such Courts within the meaning of the Act of 1859.

The Act of 1871 gave effect to this view by inserting in Article 169 thereof, corresponding to Section 19 of the Act of 1859, the words "*in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction*" But this Article also, like Section 19 of the older Act, did not contain the expression "*or any order of His Majesty in Council*" The

Article 183 — Note 1

1. (1867) 8 Suth W R 267 (268), *Ishan Chunder Choudhry v. Jugodishures Chowdhram*.
(1867) 8 Suth W R 470 (472), *Kishen Kinkur Ghose v. Buroda Kant Roy*
(1870) 14 Suth W R 289 (289) 6 Beng L R 52, *Chowdhry Wahid Ali v. Mullick Enayat Ali*
2. (1871) 16 Suth W R F B 1 (6) 7 Beng L R 704 (F B), *Ram Churn Dysack v. Luchhee Kant Dornick*.
3. (1872) 14 Moo Ind App 465 (484) 10 Beng L R 101. 17 Suth W R 292 2 Suther 561 3 Sar 62 (P C), *Kristo Kinkur Roy v. Rajah Burroda-caunt Roy*
- 3a See (1874) 21 Suth W R 391 (391), *Hurbans Lal v. Sheo Narain Singh*
(1871) 16 Suth W R F B 1 (6) 7 Beng L R 701 (F B), *Ramechuran Dysack v. Luchhee Kant Dornick*.
(1870) 5 Mad H C R 215 (216), *Arunachalla Thudayan v. Veludayan*.

Article 183
Notes
1—2

absence of these words both in the Act of 1859 and in the Act of 1871 gave rise to a difference of opinion as to the period of limitation applicable to the execution or enforcement of orders of Her Majesty in Council. In the undermentioned case⁴ it was held that applications for such enforcement were governed by the three years' rule of limitation governing execution of decrees in general, while in a later Full Bench decision⁵ it was held that there was no limitation at all applicable to such cases. In this state of circumstances, the words "or an order of Her Majesty in Council" were added to Article 169 by Section 21 of the Privy Council Appeal Act (VI of 1874). Article 180 of the Act of 1877 repeated Article 169 of the Act of 1871 as amended by Act VI of 1874. There is no difference between the present Article and Article 180 of the Act of 1877.

2. Scope.—This Article applies to applications to enforce a judgment, decree or order of a *Chartered High Court* in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, or an *order of His Majesty in Council*. Article 182 *ante*, applies to the execution of the decrees of Civil Courts not provided for by this Article. The two Articles provide different periods of limitation for execution of decrees and the difference is made to depend solely on the *character of the Court* which passed the decree. Limitation therefore depends not on the character of the Court *to which a decree is sent for execution*, but on the character of the Court *which passed it*. Thus, when a decree of a Chartered High Court passed in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction is transmitted for execution to a *moffusil* Court, the limitation applicable is twelve years under this Article and not three years under Article 182.¹

When an award is filed under Section 15 of the Arbitration Act, it is not only to be enforceable as if it were a decree in general, but having been filed in a particular Court it is to be enforceable as if it

4. (1865) 4 Suth W R Misc 10 (11), *Dr. Alexander Wise v. Juggobundoo Baboo*.
 (1881) 7 Cal 620 (622, 627) : 9 Cal L R 402 : 4 Shome L R 211, *Gopal Sahu Deo v. Joyram Tewary*. (Case under Article 167, Limitation Act of 1871—"Appeal" includes appeal to the Privy Council and "Appellate Court" includes the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council)
- (1879) 2 All 763 (764), *Narnagh Das v. Narain Das*. (Case under Article 179 (2) of Limitation Act of 1877.)
5. (1866) 6 Suth W R Misc 69 (70) : Beng L R Sup Vol 506, *Anundmoyee Dossee v. Poorno Chunder Rai*.

Note 2

1. (1890) 17 Cal 491 (497), *Tincouris Dawn v. Debendro Nath Mooherjee*.
 (1896) 24 Cal 478 (490, 491), *Jogemaya Dass v. Thachomoni Dass*.
 (1908) 31 Mad 24 (27) : 17 Mad L Jour 441 : 3 Mad L Tim. 19, *Sambanta Mudaliar v. Panchanada Pillai*.
 (1911) 11 Ind Cas 635 (637) : 36 Mad 103, *Krishna Doss v. Alambu Ammal*.
 (1928) A I R 1928 Rang 317 (317) : 114 Ind Cas 674 : 6 Rang 666, *Alhaji Mohamed v. Mahomad Noor Mahomed*. (Decree of Chief Court of Lower Burma executed by Rangoon High Court—Limitation for execution is governed by Article 182 and not by Article 183.)
 (1919) A I R 1919 Lah 95 (96) : 49 Ind Cas 922, *Kanjilal v. Kilar Nath*.

were a decree of that Court. When such award is filed in a Chartered High Court, this Article will govern its enforcement.²

The Article does not refer to Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure as Article 182 does, and is not in any way controlled by it.³ This is also made clear by clause (b) of Section 48 sub-section 2 of the Code which expressly exempts this Article from its operation.

3. Application by notice of motion : when deemed to be made. — Under the English practice, certain applications have to be made to the Court upon a notice of motion. Such notice is given by the solicitor for the party who wishes to make the motion to the solicitor for the opposite party stating that the Court will be moved on a particular day at a particular time.¹ In *In re An Arbitration between Gallop and the Central Queensland Meat Export Co.*,² it was held by Denman, J., that the notice of motion, i. e. the service of such notice on the solicitor for the opposite party, must be treated as an application for the purposes of limitation. In this country also, certain applications in the High Courts have to be made upon notice of motion. But the procedure in such cases is that a party prepares a notice in the prescribed form and submits it along with a copy thereof to the Bench Clerk or Assistant Registrar or other officer for insertion of the return day and signature by him. The original and copy are then sealed with the seal of the Court and the copy returned to the party who then serves it on the opposite party or his pleader.³ It has been held by the High Court of Bombay, following *Gallop's case*,² that the *filing* of the notice of motion in the proper office of the Court for signature and seal is an application for the purposes of limitation.⁴

The High Court of Calcutta, on the other hand, held in *Khettra Mohan Singh v. Kasi Nath Seth*,⁵ that the mere *issue* of a notice of motion calling upon another to attend a Judge in Chambers on the hearing of an application is not sufficient to save the application from being barred if the hearing of the application comes on after time. That case was followed by the same High Court in *Hinga*

2 (1927) A I R 1927 Cal 853 (855) 104 Ind Cas 809 55 Cal 499, *Belvedere Jute Mills Ltd v. Hardwarimull & Co.*

3. (1892) 6 Bom 258 (260), *Mayabhai Prembhai v. Tribhuvandas Jagannadas*

(1893) 20 Cal 551 (557), *Futleh Naram Chowdhry v. Chundrabai Choudhram*

(1884) 7 Mad 510 (545), *Ganapathi v. Balasundara*.

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 168 (174) 36 Cal 543, *Jogendra Chandra Roy v. Shamdas*.

Note 3

1 See O 52 Rr. 3 to 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883 and Form 18 of Appendix B thereto.

2 (1890) 88 W R (Eng) 621 (621) 59 L J Q B 460 25 Q B D 230 62 L T 834.

3 See O 13 Rr 1, 2, 7 and 8 of the Original Side Rules of the Madras High Court.

4 (1924) A I R 1924 Bom 36 (39) 47 Bom 764 86 Ind Cas 440, *Venkatapaya v. Naterally*.

5. (1893) 20 Cal 899 (902).

Article 182
Notes
3-4

Bibi v. Manna Bibi,⁶ and it was held that even the service of the notice of motion on the opposite party would not prevent time running. In neither of the two cases above mentioned was *Gallop's case* referred to, and on this ground it was held by a single Judge of the same High Court in the undermentioned case⁷ that the service of the notice of motion on the opposite side is an application for purposes of limitation, whatever may be the view as to the effect of the issue of a notice of motion.

In *Kuttayan v. Mannanna Ellappa*,⁸ where a notice of motion was issued and served on the same day on the opposite party, it was held by the High Court of Madras, dissenting from *Khetra Mohan's case* and *Hinga Bibi's case* (*supra*), that the application must be deemed to have been made on the date of the issue of the notice of motion. It was further held that this would be so even though the affidavit supporting the application was sworn to only later.

In the undermentioned case,⁹ where a tabular statement under Order 21 Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, was filed in Court within time, it was held by Costello, J., that that amounted to the making of an application. His Lordship also doubted the correctness of the two earlier cases of the Calcutta High Court as to the issue of a notice of motion not being a valid application for the purposes of limitation.

4. "Enforce." — While Article 182 refers to the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court, this Article refers to the enforcement of a judgment, etc. The words "to enforce" are wider than the words "to execute" and should be interpreted as equivalent to "to give full effect to."¹ They are not limited to realization by execution, and even if a proceeding is not strictly in execution but is a form of judicial relief under the decree, it would still come within the meaning of the expression "to enforce a decree." Thus, where in a mortgage decree the decree-holder makes an application praying that he may be at liberty to add a person as party defendant to the suit and that therefore he may be at liberty to proceed to sell properties pursuant to the decree, the application will be one "to enforce a judgment" within the meaning of Article 182.² But an application for an order for transmission of execution to another Court is not one for execution and cannot save limitation.^{3a}

⁶ (1903) 81 Cal 150 (154) : 8 Cal W N 97.

⁷ *Idem*, 4 B 1002 Cal 666 (667) : 17 Cal 2d 597 : 60 Cal 1106, *Jnanendra* (under Article 166)

⁸ *Dass v. Debin Behari Dhur.* : 115 Ind Cas 83, *Atarmoni*

Notes 4

1. (1925) A I R 1929 All 293 (291) : 50 All 767 : 112 Ind Cas 876, *Sohan Bibi v. Bagnath Das.*

(1922) A I R 1922 All 238 (210) : 66 Ind Cas 545 : 41 All 535, *Darf Lal v. Damodar Das.*

2. (1911) 11 Ind Cas 913 (915) : 33 Cal 913, *Amlool Chand Parai v. Sarat Chunder Mulgerjee.*

3a (1939) A I R 1939 Lah 110 (111) : 41 Pat L Jour 105, *Rughnath & Co. v. Firm Ram Gopal Rohit Ram.*

Where a preliminary mortgage decree has been passed by the Original Side of the High Court, an application under Section 89 of the Transfer of Property Act for an order absolute was held to be one to enforce the judgment within the meaning of this Article.³ But these decisions were given with reference to the law as it stood before the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 was enacted. Having regard to the form of the decrees which are now passed in mortgage suits, and having regard to the terms of Order 34 Rule 3 sub-rule 2 of the Code, an application for a final decree cannot be said to be an application to enforce the preliminary decree and such an application will be governed by Article 181 and not by this Article.^{3a} An application for a personal decree under Order 34 Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code is an application for a new decree in the suit and not an application for enforcing a judgment or decree Article 181 and not this Article applies to it.⁴

An application against the sons for execution of a Privy Council decree against the father for costs is governed by this Article and limitation commences to run from the date of the decree.⁵

There is a difference of opinion as to whether an application for restitution as a result of an Order of His Majesty in Council is one to enforce the Order in Council within the meaning of this Article. According to the High Court of Allahabad, this Article applies to such applications.⁶ A contrary view has been held by the High Court of Patna.⁷

6. "Established by Royal Charter."—The Sudder Court which had been established before the Supreme Courts in India was a Court not established by Royal Charter, and Section 19 of the Act of 1859 was held not to apply to the enforcement of decrees of that Court.¹

8. (1914) A I R 1914 P C 150 (153) 42 Cal 776 42 Ind App 88 27 Ind Cas 683 (P C), *Munna Lal Parruck v Sarat Chunder Mukerji*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Mad 268 (269) 29 Ind Cas 237 39 Mad 544, *Mohomad Hussain Sahib v. Abdul Kareem Sahib*.

3a (1935) A I R 1935 Rang 239 (240) 13 Rang 825 157 Ind Cas 784, *M. A. L. M. Chettiar Firm v. Maung Po Hmyan*.

4. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 834 (836, 845) 52 Cal 828 89 Ind Cas 1 (F B), *Francis Higgins Pell v. Munne Gregory*.

(1935) A I R 1935 Rang 167 (168) 13 Rang 905 156 Ind Cas 701, *Chockalingam v. Maung Tun Yin*.

5 (1932) A I R 1932 Pat 261 (264) 11 Pat 495 139 Ind Cas 397, *Chandra Chur Deo v. Mt Shyam Kumari*.

6 (1922) A I R 1922 All 238 (239) 44 All 555 66 Ind Cas 545, *Dary Lal v. Damodar Das*.

(1926) A I R 1926 All 293 (294) 50 All 767 112 Ind Cas 876, *Sohan Bibi v. Baijnath Das*.

(1921) 61 Ind Cas 806 (807) (All), *Madhusudan Das v. Dary Lal*.

7. (1927) A I R 1927 Pat 208 (208) 6 Pat 252 102 Ind Cas 614, *Jugal Kishore v. Homeshwar Singh*.

Note 5

1. (1869) 12 Suth W R 343 (313), *Huro Pershad Roy Chowdhry v. Manick Lushkur*.

Article 183
Notes
5—7

But the Supreme Court was established by Royal Charter and the enforcement of its judgments was held to be governed by Section 19 of the said Act.²

By Section 164 of the Companies Act, 1913, the District Judge has the same jurisdiction and the same powers as the High Court. But it cannot be said that the District Judge becomes, by virtue of that Section, "the High Court" for the purpose of enforcing a payment order under the said Section. This Article therefore does not apply to the enforcement of such an order.³

6. "In the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction." — This Article applies only to judgments, decrees and orders of the Chartered High Courts in the exercise of their ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Ordinary jurisdiction embraces all such as is exercised in the ordinary course of law and without any special step being necessary to assume it, as opposed to extraordinary jurisdiction, which the Court may assume at its discretion upon special occasions and by special orders.¹ A judgment ordered to be entered up under Section 86 of the Indian Insolvency Act is a judgment passed by the High Court in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.²

The words "original jurisdiction" clearly exclude appellate jurisdiction. The enforcement of judgments etc. passed by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction is therefore not within this Article.³

7. Order of His Majesty in Council. — Before the decision of the Full Bench in *Luchman Prasad v. Kishan Prasad*,¹ there was a difference of opinion as to whether the Article applied to the execution of Orders in Council passed in cases decided by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction. It was settled by the Full Bench, referred to, that where an order of Her Majesty in Council modifies, alters or confirms the decree of the High Court, whether passed in

(1869) 12 Suth W R 73 (73), *Thakoor Doss Gossain v. Kashree Nath Munda*

2. (1862) 1 Mad H C R 201 (205), *Coultroup v. Smith*.

3. (1938) A I R 1938 Lah 368 (368), *Panna Lal Jain v. Jain Bank of India Ltd*

Note 6

1. (1889) 13 Bom 520 (533) : 16 Ind App 156 : 13 Ind Jur 251 : 5 Sar 400 (P C), *Candas Narrondas Navirahu v. C. A. Turner*.

2. (1897) 11 Bom 135 (152), *In the matter of Candas Narrondas*. (Per West, J.)

(1889) 13 Bom 520 (533) : 16 Ind App 156 : 13 Ind Jur 251 : 5 Sar 400 (P C), *In the matter of Candas Narrondas Navirahu v. C. A. Turner*.

(1905) 33 Cal 560 (564) O Cal W N 952, *Annoda Prasad v. Nobe Keshore Roy*. (Per Sale, J. — Though the High Court exercises a special jurisdiction under the Insolvency Act, the High Court nevertheless exercises it as a part of the ordinary jurisdiction with which it is vested.)

3. (1974) 21 Suth W R 391 (391), *Hurbans Lall v. Sheo Narain Singh*.

Note 7

1. (1862) 8 Cal 218 (223) 10 Cal L R 425 4 Shome L R 261 (P 18)

its original or appellate jurisdiction, that order is the paramount decision in the suit and its enforcement is governed by this Article.

See also the undermentioned cases² to the same effect.

But when the Privy Council dismisses an appeal for want of prosecution, there is no final decree or order of His Majesty in Council as the matter of the suit is not judicially dealt with and the order cannot be regarded as an order adopting or confirming the decision appealed from. When such an order is made, the only decree capable of execution is the decree appealed from and if it has been passed by the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, the enforcement of such decree is not governed by this Article.³ The same principle will apply where the appeal before the Privy Council is withdrawn without further prosecution.⁴

Where the preparation of a final decree was a purely ministerial act to enable the Order in Council to be enforced, it was held that it could not be contended that the execution proceedings were not taken to enforce the Order of His Majesty in Council.⁵

The Court executing the decree is not competent to go behind the order passed by His Majesty in Council whether right or wrong, the only duty of the Courts in India being to give effect to the order, punctually observe, obey and carry the same into execution.⁶ In receiving and filing for the purposes of execution an order of the Privy Council, the High Court does not exercise any discretionary power but performs a function of purely ministerial character.⁷

8. Starting point.—Time, under this Article, runs from the date when a present right to enforce the judgment, decree or order accrues to some person capable of releasing the right (See Note 9.)

- 2 (1893) 20 Cal 551 (555), *Puteh Naram Choudhry v Chundrabati Choudh-rain*
- (1900) 23 All 152 (157) 27 Ind App 209 5 Cal W N 52 2 Dom L R 978 10 Mad L Jour 290 7 Bar 788 (P C), *Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v Bijai Bahadur Singh*
- (1909) 4 Ind Cas 402 (403) (Cal), *Kantini Debi v Aghore Nath Mookerjee*
- (1873) 19 Suth W R 186 (187), *Ganesh Dutt Singh v. Mungree Ram Chowdhry*.
- 3 (1914) A I R 1914 P C 66 (67) 23 Ind Cas 619 36 All 750 (P C), *Abdul Majid v Jawahir Lal*
- (1914) A I R 1914 P C 65 (66) 36 All 261 41 Ind App 104 23 Ind Cas 644 (P C), *Batuk Nath v. Mt Munni Devi*.
- 4 (1921) A I R 1921 Mad 126 (131) 61 Ind Cas 979, *Viswanatha Sastri v. Sitalakshmi Ammal*
- (1921) A I R 1921 Pat 280 (283) 58 Ind Cas 977, *Krushna Prasad v. Wazir Narain Singh*.
- 5 (1924) A I R 1924 Pat 576 (579) 3 Pat 596 78 Ind Cas 766, *Mt Bhag-wanta Kuer v Zamir Ahmad Khan*
- 6 (1925) A I R 1925 Pat 40 (41) 3 Pat 327 79 Ind Cas 791, *Somer Singh v Mt Prem Devi*
- 7 (1895) 22 Cal 960 (972), *Premilal Mullick v Sumbhoonath Roy*
- (1914) A I R 1914 Mad 222 (224) 38 Mad 832 23 Ind Cas 235, *Krishna Bhoopathi v Raja of Vajayanagaram*

Article 188
Notes
8-10

A fresh starting point is also furnished by —

1. A revivor of such judgment, decree or order. (See Note 10 *infra*.)
2. A part payment of the principal money secured by such judgment, etc.
3. A payment of interest on such money.
4. An acknowledgment of the right thereto, in writing signed by the person liable to pay such principal or interest, or his agent, to the person entitled thereto or his agent.

9. **Person capable of releasing the right.**—The words "capable of releasing the right" exclude persons who are legally incapacitated, such as infants and lunatics. In the case of such persons, therefore, time under this Article does not *begin to run at all* until the incapacity is removed. Sections 6, 7 and 8 *ante*, do not govern this Article which is self-contained. A decree was passed in favour of a minor on the 30th November 1915, and the minor attained majority in October 1918. He made an application on the 31st March 1923, to enforce the decree, more than twelve years from the date of the decree but within twelve years of the date of his attainment of majority. If Sections 6 and 7 read with Section 8 applied to the case, the application was obviously barred by limitation. It was held by the Patna High Court that those Sections did not apply and that the application having been made within twelve years of the applicant's becoming "capable of releasing the right" within the meaning of this Article, there was no bar.¹

10. **Revivor.**—The term "revivor" in this Article refers to the Common Law practice which prevailed in the Supreme Courts in India under which, if a writ of execution was not sued out within a year and a day, it was necessary to revive the decree by a process known as *scire facias* or more fully *scire facias quare executionem non habiat*, that is to say, by calling on the judgment-debtor to show cause why the plaintiff should not have execution against him. The doctrine has its origin in the presumption of satisfaction which was held to arise when execution had not been applied for within a year and a day after the date of the judgment.

When the Code of Civil Procedure came to be enacted in 1882, the rule was embodied in Section 248 thereof and is now found in Order 21 Rule 22 of the Code under which, when an application is made more than one year after the date of the decree, notice is to go to the person against whom execution is prayed, requiring him to show cause on a date to be fixed, why the decree should not be executed against him.²

Notes 9

1. (1930) A I R 1930 Pat 141 (142) : 123 Ind Cas 411, *Munshar Sahu v. Kushn Narayan Prasad*.

Notes 10

1. (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 513 (513) : 40 Mad 1127 : 46 Ind Cas 603, *Krishna v. Gajendra Naidu*.
(1909) 1 Ind Cas 164 (170) : 36 Cal 543, *Jogendra Chandra Roy v. Syam Das*. (Object of writ of *scire facias* discussed)

It follows from what has been stated above, that in order to constitute a "revivor" of the decree, there must be, expressly or by implication, a *determination* by a Court or other person duly qualified to make it, that the decree is still capable of execution, and that the decree-holder is entitled to enforce it. An order for execution operates as a revivor, because it necessarily implies such a determination.^{2a} Where the objection of the judgment-debtor is overruled and it is decided that the decree is not barred by limitation, the effect of the order is to entitle the decree-holder to proceed with the execution and hence there is a revivor.² An order for execution made after such notice as is required by Order 21 Rule 22 has the effect of reviving the decree within the meaning of this Article.³ But the mere issue or service of a notice under Order 21 Rule 22 is not sufficient. A further order by the Court is necessary to constitute revivor.⁴

Where execution cannot proceed without the leave of the Court, the granting of that leave will have the effect of reviving the decree. But where no such leave is required, the mere issue of notice of execution does not constitute revivor.⁵

The determination referred to above must be by a Court or person duly qualified to make it. Where the Registrar of the Court had no power to decide whether the decree was or was not capable of execution but passed orders that execution should issue, it was held that such an order did not operate as a "revivor."⁶

2a(1938) A I R 1938 Pat 872 (373) - 176 Ind Cas 566, *Sarju Singh v. Bhagwat Prasad Singh*

2. (1909) 4 Ind Cas 402 (403) (Cal), *Kamini Dobi v. Aghore Nath Mukherjee*.

(1916) A I R 1916 Cal 488 (491) 43 Cal 903 36 Ind Cas 602 (FB), *Chatterput Singh v. Sait Sumari Mal*

3. (1881) 6 Cal 504 (511) 8 Cal L R 23, *Ashootosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn*.

(1897) 24 Cal 244 (247), *Suja Hoosein v. Monohur Das*

(1904) 26 All 861 (864) 1904 All W N 51 1 All L Jour 80, *Umrao Singh v. Lachmi Narain*

(1898) 20 Cal 551 (559), *Futteh Narain Chowdhry v. Chundrabati*

(1894) 7 Mad 540 (543), *Ganapati v. Dalasundara*

(1909) 1 Ind Cas 168 (173) 86 Cal 543, *Jogendra Chandra Roy v. Syam Das*.

(1937) A I R 1937 Pat 321 (323) 16 Pat 316 169 Ind Cas 872, *Ghasiram Marwari v. Shiba Prasad Singh*

(1938) A I R 1938 Pat 372 (373, 374) 176 Ind Cas 566, *Sarju Singh v. Bhagwat Prasad Singh* (Issuing notice under O 21 R 22, Civil

time)

4. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 608 (671) 87 Ind Cas 61, *Amulya Ratan v. Banku Behari*

(1903) 30 Cal 979 (981, 982) 7 Cal W N 793, *Monohar Das v. Futteh Chand*

5 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 350 (351) 11 Ind Cas 216, *Chatterput Singh v. Daya Chand Marwari*.

6 (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 488 (491, 492) 43 Cal 903 36 Ind Cas 602 (FB), *Chatterput Singh v. Sait Sumari Mal*

(1936) A I R 1936 Pat 398 (399) 15 Pat 102 163 Ind Cas 411, *Sarju Singh v. Bhagwat Prasad*

Article 183
Notes
10—11

An application for transmission of a decree from the High Court to the District Court is not by itself a revivor of the decree within the meaning of this Article.⁷ Even an order transferring the decree for execution to another Court does not give a new starting point of limitation *qua* the order of transmission.⁸

An order of dismissal of an execution case for want of prosecution does not amount to a revivor.⁹ Nor can the dismissal of an application by the judgment-debtor to set aside the decree, filed by him pending execution, be regarded as an order determining the question whether the decree-holder has a subsisting right to execute the decree. Such an order does not therefore fall within the definition of revivor.¹⁰

An order recognizing the assignment of a decree and allowing the assignee to execute it, constitutes a revivor.¹¹

A revivor of a decree against one joint judgment-debtor will not keep it alive against joint judgment-debtors.¹² So also, where a mortgage decree determines the rights of prior and puisne mortgagees and allows each mortgagee to enforce his mortgage, the puisne mortgagee is not entitled to claim that his right to execute the decree accrued only after the prior mortgagee had exhausted his remedies, and execution applications by the prior mortgagee will not amount to a revivor of the right of the puisne mortgagees.¹³

11. Acknowledgments and payments. — See Note 37 to Section 20, *ante*.

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7. (1927) A I R 1927 P C 73 (75) : 101 Ind Cas 24 : 54 Cal 500 : 54 Ind App 129 (PC), *Banku Behary Chatterji v. Naraindas Dutt*
 (1915) A I R 1915 Cal 350 (351) : 11 Ind Cas 216, *Chutterput Singh v. Daya Chand Marwari*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 23 (25) : 84 Ind Cas 68, *Salaluddin v. Afsal Begum*.
 (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 213 (216) : 78 Ind Cas 1001, *Narain Das Dutt v. Banku Behari Chattopadhyaya*.
 8. (1916) A I R 1916 Cal 488 (491) : 43 Cal 903 : 36 Ind Cas 602 (FB), *Chutterput Singh v. Sait Sumari Mal*.
 (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 252 (253) : 118 Ind Cas 775 : 52 Mad 590, *Palaniappa Chettiar v. Valluamma Achi*.
 (1937) A I R 1937 Rang 477 (479) : 173 Ind Cas 160 : 1937 R L R 287, *Kannappa v. Ishaar Singh*.
 9. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 663 (670) : 67 I. O. 61, *Amulya Ratan v. Banku Behari*.
 10. (1929) A I R 1929 Cal 686 (689) : 55 Cal 578 : 110 Ind Cas 401, *Muthair Chettiar v. Chidambaram Chetty*.
 11. (1929) A I R 1929 Mad 252 (256) : 52 Mad 590 : 118 Ind Cas 775, *Palaniappa Chettiar v. Valluamma Achi*.
 12. (1918) A I R 1918 Mad 513 (514) : 40 Mad 1127 : 40 Ind Cas 603, *Krishnaswamy v. Gajendra Naydu*.
 (See also (1916) A I R 1916 Mad 1033 (1039) : 31 Ind Cas 1003 : 33 Mad 1102, *James Russel McLaren v. Veerash Naydu*.)
 13. (1925) A I R 1925 Cal 213 (217) : 78 Ind Cas 1001, *Narain Das Dutt v. Banku Behari Chattopadhyaya*.



THE SECOND SCHEDULE

Repealed by S. 3 and Second Schedule of the Repealing and Amending Act, 1930 (8 of 1930).

The Second Schedule before the repeal was as follows :

THE SECOND SCHEDULE

TERRITORIES REFERRED TO IN SECTION 31.

(See Section 31.)

The Presidency of Fort St. George

The Presidency of Bombay.

The Sambalpur District of the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William.

The United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

Burma.

The Central Provinces.

Ajmer-Merwara.

THE THIRD SCHEDULE
*Repealed by S. 3 and Second Schedule of the Second
 Repealing and Amending Act, 1914 (17 of 1914).*

The Third Schedule before the repeal was as follows :

THE THIRD SCHEDULE.

ENACTMENTS REPEALED.

(See Section 32.)

Year.	No.	Short title.	Extent of repeal.
1877	XV	The Indian Limitation Act, 1877.	The whole.
1877	XVII	The Pnnjah Courts Act, 1877.	So much as has not been repealed.
1879	XII	The Registration and Limitation Acts Amendment Act, 1879.	In the title the words "and the Limitation Act, 1877," and after section 107, from the words "and whereas" to the end of the Act.
1881	V	The Probate and Administration Act, 1881.	Section 156.
1887	IX	The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.	Section 36.
1888	VII	The Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1888.	In the title and in the preamble, the words "and the Indian Limitation Act, 1877," and of section 66 so much as has not been repealed.
1892	VI	The Indian Limitation Act and Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1892.	In the title and in the preamble, the words "the Indian Limitation Act, 1877," and section 1.
1899	X	The Carriers Act, 1899.	Section 3.
1900	VI	The Lower Burma Courts Act, 1900.	So much of section 47 and the first schedule as relates to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877.
1900	XI	The Indian Limitation Amendment Act, 1900.	The whole.
1906	IV	The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1906.	Section 5.

APPENDIX



The Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act (1 of 1920).

AN ACT TO AMEND AND CONSOLIDATE THE LAW GOVERNING THE LIMITATION OF SUITS RELATING TO ALIENATIONS OF ANCESTRAL IMMOVABLE PROPERTY AND APPOINTMENTS OF HEIRS BY PERSONS WHO FOLLOW CUSTOM IN THE PUNJAB.

WHEREAS it is expedient to amend and consolidate the law governing the limitation of suits relating to alienations of ancestral immovable property and appointments of heirs by persons who follow custom in the Punjab;

AND whereas the previous sanction of the Governor-General has been accorded under Section 79 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, to the passing of this Act;

It is hereby enacted as follows :

Short title and extent. 1. (1) This Act may be called the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920.

(2) It extends to the Punjab.

Repeal. 2. The Punjab Limitation (Ancestral Land Alienation) Act, 1900, is hereby repealed.

Definition. 3. In this Act —

“Alienation” includes any testamentary disposition of property.

“Appointment of an heir” includes any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom.

Savings. 4. This Act shall not affect any suit pending in any Court on the date on which this Act comes into force

5. Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 35 (inclusive), of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the first schedule of the said Act, every suit, of any description specified in the schedule annexed to this Act, instituted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor in the schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence

6. Notwithstanding anything herein contained, any suit for which period of limitation prescribed by this Act is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, or by the Punjab Limitation (Ancestral Land Alienation) Act, 1900, may be instituted within the period of one year next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, or by the Punjab Limitation (Ancestral Land Alienation) Act, 1900, whichever period expires first.

Provision for suits for which the period prescribed is shorter than that prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act or the Punjab Limitation Act.

THE THIRD SCHEDULE
*Repealed by S. 3 and Second Schedule of the Second
 Repealing and Amending Act, 1914 (17 of 1914).*

The Third Schedule before the repeal was as follows :

THE THIRD SCHEDULE.

ENACTMENTS REPEALED.

(See Section 32.)

Year.	No.	Short title.	Extent of repeal.
1877	XV	The Indian Limitation Act, 1877.	The whole.
1877	XVII	The Punjab Courts Act, 1877.	So much as has not been repealed.
1879	XII	The Registration and Limitation Acts Amendment Act, 1879.	In the title the words "and the Limitation Act, 1877," and after section 107, from the words "and whereas" to the end of the Act.
1881	V	The Probate and Administration Act, 1881.	Section 156.
1887	IX	The Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887.	Section 36.
1888	VII	The Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1888.	In the title and in the preamble, the words "and the Indian Limitation Act, 1877," and of section 66 so much as has not been repealed.
1892	VI	The Indian Limitation Act and Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act, 1892.	In the title and in the preamble, the words "the Indian Limitation Act, 1877," and section 1.
1899	X	The Carriers Act, 1899.	Section 3.
1900	VI	The Lower Burma Courts Act, 1900.	So much of section 47 and the first schedule as relates to the Indian Limitation Act, 1877.
1900	XI	The Indian Limitation Amendment Act, 1900.	The whole.
1906	IV	The Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1906.	Section 5.

APPENDIX

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WHEREAS it is expedient to amend and consolidate the law governing the limitation of suits relating to alienations of ancestral immovable property and appointments of heirs by persons who follow custom in the Punjab;

AND whereas the previous sanction of the Governor-General has been accorded under Section 79 (2) of the Government of India Act, 1915, to the passing of this Act;

It is hereby enacted as follows :

Short title and extent. 1. (1) This Act may be called the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920.

(2) It extends to the Punjab.

Repeal. 2. The Punjab Limitation (Ancestral Land Alienation) Act, 1900, is hereby repealed.

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“Alienation” includes any testamentary disposition of property.

“Appointment of an heir” includes any adoption made or purporting to be made according to custom.

Savings. 4. This Act shall not affect any suit pending in any Court on the date on which this Act comes into force.

5. Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 (inclusive), of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the first schedule of the said Act, every suit, of any description specified in the schedule annexed to this Act, instituted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor in the schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

6. Notwithstanding anything herein contained, any suit for which period of limitation prescribed by this Act is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, or by the Punjab Limitation (Ancestral Land Alienation) Act, 1900, may be instituted within the period of one year next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, or by the Punjab Limitation (Ancestral Land Alienation) Act, 1900, whichever period expires first.

Provision for suits for which the period prescribed is shorter than that prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act or the Punjab Limitation Act.

Limitation on suits for possession where no declaratory decree has been obtained.

7. Subject to the provisions of Section 6 —

(a) No suit for the possession of ancestral immovable property on the ground that an alienation of such property or the appointment of an heir is not binding on the plaintiff according to custom shall lie if a suit for the declaration that the alienation or appointment of an heir is not so binding would be time-barred, unless a suit for such a declaration has been instituted within the period prescribed by the schedule.


(h) No suit for the possession of ancestral immovable property by a plaintiff on the ground that he is as heir appointed in accordance with custom entitled thereto shall lie if a suit for a declaration that his alleged appointment as heir was validly made according to custom would be time-barred, unless a suit for such declaration has been instituted within the period prescribed by the schedule.

8. When any person obtains a decree declaring that an alienation of ancestral immovable property or the appointment of an heir is not binding on him according to custom, the decree shall enure for the benefit of all persons entitled to impeach the alienation or the appointment of an heir.

SCHEDULE.

Description of suit.	Period of Limitation.	Time from which period begins to run.
1. A suit for a declaration that an alienation of ancestral immovable property will not, according to custom, be binding on the plaintiff after the death of the alienor or (if the alienor is a female) after her death or forfeiture of her interest in the property.	Six years .	<p><i>Firstly</i>:—If the alienation is by a registered deed, the date of registration of such deed.</p> <p><i>Secondly</i>:—If the alienation is not by a registered deed—</p> <p>(a) if an entry regarding the alienation in the Register of Mutations has been attested by a Revenue officer under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, the date on which the entry is attested;</p> <p>(b) If such entry has not been attested, the date on which the alienor takes physical possession of the whole or any part of the property alienated in pursuance of such alienation;</p> <p>(c) in all other cases, the date on which the alienation comes to the knowledge of the plaintiff.</p>
2. A suit for possession of ancestral immovable property which has been alienated on the ground that the alienation is not binding on the plaintiff according to custom —		

Description of suit.	Period of Limitation.	Time from which period begins to run.
(a) if no declaratory decree of the nature referred to in Article 1 is obtained	Six years	As above.
(b) if such declaratory decree is obtained.	Three years	The date on which the right to sue accrues, or the date on which the declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later.
3. A suit for a declaration that an alleged appointment of an heir is invalid as being opposed to custom or in fact never took place.	Six years	The date on which the alleged appointment of an heir becomes known to the plaintiff.
4. A suit for possession of ancestral immovable property on the ground that an appointment of an heir is invalid or never in fact took place—		
(a) if no declaratory decree of the nature referred to in Article 3 is obtained;	Six years	The date on which the alleged appointment of an heir becomes known to the plaintiff.
(b) if such declaratory decree is obtained.	Three years	The date on which the right to sue accrues, or the date on which the declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later.
5. A suit for a declaration that an alleged appointment of an heir was validly made according to custom.	Six years	The date when the rights of the alleged appointed heir are interfered with.
6. A suit for possession of ancestral immovable property by a plaintiff on the ground that he is an heir appointed in accordance with custom entitled thereto—		
(a) if no declaratory decree of the nature referred to in Article 5 is obtained;	Six years	The date when his rights as such heir are interfered with.
(b) if such declaratory decree is obtained.	Three years	The date of the death of the person making the appointment or (if such person is a female) of her death or of the forfeiture of her interest in the property or the date on which the declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later.



THE INDIAN LIMITATION ACT, IX OF 1908

VOLUME III

ARTICLES 141 TO 183 WITH SYNOPSES IN PARALLEL COLUMNS

THE FIRST SCHEDULE

FIRST DIVISION : SUITS—(*Continued*)

PART VIII — TWELVE YEARS—(*Continued*)

ARTICLES

SYNOPSIS

141. Like suit by a Hindu or Muhammadan entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female.

— Twelve years. —
When the female dies.

the female p. 1960
7. "On the death of a Hindu or Muhammadan female": p. 1961
8 Suit by a transferee from a Hindu or Muhammadan entitled etc. p. 1962
9. Death, if includes civil death — Effect of surrender by female or re-marriage of widow : p. 1963
10. "Hindu or Muhammadan female" : p. 1965
11. "Immoveable property" : p. 1966
12 Suit contemplated is one against a person in possession : p. 1967

16. Suit involving declaration as to adoption by Hindu female . p. 1978

20 Onus of proof : p. 1982
21. Starting point p. 1982
22. Local and special law p. 1984

142. For possession of immoveable property when the plaintiff, while in possession of the property, has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession.

— Twelve years. —
The date of the dispossession or discontinuance.

144. For possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specially provided for.

7. Interest in immoveable property : p. 2015
8. "Plaintiff" in Article 142, meaning of : p. 2017
9. "Has been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession" : p. 2018
10. Defendant must be in possession at the date of the suit : p. 2021
11. "Possession," what is : p. 2024
12. Possession of part, if possession of whole : p. 2030
13 Possession of house is possession of site : p. 2033
14. Plaintiff only in constructive possession — Dispossession or discontinuance of possession : p. 2033

— Twelve years. —

When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff,

15. Principle that possession follows title : p. 2034
16. Adverse possession, what is : p. 2042
17. "Defendant" : p. 2048
18. Possession is not adverse if it can be referred to a *havi* title - p. 2048
19. Possession by Hindu female : p. 2050
20. Possession under a temporary arrangement between members of a family : p. 2054
21. Possession in lieu of dower : p. 2055
22. Possession in lieu of maintenance : p. 2056
23. Possession by the holder of a life estate, if can be adverse to reversioners : p. 2057
24. Possession of property belonging to person under disability : p. 2057
25. Possession of insolvent : p. 2060
26. Possession of mortgagor, when becomes adverse to the mortgagee : p. 2061
27. Possession of a co-mortgagor who redeems the mortgage : p. 2062
28. Possession of a co-mortgagor who does not redeem the mortgage : p. 2062
29. Possession of a co-mortgagor who does not redeem the mortgage : p. 2062
30. Possession of a co-mortgagor who does not redeem the mortgage : p. 2062
31. Possession of a co-mortgagor who does not redeem the mortgage : p. 2062
32. Possession of a co-mortgagor who does not redeem the mortgage : p. 2062
33. Possession by the mortgagee, after redemption, of accretions to mortgaged property : p. 2070
34. Possession of co-mortgagee paying off other co-mortgagees : p. 2070
35. Possession of a co-mortgagee who does not pay off other co-mortgagees : p. 2070
36. Possession of a co-mortgagee who does not pay off other co-mortgagees : p. 2070
37. Possession of a co-mortgagee who does not pay off other co-mortgagees : p. 2070
38. Possession of a co-mortgagee who does not pay off other co-mortgagees : p. 2070
39. Possession of a co-mortgagee who does not pay off other co-mortgagees : p. 2070
40. Possession of a co-mortgagee who does not pay off other co-mortgagees : p. 2070
41. Adverse possession by co-owners against stranger : p. 2094
42. Abandonment by co-owner : p. 2094
43. Relinquishment by co-owner : p. 2095
44. Co-heirs : p. 2095
45. Suit for possession by one co-owner against another : p. 2095
46. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2095
47. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2095
48. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2095
49. Adverse possession of property of Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious endowments : p. 2099
50. Possession of co-trustees after division among them : p. 2103
51. Possession of alienee from co-trustees : p. 2103
52. Acts referable to exercise of easement : p. 2103
- 52a. Adverse possession—Vendor and vendee : p. 2104
- 52b. Possession held under mistake, if can be adverse : p. 2106
53. Possession of wrongdoer must be actual : p. 2107
54. Adverse possession of surface and of sub-soil rights in the land : p. 2108
55. Possession of person who could not advance a hostile title : p. 2110
56. Permissive possession : p. 2110
57. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
58. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
59. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
60. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
61. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
62. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
63. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
64. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
65. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
66. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
67. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
68. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
69. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
70. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
71. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
72. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
73. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
74. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
75. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
76. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
77. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
78. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
79. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
80. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
81. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
82. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
83. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
84. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
85. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
86. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
87. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
88. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
89. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
90. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
91. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
92. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
93. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
94. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
95. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
96. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
97. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
98. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
99. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113
100. Possession of a co-owner who does not pay off other co-owners : p. 2113

becomes

124

omments :

p. 2125

61b Adverse possession of rights not recognized by law :
p. 212662. Possession of owner, if can be adverse to himself . p. 2126
63 Possession must be continuous for the statutory period :
p. 2127

64 Break in adverse possession, effect of p. 2128

65 Delivery of symbolical possession, if interrupts adverse
possession : p. 2132

66. Decree does not interrupt adverse possession p. 2137

67. Effect of attachment on adverse possession p. 2139

68. Decision of Revenue Officer or Court regarding boundary,
if interrupts adverse possession . p. 214169. Subsequent assertion of a different title by defendant, if
affects his adverse possession . p. 2143

70. Submerged land p. 2143

71. Receiver and adverse possession p. 2148

72. Abandonment of possession p. 2149

73. Confiscation and re-grant p. 2150

74. Revenue sale — Adverse possession against purchaser :
p. 215075 Disposition of wrongdoer by another, if interrupts ad-
verse possession p. 2150

76. Possession must be open p. 2151

82. Adverse possession against co-owners . p. 2159

83. Adverse possession against widow is not adverse against
subsequently adopted son . p. 215984 Adverse possession against mortgagor, if adverse against
mortgagee p. 216085. Adverse possession against mortgagee, if adverse to mort-
gagor p. 216286 Adverse possession against tenant, if adverse against
landlord p. 2165

87 Onus of proof p. 2169

88 Judgment against third party does not alter onus :
p. 218489. Question immaterial when evidence has been let in on
both sides p. 218594. Adverse possessor can get only what quondam owner
had : p. 219595. Adverse possessor can get only what interest he pur-
chased : p. 219598. Question of adverse possession, if one of law or fact :
p. 2205

99. Adverse possession by or against Crown : p. 2207

99a Adverse possession by or against the public : p. 2209

100 Special or local law : p. 2208

143. Like suit, when the plaintiff has become entitled by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition.

— Twelve years. —

When the forfeiture is incurred or the condition is broken.

144. For possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not hereby otherwise specially provided for.

— Twelve years. —

When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.

PART IX — THIRTY YEARS

145. Against a depository or pawnee to recover moveable property deposited or pawned.

— Thirty years. —

The date of the deposit or pawn.

146. Before a Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction by a mortgagee to recover from the mortgagor the possession of immoveable property mortgaged

— Thirty years. —

When any part of the principal or interest was last paid on account of the mortgage-debt.

146A. By or on behalf of any local authority for possession of any public street or road or any part thereof from which it has been dispossessed or of which it has discontinued the possession.

— Thirty years. —

The date of the dispossession or discontinuance.

1. Legislative changes : p. 2209
2. Scope of the Article : p. 2210
3. Forfeiture and breach of condition, distinguished : p. 2211
4. Forfeiture of tenancy—General : p. 2211
5. Forfeiture of tenancy for breach of condition of lease : p. 2212

See Article 142.

1. Legislative changes : p. 2221

p. 2231

1. Legislative changes : p. 2232

suits for possession

6. Effect of bar of suit by expiry of period prescribed by this Article : p. 2233

PART X—SIXTY YEARS

147. By a mortgagee for foreclosure or sale.

— Sixty years. —

When the money secured by the mortgage becomes due

148. Against a mortgagee to redeem or to recover possession of immoveable property mortgaged.

— Sixty years. —

When the right to redeem or to recover possession accrues :

Provided that all claims to redeem arising under instruments of mortgage of immoveable property situate in Lower Burma which had been executed before the first day of May 1863 shall be governed by the rules of limitation in force in that province immediately before the same day.

149. Any suit by or on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council, the Secretary of State, the Crown Representative, the Central Government or any Provincial Government, except a suit before a Federal Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction

— Sixty years. —

When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against a like suit by a private person.

deposit of title

3. Mortgages . p. 2244
4. Starting point : p. 2244

1. Legislative changes . p. 2246
- 1a Scope . p. 2248
- 2 "Mortgage" . p. 2249
3. Redeeming co-mortgagor, position of : p. 2251
4. Adverse possession by mortgagee against mortgagor : p. 2254
5. Invalid transfer of equity of redemption to mortgagee — Effect : p. 2257

8. Mortgagee purchasing mortgaged property in contravention of O 34 R 14, Civil Procedure Code—Effect : p. 2261
9. Void mortgage — Person entering into possession under such mortgage . p. 2261
10. Extinction of mortgage by decree or order of Court : p. 2262
11. Effect of proceedings under Bengal Regulation, 17 of 1806 . p. 2263

20. This Article and Article 126 . p. 2269
21. Suit by puisne mortgagee for redemption of prior mortgage . p. 2270
22. Suit by execution purchaser of equity of redemption : p. 2271
23. Burden of proof . p. 2271
24. Laches of mortgagor . p. 2271
25. Effect of bar of limitation : p. 2272
26. Special or local law . p. 2272
27. Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act, 2 of 1913—Dismissal of application for redemption under—Effect . p. 2272

1. Legislative changes . p. 2274
2. Scope of Article . p. 2274
3. Applicability of Limitation Act to Government—General . p. 2275
4. Suit by or on behalf of the Government — Illustrative cases . p. 2277

p. 2277

on deriving title

8. Resumption or assessment of lakhiraj grants — Right of Government, whether extinguished by bar of limitation . p. 2279
9. Acquisition of title by adverse possession against Government . p. 2280
10. Special or local law . p. 2281
11. "Private person" . p. 2281
12. Acquisition of easement against Government : p. 2282

SECOND DIVISION : APPEALS

150. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from a sentence of death passed by a Court of Session.

— Seven days. —

The date of the sentence.

150A. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from a finding rejecting a claim under section 443 of that Code.

— Seven days. —

The date of the finding.

151. From a decree or order of any of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras, Bombay and Lahore in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

— Twenty days. —

The date of the decree or order.

152. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to the Court of a District Judge.

— Thirty days —

The date of the decree or order appealed from.

153. Under the same Code to a High Court from an order of a Subordinate Court refusing leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council.

— Thirty days —

The date of the order.

154. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to any Court other than a High Court.

— Thirty days. —

The date of the sentence or order appealed from.

155. Under the same Code to a High Court, except in the cases provided for by Article 150 and Article 157

— Sixty days. —

The date of the sentence or order appealed from.

1. Legislative changes : p. 2282
2. Scope and applicability : p. 2282

1. Legislative changes : p. 2283
2. Scope and applicability : p. 2283

1. Legislative changes : p. 2284
2. Scope of the Article : p. 2284
3. Starting point : p. 2285

4. Amendment of Section 150 Civil Procedure

p. 2289

1. Scope of the Article : p. 2290

1. Scope and applicability : p. 2291
2. Appeals from orders under Sections 476 and 476-A of the Criminal Procedure Code—Starting point : p. 2291
3. Appeals from jail : p. 2292

1. Scope : p. 2293
2. Appeal from order of Civil Court under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code—Starting point : p. 2293
3. Appeals from orders of Civil Court under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code—Starting point : p. 2293
5. Starting point : p. 2294

156. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High Court, except in the cases provided for by Article 151 and Article 153.

— Ninety days —

The date of the decree or order appealed from

157. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, from an order of acquittal.

— Six months. —

The date of the order appealed from.

THIRD DIVISION APPLICATIONS

158. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to set aside an award.

— Ten days. —

When the award is filed in Court and notice of the filing has been given to the parties.

159. For leave to appear and defend a suit under the summary procedure referred to in Section 128 (2) (f) or under Order 37 of the same Code

— Ten days —

When the summons is served

160. For an order under the same Code, to restore to the file an application for review rejected in consequence of the failure of the applicant to appear when the application was called on for hearing

— Fifteen days —

When the application for review is rejected.

161. For a review of judgment by a Provincial Court of Small Causes or by a Court invested with the jurisdiction of a Provincial Court of Small Causes when exercising that jurisdiction

— Fifteen days. —

The date of the decree or order.

6. "Decree or order" . p. 2299
7. Several decrees in same suit : p. 2300
8. Amendment of decrees—Effect of . p. 2300
9. Review of judgment—Effect of . p. 2301
10. Death of party after decree . p. 2302
11. Ex parte decree set aside by trial Court, but restored by High Court . p. 2302
12. Section 4 and this Article . p. 2303

1. Legislative changes . p. 2303
2. Scope and applicability . p. 2303

1. Legislative changes . p. 2305
2. Scope and applicability . p. 2305
3. Period of limitation . p. 2306
4. Starting point . p. 2306
5. Extension of time . p. 2308
6. Exclusion of time : p. 2308
7. Effect of bar : p. 2309

1. Scope . p. 2310
2. Extension of period fixed . p. 2310
3. Starting point . p. 2310
4. Rangoon Small Cause Court Rules 1922, Rule 101 . p. 2310

1. Scope of the Article . p. 2311
2. Starting point . p. 2311

1. Legislative changes . p. 2312
2. Court of Small Causes : p. 2312
3. "Review," meaning of . p. 2312
4. Security deposit . p. 2312

162. For a review of judgment by any of the following Courts, namely, the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William, Madras, Bombay, Lahore, and Nagpur and the Chief Court of Sind in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

— Twenty days. —

The date of the decree or order.

163. By a plaintiff for an order to set aside a dismissal for default of appearance or for failure to pay costs of service of process or to furnish security for costs.

— Thirty days. —

The date of the dismissal.

164. By a defendant, for an order to set aside a decree passed *ex parte*.

— Thirty days. —

The date of the decree, or where the summons was not duly served, when the applicant has knowledge of the decree.

165. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by a person dispossessed of immovable property and disputing the right of the decree-holder or purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree to be put into possession.

— Thirty days. —

The date of the dispossession.

1. Legislative changes : p. 2314
2. Scope of the Article : p. 2314
3. "Review" : p. 2315
4. "Original jurisdiction" : p. 2315
5. Application for review, when maintainable : p. 2316
6. Starting point : p. 2316

dismissed for default :

use Courts

4. "Defendant," if includes his legal representative : p. 2326
5. Starting point : p. 2327
6. "Summons," meaning of : p. 2330

2334

1. Legislative changes : p. 2336
2. Scope and applicability of the Article : p. 2336
3. "By a person dispossessed" : p. 2337
4. "Dispossessed," meaning of : p. 2338
5. Starting point of limitation : p. 2338

166. Under the same Code to set aside a sale in execution of a decree (including any such application by a judgment-debtor).

— Thirty days. —

The date of the sale

167. Complaining of resistance or obstruction to delivery of possession of immoveable property decreed or sold in execution of a decree.

— Thirty days. —

The date of the resistance or obstruction.

168. For the re-admission of an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution.

— Thirty days. —

The date of the dismissal.

1. Legislative changes : p. 2340
2. Scope of Article . p. 2342
3. "Under the same Code" . p. 2347
4. "To set aside" : p. 2347
- 4a. Void sale — Application in respect of : p. 2347
5. "Decree" : p. 2347
6. Adjustment of decree after sale — Application to record adjustment and set aside sale — Limitation . p. 2348
7. Application under Order 21 Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code . p. 2349
8. Application on ground of judgment-debtor having no saleable interest in the property—Limitation : p. 2350
9. Sale in insolvency proceedings—Applicability of Article : p. 2351

13. Application by notice of motion, when deemed as made : p. 2353
14. Suit to avoid sale treated as proceeding under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code—Limitation . p. 2353
15. Setting aside of sale under inherent power— Limitation : p. 2354
16. Fresh ground for setting aside sale, if can be urged after limitation : p. 2354
17. Extension of time under this Article . p. 2354
18. Computation of limitation under the Article — Effect of fraud : p. 2357

19. Defence not barred on account of delay in filing application for setting aside sale

p. 2363
p. 2364

5. Transfer of execution case to another Court and limitation for an application under Order 21 Rule 97 . p. 2365

Order 41

5. Application to restore appeal rejected for non-payment of court-fee : p. 2369
6. Dismissal without jurisdiction : p. 2369
7. Application made in time—Party implicated afterwards —Effect : p. 2370
8. Starting point : p. 2370
9. Court cannot extend time prescribed by this Article : p. 2370
10. Rangoon High Court Rules of Procedure : Rule 9 sub-rule 2 : p. 2371

169. For the re-hearing of an appeal heard *ex parte*.

— Thirty days. —

The date of the decree in appeal, or, where notice of the appeal was not duly served, when the applicant has knowledge of the decree.

170. For leave to appeal as a pauper.

— Thirty days. —

The date of the decree appealed from.

171. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1909, for an order to set aside an abatement.

— Sixty days. —

The date of the abatement.

172. Under the same Code by the assignee or the receiver of an insolvent plaintiff or appellant for an order to set aside the dismissal of a suit or an appeal.

— Sixty days. —

The date of the order of dismissal.

173. For a review of judgment except in the cases provided for by Article 161 and Article 162.

— Ninety days. —

The date of the decree or order.

174. For the issue of a notice under the same Code, to show cause why any payment made out of Court of any money payable under a decree or any adjustment of the decree should not be recorded as certified.

— Ninety days. —

When the payment or adjustment is made.

175. For payment of the amount of a decree by instalments.

— Six months. —

The date of the decree.

1. Legislative changes : p. 2372
2. Scope of the Article : p. 2372
3. Burden of proof : p. 2372
4. Starting point : p. 2373

5. Extension of time under Section 6 : p. 2375
6. Power to grant time for payment of court-fee : p. 2375

1. Legislative changes : p. 2376
2. Scope : p. 2376
3. Starting point : p. 2378
4. Applicability of Section 5 to applications governed by this Article : p. 2379

1. Legislative changes : p. 2380
2. Scope and applicability : p. 2380
3. Starting point : p. 2381

1. Legislative changes : p. 2382

5. Starting point : p. 2382
6. Court-fee and limitation : p. 2383

1. Legislative changes : p. 2385
2. Scope and applicability : p. 2385
3. Certification by decree-holder : p. 2387
4. Effect of order on application made beyond six months : p. 2393
5. Decree must be for payment of money : p. 2394
6. Starting point : p. 2394

1. Legislative changes : p. 2393
2. Scope : p. 2393
3. Effect of order on application made beyond six months : p. 2393
4. Decree must be for payment of money : p. 2394
5. Starting point : p. 2394

176. Under the same Code to have the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff or of a deceased appellant made a party.

— Ninety days —

The date of the death of the deceased plaintiff or appellant.

177. Under the same Code to have the legal representative of a deceased defendant or of a deceased respondent made a party.

— Ninety days. —

The date of the death of the deceased defendant or respondent.

178. Under the same Code for the filing in Court of an award in a suit made in any matter referred to arbitration by order of the Court or of an award made in any matter referred to arbitration without the intervention of a Court.

— Six months. —

The date of the award.

179. By a person desiring to appeal under the same Code to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal

— Ninety days. —

The date of the decree appealed from

180. By a purchaser of immoveable property at a sale in execution of a decree for delivery of possession.

— Three years. —

When the sale becomes absolute.

181. Applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

— Three years. —

When the right to apply accrues.

6. Extension and exclusion of time prescribed by this Article . p 2397

7. One representative applying within time — Another, if can be brought on record afterwards . p. 2398

1. Legislative changes . p. 2399

2. Scope . p. 2400

3. "Award" . p. 2407

1. Legislative changes : p 2405

2 Scope of the Article . p. 2406

3. "Award" . p 2407

4. Starting point : p. 2407

5. Extension of time . p 2408

1. History of the Article : p. 2409

2 Scope . p. 2409

3 Starting point . p 2410

4 Extension of time . p 2411

1. Legislative changes . p 2412

2 Scope of the Article . p 2413

3 "By a purchaser" : p 2414

4 Starting point . p. 2415

5 Extension and exclusion of time . p. 2415

6. Second application . p 2416

1. Legislative changes . p. 2418

2. Scope . p 2418

3 "Or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908" : p. 2420

4 Applications for final decree in mortgage suits under

7. Application for restitution—Section 144, Civil Procedure Code . p. 2429

8 Application for execution . p 2432

9. Application to set aside sale . p. 2432

such refund) the date of such last-mentioned decree or, in the case of an appeal therefrom, the date of the final decree of the Appellate Court or of the withdrawal of the appeal, or

7. (where the application is to enforce any payment which the decree or order directs to be made at a certain date) such date.

Explanation I. — Where the decree or order has been passed severally in favour of more persons than one, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable to each, the application mentioned in clause 5 of this article shall take effect in favour only of such of the said persons or their representatives as it may be made by. But where the decree or order has been passed, jointly in favour of more persons than one, such application, if made by any one or more of them, or by his or their representatives, shall take effect in favour of them all.

Where the decree or order has been passed severally against more persons than one, distinguishing portions of the subject-matter as payable or deliverable by each, the application shall take effect against only such of the said persons or their representatives as it may be made against. But where the decree or order has been passed jointly against more persons than one, the application, if made against any one or more of them, or against his or their representatives, shall take effect against them all.

Explanation II. — "Proper Court" means the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree or order.

31. Decree becoming inexecutable by reason of subsequent events : p. 2482

32. Decree on condition to be performed by the decree-holder himself : p. 2483

33. Appeal : p. 2484

34. Appeal whether should be against the decree or order sought to be executed p. 2485

35. Appeal against portion of decree, if saves limitation for execution of whole decree p. 2486

41. Abatement of appeal : p. 2493

42. Dismissal of appeal for default, whether gives a fresh start of limitation for execution p. 2495

43. Order returning appeal for presentation to proper Court : p. 2497

48 "Where there has been a review of judgment" : p. 2499

49 Review in part p. 2501

50 "Where the decree has been amended" p. 2501

51. Where amended decree is appealed against p. 2506

53 Application barred by limitation p. 2514

53a. Application in respect of person or property outside jurisdiction p. 2514

55b "Where the decree has been amended" p. 2501

56. "Where the decree has been amended" p. 2501

57 Application for relief in mode not permitted by law : p. 2517

58 Application in respect of decree incapable of execution : p. 2517

58a. Application for execution of conditional decree without performing condition : p. 2517

59 Application not accompanied by certificate required by law p. 2518

60. Omission to sign or verify application p. 2519

61. Omission to state previous adjustments p. 2520

64 Omission to state previous adjustments p. 2520

68 Failure to file copy of decree p. 2522

69 Failure to produce encumbrance certificate p. 2523

70 Omission to give description of property sought to be proceeded against p. 2523

71. Defects of vakalatnama p. 2524

72 Other defects p. 2525

73. Application valid only if made by decree-holder or his representative p. 2526

74. Application by attaching creditor p. 2527

115. Application for postponement of execution proceedings :
p. 2567
116. Application for issue of notice under Order 21 Rule 22,
Civil Procedure Code : p. 2569
- 116a. Application for proclamation of sale under Order 21,
Rule 66, Civil Procedure Code : p. 2570
122. Application by decree-holder for leave to bid, if step-in-
aid : p. 2577
123. Application for delivery of possession by decree-holder
auction-purchaser : p. 2579
124. Certification under Order 21 Rule 2 of the Civil Proce-
dure Code : p. 2580
125. Application for payment out of moneys lying in Court :
p. 2582
126. Application for substitution of representatives : p. 2584
127. Application for substitution of name of transferee of
decree, if step-in-aid : p. 2585
128. Other illustrative instances of step-in-aid : p. 2585
129. "Final order" : p. 2587
130. Order transferring decree for execution : p. 2591
- 130a. Order returning application : p. 2592
131. Final order need not be in accordance with law :
p. 2592
- 131a. Retrospective operation of amendment of Clause 5 ;
p. 2592
132. Clause 6 : p. 2592
133. Clause 7—General : p. 2593
134. "Payment which the decree or order directs to be made
at a certain date" : p. 2594
135. "Certain date" : p. 2596
136. Instalment decree : p. 2598
140. Decree for partition : p. 2608
141. Decree partly joint and partly several against several
defendants : p. 2609
142. Several persons becoming entitled to or liable under
decree after it is passed — Effect of application by or
against one : p. 2610
- 142a. Explanation II : p. 2611
143. Revival of application : p. 2611
144. Onus : p. 2618

Limitation in

183. To enforce a judgment, decree or order of any Court established by Royal Charter in the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, or an order of His Majesty in Council.

— Twelve years. —

When a present right to enforce the judgment, decree or order accrues to some person capable of releasing the right :

Provided that when the judgment, decree or order has been revived, or some part of the principal money secured thereby, or some interest on such money has been paid, or some acknowledgment of the right thereto has been given in writing signed by the person liable to pay such principal or interest, or his agent, to the person entitled thereto or his agent, the twelve years shall be computed from the date of such revival, payment or acknowledgment or the latest of such revivals, payments or acknowledgments, as the case may be.

1. Legislative changes : p. 2621
2. Scope : p. 2622
3. Application by notice of motion : when deemed to be made : p. 2623
4. "Enforce" : p. 2624
5. "Established by Royal Charter" : p. 2625
6. "In the exercise of its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction" : p. 2626
7. Order of His Majesty in Council : p. 2626
8. Starting point : p. 2627
9. Person capable of releasing the right : p. 2628
10. Reviver : p. 2628
11. Acknowledgment and payments : p. 2630



GENERAL INDEX

Note. — A=ARTICLE; Cl=CLAUSE; FN=FOOT NOTE reference;
P=Preamble; N=NOTE number in the Commentary;
S=SECTION.

Abandonment

- By owner : See Possession—Abandonment.
- By trespasser : See Adverse possession—Interruption.

Abatement

- Cause of A 171 N 2
 - (a) Death of party to suit A 172 N 2
 - (b) Failure to bring on record legal representative of plaintiff or defendant who dies after preliminary but before final decree A 177 N 5
 - (c) Insolvency of plaintiff—Whether causes abatement of suit A 172 N 2
- Date of—What is A 171 N 3
- Representative suit under Civil P. O., S 92—Whether abates ... A 171 N 2
- Revision applications—Whether subject to abatement ... A 177 N 2
- Setting aside of
 - (a) Application for
 - (i) Abatement caused by failure to substitute legal representative of deceased defendant or respondent in time—Time cannot be enlarged for sufficient cause ... A 177 N 7
 - (ii) Application for substitution, whether can be treated in substance as one for setting aside abatement ... A 171 N 3
 - (iii) Delay in filing, if can be excused .. S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (iv) Limitation A 171, A 172 N 1
 - (a) Starting point A 171 N 3
 - (b) Time, whether can be extended by virtue of S. 5. A 171 N 4
 - (v) Representation of several persons by one—Death of person instituting suit—Application by person represented to continue suit—Whether one for setting aside abatement ... A 171 N 2
 - (vi) Suit by nearest reversioner to set aside alienation by widow—Death of nearest reversioner pending suit—Declaration of abatement of suit by Court—Application by next reversioner for setting aside abatement is not governed by Art 171 A 171 N 2
 - (b) Who can set aside abatement A 171 N 2

Accommodation bill

- Acceptor for honour of—Suit by him on the bill—Limitation ... A 79 N 1
- Acceptor of—Suit against drawer—Limitation—Starting point .. A 79 N 3
- Accommodator of—Suit for recovery of sum paid—Limitation .. A 79 N 3
- Indorser for accommodation—Suit by—Limitation .. A 79 N 2 FN 1
- Meaning of A 79 N 1

Accounts

- Debtor calling for accounts in reply to creditor's demand for payment—Debtor, if admits existence of unsettled accounts ... 8 19 N 19
- Demand for—What amounts to demand for accounts within Article 89 ... A 89 N 13
- Mutual account
- (a) Meaning of ... A 85 N 3
- (b) Test ... A 85 N 3
- Mutual, open and current account
- (a) Shifting balance, whether must exist throughout dealings ... A 85 N 13
- (b) Suit for balance due on
- (i) Account between debtor and creditor where debtor has made casual overpayment—Limitation ... A 85 N 10
- (ii) Account consisting of advances of loan on one side and agency on the other—Limitation applicable ... A 85 N 5
- (iii) Account consisting of sale of goods on one hand and payments of price on the other—Limitation applicable ... A 85 N 6
- (iv) Account where each party sells goods to the other—Limitation ... A 85 N 7
- (v) Account where employee is in the habit of drawing advances of salary—Limitation ... A 85 N 4
- (vi) Account where there are advances of loan on one side and repayments on the other—Limitation applicable: ... A 85 N 4
- (vii) Account which consists of deposits and withdrawals—Limitation ... A 85 N 9
- (viii) Account which consists of loan by each party to the other—Limitation ... A 85 N 10
- (ix) Account which consists of receipt of rent from minor's estate on one side and money spent for minor on the other—Limitation ... A 85 N 12
- (x) Object of Art. 85 ... A 85 N 2
- (xi) "Last item admitted or proved" in Art. 85—Meaning of: ... A 85 N 18
- (xii) Limitation
- (a) English Law ... A 85 N 2
- (b) Indian Law ... A 85 N 2
- (c) Starting point ... A 85 N 17
- (d) Section 25 not applicable ... A 85 N 17
- (xiii) Suit where account consists of advances of loan on one side and sale of goods on the other—Limitation applicable ... A 85 N 8
- (c) Whether each party must keep accounts to constitute mutual, open and current account ... A 85 N 15
- (d) Whether the parties must be the same throughout the period of account ... A 85 N 15
- Open and current account—Meaning of ... A 85 N 14
- Principal and agent—Agent whether bound to render proper accounts ... A 89 N 21
- Refusal to give—What amounts to refusal to give accounts within Article 89 ... A 89 N 13
- Suit for
- (a) Account of profits made by defendant by infringing copyright or exclusive privilege—Limitation ... A 40 N 1

Accounts—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (b) Admission of existence of unsettled accounts — Accounts submitted to arbitrators for settlement — Admission, if saves limitation for suit notwithstanding failure of arbitration proceedings ... S 19 N 19
- (c) Against executor—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
- (d) Against executor — Whether executor liable to render accounts for period of twelve years previous to suit, in suit by residuary legatee for recovery of his share granted under the will ... A 123 N 7
- (e) Against factor—Limitation ... A 88, A 88 N 1
- (f) Against trustee where he is liable to account in equity for a particular fund—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 4
- (g) Based upon registered contract of agency—Suit, whether one for compensation for breach of registered contract ... A 116 N 12
- (b) By legal representative of deceased principal against agent for accounts due to deceased principal ... A 89 N 11
- (i) By principal against agent
- (i) Agency, how terminated ... A 89 N 14 to 19
- (ii) Burden of proof ... A 89 N 20
- (iii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 89 N 5; A 89 N 12, A 89 N 13
- (iv) Nature of relief ... A 89 N 5
- (v) On ground of breach of contract of agency—Suit, whether governed by residuary Art. 115 ... A 115 N 1
- (vi) On registered agreement to account—Limitation applicable ... A 89 N 4
- (vii) What constitutes demand and refusal of accounts within Art. 89—Illustrative cases ... A 89 N 13
- (j) By principal against legal representative of deceased agent—Limitation ... A 62 N 11, A 89 N 10
- (k) By proprietor for account of profits against lambardar based on implied contract—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- (l) Cause of action—When arises ... A 120 N 15
- (m) Decree in favour of defendant, if may be passed ... S 3 N 14
- (n) Discharge—Manager of joint Hindu family—Capacity of, to give ... S 7 N 16
- (o) Essentials of such suit ... A 120 N 15
- (p) Hindu family—Partition of Hindu family—Portion of estate left in management of one member — Suit against such member—Suit for accounts by other members—Limitation ... A 89 N 8
- (q) Limitation—Illustrative cases governed by Art. 120 ... A 120 N 15
- (r) Limitation applicable — Whether same as applicable for money had and received ... A 62 N 4
- (s) Partnership accounts — Partnership deed registered—Whether suit is one for compensation for breach of registered contract ... A 116 N 11
- (t) Suit for accounts and share of profits of dissolved partnership
- (i) Between partner and sub-partner—Limitation applicable ... A 106 N 8
- (ii) Burden of proof ... A 106 N 14
- (iii) By assignee or successor-in-interest of a partner — Limitation ... A 106 N 10

Accounts—Suit for — Suit for accounts and share of profits of dissolved partnership—(Contd.)

- (iv) Limitation
 - (a) Fact that there are unrealized assets outstanding at the date of dissolution and date of suit, whether alters character of suit as one for accounts: A 106 N 2
 - (b) Starting point A 106 N 13
- (v) Meaning of A 106 N 5
- (vi) Partnership dissolved on death of a partner — Suit against heir of deceased partner for debts due from him as member of partnership — Limitation ... A 106 N 11
- (vii) Second partnership after dissolution of first — Suit for account of second partnership — Accounts of first partnership, if can be gone into A 106 N 9
- (viii) Settlement after dissolution—Whether permissible even after expiry of limitation for suit for accounts ... A 106 N 6
- (ix) Suit for accounts of family business—Limitation ... A 106 N 3
- (x) Suit for accounts where deed of partnership is registered—Limitation A 106 N 12
- (xi) Suit for declaration that plaintiff has share in the property attached in execution of a decree against one of the partners as solely belonging to him—Whether suit for accounts and share of profits of dissolved partnership A 106 N 5
- (xii) Suit for recovery of money found due to plaintiff by defendant by prior judgment between parties in suit for accounts of dissolved partnership—Limitation ... A 106 N 5
- (xiii) Suit for relief arising out of existing partnership — Whether suit for accounts of dissolved partnership ... A 106 N 4
- (xiv) Suit for share in specific amounts received by one partner after dissolution—Limitation A 106 N 7
- (xv) Suit if time-barred, whether bars subsequent suit for relief unclaimable without findings as to account and share of dissolved partnership A 106 N 5
- (xvi) Suit in respect of matter which is not and has not become item of partnership account — Whether maintainable without prayer for adjustment of accounts—Illustrative cases A 106 N 5
- (xvii) Suit to recover amount due on basis of settlement reached between partners—Limitation A 106 N 6
- (xviii) Time, whether can be extended by application of Sections 4 to 25 A 106 N 13
- (xix) What is — Test A 106 N 2
- (xx) Whether form or substance of suit is material for applicability of Art. 106 A 106 N 2
- (u) Suit for accounts and suit for compensation, distinguished: A 116 N 1
- (v) Suit for accounts of moveable property left in management of one member after disruption of joint status of joint Hindu family—Limitation applicable A 127 N 6
- (w) Suit for accounts without prayer for dissolution of partnership—Limitation A 120 N 27
- (x) Suit for directing defendants to produce their accounts of office—Limitation A 124 N 5

Accounts—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (y) Suit for money under agreement — Subsequent suit for the same sum as on settlement of accounts— Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14 ... S 14 N 18
- (z) Suit seeking to make trustee liable to account for property that came into his hands and to make good such portion as is not duly accounted for—Whether within S. 10 ... S 10 N 23
- (z¹) Suit to enforce liability of trustee in respect of property which never came into his hands—Whether within S. 10 ... S 10 N 23

—Suit on

- (a) Adjusted accounts of partnership which entitles plaintiff to sue by virtue of adjustment—Limitation ... A 115 N 3
- (b) Oral adjustment—Limitation ... A 120 N 15
- (c) Suit for recovery of sums due on accounts after a bill which defendant has sent to plaintiff in settlement of accounts is dishonoured on presentment for acceptance—Limitation ... A 78 N 3

Accounts stated

- In respect of registered contract of debt — Suit upon original contract within six years thereof but beyond three years of statement of accounts—Whether barred ... A 64 N 5
- Meaning of ... A 64 N 2
- Promise implied in—Whether constitutes express promise within Contract Act, S. 25, sub.s. 3 ... A 64 N 3
- Statement of account, whether extinguishes original rights ... A 64 N 6

—Suit upon

- (a) Accounts stated not signed by defendant or his agent — Limitation ... A 64 N 10
- (b) Adjustment of accounts if not signed by defendant, whether furnishes cause of action ... A 64 N 8
- (c) Between principal and agent ... A 64 N 7
- (d) Limitation
- (i) Art. 85 and Art. 64 distinguished ... A 64 N 4
- (ii) Starting point ... A 64 N 9

—What is

- (a) Account which merely consists of advances of amount on one side and repayments towards such advances on the other, whether accounts stated ... A 64 N 2
- (b) Acknowledgment under S. 19, whether accounts stated ... A 64 N 2; A 64 N 3
- (c) Mere balancing of account, whether accounts stated ... A 64 N 3
- Whether must be in terms of money ... A 64 N 5

Acknowledgment

- After dissolution of partnership by partner authorized to wind up business—Whether binding on other partners ... S 21 N 13
- Against whom operates—Person jointly liable with person making acknowledgment—Whether bound ... S 21 N 6
- Authorization need not have been made with reference to particular acknowledgment in question ... S 21 N 6
- Authorization of a member of any of the groups mentioned in S. 21 to acknowledge on behalf of others may be express or implied and may be general or special ... S 21 N 6
- By agent
- (a) "Agent duly authorized in this behalf" in S. 19—Meaning of. ... S 21

Acknowledgment—By agent—(Contd.)

(b) Agent of Hindu widow acknowledging liability—Whether valid as against reversioner succeeding to such liability ... S 21

(c) Persons who can be considered as agents for the purpose of S. 19 ... S 21 N 6

—By co-mortgagee

(a) Mere fact that persons stand to each other in the relation of co-mortgagees—Whether makes them agents for each other for purpose of making acknowledgments ... S 21 N 16

(b) Mortgagee right partitioned and each mortgagee in separate possession of a portion of mortgaged property—Acknowledgment by one of them—Whether can be used in suit for redemption of particular share in his enjoyment ... S 21 N 16

(c) Whether effective to sustain suit for redemption of such co-mortgagee's share in mortgage ... S 21 N 16

(d) Whether operates against other co-mortgagees for purposes of limitation ... S 21 N 16

—By Court of Wards—Authority to acknowledge is statutory and not as guardian of ward ... S 21 N 5

—By guardian

(a) Acknowledgment by *de facto* guardian of minor who is not his legal guardian—Whether binding on minor under S. 21 : S 21 N 3

(b) Acknowledgment must be made by lawful guardian ... S 21 N 3

(c) After ward's death—Ward's estate, if bound ... S 21 N 3

(d) "Lawful guardian" in S. 21—Meaning of ... S 21 N 3

(e) Of insane person—Before he is so appointed one is not the ... S 21 N 4

... S 21 N 3

... S 21 N 3

... S 21 N 19

—By Hindu widow—Whether binding on reversioners ... S 21 N 20

—By junior member of Hindu joint family—Whether binds other members of the family ... S 21 N 20

—By manager of Hindu joint family

(a) After partition—Creditor having no notice of partition—Acknowledgment, if binds other members of family ... S 21 N 20

(b) Family joint when liability was incurred—Acknowledgment by alleged manager after family divided—Acknowledgment, if binding on other members of family ... S 21 N 20

(c) In his individual capacity—Whether binding on other members of the family ... S 21 N 20

(d) It should be joint family liability in order to bind the other members of the family ... S 21 N 20

(e) Liability incurred by members of family in their individual capacity—Manager, if can acknowledge liability on behalf of other members of the family ... S 21 N 20

(f) Liability incurred by or on behalf of Hindu undivided family—Acknowledgment by manager or his agent—Whether can be deemed to have been made on behalf of whole family ... S 21

(g) Mention of debt in schedule of debts filed by manager in the course of proceedings for his being adjudicated insolvent—Admission, if binding on family ... S 21 N 20

(h) Whether saves limitation in regard to liabilities binding on family ... S 21 N 20

Acknowledgment—By manager of Hindu joint family—(Contd.)

- (i) Whether should be expressed as made in his capacity as manager ... S 21 N 20
- By manager of Malabar tarwad in respect of liabilities binding on tarwad—Whether binds the whole tarwad ... S 21 N 20
- By member of joint Hindu family carrying on business made in the course of the business—Whether can be presumed to be authorized by other members of the family ... S 21 N 14
- By member of joint Hindu family in the ordinary course of business after partition—Creditor having no notice of partition—Acknowledgment, if binding on other members of the family ... S 21 N 14
- By one co-mortgagor—Whether saves limitation as against other co-mortgagors... S 21 N 11
- By one of Muhammadan co-heirs—Whether saves limitation as against another co-heir ... S 21 N 10
- By one of several executors—Whether effective against the others: S 21 N 15
- By one of several joint contractors
 - (a) Authorization by one of the others for acknowledgment to be made—Limitation will be saved as against him also ... S 21 N 7
 - (b) Limitation, if saved against others ... S 21 N 7
 - (c) By one of several joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees—Effect of ... S 21
- By one of several judgment-debtors—Whether saves limitation against other co-judgment-debtors ... S 21 N 17
- By one partner in a going mercantile concern
 - (a) Presumption of agency of such partner on behalf of firm will hold good only if acknowledgment made in course of partnership business ... S 21 N 18
 - (b) Whether binding on firm ... S 21 N 18
- By partner
 - (a) After dissolution of partnership in respect of a debt which was a partnership debt—Whether binds other ex-partners S 21 N 13
 - (b) Authority of partner to acknowledge on behalf of firm ... S 21 N 13
 - (c) Authorized by other partners to do so—Whether saves limitation against other partners ... S 21 N 13
 - (d) In respect of partnership debts after dissolution of firm of which creditor has no notice—Acknowledgment, if binds estate of deceased partner ... S 21 N 13
 - (e) In the course of proceedings relating to his insolvency—Acknowledgment, if can be used as against other partners S 21 N 13
 - (f) Partner purporting to acknowledge only his own liability and not that of partnership as a whole—Whether saves limitation as against other partners ... S 21 N 13
- By principal debtor—Whether saves limitation as against su 21 N 12
- By surety—Whether saves limitation as against principal debtor . S 21 N 12
- By vakil on behalf of minor—Whether binding on minor ... S 21 N 3
- Categories mentioned in S. 21 are exhaustive ... S 21 N 6
- Certificate of guardianship granted to two persons jointly—Acknowledgment by one of them, if and when binding on minor S 21 N 3
- Disability of creditor at the time of acknowledgment—Effect ... S 6 N 15
- During vacation—Effect ... S 4 N, 8

Acknowledgment—(Contd.)

- Gt. ... S 21 N 3
- Head of Muhammadan family—Whether can make acknowledgment on behalf of the family ... S 21 N 22
- Ineffective for purposes of Art. 183—Fresh period of limitation, if will run from date of acknowledgment ... S 20 N 37
- In favour of original creditor's legal representative—Legal representative minor—Effect ... S 6 N 14
- In respect of cause of action—Day of acknowledgment to be excluded in computing period of limitation ... S 12 N 3
- Joint contractors—More fact that certain persons are related to each other as joint contractors—Whether by itself makes them agents of each other for making acknowledgment ... S 21 N 7
- Joint mortgagees
 - (a) Acknowledgment by joint mortgagees—Whether saves limitation for suit for redemption by mortgagor ... S 21 N 16
 - (b) Death of one of two co-mortgagees—Entire mortgagee right becoming vested in the other—Acknowledgment by him after the other's death—Whether sufficient to keep alive right of redemption ... S 21 N 16
 - (c) One of several mortgagees, if can be deemed to be acting as agent of the others for purpose of acknowledgment ... S 21 N 16
- Made after period fixed in Schedule but before expiry of period extended on ground of disability—Whether furnishes fresh starting point of limitation ... S 6 N 41
S 19 N 19
- Meaning of ... S 21 N 6
- More persons than one jointly liable—Acknowledgment by one will not bind the others ... S 21 N 13
- Nature of business of firm such that acknowledgment of liability is a thing done in the usual course of the business—Authorization to one partner by other partners to acknowledge may be presumed ... A 110 N 12
- Of liability to pay arrears of rent—Acknowledgment, whether extends period of limitation for suit for arrears of rent ... S 21 N 6
- Person making acknowledgment having authority, of other members of the group to which he belongs, to make acknowledgment—Acknowledgment binds other members also ... S 21 N 2
- Persons who can keep alive right which is not time-barred, by acknowledgment ... A 64 N 3
- Promise implied in—Whether constitutes express promise within Contract Act, S. 25, sub-s. 3 ... S 20 N 37
- Requirements of Art. 183 satisfied but not those of S. 19—Date of acknowledgment will be starting point under Art. 183 ... S 21 N 6
- Section 21 is not an exception to S. 19 but an explanation to it ... S 20 N 37
- Should be made to person entitled under Art. 183 ... A 110 N 12
- To pay time-barred rents—Suit on basis of such acknowledgment—Whether maintainable ... A 64 N 2 : A 64 N 3
- Under S. 19—Whether accounts stated within Art. 64 ... S 29 N 2
- Validity of, when made after the prescribed period ...

Acknowledgment and payment

- Distinction between S. 19 and S. 20 and Art. 183 ... S 20 N 37.

Acknowledgment of liability

- Acknowledgment and fresh contract—Distinction between ... S 19 N 8
- Acknowledgment by administrator
 - (a) Administrator, if can bind estate by acknowledgment made by him in respect of debt due by estate ... S 19 N 55
 - (h) Letters of administration granted to heir of deceased—Acknowledgment by heir made before grant of letters—Effect of ... S 19 N 55
- Acknowledgment by agent
 - (a) Acknowledgment necessarily implies that agent acknowledges liability of principal in favour of third party ... S 19 N 50
 - (b) Agent authorized to affix principal's signature on his behalf
 - (c) ... S 19 N 50
 - (d) ... S 19 N 50
 - (e) acknowledge debt due by principal ... S 19 N 50
 - (e) Authority confined to dealings with lands — Agent, if empowered to acknowledge liability for personal debt not charged on lands ... S 19 N 50
 - (f) Authority of agent may be express or implied and may be presumed from attendant circumstances ... S 19 N 50
 - (g) Authority of agent may be the outcome of an order of Court or arise as a matter of law ... S 19 N 50
 - (h) Authority of agent to make acknowledgment on behalf of another may be special or general ... S 19 N 50
 - (i) Authority to borrow implies authority to acknowledge debts. ... S 19 N 50
 - (j) Authority to buy goods and pay for them — Whether implies authority to acknowledge liability for price of goods bought. ... S 19 N 50
 - (k) Authority to settle and pay claims—Whether includes authority to acknowledge such claims ... S 19 N 50
 - (l) Burden of proof that person acknowledging was duly authorized to do so is on plaintiff ... S 19 N 50
 - (m) Business of firm carried on by gumastha who generally managed all its affairs—Gumastha always allowed to write letters on behalf of firm which were never repudiated—Gumastha, if could acknowledge debts on behalf of firm ... S 19 N 50
 - (n) Court of Wards in charge of estate of a ward — Whether an agent authorized under the statute to make acknowledgments on behalf of ward ... S 19 N 50
 - (o) Executor's authority to give acknowledgment on behalf of estate is based on his position under the law. ... S 19 N 50
 - (p) Letter acknowledging debt on behalf of another written at the request of the latter — Acknowledgment is made by agent specially authorized in this behalf ... S 19 N 50
 - (q) Mere fact that agent used to write letters on behalf of principal — Court, if can infer that he was authorized to make acknowledgment of liability on behalf of principal ... S 19 N 50
 - (r) Question whether there is authority to acknowledge depends on facts and circumstances of case ... S 19 N 50
 - (s) Receiver authorized by Court to acknowledge debts—Authority is derived from order of the Court ... S 19 N 50

Acknowledgment of liability—(Contd.)**—Acknowledgment by Court**

(a) Judgment purporting to record admission made by or on behalf of a party — Judgment, if can operate as acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 57

(b) Statement in judgment of Court that certain person was mortgagee — Whether can be used as acknowledgment of liability against him ... S 19 N 57

—Acknowledgment by Court of Wards — Whether saves limitation under S. 19 ... S 19 N 57

—Acknowledgment by executor—Whether binding on estate ... S 19 N 56

—Acknowledgment by minor—Whether available against him ... S 19 N 69

—Acknowledgment by Official Assignee

(a) Suit against debtor after termination of insolvency—Previous acknowledgment by Official Assignee — Whether can be relied on as saving limitation ... S 19 N 53

(b) Suit against Official Assignee of insolvent to enforce mortgage executed by insolvent—Acknowledgment by Official Assignee may be relied on as saving limitation ... S 19 N 53

—Acknowledgment by one of several co-judgment debtors—Whether saves limitation against others ... S 19 N 54

—Acknowledgment by pleader

(a) Admission by pleader in the course of his duties on behalf of his client — Whether binds client as acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 51

(b) Admission by vakil in course of letter by him on behalf of client—Whether binds client ... S 19 N 51

(c) Petition by vakil signed by him praying for additional time for payment of amount due under decree passed against client — Whether acknowledgment of liability under S. 19 : S 19 N 51

—Acknowledgment by Receiver

(a) Receiver, if can make acknowledgment on behalf of party of whose property he is receiver ... S 19 N 52

(b) Receiver of assets of firm with power to pay debts due by firm—Whether can give acknowledgment in respect of debts S 19 N 52

(c) Suit for dissolution of firm—Receiver appointed for collecting outstanding and doing all things necessary for preservation of estate — Receiver, if can acknowledge liability for debt due by firm ... S 19 N 53

—Acknowledgment contained in document 30 years old

(a) Document purporting to be signed by agent on behalf of principal — Presumption, if arises as to agent's authority : S 19 N 63

(b) Presumption as to—Whether presumption applies where copy is produced as secondary evidence ... S 19 N 63

(c) Signature of executant purporting to have been written by another person under the former's authority—Presumption that person affixing signature of executant had his authority to do so—Whether arises ... S 19 N 63

—Acknowledgment contained in letter marked "without prejudice" —Admissibility of ... S 19 N 66

—Acknowledgment does not confer right or title on person whose right is acknowledged ... S 19 N 7

—Acknowledgment, if must be signed by person making acknowledgment ... S 19 N 5

Acknowledgment of liability — (Contd.)

- Acknowledgment, if should be admission of one's own liability ... S 19 N 35
- can be compelled by Court to prove acknowledgment of liability by applicant ... S 19 N 70
- (b) Whether can be compelled to be produced in Court to prove acknowledgment ... S 19 N 70
- Acknowledgment made under prior enactment—Test of sufficiency: S 19 N 2
- Acknowledgment not sufficient under prior enactment—Right to sue becoming barred on date of coming into force of Act under which suit instituted—Right of suit is not revived ... S 19 N 2
- Acknowledgment obtained by threat or intimidation — Whether can be used under S. 19 ... S 19 N 69
- Acknowledgment of debt inadmissible for want of stamp — Inadmissibility does not preclude debt acknowledged from being proved by parol evidence ... S 19 N 74
- Acknowledgment of debt which otherwise falls within provisions of Art. 1, Sec. 1, Stamp Act—Acknowledgment if not duly stamped cannot be relied on ... S 19 N 74
- Acknowledgment under circumstances that would vitiate contract —Effect of ... S 19 N 69
- Acknowledgment, when to be made
- (a) Acknowledgment must be made before expiry of period of limitation prescribed for suit or application ... S 19 N 12
- (b) Period prescribed—Meaning of
- (i) Acknowledgment made before expiry of period of limitation as extended by S 14—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 12
- (ii) Acknowledgment made during additional period conferred by S 19—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 12
- (iii) Acknowledgment made during the period of two years conferred by the now repealed S. 31—Whether within S. 19 ... S 19 N 12
- (iv) Acknowledgment made under prior Act — Period prescribed refers to period prescribed by Act in force at the time of institution of suit ... S 19 N 13
- (v) Extra period to which a person is entitled under S. 6 of the Act—Whether period prescribed within S 19 ... S 19 N 12
- (vi) Extra time which a litigant gets under S 4—Whether part of period prescribed within S 19 ... S 19 N 12
- (vii) Period got after deducting a certain time under S. 52, U P Court of Wards Act — Whether period prescribed within S. 19 ... S 19 N 12
- (viii) Period in computing which time is deducted under S 78, sub.s 2, Provincial Insolvency Act — Whether period prescribed within S. 19 ... S 19 N 12
- (ix) Period of 12 years under S. 48, Civil Procedure Code —Whether period prescribed within S 19 ... S 19 N 15
- (x) Period prescribed by special or local law — Whether period prescribed within S 19 ... S 19 N 14

Acknowledgment of liability—By whom to be made—(Contd.)

- (d) Person making acknowledgment—Whether must have had interest in property in respect of which acknowledgment is given, at the time when it was made ... S 19 N 33
- (e) "Person through whom he derives title or liability"—Meaning of ... S 19 N 34
- (f) Statement by person made at time when he was not in any way liable in regard to matter alleged to be acknowledged—Whether can be used against him as acknowledgment when he subsequently becomes liable in regard to it ... S 19 N 25

—Conditional acknowledgment

- (a) Admission by person of existence of open and unsettled accounts between himself and another—Effect of ... S 19 N 19
- (b) Admission of liability coupled with condition that liability is found by arbitrators to exist—Sufficiency of, for purposes of S. 19 ... S 19 N 19
- (c) Admission qualified by condition which is fulfilled—S. 19, if applies ... S 19 N 19
- (d) Cosharer in exclusive possession calling upon other co-sharer to pay up his share of expenses incurred for repair—Acknowledgment of other's right implied in letter—Whether conditional ... S 19 N 19
- (e) Statement by debtor that he is willing to pay on hearing from creditor full details of dues—Whether amounts to conditional acknowledgment ... S 19 N 19

—Conditions for applicability of S. 19 ... S 19**—Date of acknowledgment**

- (a) Admissibility of evidence to prove that date given in writing is a mistake ... S 19 N 38
- (b) Admissibility of oral evidence as to date ... S 19 N 38
- (c) Date scored out—Oral evidence, if can be given of date of document ... S 19 N 38
- (d) Whether should be mentioned in writing containing acknowledgment ... S 19 N 38
- (e) Writing containing acknowledgment undated—Oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed ... S 19 N 38

—Distinction between S. 19, Limitation Act, and S. 25, Clause 3, Contract Act ... S 19 N 9**—Distinction between Ss. 19 and 20 ... S 19 N 5****—Document containing acknowledgment**

- (a) Construction of—Surrounding circumstances, if can be taken into consideration ... S 19 N 18
- (b) Document alleged to contain acknowledgment—Evidence of external circumstances, if can be taken into consideration ... S 19 N 32
- (c) Fact that document is not intended to be acted upon—Whether invalidates acknowledgment ... S 19 N 18

—Document containing admission by author of subsisting liability—S 19 N 18**—S. 19 ... S 19 N 18****—Document not containing admission of subsisting liability—Whether operates as acknowledgment under S. 19 ... S 19 N 18**

Acknowledgment of liability—(Contd.)**—Effect of**

- (a) Acknowledgment made only with reference to portion of claim made by plaintiff—Whether can save limitation with regard to entire claim of plaintiff ... S 19 N 23
- (b) Acknowledgment of anything includes acknowledgment of its legal consequences ... S 19 N 27
- (c) Acknowledgment of liability in respect of promissory note—Intention to give promissory note in conditional terms of original debt—Acknowledgment, if can be relied on in suit for original debt ... S 19 N 29
- (d) Acknowledgment of liability in respect of promissory note—Whether available in respect of original cause of action ... S 19 N 29
- (e) Admission of mortgage—Whether amounts to admission of mortgagee's right to possession of mortgaged property under terms of mortgage ... S 19 N 27
- (f) Date from which fresh period of limitation is allowed ... S 19 N 5
- (g) One person liable to contribute to another for joint debt which latter has discharged—Admission that debt is a joint debt—Whether sufficient acknowledgment with reference to suit for contribution by either against him ... S 19 N 27
- Endorsement of payment, if should imply acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 5
- Endorsement of payment towards debt due on promissory note—No payment actually made—Endorsement, if amounts to acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 5
- English Law—Distinction from Indian Law ... S 19 N 8
- Entry in settlement record etc., that a property is under a mortgage—Record not signed by party sought to be bound or his agent but only by officer—Whether can be used against party as acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 49
- Entry in settlement record etc., that certain property is under a mortgage—Record signed by parties concerned—Document can be used as acknowledgment of liability in respect of mortgage: ... S 19 N 49
- Essentials of ... S 19 N 18
- (a) Acknowledgment accompanied by statement that it is not to be enforced in a particular manner—Sufficiency of, for purposes of S. 19 ... S 19 N 18
- (b) Acknowledgment coupled with averment that time for payment etc., has not yet come—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 43
- (c) Acknowledgment coupled with proposal for its discharge in a particular manner—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 18
- (d) Acknowledgment must be definite ... S 19 N 18
- (e) Acknowledgment must be in respect of the particular property or right claimed in the suit or application ... S 19 N 26
- (f) Acknowledgment must be in writing ... S 19 N 30
- (g) Acknowledgment must be made before expiry of period of limitation to furnish fresh starting point ... S 19 N 9
- (h) Acknowledgment must be of a subsisting liability ... S 19 N 20
- (i) Acknowledgment must be signed by person making acknowledgment or his agent ... S 19 N 31
- (j) Acknowledgment need not be in respect of the particular relief claimed in the suit ... S 19 N 26

Acknowledgment of liability—Essentials of—(Contd.)

- (k) Acknowledgment need not specify the exact nature of the property or right S 19 N 26
- (l) Acknowledgment of debt need not specify any precise sum as due S 19 N 26
- (m) Conscious acknowledgment of liability is necessary ... S 19 N 18
- (n) Court of Wards in charge of estate giving notice to creditor informing that debt was due to him and requiring him to S 19 N 18
- (o) Debtor pledging with creditor shares in a company to secure old loan—Pledge not recorded in writing—Whether sufficient to save limitation under S. 19 S 19 N 30
- (p) Decree partly in favour of plaintiff and partly in favour of defendant—Plaintiff merely applying for execution of that portion of decree in his favour—Whether acknowledges liability in favour of defendant S 19 N 18
- (q) Document containing acknowledgment ambiguous—Document, if sufficient for purposes of S. 19 S 19 N 18
- (r) Documents containing admission of liability must also indicate that such admission is in respect of right sued on ... S 19 N 26
- (s) Document must contain within itself admission of subsisting liability S 19 N 32
- (t) Judgment-debtor stating that amount due under decree remains unpaid but time for payment has not yet come—Statement is sufficient acknowledgment of liability under decree S 19 N 43
- (u) Letter from debtor admitting correctness of accounts sent by creditor and requesting time for payment—Whether constitutes acknowledgment of liability S 19 N 18
- (v) Letter written by executor to plaintiff that his claim against estate was registered and that due notice would be given to him when assets were to be distributed—Letter, if acknowledgment of liability S 19 N 18
- (w) Liability admitted must be one to the plaintiff or some one through whom he claims S 19 N 46
- (x) Mere admission of title of plaintiff without in any way implying that there is any liability on defendant's part—Sufficiency of, for S 19 S 19 N 18
- (y) Mere payment of money towards debt—Whether sufficient under S 19 though payment may be intended as acknowledgment of the debt S 19 N 30
- (z) Purpose for which statement containing acknowledgment was made is immaterial S 19 N 18
- (z¹) Right indicated in document containing admission in such a way that with the help of external evidence it can be identified with right claimed in suit—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 26
- (z²) Several debts due by defendant to plaintiff—Defendant acknowledging liability in respect of a debt—Identification of debt acknowledged with the one claimed in suit not possible—Acknowledgment, if sufficient for S 19 S 19 N 26

Acknowledgment of liability—Essentials of—(Contd.)

(z⁵) Signature

- (i) Admission of liability contained in plan filed with
plaint — Plan when not signed by plaintiff cannot be
used as acknowledgment under S. 19 ... S 19 N 31
- (ii) Affixing of one's seal to acknowledgment — Whether
equivalent to signing the document ... S 19 N 31
- (iii) Entries in account book which are not signed by
defendant—Whether sufficient for purpose of S. 19 : S 19 N 31
- (iv) Form of signature is immaterial so long as it verifies
the acknowledgment ... S 19 N 31
- (v) Full signature is not necessary—Initials, sufficiency of: S 19 N 31
- (vi) Mere writing containing admission of liability in re-
spect of right claimed—Sufficiency of, under S. 19 ... S 19 N 5
- (vii) Mortgagor signing entries in account book of mortgagee
—Mortgagee also signing entries as scribe—Mort-
gagee, if thereby acknowledges any liability on his
part ... S 19 N 31
- (viii) One person authorizing another to sign his name on his
behalf—Signature, if can be deemed to be that of the
principal ... S 19 N 31
- (ix) One person executing a document but another signing
it as scribe—Document cannot operate as acknowl-
edgment by the latter ... S 19 N 31
- (x) Person making acknowledgment unable to write his
name—Mark or thumb impression—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 31
- (xi) Signature need not appear in any particular part of the
document ... S 19 N 31
- (xii) Telegram, if constitutes sufficient acknowledgment
under S. 19 ... S 19 N 31
- (xiii) Words or letters by which a person usually authenti-
cates documents as being his own—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 31
- (z⁴) Statement that liability originally existed but has since been
discharged—Whether acknowledgment of liability within
S. 19 ... S 19 N 20
- (z³) Suit by consignor of goods against Railway Company for
compensation for non-delivery of goods—Letter written by
Railway Company informing consignor that goods are lying
at a particular place and that consignor's instructions are
awaited—Whether serves as an acknowledgment of liability: S 19 N 18
- (z²) Suit for compensation for land compulsorily acquired by
Government—Letter of Commissioner of Revenue to Dis-
trict Magistrate expressing willingness to recommend to
Government to pay for the land—Whether amounts to
acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 16
S 19 N 18

(z¹) Test to see if words amount to acknowledgment of liability :
—Evidence

(a) Admissibility of

...
...
... in regard to question
whether document contains admission of liability ...

S 19 N 39

S 19 N 32

S 19 N 32

Acknowledgment of liability—Evidence—Admissibility of—(Contd.)

- (iv) For contradicting or varying etc., matters stated in document containing acknowledgment ... S 19 N 41
- (v) For showing how language used in a document is ... S 19 N 32
- ... as to ... S 19 N 40
- his intention ... S 19 N 32
- (viii) Secondary evidence, if can be given to prove contents of acknowledgment in cases in which such evidence is admissible under the Evidence Act ... S 19 N 39
- (h) Document admitting that the liability exists at a certain time—Evidence, if admissible to show that the liability did not exist at that time... S 19 N 41
- (c) Evidence of facts which enable Court to identify persons and things to which instrument refers—Admissibility of ... S 19 N 32
- (d) Executant of document, containing acknowledgment at the same time, orally promising to pay the debt—Oral promise, if can be proved to show that there was a fresh contract between the parties ... S 19 N 41
- (e) Inadmissibility of acknowledgment of debt for want of stamp—Whether precludes debt acknowledged from being proved by parol evidence ... S 19 N 74
- (f) Inference drawn from document, if oral evidence ... S 19 N 38
- (g) Letter containing acknowledgment of debt addressed to one person as creditor—Admissibility of parol evidence to show that another person was known as the person addressed to and that letter was given to him . . . S 19 N 26
- (h) Promissory note given in lieu of earlier debt—Debtor giving receipt to creditor acknowledging the receipt of the sum mentioned in promissory note the same day—Evidence to prove that money referred to in receipt is money paid at the time of earlier debt—Admissibility of ... S 19 N 29
- (i) Right acknowledged indicated to be right to debt—Fact that on date of acknowledgment there was no other debt due from defendant to plaintiff—Whether can be proved to establish identity between right acknowledged and that claimed ... S 19 N 26
- Execution of new promissory note in lieu of earlier one—Endorsement on back of earlier note that in its stead new note was executed—Suit on original note, new note not being sufficiently stamped—Endorsement, if can be relied on as acknowledgment to save limitation ... S 19 N 29
- Express promise to pay existing debt—Whether constitutes acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 8
- Fact that acknowledgment has been made in writing—Whether can be proved except by production of document itself or by secondary evidence of its contents ... S 19 N 40
- Form of—S. 19 does not require acknowledgment in any particular form or an express acknowledgment ... S 19 N 11
- Fresh period of limitation
 - (a) Computation of—Day on which acknowledgment is signed should be omitted ... S 19 N 37

[illegible]

Acknowledgment of liability—(Contd.)

- Plaint containing definite allegation of acknowledgment as saving limitation—Defendant pleading that suit is barred—Such mere plea is not sufficient to constitute specific denial of the allegation in the plaint ... S 19 N 77
- Plaint, if can be allowed to be amended by including allegation of acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 77
- Pleading
 - (a) Presumption of bar of limitation not arising on face of plaint —Fact that acknowledgment is relied on to save suit from bar, if should be stated in plaint ... S 19 N 77
 - (b) Suit barred on the face of the plaint — Acknowledgment of liability relied on to save bar—Fact that such acknowledgment is relied on must be stated in plaint ... S 19 N 77
- - (c) Suit or application must be one in which any property or right is claimed ... S 19 N 17
 - Pre-emption — Acknowledgment by vendee of mortgage on property—Whether binding on pre-emptor ... S 19 N 16
 - Principle of S. 19 ... S 19 N 34
 - Proceedings to which provisions as to extension of limitation apply: S 19; S 19 N 1
 - Promise to pay—Whether necessary ingredient of acknowledgment under S. 19 ... S 19 N 4
 - Promise to pay time-barred debt ... S 19 N 8
 - Promise which is merely implied in acknowledgment of liability—Whether promise within S. 25, Cl 3, Contract Act ... S 19 N 9
 - Promissory note for pre-existing debt — Whether can be used as acknowledgment of liability in suit on original cause of action ... S 19 N 9
 - Promissory note for pre-existing debt becoming unenforceable as being inadmissible for want of sufficient stamp — Suit on original cause of action — Promissory note, if can be relied on as acknowledgment ... S 19 N 64
 - Promissory note for pre-existing debt failing as contravening S 26 of the Paper Currency Act — Suit on original cause of action — Promissory note, if can be used as acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 64
 - Promissory note for pre-existing debt unenforceable under S 28 of ... S 19 N 64
- - ment of liability ... S 19 N 64
 - Provisions as to—Applicability to execution proceedings ... S 19 N 63
 - Registration
 - (a) Acknowledgment contained in document compulsorily registrable but not registered — Admissibility of, for proving acknowledgment of liability contained in it ... S 19 N 75
 - (b) Acknowledgment of liability in respect of right to or in immovable property of value of Rs. 100 or more — Whether a document compulsorily registrable under S 17, Registration Act ... S 19 N 75
 - Requirements of S. 19 ... S 19

Acknowledgment of liability—(Contd.)

- Section 19 applies to any right or property ... S 19 N 5
- Set-off
 - (a) Acknowledgment made by person with ... S 19 N 45
 - ... coupled with claim of set-off ... S 19 N 45
 - (c) Defendant denying that he owes anything but claiming plaintiff owes him money — Admission that latter is entitled to set off a certain amount against his claim — Statement, if amounts to acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 45
- Stamp
 - (a) Acknowledgment admitted in evidence though not duly stamped—Admissibility cannot be questioned subsequently: ... S 19 N 74
 - (b) Acknowledgment need not be stamped in every case ... S 19 N 74
- Statement that a sum of money will become due on the happening of an event future and uncertain—Whether amounts to acknowledgment of debt ... S 19 N 43
- Statement that liability existed once but has since been discharged —Whether acknowledgment of liability coupled with refusal to pay ... S 19 N 44
- Statement that liability exists — Whether can be used against person making it who at the time of making was not liable in regard to matter acknowledged ... S 19 N 43
- Statement that money claimed is not due but that if it is, it must be set off against the amount due from plaintiff — Whether acknowledgment of liability coupled with claim of set-off ... S 19 N 45
- Statement which if literally construed does not amount to acknowledgment—Whether sufficient for purposes of S. 19, if it implies admission of liability ... S 19 N 11
- To whom to be made
 - (a) Acknowledgment addressed to some persons — Acknowledgment, if should be addressed to plaintiff or to any one through whom he claims ... S 19 N 45
 - (b) Acknowledgment by mortgagee of mortgage and of his liability to be redeemed—Whether may be contained in deed of sub-mortgage or other documents executed by him in favour of a third person ... S 19 N 45
 - (c) Acknowledgment contained in will—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 45
 - (d) Acknowledgment may be contained in document presented or addressed to Court ... S 19 N 46; S 19 N 47
 - (e) Acknowledgment not addressed to person entitled — Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 45
 - (f) Acknowledgment of debt contained in letter to creditor's attorney—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 45
 - (g) Acknowledgment of debt made to creditor's brother — Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 45
 - (h) Agreement of reference to arbitration containing acknowledgment of liability to creditor—Sufficiency of ... S 19 N 45
 - (i) Document addressed to Court
 - (1) Acknowledgment of debt by its inclusion in schedule of creditors filed by insolvent—Sufficiency of, for purposes of S. 19 ... S 19 N 47

Acknowledgment of liability—To whom to be made—Document addressed to Court—(Contd.)

(ii) Admission in written statement—Whether amounts to acknowledgment of liability	S 19 N 47
(iii) Admission of liability made in plaint — Whether operates as acknowledgment	S 19 N 47
(iv) Application by judgment-debtor for entering up part satisfaction of decree—Whether amounts to acknowledgment of liability under decree	S 19 N 47
(v) Application by judgment-debtor for postponement or stay of sale — Whether amounts to acknowledgment of liability under decree	S 19 N 47
(vi) Application for extension of time for payment of decretal amount — Whether sufficient acknowledgment under decree	S 19 N 47
(vii) Application for probate — Objection that applicant is debtor to estate of deceased — Reply by applicant admitting his liability—Sufficiency of, as acknowledgment	S 19 N 47
(j) Entry in defendant's own book, not communicated to any one else—Whether sufficient acknowledgment under S. 19	S 19 N 46
(k) Mortgage—Mortgagee with possession of rights in land which later were commuted into fixed money allowance to be paid from Government Treasury—Mortgagee receiving payments and giving to Government receipts signed by him as mortgagee — Receipts, if constitute acknowledgments to save limitation for suit for redemption of mortgage	S 19 N 46
—Unconditional acknowledgment—Whether implies promise to pay:	S 19 N 8
—Unqualified acknowledgment of liability in respect of a debt — Whether necessarily implies promise to pay debt	S 19 N 8
—Whether should be addressed to person entitled	S 19 N 5
—Writing recording payment—When amounts to acknowledgment of liability	S 19 N 5

Acquiescence

—Defence of, if can prevail over statutory period of limitation	...	Preamble N 5
—Doctrine of		
- (a) As distinguished from the doctrine of laches	...	Preamble N 6
- (b) As distinguished from doctrine of limitation	...	Preamble N 6
—Meaning of	...	Preamble N 6

Acquisition

—Acquisition of land by Government		
(a) Collector refusing to make award for compensation — Suit against collector for damages—Limitation	...	A 120 N 9
(b) Suit for compensation — Limitation	...	A 120 N 9

Acquittal

—Order of — Appeal from — Appeal under Criminal Procedure Code		
— Provision for — Limitation	...	A 157 N 2

Act

—Act of Government officer		
(a) Suit for setting aside		
(i) Illustrative cases of acts not governed by Art. 14	...	A 14 N 3

Act—Act of Government officer—Suit for setting aside—(Contd.)

- (ii) Illustrative cases where it is not necessary for plaintiff to set aside act ... A 14 N 2; A 14 N
- (iii) Limitation
 - (a) Act, whether must be binding on plaintiff for applicability of Art. 14 ... A 14 N
 - (b) Residuary provision of ... A 14 N
 - (c) Starting point ... A 14 N
 - (d) Time occupied in proceedings before revenue authorities, whether excluded ... A 14 N
- (iv) "Setting aside," whether implies act binding upon plaintiff until and unless it is set aside ... A 14 N
- Act alleged to be in pursuance of enactment
 - (a) "Alleged to be"—Meaning of ... A 2 N
 - (b) Assumption of pursuance is not permissible ... A 2 N
 - (c) Meaning of — Honest belief of statutory powers, if indispensable to constitute ... A 2 N
- Act in pursuance of enactment
 - (a) Doing or omitting to do
 - (i) "Doing or omitting to do" — Meaning of ... A 2 N
 - (ii) Suit for compensation
 - (a) Limitation
 - (i) On statements contained in plaint defendants doing the act at their own hands—Limitation applicable ... A 2 N
 - (ii) Special and general provisions of ... A 2 N
 - (iii) Starting point ... A 2 N
 - (iv) Suit against agent for damages for negligence of duty under enactment ... A 2 N
 - (v) Suit against Municipal Board for illegal distress of plaintiff's goods under colour of enactment ... A 2 N
 - (vi) Suit for specific sum of money illegally levied by defendant under colour of enactment: ... A 2 N
 - (vii) Under English Law ... A 2 N
 - (viii) Where special or local law prescribes different period of limitation ... A 2 N
 - (b) Enactment must be in force ... A 2 N
 - (c) Meaning of ... A 2 N
- Act necessary to be set aside — Plaintiff framing suit in different manner—Plaintiff, whether can evade limitation applicable to suit for setting aside act or order ... A 14 N
- Act not binding on plaintiff—Illustrative cases ... A 14 N
- Act not necessary to be set aside — Prayer by plaintiff for setting aside act—Effect of ... A 14 N
- Act or omission under contract — Compensation for — Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for compensation for doing or omitting to do act in pursuance of enactment ... A 2 N
- Act or order
 - (a) Suit for setting aside
 - (i) Act or order of Government officer in his official capacity — Limitation ... A 120 N

Adjustment—Adjustment of decree out of Court; application for notice as to recording of certification—(Contd.)

- (p) Surety for judgment-debtor, whether can plead uncertified adjustment made by him A 174 N 4
 (q) Who must make such application A 174 N 4

Administration

See also Legal Representative.

—Administration of estate of deceased person—Suit for

- (a) Limitation—Where administration is entailed in suit for legacy A 123 N 3
 (b) Whether barred if claim for legacy or share has become barred A 123 N 3
 (c) Who can sue A 123 N 3

—Bona fide prosecution in administration suit of a claim by a creditor under promissory note by deceased debtor—Period of prosecution, whether can be excluded in computing limitation for subsequent suit on promissory note S 14 N 12

—Person to whom letters of administration have been granted—Whether trustee for a specific purpose S 10 N 16

—Same person suing as administratrix of an estate in one suit and of the estate of a different person in another suit—Whether by the same plaintiff for purposes of S. 14 S 14 N 16

—Suit for

- (a) Debt due by heir to deceased, if deductible from share payable to heir when suit for recovery of such debt is barred : S 3 N 14
 (b) Fact of one creditor having instituted suit for administration of estate of a deceased debtor—Whether saves limitation for a suit by another creditor S 9 N 6

Administrator

—Acknowledgment of liability by administrator—Effect of S 19 N 55
 —Administrator *de son tort*—Whether agent A 69 N 7

—Administrator of estate of deceased person governed by Indian Succession Act—Suit against him by heirs—Limitation A 123 N 4

—Administrator of estate of intestate person—Suit by, against executor *de son tort*—Limitation A 120 N 2

—Alienation by—Alienation without permission of Court—Heir, whether bound to set aside alienation before he can claim relief which he wants A 91 N 12

—Joint administrators—Capacity of one to give discharge on behalf of all S 7 N 26

—Letters of administration granted only with reference to portion of estate—Suit in respect of balance—Whether can be brought until letters of administration have been obtained with regard to such portion S 17 N 6

—Suit against

- (a) Suit for accounts—Limitation A 120 N 15
 (b) Suit for legacy—Limitation A 123 N 2
 (c) Suit for monies misappropriated by administrator—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 4
 (d) Suit for residue bequeathed by testator—Limitation A 123 N 2
 (e) Suit for share of property of intestate—Limitation A 123 N 2
 (f) Suit under Legal Representatives Suits Act—Limitation: Arts. 33 to 35 N 1

Administratr—(Contd.)

—Suit by

- | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------|
| (a) Limitation, if can begin before grant of letters of administration | ... | S 17 N 8 |
| (b) Suit under Indian Fatal Accidents Act—Limitation | ... | A 21 |
| (c) Suit under Legal Representatives Suits Act—Limitation | ... | A 20 |

Admission

- | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------|
| —Allegations to save suit from bar admitted by defendant—Plaintiff, if should prove them | ... | S 3 N 38 |
| —By counsel on point of limitation, if will bind client | ... | S 3 N 21 |
| —By party on point of limitation—Effect | ... | S 3 N 21 |

Adopted son

- | | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------|
| —Right of—Aurasa son, if has independent cause of action to challenge adoption by father | ... | S 2 (8) N 8 |
| —Suit by | | |
| (a) Adverse possession by stranger prior to adoption—Adopted son, if entitled to extension of time on ground of minority | | S 6 N 14 |
| (b) For impeaching alienation by adoptive mother before adoption—Suit, whether one for declaration that alienation is void | ... | A 125 N 3, A 125 N 10 |
| (c) For possession of adoptive mother's estate, suit also involving affirmation of adoption—Limitation | ... | A 141 N 16 |
| (d) For property of adoptive mother—Limitation | ... | A 141 N 7 |
| (e) For property of last male owner—Limitation | ... | A 141 N 7 |
| (f) For setting aside alienation by adoptive father of ancestral property—Limitation | ... | A 126 N 5 |
| —When becomes entitled to property of adoptive father | ... | A 141 N 7 |
| —When becomes entitled to property of adoptive mother | ... | A 141 N 7 |
| —Whether has title of remainderman to property alienated by widow before adoption | ... | A 140 N 3 |

Adoption

—Invalidity of

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------|
| (a) Omission to bring declaratory suit within prescribed period—Whether bar to suit for possession of property against person claiming to be in possession in right of adoption | ... | A 118 N 2 |
| (b) Suit for declaration | | |
| (i) Alienation of property of adoptive father subsequent to adoption—Whether gives fresh cause of action | ... | A 118 N 9 |
| (ii) By minor natural son born subsequent to adoption—Limitation | ... | A 118 N 6 |
| (iii) Limitation | ... | A 141 N 16 |
| (iv) Limitation—Starting point—Registration of deed of adoption, if amounts to knowledge so as to start limitation running | ... | A 118 N 5 |
| (v) Minor plaintiff, if and when can be said to have knowledge so as to start time running | ... | A 118 N 6 |
| (vi) Onus of proof | ... | A 118 N 7 |
| (vii) Suit by Hindu reversioner | ... | A 118 N 8 |
| (viii) Whether can be converted into one for recovery of possession in interests of justice | ... | A 118 N 2 |
| (c) Suit for possession against person who claims to be in possession in right of adoption—Limitation | ... | A 118 N 2 |

Adoption—(Contd.)

- Suit on title based on adoption for possession of office and property attached thereto A 124 N 12
- Validity of
 - (a) Suit for declaration
 - (i) Limitation—Starting point A 119 N 4
 - (ii) Suit for possession where plaintiff has to establish validity of adoption on basis of
 - (iii)
- What is, wit

Adverse Possession

- Acquisition of title by—Mere constructive possession will not enable a person to acquire title by adverse possession : A 142 & 144 N 19
- Acquisition of title by 12 years' period is that excluding period of notice of suit S 15 N 21
- Admission of liability in writing and signed by person in adverse possession — Whether amounts to acknowledgment of liability : S 19 N 65
- Against female limited owner — Whether bars against reversionary heirs A 141 N 13
- Against female shebait—Operates effectively against succeeding male shebait A 142 & 144 N 49
- Against Government
 - (a) Acquisition of title by—Manner of—Burden of proof ... A 149 N 9
 - (b) Burden of proof
 - (i) It is on person claiming title ... A 142 & 144 N 99
 - (ii) Proof of adverse possession for a shorter period will not shift onus to the Government ... A 142 & 144 N 99
 - (c) Can be pleaded A 142 & 144 N 99
 - (d) Grant by third person of fishery leases belonging to Crown is evidence of adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (e) Requisites—Same as in case of adverse possession against private person except longer period of possession necessary ... A 142 & 144 N 99
 - (f) What constitutes A 149 N 9
- Against Hindu father—Also adverse against his son ... A 142 & 144 N 83
- Against Hindu widow
 - (a) Adverse against her adopted son only from date of adoption ... A 142 & 144 N 83
 - (b) Repairs or payment of taxes, etc. by reversioner during her lifetime are not evidence of adverse possession : A 142 & 144 N 96
 - (c) Suit for possession by adopted son governed by Art. 144 for limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 83
- Against last male owner—Whether bars reversioner of female limited owner A 141 N 14
- Against municipality—Adverse possession in respect of drains on sides of public street—What amounts to ... A 146-A N 5
- Against one co-trustee—Whether adverse to the other : A 142 & 144 N 81
- Against person having no present right to possession
 - (a) Adverse possession against 'stani' in Malabar—Whether bars next stani when succession opens ... A 142 & 144 N 75
 - (b) Life estate holder alienating property—Possession of alienee not adverse to person entitled to remainder ... A 142 & 144 N 73

Adverse possession—Against person having no present right to possession— (Contd.)

- (c) Plaintiff, under sentence of transportation, gifting property to another—Condition that if he returned, donee to return it—Donee selling property more than 12 years before plaintiff's return—Suit for possession by plaintiff on his return—Limitation—Starting point .. A 142 & 144 N 78
- (d) Property mortgaged for fixed period—Death of mortgagor—Unauthorized sale of mortgaged property by guardian of minor son of deceased mortgagor—Purchaser redeeming prematurely—Suit for possession against purchaser—Starting point of limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 78
- Against the public
 - (a) Person in adverse possession of property vested in municipality for statutory period—Right of municipality is extinguished—Right of public also becomes extinguished . A 142 & 144 N 99a
 - (b) Public may lose its rights of user over property by the adverse possession of a private person .. A 142 & 144 N 99a
 - (c) There can be no acquisition of title against the public by adverse possession . . . A 142 & 144 N 99a
- Against trust property by stranger
 - (a) Possession is adverse to trust .. A 142 & 144 N 80
 - (b) Stranger not denying trust but taking possession of trust property as trustee—Possession not adverse to trust but adverse to trustee ... A 142 & 144 N 80
- Against trustee—Adverse possession against one trustee is adverse against all ... A 142 & 144 N 85
- Against widow—Whether adverse to son adopted subsequently by widow ... A 141 N 7
- Animus of person doing acts should be ascertained . A 142 & 144 N 16
- By agent, servant, etc
 - (a) As long as agency continues, possession does not become adverse ... A 142 & 144 N 57
 - (b) Repudiation of agency, etc to knowledge of principal accompanied by overt act amounts to assertion of adverse right ... A 142 & 144 N 57
 - (c) Whether enures for benefit of principal ... A 142 & 144 N 57
- By alienee from trustee—Alienee for valuable consideration can acquire title to trust property by adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 47
- By Crown—Crown can acquire title by adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 99
- By manager—Possession of manager is not adverse . A 142 & 144 N 57
- By the public—Public cannot acquire title by adverse possession .. A 142 & 144 N 99a
- By trustee
 - (a) Quasi or constructive trustee cannot acquire title by adverse possession to trust property .. A 142 & 144 N 46
 - (b) Trustee cannot acquire title to trust property by adverse possession . A 142 & 144 N 46
- Co-heirs
 - (a) Mahomedan co-heirs—Possession of one—Whether adverse to others . A 142 & 144 N 44
 - (b) Possession of an heir of a deceased Christian is not adverse to co-heirs without proof of ouster . A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (c) Possession of one *prima facie* not adverse to another A 142 & 144 N 44

Adverse possession—(Contd.)

- Confiscation and re-grant—Order confiscating all lands in Oudh and vesting them in Government—Re-grant by Government—Suit by grantee for possession within 12 years of grant maintainable ... A 142 & 144 N 73
- Constructive possession—Trespasser cannot acquire title by prescription on ground of constructive possession ... A 142 & 144 N 53
- Co-owners
 - (a) Adverse possession against co-owner — Whether adverse against other co-owners ... A 142 & 144 N 83
 - (b) Adverse possession against minor co-owner—Denial of his title to his knowledge, whether necessary ... A 142 & 144 N 77
 - (c) Adverse possession by, against a stranger—Possession by some is on behalf of all ... A 142 & 144 N 41
 - (d) Adverse possession *inter se*
 - (i) A and B two Hindu coparceners—A dies leaving C as heir—B takes possession of separate property of A—Possession of B is adverse to C ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (ii) A, B, C three co-sharers—A in adverse possession against C but not against B—C's share transferred to B—Adverse possession of A of such share ceases: A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (iii) Adverse possession of co-owner may extend to a portion only of common property ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (iv) Application to municipality by a tenant-in-common to build a wall does not amount to denial of title of other co-owners ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (v) Building of residential house on common land by one co-sharer amounts to assertion of hostile title to the knowledge of other co-sharers ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (vi) Conduct of co-owner to prove adverse possession must be unequivocal and inconsistent with his character as co-owner ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (vii) Co-owner abandoning his share—Subsequent possession by other co-owner is adverse ... A 142 & 144 N 43
 - (viii) Co-sharer's possession becomes adverse when he rebuilds a house making it *pacca* ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (ix) Evidence to show adverse possession by co-tenant must be clearer than between strangers ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (x) Illustrative cases ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (xi) Mere non-participation in profits by one and exclusive possession by other will not constitute adverse possession by latter ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (xii) Mere uninterrupted possession of a co-owner is not adverse to other co-owners ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (xiii) Nothing short of ouster or something equivalent to it can make the possession of co-owner adverse to the others ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (xiv) One co-owner acquiring title by adverse possession against share of other co-owner—Abandonment by former does not revive latter's title ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (xv) Ouster of plaintiff from part of joint property by defendant does not amount to assertion of hostile title as regards whole property ... A 142 & 144 N 35

Adverse possession—Co-owners—Adverse possession inter se—(Contd.)

- (xvi) Person in possession in assertion of hostile title subsequently becomes co-owner—His possession does not cease to be adverse if he continues to assert hostile title and exercise exclusive possession A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xvii) Possession of co-owner will be adverse to the others if there is ouster A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xviii) Possession of mortgagee under mortgage by two of the cosharers does not amount to adverse possession of the cosharers against the third unless the third has knowledge A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xix) Relinquishment by one co-owner of his share—Subsequent possession of other is adverse even if relinquishment deed is invalid A 142 & 144 N 43
- (xx) When there is ouster adverse possession of one co-owner is not interrupted by the mere fact that a decree is passed in favour of other establishing his right as co-owner A 142 & 144 N 35
- (e) Alienee from co-owner
 - (i) Alienee entitled to possession not obtaining it—Possession of other co-owners—Whether adverse to alienee A 142 & 144 N 36
 - (ii) Other co-owner continuing in solo possession—His possession is not adverse to alienee A 142 & 144 N 40
 - (iii) Possession of—Whether adverse to other co-owners A 142 & 144 N 36
- (f) Alienee from co-owner of entire common property—Possession of alienee, whether adverse A 142 & 144 N 36
- (g) Alienee from co-owner of his undivided share
 - (i) Alienee entitled to joint possession—His possession is not adverse to other co-owners A 142 & 144 N 36
 - (ii) Alienee not entitled to possession—His possession is adverse to other co-owners A 142 & 144 N 36
- (h) Alienee from co-owner of specific item of common property—Possession of alienee is adverse A 142 & 144 N 36
- (i) Lamhardar can, by appropriating to his use the profits, acquire a title by adverse possession against cosharers A 142 & 144 N 35
- (j) Licensee from co-owner—Possession of—Whether adverse to other co-owners A 142 & 144 N 37
- (k) Ouster
 - (i) Actual driving out of co-owner is ouster A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (ii) Court can find whether there is ouster for statutory period, though no ouster at any particular moment is proved A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (iii) Demand for partition by one co-owner and refusal by other who is in possession, does not amount to ouster A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (iv) Denial by co-owner in possession of title of other co-owners to their knowledge amounts to ouster A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (v) Entry in revenue papers of the name of one co-owner alone does not constitute ouster A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (vi) Exclusive receipts of profits—Whether ouster A 142 & 144 N 36
 - (vii) Illustrative cases A 142 & 144 N 35

Adverse possession — Co-owners — Ouster—(Contd.)

- (viii) Knowledge about denial of title of co-owner may be inferred from circumstances of the case; it need not be proved by direct evidence ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (ix) Meaning of ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (x) Mere fact that a cosherer brought a suit to eject trespasser does not amount to ouster of other cosharers: A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xi) Mere non-payment of profits to cosbarer by *lambardar* is not ouster ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xii) Onus of proof ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xiii) Partition between co-owners in exclusive possession does not amount to ouster or denial of title of co-owner not in possession ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xiv) Physical eviction not necessary ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xv) Possession of mortgagee, under mortgage by two of cosbarers, does not amount to ouster of the third: A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xvi) Presumption of—In case of long continued possession ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xvii) Question is one of fact depending on circumstances of each case ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xviii) Sale of portion of joint property by co-owner does not amount to ouster ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xix) Test ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xx) There should be refusal, express or implied, to allow other co-owners' enjoyment of property ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xxi) When there is ouster of co-owner by other co-owner, time will not stop running against former because his ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (xxii) '
 - by other co-owners ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- (l) Partition
 - (i) Certain property in possession of one not partitioned—His possession is not adverse after partition of other properties ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (ii) Partition amongst co-owners does not interrupt adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (iii) Possession by one co-owner of portion allotted to another subsequent to partition is adverse to latter: A 142 & 144 N 35
- (m) Person in adverse possession against all co-owners—Co-owner obtaining possession from such person on his own behalf—His possession is adverse to other co-owners: A 142 & 144 N 35
- (n) Possession of one co-owner entitled to possession as such is not adverse to other co-owners ... A 142 & 144 N 35

—Coparcener

- (a) Coparcener continuing to stay in the property even after alienation—Possession of such coparcener, whether adverse to other coparcener from date of alienation ... A 127 N 11
- (b) Possession of—Whether can be held as *prima facie* adverse to other coparceners ... A 127 N 11

—Co-tenant—Possession long but silent—Whether can be construed as adverse to other co-tenant ... A 127 N 11

Adverse possession—(Contd.)**—Effect of**

- (a) Principal right to sue extinguished—Rights accessory there-
to are also extinguished A 142 & 144 N 93
- (b) Title acquired by adverse possession—Subsequent dispospos-
sion by true owner—He is not remitted to his old title A 142 & 144 N 93
- (c) True owner's title is extinguished A 142 & 144 N 93

—Equity of redemption—Whether can be adversely possessed A 142 & 144 N 7**—Essentials of****(a) Continuous possession**

- (i) Possession must be continuous for the statutory
period A 142 & 144 N 63
- (ii) Presumption of continuity is prospective rather than
retrospective A 142 & 144 N 63

(b) Open possession

- (i) Actual knowledge on part of true owner not neces-
sary A 142 & 144 N 76
- (ii) Knowledge on part of true owner—Suit for possession
of underground mining areas—Defendant claiming to
be in adverse possession for statutory period, what
must prove A 142 & 144 N 76
- (iii) Possession must be overt and without any attempt at
concealment A 142 & 144 N 76
- (iv) What is—Sub-lessee instead of growing crops, erect-
ing headworks of colliery—Possession open and hence
adverse to landlord A 142 & 144 N 76
- (v) What is not—Mahant getting mutation effected in his
name by *ex parte* decree—Possession not open . A 142 & 144 N 76
- (c) Possession must be actual A 142 & 144 N 12
- (d) Possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and
in extent A 142 & 144 N 16
- (e) Possession must be continuous A 142 & 144 N 11
- (f) Possession must be in denial of title of true owner A 142 & 144 N 16
- (g) Possession must be open A 142 & 144 N 76
- (h) Possession must be peaceful, open and continuous : A 142 & 144 N 16
- (i) Protests by owner and possession inspite of them are not
necessary A 142 & 144 N 16
- (j) Right sought to be acquired must be one recognized by
law A 142 & 144 N 61b

—Evidence of

- (a) A few acts such as granting of lease, execution of mortgage
are not sufficient A 142 & 144 N 96
- (b) Acts must be scrutinized in the light of relationship
between parties A 142 & 144 N 96
- (c) Acts such as sub-letting, mortgaging, excavation etc , of a tank
are evidence of adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 96
- (d) Long possession and absence of proof of license or agreement
between owner and occupier—Adverse possession may be
inferred A 142 & 144 N 96
- (e) Long possession far beyond statutory period and no payment
of rent A 142 & 144 N 96
- (f) Mere appropriation of fish from tank may not necessarily
constitute adverse possession of tank A 142 & 144 N 96

Adverse possession—Evidence of—(Contd.)

- (g) Mutation in revenue register of son's name is not assertion of hostile title to step-mother ... A 142 & 144 N 96
- (h) Mere user is not ... A 142 & 144 N 96
- (i) Sufficiency of—Other illustrations... A 142 & 144 N 96
- (j) Unregistered document may be referred to explain nature of possession ... A 142 & 144 N 96
- Ex-proprietary tenant—Claim as to—Whether can be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 95
- Extent of right acquired
 - (a) Adverse possessor gets only what quondam owner had : A 142 & 144 N 94
 - (b) Adverse possessor gets title only to interest he purports to proscribe for ... A 142 & 144 N 95
 - (c) Question depends on *animus possidendi* of the adverse possessor ... A 142 & 144 N 95
- Female limited owner—Possession of—Whether adverse to rever-sioner ... A 141 N 15a
- Fishery right — Evidence of acts of possession in parts of river adjoining part in dispute, is admissible ... A 142 & 144 N 96
- Holder of life estate—Adverse possession against
 - (a) Not also adverse against person entitled to succeed life-estate bolder till latter's death ... A 142 & 144 N 79
 - (b) Suit for possession by successor of life-estate bolder — Limi-tation — Starting point ... A 142 & 144 N 79
- Husband and wife — Possession by either husband or wife is on behalf of the other and not adverse to the other ... A 142 & 144 N 53
- Inalienable property
 - (a) Land not attached to an office but granted for service can be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 61
 - (b) Property attached to service inam cannot be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 61
 - (c) Right of occupancy cannot be acquired by adverse possession on lands granted on police tenure ... A 142 & 144 N 61
 - (d) Watan property—Whether can be acquired by adverse pos-session ... A 142 & 144 N 61
- Interruption of
 - (a) Abandonment by trespasser—Effect ... A 142 & 144 N 72
 - (b) Abandonment or relinquishment by adverse possessor—Lim-i-tation ceases to run against true owner—No act is necessary on his part ... A 142 & 144 N 64
 - ... period: A 142 & 144 N 64
 - ... A 142 & 144 N 64
 - ... A 142 & 144 N 64
- (iii) Admission under mistake of fact not sufficient
- (d) Attachment
 - (i) Attachment under S. 145, Criminal P. O. — Property in possession of trespasser — Attachment does not interrupt possession of trespasser ... A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (ii) Attachment under Ss. 145 and 146, Criminal P. O. — Whether affects adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (iii) Attachment under S. 146, Criminal P. O.
 - (a) Property in possession of trespasser — Attach-ment will interrupt adverse possession of tres-passer ... A 142 & 144 N 67

Adverse possession—Interruption of—Attachment—Attachment under S. 146, Cr. P. C.—(Contd.)

- (b) Property in possession of true owner
 - (i) Attachment does not amount to dispossession of true owner A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (ii) Remedy of true owner is suit for declaration—Limitation A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (iv) Claim petition by adverse possessor rejected—No suit to establish his right filed within limitation
 - (a) Adverse possessor, whether can plead that he was in adverse possession on date of order dismissing his claim petition A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (b) Adverse possessor, whether precluded from pleading adverse possession from date of order dismissing his claim A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (c) Attachment raised subsequently — Adverse possessor, whether precluded from pleading adverse possession on date of order dismissing his claim A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (v) Property in possession of defendant attached by Government — Property subsequently restored to defendant—Defendant's possession, whether interrupted A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (vi) Whether interrupts adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 67
 - (a) Decision of Revenue Officer or Court
-
- ... of defendant A 142 & 144 N 68
 - (ii) Mere registration of owner's name in Collectorate does not interrupt adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 68
 - (iii) Order of Collector in boundary dispute under S. 41, Bengal Survey Act, declaring parties to be in possession — Whether amounts to dispossession of party adversely affected A 142 & 144 N 68
 - (iv) Whether interrupts adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 68
 - (f) Decree
 - (i) Decree in favour of third party against defendant—Third party obtaining possession in execution—Decree reversed on appeal—Defendant's adverse possession, whether interrupted A 142 & 144 N 66
 - (ii) Decree merely establishing plaintiff's right to possession—Whether interrupts adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 66
 - (iii) Plaintiff obtaining possession under decree — Decree reversed on appeal and possession restored to defendant — Defendant's adverse possession is interrupted A 142 & 144 N 66
 - (iv) Whether interrupts adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 66
 - (g) Discontinuance of possession by trespasser — Intention of trespasser to return or not is immaterial A 142 & 144 N 64
 - (h) Effect A 142 & 144 N 64
 - (i) No difference in principle between break in continuity caused by voluntary abandonment by wrongdoer and break caused by extraneous circumstances A 142 & 144 N 75
 - (j) Re-entry by true owner A 142 & 144 N 64
 - (i) Instances not amounting to effective re-entry A 142 & 144 N 64

Adverse possession—Interruption of—Re-entry by true owner—(Contd.)

- (ii) Must be effective and more than formal A 142 & 144 N 64
- (iii) What constitutes re-entry ... A 142 & 144 N 64
- (k) Revenue sale — Revenue sale in 1891 under Bengal Revenue Sales Act (11 of 1859)—Suit for possession by auction-purchaser—Defendant claiming to be in adverse possession of property sold since 1859 — Limitation ran from date of sale ... A 142 & 144 N 74
- (l) Submersion of land ... A 142 & 144 N 64
 - (i) Wroegdoor in possession before submersion — Adverse possession is interrupted ... A 142 & 144 N 70
- (m) Subsequent assertion of different title by defendant — Whether affects his adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 69
- (n) Symbolical possession
 - (i) Delivery of
 - (a) Formal defect in each delivery proceedings—Whether will arrest adverse possession of defendant ... A 142 & 144 N 65
 - (b) Revenue sales—Auction-purchaser given symbolical possession—Suit for possession by auction-purchaser—Limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 65
 - (c) Title acquired by defendant by prescription before delivery—Effect on—Suit for possession within twelve years of delivery barred ... A 142 & 144 N 65
 - (ii) Delivery of, by defendant to plaintiff
 - (a) Defendant in actual possession of land—Suit by plaintiff for possession—Starting point A 142 & 144 N 65
 - (b) Property in occupation of ryots—Defendant against dispossessing plaintiff—Suit by plaintiff for possession—Starting point ... A 142 & 144 N 65
 - (iii) Delivery of, in execution—Actual delivery prescribed by Civil Procedure Code as mode of delivery — Delivery, whether will interrupt adverse possession of defendant and furnish fresh starting point A 142 & 144 N 65
 - (iv) Delivery of, is equivalent to actual delivery A 142 & 144 N 65
 - (v) Delivery of, to decree-holder — Effect of, on rights of third party ... A 142 & 144 N 65
 - (vi) Delivery of, to decree-holder or auction-purchaser — Delivery operates as dispossession of defendant and puts an end to his adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 65
- (o) Trespasser in possession dispossessed by person without title
 - (i) Dispossession of trespasser, whether dispossession of true owner ... A 142 & 144 N 75
 - (ii) Suit for possession by true owner—Limitation A 142 & 144 N 75
- (p) Vis major — Effect is same as caused by voluntary abandonment ... A 142 & 144 N 64
- Joint family—Members separate only in mess and not in estate—No adverse possession amongst them ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- Knowledge of his defective title or absence of title by person claiming adverse possession is immaterial ... A 142 & 144 N 16
- Land in military cantonments—It cannot be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 61a

Adverse possession—(Contd.)**—Landlord and tenant**

- (a) Adverse possession against tenant, whether adverse against landlord ... A 142 & 144 N 86
- (b) Encroachment by tenant on adjoining land belonging to landlord
 - (i) Possession of tenant is adverse to landlord . . . A 142 & 144 N 59a
 - (ii) Right acquired by tenant—Presumption as to ... A 142 & 144 N 59a
- (c) Encroachment by tenant on adjoining land not belonging to landlord
 - (i) Tenant's possession is adverse to owner of such land ... A 142 & 144 N 59a
 - (ii) Whether such possession enures to benefit of land. lord ... A 142 & 144 N 59a
- (d) Mere non-payment of rent does not create adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 59
- (e) Tenancy right
 - (i) Tenancy cannot be acquired by prescription in Central Provinces ... A 142 & 144 N 95
 - (ii) Whether can be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 95
- (f) Tenant dispossessed during continuance of lease by trespasser—Latter's possession is not adverse to landlord as long as lease subsists ... A 142 & 144 N 86
- (g) Tenant grazing cattle and cutting grass on adjoining waste land of landlord—He cannot claim adverse possession merely by such act ... A 142 & 144 N 59a
- (h) Tenant holding over with landlord's consent dispossessed—Trespasser's possession is adverse to landlord ... A 142 & 144 N 86
- (i) Tenant under void lease dispossessed by third person—Possession of such person is adverse to landlord . . . A 142 & 144 N 86
- (j) Tenant's interest can be acquired by adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 86
- (k) Tenant's possession is not adverse to landlord ... A 142 & 144 N 59
- (l) Third party collecting rents from tenant in assertion of his own right is in adverse possession of landlord's interest A 142 & 144 N 86

—Loss of property by—Necessary elements for . . . A 142 & 144 N 90

—Meaning of A 142 & 144 N 16

—Mere consent or acquiescence on part of true owner is immaterial

... .. A 142 & 144 N 16

—Minor or lunatic

- (a) Alienation of minor's property void—Alienee taking possession—Remedy of minor is suit for possession—Limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 77
- (b) Guardian in possession of his property—Suit by minor or lunatic for possession—Limitation is governed by Art 141 ... A 142 & 144 N 24
- (c) Possession by *de facto* guardian of his property not adverse ... A 142 & 144 N 24
- (d) Possession of his property by guardian—Presumption that such possession is not adverse is rebuttable . . . A 142 & 144 N 24
- (e) Possession of his property by person in trust
 - (i) Possession is only as bailiff of person under disability . . . A 142 & 144 N 24
 - (ii) Whether such person can make his possession hostile after disability has ceased . . . A 142 & 144 N 24
- (f) Possession of his property by stranger—Whether adverse A 142 & 144 N 24

Adverse possession—Minor or lunatic—(Contd.)

- (g) Possession of his property commencing as guardian—Possession continues to be so even after minor attains majority: A 142 & 144 N
 - (h) Possession of his property with guardian — Alienation to stranger purchasing bona fide—Stranger's possession adverse from date of entry A 142 & 144 N
 - (i) Property belonging to, in adverse possession of another—Whether can be adverse against minor or lunatic A 142 & 144 N
 - (j) Right to extended period of limitation under Ss. 6 and 8: A 142 & 144 N
- Mortgagor and mortgagee
- (a) Adverse possession against mortgagor
 - (i) If adverse to mortgagor A 142 & 144 N
 - (ii) Mortgage by conditional sale—Subsequent adverse possession against mortgagor does not affect mortgagee: A 142 & 144 N
 - (iii) Mortgage with default clause — Subsequent adverse possession against mortgagor before default does not affect mortgagee A 142 & 144 N
 - (iv) Possession by mortgagor
 - (a) Mortgage deed stipulating that on default in payment by mortgagor, mortgagee entitled to take possession of mortgaged property — Default by mortgagor — Mortgagor's possession subsequent to such default is adverse to mortgagee... A 142 & 144 N
 - (b) Right to possession of mortgagee barred by adverse possession by mortgagor — Mortgagee, whether can sue on his mortgage A 142 & 144 N
 - (c) Simple mortgage — Mortgagor's possession not adverse to mortgagee A 142 & 144 N
 - (vii) Simple mortgage
 - (a) Invalid lease by mortgagor after mortgage — Lessee's possession not adverse to mortgagee: A 142 & 144 N
 - (b) Mortgaged property in possession of trespasser before mortgage — Adverse possession of trespasser continuing for 12 years — Trespasser's possession is also adverse to mortgagee... A 142 & 144 N
 - (c) Subsequent entry by trespasser on mortgaged property—Adverse possession continuing for 12 years—Mortgagee's right not affected... A 142 & 144 N
 - (b) Adverse possession against mortgagor A 149 N 4
 - (i) Co-mortgagee redeeming another co-mortgagee — His possession does not become adverse against mortgagor: A 149 N 4
 - (ii) Mortgage by conditional sale—Invalid foreclosure proceedings — Mutation of names in mortgagee's favour — No adverse possession A 149 N 6
 - (iii) Mortgagor from vatandar continuing in possession after vatandar's death — Mortgagee's possession is adverse to successors from date of death A 149 N 9
 - (iv) Mortgagor holding land as owner to knowledge of mortgagor—Mortgagee's possession is adverse to mortgagor: A 149 N 7
 - (v) Mortgagor paying Government revenue and getting possession of mortgaged property by preventing operation of Ss. 56 and 57 of Bombay Land Revenue Code — His possession is on behalf of mortgagor and not adverse A 149 N 4

Adverse possession — Mortgagor and mortgagee — Adverse possession against mortgagor — (Contd.)

- (vi) Person dispossessing mortgagee in possession—Whether his possession adverse to mortgagor ... A 142 & 144 N 85
- (vii) Person receiving rents and profits in assertion of hostile title has adverse possession of equity of redemption ... A 142 & 144 N 85
- (viii) Possession of co-mortgagee paying off other co-mortgagees is not adverse to mortgagor ... A 142 & 144 N 34
- (ix) Possession of mortgagee
 - (a) Decree that mortgage is satisfied — Mortgagee's possession subsequent to such decree is adverse to mortgagor ... A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (b) Denial of existence of mortgage or assertion of proprietary title does not give adverse possession to mortgagee ... A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (c) Equity of redemption sold to mortgagee but sale found to be void—Possession of mortgagee, whether becomes adverse from date of sale ... A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (d) Mortgage discharged by payment—Possession of mortgagee, whether adverse to mortgagor. . A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (e) Mortgagee entitled to be in possession — Mortgagee's possession becoming adverse to mortgagor subsequently — Suit by mortgagor for possession is governed by Art. 144 ... A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (f) Mortgagee entitled to possession — Mortgagee's possession not adverse during subsistence of mortgage A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (g) Mortgagee in possession of mortgaged property without right — Possession is adverse to mortgagor A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (h) Mortgagee in possession without any right to possession—Suit by mortgagor against mortgagee for possession — Suit is governed by Art 142 A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (i) Nature of—Character cannot be changed by taking settlement from landlord in his own name A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (j) Person entering as simple kanomdar subsequently taking invalid permanent kanom from uralan — Kanomdar's possession is not adverse to trust A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (k) Simple mortgagee getting into possession by sale — Sale set aside and mortgagee treated as mortgagee in possession — His possession is not adverse A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (l) Suit by mortgagor to recover mortgaged property — Mortgagee setting up adverse possession — Burden of proof A 142 & 144 N 28
 - (m) Usufructuary mortgage
 - (i) Mortgagee agreeing to purchase property — Possession of mortgagee is not adverse to mortgagor thereafter A 142 & 144 N 28

Adverse possession — Mortgagor and mortgagee — Adverse possession against mortgagor—Possession of mortgagee—Usufructuary mortgage—(Contd.)

- (ii) Mortgagor selling mortgaged property to mortgagee, but mortgagee holding property only as mortgagee—Possession not adverse to mortgagor ... A 142 & 144 N 5
- (iii) Third person selling equity of redemption to mortgagee — Mortgagee's possession not adverse thereafter ... A 142 & 144 N 5
- (x) Possession of mortgagee under void mortgage is adverse to mortgagor ... A 148 N
- (xi) Purchase in execution of one co-mortgagor's interest—Possession of mortgagee not adverse to other co-mortgagor ... A 148 N
- (xii) Simple mortgagee entering into possession by virtue of sale—Sale set aside—Mortgagee subsequently treated as one in possession — His possession after sale is not adverse to mortgagor ... A 148 N
- (xiii) Stranger getting into possession in collusion with usufructuary mortgagee—His possession is not adverse to mortgagor ... A 142 & 144 N 6
- (xiv) Stranger paying off mortgage with knowledge and consent of mortgagor—Limitation period under Art. 132 for suit by such person expiring — Subsequent possession of such person—Whether adverse to mortgagor ... A 148 N
- (xv) Stranger paying off usufructuary mortgagee and getting possession—Whether his possession adverse to mortgagor ... A 142 & 144 N 6
- (xvi) Stranger renewing usufructuary mortgage in assertion of his title to equity of redemption — Whether in adverse possession of equity of redemption ... A 142 & 144 N 6
- (c) Mortgage deed containing clause, entitling mortgagee to possession in case of default in payment — Default in payment made—Third person purchasing property in execution of his money decree against mortgagor—Third person believing himself *bona fide* to be full owner — Third person's possession is adverse to mortgagee ... A 142 & 144 N 6
- (d) Mortgage right—Whether can be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 6
- Of office
- (a) Decree that person in possession of office has no title thereto, whether interrupts running of time in favour of such person: A 121 N 6
- (b) Extent of interest to which person in such possession can prescribe ... A 121 N 6
- (c) Suit for possession of office—Adverse possession of defendant —Whether necessary for applicability of Art. 124 ... A 121 N 6
- Of surface and sub-soil rights in land
- (a) Evidence of long possession of surface by tenure-holder from zamindar in India is not evidence of adverse possession of sub-soil ... A 142 & 144 N 5
- (b) Where minerals are involved, adverse possession of one strata is not necessarily adverse possession of another strata: A 142 & 144 N 5

Adverse possession—(Contd.)

—Owner having absolute title to property—Adverse possessor claiming only limited interest—Determination of such interest—Right of true owner to possession will again come into operation S 28 N 6

—Permissive possession

- (a) Building by tenant of house in abadi of village and occupying it for 12 years is not sufficient to establish title by adverse possession against zamindar .. A 142 & 144 N 56
- (b) Burden of proof as to permissive nature of possession: A 142 & 144 N 56
- (c) Fact that licensee has improved buildings on land or has replaced erections does not confer title on him. A 142 & 144 N 56
- (d) Not adverse to true owner A 142 & 144 N 56

—Plea of

- (a) Defendant setting up title and pleading limitation—He can succeed on limitation even if he fails to prove title: A 142 & 144 N 97
- (b) It should be expressly pleaded or at least as an alternative ground A 142 & 144 N 97
- (c) Land in possession of defendant not identified with land in suit—Plea of limitation by adverse possession must be rejected A 142 & 144 N 53
- (d) Plea may be raised by Court *suo motu* if admitted facts are sufficient to raise it A 142 & 144 N 97
- (e) Suit on ground of title—Failure to prove title—Whether plaintiff can rely on title by adverse possession: A 142 & 144 N 97
- (f) Whether can be taken in first appeal A 142 & 144 N 97
- (g) Whether can be taken in second appeal A 142 & 144 N 97

—Possession by Hindu female

- (a) Alienation by female — Alienor's possession not adverse during female's lifetime A 142 & 144 N 19
- (b) Female entering into possession without title — Presumption A 142 & 144 N 19
- (c) Female entitled only to maintenance and not to possession — Possession is adverse A 142 & 144 N 19
- (d) No right to be in possession
 - (i) Possession is adverse A 142 & 144 N 19
 - (ii) Suit for possession against her or her alienor is governed by Art 142 A 142 & 144 N 19
- (e) Possession in lieu of residence and maintenance—Possession continued after death of last male holder but not as heir—Possession is not adverse till possession demanded by reversioners A 142 & 144 N 19
- (f) Possession only in lieu of maintenance—Purchases by female out of savings and purchased property kept separate—Possession does not become adverse A 142 & 144 N 19
- (g) Possession started as heiress — Female subsequently disentitled to retain possession—Possession becomes adverse but female prescribes only for a limited estate: A 142 & 144 N 19
- (h) Possession without right but under arrangement with other members—Possession is not adverse A 142 & 144 N 19
- (i) Property inherited by her—Possession not adverse to reversioners A 142 & 144 N 19

Adverse possession—(Contd.)

- Possession by holder of life-estate
 - (a) Alienation by holder—Whether adverse to person entitled to possession after him ... A 142 & 144 N 79
 - (b) Mere assertion that possession is held as absolute owner—Not sufficient to acquire title by adverse possession: A 142 & 144 N 23
 - (c) Possession is not adverse to reversioners ... A 142 & 144 N 23
- Possession by manager of one of co-owners is not adverse to others ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- Possession cannot be adverse to person not having present right to possession ... A 142 & 144 N 73
- Possession in lieu of dower
 - (a) Possession obtained peaceably and without force or fraud—Consent of husband's heirs is not necessary ... A 142 & 144 N 21
 - (b) Possession obtained without force or fraud is not adverse to other heirs ... A 142 & 144 N 21
 - (c) Possession gives her only right of retention and no title: A 142 & 144 N 21
 - (d) Possession lost and property held by stranger for more than 12 years—Suit for possession by heirs barred ... A 142 & 144 N 21
 - (e) Possession not adverse to person entitled to property after his death ... A 142 & 144 N 23
 - (f) Suit by heirs against widow for immediate possession—Decree on condition that dower was to be paid within certain time—Non-payment does not confer absolute estate on widow—Plaintiffs' right to claim possession at any future time not extinguished ... A 142 & 144 N 21
 - (g) Widow dispossessed by heir of husband—Remedy of widow is suit under S. 9, Specific Relief Act, and not one for possession based on title ... A 142 & 144 N 21
- Possession in lieu of maintenance—Defendant in possession under a grant for maintenance from plaintiff—Decree in favour of plaintiff for resumption of grant—Defendant continuing in possession for 12 years after such decree—Suit for possession by plaintiff is not maintainable... A 142 & 144 N 23
- Possession of Hindu coparcener converted to another faith is not adverse to other members of family ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- Possession of insolvent—Whether adverse to Official Receiver or Assignee ... A 142 & 144 N 25
- Possession of owner—Whether can be adverse to himself: A 142 & 144 N 63
- Possession of part, not sufficient to constitute adverse possession of whole ... A 142 & 144 N 19
- Possession of person who could not advance hostile title under law cannot be adverse to true owner ... A 142 & 144 N 55
- Possession of Receiver
 - (a) Property kept derelict in absence of heirs of deceased owner from the place—Possession taken by Court official—Faction is not adverse to person rightfully entitled:
 - (b) Rival claimants to property
 - (i) Possession taken by Official Receiver—Possession is dispossession of wrongdoer in at the time of appointment... ..
 - (ii) Receiver appointed by Court—Possession of is on behalf of heir ultimately found entitled:

Adverse possession—(Contd.)**—Possession of wrongdoer**

- (a) Must be actual A 142 & 144 N 53
 (b) When adverse—Necessary elements ... A 142 & 144 N 53

—Possession on plaintiff's behalf—Possession by constructive trustee : S 10 N 28**—Possession under benami document—Not adverse at inception : A 142 & 144 N 60****—Possession under invalid transaction**

- (a) Alienation in contravention of S. 3, Bhagdari Act, 1862 · A 142 & 144 N 60
 (b) Alienation in contravention of S. 8 of Regulation 25 of 1802 A 142 & 144 N 60
 (c) Grant in contravention of S. 12-A, Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act A 142 & 144 N 60
 (d) It is adverse to true owner A 142 & 144 N 60
 (e) Lease granted by unauthorized person or void lease A 142 & 144 N 60
 (f) Only right purported to be transferred is acquired A 142 & 144 N 60
 (g) Sale void on ground of immoral consideration or for want of lawful consideration A 142 & 144 N 60
 (h) Transfer by person not entitled to the property A 142 & 144 N 60
 (i) Transfer for life—Possession of legal representative of transferor is adverse A 142 & 144 N 60
 (j) Transfer good during lifetime of transferor but void beyond his lifetime—Possession is adverse after his lifetime ... A 142 & 144 N 60
 (k) Transfer of common property by one of several co-owners
 (l) Unregistered deed of gift or void gift A 142 & 144 N 60
 (m) Void legacy A 142 & 144 N 60
 (n) Void sale or unregistered sale-deed... .. A 142 & 144 N 60
 (o) Void trust deed A 142 & 144 N 60
 (p) Void usufructuary mortgage A 142 & 144 N 60

—Possession under mistake

- (a) A and B in joint possession of A's property under mistaken belief that property belongs to both—B's possession adverse to A's claim for property as his separate and after 12 years property becomes joint property A 142 & 144 N 52b
 (b) A enters into possession of property of B honestly believing it to be his own—A's possession is adverse to B A 142 & 144 N 52b
 (c) If can be adverse—Illustrative cases A 142 & 144 N 52b
 (d) Mistake by both parties—Possession of person claiming right but having no title, adverse to true owner A 142 & 144 N 52b
 (e) True owner under mistake, ignorant of his right to property trespassed upon—Trespasser's possession is adverse to true owner A 142 & 144 N 52b

—Possession under temporary arrangement between members of family

- (a) Defendant in possession under agreement to surrender land to plaintiff—Defendant's possession is not adverse to plaintiff at the time of surrender, but becomes adverse on refusal to surrender A 142 4 N 20
 (b) Plaintiff transferring property to defendant collusively to save it from creditors—Defendant's possession is not adverse to plaintiff A 1 20
 (c) Property worked in turns by mutual arrangement—Not adverse possession A 142 & 1 4

Adverse possession — Possession under temporary arrangement between members of family — (Contd.)

- (d) Suit by Mahomedan heir for recovery of his share—Dispute agreed to be referred to arbitration—No reference actually made but certain fixed sum out of profits of estate continued to be paid to heir for several years—Heir held acquired no title to alleged share by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 20
- Possession under transfer which subsequently becomes invalid—
 - Suit against transferee for possession — Limitation — Starting point ... A 142 & 144 N 60a
- Possession under voidable transfer—Possession is not adverse till transfer is set aside ... A 142 & 144 N 60
- Question of
 - (a) Inference as to adverse possession is one of law A 142 & 144 N 93
 - (b) It is a mixed question of law and fact ... A 142 & 144 N 93
- Religious endowment
 - (a) Alienation by manager of office — Adverse possession of alienee begins from date of taking possession under alienation ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (b) Alienee from co-trustee of—Suit against, by other trustee for property alienated—Limitation—Starting point A 142 & 144 N 51
 - (c) Dismissed manager setting up right in himself repudiating claim of persons who appointed him — Adverse possession starts from date of repudiation ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (d) Joint shebats dividing debutter property between them and applying profits thereof to their own use—Their possession is not adverse to institution ... A 142 & 144 N 50
 - (e) Mabant's possession is not adverse to founder unless founder's title is repudiated ... A 142 & 144 N 46
 - (f) Manager of — Cannot acquire title by adverse possession to endowment property ... A 142 & 144 N 46
 - (g) Person who never accepted office of manager can acquire title to endowed property by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (h) Stranger can acquire by adverse possession property of religious endowment ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (i) Stranger entering into possession of property claiming to be manager
 - (i) He will acquire right of manager by twelve years' adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (ii) His possession not adverse to institution but against trustee ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (j) Transfer of property by co-shebat — Alienee coming as co-sharer of other co-shebats—His possession not adverse to other co-shebats in absence of proof of ouster ... A 142 & 144 N 51
- Religious institution
 - (a) Hindu idol or Muhammadan mosque as material property can be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (b) Religious institutions of Hindus, Muhammadans or Buddhists can acquire property by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- Right to worship in temple
 - (a) Acquisition of prescriptive right to perform minor worship does not carry with it right to perform major worship : A 142 & 144 N 43
 - (b) Right can be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 43

Adverse possession—(Contd.)**—Rights not recognized by law**

- (a) Right of fishery by a member of public in a non-tidal river cannot be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 61b
- (b) Status of coparcenary cannot be acquired by adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 61b

—Starting point

- (a) Ouster by owner of person in adverse possession—Latter obtaining decree and dispossessing owner—Adverse possession of such person starts only from dispossession under decree ... A 142 & 144 N 64
- (b) Property under usufructuary mortgage first sold to A and then to B—B redeems and enters into possession—His possession is adverse to A from the date of entering into possession and not from the date of sale in his favour. A 142 & 144 N 52a

—Suit for declaration of title acquired by

- (a) Onus is on plaintiff ... A 142 & 144 N 87
- (b) Plaintiff must prove all qualities of adverse possession. A 142 & 144 N 87

—Tacking of

- (a) Auction-purchaser deriving title from judgment-debtor—Possession of both can be tacked as against private vendee from judgment-debtor ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (b) Character of possession of different persons, whether should be same ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (c) Devisee of trespasser can tack on period of devisor's possession to that of his own ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (d) Essential element for ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (e) Government taking possession of disputed land and subsequently delivering to B—Land found to belong to A—Suit by A against B—B cannot tack on his adverse possession to possession of Government ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (f) Independent trespassers cannot tack on the period of their adverse possession for computing period of limitation under Art 144 ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (g) Mortgagee in adverse possession of fishery adjoining mortgaged property—After redemption mortgagor continues in adverse possession of same—Mortgagor can tack on his adverse possession to that of mortgagee ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (h) Period of possession under title cannot be tacked on to period of possession without title ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (i) Question of tacking of adverse possession by successive trespassers does not arise in suit under Art. 142 ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (j) Submerged land belonging to A taken possession of by Government on re-formation and afterwards delivered to B—B cannot tack on his adverse possession to that of Government ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (k) Succession of wrong-doers claiming through one another cannot tack on the period of their adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 92
- (l) Successive trustees can tack on their adverse possession if their title is from same source ... A 142 & 144 N 92

—Title acquired by

- (a) Nature of ... S 28 N 6
- (b) Person in adverse possession of land normally acquires title both to surface and sub-soil ... A 142 & 144 N 54

Adverse possession — (Contd.)

- Title by adverse possession—Whether can be obtained against *math*: S 28 N 4
- Trustee—Exclusive possession of trustee for period of nineteen years where co-trustees are entitled to manage trust by rotation, whether adverse against co-trustees excluded from management of trust ... A 124 N 9
- Vendor and vendee
 - (a) Sale of immovable property
 - (i) Illustrative cases ... A 142 & 144 N 52a
 - (ii) Vendor continuing in possession—Vendor's possession is adverse to vendee from date of sale, though purchase money is not paid ... A 142 & 144 N 52a
 - (b) Sale of immovable property under usufructuary mortgage—No adverse possession by vendor against vendee till property is redeemed and possession obtained by vendor: A 142 & 144 N 52a
- Waste land—Occasional stacking of grass or tethering of animals does not amount to adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 15
- What does not constitute
 - (a) Adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 52
 - (b) ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (c) Mere acts of trespass without intent to possess do not constitute adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (d) Mere acts of user without *animus possidendi* do not constitute adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (e) Mere *animus possidendi* without actual user is not sufficient to constitute adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (f) Mere entry in Revenue Records as Government waste land does not transfer possession to Government ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (g) Mere payment of water and house tax by occupier of house not sufficient ... A 142 & 144 N 16
 - (h) Possession referable to lawful title is not adverse ... A 142 & 144 N 18
 - (i) Sporadic invasion by person without title on waste land does not amount to possession ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (j) Use of vacant land by municipality for depositing refuse does not amount to adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (k) Woman's name entered in village record because male owner is away—Her possession is not adverse to male owner ... A 142 & 144 N 18
 - (l) Other illustrative cases ... A 142 & 144 N 11
- What is
 - (a) Permissive possession of office of defendant—Whether adverse possession ... A 124 N 6
 - (b) Possession of bailee after expiry of period for which goods were bailed to him ... A 49 N 8
- When amounts to incumbrance ... A 121 N 2
- Advocate** ... A 81 N 2
- Suit by, for costs—Limitation ...
- Affidavit**
- Filing of ... award made ... A 165 N 2
- Court—When ...

Age

—Calculation of — Whether should be calculated from date of birth or date of conception	S 6 N 24
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	----------

Agency

—Advance of loan and agency—Account consisting of advances of loan on one side and agency on the other—Balance due on such account—Suit for—Limitation	A 85 N 5
—Contract of—Suits relating to — Limitation — Cases falling under residuary Art 120	A 120 N 19
—Registered contract of—Suit based upon—Suit for accounts—Suit, whether one for compensation for breach of registered contract :				A 116 N 12
—Termination of				
(a) By agent renouncing business of agency	A 89 N 16
(b) By completion of business of agency	A 89 N 17
(c) By death of agent	A 89 N 19
(d) By death of principal	A 89 N 18
(e) By revocation of agent's authority	A 89 N 15
(f) Modes of	A 89 N 14

Agent

—Deceased agent				
(a) Suit against legal representative for accounts—Limitation :				A 62 N 11
(b) Suit against legal representative for misconduct or neglect of deceased agent—Maintainability	A 90 N 5
(c) Suit against legal representative by principal for money received by deceased agent for use of principal—Limitation				A 62 N 11
(d) Suit against representative for accounts due from deceased agent—Suit by principal—Maintainability—Limitation	...			A 89 N 10
— <i>Del credere</i> agent				
(a) Suit by principal—Limitation	A 89 N 9
(b) Suit for recovery of price of goods sold by agent and not paid by purchaser, whether suit for compensation for breach of contract	A 115 N 10
(c) Who is	A 89 N 9
—Duty of—To render proper accounts	A 89 N 21
—Liability of				
(a) Agent employed jointly by more than one principal—Agent, whether bound to account separately	A 89 N 21
(b) Liability to principal	A 89 N 2
(c) Period for which agent is liable to render accounts to principal in suit for accounts by principal	A 89 N 22
—Lien—Exercise of—Time limit, if exists		S 3 N 14 F N 12
—Misconduct				
(a) What is	A 90 N 2
(b) When actionable	A 90 N 2
—Neglect				
(a) What is	A 90 N 2
(b) When actionable	A 90 N 2
—Possession of—Is that of principal	A 142 & 144 N 57
—Signature by—Agent duly authorized in that behalf — Sufficiency of, for purposes of S. 19	
—Son of—Suit against, for accounts—Limitation	A 120

Agent—(Contd.)

—Suit against

- (a) By legal representative of principal—Suit for accounts due to deceased principal—Limitation A 89 N 11
- (b) By principal
- (i) Period for which agent is liable to render accounts ... A 89 N 23
 - (ii) For accounts—Agency, when terminates ... A 89 N 14 to 19
 - (iii) For accounts—Burden of proof A 89 N 20
 - (iv) For accounts—Limitation—Starting point A 89 N 12
 - (v) For balance due out of moneys received by agent after deducting all legitimate expenses and allowances—Limitation A 62 N 10
 - (vi) For money belonging to principal and received by agent after termination of agency—Limitation ... A 62 N 10
 - (vii) For moneys collected and retained by agent—Limitation... .. A 57 N 2
 - (viii) For moneys received by agent for principal under circumstances which make it the agent's duty to pay over to principal immediately the money is received—Limitation A 62 N 10
 - (ix) For moveable property received by agent and not accounted for—Limitation—Applicability of Art. 89 and Art. 115 A 89 N 3
 - (x) For moveable property received by agent and not accounted for—Limitation A 89; A 89 N 2
 - (xi) For neglect or misconduct
 - (a) Limitation—Starting point : A 90; A 90 N 1; A 90 N 4
 - (b) Suit against director of company—Limitation : A 90 N 3
 - (c) Suit against lambardar—Limitation A 90 N 3
 - (xii) For recovery of moveable property received by agent and not accounted for—Suit where there is express agreement to account—Limitation A 89 N 3
 - (xiii) For recovery of sums misappropriated by agent—Limitation A 89 N 3
 - (xiv) For specific sum found due from agent after taking of accounts—Limitation A 89 N 2
 - (xv) Suit for accounts by members of divided Hindu family against member in whose hands portion of estate is left for management—Limitation applicable ... A 89 N 8
 - (xvi) To enforce charge on immovable property created to secure moneys which might be found due from agent—Limitation A 89 N 2
 - (xvii) What constitutes demand and refusal of accounts within Art. 89—Illustrative cases A 89 N 13
- (c) For recovery of account papers—Limitation A 120 N 19
- (d) For damages for negligence of duty under enactment—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for doing or omitting to do act in pursuance of enactment ... A 2 N 3
- (e) For neglect or misconduct—Suit against bank clerk in charge of savings bank account for moneys paid out by his fraud—Limitation A 90 N 3

Agent—(Contd.)

—Suit by

(a) Suit against principal to recover money paid in respect of liabilities incurred on principal's behalf—Limitation ... A 61 N 15

(b) Suit to enforce obligation under S 222, Contract Act—Limitation ... A 83 N 4

—Trespass by—Whether enures to benefit of principal .. A 142 & 144 N 57

—Who is ... A 89 N 7

(a) Bank clerk in charge of savings bank accounts, whether agent: A 90 N 3

(b) Director of company, whether agent ... A 90 N 3

(c) Lambardar, whether agent of co-sharers of village ... A 90 N 3

Agent and Principal

—Agent of two principals—Use by agent of money belonging to one principal for benefit of other—Suit by former against latter for recovery of money—Limitation ... A 120 N 19

—Goods purchased for principal—Principal's default in payment—Goods sold by agent—Suit by agent to recover loss—Limitation : A 61 N 15

—Relationship of

(a) Relationship between brothers where after partition one of them is recovering outstandings originally due to joint family—Nature of ... A 62 N 9

(b) Relationship between co-sharers some of whom are realizing rents of joint immovable property for division among other co-sharers—Nature of ... A 62 N 9

—Same agent acting for two principals—Money of one principal lent to another by agent—Suit for recovery of loan—Suit against principal receiving loan—Limitation ... A 62 N 31

Agra Tenancy Act

—Appeal under—Appeal to District Judge against decree of Revenue Court—Limitation ... A 152 N 2a

—Suit under—S 14, Lim. Act applies ... S 29 N 3

Agreement

—Void agreement—Money paid under—Suit for—Limitation ... A 62 N 12

Alien

—Alien enemy—Suit prevented by outbreak of war between alien's mother country and Great Britain—Suspension of limitation ... S 9 N 4

—Plaintiff alien prevented from suing on account of outbreak of war—Cause of action, if suspended ... S 9 N 11

Alien enemy—Suit by—Suit as legal representative of deceased person—Limitation ... S 6 N 3

Alienation

—Ancestral property—Alienation by father—Suit for setting aside

(a) By adopted son ... A 126 N 5
 ... A 126 N 9
 ... A 126 N 5

... A 126 N 5
 ... A 126 N 3

... A 126 N 2
 (g) By person governed by Customary Law in Punjab ... A 126 N 3

Alienation—Ancestral property: alienation by father: suit for setting aside (Contd)

(h) By son

- (i) Against alienee from father for possession of property alienated—Suit, whether one for setting aside alienation ... A 126 N 4
- (ii) Fact whether alienee has taken property with or without notice of limited powers of alienor, whether relevant for applicability of Art. 126 ... A 126 N 6
- (iii) For redemption of usufructuary mortgage made by father—Suit, whether one for setting aside alienation: ... A 126 N 4
- (iv) For setting aside alienation of moveable property by father ... A 126 N 7
- (v) Where another person joins with father in the alienation: ... A 126 N 5
- (vi) Where father purported to alienate ancestral property as guardian of minor son ... A 126 N 5
- (vii) Whether alienation must be one for consideration for applicability of Art. 126 ... A 126 N 6

- (i) By son's son or other member of family for possession from alienee ... A 126 N 5
- (j) By transferee of son for possession of property alienated ... A 126 N 5
- (k) Failure of son to sue within twelve years, whether extinguishes right to property ... A 126 N 10
- (l) Son in mother's womb whether gets benefit of S. 6, Limitation Act ... A 126 N 5, A 126 N 9

—By administrator—Alienation without permission of Court—Heir, whether bound to set aside alienation before he can claim relief which he wants ... A 91 N 12

—By Court of Wards ... A 91 N 13

- (a) Suit for setting aside—Limitation ... A 91 N 13
- (b) Void alienation by Court of Wards—Proprietor, whether must set aside such alienation before claiming appropriate relief: ... A 91 N 13
- (c) Whether binding on proprietor ... A 91 N 13

—By executor ... A 91 N 12

- (a) Suit by legatee to declare that alienation is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 12
- (b) Whether binding on legatee ... A 91 N 12

—By father ... S 6 N 16

- (a) After-born coparcener coming into existence after expiry of limitation against pre-existing coparcener, if has right to sue: ... S 6 N 14
- (b) After-born son—Suit to set aside alienation—Extension of time, if available to after-born son ... S 7 N 7
- (c) Right of after-born son to set aside—Minority of after-born son, if gives him extension of time ... S 6 N 16
- (d) Suit by coparcener challenging alienation of joint family property—Extension of time on ground of minority ...
- (e) Suit by son

- (i) Where alienee does not get possession of property alienated ... A 120 N 35
- (ii) Where property belongs to son ... A 126 N 5
- (iii) Where property cannot be said to be ancestral property: ... A 120 N 35
- (f) Suit for ... S 6 N 16
- (g) Suit by family—Limitation ... S 6 N 16

Alienation—(Contd.)**—By female guardian**

- (a) Alienation by mother as guardian — Death of minor — Mother succeeding as heir — Suit by reversioner for impeaching alienation—Limitation A 125 N 16
- (b) Of minor's property — Suit for avoidance by reversioner—Limitation A 125 N 5

—By female limited owner

- (a) Alienation for necessity — Alienation, whether binding on reversioner A 141 N 15
- (b) Alienation not binding on estate — Remedies of reversioner : A 141 N 12
- (c) Alienation without necessity — Alienation, whether binding on reversioner A 141 N 15
- (d) Impeachment of
- (i) Suit by remote reversioner — Maintainability ... A 125 N 8
- (ii) Who can sue, within Art 125 A 125 N 9
- (e) Invalidity of — Suit for declaration by reversioner during life-time of female — Limitation A 141 N 12
- (f) Possession of life estate by virtue of bequest, grant or transfer *inter vivos* — Suit in respect of — Suit by reversioner for declaration that alienation is not binding on reversioner — Limitation A 120 N 34
- (g) Remedies of reversioner in respect of A 125 N 2
- (h) Right of reversioner to challenge — Recognition and purpose of such right A 125 N 6
- (i) Suit by reversioner
- (i) Suit for declaration that alienation is not binding on reversioner — Limitation — Starting point ... A 120 N 34
- (ii) Limitation — Starting point A 125 N 15
- (iii) Whether each reversioner has a separate cause of action A 120 N 34
- (iv) Whether further alienation by alienee furnishes fresh cause of action A 120 N 34
- By guardian — Suit for setting aside — Limitation — Applicability of Art. 44 and Art. 91 A 91 N 5

—By Hindu widow

- (a) Alienation by widow before adoption — Suit by adopted son — Nature of — Limitation A 125 N 3; A 125 N 10
- (b) Alienation without necessity — Suit for recovery of property by son subsequently adopted by widow — Limitation ... A 141 N 7
- (c) Of life interest — Whether furnishes cause of action to reversioner A 125 N 13
- (d) Reversioner not suing — Next reversioner minor — Minority, if ground for extension of time in suo S 6 N 14
- (e) Right of reversioner to sue for possession from alienee — When extinguished S 25 N 2
- (f) Suit by one reversioner that alienation cannot hind reversionary interest — Dismissal of suit on ground that he is not next reversioner but another — Suit by such other after widow's death for possession against alienee — Dismissal on ground that he is not reversioner — Suit by former reversioner for possession — Plaintiff, if gets fresh right of action on decree in other reversioner's suit S 9 N 11

Alienation—By Hindu widow—(Contd.)

- (g) Suit by reversioner to declare alienation void except for life or until remarriage of widow ... A 123 N 3
- (h) Suit by reversioner
- (i) For declaration, brought after death of limited female owner—Applicability of Art. 125 ... A 125 N 3
 - (ii) To declare that alienation is not binding on the reversion—Limitation ... A 120 N 31; A 120 N 34
 - (iii) To declare alienation of land void
 - (a) Adoption by Hindu widow under Benares School of Hindu law without express permission of her husband—Mortgage jointly with adopted son of properties inherited as limited owner—Reversioner, whether must set aside adoption before he can obtain declaration ... A 125 N 19
 - (b) Alienation—Nature of—Competent to attract Art. 125 ... A 125 N 13
 - (c) Decree for sale obtained upon simple mortgage by widow—Whether furnishes fresh cause of action ... A 125 N 13; A 125 N 15
 - (d) Limitation ... A 125 N 2
 - (i) For such suit under Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act ... A 125 N 17
 - (ii) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 18, Limitation Act ... A 125 N 18
 - (iii) Where possession of female is by virtue of a right irrespective of her being a Hindu : ... A 125 N 5
 - (e) On death of widow property to go absolutely to another female—Plaintiff reversioner to widow alienating property—Maintainability of suit ... A 125 N 3
 - (f) Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, when applies : ... A 125 N 17
 - (g) Relief in declaratory suit dependent upon another relief which is time-barred—Whether can be obtained ... A 125 N 19
 - (h) Who may bring such suit within Art. 125 ... A 125 N 9
 - (iv) To set aside—Extension of time on ground of disability ... S 6 N 17
 - (i) Whether must be set aside by reversioner before he can claim relief which he wants ... A 91 N 4
 - (j) Whether void ... A 91 N 4
- By Kanyasulk of Malabar tarwad
- (a) Suit by junior member for declaration that alienation is not binding on tarwad—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 36
 - (b) Suit by member of tarwad for recovery of property alienated—Limitation ... A 91 N 8
 - (c) Suit by member of tarwad to declare that alienation is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 8
- By Iambardar—Suit by cosharer not party to alienation to declare that alienation is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 7
- By mahant of math—Whether binding on succeeding mahants ... A 91 N 10
- By member of Aliyasanthana family—Whether binding on other members ... A 91 N 9

Alienation—(Contd.)

—By member of joint Hindu family

- (a) Remedy of another member of family not party to alienation ... A 91 N 6
- (b) Suit by another member of family not party to alienation to declare that alienation is not binding on him—Limitation : A 91 N 6
- (c) Whether must be set aside by another member of family not party to alienation before he can claim relief which he wants ... A 91 N 6

—By minor as major

- (a) Suit for possession of property after attaining majority—Limitation ... A 91 N 15
- (b) Whether void against minor ... A 91 N 15

—By Muhammadan widow

- (a) Suit by remote reversioner to declare alienation of land void except for life or until re-marriage of widow ... A 125 N 3
- (b) Suit by reversioner to declare alienation of land void ... A 125 N 13

- ... A 125 N 3
- 25; A 125 N 2

- (a) For such suit under Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act ... A 125 N 17

- (b) Starting point ... A 125 N 18

- (c) Where possession of female is by virtue of a right ... A 125 N 5
- ... A 125 N 17

- which is time-barred, whether can be obtained ... A 125 N 19

- (vi) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 18, Lim. Act: A 125 N 18

- (vii) Who may bring such suit within Art. 125 ... A 125 N 9

—By one of daughters inheriting jointly father's estate with right of survivorship—Alienation affecting right of survivorship of other daughter — Suit for declaration by other daughter—Limitation :

A 125 N 3

—By sonless proprietor in the Punjab — Whether binding on the reversioner ...

A 91 N 11

—By trustee of temple—Whether binding on succeeding trustee ...

A 91 N 10

—Invalidity of — Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation — Starting point ...

A 120 N 31

—Meaning of ...

A 125 N 13

—Suit for setting aside

- (a) Alienation voidable under S. 53, T. P. Act — Limitation : A 91 N 14

- (b) Power of manager of Mitakshara joint family to give discharge: S 7 N 17

—What is

- (a) Allotment of share on partition to a perfect stranger, whether alienation within Art. 126 ... A 126 N 6

- (b) Compromise in nature of family arrangement entered into by widow or other limited heir, whether alienation ... A 125 N 13

- (c) Compromise in the nature of family arrangement entered into by widow or other limited heir — Whether binding upon reversioners ... A 125 N 13

- (d) Confirmation of past alienation not made by female, whether alienation made by female within Art. 125 ... A 125 N 14

- (e) Creation of occupancy right, whether alienation ... A 125 N 13

Alienation—What is—(Contd.)

- (f) Devolution of property by succession, whether alienation ... A 125 N 13
- (g) Gift by sonless Hindu widow of her deceased husband's estate to her daughter, whether alienation ... A 125 N 13
- (h) Gift, whether alienation ... A 125 N 13
- (i) Hypothecation of immovable property, whether alienation: A 125 N 13
- (j) Mortgage of immovable property, whether alienation ... A 125 N 13
- (k) Perpetual lease, whether alienation ... A 125 N 13
- (l) Property bequeathed by will, whether alienation within Art. 126 ... A 126 N 6
- (m) Sale of equity of redemption, whether alienation ... A 120 N 34
- (n) Sale of property in execution of decree, whether alienation by widow within Art. 125 ... A 125 N 14
- (o) Sale, whether alienation within Art. 126 ... A 126 N 6
- (p) Simple mortgage, whether alienation within Art. 126 ... A 126 N 6
- (q) Usufructuary mortgage, whether alienation within Art. 126: A 126 N 6
- (r) Whether must be one for consideration for applicability of Art. 126 ... A 126 N 6
- (s) Withdrawal by widow of defence to an action on mortgage executed by her husband, whether alienation ... A 125 N 13

Alienee

- Alienee from female limited owner ...
 - (a) Suit by reversioner for possession of property alienated by female without necessity—Limitation ... A 141 N 15
 - (b) Suit for possession of property alienated by reversioner in whose favour limited owner has surrendered estate after alienation—Limitation ... A 141 N 9
- Alienee from heir or devisee—Suit against, by creditor of ancestor or testator for declaration that alienation is void and for consequential relief—Limitation ... A 120 N 44
- Alienee from Hindu female — Suit for possession by Hindu reversioner—Limitation ... A 141 N 19
- Alienee of father—Alienation set aside at the instance of the sons except as to father's share — Profits received by such alienee, whether profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 3
- Alienee of Hindu widow
 - (a) Receipt of profits by — Part of alienation set aside after widow's death—Profits of whole property, whether wrongfully received ... A 109 N 3
 - (b) Receipt of profits by, after widow's death — Alienation set aside—Whether profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 24
- Alienee of member of joint family—Suit by another member—Limitation applicable ... A 127 N 3
- Alienee of tenant—Suit against
 - (a) Suit by landlord for possession on determination of tenancy by forfeiture by alienation—Suit under T. P. Act, S. 111—Limitation ... A 143 N 5
 - (b) Suit by landlord for possession on ground of breach of condition of non-alienation—Limitation ... A 143 N 2 ; A 143 N 5
 - (c) Suit for possession by landlord on ground of forfeiture incurred on ground of alienation—Limitation ... A 139 N 3
- Alienee of trust property—Suit against—Suit for possession—Limitation ... A 124 N 2

Amendment

- Amendment altering or adding to ground or basis of right or liability—No change in persona of parties—Whether amounts to addition of new parties within S. 22 ... S 22 N 6
- Amendment of decree—When amounts to sufficient cause to excuse delay in filing appeal ... S 5 N 14
- Appeal, memo of—When allowed ... S 3 N 33
- Application—When allowed ... S 3 N 33
- Application to amend clerical errors—Whether subject to any period of limitation ... S 3 N 26
- Court, if can allow, introducing additional ground of exemption ... S 3 N 31
- Execution application in time—Amendment sought for after limitation, if to be allowed ... S 3 N 33 F N 10
- Limitation
 - (a) Amendment altering substantial character of suit—Fresh suit barred at the time of amendment—Amendment, if to be allowed ... S 3 N 33
 - (b) Suit filed in time—Amendment after limitation—Suit in amended form, if barred ... S 3 N 33
- Of clerical error—Question of limitation, if arises ... S 3 N 33 F N 6
- Plaint can be allowed to be amended by inclusion of allegation of acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 77

Ancestral property

- Ancestral property of joint Mitakshara Hindu family—Sale of—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation ... A 49 N 2
- Meaning of ... A 126 N 7
- What is
 - (a) Property gifted by father to son ... A 126 N 7
 - (b) Property, whether includes both moveable and immovable property ... A 126 N 7

Appeal

- Addition of legal representative of deceased respondent after limitation—Delay, if can be excused on sufficient cause being shown: S 22 N 12
- Addition of party made by Appellate Court to appeal from order of lower Court refusing to make addition—Addition, when to be deemed to be effected ... S 22 N
- Admission ex parte
 - (a) Practice, legality of ... S 5 N 36
 - (b) Respondent, if must apply by motion as early as possible to set aside order ... S 5 N 36
 - (c) Respondent not objecting to, at hearing—High Court, if will interfere in revision ... S 5 N 36
- Admission ex parte beyond time—Absence of notice to opposite party—Power of Court to re-open question and decide as to sufficient cause ... S 5 N 36
- Amendment—Appeal by or against dead person—Whether can be amended by adding his legal representatives ... S 22 N 12
- Appeal against sole respondent who is dead at the time of preferring appeal—Appeal, if valid ... S 22 N 12

Appeal—(Contd.)

- Appeal dismissed for want of prosecution — Application for re-admission ... A 168; A 168 N 2
- (a) Application for re-admission of appeal struck off before date fixed for hearing, for default of payment of process fee—Limitation ... A 168 N 3
- (b) Application for re-admission under Rules of High Court—Limitation ... A 168 N 2
- (c) Application invoking Court's inherent powers — Limitation: ... A 168 N 2
- (d) Application made in time—Party impleaded afterwards — Effect of ... A 168 N 7
- (e) Application to restore appeal dismissed without jurisdiction—Limitation ... A 168 N 6
- (f) Application to restore appeal rejected for non-payment of court fee
- (i) Limitation ... A 168 N 5
- (ii) Whether lies ... A 168 N 5
- (g) Application to restore appeal rejected under Civil P. C., O. 41 R. 10
- (i) Limitation ... A 168 N 4
- (ii) Whether lies ... A 168 N 4
- (h) Limitation
- (i) Art. 168 and Rule 9 (2) of Appellate Side Rules of Procedure of Rangoon High Court ... A 168 N 10
- (ii) Art. 168, whether restricted to application under Civil Pro. Code ... A 168 N 9
- (iii) Court, whether can extend time under inherent power: ... A 168 N 9
- (iv) Plea of — Minority of applicant, whether answer to plea of limitation under Art. 168 ... A 168 N 8
- (v) Starting point ... A 168 N 8
- (vi) Time, whether can be extended by virtue of S. 5, Lim. Act ... A 168 N 9
- (i) Provision for ... A 168 N 3
- (i) What dismissed appeals can be re-admitted ... A 168 N 3
- Appeal dismissed without jurisdiction—Re-admission of—Application for, whether one within Art. 168 ... A 168 N 6
- Appeal filed with copy of judgment or decree alone
- (a) Application for ...
- obtained —Appeal, if in time ... S 12 N 31
- (b) Copy of decree produced in Court when time for appeal had expired—Appeal is barred ... S 12 N 31
- Appeal from decree in suit under Divorce Act—Limitation applicable ... S 29 N 7
- Appeal from judgment on review—Time requisite for obtaining copy of the original judgment which was the subject matter of the review application—Whether can be deducted in computing limitation ... S 12 N 27
- Appeal from orders—Limitation—Time spent in obtaining not only the fair order but also the final order to be excluded in computing period ... S 12 N 35

Appeal—(Contd.)

- ve to appeal in criminal cases—
- Limitation ... A 179 N 2
- (ii) Date of decree—What is ... A 179 N 3
- (iii) Death of applicant—Substitution of legal representative—Limitation ... A 179 N 2
- (iv) Limitation ... A 179 ; A 179 N 1 ; A 179 N 2
- (v) Limitation—Starting point ... A 179 N 3
- (vi) One application for leave to appeal from two decrees decided by one judgment—Amendment of such application so as to restrict prayer to one decree, whether allowable ... A 179 N 2
- (vii) Time occupied in obtaining copy of judgment, whether excluded ... A 179 N 4
- (viii) Time requisite for obtaining copy of decree appealed from, whether excluded ... A 179 N 4
- (ix) Time, whether excluded by reason of legal disability ... A 179 N 4
- (x) Time, whether extended on ground that Court is closed on last day of limitation ... A 179 N 4
- (xi) Time, whether extended under S. 5, Lim. Act ... A 179 N 4
- (xii) Two applications for leave to appeal from two decrees decided by one judgment—Limitation ... A 179 N 2
- (b) Procedure as to ... A 179 N 2
- (c) Two appeals from two decrees decided by one judgment—Procedure as to ... A 179 N 2
- Appeal under Code of Civil Procedure—Meaning of ... A 156 N 3 ; A 166 N 3
- Criminal appeal
- (a) Appeal by person in jail—Limitation—Time taken up in forwarding applications for copies by officer in charge of jail and in transmission of such copies to the jail to be excluded ... S 12 N 32
- (b) Application for leave to appeal—Limitation—Time taken for ... S 12 N 32
- ... S 12 N 32
- ... case
- filed with appeal—Whether can be excluded ... S 12 N 32
- Delay in filing
- (a) Appeal filed out of time owing to misleading entries on copy made by copying department—Whether can be admitted under S. 5 ... S 12 N 34
- (b) Excuse of ... S 5
- Dismissal of—Application for setting aside
- ... A 172 ; A 172 N 1 ; A 172 N 3
- ... A 172 N 2
- (iii) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Lim. Act ... A 172 N 3
- (h) By receiver of insolvent
- (i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 172 ; A 172 N 1 ; A 172 N 3
- (ii) Provision for ... A 172 N 2
- (iii) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Lim. Act ... A 172 N 3

Appeal—(Contd.)**—Ex parte—Application for rehearing**

- (a) Application in appeal to set aside ex parte decree passed in suit—Limitation ... A 169 N 2
 (b) Burden of proof as to application being in time ... A 169 N 3
 (c) Court, whether has discretion to extend period of limitation: A 169 N 2
 (d) Limitation—Starting point ... A 169; A 169 N 2; A 169 N 4
 (e) Provision for ... A 169 N 2
 (f) Respondent not served with notice of appeal—Limitation ... A 169 N 1

—Filing of, after expiry of period of limitation—Effect ... S 3**—Institution of—Civil appeal**

- (a) By or against minor, when preferred ... S 3 N 6
 (b) Memo, if must be accompanied by copy of decree and judgment ... S 3 N 6
 (c) Memo must be signed by appellant or his pleader ... S 3 N 6
 (d) Payment of sufficient court-fee on memo—Necessity of ... S 3 N 6
 (e) Presentation by duly authorized person—Necessity of ... S 3 N 6
 (f) Presentation to proper Court—Necessity of ... S 3 N 6
 (g) Second appeal—Copy of judgment of Court of first instance, if to be filed ... S 3 N 6
 (h) Sending of appeal by post, if sufficient ... S 3 N 6 FN 5

—Institution of—Criminal appeal, what constitutes ... S 3 N 6 FN 10**—Leave to appeal as pauper—Application for**

- (a) Application for leave to file cross-objections in forma pauperis—Limitation ... A 170 N 2
 (b) Application to continue in forma pauperis an appeal for which applicant has put in insufficient court-fee—Limitation ... A 170 N 2
 (c) Court, whether can extend time on equitable ground ... A 170 N 2
 (d) Limitation—Starting point ... A 170; A 170 N 2; A 170 N 2
 (e) Provision for such ... A 170 N 6
 (f) Rejection of application—Court, whether has power to grant applicant time for payment of court-fee ... A 170 N 3
 (g) ... or excluded: A 170 N 4
 (h) ... Act ... A 170 N 5

(a) Computation of

- (i) Day of judgment and time requisite for obtaining copy of decree, sentence or order and copy of judgment to be excluded ... S 19

- (ii) Time requisite for obtaining both copy of judgment and of decree should be excluded ... S 19 N 8

- (b) Exclusion of time spent in proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction—Exclusion, if available ... S 14 N 5

—Maintainability of—Order dismissing appeal as too late—Appeal, if lies ... S 5 N 45**—Meaning of** ... A 156 N 2

- (a) Appeals from Appellate Side of High Court—Whether governed by S. 12 ... S 19 N 4

- (b) 'Appeal' in S. 12, whether includes appeal from Original Side ... S 19 N 4

- (c) ... ; to set aside appeal ... A 182 N 37

- (d) In Art. 182, Cl. 2 ... A 182 N 33

Appeal—(Contd.)

—New plea as to limitation	
(a) If can be raised ...	S 3 N 17
(b) If can be raised when plea depends on question of fact ...	S 3 N 17
(c) Involving investigation into fresh facts, if can be raised ...	S 3 N 17
(d) Involving only question of law, if can be raised ...	S 3 N 17
(e) Raising question of fact abandoned by party, if can be subsequently raised as matter of right ...	S 3 N 17
—Notice of—What is, within Art. 169 ...	A 169 N 4
—Period of pendency of appeal from decree—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation for execution of decree ...	S 15 N 15
—Power of Appellate Court to add as respondent person who was party to suit but not made party to appeal ...	S 22 N 4
—Preferring of appeal does not amount to injunction or stay ...	S 15 N 15
—Presentation—Copy of decree and judgment not accompanying memo—Appeal, if valid ...	S 4 N 14
—Presentation after hour fixed by Judge—Validity ...	S 4 N 14
—Rejection of, summarily—Propriety of ...	S 3 N 36
—Review and appeal distinguished ...	A 173 N 3
—Revision application—Whether appeal ...	A 177 N 2
—Revision converted into appeal—Delay in presenting appeal, if can be excused ...	S 5 N 30
—Second appeal — Limitation — Computation of — Time spent in obtaining copies of judgment and decree of first Court—Whether can be excluded ...	S 12 N 8
—Section 22, if applies to appeals ...	S 22 N 4
—Time-barred appeal, if can be treated as cross-objections in another appeal ...	S 3 N 18
—Two appeals against same decree with one decree copy — Second copy, furnishing of, after time—Delay, if can be excused ...	S 5 N 31
—When preferred ...	S 3 ; S 3 N 6
—Whether suit ...	S 2 Cl 10 N 1

Appearance

—Appearance and defence in summary suit under Civil Procedure Code — Application for leave : <i>See</i> under Civil Procedure Code	
—Meaning of ...	A 163 N 6

Appellant

—Legal representative of : <i>See</i> Legal representative — Of deceased appellant	
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--

Appellate Court

—Duty of	
(a) Appeal filed beyond limitation	S 3 N 18
— Appellate	S 3 N 18
Duty to dismiss suit ...	S 3 N 18
—Meaning of, in Art 182, Cl 2 ...	A 182 N 44
—Power of, to go into question of limitation	
(a) Appeal by some only of several defendants — Court, if can see if suit against all was instituted beyond time ...	S 3 N 18

Appeal—(Contd.)**—Ex parte—Application for rehearing**

- (a) Application in appeal to set aside ex parte decree passed in suit—Limitation ... A 169 N 2
- (b) Burden of proof as to application being in time ... A 169 N 3
- (c) Court, whether has discretion to extend period of limitation: ... A 169 N 2
- (d) Limitation—Starting point ... A 169; A 169 N 2; A 169 N 4
- (e) Provision for ... A 169 N 2
- (f) Respondent not served with notice of appeal—Limitation ... A 169 N 1

—Filing of, after expiry of period of limitation—Effect ... S 3**—Institution of—Civil appeal**

- (a) By or against minor, when preferred ... S 3 N 6
- (b) Memo, if must be accompanied by copy of decree and judgment ... S 3 N 6
- (c) Memo must be signed by appellant or his pleader ... S 3 N 6
- (d) Payment of sufficient court-fee on memo—Necessity of ... S 3 N 6
- (e) Presentation by duly authorized person—Necessity of ... S 3 N 6
- (f) Presentation to proper Court—Necessity of ... S 3 N 6
- (g) Second appeal—Copy of judgment of Court of first instance, if to be filed ... S 3 N 6
- (h) Sending of appeal by post, if sufficient ... S 3 N 6 FN 5

—Institution of—Criminal appeal, what constitutes ... S 3 N 6 FN 10**—Leave to appeal as pauper—Application for**

- (a) Application for leave to file cross-objections in forma pauperis—Limitation ... A 170 N 2
- (b) Application to continue in forma pauperis an appeal for which applicant has put in insufficient court-fee—Limitation ... A 170 N 2
- (c) Court, whether can extend time on equitable ground ... A 170 N 3
- (d) Limitation—Starting point ... A 170; A 170 N 2, A 170 N 3
- (e) Provision for such ... as power to grant ... A 170 N 6
- (f) ... whether excluded: ... A 170 N 3
- (g) ... Am. Act ... A 170 N 4
- (h) ... A 170 N 5
- (i) Time, whether extended on ground of minority... ...

—Limitation**(a) Computation of**

- (i) Day of judgment and time requisite for obtaining copy of decree, sentence or order and copy of judgment to be excluded ... S 13
- (ii) Time requisite for obtaining both copy of judgment and of decree should be excluded ... S 13 N 8

- (b) Exclusion of time spent in proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction—Exclusion, if available ... S 14 N 5

—Maintainability of—Order dismissing appeal as too late—Appeal, if lies ... S 5 N 45**—Meaning of ... A 156 N 2**

- (a) Appeals from Appellate Side of High Court—Whether governed by S. 12 ... S 13 N 4
- (b) 'Appeal' in S. 12, whether includes appeal from Original Side of High Court ... S 13 N 4
- (c) Application by party in Appellate Court asking to set aside or revise a decision of Subordinate Court is an appeal ... A 182 N 37
- (d) In Art. 182, Cl. 2 ... A 182 N 33

Appeal—(Contd.)

- New plea as to limitation
 - (a) If can be raised ... S 3 N 17
 - (b) If can be raised when plea depends on question of fact ... S 3 N 17
 - ... S 3 N 17
 - ... S 3 N 17
 - ... sub-
 - ... subsequently raised as matter of right ... S 3 N 17
- Notice of—What is, within Art 169 ... A 169 N 4
- Period of pendency of appeal from decree—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation for execution of decree ... S 15 N 15
- Power of Appellate Court to add as respondent person who was party to suit but not made party to appeal ... S 22 N 4
- Preferring of appeal does not amount to injunction or stay ... S 15 N 15
- Presentation—Copy of decree and judgment not accompanying memo—Appeal, if valid ... S 4 N 14
- Presentation after hour fixed by Judge—Validity ... S 4 N 14
- Rejection of, summarily—Propriety of ... S 3 N 36
- Review and appeal distinguished ... A 173 N 3
- Revision application—Whether appeal ... A 177 N 2
- Revision converted into appeal—Delay in presenting appeal, if can be excused ... S 5 N 30
- Second appeal — Limitation — Computation of — Time spent in obtaining copies of judgment and decree of first Court—Whether can be excluded ... S 12 N 8
- Section 22, if applies to appeals ... S 22 N 4
- Time-barred appeal, if can be treated as cross-objections in another appeal ... S 3 N 18
- Two appeals against same decree with one decree copy — Second copy, furnishing of, after time—Delay, if can be excused ... S 5 N 31
- When preferred ... S 3 ; S 3 N 6
- Whether suit ... S 2 Cl 10 N 1

Appearance

- Appearance and defence in summary suit under Civil Procedure Code — Application for leave : *See under Civil Procedure Code*
- Meaning of ... A 163 N 6

Appellant

- Legal representative of : *See Legal representative—Of deceased appellant*

Appellate Court

- Duty of
 - (a) Appeal filed beyond limitation ... S 3 N 18
 - (b) Point of limitation not taken in memo of appeal— Appellate Court, if bound to go into the question ... S 3 N 18
 - (c) Suit in lower Court instituted beyond time—Duty to dismiss suit ... S 3 N 18
- Meaning of, in Art 182, Cl. 2 ... A 182 N 44
- Power of, to go into question of limitation
 - (a) Appeal by some only of several defendants — Court, if can see if suit against all was instituted beyond time ... S 3 N 18

Appellate Court—Power of, to go into question of limitation—(Contd.)

- (b) Appeal only from portion of decree—Court, if can consider whether whole suit is barred ... S 3 N 13
- Power of, under O. 41 R. 33, Civil P. C., may be exercised in favour of parties who have not themselves filed any appeal or objection against decree ... A 182 N 35
- Power of under O. 41, R. 33, Civil P. C., to pass any decree or order notwithstanding that appeal is as to part only of decree ... A 182 N 35

Applicant

- Meaning of ... S 2 Cl 1; S 2 Cl 1 N 1

Application

- Act, if applies only to such applications as are made under the Civil Procedure Code ... S 3 N 26
- Act, if applies to all applications under the Civil Procedure Code ... S 3 N 26
- Admission ex parte beyond time—Absence of notice to opposite party—Power of Court to reopen question and decide as to sufficient cause ... S 5 N 36
- Applicability of Act to—Test to determine ... S 3 N 26
- By liquidator of company for recovery of money due from contributory, if maintainable when at the date of application suit for money would be barred ... S 3 N 26
- By Official Assignee for recovery of money due from debtor to insolvent's estate—Whether equivalent to suit for purposes of limitation ... S 3 N 26; S 3 N 30
- Filing and conduct of — Whether 'particular business' within Art. 84 ... A 84 N 3
- For execution—Delay in filing, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3 FN 1
- For final decree—Delay in filing, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3 FN 1
- For leave to appeal—Day of judgment and time requisite for obtaining copy of decree, sentence or order to be excluded ... S 12
- For leave to appeal—Delay in filing—Excuse of ... S 5
- For leave to appeal as pauper — Delay in filing, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3
- For leave to appeal to Privy Council
 - (a) Time requisite for obtaining copy of decree—Whether should be excluded ... S 12 N 23
 - (b) Time requisite for obtaining copy of judgment—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation for application ... S 12 N 23
- For leave to appeal under S. 449 (c), Criminal P. C.—Delay in filing, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3
- For leave to defend summary suit — Delay in filing, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3 FN 1
- Governed by Art. 168—Delay in filing, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3 FN 1
- Limitation for—Residuary provisions ... A 181; A 181 N 2
 - (a) Article 181, whether applies only to applications under Civil Procedure Code ... A 181 N 2
 - (b) Enlargement of time—Time for application falling under residuary Art. 181, whether extended ... A 181 N 24
 - (c) Starting point of limitation—Principles ... A 181 N 2
 - (d) Test to see if application is governed by Art. 181 ... A 181 N 2

Application—Limitation for; residuary provisions—(Contd.)

(e) Where it is the duty of Court to do particular thing <i>suo motu</i> , whether governed by Art. 181	A 181 N 2
—Making of, after expiry of period of limitation—Effect	S 3
—Matter resting with discretion of Court—Undue delay in approaching Court, if will be considered by Court	S 3 N 26
—Presentation of—Practice allowing petitions to be thrown into box	S 4 N 14
—Such presentation, if proper	S 4 N 14
—Proceeding not falling under Civil Procedure Code — Maintainability of, if affected by fact that suit to obtain same relief would have been barred at the date of institution of proceeding	S 3 N 26
—Revision application			
(a) Whether appeal	A 177 N 2
(b) Whether subject to abatement	A 177 N 2
(c) Whether suit	A 177 N 2
—Right of assignee <i>pendente lite</i> to apply in pending suit, when accrues	A 181 N 20
—To bring legal representative on record—Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—To rescind leave to sue—Limitation	A 181 N 14
—To set aside abatement—Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—To set aside award—Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—To set aside execution sale—Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—To set aside ex parte decree—Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—To which provisions as to excuse of delay made applicable by or under any enactment—Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5
—Under Act other than Civil P. C. but where Court is asked to exercise its jurisdiction by applying Civil Procedure Code — Limitation	A 181 N 22
—Under Companies Act—Limitation	A 181 N 22
—Under O. 34, R. 8-A, Civil P. C.—Limitation	A 181 N 6
—Under O. 9, R. 4, Civil P. C. — Made after time — Delay, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—Under O. 9, R. 4, Civil P. C., in Bombay — Delay in making, if can be excused	S 5 N 3
—Under O. 9, R. 9, Civil P. C. — Made after time—Delay, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—Under O. 9, R. 9, Civil P. C., in Bombay — Delay in making, if can be excused	S 5 N 3
—Under O. 9, R. 13, Civil P. C. — Delay in making, if can be excused	S 5 N 3
—Under O. 21, R. 95, Civil P. C. — Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—Under O. 22, R. 9, Civil P. C.—Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3
—Under O. 41, R. 20, Civil P. C. — Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1
—Under Sch. 2, Para. 20, Civil P. C.—Delay in filing, if can be excused	S 5 N 3 FN 1

Application—(Contd.)

—Under Provincial Insolvency Act—Limitation	A 181 N 23
—Under R. 27, Ch. 38—Original Side Rules, Calcutta High Court— Limitation	A 181 N 2
—What is			
(a) Application to Registrar of Original Side for issue of notice of motion under Rr. 154, 155 of Original Side Rules of Madras High Court, whether application within Art. 163:			A 163 N 3
(b) Certificate of Advocate-General under Letters Patent Cl. 26, whether application	A 162 N 2 S 3 N 7
—When made	

Appropriation

—Payment by debtor—Method of appropriation determined at the outset by express contract — Specific appropriation on the occa- sion of each payment is not necessary	S 20 N 6
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Arbitration

—Act, if applies to such proceedings	S 3 N 27
—Agreement to refer to arbitration matter in respect of cause of action that has accrued—Cessation of cause of action, if arises so as to affect running of limitation	S 9 N 13
—Award. <i>See also under Award.</i>			
(a) Agreement to deal with matter in dispute seriatim and to deliver award bit by bit — Portion so decided, whether dis- tinct award	A 178 N 3
(b) Award on reference through Court—Failure of arbitrator to file award—Remedy of party to award	A 178 N 2 A 178 N 4
(c) Date of—What is	
(d) Filing of			A 178
(i) Application for—Limitation	
(ii) Application under Sch. 2, Para. 10, Civil P. C.—Lim- itation	A 178 N 1, 2
(iii) Application under Sch. 2, Para. 10, Civil P. C., read with para. 19—Limitation	A 178 N 1
(iv) Application under Sch. 2, Para. 20, Civil P. C. — Limitation	A 178 N 2
(v) Award filed without intervention of Court — Whether can be split up and not filed as whole	A 178 N 3 A 178 N 4
(vi) Date of award—What is	
(vii) Failure of arbitrator to file award—Remedies of party in whose favour award is made	A 178 N 3
(viii) Failure to file within limitation—Whether invalidates award	A 178 N 3 A 178 N 4
(ix) Limitation—Starting point	A 178 N 2
(x) Mode of	
(xi) Order filing award and order passing decree in terms of it contained in same order—Portion of order direct- ing filing of award — Whether appealable	A 178 N 3 A 178 N 2
(xii) Provision for	A 178 N 3
(xiii) Suit for—Limitation	
(xiv) Time spent bona fide in infructuous proceedings in wrong Court, whether excluded	A 178 N 5 A 178 N 6
(xv) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Lim. Act	A 178 N 6
(xvi) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Lim. Act	

Arbitration—Award—Filing of—(Contd.)

(xvii) Under Civil P. C., Sch. 2, Para. 10—Limitation ... A 178 N 2

(xviii) Where reference and arbitration are both without intervention of Court—Provision for ... A 178 N 2

(xix) Where without suit parties agree to refer differences to arbitrator—Provision for ... A 178 N 2

(e) Invalidity of—Failure to make award rule of Court within limitation—Whether invalidates award ... A 178 N 3

(f) Whether must be single instrument ... A 178 N 3

... their respective agreement of liability ...

... S 19 N 46

—Duty of arbitrators not to allow time-barred claims ... S 3 N 27

—Proceedings before arbitrator

(a) Time spent in prosecuting in good faith the same claim before arbitrator without jurisdiction—Whether can be excluded ... S 14 N 5

(b) Whether civil proceedings in a Court ... S 14 N 13

—F ... to arbitrator's award ... S 14 N 18

—Provisions as to ... A 178 N 2

—Suit referred to, by Court's order—Court, if can dismiss suit as barred ... S 3 N 27

Arrears

—Of revenue—Demands recoverable as arrears of revenue—What are ... A 16 N 2, A 16 N 2a

—Suit for arrears of customary dues payable to *chhatram*—Limitation ... A 120 N 39**Artisan**

—Meaning of ... A 7 N 5

Assessment

—Assessment of rent—Rent free lands held by Revenue Court to be liable for rent—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 3

—Assessment of lakhiraj grants—Right of Government of—Right, whether extinguished by bar of limitation ... A 149 N 8

—Assessment of rent-free land—Suit for: *See under* Rent—Assessment on inam lands—Assessment payable to *inamdars*—Whether rent ... A 110 N 2

—Suit for declaration of right to impose without consequential relief—Limitation ... A 120 N 2

Assignee

—Of administration bond—Suit on—Limitation ... A 68 N 2

—Of insolvent ... dismissal of appeal ... A 172; A 172 N 1; A 172 N 3

(iii) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Lim. Act ... A 172 N 3

Assignee—Of Insolvent—(Contd.)

- (b) Application by, for setting aside dismissal of suit
 - (i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 172; A 172 N 1; A 172 N 3
 - (ii) Provision for A 172 N 2
 - (iii) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Limitation Act A 172 N 3
- Of last manager of endowed property—Dispossession of—Suit for
 - Suit, whether one for possession A 120 N 4
- Right of, to apply *pendente lite*—When accrues A 181 N 20

Assignment

- Of mortgage — Mortgagee receiving mortgage money in fraud of assignee—Suit by assignee for money received by mortgagee—Limitation A 62 N 31
- Void assignment—Void assignment of mortgage bond—Money received by assignee on such bond—Suit by assignor—Suit for recovery of money—Limitation A 62 N 31

Attachment

- Before judgment
 - (a) By order of Provincial Small Cause Court—Order in claim proceeding preferred in respect of such attachment—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation A 11 N 19
 - (b) Claims and objections—Order as to—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation A 11 N 19
- Claims and objections
 - (a) Claim by person in adverse possession of property attached but whose title has not ripened allowed—Suit by decree-holder for setting aside order within limitation but after ripening of title of adverse possessor — Suit, if maintainable A 11 N 23
 - (b) Order disallowing claim
 - (i) Order under Civil P. C.—Withdrawal or removal of attachment subsequent to order—Effect of A 11 N 6
 - (ii) Order under Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, S. 28—Withdrawal or removal of attachment subsequent to order—Effect of A 11 N 6
 - (c) Withdrawal of attachment prior to enquiry into claim or objection—Effect of A 11 N 7
- Claims and objections — Order as to—Properties in respect of which such order can be conclusive A 11 N 10
- (a) Debt attached under Civil P. C., O. 21, R. 46, whether can be comprised in order A 11 N 10
- (b) Property comprised in order, whether must be moveable or immovable A 11 N 10
- In execution of mortgage decree, if necessary A 11 N 18
- Money wrongly attached—Money paid over to decree-holder—Suit by real owner against decree-holder—Limitation A 62 N 27
- Of immovable property
 - (a) Attachment by revenue authorities for arrears of Government revenue—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation A 15
 - (b) Attachment for arrears of land revenue under Bombay Land Revenue Code—Forfeiture of lands before expiry of limitation for suit for restoration—Subsequent suit to declare forfeiture illegal—Limitation A 15 N 1

Attachment—(Contd.)

- Of moveable property—Attachment in execution of decree—Moveable property put in custody of Sapurdar—Objection to attachment—Court upholding objection—Suit by objector for recovery of moveable property attached—Limitation ... A 143 N 3
- Of property by Magistrate—Not caused by wrongful denial of plaintiff's title by defendant—Right to declaration of title—When accrues ... S 23 N 17
- Order as to claims and objections
 - (a) Suit by person against whom order passed
 - (i) Failure to bring such suit within limitation
 - (a) Effect of
 - (i) Attaching decree-holder, whether can move after limitation Insolvency Court to annul transfer where judgment-debtor has been declared insolvent ... A 11 N 3
 - (ii) On right of claimant in respect of stranger not party to claim proceeding ... A 11 N 3
 - (b) Stranger not party to claim proceeding, whether can set up such failure as bar to action against him ... A 11 N 8
 - (ii) Limitation ... A 11; A 11 N 2
 - (a) Article 11 and Art. 29 distinguished ... A 11 N 10
 - (b) Starting point ... A 11 N 21
 - (c) Time spent in unsuccessful revision to High Court, whether excluded ... A 11 N 21
 - (d) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 14, Limitation Act ... A 11 N 21
 - (e) Where order is against minor ... A 11 N 5
 - (iii) Nature of such suit ... A 11 N 8
 - (iv) Order referred to in Art. 11
 - (a) What is ... A 11 N 11
 - (i) Consent order in claim petitions, whether order referred to in Art. 11 ... A 11 N 15
 - (ii) Order allowing withdrawal of claim or objection, whether order referred to in Art. 11: A 11 N 14
 - (iii) Order dismissing claim for default of appearance, whether order passed against claimant within Art. 11 ... A 11 N 12
 - (iv) Order dismissing claim for failure to produce evidence, whether order passed against claimant within Art. 11 ... A 11 N 12
 - (v) Order dismissing claim without jurisdiction, whether order referred to in Art. 11 ... A 11 N 17
 - (vi) Order in claim proceedings directing sales after notifying claim, whether order referred to in Art. 11 ... A 11 N 16
 - (vii) Order rejecting claim for want of jurisdiction, whether order referred to in Art. 11... A 11 N 17
 - (b) Whether must have been passed on investigation into merits of the case for applicability of Art. 11 ... A 11 N 12
 - (v) Relief which can be prayed for in such suit—Nature of: A 11 N 9

Attachment—Order as to claims and objections—Suit by person against whom order passed—(Contd.)

- (vi) Suit barred under other Article—Suit, whether maintainable under Art. 11 ... A 11 N 3
- (vii) Suit based on cause of action which accrues subsequent to date of order—Limitation ... A 11 N 2 A
- (viii) Suit for establishing right to property comprised in order dismissing claim or objection on ground of delay—Limitation ... A 11 N 13
- (ix) Suit in respect of claim arising out of execution of mortgage decree—Limitation ... A 11 N 18
- (x) Who can bring such suit within Art. 11 ... A 11 N 4
- Order under S. 146, Criminal P. C.—Order, whether one respecting possession of immoveable property within Art. 47 ... A 47 N 5
- Property attached under Criminal Procedure Code—Suit for declaration of right—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 11
- Property of plaintiff under attachment under S. 146, Criminal P. C.—Title cannot be extinguished however long attachment may continue ... S 28 N 2
- Under S. 146, Criminal P. C., of land after dispossession—Suit for possession by person dispossessed—Attachment, if enlarges period of limitation for suit ... S 9 N 2
- What constitutes ... A 11 N 18
- Whether amounts to injunction or stay order within S. 15 ... S 15 N 12
- Wrongful attachment of standing crops—Subsequent cutting and removing of standing crops inspite of fact that claim of objector to such crops was allowed in his favour—Suit for compensation by objector—Limitation ... A 29 N 5
- Wrongful attachment procured under S. 146, Criminal P. C.—Suit for declaration of title—Limitation, when begins to run ... S 23 N 17

Attorney

- Application by, for costs
 - (a) Under Civil Procedure Code—Limitation ... A 84 N 4
 - (b) Under Rules of High Court—Limitation ... A 84 N 4
- Costs, lien for, against client, if can be availed of when suit to recover costs barred ... S 3 N 14
- Suit against—By client for recovery of documents and papers relating to his case—Attorney, whether can plead in defence lien for costs even if his claim for costs is barred by limitation ... A 84 N 6
- Suit by, for costs
 - (a) Against opposite party—Limitation ... A 84 N 2
 - (b) Against other party according to provision of consent decree—Limitation ... A 120 N 16
 - (c) Limitation—Starting point ... A 84 ; A 84 N 2 ; A 84 N 7
 - (d) Where there is express agreement as to time when costs are to be paid—Limitation ... A 84 N 3

Auction-purchaser

See also Execution purchaser

- Amount of decree realized by auction-purchaser—Execution sale set aside—Suit by decree-holder against auction-purchaser for money realized by latter under decree—Limitation ... A 63 N 31
- Application by—Under Civil P. C., O. 21, R. 93 for refund of purchase money—Limitation—Starting point ... A 181 N 11

Auction-purchaser—(Contd.)

- Auction-purchaser being delivered symbolical possession—Subsequent suit for actual possession—Limitation—Starting point—Where judgment-debtor was in possession at date of sale ... A 138 N 8
- Auction-purchaser having obtained possession of property sold in execution—Loss of property by auction-purchaser—Subsequent suit for recovery of possession—Limitation ... A 138 N 7
- Auction-purchaser of mortgaged property—Status of ... A 134 N 9
- Auction-purchaser of trust property, whether transferee of trustee for valuable consideration ... A 134 N 9
- Auction-purchaser in execution of mortgage decrees—Suit by, for possession—Limitation ... A 137 N 2
- Auction-purchaser obstructed in delivery of possession of immovable property sold in execution—Remedy of ... A 167 N 2
- Auction-purchaser of immovable property—Auction-purchaser being delivered effective symbolical possession—Subsequent suit for actual possession—Limitation—Starting point ... A 137 N 7
- Auction-purchaser of interest of remainderman—Suit by, for possession of property sold—Limitation—Starting point ... A 137 N 6
- Auction-purchaser of property in possession of mortgagee—Suit by, for possession of property—Limitation—Starting point ... A 137 N 6
- Auction-purchaser of property of religious or charitable endowment sold in execution of decree against manager of endowment—Suit against, for recovery of possession of property—Limitation—Starting point ... A 134 A B C N 8
- Suit by
 - (a) For possession—Judgment-debtor out of possession at date of sale—Limitation ... A 137 N 2
 - (b) For possession of immovable property sold—Judgment-debtor in possession at date of sale—Limitation ... A 138 ; A 138 N 2
 - (c) For possession of property sold in execution—Under what circumstances suit maintainable ... A 138 N 2
 - (d) For refund of purchase money, after sale of patni taluq for arrears of rent is set aside—Limitation ... A 62 N 20
 - (e) For refund of purchase money on execution sale being set aside under O. 21, R. 92, Civil P. C.—Maintainability—Limitation ... A 97 N 12
 - (f) For refund of purchase money on ground that judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in property sold—Maintainability of suit—Limitation ... A 62 N 19 ; A 120 N 45

Award

- See also Arbitration—Award
- Application for filing award under Sch. 2, Para. 20, Civil P. C.—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 3
- Application to have award as to family rights and property filed and decreed upon—Mutation proceedings before Revenue authorities—Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14 : ... S 14 N 18
- Application to set aside
 - (a) Application on the face of it out of time—Duty of party to bring to notice of Court that copies have been obtained and time was consumed thereby ... S 12 N 30
 - (b) Time requisite for obtaining copy of award to be excluded: S 12; S 12 N 30
 - (c) Time requisite for obtaining copy of award only to be excluded ... S 12 N 8

Award—(Contd.)

- Award filed under Arbitration Act S. 15
 - (a) Award filed in Chartered High Court — Enforcement of—
 - Application for—Limitation A 183 N 2
 - (b) Enforcement of—Mode of A 183 N 2
- Award made on reference through Court—On what ground can be set aside A 153 N 2
- Award made on reference without intervention of Court — Whether can be set aside on application A 153 N 2
- Award null and void
 - (a) Whether Court can take notice of invalidity of such award... A 153 N 2
 - (b) Whether need be set aside A 153 N 2
- Award of Board of Revenue
 - (a) Suit to contest
 - (i) Limitation A 1; A 1 N 1
 - (ii) Time spent in obtaining copy of the award, whether can be excluded... .. A 1 N 1
 - (iii) Whether application within Sec. 12, sub-s. 4, Lim. Act A 1 N 1
 - (b) Who can contest A 1 N 1
- Charge on immovable property created by—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation A 132 N 6
- Correction of — Application for — Application under Civil P. O. para. 12, Sch. 2—Limitation A 153 N 2
- Decision by Settlement Officer under Bengal Land Revenue Regulations, 1822, 1825, 1833, when has the force of award A 45 N 1
- Enforcement of — Suit for — Whether suit for compensation for breach of contract A 115 N 11
- Filing of
 - (a) Application for, under Civil P. C., para. 20, Sch. 2
 - (i) Limitation A 153 N 2
 - (ii) Written statement filed by defendant in answer to such statement—Limitation A 153 N 2
 - (b) What is A 153 N 4
- Modification of—Application for — Application under Civil P. O., para. 12, Sch. 2—Limitation A 153 N 2
- Party to—Covenant for indemnity in favour of — Covenant, when enures for benefit of all persons claiming under him A 83 N 15
- Possession based on—Suit for—Limitation A 120 N 49
- Remission of — Application under Civil P. C., para. 14, Sch 2—Limitation A 153 N 2
- - time—Whether allowable A 153 N 5
 - (b) Application to revise a decree passed on basis of award—Limitation A 153 N 2
 - (c) Application to set aside award A 153 N 2
 - (d) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (e) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (f) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (g) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (h) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (i) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (j) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (k) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (l) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (m) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (n) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (o) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (p) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (q) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (r) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (s) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (t) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (u) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (v) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (w) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (x) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (y) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
 - (z) Application to set aside award S 5 N 3 FN 1
- High Court — Filing of such award, whether equivalent to application for setting aside award A 153 N 2

Award—Setting aside—Application for—(Contd.)

(f) Limitation			
(i) Bar of—Effect of	A 158 N 7
(ii) Object of the Legislature in framing Art. 158	A 158 N 3
(iii) Starting point	A 158 N 4
(g) Whether Court has power to extend time allowed under Art. 158, Limitation Act for supplying necessary court-fee stamp	A 158 N 5
(h) Whether S. 5 applies to application to set aside award	A 158 N 5
(i) Whether time extended under S. 4	A 158 N 5
(j) Whether time requisite for obtaining copy of award excluded	A 158 N 6
—Suit based upon — Where agreement to refer to arbitration has been registered and award signed by parties — Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for compensation for breach of registered contract	A 116 N 14
—Suit on—Suit on award signed by parties making reference—Suit, whether one for compensation for breach of contract	A 115 N 11
—Suit to enforce — Whether suit for specific performance of contract	A 113 N 5
—Suit to set aside award — Suit on promissory note executed in pursuance of award — Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14	S 14 N 18
—Terms of—Specific performance of—Suit for	A 120 N 42
		oken of	
		s appli.	
—Under Arbitration Act—Filing of—Application for—Limitation	A 120 N 42
—Under Bengal Land Revenue Settlement Regulations 1822, 1825, and 1833	A 164 N 2
(a) Contesting of—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point	A 45; A 45 N 2, A 45 N 3
(b) P	
	Art. 46	...	A 46 N 2
	1—Limitation	...	A 46, A 46 N 2
		...	A 46 N 2
		...	A 45 N 1
(d) Suit to avoid batwara division by Collector—Limitation	A 45 N 1
(e) Suit to recover possession of property subject to payment of revenue settled by revenue authorities—Limitation	A 45 N 1
(f) Suit to set aside order of Commissioner refusing to make settlement of khas mahal land with plaintiff who claimed settlement of it as accretion to his jote—Limitation	A 45 N 1
—What is	A 45 N 2
(a) Whether contract	A 115 N 11
(b) Whether contract, if signed by parties making reference	A 115 N 11
(c) Whether contract within Art. 116	A 116 N 14
—Whether contract	A 113 N 5
—Whether must be single instrument	A 178 N 3
Ballments			
—Kinds of	A 145 N 3

Award—(Contd.)

- Award filed under Arbitration Act S. 15
 - (a) Award filed in Chartered High Court — Enforcement of—
 - Application for—Limitation A 183 N 3
 - (b) Enforcement of—Mode of A 183 N 2
- Award made on reference through Court—On what ground can be set aside A 158 N 2
- Award made on reference without intervention of Court — Whether can be set aside on application A 159 N 2
- Award null and void
 - (a) Whether Court can take notice of invalidity of such award... A 158 N 2
 - (b) Whether need be set aside A 159 N 2
- Award of Board of Revenue
 - (a) Suit to contest
 - (i) Limitation A 1; A 1 N 1
 - (ii) Time spent in obtaining copy of the award, whether can be excluded... .. A 1 N 1
 - (iii) Whether application within Sec. 12, sub-s. 4, Lim. Act A 1 N 1
 - (b) Who can contest A 1 N 1
- Charge on immovable property created by—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation A 132 N 6
- Correction of — Application for — Application under Civil P. C. para. 13, Sch. 2—Limitation A 158 N 2
- Decision by Settlement Officer under Bengal Land Revenue Regulations, 1822, 1825, 1833, when has the force of award ... A 45 N 1
- Enforcement of — Suit for — Whether suit for compensation for breach of contract A 115 N 11
- Filing of
 - (a) Application for, under Civil P. C., para. 20, Sch. 2
 - (i) Limitation A 158 N 2
 - (ii) Written statement filed by defendant in answer to such statement—Limitation A 158 N 2
 - (b) What is A 158 N 4
- Modification of—Application for — Application under Civil P. C., para. 12, Sch. 2—Limitation A 158 N 2
- Party to—Covenant for indemnity in favour of — Covenant, when enures for benefit of all persons claiming under him ... A 83 N 15
- Possession based on—Suit for—Limitation A 120 N 43
- Remission of — Application under Civil P. C., para. 14, Sch. 2—Limitation A 158 N 2
- Setting aside—Application for
 - (a) Application containing additional ground of objection to validity of award in addition to prior application filed within time—Whether allowable A 158 N 5
 - (b) Application to revise a decree passed on basis of award—Limitation A 158 N 2
 - (c) Application under Civil P. C.—Limitation A 158
 - (d) Delay in filing, if can be excused S 5 N 3 F N 1
 - (e) Filing of affidavit in Prothonotary's office objecting to award made on reference made in a suit on the Original Side of High Court — Filing of such award, whether equivalent to application for setting aside award A 158 N 2

Award—Setting aside—Application for—(Contd.)**(f) Limitation**

- (i) Bar of—Effect of ... A 158 N 7
 (ii) Object of the Legislature in framing Art 158 ... A 158 N 3
 (iii) Starting point ... A 158 N 4

(g) Whether Court has power to extend time allowed under Art 158, Limitation Act for supplying necessary court-fee stamp ... A 158 N 5

(h) Whether S 5 applies to application to set aside award ... A 158 N 5

(i) Whether time extended under S 4 ... A 158 N 5

(j) Whether time requisite for obtaining copy of award excluded ... A 158 N 6

—Smit based upon — Where agreement to refer to arbitration has been registered and award signed by parties — Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for compensation for breach of registered contract ... A 116 N 14

—Suit on—Suit on award signed by parties making reference—Suit, whether one for compensation for breach of contract ... A 115 N 11

—Suit to enforce — Whether suit for specific performance of contract ... A 113 N 5

—Suit to set aside award — Suit on promissory note executed in pursuance of award — Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14 ... S 14 N 18

—Terms of—Specific performance of—Suit for ... Art. 120 ... A 120 N 42

parties in token of
 her same as appli-
 of contract ... A 120 N 42

—Under Arbitration Act—Filing of—Application for—Limitation ... A 164 N 2

—Under Bengal Land Revenue Settlement Regulations 1822, 1825, and 1833

(a) Contesting of—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ... A 45; A 45 N 2; A 45 N 3

(b) Property comprised in—Suit for recovery

(i) Nature of relief in suit governed by Art. 46 ... A 46 N 2

(ii) Suit by party bound by such award—Limitation ... A 46, A 46 N 2

(iii) Suit, by whom maintainable for applicability of Art. 46: ... A 46 N 2

(c) Suit to amend settlement and establish right of persons who were not before the Collector—Limitation ... A 45 N 1

(d) Suit to avoid batwara division by Collector—Limitation ... A 45 N 1

(e) Suit to recover possession of property subject to payment of revenue settled by revenue authorities—Limitation ... A 45 N 1

(f) Suit to set aside order of Commissioner refusing to make settlement of khas mahal land with plaintiff who claimed settlement of it as accretion to his jote—Limitation ... A 45 N 1

—What is ... A 45 N 2

(a) Whether contract ... A 115 N 11

(b) Whether contract, if signed by parties making reference ... A 115 N 11

(c) Whether contract within Art. 116 ... A 116 N 14

—Whether contract ... A 113 N 5

—Whether must be single instrument ... A 178 N 3

Ballments

—Kinds of ... A 145 N 3

Banker

—Deposit with—Suit for

- (a) Against person who has placed himself in position of banker with regard to particular person—Limitation... A 60 N 6
 (b) Limitation... A 60 N 3
 (c) Limitation, where deposit is payable on demand ... A 60

Banker and Customer

—Banker, if trustee for customer in regard to customer's moneys in his hands ... S 10 N 11, 16

Bankruptcy Act

—Applicability to Crown ... A 149 N 3

Benamidar—Decree against—Decree obtained collusively and fraudulently—Real owner, whether bound to sue to set aside decrees within the period applicable to suits for setting aside decrees on ground of fraud ... A 95 N 6
S 10 N 15—If a trustee for a specific purpose ... S 22 N 6
S 2 Cl 11 N 2—Impleaded as defendant in time—Benamidar acting as real owner and benami relationship known only subsequently—Impleading of real owner after limitation—Whether fatal to suit ... S 22 N 6
S 2 Cl 11 N 2

—Meaning of, if a trustee ... S 22 N 29

—Promissory note in name of benamidar—Suit on note by beneficial owner making benamidar a defendant—Benamidar, if can be allowed to be transposed as plaintiff ... S 22 N 29

—Suit against

(a) Suit by real owner for money belonging to real owner and received by benamidar—Limitation ... A 62 N 24

(b) Suit by real owner for money received by benamidar upon mortgage bond in his name—Limitation ... A 62 N 24

(c) Suit on agreement by benamidar to collect money for plaintiff—Whether based on contract within Art. 115 ... A 115 N 1

—Suit by—Addition of real owner as party after limitation—Suit, if becomes infructuous ... S 22 N 6
S 10 N 7

—Whether trustee under Act ... S 10 N 7

Bengal Act 11 of 1859

—Statutory liability of Government to return to owner of land sold, surplus proceeds—Whether liability is that of trustee ... S 10 N 9

Bengal Cess Act

—Cess payable under—Cess payable by tenant to proprietor—Whether rent ... A 110 N 2

Bengal Drainage Act

—Cost levied on landlord under—Sums payable to landlord by tenants for such costs—Whether rent ... A 110 N 2

Bengal Estates Partition Act

—S 82—Order under, whether affects right to partition under general law ... A 14 N 2

Bengal Regulation 17 of 1805

—Proceedings under—Effect of—See Mortgage—Foreclosure

Bengal Regulation 26 of 1814

—Provisions of, for excusing delay ... S 5 N 1

Bengal Tenancy Act

- S. 26-F—Application under—Delay in filing—Excuse of ... S 5 N 4 F N 8
- S. 111-A—Suit under—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 50
- S. 155—Suit under—Suit for ejectment on ground of misuse of land—Limitation ... A 143 N 2
- S. 158—Proceedings under—Whether suits ... S 2 Cl 10 N 1
- S. 158 (B)—Execution sale in contravention of—Declaration that such sale is illegal—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- S. 167—Legal disability, extension on ground of—Whether available for proceedings under ... S 6 N 20 F N 2
- S. 173—Sale under—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation : A 166 N 10
- S. 174—Applications under—Applicability of S. 18 of Limitation Act ... S 29 N 3
- S. 184—Suits under—Provisions of Limitation Act other than Ss. 7, 8 and 9 apply ... S 29 N 5
- Suit for rent under
 - (a) Limitation ... A 110 N 5
 - (b) Suit based on registered lease deed—Limitation ... A 116 N 8

Bhagdari Act (Bombay Act 5 of 1862)

- S. 3—Suit under—Suit by Collector—Limitation ... A 149 N 3

Bill

- Accommodation bill *See* Accommodation bill
- Foreign bill
 - (a) Dishonoured foreign bill—Suit on—Limitation—Starting point ... A 77, A 77 N 2
 - (b) Meaning of ... A 77 N 1

Bill of exchange

- Acceptor for honour—Suit by, against person for whose honour bill has been accepted—Limitation ... A 79 N 1
- Bill of exchange sent in settlement of accounts—Bill dishonoured on presentment of its acceptance—Suit for recovery on sums due on accounts—Limitation ... A 78 N 3
- Definition of ... S 2 Cl 2
- Dishonoured by non-acceptance
 - ... A 77 N 2
 - ... A 78 N 2
 - but for payment—Limitation ... A 78 N 1
- Hundi
 - (a) Hundi never presented for acceptance—Suit on—Limitation : A 80 N 1
 - (b) Hundi not falling within bill of exchange or promissory note as defined in Negotiable Instruments Act—General law of contract and local usage govern it ... S 2 Cl 2 N 1
 - (c) Meaning of ... S 2 Cl 2 N 1
- Maturity of—Method of calculating ... A 69 N 2
- Meaning of ... S 2 Cl 2 N 1; A 69 N 1
- Not payable on demand—When falls due ... A 69 N 2
- Payable, a stated number of days or months after date or sight—
 - Mode of calculating maturity ... A 72 N 1
- Payable after demand—Meaning of ... A 72 N 1

Bill of exchange—(Contd.)

—Payable after sight

- (a) Meaning of A 70 N 2, A 72 N 1
 (b) Methods of presentation A 70 N 2
 (c) Suit on—Limitation A 70

—Payable at fixed time

- (a) Evidence of contract fixing period of payment, whether admissible in cases where bill is silent on the point ... A 69 N 3
 (b) Suit on—Limitation A 69
 (c) Where bill fixes a date, evidence showing that terms of contract are different, whether admissible ... A 69 N 3

—Payable at fixed time after date—Stipulation as to period of payment—Whether must be embodied in the bill itself to constitute bill of exchange payable at fixed time A 69 N 3

—Payable at fixed time after demand—Suit on—Limitation—Starting point A 72, A 72 N 1

—Payable at fixed time after sight—Suit upon—Limitation— A 73

—Payable at particular place—Suit on—Limitation A 71; A 71 N 1

—Payable at sight

- (a) Limitation—Art. 70 and Art. 73 distinguished ... A 70 N 1
 (b) Meaning of A 70 N 1
 (c) Suit on—Limitation A 70

—Payable at two places—Whether can be presented at either place : A 71 N 1

—Payable on demand

- A 73 N 4
 A 73
 A 73 N 5
 A 73 N 1
 A 73 N 3

will not be made for certain

- (g) Oral agreement to postpone date of payment—Limitation ... A 73 N 4
 (h) Suit on—Limitation—Art. 73 and Art. 70 distinguished ... A 73 N 3
 (i) What is

(i) Bill of exchange in which no time is fixed, whether bill of exchange payable on demand ... A 73 N 3

(ii) Bill of exchange payable at sight, whether bill of exchange payable on demand ... A 73 N 3

—Suit based on—Limitation A 69 N 1

—Suit on

- (a) Bill of exchange never presented for acceptance but only for payment—Limitation A 78 N 1
 (b) Illustrative cases governed by Art. 80 A 80 N 1
 (c) Limitation—Residuary provision of A 80; A 80 N 1
 (d) Limitation—Starting point A 69 N 2
 (e) Summary suit—Limitation A 69 N 1
 (f) Whether can be instituted as summary suit A 69 N 1
 (f) Whether can be instituted as summary suit A 54 N 1

—Whether includes hundi

Bombay District Municipal Act

—S. 167—Suit by Secretary of State against Municipality for damages—Limitation applicable... .. S 29 N 3

Bombay District Municipal Act—(Contd.)

- S. 167—Whether expressly excludes applicability of S. 15 of Act in respect of suit against municipality S 29 N 4

Bombay Rent Act

- Payment of premium by tenant to landlord prohibited under—
Claim for refund of premium paid—Limitation A 120 N 2

Bond

- Administration bond
- (a) Bond to the effect that administrator would file inventories at certain periods and would administer assets of deceased person—Death of administrator without performing these conditions—Suit to enforce such bond—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 16
 - (b) Suit by assignee of administration bond—Limitation A 68 N 2
 - (c) Suit on—Limitation—Cases governed by residuary Art. 120 : A 120 N 16
- Bond by Hindu bearing native date only, for repayment of money within one year — Suit on bond — Limitation, how to be computed S 25
- Bond payable on demand—Suit on—Limitation A 67 N 2
- Conditional bond
- (a) Meaning of A 68 N 1
 - (b) Suit on—Limitation—Starting point A 68; A 68 N 3
 - (c) Suit on administration bond by assignee of bond — Limitation A 68 N 2
 - (d) What is
 - (i) Administration bond, whether conditional bond within Art. 68 A 68 N 1
 - (ii) Bond executed by custodian of attached property under Civil P. C, O. 21, R. 43, whether conditional bond A 68 N 1
 - (iii) Bond executed by surety under Guardians and Wards Act, whether conditional bond A 68 N 1
 - (iv) Bond given by grantee of succession certificate under Indian Succession Act, whether conditional bond A 68 N 1
 - (v) Bond which stipulates that money due under should be paid before payment of another bond, whether conditional bond A 68 N 1
 - (vi) Mortgage bond providing for immediate payment of principal and interest in default of regular payment of interest, whether conditional bond A 68 N 1
- Definition of—If exhaustive S 2 Cl 3 N 1
- Hypothecation bond—Interest upon—Whether allowable A 68 N 1
- Indemnity bond—Suit on—Indemnity bond being one indemnifying plaintiff against fraud of third party does not make suit one for relief on ground of fraud A 95 N 4
- Instalment bond
- (a) Condition that debtor will pay a certain sum of money monthly and that if five consecutive instalments are not paid creditor might call for payment of whole amount—Non-payment of instalments, if a constantly recurring cause of action S 23 N 19
 - (b) Creditor, if can prove that payment was made for his debt to show that he had waived default of instalments S 20 N 21

Bond—Instalment bond—(Contd.)

- (c) Evidence to show that certain instalments were paid and creditor waived default—Admissibility of ... S 20 N 36
- (d) Registered bond—Suit on—Limitation ... A 74 N 3
- (e) Suit for second instalment under the impression that first instalment was time-barred—Plaint returned for presentation through proper Court—Plaintiff including first instalment also in re-presenting plaint—Second suit, if saved by first suit in respect of first instalment ... S 14 N 18
- (f) Suit on
 - (i) Art. 74 and Art. 75 distinguished ... A 74 N 2
 - (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 74; A 74 N 2, A 116 N 7
 - (iii) No default clause—Limitation ... A 75 N 5
 - (iv) Special and general provisions of limitation ... A 75 N 2
- (g) What is ... A 75 N 4
- (h) With a default clause
 - (i) Application for execution of decree payable by instalments—Limitation ... A 75 N 3
 - (ii) Bond containing not only a default clause but obligee also having option to demand payment
 - (a) Limitation—English law ... A 75 N 8
 - (b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 75 N 8
 - (iii) Bond creating charge on immovable property
 - (a) Suit to enforce charge—Limitation ... A 75 N 21
 - (b) Suit to enforce personal remedy under bond—Limitation—Where bond is registered ... A 75 N 21
 - (iv) 'Default clause,' if penalty within Contract Act, S. 74: ... A 75 N 19
 - (v) "Default", what amounts to within Art. 75 ... A 75 N 6
 - (vi) Demand of overdue instalment, whether waiver of default clause so as to start time running from fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver ... A 75 N 12
 - (vii) Limitation—Starting point—Burden of proof as to waiver of default clause which postpones starting point to fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver ... A 75 N 16
 - (viii) Overdue instalment—Demand of—Whether waiver of default clause within Art. 75 ... A 75 N 12
 - (ix) Part payment of instalment or payment generally towards account, whether waiver of default clause so as to start time running from fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver ... A 75 N 13
 - (x) Payment of certain instalments made and accepted by creditor—Time, when begins to run ... S 20 N 36
 - (xi) Registered bond—Suit on—Limitation—Starting point: ... A 75 N 20
 - (xii) Suit on
 - (a) Bond containing not only a default clause but where obligee has also option to demand payment—Limitation ... A 75 N 8
 - (b) Default clause and default taking place—Waiver of default—No fresh default—Limitation ... A 75 N 7
 - (c) Default clause but no default taking place—Limitation ... A 75 N 6
 - (d) Essentials of, applicability of Art. 75 ... A 75 N 3
 - (e) Limitation—Art. 75 and S. 20 ... A 75 N 22

Bond—Instalment bond—With a default clause—Suit on—(Contd.)

- (f) Limitation—Starting point ... A 75, A 75 N 10
 (g) On default, whole amount payable on demand—
 Limitation—Starting point ... A 75 N 9
 (h) Provision of, in Punjab Loans Limitation Act ... A 75 N 22
 (xiii) Suit on verbal contract under which money is pay-
 able in instalments—Limitation ... A 75 N 3
 (xiv) Surety for—Suit against—Limitation—Starting point ... A 75 N 14
 (xv) Waiver of default
 (a) What constitutes, so as to start time running from
 fresh default in respect of which there is no
 waiver ... A 75 N 11
 (b) Whether bars suit on second default ... A 75 N 18
 (c) Whether can be gathered from pleadings ... A 75 N 17

—Meaning of ... S 2 C 13

- (a) Bond and acknowledgment of liability—Distinction between: S 2 C 13 N 4
 (b) Bond and agreements to do specified acts—Distinction
 between ... S 2 C 13 N 2
 (c) Bond and promissory note—Distinction between ... S 2 C 12 N 3
 (d) Stamp Act, definition of bond in ... S 2 C 13 N 1, 2

—Money advanced under—Money advanced for goods to be delivered
—Goods not delivered—Suit for money so advanced—Limitation: A 51 N 1—Mortgage bond—Mortgage bond in benamidar's name—Money due
upon—Money received by benamidar—Suit for, by real owner—
Limitation ... A 62 N 24

—Registered bond—Suit on—Limitation ... A 66 N 4; A 67 N 3; A 80 N 1

—Security bond

- (a) Executed by guardian—Suit to recover moneys out of pro-
 perties given as security by guardian—Limitation: A 132 N 8, F N 2
 (b) Money charged under—Suit for—Limitation ... A 132 N 8
 (c) Suit upon—Limitation ... A 67 N 4

—Simple bond—Simple bond registered—Money lent and due upon
—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation applicable, whether same as
applicable to suit for compensation for breach of registered con-
tract ... A 116 N 7

—Single bond

- (a) Bond specifying day of payment—What is—Limitation: A 66; A 66 N 3
 (b) Meaning of ... A 66 N 2
 (c) Suit on ... A 66 N 5

A 67 N 2

- where no date is specified for payment—Limitation: A 67 N 2
 (iv) Suit on single bond providing for immediate payment
 of principal and interest on default of regular pay-
 ment of interest—Limitation ... A 68 N 1
 (v) Where no day is specified for payment—Limitation—
 Starting point ... A 67; A 67 N 2, A 67 N 5
 (vi) Whole amount of bond is to become due on default of
 regular payment of interest—Limitation—Starting
 point ... A 66 N 3

Bond—(Contd.)**—Suit on**

- (a) Bond providing for repayment either on demand or on expiration of stipulated period, whichever is earlier—Limitation ... A 80 N 1
- ... on future date on happening ... A 80 N 1
- ... under obligation pays certain sum before certain date, bond would become void—Limitation ... A 80 N 1, F N 7
- (d) Bond providing that money due upon it would be paid at the time of payment of money due on two prior mortgage deeds—Limitation ... A 80 N 1
- (e) Bond with default clause and also an option on creditor's part to claim full payment—Limitation ... A 80 N 1
- (f) Bond with stipulation that whole amount of bond shall be payable on default of payment of interest—Limitation ... A 80 N 1
- (g) Limitation
- (i) Residuary provision of ... A 80; A 80 N 1
- (ii) Starting point—Cases governed by residuary Art. 80... A 80 N 1; A 80 N 2
- (h) Where relief claimed is enforcement of lien against property—Limitation ... A 80 N 1
- Suit to recover—Bond lost or acquired by theft or dishonest misappropriation or conversion—Whether suit on ground of fraud ... A 95 N 4
- Surety bond—Enforcement of—Execution application for—Application under Civil P. C., O. 21, R. 43—Limitation ... A 85 N 1

Book debt

- Attachment of—Suit for recovery thereof, if barred by attachment ... S 15 N 12
- Decree-holder attaching book-debt due to judgment-debtor and purchasing it in court auction—Subsequent suit to recover book-debt—Whether on same cause of action as the attachment ... S 14 N 18

British India

- Absence from, of defendant—Suspension of limitation ... S 9 N 3
- If includes Aden ... S 1 N 1
- If includes British Burma ... S 1 N 1
- If includes Civil Stations and Cantonment areas ... S 1 N 1
- If includes Native States of India ... S 1 N 1
- If includes Scheduled Districts ... S 1 N 1
- If includes Singapore ... S 1 N 1
- If includes the Laccadive Islands ... S 1 N 1
- Meaning of ... S 1 N 1

Buddhist Law

- Religions or charitable endowment—Property comprised in—Whether property vested in trust for specific purpose... S 10

Burden of proof

- Acknowledgment by agent—Onus of proof that person by whom acknowledgment has been made on behalf of another was duly authorized to do so is on plaintiff ... S 19 N 50

C. P. Land Revenue Act

- Section 60 (4) (1)—Suit under—Legal disability—Extension on ground of—If available ... S 6 N 20 F N 2
- Section 83—Suit under—Limitation ... A 120 N 50
- Section 160
 - (a) Suit for recovery of share of proprietary profits by minor plaintiff—Extension on ground of minority, if available ... S 6 N 20 F N 3
 - (b) Suit for share of village profits by minor plaintiff—S. 6, Limitation Act, applies ... S 29 N 5

C. P. Tenancy Act

- Cases arising under—S. 28, Limitation Act, if applies ... S 28 N 3
- Suit for rent — Based on registered lease deed — Limitation — Whether special period of limitation under Central Provinces Tenancy Act overrides provisions of Limitation Act for suit for compensation for breach of registered contract ... A 116 N 8

Certificate

- Sale certificate : *See under Sale*

Certification

- Under O. 21 R. 2, Civil P. C., by decree-holder—Limitation ... A 181 N 18
- Under O. 21 R. 2, sub-1, Civil P. C.
 - (a) Limitation ... A 174 N 3
 - (b) Whether application within Art. 181 ... A 174 N 3

Cess

- Kattubadi cess payable by holder of Darmilla inam — Whether rent ... A 110 N 2
- Road cess payable to zamindars by holder of service of inam under him subject to such payment—Whether rent ... A 110 N 2
- Road cess under Madras Local Boards Act—Arrears of — Interest of defaulter sold for—Remedy of incumbrancer ... A 12 N 8
- Suit against Government for recovery of cess paid under protest in respect of a certain year—Suit dismissed in trial Court but decreed in Appellate Court — Circumstances, if bring about cancellation and revival of plaintiff's cause of action for similar suit against Government in respect of cess paid for a subsequent year: S 9 N 11
- Suit for recovery of cess from intermediate landholders under S. 88, Madras Local Boards Act—Limitation ... A 120 N 43

Charge

- "Charged upon immovable property" — "Charged" meaning of in Art. 132 ... A 132 N 3
- Created on shares of other co-mortgagors by one co-mortgagor paying off mortgage—Enforcement of — Suit for — Limitation—Starting point ... A 132 N 10
- Enforcement of—Suit for—Legacy charged upon property—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for legacy ... A 123 N 9
- Interest charged upon immovable property—Suit for—Limitation: A 63 N 4
- On immovable property
 - (a) Created by award—Enforcement of—Suit for — Limitation : A 132 N 6
 - (b) Created by decree—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation : A 132 N 5
 - (c) Created by instalment bond with default clause — Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 75 N 21

Charge—On immovable property—(Contd.)

(d) Enforcement of — Suit for — By principal against agent —				
Limitation	A 89 N 2
(e) Interest due on contract of mortgage, whether charge on				
immovable property	A 133 N 13
(f) Suit to enforce indemnity charged upon immovable property				
—Limitation	A 83 N 6
—On property created by payment on behalf of defendant — Suit				
for money paid—Limitation	A 61 N 17
—Suit to enforce hypothecation of property to secure payment of				
grain—Limitation	A 120 N 2, F N 2

Cheque

—Meaning of	S 2, Cl 2 N 1
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Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act

—Suit under—S. 15, Limitation Act, applies	S 29 N 3
--------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	----------

Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act

—Record of Rights under—Entry in—Incorrectness of—Declaration				
of—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 50

Civil Court

—Mamlatdar's Court, whether Civil Court	A 13 N 3
—Receiver, whether Court	A 13 N 4

Civil Procedure Code (5 of 1908)

—Appeal to District Court — Limitation — Starting point :	A 152; A 153 N 2.
	A 152 N 3, A 153 N 6

—Appeal to High Court

(a) Applicability of Art. 151, Art. 153 and Art. 156	...	A 156 N 2
(b) From decree		
(i) Amendment of decree, whether gives fresh starting		
point for such appeal	...	A 156 N 8
(ii) Where decree is reviewed—Limitation—Starting point:	...	A 156 N 9
(iii) Where ex parte decree is set aside by trial Court but		
restored by High Court—Limitation—Starting point:	...	A 156 N 11
(iv) Where the party against whom decree is passed dies —		
Limitation—Starting point	...	A 156 N 10
(v) Where there are several decrees in same suit—Limita-		
tion—Starting point	...	A 156 N 7
(c) From order — Where judgment is given but order is not		
drawn up—Limitation—Starting point	...	A 156 N 6
(d) From order of Subordinate Court refusing leave to appeal to		
Privy Council—Provision for such appeal—Limitation: A 153; A 153 N 1		
(e) Limitation—Starting point	...	A 156; A 156 N 5
(f) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 4, Limitation Act	...	A 156 N 12

—Appeal under

(a) Limitation—Art. 151, Art. 152 and Art. 156, distinguished :	A 152 N 2
(b) "Under Civil Procedure Code"—Meaning of	...
	A 156 N 3; A 160 N 3

—Application for order to restore application for review dismissed for default

(a) Limitation—Starting point	A 160; A 160 N 2
(b) Time for such application, whether can be extended by			
Court	A 160 N 2

Civil Pro. Code—(Contd.)

- If interprets Limitation Act Preamble N 18
- Order under — To restore application for review dismissed for default—Provision for A 160 N 1
- Summary suit—Application for leave to appear and defend
 - (a) Applicability of Art. 159, Limitation Act, and Rangoon Small Cause Court Rules, Rule 101 A 159 N 4
 - (b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 159; A 159 N 1, A 159 N 3
- Summary suit under — Appearance and defence in — Leave for—Application for
 - (a) Chamber Judge, whether invested with discretion to extend time in cases not governed by O. 37, Civil P. C. ... A 159 N 2
 - (b) Time, whether can be extended by virtue of Sec. 5, Limitation Act ... A 159 N 2
 - (c) Time, whether can be extended under S. 148, Civil P. C. ... A 159 N 2
- Whether a general law S 29 N 6
- Section 47—Order in execution proceedings—Case falling under S. 47—Remedy of person against whom order is passed is by way of appeal and not by suit—Art. 11-A not applicable ... A 11-A N
- Section 48
 - (a) Fraud referred to therein — Whether same as fraud referred to in S. 18, Limitation Act ... S 18 N 15
 - (b) Period fixed by — Whether "prescribed period" within Limitation Act ... S 15 N 3
 - (c) Period of 12 years—Whether "period prescribed" within the meaning of Limitation Act ... S 29 N 6
 - (d) Period of 12 years fixed under—Whether can be extended on ground of minority or other disability of decree-holder : ... S 8 N 21
 - (e) Period of 12 years referred to in S. 48—Whether period of limitation prescribed ... S 14 N 9
 - (f) Period of 12 years under—Whether period prescribed within S. 19, Limitation Act ... S 19 N 15
 - (g) Period under—Whether prescribed period within the meaning of S. 20 ... S 20 N 10
 - (h) Time fixed by—Whether can be regarded as time limited for instituting a suit or making an application within Section 18, Limitation Act ... S 18 N 15
- S. 73 sub-s. 2—Suit for refund of money wrongly paid to defendant by executing Court engaged in rateable distribution of assets of judgment-debtor—Limitation ... A 62 N 26
- S. 86—Time taken in obtaining permission of Government for suing Native Prince—Whether can be deducted in computing limitation for suit ... S 3 N 3
- S. 92—Suit under—Whether abates ... A 171 N 2
- S. 109—"Final order"—Order extending time and admitting appeal—If final order ... S 5 N 45
- S. 109 (a)—Order "passed on appeal"—Order dismissing appeal as barred after refusing to extend time—If order "passed on appeal" ... S 5 N 45
- S. 151—Whether can be invoked to obtain extension of limitation ... S 3 N 3
- O. 9 R. 13 —Application under—Whether suit ... S 2 Cl 10 N 1
- O. 9 R. 13 read with S. 141—Application under—Limitation ... A 164 N 2

Civil Pro. Code—(Contd.)

- O 21 R. 2 (2)—Application under—By judgment-debtor—Limitation ... A 174 ; A 174 N 2
- O. 21 R. 92—Period fixed under—Whether can be extended on ground of legal disability ... S 6 N 20 FN 5
- O. 21 R. 95—Suit by person against whom order passed—Art. 11-A not applicable ... A 11-A N 8
- O 21 Rr. 98, 99, 101
- (a) Court declining to pass order—Suit by aggrieved person—Art. 11-A not applicable ... A 11-A N 6
- (b) Nature of order contemplated by ... A 11-A N 8
- (c) Suit against order passed without jurisdiction—Art. 11-A not applicable ... A 11-A N 7
- (d) Suit by person against whom order passed under—Limitation: A 11-A N 9
- O 21 R. 99—Scope of—Purchaser in court-auction, of share of co-owner applying for actual possession—Application dismissed—Order is one under R. 99 ... A 11-A N 8
- O. 21 Rr. 99, 103—Investigation made on application not by party but *suo motu* by Court—Suit by person against whom order passed—Art. 11-A not applicable ... A 11-A N 8
- O. 21 R. 100
- (a) Application complaining dispossession
- (i) By person dispossessed of immovable property—Limitation—Starting point ... A 165 ; A 165 N 5
- (ii) By person dispossessed of immovable property in execution sale—Time, whether extended on ground that Court is closed on last day of limitation ... A 165 N 5
- (b) Remedy provided by—Nature of ... A 165 N 2
- O 21 Rr. 100, 103—Order against manager of joint Hindu family operates against other members also—Manager not availing of remedy under R. 103 within limitation—Right of other members is also barred ... A 11-A N 4
- O. 21 R. 101—Order dismissing application under R. 100 is order under R. 101 ... A 11-A N 8
- O. 21 R 103
- (a) Nature of suit contemplated by ... A 11-A N 9
- (b) "Present possession"—Proof of ... A 11-A N 9
- (c) Suit not falling under—Art. 11-A not applicable : A 11-A N 2; A 11-A N 8
- (d) Suit under
- (i) Art 11-A applies only to suit against person in whose favour order is made ... A 11-A N 5
- (ii) Limitation ... A 11-A; 11-A N 9
- (a) Revision against order dismissed—Subsequent suit—Period of revision proceedings may be excluded... A 11-A N 11
- (b) Starting point ... A 11-A N 11
- (i) Revision against order dismissed—Time starts from date of order and not from date of order in revision ... A 11-A N 11
- (ii) Only person against whom order is passed is bound to sue within one year of order ... A 11-A N

Civil Pro. Code—O. 21 R. 103—Suit under—(Contd.)

- (iv) Person against whom order passed benamidar of another—Suit by benamidar within time—Real person impleaded after one year of order—Suit is not barred ... A 11-A N 4
 - (v) Person in whose favour order is passed is not bound to sue within one year ... A 11-A N 4
 - (vi) Reason for short period of limitation ... A 11-A N 2
 - (vii) Right of suit given to decree-holder or third party but not to judgment-debtor ... A 11-A N 4
 - (viii) Right to "present possession"—Meaning of ... A 11-A N 9
 - (ix) Right to present possession claimed only as consequential relief—Art. 11-A not applicable ... A 11-A N 9
 - (x) Suit by plaintiff not in his character as auction-purchaser—Art. 11-A not applicable ... A 11-A N 9
 - (xi) Suit not brought within one year—Effect ... A 11-A N 10
- Sch. II, Para. 20—Application under—Whether suit ... S 2, Cl 10 N 1

Civil rights

—Exclusion from—Suit for compensation—Limitation ... A 24 N 1

Claim

—Claimant—Lessor whether claimant of lessee ... A 47 N 4

—Order as to claim to property attached in execution of decree—Suit by person against whom order passed : *See under Attachment*

—Person when can be said to claim under another ... A 47 N 4

Claim suit

—Adverse order in—What is ... A 11 N 4

—Claim by Official Receiver after attachment before judgment of insolvent's property—Suit by receiver to set aside order on such claim—Limitation ... A 120 N 6

—Claim suit not governed by Art. 11 or Art. 13—Limitation ... A 120 N 6

—Claim to property attached—Withdrawal of attachment prior to enquiry into claim or objection—Effect of ... A 11 N 7

Order in

(a) Judgment-debtor, when bound by such order ... A 11 N 4

(b) Person against whom there is such an order—Who is ... A 11 N 4

—Order under Civil P. C., disallowing claim—Withdrawal or removal of attachment subsequent to order disallowing claim—Effect of ... A 11 N 6

—Order under Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, S. 28, disallowing claim—Withdrawal or removal of attachment, subsequent to order disallowing claim—Effect of ... A 11 N 6

—Suit on behalf of minor under Court of Wards—Suit without necessary sanction—Order in such suit, whether binding on minor: ... A 11 N 5

Club

—Suit by or against—Necessary parties ... S 22 N 21

Co-debtors

—One debtor authorizing the other to make payment on behalf of both—Payment made by the other—It does not matter that money paid does not belong to the former but belongs to the latter ... S 20 N 12

Company—(Contd.)

- Director under positive duty to pass true accounts to be kept by his agents—His negligent failure to do so—Whether a continuing wrong S 23 N 11
- Directors
 - (a) Application under S. 235, Companies Act, for compensation for misfeasance of directors—S 24, if applies S 24 N 1
 - (b) Omission of directors to come to any conclusion on important piece of business duly proposed for decision of Board—Whether amounts to a continuing breach S 23 N 11
 - (c) Whether trustees of the property of the company S 10 N 9
- Liquidator of — Suit by—In respect of unpaid calls — Limitation A 120 N 30
- Suit for converting assets of company into cash and return of subscriptions—Limitation A 62 N 7
 - assets of company for payment of his debts, where company is wound up—Suit for—Limitation A 112 N 2
 - (c) Call in respect of share-holder's liability under special contract for amounts which are due and owing at the time of forfeiture of his shares—Limitation A 112 N 2
 - (d) Suit by liquidator against share-holder for recovery of money due in respect of certain calls of shares not fully paid up—Limitation—Starting point A 115 N 3
- Share-holders—Company, if holds dividends declared on shares in trust for share-holders S 10 N 11
- Suit against company which is being wound up — Date of institution of—What is S 3 N 13
- Suit against company which is being wound up by Court — Suit, when to be deemed to be instituted S 3 N 4
- Compensation**
 - And damages, distinguished A 116 N 6
 - Awarded under Land Acquisition Act — Suit by mortgagor against usufructuary mortgagee A 120 N 9
 - For breach of contract
 - (a) By principal against agent to recover moveable property received by agent and not accounted for where there is express agreement to account—Limitation A 89 N 3
 - (b) By vendor against vendee for vendee's failure to pay vendor's debt as contracted and for which purchase money has been left in vendee's hand — Limitation A 83 N 7
 - A 65 N 1
 - A 65 N 4
 - A 65 N 4
 - point A 65 N 3
 - (g) Contract to deliver goods—Limitation A 51 N 1
 - (h) For breach of promise to do anything at specified time — Limitation—Illustrative cases governed by Art. 65 A 65 N 1

Compensation—For breach of contract—(Contd.)

- (i) For inducing breach—Limitation A 27
- (j) In respect of contract performable on demand—Limitation—Starting point ... A 65 N 2; A 65 N 3
- (k) Suit for—Whether one for specific performance of contract ... A 113 N 2
- For breach of covenant for title or for quiet enjoyment contained in deed of transfer ... A 62 N 5
- For breach of implied contract—Suits for—What are—Illustrative cases ... A 115 N 4
- For breach of promise
 - (a) Art. 115 and Art. 65 distinguished... A 65 N 1
 - (b) Execution application under Civil P. C., O. 21 R. 43, to enforce surety bond—Limitation... A 65 N 1
 - (c) Limitation—Illustrative cases governed by Art. 65 ... A 65 N 1
 - (d) Suit for—Limitation ... A 65
- Fc ... A 116 N 1
 - ... years after the expiry of the term fixed for payment in a mortgage deed which contains no stipulation for payment of *post diem* interest ... A 116 N 23
 - (c) Claim for personal decree in suit to enforce vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money ... A 116 N 23
 - (d) Claim for personal decree under O. 34. R. 6, Civil P. C.—Limitation ... A 116 N 19, A 116 N 20
 - (e) Limitation ... A 65 N 3; A 116 N 1
 - (f) Registered document of redemption—Clause in document whereby executant undertakes to put opposite party in possession—Default of such clause—Suit for refund of money paid under such registered document of redemption ... A 116 N 24
 - (g) "Registered"—Meaning of ... A 116 N 5
 - (h) Special Art. 116, whether prevails over any other Article under which suit may fall ... A 116 N 1
 - (i) Suit based upon award, where agreement to refer to arbitration has been registered and award is signed by parties ... A 116 N 14
 - (j) Suit based upon breach of covenants in registered sale deeds—Limitation—Starting point ... A 116 N 15
 - (k) Suit by lessee for compensation for breach of express or implied term in lease deed to put lessee in possession of properties leased ... A 116 N 10
 - (l) Suit by mortgagor against mortgagee for compensation for failure to pay prior mortgagee as undertaken in mortgage deed—Limitation—Starting point ... A 116 N 22
 - (m) Suit by mortgagor against usufructuary mortgagee for compensation for sale of portion of mortgaged properties for arrears of revenue as a result of default of mortgagee who was bound, under mortgage deed to pay Government revenue—Limitation—Starting point ... A 116 N 22
 - (n) Suit by mortgagor against usufructuary mortgagee for recovery of mortgage money ... A 116 N 22
 - (o) Suit by usufructuary mortgagee for mesne profits during period he was kept out of possession ... A 116 N 22

Compensation—For breach of registered contract—(Contd.)

- (p) Suit by usufructuary mortgagee for refund of money advanced on mortgage on ground that property was already mortgaged with possession ... A 116 N 22
- (q) Suit by vendee for breach of covenant to put him in possession—Limitation ... A 116 N 16
- (r) Suit by vendee for breach of express or implied covenant of title in sale deed ... A 116 N 15
- (s) Suit by vendor for *peishkush* paid by him after execution of sale deed under which vendee is bound to pay the same ... A 116 N 15
- (t) Suit by vendor against vendee for compensation for vendee's failure to pay vendor's debts as undertaken in sale deed—Limitation—Starting point ... A 116 N 15
- (u) Suit for account based upon registered contract of agency ... A 116 N 12
- (v) Suit for accounts by principal against agent—Suit arising on registered contract of agency ... A 116 N 1
- (w) Suit for accounts by principal against agent on registered agreement to account—Limitation ... A 89 N 4
- (x) Suit for accounts of partnership where deed of partnership is registered ... A 116 N 11
- (y) Suit for mortgage money by usufructuary mortgagee on breach of covenant in mortgage deed for delivery of possession—Limitation ... A 116 N 22
- (z) Suit for mortgage money by usufructuary mortgagee on ground that he was subsequently dispossessed by third person by virtue of superior title created by mortgagor—Limitation ... A 116 N 22
- (z¹) Suit for possession of immovable property founded on breach of contract in writing registered ... A 116 N 1
- (z²) Suit for profits on registered agreement ... A 116 N 6
- (z³) Suit for purchase money by vendor, who had previously refused it before sub-registrar before whom it was tendered by vendee in accordance with covenant in sale deed ... A 116 N 1
- (z⁴) Suit for recovery of arrears of allowance payable annually under registered *ekrarnama* ... A 116 N 24
- (z⁵) Suit for recovery of dower under registered deed—Limitation—Starting point—Where suit is by heirs of wife ... A 116 N 13
- (z⁶) Suit for recovery of money on simple bond registered ... A 116 N 7
- (z⁷) Suit for recovery of royalty under registered deed—Limitation ... A 116 N 9
- (z⁸) Suit for refund of mortgage money by mortgagee on ground that he has been defrauded by defendant and made to enter into mortgage transaction ... A 116 N 1
- (z⁹) Suit for rent against tenant holding over after expiry of registered lease deed, for period of holding over ... A 116 N 8
- (z¹⁰) Suit for share of profits in lands collected by defendant and to which plaintiff is entitled by virtue of registered agreement ... A 116 N 8
- (z¹¹) Suit for simple money decree on covenant to pay contained in mortgage deed executed by manager or father of joint Hindu family where mortgage is not binding on interest of sons or junior members—Limitation ... A 116 N 19
- (z¹²) Suit founded on breach of statutory obligation ... A 116 N 1
- (z¹³) Suit founded upon tort ... A 116 N 1

Compensation—For breach of registered contract—(Contd.)

- (z¹⁴) Suit on contract, part of which only is in writing and registered ... A 116 N 3
- (z¹⁵) Suit on contract signed by one party only—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for compensation for breach of registered contract ... A 116 N 3
- (z¹⁶) Suit to enforce charge against property by sale thereof, such relief being founded upon breach of contract in writing registered... A 116 N 1
- (z¹⁷) Suit to enforce mortgage executed to secure loan in kind ... A 116 N 2
- (z¹⁸) Suit to enforce personal relief in mortgage deed not validly registered ... A 116 N 2
- (z¹⁹) Suit to enforce personal remedy arising under registered mortgage deed ... A 116 N 19
- (z²⁰) Suit to recover Government and under-proprietary rent payable by transferee under registered maintenance deed to transferor... A 116 N 24
- (z²¹) Suit upon covenant of indemnity contained in registered deed of exchange ... A 116 N 18
- (z²²) Suit, whether lies by third party to contract ... A 116 N 2
- (z²³) Vendor and vendee—Vendee undertaking to pay mortgage debt of vendor—Stipulation to return to vendor surplus after payment to mortgagee—Suit by vendor for such surplus—Limitation ... A 116 N 15
- (z²⁴) Whether restricted to claim for unliquidated damages or includes also claim for sum certain, in Art. 116 ... A 116 N 6

—For breach of unregistered contract

- (a) Amount of damages payable by parties fixed even in advance before date fixed for performance ... A 115 N 16
- (b) Applicability of Art. 115—Essentials of ... A 115 N 1
- (c) Art. 116 and Art. 115, difference between ... A 115 N 1
- (d) Benamidar—Agreement to collect money for plaintiff—Suit on such agreement, whether based on contract within Art. 115 ... A 115 N 1
- (e) Breach of contract, continuing one... A 115 N 16
- (f) Cases governed by Art. 115—Illustrative cases... A 115 N 15
- (g) Contract to be performed at future date and no time fixed for performance either expressly or by necessary implication ... A 115 N 16
- (h) Date fixed for performance of contract ... A 115 N 16
- (i) Date for performance not fixed either expressly or by necessary implication, but intention of parties that there should be demand for performance of contract ... A 115 N 16
- (j) "Date of breach of contract"—Breach of contract, when occurs ... A 115 N 16
- (k) Limitation—Starting point ... A 115; A 115 N 16
- N 16; A 115 N 1
- paid ... A 115 N 16
- n for ... A 115 N 14
- interest, if sustainable... .. A 115 N 10
- (p) Suit against *del credere* agent for recovery of price of goods sold by him and not paid by purchasers ... A 115 N 10

Compensation—For breach of unregistered contract—(Contd.)

(q) Suit based on award signed by parties making the reference :	A 115 N 11
(r) Suit based on compromise decree, whether one for breach of contract between parties or for breach of terms imposed by decree of Court	A 115 N 12
(s) Suit based on tort	A 115 N 1
(t) Suit by co-sharer against other co-sharer for profits	A 115 N 1
(u) Suit by judgment-debtor for compensation against decree-holder for failure to certify payment made out of Court—Limitation—Starting point	A 115 N 6
(v) Suit for accounts on agreement still good and subsisting	A 115 N 1
(w) Suit for claim by share-holder for his dividend	A 115 N 1
(x) Suit for claim for use and occupation—Limitation	A 115 N 13
(y) Suit for commission by broker—Addition of prayer for account, whether alters its character as suit for compensation for breach of contract	A 115 N 9
(z) Suit for commission by broker—Whether one for compensation for breach of contract	A 115 N 9
(z ¹) Suit for compensation for wrongful dismissal from Government or municipal service—Limitation—Starting point	A 115 N 7
(z ²) Suit for recovery of <i>malikana</i> where plaintiff does not seek to enforce charge on land—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for compensation for breach of contract	A 115 N 5
(z ³) Suits for recovery of sum certain governed by Art. 115—Illustrations	A 115 N 3
(z ⁴) Suit on contract that is partly in writing which is registered actual loss on account of breach of contract	A 115 N 2 A 115 N 1
(z ⁵) Time, whether runs from plaintiff's knowledge of the breach of contract	A 116 N 16 A 116 N 16
—For depreciation of security—Limitation	A 132 N 11
—For diverting water-course—Limitation	A 38
—For doing or omitting to do act in pursuance of enactment—See under Act	
—For false imprisonment—Suit for—Limitation	A 19
—For inducing breach of contract	A 27
—For infringement of copyright	
(a) Suit for—Limitation—Starting point	A 40, A 40 N 5
(b) Suit for account of profits made by defendant by infringing copyright—Limitation	A 40 N 1
(c) Suit for injunction restraining defendant from making infringement	A 40 N 1
(d) Suit for injunction restraining defendant from making infringement—Suit, whether one for compensation for infringement within Art. 40	A 40 N 1
—For	P. C., and necessary
(b) Suit for—Limitation—Starting point	A 42; A 42 N 4
(c) Suit, when maintainable	A 42 N 2

Compensation—For injunction wrongfully obtained—(Contd.)

- (d) Suit, whether barred by omission to proceed under Civil P. C., Sec. 95 ... A 42 N
- (e) What constitutes "wrongfully obtaining" injunction ... A 42 N
- For injury to person
 - (a) Case falling both under Art. 32 and general Art. 36—Limitation ... A 22 N
 - (b) Limitation—Applicability of Art. 22 and Workmen's Compensation Act, S. 19 ... A 22 N
 - (c) Limitation—Residuary provision ... A 2
 - (d) Limitation—Starting point ... A 23 N
 - (e) Proceeding under Workmen's Compensation Act—Limitation ... A 22 N
 - (f) Suit by plaintiff against defendant for enticing away former's wife—Limitation ... A 22 N
- For injury to property—What is, within Art. 49 ... A 49 N
- For interest claimed as compensation—Limitation ... A 132 N
- For land acquired by Government
 - (a) Amount of compensation not determined—Limitation ... A 17 N
 - (b) Execution proceedings to enforce award by Court—Limitation ... A 17 N
 - (c) Remedy of person who accepts award of Collector in order to enforce it ... A 17 N
 - (d) Suit against third person who has received compensation money from Government which plaintiff claims—Limitation ... A 17 N
- For land acquired for public purposes—Limitation ... A 17; A 17 N
- For libel
 - See under Libel—Compensation for*
- For loss caused by defendant's obstructing plaintiff's right of fishery ... A 109 N
- For loss or injury to goods—Suit against carrier
 - See under Carrier*
- For loss resulting from misconduct of agent ... A 90 N
- For loss resulting from neglect of agent ... A 90 N
- For loss resulting from want of skill of agent ... A 90 N
- For malfeasance
 - (a) Applicability of general Art. 36 to cases falling under other specific Articles ... A 36 N
 - (b) Application under Indian Companies Act, S. 244—Limitation ... A 36 N
 - (c) Suit against trustee—Limitation ... A 36 N
 - (d) Suit for—Limitation
 - (i) Starting point ... A 36 N
 - (ii) Starting point in case of recurring cause of action : ... A 36 N
 - (iii) Starting point, whether modified in cases governed by S. 24, Limitation Act ... A 36 N
 - (e) Suit in respect of malfeasance independent of contract—Limitation ... A 36; A 36 N
 - (f) Suit in respect of malfeasance not independent of contract—Illustrative cases ... A 36 N
 - (g) Suit in respect of wrongs independent of contract—Illustrative cases within Art. 36 ... A 36 N

Compensation—(Contd)

- For malicious prosecution
 See under Malicious Prosecution—Compensation for.
- For misfeasance: *See* Misfeasance.
- For money had and received ... A 62 N 2
- For money paid in land acquisition proceedings—Plaintiff entitled to compensation money but defendant receiving it—Suit by plaintiff for money received by defendant—Limitation ... A 62 N 22
- For money paid upon existing consideration portion of which only afterwards fails—Suit, whether maintainable ... A 97 N 4
- For non-completion of land acquisition
 - (a) Suit for—Limitation ... A 18; A 18 N 1
 - (b) Suit for damages which could not be foreseen at the time of acquisition proceedings ... A 18 N 1
 - (c) Suit in respect of land vesting in Government but Collector refusing to make order for compensation—Limitation ... A 18 N 1
- For non-delivery of goods purchased and paid for—Cause of action, when arises—Refusal to pay compensation, if gives fresh cause of action ... S 9 N 9
- For non-feasance
 See Non-feasance—Compensation for
- For recovery of amount wrongfully taken by defendant from Government treasury under legal process ... A 29 N 6
- For recovery of compensation for breach of covenant for title or for quiet enjoyment ... A 62 N 5
- For recovery of difference between sum advanced on written contract for supply of goods and value of goods delivered—Limitation: ... A 62 N 5
- For recovery of specific property—Whether one for compensation: ... A 36 N 3
- For recovery of specific property seized ... A 29 N 6
- For return of moneys wrongfully levied by defendant, whether one for compensation ... A 2 N 6
- For return of octroi duty returnable under law—Whether comes under Art. 2 ... A 2 N 6
- For slander—Suit for ... A 25 N 1
- For trees wrongfully cut by mortgagee, whether one for collections made by mortgagee ... A 105 N 3
- For trespass
 See under Trespass
- For wrongful seizure of moveable property under legal process
 - Limitation—Art. 11 and Art. 29 distinguished ... A 11 N 10
- For wrongful taking or detaining specific moveable property—Limitation ... A 48
- For wrongful taking or injury or detention of moveable property
 - Meaning of ... A 49 N 5
- Meaning of ... A 116 N 6
- Meaning of, within Arts. 115 and 116 ... A 115 N 3
- Suit against carrier for non-delivery of goods ... A 115 N 1
- Suit against Government under Land Acquisition (Mines) Act ... A 120 N 9
- Suit by co-sharer for loss resulting from neglect and misconduct of lambardar—Limitation ... A 90 N 3
- Suit by vendee under S. 65, Contract Act ... A 116 N 17

Compensation—(Contd.)

- Suit by vendor against vendee for vendor's failure to pay vendee's debt as contracted and for which purchase money has been left in vendee's hand ... A 83 N 7
- Suit for—Whether one for money paid upon existing consideration which afterwards fails ... A 97 N 2
- Suit for compensation and suit for accounts—Distinguished ... A 116 N 1
- Suit for compensation which could not be foreseen at the time of land acquisition proceedings—Limitation ... A 18 N 1

Compromise

- Defendant undertaking to deliver certain quantity of grain to plaintiff yearly—Failure to pay each year, if gives rise to a fresh cause of action ... S 23 N 19

Computation of time

- Mentioned in instruments
 - (a) All instruments to be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian calendar ... S 25
 - (b) Bond by Hindu bearing native date only for repayment of money within one year—Limitation for suit on bond, how to be computed ... S 25
 - (c) Instrument fixing 30th of a native month for payment—Month containing only 29 days—Cause of action arises only on 1st of next month ... S 25 N 3
 - (d) Intention of parties that months should be reckoned in a particular manner—S. 25, if applies ... S 25 N 2
 - (e) Intention of parties to use a calendar other than Gregorian apparent clearly—Words month and year, if to be reckoned according to Gregorian calendar ... S 25 N 2
 - (f) Promissory note bearing native date only and payable four months after date—Limitation, how to be computed ... S 25
 - (g) Reckoning according to Gregorian calendar giving a larger period to plaintiff—Such reckoning if to be adopted ... S 25 N 2

Condition

- Breach of
 - (a) Forfeiture and breach of condition distinguished ... A 143 N 3
 - (b) Suit on ground of—For possession
 - (i) By landlord — Against alienee of tenant — Limitation ... A 143 N 2 ; A 143 N 5
 - (ii) By landlord — Against whom must the suit be for applicability of Art. 143 ... A 143 N 2
 - (iii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 143 ; A 143 N 2 ; A 143 N 14
 - (iv) Suit in tort for ejectment of tenant—Limitation ... A 143 N 2
 - (v) Suit under Bengal Tenancy Act, S. 155 for ejectment of tenant on ground of misuse of land—Limitation ... A 143 N 2
 - (vi) Suit under T. P. Act, S. 119—Limitation ... A 143 N 13

Condition subsequent

- Suit to enforce—Whether suit for specific performance of contract: A 113 N 4
- What is ... A 113 N 4

Conjugal rights

- Suit for restitution
 - (a) Cause of action, whether continuing one within Sec. 23, Limitation Act ... A 120 N 46
 - (b) Limitation... ... A 120 N 46

Consent decree

- For time-barred claim—Court, if entitled to raise question when claim is time-barred S 3 N 20

Consideration

- Existing consideration which afterwards fails—Suit for money paid—Limitation A 62 N 13
- Valuable consideration—*See under Valuable Consideration*
- Want of—Suit for setting aside document on ground of want of consideration—Limitation—Starting point A 91 N 20

Continuing breaches and wrongs

- Applicability of S. 23 to declaratory suits based on a continuing wrong S 23 N 4
- Breach of continuing guarantee—Whether a continuing breach of contract S 23 N 10
- Breach of contract to keep building in repair—Whether a continuing breach of contract so long as building is out of repair . . . S 23 N 5
- Breach of covenant for quiet possession—Whether a continuing wrong S 23 N 7
- Breach of covenant for title—Whether a continuing wrong . . . S 23 N 6
- Breach of obligation to give possession—Whether a continuing breach of contract S 23 N 9
- Closing of drain by defendant through which plaintiff is entitled to throw the water from his house—Whether a continuing wrong S 23 N 12
- Continuing breach—Whether implies the right of the person committing the breach to resume performance of the contract . . S 23 N 7
- Contract by one person with another to allow the latter to take forest produce for a certain period from certain forest—Breach of obligation to allow taking of produce—Whether a continuing breach of contract during the period fixed in the contract . . . S 23 N 11
- Contract for payment of money—Non-payment of money, if a continuing breach of contract S 23 N 8
- Failure on the part of lessee to plant certain trees within time fixed in the contract—Whether a continuing breach of contract S 23 N 11
- Fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of time during which the breach or wrong continues S 23
- Obstruction caused by closing the main sluice of a tank through which plaintiff takes his water to his lands—Whether a continuing wrong S 23 N 12
- Obstruction of passage in which plaintiff is entitled to discharge rain water of his house as well as water from his drains—Whether a continuing wrong S 23 N 12
- Obstruction to plaintiff's right to discharge surface water of plaintiff's land over defendant's land—Whether a continuing wrong S 23 N 12
- Obstruction to right of way—Whether a continuing wrong . . . S 23 N 13
- Obstruction to water-course and to flow of water—Whether a continuing wrong S 23 N 12
- Occupation for private residence of a *balakhana* over a mosque—Whether a desecration of a place of worship and a continuing wrong S 23 N 16

Continuing breaches and wrongs—(Contd.)

- Omission of directors of company to come to any conclusion on important piece of business duly proposed for decision of Board —Breach of duty, if a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 11
- Ouster from possession—Duty to give up possession to person ousted—Breach of duty, if a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 16
- Proceedings to which S. 23 applies ... S 23 N 4
- Procuring wrongful attachment under S. 146, Criminal P. C.—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 17
- Refusal of conjugal rights—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 15
- S. 23 will not apply unless there is a wrong and the wrong is a continuing one ... S 23 N 2
- Test to see if a breach is a continuing one ... S 23 N 7
- Trespass—Trespass amounting to complete ouster—Cause of action for suit for possession—Whether a continuing one ... S 23 N 16
- Violation of right of ferry by setting up another ferry — Whether a continuing wrong so long as latter ferry is allowed to remain ... S 23 N 14
- Withholding of moveable property wrongfully seized — Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 16
- Wrongful seizure of moveable property under legal process—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 16

Continuing wrong

- Causing of nuisance by throwing latrine water through a hole in the wall—Whether a continuing wrong... S 23 N 16
- Company director under positive duty to pass true accounts to be kept by his agents — His negligent failure to do so — Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 11
- Infringement of right giving a cause of action for a declaratory suit, if a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 4
- Instances—False imprisonment ... A 19 N 2
- Meaning of ... S 23 N 1
- (a) Continuance of the effect of wrong is not a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 3
- (b) Order prohibiting persons from taking processions along particular route until they get order from Civil Courts affirming their rights — Such persons trying to disobey order — Obstruction by defendant—Defendants, if commit continuing wrong ... S 23 N 2
- (c) Plaintiff's trap dashing against stones heaped on the roadway by defendant — Plaintiff's leg having to be amputated ultimately—Defendant's act, if a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 3
- One set of Jains placing impressions of footprints of saints on a sacred hill — Such placing constituting infringement of a right of another set of Jains—Wrong committed, if a continuing one ... S 23 N 16
- Order of injunction issued against a person restraining him from building a certain wall — Such person building up the wall in breach of order—Whether amounts to a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 16
- Person entitled under the law to a water connexion to his house from the municipal main pipe—Municipality cutting off the connexion — Whether a continuing wrong so long as connexion is withheld ... S 23 N 16
- Suit for declaration by Hindn reversinner — Test to see if S. 23 applies ... S 23 N 4

Continuing wrong—(Contd.)

- Test of applicability of S. 23 is not whether right or its corresponding obligation is a continuing one, but whether the wrong is a continuing one ... S 23 N 2
- Throwing sulphuric acid on another's face—Latter losing one of his eyes after some time—Former's act, if a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 3
- Trade-mark — Infringement of, is a continuing wrong so long as infringement continues ... S 23 N 18
- Wrong entry in village papers against the rights of the plaintiff — Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 18

Contract

- Acknowledgment under circumstances that would vitiate contract — Whether can be used under S. 19 ... S 19 N 69
- Breach of
 - (a) Applicability of S. 24 ... S 24 N 2
 - (b) By either party repudiating his liability and declining performance — Illustrative cases of such breaches ... A 115 N 16
 - (c) Compensation for—See Compensation—Breach of contract
 - (d) Inducing, whether actionable wrong ... A 27 N 1
 - (e) Person injured by—Remedies of ... A 113 N 2
 - (f) Suit by lessor against lessee for not paying portion of rent to superior landlord or to creditor of lessor as undertaken — Limitation ... A 115 N 3
 - (g) Suit in respect of breach of executory promise — Remedy of promisee—What is ... A 97 N 11
 - (h) Suit on—Limitation—Starting point—General rule ... A 109 N 2
 - (i) Suit to enforce payment under adjustment between lessor and lessee fixing certain amount due for rent and lessee undertaking to pay it to superior proprietor of lessor—Suit, whether one for rent or for breach of contract ... A 110 N 2
 - (j) Suit to recover amount payable by defendant for breach of agreement under which he was bound to pay share of produce annually—Limitation ... A 115 N 3
 - (k) Suit to recover difference between sum advanced on written contract for supply of goods and value of goods delivered — Limitation ... A 62 N 5
 - (l) When occurs ... A 115 N 16
- Breach of registered contract—Compensation for
See Compensation—Breach of registered contract
- Breach of unregistered contract
 - (a) Compensation for
See Compensation—Breach of unregistered contract
 - (b) Suit for—Limitation — Art. 115 and Art. 65 distinguished : ... A 65 N 1
- Contingent contract—Breach of—Suit for—Limitation — Starting point ... A 65 N 1
- Continuing breach of contract — Fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of time during which breach continues : ... S 23
- Contract for payment of money — Cause of action for suit, when arises ... S 23 N 8
- Contract for pro-emption — Whether subject to rule against perpetuity enacted in S. 14, T. P. Act ... A 10 N 5
- Contract for sale of immovable property — Whether gives rise to a trust ... S 10 N 11
- Contract in English using the word month—Interpretation of ... S 25 N 1

Contract—(Contd.)

- Contract of agency — Suit for accounts on ground of breach by principal against agent—Whether governed by residuary Art. 115: A 115 N 1
- Contract performable on demand — The words "on demand" whether by themselves make demand a term of contract ... A 65 N 2
- Contract to be performed at a specified future date — Breach of—
 Suit for—Limitation ... A 65 N 1
- Contract—What is—Award of arbitrators, whether contract ... A 115 N 11
- Enforcement of
 - (a) Suit for—Whether lies by third party to contract ... A 116 N 2
 - (b) Suit for recovery by purchaser of debt due by one party to another under contract—Limitation ... A 115 N 3
 - (c) Suit on contract embodying a promise to pay a time-barred debt—Limitation ... A 115 N 3
- Express promise to pay existing debt — Whether constitutes new contract ... S 19 N 8
- Guarantee—Continuing guarantee—Meaning of ... S 23 N 10
- If can override statute ... S 3 N 24
- Implied contract
 - (a) Breach of—Suits on—What are—Illustrative cases ... A 115 N 4
 - (b) Suit based on, for account of profits by proprietor against lambardar—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- Joint promisors—Liability of—Whether joint and several ... S 19 N 5
- Law governing, how determined ... S 11 N 1
- Meaning of ... A 113 N 2
- Meaning of, under Bengal Chauthdari Act ... A 113 N 3
- Money paid on
 - (a) Suit on ground of contract becoming void — Limitation —
 Starting point ... A 97 N 11a
 - (b) Suit on ground that agreement is discovered to be void—
 Limitation ... A 97 N 11a
- Obligation based on contract—Whether can give rise to a trust ... S 10 N 11
- Of indemnity—See under Indemnity.
- Party having successive causes of action under contract—Each cause of action, if gives fresh start to period of limitation ... S 23 N 19
- Promise to do something in consideration of the other party giving up his original right against promisor—Whether amounts to fresh contract giving rise to new cause of action ... S 19 N 8
- Promise to pay involved in acknowledgment of debt—Whether constitutes fresh contract and new cause of action ... S 19 N 8
- Promise which is implied only as matter of law or legal fiction—
 Whether contract ... A 83 N 2
- Registered contract
 - (a) Claim for dower embodied in registered contract — Limitation ... A 103 N 11
 - (b) Contract to pay dower debt under Mahomedan law—Suit on—
 Limitation ... A 104 N 1
 - (c) Statement of account in respect of money due upon—Suit filed upon original contract within six years thereof but beyond three years of statement of accounts—Suit, whether barred ... A 64 N 6
 - (d) Terms which law implies or reads as part of contract, whether can be excluded by express condition in contract ... A 116 N 4

Contract—Registered contract—(Contd)

- (e) What is—Mere attestation of deed before Kasee, whether amounts to registration within Art. 116 ... A 116 N 5
- (f) Whether includes all terms which law implies or reads as part of contract ... A 116 N 4

—Rescission of

- (a) Cases where rescission may be adjudged by the Court ... A 114 N 1
- (b) Suit by donor for recovery of gift property on failure of donee to fulfil certain conditions, whether one for rescission of contract ... A 114 N 1
- (c) Suit by person not party to instrument, for cancelling or setting it aside, whether suit for rescission of contract ... A 114 N 1
- (d) Suit by reversioner for recovery of property from alienee of widow, whether suit for rescission of contract ... A 114 N 1
- (e) Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ... A 114; A 114 N 2
- (f) Suit for dissolution of partnership, whether one for rescission of contract ... A 114 N 1
- (g) Whether can be only between promisor and promisee ... A 114 N 1

—Sale of immovable property—Part of consideration left with vendee under contract that latter should pay it to vendor's creditors—Trust, if created

S 10 N 11

—Specific performance of

- (a) Agreement by vendee to re-convey property to vendor—Limitation ... A 113 N 8
- (b) Contract for sale of immovable property providing for execution of sale deed 'on demand' from vendee—Limitation ... A 113 N 8
- (c) Contract of sale of immovable property contingent on vendor's title being declared in pending suit—Limitation ... A 113 N 7
- (d) "Date fixed for performance of contract"—What is ... A 113 N 7
- (e) Defences to suits for—What are ... A 100 N 9
- (f) No date fixed for performance of contract—Limitation ... A 113 N 8
- (g) Suit by mortgagee for possession of immovable property mortgaged where mortgage instrument recites that possession has been given to mortgagee—Whether one for specific performance of contract ... A 135 N 4
- (h) Suit by mortgagee to enforce stipulation in mortgage instrument that mortgagor should give possession to mortgagee—Limitation ... A 135 N 4
- (i) Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ... A 113; A 113 N 6
- (j) Suit for—What is—Illustrative cases ... A 113 N 2
- (k) Suit for compensation for breach of contract, whether suit for specific performance ... A 113 N 2
- (l) Suit for possession and suit for specific performance by giving possession—Distinction between—Illustrative cases ... A 113 N 3
- (m) Suit on contract in deed of exchange providing that one party should return portion equal in value for loss of the part taken away from other ... A 113 N 4
- (n) Suit to enforce award, whether suit for specific performance of contract ... A 113 N 5
- (o) Suit to enforce condition subsequent—Limitation ... A 113 N 4
- (p) What is ... A 113 N 2

Contract—(Contd.)

—Successive breaches of contract

- (a) Defendant under compromise undertaking to deliver a certain quantity of grain to plaintiff yearly—Failure to pay each year gives rise to a fresh cause of action ... S 23 N 19
- (b) Instalment bond stipulating that debtor will pay a certain sum monthly and that if five consecutive instalments are not paid, creditor might call for payment of whole amount —Case, if one of successive breaches ... S 23 N 19
- (c) S. 22 does not apply ... S 23 N 19
- (e) Whether give rise to successive causes of action ... S 23 N 19

—Suit for money paid in consideration of

- (a) Where consideration fails through, Court of law refusing to enforce its specific performance—Limitation—Starting point ... A 97 N 11
- (b) Where valid promise ceases to be enforceable by act promised becoming impossible or unlawful—Limitation—Starting point ... A 97 N 11
- (c) Whether time runs from failure to perform a promise ... A 97 N 11

—Suit upon

- (a) Mifeasance—Illustrative cases ... A 36 N 3
- (b) Mifeasance—Illustrative cases ... A 36 N 3
- (c) Non-feasance—Illustrative cases ... A 36 N 3

—Time-barred debt, agreement to pay—If valid and binding ... S 9 N 14

—Time for performance of contract extended—Limitation for suit on contract, when commences ... S 19 N 73

—Unregistered contract—Suit for difference in value between sums advanced for supply of *kankar* and value of *kankar* delivered—Limitation ... A 115 N 3

—Valid contract—Acknowledgment in writing containing express promise to pay rents barred by limitation, whether valid contract : A 110 N 12

—Verbal contract—Money payable in instalments—Suit on—Limitation ... A 75 N 3

—What is ... A 113 N 5

- (a) Award, whether contract ... A 116 N 14
- (b) Contract in Art. 116—Whether includes award ... A 116 N 4
- (c) Contract under Art. 116—Whether includes implied contract: A 113 N 3

—Whether refers to transactions which create real rights ... S 23 N 1

—Wrong arising out of contract—What is ... S 23 N 1

—Wrong independent of contract—What is ... A 97 N 4

Contract Act

—Consideration under—Definition ... S 29 N 3

—Section 25 ... S 29

- (a) Promise to pay barred debt—Whether good and enforceable: S 29

- (b) Whether affected by Limitation Act ...

—Section 25 (3) ... S 19 N 9

- (a) Promise—Whether includes promise which is merely implied in acknowledgment of liability ...

- (b) Promise implied in an acknowledgment or in a statement of account—Whether express promise within the meaning of Contract Act, S. 25, sub-s. 3 ... A 63 N 3

Contract Act—(Contd.)

—Section 65			
(a) Liability under—Suit on—Limitation	A 97 N 11a
(b) Suit for compensation by vendee—Limitation	A 116 N 17
—Sections 69, 70—Obligation under—Suit for enforcement—Limitation	A 83 N 3
—Section 222—Obligation under—Suit for enforcement by agent against principal—Limitation	A 83 N 4

Contribution

—Right of			
(a) Basis of—When arises	A 99 N 3; A 100 N 1
(b) Between co-sureties—Basis of	A 82 N 1
(c) Between joint tort-feasors	A 99 N 8
(d) Suit to claim—Art. 99, whether exhaustive of cases in which such right can be claimed	A 99 N 4
—Right to—When arises	A 120 N 25
—Suit by co-trustees to enforce claim against estate of deceased trustee			
(a) Limitation—Starting point	A 100, A 100 N 2
(b) Right of contribution—When arises	A 100 N 1
(c) Where one trustee is less guilty than another and has had to refund the loss	A 100 N 1
—Suit by co-trustees to enforce claim against living trustee—Limitation	A 100 N 1
—Suit for			
(a) By co-mortgagor paying off mortgage, against other co-mortgagor—Limitation—Starting point	A 132 N 10
(b) By cosharer in mortgage right in respect of costs incurred in suit on mortgage in which decree was passed in favour of all cosharers—Limitation	A 61 N 12
(c) By cosharer who has paid whole or more than his share of joint liability—Execution of mortgage, whether payment...	A 99 N 5
(d) By cosharer who has paid whole or more than his share of revenue due			
(i) Deposit in Court, whether payment for such suit			A 99 N 6
..			A 99; A 99 N 9
..			A 99 N 5
(iv) Payment of revenue, whether creates charge in favour of person paying or charges of cosharers	A 99 N 7
..	A 99 N 2
..	A 99 N 3
..	A 99, A 99 N 2
of joint			
..			A 99 N 5
(ix) Where payment of revenue is held to create charge in favour of person paying, on shares of cosharers	A 97 N 7
(x) Where plaintiff borrows money from third person and pays Government revenue and subsequently paying off third person, sues his cosharers for contribution	A 99 N 3
(e) By executant of joint promissory note against joint promisor—Limitation	A 83 N 11

Contribution—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (f) By joint promisor against other promisor for share of money paid under joint promissory note—Limitation ... A 81 N 2
- (g) By manager of joint family for payments made in excess of his share towards family expenses—Limitation ... A 99 N 4
- (h) By manager in respect of payment on account of joint estate
- (i) Claim, whether can be taken into account in adjusting equities in subsequent partition ... A 107 N 4
 - (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 107; A 107 N 3
 - (iii) Manager borrowing money in his private capacity and expending the same for the estate—Limitation ... A 107 N 3
 - (iv) Person incurring debt as manager of the family and spending it for the estate—Limitation ... A 107 N 3
 - (v) Right of contribution—Basis of ... A 107 N 2
 - (vi) Suit by person who was manager brought after partition—Limitation ... A 107 N 2
 - (vii) Suit falling under both Articles 107 and 99—Limitation ... A 107 N 2
- (i) By one co-owner in respect of repairs or improvement of common property—Limitation ... A 61 N 11
- (j) By one co-tenant against others — Landlord impleaded to obtain refund if others had already paid — Claim against landlord—Limitation... A 120 N 25
- (k) By partner against sub-partner for losses sustained in main partnership—Limitation ... A 61 N 10
- (l) By party who has paid whole or more than his share of amount due under joint decree
- (i) Deposit in Court, whether payment ... A 99 N 6
 - (ii) Mere incurring of pecuniary liability in shape of bond or promissory note, whether payment ... A 99 N 5
 - (iii) Right of contribution in such cases—When arises—Basis of ... A 99 N 3
 - (iv) Limitation—Starting point—Illustrative cases ... A 99 N 9
 - (v) Special and general provisions of limitation ... A 99; A 99 N 2
 - (vi) Suit against partners ... A 99 N 2
 - (vii) Suit by manager of joint estate of undivided family... A 107 N 2
 - (viii) Where payments towards the decree are made in instalments ... A 99 N 9
- (m) By surviving partner against representatives of deceased partner after dissolution of partnership—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- (n) Decree obtained against B and C for contribution — Failure to recover from C his share of amount — Suit against B for recovery of whole amount under Contract Act, S. 43—Limitation ... A 61 N 3
- (o) Limitation—Starting point
- (i) General principle applicable ... A 107 N 3
 - (ii) Illustrative cases ... A 120 N 25
- (p) Limitation for suits not falling under Arts 61, 99, 107 ... A 120 N 25
- (q) One person liable to contribute to another for joint debt which latter has discharged — Mere admission by former that debt is a joint debt — Whether sufficient acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 27
- (r) Right to sue, when arises on date of payment by plaintiff ... A 120 N 25

Contribution—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (s) Suit, in substance, one for account and share of dissolved partnership — Whether can be treated as one for account and share of dissolved partnership ... A 106 N 2
- To one tenant from his co-tenants in respect of rent of landlord —Whether rent ... A 110 N 2

Conversion

- Meaning of ... A 48 N 6
- What is—Wrongful taking and wrongful detention—Whether conversion of property ... A 48 N 6

Conveyance

- Drawing up of—Whether 'particular business' within Art. 84 ... A 84 N 3

Conveyed or bequeathed in trust

- Meaning of, within Art. 134... A 134 N 4

Co-owner

- Alienee from — Possession of — Whether adverse to other co-owners—*See under* Adverse possession
- Co-owner fraudulently allowing revenue to fall into arrears and then purchasing estate himself — Suit by other co-owner to be relieved from the effect of fraud—Limitation ... A 95 N 4
- Co-owner of jagir appointed by Government as manager—Suit by beneficial owners for accounts—Limitation ... A 62 N 9
- Diversion of land to purpose other than that to which it is set apart — Diversion amounting to ouster of other co-owner — Suit ... A 120 N 10
- doubted ... A 142 & 144 N 45
- One co-owner, if can acquire easement for beneficial enjoyment of property ... S 26 N 5
- One co-owner receiving rents and profits of property—Whether only constructive trustee for other co-owners in respect of such rents and profits ... S 10 N 7
- Rents collected by—Amount due to another co-owner in respect of such collection—Whether rent ... A 110 N 2, 3
- Right of co-owner to partition of joint property—Breach of—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 1
- Right to profits of—Whether barred after twelve years where other co-owner exclusively claims possession of whole property and also receives whole profits therefrom ... A 109 N 3
- Sale of share of joint property—Suit by vendee for possession—Limitation—Starting point... A 136 N 6
- Stranger dispossessing co-owners and holding land adversely against co-owners—Death of one co-owner—Stranger succeeding to his interest — Other co-owner's cause of action against stranger, if put an end to ... S 9 N 11
- Suit by
- (a) Against other co-owner for profits—Limitation ... A 120 N 23
- (b) Against other co-owner who has mortgaged property and received the mortgage money—Limitation ... A 132 N 8
- (c) Against trespasser for profits — Co-owner, whether can recover whole profits without making other co-owners parties ... A 109 N 15

Contribution—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (f) By joint promisor against other promisor for share of money paid under joint promissory note—Limitation ... A 81 N 2
- (g) By manager of joint family for payments made in excess of his share towards family expenses—Limitation ... A 99 N 4
- (h) By manager in respect of payment on account of joint estate
- (i) Claim, whether can be taken into account in adjusting equities in subsequent partition ... A 107 N 4
 - (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 107; A 107 N 3
 - (iii) Manager borrowing money in his private capacity and expending the same for the estate—Limitation ... A 107 N 3
 - (iv) Person incurring debt as manager of the family and spending it for the estate—Limitation ... A 107 N 3
 - (v) Right of contribution—Basis of ... A 107 N 2
 - (vi) Suit by person who was manager brought after partition—Limitation ... A 107 N 2
 - (vii) Suit falling under both Articles 107 and 99—Limitation ... A 107 N 2
- (i) By one co-owner in respect of repairs or improvement of common property—Limitation ... A 61 N 11
- (j) By one co-tenant against others — Landlord impleaded to obtain refund if others had already paid — Claim against landlord—Limitation... A 120 N 25
- (k) By partner against sub-partner for losses sustained in main partnership—Limitation ... A 61 N 10
- (l) By party who has paid whole or more than his share of amount due under joint decree
- (i) Deposit in Court, whether payment ... A 99 N 6
 - (ii) Mere incurring of pecuniary liability in shape of bond or promissory note, whether payment ... A 99 N 5
 - (iii) Right of contribution in such cases—When arises—Basis of ... A 99 N 3
 - (iv) Limitation—Starting point—Illustrative cases ... A 99 N 9
 - (v) Special and general provisions of limitation ... A 99, A 99 N 2
 - (vi) Suit against partners ... A 99 N 2
 - (vii) Suit by manager of joint estate of undivided family... A 107 N 2
 - (viii) Where payments towards the decree are made in instalments ... A 99 N 9
- (m) By surviving partner against representatives of deceased partner after dissolution of partnership—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- (n) Decree obtained against B and C for contribution — Failure to recover from C his share of amount — Suit against B for recovery of whole amount under Contract Act, S. 43—Limitation ... A 61 N 3
- (o) Limitation—Starting point
- (i) General principle applicable ... A 107 N 3
 - (ii) Illustrative cases ... A 120 N 25
- (p) Limitation for suits not falling under Arts. 61, 99, 107 ... A 120 N 25
- (q) One person liable to contribute to another for joint debt which latter has discharged — Mere admission by former that debt is a joint debt — Whether sufficient acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 27
- (r) Right to sue, when arises on date of payment by plaintiff ... A 120 N 25

Contribution—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (s) Suit, in substance, one for account and share of dissolved partnership — Whether can be treated as one for account and share of dissolved partnership ... A 106 N 2
- To one tenant 'from his co-tenants in respect of rent of landlord ...
- Whether rent ... A 110 N 2

Conversion

- Meaning of ... A 48 N 6
- What is—Wrongful taking and wrongful detentioo—Whether conversion of property ... A 48 N 6

Conveyance

- Drawing up of—Whether 'particular business' within Art. 84 ... A 84 N 3

Conveyed or bequeathed in trust

- Meaning of, within Art. 134... A 134 N 4

Co-owner

- Alienation from — Possession of — Whether adverse to other co-owners—See under Adverse possession
- Co-owner fraudulently allowing revenue to fall into arrears and then purchasing estate himself — Suit by other co-owner to be relieved from the effect of fraud—Limitation ... A 95 N 4
- Co-owner of jagir appointed by Government as manager—Suit by beneficial owners for accounts—Limitation ... A 62 N 9
- Diversion of land to purpose other than that to which it is set apart — Diversion amounting to ouster of other co-owner— Suit ... A 120 N 10

- doubted ... A 142 & 144 N 45
- One co-owner, if can acquire easement for beneficial enjoyment of property ... S 26 N 5
- One co-owner receiving rents and profits of property—Whether only constructive trustee for other co-owners in respect of such rents and profits ... S 10 N 7
- Rents collected by—Amount due to another co-owner in respect of such collection—Whether rent ... A 110 N 2, 3
- Right of co-owner to partition of joint property—Breach of—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 1
- Right to profits of—Whether barred after twelve years where other co-owner exclusively claims possession of whole property and also receives whole profits therefrom ... A 109 N 3
- Sale of share of joint property—Suit by vendee for possession—Limitation—Starting point... A 136 N 6
- Stranger dispossessing co-owners and holding land adversely against co-owners—Death of one co-owner—Stranger succeeding to his interest—Other co-owner's cause of action against stranger, if put an end to ... S 9 N 11
- Suit by
- (a) Against other co-owner for profits—Limitation ... A 120 N 23
- (b) Against other co-owner who has mortgaged property and received the mortgage money—Limitation ... A 132 N 8
- (c) Against trespasser for profits — Co-owner, whether can recover whole profits without making other co-owners parties ... A 109 N 15

Co-owner—Suit by—(Contd.)

- (d) For contribution to expenses incurred for repairs or improvement of property against other co-owner—Limitation ... A 61 N 11
- (e) For possession against another having adverse possession—Article applicable ... A 142 & 144 N 45
- (f) For share of his profits—Limitation ... A 109 N 3
- (g) For share of his profits accruing after cessation of co-ownership—Limitation ... A 109 N 3
- (h) For share of his profits accruing after decree for partition and before its execution ... A 109 N 3

—Who is

- (a) Alienee of father where alienation is set aside at the instance of the sons except as to father's share, whether co-owner... A 109 N 3
- (b) Alienee of Hindu widow where part of alienation is set aside after widow's death at the instance of reversioners, whether co-owner ... A 109 N 3
- (c) Co-heir inheriting an estate, whether co-owner ... A 109 N 3

Co-parcener

- Co-parcener in possession alienating family property but continuing to stay in the same property even after alienation — Possession of such co-parcener, whether adverse from date of alienation: A 127 N 11
- Suit against—By widow of deceased coparcener, for rendition of accounts—Limitation ... A 120 N 15, F N 8

Copy

- Time for obtaining—Exclusion of : See Exclusion of time.

Copyright

- Infringement of — Compensation for — See Compensation — For infringement of copyright
- Meaning of ... A 40 N 2
- When deemed to be infringed—Enactment as to ... A 40 N 4
- Whether infringed, is question of fact ... A 40 N 4

Corporation

- Incorporated body
- (a) Nature of—If has distinct existence in the eye of the law apart from persons constituting the body ... S 6 N 6
- (b) Provision as to extension in case of legal disability—If applies to incorporated body ... S 6 N 6

Co-sharer

- Alienation by lambardar — Remedy of co-sharers of lambardar not party to alienation ... A 91 N 7
- Cosharer in exclusive possession writing to other cosharer calling upon him to pay up his share of expenses incurred for repair—Acknowledgment of other's right implied in letter—Whether conditional ... S 19 N 19
- Cosharer in *vatan* — Suit by, against another cosharer who has improperly received plaintiff's shares of *hak*—Limitation ... A 62 N 9
- Cosharer paying off revenue due to Government in order to save estate—Whether has charge on estate for amount in excess of his share ... A 132 N 8
- Each cosharer exclusively enjoying some portion of joint property undivided from the rest—One of them, if can acquire right of easement over plot held exclusively by other cosharers ... S 26 N 12

Cosharer—(Contd.)**—Of joint Mitakshara family**

(a) Exclusion from enjoyment of family property—Suit by, for account of profits received by members in possession .. A 109 N 4

(b) Exclusion from family property by another co-parcener claiming it exclusively—Remedies of ... A 109 N 4

—Repairing of whole house by one co-sharer does not amount to denial of title of other co-sharers ... A 142 & 144 N 35

—Rights of—Long absence does not impair rights of co-sharer unless adverse title is set up ... A 142 & 144 N 35

—Separate suits for recovery of specific portions of property in hands of cosharers—Suit for general partition as against all cosharers—Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14 ... S 14 N 18

—Suit against, by another cosharer for share of rent received, whether one for arrears of rent ... A 110 N 3

—Suit by

(a) Against another cosharer who has received the former's share of money due—Limitation ... A 62 N 9

(b) Against cosharer in vatan for share of *haqs* improperly received by defendant—Limitation ... A 132 N 20

(c) Against other cosharer for profits—Whether one for compensation for breach of contract ... A 115 N 1

(d) Against other cosharer for share of profits of common property received by defendant—Limitation ... A 120 N 15

(e) Against other cosharer in respect of perversion by latter of joint property intended to be used for specific purpose—Limitation ... A 32 N 3

(f) For Contribution—See Contribution—Suit for ...

(g) For joint possession—Limitation ... A 120 N 37

(h) For rent received by other cosharer where latter is also a tenant—Limitation ... A 109 N 13

(i) To declare that alienation by *lambardar* is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 7

—Tenants-in-common

(a) One tenant-in-common, if can give discharge on behalf of all in respect of suit for mesne profits ... S 7 N 27

(b) Suit by, for mesne profits—Tenants-in-common, whether persons jointly entitled to sue for possession within S. 7 ... S 7 N 27

—Whether *lambardar* is agent of cosharers of village ... A 90 N 3

Costs**—Application for**

(a) By attorney, under Civil P. C.—Limitation ... A 84 N 4

(b) By attorney, under rules of High Court—Limitation ... A 84 N 4

(c) By *vakil*, under Civil P. C.—Limitation ... A 84 N 4

(d) By *vakil*, under Rules of High Court—Limitation ... A 84 N 4

—Lien for—Whether can be pleaded in defence in suit against attorney for recovery of documents and papers even if attorney's suit for costs is time-barred ... A 84 N 6

—Meaning of ... A 84 N 5

—Suit for

(a) By advocate—Limitation ... A 84 N 2

(b) By attorney—Limitation—Starting point ... A 84; A 84 N 2; A 84 N 7

(c) By attorney—Against opposita party—Limitation ... A 84 N 2

Court—Wrong Court—(Contd.)

- (c) Time spent in proceeding, whether excluded in computing period of limitation for application to file arbitration award A 178 N 5
- (d) Time, whether excluded on ground of prosecuting in wrong Court application for setting aside *ex parte* decree ... A 164 N 10

Court-fee

- Deficiency in — Document through mistake or inadvertence received, filed and used in office—Deficiency subsequently made up at direction of Court—Effect of A 173 N 6
- Leviable on review application—Review application made after period of limitation—Effect of—Limitation A 173 N 6
- Payment of
- (a) Limitation for—Extension of time A 170 N 6
- (b) Whether enables party to apply for review beyond period of limitation A 173 N 6
- Recovery of — Right of Government to recover court-fees under S 309, Civil P. C., 1859—Whether subject to limitation ... A 149 N 3
- Recovery of, from party—Application by Government—Limitation: A 182 N 3

Court-fees Act

- Whether affects provisions of Limitation Act A 173 N 6

Court of Wards

- Alienation by A 91 N 13
- A 91 N 13
- acknowledgment or pay-
ment so as to save limitation is statutory and not as guardian: S 21 N 5
- Bombay Court of Wards Act, S. 16—Offer of Collector under—
Whether can be used as acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 72
- Court of Wards taking charge of estate—Government, if becomes
trustee for rightful owners S 10 N 9
- If an agent authorized under the statute to make acknowledgments
on behalf of ward S 19 N 50
- Notice to creditor of estate stating that debt was due to him and
requiring him to appear before Collector when he would be ques-
tioned about debt — Whether constitutes acknowledgment of
liability within S. 19 S 19 N 18
- Plaintiff being disqualified proprietor under Bengal Court of Wards
Act, 1879—Whether ground for extending limitation for suit for
possession by him S 9 N 6
- United Provinces Court of Wards Act, S. 51—Suit instituted
against ward outside United Provinces—Period of notice under
S. 51, if can be deducted S 15 N 23

Creditor

- Creditor of ancestor or testator—Suit by, against purchaser from
devisee or heir, for declaration that such alienation is void and
for consequential relief—Limitation A 120 N 44
- Suit by, against surety—Limitation A 83 N 10
- Transfer in fraud of—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 23

Criminal complaint

- Whether suit or application within the meaning of S. 18 ... S 18 N 3

Criminal Procedure Code (5 of 1898)

- Appeal against rejection of claim under S. 443—Limitation: A 150-A; A 150-A N 2
- Appeal against sentence of death passed by Court of Session—
 - Provision for—Limitation ... A 150; A 150 N 2
- Appeal from order of acquittal—Provision for—Limitation: A 156 N 2; A 157; A 157 N 2
- Appeal to Court other than High Court
 - (a) Limitation ... A 154; A 154 N 1
 - (b) Provision for such appeal ... A 154 N 1
 - (c) Where appeal is preferred by appellant in jail—Limitation
 - Starting point ... A 154 N 3
- Appeal to High Court
 - (a) Applicability of Arts. 150, 155 and 157 ... A 155 N 1
 - (b) Limitation ... A 155 N 1
- Appeal under—Applicability of Arts. 150, 154 and 157 ... A 154 N 1
- Application under—Limitation ... A 181 N 23
- Order under, respecting possession of immovable property
 - (a) Jurisdiction to pass such order ... A 47 N 5
 - (b) Suit for recovery of property
 - (i) Art. 47, Lim. Act, and Bengal Tenancy Act ... A 47 N 8
 - (ii) Art. 47, Limitation Act, and local or special law—
 - Applicability of ... A 47 N 8
 - A 47
 - (iii) By person bound by such order—Limitation ... A 47
 - (iv) By rightful owner to recover property attached under S. 146, Criminal P. C.—Limitation ... A 47 N 7
 - (v) Date of final order—"Final order," what is, under Section 145, Criminal P. C. ... A 47 N 9
 - (vi) Defendant not party to suit in which order was passed
 - Effect of ... A 47 N 8a
 - A 47 N 2
 - (vii) Essentials of applicability of Art. 47 ... A 47 N 9
 - (viii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 47 N 9
 - (ix) Person not bound by order, whether must bring such suit within limitation prescribed by Art. 47 ... A 47 N 3
 - (x) Person's right to property, whether extinguished by virtue of Sec. 28 by his failure to bring such suit within three years under Art. 47 ... A 47 N 10
 - (xi) Plaintiff, when can bring such suit within Art. 47: ... A 47 N 3
 - (xii) Plaintiff, whether must have existing right to sue in ejectment on date of order for applicability of Art 47: ... A 47 N 2
 - (xiii) "Recovery of property"—Meaning of ... A 47 N 7
 - (xiv) Such suit and suit under Specific Relief Act, S. 9, distinguished ... A 47 N 2
 - (xv) Such suit by person claiming under one bound by order—When maintainable... ... A 47 N 4
 - (xvi) Such suit is essentially one in ejectment... ... A 47 N 1
 - (xvii) Suit for declaration of right to property—Limitation: ... A 47 N 7
- S. 88 (6-D) Proviso, Criminal P. C.—Suit under—Limitation ... A 15 N 1
- S. 145
 - (a) Order under
 - (i) Neither dispossessing plaintiff nor maintaining defendant to the exclusion of plaintiff—Order, whether one respecting possession ... A 47 N 5

inal Pro. Code—Section 145—Order under—(Contd.)

(i) Respecting trust property against trustee — Whether binding on succeeding trustee	A 47 N 4a
(ii) Revision by High Court, whether allowed	A 47 N 9
(iv) What is	A 47 N 5
(v) When "final order" within meaning of Art. 47	A 47 N 9
(vi) Whether binds any person other than actual parties to the proceedings	A 47 N 3
S. 146—Order under—Whether one respecting possession of immovable property within Art. 47	A 47 N 5
S. 147—Order under—Whether one respecting possession of immovable property within Art. 47	A 47 N 5
S. 443		
(a) Provision of	A 150-A N 2
(b) Rejection of claim under—Appeal against—Limitation	A 150-A; A 150-A N 2
S. 449—Application for leave to appeal under—Limitation	A 155 N 4
S. 449, sub-a, 1, Cl (c)—Order of Single Judge of High Court—Appeal from, to Division Bench of High Court—Limitation	A 155 N 3
S. 476		
(a) Order of Civil Court—Appeal from—Limitation	A 155 N 2
(b) Order passed by Single Judge of High Court—Appeal from, to Division Bench—Whether lies...	A 155 N 3
(c) Order under—Appeal from—Limitation—Starting point	A 154 N 2, A 155 N 5
S. 476-A—Order under—Appeal from — Limitation — Starting point	A 154 N 2
S. 520—Application under—Whether subject to Limitation Act...	A 154 N 1
S. 522—Order under		
(a) Suit for possession by person bound by such order — Limitation	A 47 N 1
(b) When binding on a person	A 47 N 3
inal proceedings		
-How far governed by ActPreamble N 32
ps		
-Growing crops		
(a) Suit for—Whether one for price of goods sold and delivered...	A 55 N 1
(b) Suit for price—Limitation—Starting point	A 55 N 1
(c) Suit for price where no fixed period of credit is agreed upon—Limitation	A 55
(d) Whether immovable property	A 55 N 1
wn		
-Adverse possession by or against—See Adverse possession		
-Crown as such is not entitled to any exemption from limitation	S 3 N 3
-Easement against Crown		
(a) Property must be in ownership of Crown and need not be in its possession	S 26 N 16
(b) Sixty years' user necessary	S 26 N 16
-Easement right claimed over property belonging to Crown—Easement is acquired by open enjoyment without interruption for 60 years	S
-Suit by—Limitation	A 149;

Custom

- Easement—Custom, if can override positive provisions of the Act: S 26 N 21
- If can override the statute S 3 N 24

Damages

- Act of defendant itself constituting legal injury—Fact that plaintiff suffers damage subsequently—Whether entitles him to fresh cause of action S 9 N 9
- For breach of trust in management of trust property—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 4
- Relief for possession under sale deed—Relief for damages or for return of purchase money is different S 14 N 19
- Suit for—See also under Compensation
 - (a) Against Collector for refusing to make award for compensation on acquisition of land—Limitation A 120 N 9
 - (b) Against person not tenant of plaintiff for use and occupation—Whether suit for rent A 110 N 2
 - (c) Against trustee for loss sustained by trust on account of trustee's omission to collect moneys due to trust—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 4
 - (d) Against vendee of property who has undertaken to pay the mortgagee of the vendor but fails to pay the same with result that vendor is damaged—Limitation A 120 N 51
 - (e) For breach of covenant of title—Suit not falling under Art. 116—Limitation... .. A 120 N 51
 - (f) For damages to personal property—Limitation A 109 N 13
 - (g) For enticement of plaintiff's wife—Limitation A 120 N 51
 - (h) For trespass made under mistake—Limitation A 96 N 2
 - (i) Limitation—Cases governed by residuary Art. 120 A 120 N 51
 - (j) Suit for amount contracted by lessee to be paid to lessor's superior holder—Whether one for damages for use and occupation A 110 N 2
 - (k) Suit for interest as damages for money due—Limitation A 120 N 51
 - (l) Use by defendant of plaintiff's land for non-agricultural purposes without permission—Plaintiff forced to pay fine to Government in consequence—Suit by plaintiff for recovery of amount of fine from defendant—Limitation A 120 N 51
 - (m) Whether can be treated as one for money paid upon existing consideration which afterwards fails A 97 N 2

Damdupat

- Limitation Act, if affects rule Preamble N 33

Death

- Death of judgment-debtor—Effect of—Whether gives fresh starting point for appeal from decree by legal representative A 156 N 10
- Sentence of—Appeal under Criminal Procedure Code against sentence of death passed by Court of Session—Limitation: A 150, A 150 N 2

Debt

- Attached under Civil P. C., O. 21, R 46—Claim in respect of—Whether lies A 11 N 10
- Contractual debt—Suit for recovery by purchaser of debt due by one party to another under contract—Limitation A 115 N 3

Debt—(Contd.)

- Father's debt—Pious obligation of Hindu son to pay—Enforcement of—Suit for—Maintainability—Limitation—Starting point: A 120 N 49
- Joint family debt—Partition of joint family—Collection and fraudulent appropriation of debt by one member—Suit for share by another—Whether one for relief on ground of fraud ... A 95 N 4
- Servant's wages as debt—Suit upon—Limitation ... A 7 N 2
- Time-barred debt—Promise to pay—Suit on contract embodying such promise—Limitation ... A 115 N 3
- Whether forfeiture ... A 6 N 2
- Whether moveable property within Art. 29 ... A 29 N 5
- Whether penalty ... A 6 N 2

Debt or liquidated demand

- Summary suit to realize
 - (a) Suit under Civil P. C., O. 37—Limitation ... A 5; A 5 N 2
 - (b) Suit under Civil P. C., S. 128 (2) (f)—Limitation ... A 5; A 5 N 2

Debtor

- Principal debtor—Suit against, by surety—Limitation ... A 81
- Suit against—For personal recovery of loan—Limitation: A 57 N 4; A 120 N 41

Debtor and creditor

- Agreement in writing undertaking to pay time-barred debt—Whether valid and binding ... S 3 N 14
- Creditor's right against principal debtor is barred—Rights of surety ... A 81 N 4
- Death of creditor on day when debt becomes due—Starting point of limitation, if postponed ... S 17 N 5
- Debtor calling for accounts in reply to demand of creditor for payment—Debtor, if impliedly admits existence of unsettled accounts: S 19 N 19
- Debtor, if trustee for creditor ... S 10 N 11
- Debtor owing several debts to creditor—Creditor can adjust payment towards any of the debts though suit for recovery of the debt may be time-barred ... S 3 N 14
- Debtor paying to creditor after expiry of limitation for suit for recovery of debt—Debtor cannot claim back amount ... S 3 N 14
- Fusion of interests of ...
 - (a) Subsequent separation of the two interests—Person on whom interest of creditor devolves, whether gets fresh cause of action from date of such separation ... S 9 N 12
 - (b) Whether amounts to satisfaction of cause of action ... S 9 N 12
- Joint creditor—Capacity to receive payment of debt and give discharge on behalf of all ... S 7 N 22
- Letter by debtor admitting correctness of account sent by creditor ... S 19 N 18
- Creditor against such third person for recovery—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
- Payment by debtor without specification, whether to be appropriated for interest or for principal—Right of creditor to appropriate for either at his option ... S 20 N 5
- Relationship of — Deposit of money, whether creates relationship of debtor and creditor ... A 59 N 3

Debtor and creditor—(Contd.)

- Suit by creditor on hatchitta document stamped and signed by debtor containing statement of adjustment of accounts and consisting unqualified promise to pay—Limitation ... A 115 N 3

Deccan Agriculturists' Relief Act

- S. 48—Suit or application under—Limitation ... A 132 N 2

Decision

- Decision of Civil Court in proceeding other than suit—Suit for setting aside—Limitation ... A 13
- Decision of Settlement Officer—Suit for setting aside—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 31
- Decision of survey officer—Whether final ... A 14 N 2
- Of Civil Court
- (a) Suit for relief which plaintiff can seek without setting aside decision—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for setting aside decision of Civil Court ... A 13 N 1
- (b) Suit for setting aside—Limitation—Starting point ... A 13 N 4
- (c) When needs be set aside ... A 13 N 1

Declaration

- Relief of declaration is different from relief of possession ... S 14 N 19
- Suit by co-sharer to declare that alienation by lambardar is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 7
- Suit by legatee to declare that alienation by executor is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 12
- Suit by member not party to alienation to declare that alienation by a member of joint Hindu family is not binding on him—Limitation: ... A 91 N 6
- Suit by member of tarwad to declare that alienation by karnavan of Malabar tarwad is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 8
- Suit by third party against decree-holder for declaration that decree is invalid—Suit decreed in first Court but dismissed on appeal—Period of suit cannot be excluded for application to execute decree ... S 15 N 11
- Suit for

- (a) By reversioner to declare that alienation by limited female owner is void except for her life-time—Suit during life-time of female—Limitation ... A 141 N 12
- (b) By third party that document is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 3
- (c) Declaration of invalidity of document and to cancel it—Limitation ... A 91 N 3
- (d) Declaration of right to property—Limitation ... A 47 N 7
- (e) Relief involving negating decree obtained by defendant—Limitation applicable ... A 95 N 6
- (f) Watercourse, right to—Suit for declaring such right—Limitation ... A 38 N 2
- (g) Whether suit for possession within S. 28 ... S 28 N 3
- Suit to declare that document is not binding on particular person—Limitation ... A 91 N 2

Declaratory suit

- Applicability of S. 23 to declaratory suits based on a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 4

Decree

- Adjustment of decree not of Court—See Adjustment.

Decree—(Contd.)

- Against benamidar, obtained collusively and fraudulently—Real owner, whether bound to sue to set aside decree within period applicable to suits for setting aside decrees on ground of fraud ... A 95 N 6
- Against Hindu father — Non-satisfaction of decree—Subsequent suit to enforce pious obligation of Hindu son to pay his father's debt—Maintainability ... A 120 N 49
- Against Hindu widow, obtained fraudulently
 - (a) Suit by reversioner for declaration that decree is not binding on reversion—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 34
 - (b) Whether binding on reversionary heirs ... A 141 N 13
- Against several persons
 - (a) Decree passed against several persons as legal representatives of deceased person is passed against them jointly and severally ... A 182 N 138
 - (b) Joint decrees
 - (i) Decree against manager of Hindu joint family carrying on business is one passed against several persons jointly within Expt I, Art 182 ... A 182 N 138
 - (ii) Decree for sale against all defendants — Decree against one set aside — Suit against that defendant subsequently decreed—Second order absolute—Two orders operate as one decree ... A 182 N 138
 - (iii) Decree passed jointly against A & B—Fact that decree provides that it should be first executed against A does not make it other than joint decree against both ... A 182 N 138
 - (iv) Fact that joint decree differentiates between several judgment-debtors regarding mode of execution does not affect its character as joint decree ... A 182 N 138
 - (v) Fact that subsequent to passing of joint decree liability of one is limited by adjustment with decree-holder does not alter its character as joint decree ... A 182 N 138
 - (vi) Mortgage decree not apportioning mortgage debt among different items of property mortgaged—It is joint decree passed against mortgagor and subsequent mortgagee of some items ... A 182 N 138
 - (vii) Simply mentioning name of other judgment-debtor does not make decree one against both ... A 182 N 138
 - (viii) Suit for sale on mortgage—One of properties previously sold for arrears of revenue — Decree passed for realization of amount by sale of other properties and out of certain amount in hands of one of defendants as surplus proceeds of revenue sale—Decree is one passed jointly against all defendants ... A 182 N 138
- Amendment of
 - (a) And novation of decree—Distinction between ... A 156 N 8
 - (b) And substitution of decrees—Distinction between ... A 156 N 8
 - (c) Application for—Limitation ... A 181 N 19
 - (d) Duty of—On whom lies ... A 181 N 19
 - (e) Effect of ... A 152 N 4
 - (f) Whether gives fresh starting point for application to High Court under Civil Procedure Code ... A 156 N 8
 - (g) Whether sufficient ground for excuse of delay within S. 5, Limitation Act, for appeal from such decree ... A 156 N 8

Decree—(Contd.)

- Appeal from — Limitation — Starting point—Where review of judgment is granted A 152 N 5
- Appeal from, to High Court—*See under* High Court
- Appellate decree—Appellate decree passed *ex parte*—Application for setting aside by respondent—Limitation A 164 N 2
- Cause of action furnished by decree — Appeal—Dismissal of, if causes revival of right so as to furnish fresh period of limitation S 9 N 11
- Charge created by, upon immovable property — Enforcement of — Suit for—Limitation A 133 N 5
- Compromise decree
 - (a) Suit for enforcement, whether one for breach of contract between parties or for breach of terms imposed by decree of Court A 115 N 12
 - (b) Suit on basis of—Suit for accounts—Limitation A 120 N 15
 - (c) Whether like contract can be set aside on grounds other than fraud A 95 N 6
- Copy of—Time occupied in obtaining—Whether excluded in computing period of limitation for appeal from decree of High Court on Original Side A 151 N 3
- Date of A 156 N 5
 - (a) Meaning of A 182 N 25
 - (b) What is ... A 151 N 3, A 152 N 3, A 162 N 6; A 173 N 5; A 174 N 6, A 175 N 5, A 179 N 3
- Decree absolute in suit for divorce made on Original Side of High Court—Appeal against—Limitation A 151 N 2
- Decree subsequently set aside—Possession of defendant under—Profits received during such possession—Suit for, whether suit for profits wrongfully received A 109 N 8
- Enforcement of
 - (a) Against defendant—Plea of fraud in defence, without having sued to set aside decree for fraud, if permissible A 95 N 18
 - (b) And execution of decree distinguished A 183 N 4
 - (c) Application for—What is A 183 N 4
 - (d) Meaning of A 183 N 4
- Execution of, *See also under* Execution.
 - (a) Application for—Limitation A 181 N 3
 - (b) Application not filed within time—Effect of
 - (i) Decree cannot be revived by subsequent proceedings by decree-holder, though *bona fide* or permitted by Court by inadvertence or not opposed by judgment-debtor : A 182 N 146
 - (ii) Decree rendered inoperative and unenforceable A 182 N 146
 - (iii) No Court can be called upon to take action on such decree even under inherent powers A 182 N 146
 - (c) Movable property wrongly sold in—Recovery of—Suit for —Limitation A 120 N 2
 - (d) Property purchased by decree-holder, judgment-debtor having no saleable interest in property sold — Decree-holder, whether can again apply for execution of decree without setting aside prior sale A 166 N 8

Decree—Execution of—(Contd.)

- (e) Property sold belonging to other than judgment-debtor but who is party to suit — Application by such person for relief in respect of such sale—Application under S. 47, Civil P. C. —Limitation ... A 166 N 8
- (f) Sale in—Suit for—When maintainable ... A 12 N 5
- Ex parte decree
- (a) Setting aside
- (i) Right of—Provision for ... A 164 N 2
- (ii) Whether can be set aside by legal representative of defendant ... A 164 N 4
- (b) Setting aside, application for
- (i) Application by legal representative — Limitation — Starting point—Where original defendant had been duly served with summons ... A 164 N 7
- (ii) Application by legal representative of deceased defendant—Limitation ... A 164 N 4
- (iii) Application dismissed for default — Subsequent application to restore prior application — Limitation for subsequent application ... A 164 N 15, A 181 N 15
- (iv) Application filed on Original Side of High Court—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
- (v) Application for setting aside decree in proceeding other than suit—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
- (vi) Application for setting aside ex parte decree in case where proceeding under Succession Act is to take form of suit and order passed is to be enforced as decree—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
- (vii) Application for setting aside decree in case where order in execution—Limitation ... A 169 N 2
- (viii) Application for setting aside decree in case where order in execution—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
- (ix) Application within time consigned to record room owing to notice—S set aside maintainable ... A 164 N 15
- (x) Article 164 and S. 18, Limitation Act—Limitation ... A 164 N 11
- (xi) Death of defendant after making application — Legal representative, whether can continue application made by deceased defendant ... A 164 N 4
- (xii) Decree under Provincial Small Cause Courts Act—Security or deposit requisite for such application—Provisions as to — Validity of application without security or deposit ... A 164 N 3
- (xiii) Decree under Provincial Small Cause Courts Act—Whether Court can extend time for providing security or deposit ... A 164 N 3
- (xiv) Essentials of Art. 164 ... A 164 N 2
- (xv) Limitation—Starting point ... A 164; A 164 N 5
- (xvi) Necessary parties ... A 164 N 13
- (xvii) Onus of proof—Where application is made more than 30 days from date of decree ... A 164 N 14

Decree—Ex parte decree—Setting aside, application for—(Contd.)

- (xviii) Where summons was not duly served when applicant has knowledge of decree—'Knowledge of decree' what constitutes—Limitation—Starting point ... A 164 N 8
- (xix) Whether Court can extend time under inherent powers ... A 164 N 9
- (xx) Whether time can be extended under S 5, Lim. Act... A 164 N 9
- (xxi) Whether time can be extended under S 6, Lim. Act... A 164 N 9
- (xxii) Whether time during which applicant has been prosecuting another civil proceeding in wrong Court can be excluded ... A 164 N 10
- (xxiii) Who can apply to set aside decree within Art. 164 ... A 164 N 2
- ... was not
of decree ... A 164 N 6
- (ii) On ground of decree having been obtained by fraud—Suit, whether lies after failure of prior application to set aside decree ... A 95 N 19
- (iii) On ground of fraud—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
- (iv) Suit and decree, whether must be under Civil P. C., for applicability of Art. 164 ... A 164 N 2
- Final decree in mortgage suit—Application for
- (a) In respect of compromise decree, where such decree contemplates passing of final decree—Limitation ... A 181 N 4
- (b) Limitation—Where mortgage suit is on Original Side of Chartered High Court ... A 181 N 4
- (c) Under Civil P. C., O. 34, Rr. 3 and 5
- (i) Application adjourned at the request of defendant or not judicially disposed of—Second application out of time, if maintainable ... A 181 N 4
- (ii) Application disposed of or dismissed for default or non-prosecution—Second application out of time, if barred ... A 181 N 4
- (iii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 181 N 4
- (a) Where decree in suit for sale is against separate sets of defendants and one set of defendants appeals from decree so far as decree against it is concerned ... A 181 N 4
- (iv) The preliminary decree: pendency of proceedings to set aside preliminary decree passed ex parte ... A 181 N 4
- (v) Time, whether excluded on ground of proceedings in any Court ... A 181 N 4
- Final decree in partition suit—Application for—Limitation ... A 181 N 16
- Final decree in partnership suit—Application for—Limitation ... A 161 N 16
- Final decree in redemption suit—Application for, under Civil P. C. O. 34, R. 8—Limitation ... A 181 N 5
- Foreign decree—Application for execution—Limitation ... A 117 N 4
- For future maintenance—Whether can be passed ... A 129 & 129 N 6
- For future mesne profits—Period from date of decree for which such profits can be given ... A 109 N 11

Decree—(Contd.)

—Payment by instalments

- (a) Application entertained by Court after expiry of limitation
—Order passed on application—Effect of ... A 176 N 3
- (b) Application for postponement of payment of decree—Limitation ... A 175 N 3
- (c) Application in respect of decree for sale on a mortgage—Limitation ... A 175 N 4

—Payment by instalments, application for

- (a) Court, whether can extend time ... A 175 N 3
- (b) Date of decree—What is ... A 175 N 5
- (c) Limitation—Starting point ... A 175; A 175 N 2; A 175 N 5
- (d) Provision for such application ... A 175 N 2

—Payment of—Postponement of, application for—Limitation ... A 175 N 2

—Personal decrees

- (a) Application for—Under Civil P. C., O. 34, R. 6—Limitation
- (i) Starting point ... A 116 N 19, A 116 N 20; A 181 N 6
- (ii) Where appeal is preferred against order confirming sale after dismissing application to set aside sale and such ... A 181 N 6
- (iii) ... y Chartered High ... A 181 N 8

- (b) Claim for—Claim in suit by vendor to recover balance of unclaimed purchase money in enforcement of vendors' lien—Limitation ... A 116 N 23

- (c) Decree under Civil P. C., O. 34, R. 6—Whether can be passed with regard to interest accrued six years before suit even if claim for personal relief with regard to principal is barred in suit on mortgage ... A 118 N 20

- (d) Suit against sons of deceased mortgagor against his assets in their hands where mortgage is not binding on sons but contains indemnity clause—Whether lies—Limitation—Starting point ... A 116 N 20

- (e) Suit for personal decree against mortgagor for loss or diminution of security—Limitation—Starting point... ... A 120 N 53

- (f) Suit for personal decree in respect of money due under mortgage or charge—Limitation ... A 132 N 18

- (g) Suit under T. P. Act, S. 68, on basis of mortgage deed—Limitation—Starting point ... A 116 N 20

—Person bound by—Whether can seek relief negated by decree, without setting it aside ... A 95 N 6

—Person not party to

- (a) Remedy of, against decree ... A 120 N 23
- (b) Whether can set aside decree ... A 120 N 23

—Pre-decree compromise—Declaratory suit on ground of—Suit for declaration that decree-holder is barred from executing decree—Limitation ... A 120 N 31

—Preliminary decree—Application to obtain execution under—Relief is not same as for subsequent application for final decree in suit : ... S 14 N 19
A 12 N 6

—Reversed after sale—Effect of, on auction-purchaser ... A 62 N 18

—Reversed afterwards—Money paid under—Suit for—Limitation ... A 156 N 9

—Review of—Effect of—Whether gives fresh starting point for appeal from decree ...

Decree—(Contd.)

—Revision of				
(a) Application for—Application to revise decree passed on basis of award—Limitation	A 158 N 2
(b) What constitutes	A 183 N 10
—Set aside after sale—Effect of, on auction-purchaser	..			A 12 N 6
—Set aside by trial Court—Decree restored in revision by High Court—Appeal from such decree to High Court under Civil P. C.—Limitation—Starting point	A 156 N 11
—Setting aside—Decree void as being without jurisdiction—Whether must be set aside by party to it, before claiming relief inconsistent with decree	A 96 N 6
—Setting aside, suit for				
(a) By minor—Suit to set aside decree based on compromise entered into by guardian—Where decree involves transfer of property—Limitation	A 44 N 4
(b) Decree null and void, minor not being properly represented—Limitation for suit	A 95 N 6
(c) Decree obtained by fraud— <i>See under Fraud</i>				
(d) Decree obtained by fraud against shewait—Suit by successor of shewait for setting aside decree—Limitation applicable :				A 95 N 7
(e) Grounds on which such suit is maintainable—Perjured evidence having been given, whether such ground	...			A 95 N 6
(f) Limitation—Limitation whether can be avoided by person bound by decree by framing suit as one for possession or declaration	A 95 N 6
(g) On ground of decree having been obtained by fraud—Limitation—Starting point	A 95 N 6; A 95 N 12
(h) On ground of fraud				
(i) Burden of proof	A 95 N 17
(ii) Decree against shewait collusively and fraudulently—Suit by successor—Limitation—Starting point	...			A 95 N 14
(iii) Matters to which fraud must relate in order to make suit lie	A 95 N 6
(iv) Plea of fraud, in what way must be set forth	...			A 95 N 16
(i) On ground of mistake—Suit, whether one for relief on ground of mistake	A 96 N 2
(j) On ground other than fraud				
(i) Decree against minor—Limitation	A 120 N 22
(ii) Decree voidable—Limitation	A 120 N 22
(iii) Limitation	A 120 N 22
(k) On ground that it is voidable, whether governed by Art. 95 :				A 95 N 6
(l) Suit barred—Whether bars suit for relief which cannot be obtained without setting aside decree	A 120 N 22
(m) When lies	A 95 N 6
(n) Who can sue	A 95 N 6
—Suit for declaration that decree is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 22
—Suit for relief inconsistent with decree in favour of defendant—Limitation—Applicability of period applicable to suit for setting aside decree	A 95 N 6
—Suit to set aside decree obtained by fraud—Fraudulent character of decree, if may be set up in defence even if suit is barred	...			S 3 N 15

Delay—Excuse of—Discretion, exercise of—Appellate Court, interference by—

(Contd.)

(d) Extension of time without any material	S 5 N 38 F N 1
(e) Lower Court holding there is no general rule for exercise of discretion ...	S 5 N 38
(f) No discretion exercised at all ...	S 5 N 38 F N 1
(g) Reasons not given for refusing to excuse delay	S 5 N 38 F N 1
(h) Total disregard of ground of extension—Appellate Court, if will interfere ...	S 5 N 38 F N 1
(ii) Appellate Court, when will interfere with ...	S 5 N 38
(iii) General principles ...	S 5 N 7
(iv) High Court, interference by—Exercise of discretion founded on mistaken view of law ...	S 5 N 39
(v) Importance of matter, if to be considered in ...	S 5 N 27
(vi) Party not guilty of negligence ...	S 5 N 7
... another ...	S 5 N 9
... has been ...	S 5 N 40
made ...	S 5 N 40
(ix) Question of exercise, when arises ...	S 5 N 40
(x) Question will not arise until period of limitation has actually expired ...	S 5 N 40
(xi) Reasonable diligence—Test of ...	S 5 N 7
(xii) Revision converted into appeal—Time for appeal expiring—Delay, if can be excused ...	S 5 N 30
(xiii) Revision, if lies over order ...	S 5 N 39
(xiv) Two appeals against same decree with one decree copy—Second copy furnished after time—Delay, if can be excused ...	S 5 N 31
(w) Extension of time is a matter of concession or indulgence ...	S 5 N 2
(x) Extension of time, right to—If can be claimed as an absolute right ...	S 5 N 2
(y) Good faith—Necessity of, on applicant ...	S 5 N 7 F N 5
(z) Grounds—Appellant having good case on merits, if ground :	S 5 N 7 F N 7
(z ¹) In filing appeal ...	S 5
(z ²) In filing application for leave to appeal ...	S 5
(z ³) In filing application for review ...	S 5
(z ⁴) Jurisdiction of Court—Single Judge sitting in admission Court—Power to excuse delay in filing appeal from Original Side or from mofussil Court ...	S 5 N 46
(z ⁵) Order admitting appeal by excusing delay—If 'adjudicating' appeal ...	S 5 N 45
(z ⁶) Order allowing filing of application or appeal beyond time—If 'judgment' within the meaning of the Letters Patent ...	S 5 N 44
(z ⁷) Order dismissing appeal as barred after refusing application to extend time—If 'order passed in appeal' within Sec. 109 (a), Civil P. C. ...	S 5 N 45
(z ⁸) Order extending time and admitting appeal—If 'final order' within S. 109, Civil P. C. ...	S 5 N 45
(z ⁹) Order must give reasons ...	S 5 N 41

Delay—Excuse of—(Contd.)

- (z¹⁰) Order passed on no evidence—Omission to consider whether there was sufficient cause for delay—Revision, interference in—Propriety of ... S 5 N 39
- (z¹¹) Order passed without investigating into allegation of illness—Revision, interference in—Propriety of ... S 5 N 39
- (z¹²) Party must show sufficient cause for not filing in time and circumstances to enable Court to exercise discretion to extend time ... S 5 N 2
- (z¹³) Principle applies only to admission of and not to granting or allowing it ... S 5 N 2
- (z¹⁴) Proceedings under Bengal Emergency Powers Ordinance 1931 ... S 5 N 4 FN 8
- (z¹⁵) Proceedings under Land Acquisition Act ... S 5 N 4 FN 8
- (z¹⁶) Prosecuting in good faith and due diligence another civil proceeding
- (i) Absence of reasonable grounds for prosecuting wrong ... S 5 N 9
- (ii) ... to appeal in delay : S 5 N 9 FN 7a
- (iii) Only period during which wrong proceeding was pending can be excused ... S 5 N 9
- (iv) Pendency of pauper application—If sufficient cause for delay in providing stamps for appeal ... S 5 N 9 FN 2
- (v) Prosecution of appeal in wrong Court knowing that appeal lay in another Court—If sufficient cause: S 5 N 9 FN 7a
- (vi) Prosecution of appeal in wrong Court owing to bona fide doubt—Delay, if can be excused ... S 5 N 9 FN 2
- (vii) Prosecution of application for review—If sufficient cause for delay in filing appeal ... S 5 N 9 FN 2
- (viii) Prosecution of application to set aside ex parte decree—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 9 FN 2
- (ix) Prosecution of application under Ss. 151 and 152, Civil P. C.—Time, if will be extended ... S 5 N 9 FN 2
- (x) Prosecution of one of two remedies open and failing on merits—Time spent, if can be excused ... S 5 N 9
- (xi) Prosecution of revision bona fide where more than one view of its competency was possible—Delay if can be excused ... S 5 N 9 FN 2
- (xii) Review—Absence of reasonable grounds for—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 9 FN 7
- (xiii) Review—Application knowingly filed beyond time without excuse—If sufficient cause for delay in filing appeal ... S 5 N 9 FN 7a
- (xiv) Suit filed on dismissal of objections—Suit rejected—Appeal then filed—Time, if can be extended : S 5 N 9 FN 2
- (xv) Time spent in prosecuting infructuous appeal—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 9 FN 2
- (xvi) ... of negligence—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 9 FN 7a
- (xix) Wrong prosecution of application under S. 151, Civil P. C.—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 9 FN 7a

Delay—Excuse of—(Contd.)**(z¹⁷) Reasonable diligence**

- (i) Application to prefer appeal not thought of until very late—If amounts to due diligence ... S 5 N 8 F N 2
- (ii) Delay of 23 days in applying for copies—If reasonable ... S 5 N 8
- (iii) Duty of appellant to prefer appeal as speedily as possible ... S 5 N 8 F N 6
- (iv) Existence of, after removal of cause for delay—Question of fact ... S 5 N 8
- (v) ... days of ... S 5 N 8
- (vi) ... according to mistaken calculation — If amounts to due diligence ... S 5 N 8 F N 6
- (vii) Necessity of showing in addition to sufficient cause ... S 5 N 7
- (viii) Party waiting till last day—Illness preventing filing in time—Delay, if can be excused ... S 5 N 8
- (ix) Party waiting till last moment—Appeal filed late due to inability to cross river in flood—Delay, if can be excused ... S 5 N 8
- (x) Proof of, in addition to existence of sufficient cause—Necessity of ... S 5 N 8
- (xi) Want of due diligence after removal of cause for delay—Whether disentitles party to indulgence ... S 5 N 8
- (xii) Whether should be shown even during period antecedent to delay ... S 5 N 8
- (z¹⁸) Refusal to excuse—Revision on order of competency of ... S 5 N 39
- (z¹⁹) Sufficient cause

(i) Amendment of decree

- (a) Appellant under bona fide mistake that time runs from the date of amendment — Absence of negligence—Time, if can be extended ... S 5 N 14
- (b) Name of defendant omitted in decree and added by amendment—Name substituted in memo of appeal after time—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 14
- (c) When sufficient cause ... S 5 N 14
- (ii) Appeal as pauper—Leave not granted—Time to pay court-fee given—Payment within such time—Sufficiency of ... S 5 N 29
- (iii) Appellant or applicant misled by order, practice or judgment of High Court ... S 5
- (iv) Being engaged in important litigation — If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 28
- (v) Body corporate, party—Delay, if can be excused ... S 5 N 26
- (vi) Burden of proof of ... S 5 N 37
- (vu) Circumstances contemplated in S. 14—Whether constitute sufficient cause within S. 5 ... S 14 N 5
- (viii) Copy of judgment
 - (a) Accidental loss of copy on day of filing appeal—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 35 F N 1
 - (b) Delay in filing—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 33
 - (c) Time taken for obtaining copy not required to be filed—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 31

Delay—Excuse of—Sufficient cause—(Contd.)

- (ix) Delay—Every day's delay must be properly explained: S 5 N 37
- (x) Delay in obtaining copy of judgment not explained—
Time, if can be extended ... S 5 N 7 F N 5
- (xi) Discovery of fresh evidence—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 23
- (xi¹) Discretion—Principles for exercise of, when sufficient
cause shown ... S 5 N 7
- (xii) Existence of, question of—Question of fact ... S 5 N 6
- (xiii) Failure of Court of Wards to file proceeding, if suffi-
cient cause ... S 5 N 32
- (xiv) Fraud of Vakil's clerk—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 17
- (xv) Fraudulent re-presentation of appeal—Delay, if can be
excused ... S 5 N 17
- (xvi) Government, party—Time if can be extended ... S 5 N 26
- (xvii) Ignorance—Ignorance of law—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 13
- (xviii) Illness of party
 - (a) Antecedent diligence, if should be shown ... S 5 N 15
 - (b) Illness after expiry of period of limitation—If
sufficient cause ... S 5 N 15
 - (c) Illness proved to be sufficient cause—Reasonable
diligence in prosecution of appeal till he fell ill—
Proof of—Necessity of ... S 5 N 15
 - (d) Question whether illness affords sufficient cause
—Question of fact ... S 5 N 15
 - (e) When sufficient cause ... S 5 N 15
- (xix) Importance of subject-matter is sufficient cause ... S 5 N 27
- (xx) Imprisonment of party
 - (a) Criminal offence—Convict's ignorance of right of
appeal—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 20
 - (b) When sufficient cause ... S 5 N 20
- (xxi) Leave to appeal as pauper sought for, on appeal being
returned as deficient in court-fee—Time, if can be
extended ... S 5 N 29
- (xxii) Liberal construction to be given ... S 5 N 6
- (xxiii) Meaning of ... S 5 N 6
- (xxiv) Mere proof of existence of, if will compel Court to
extend time ... S 5 N 2
- (xxv) Minority
 - (a) Guardian's failure to appeal due to his having
personal motive opposed to minor's interest—If
sufficient cause ... S 5 N 16
 - (b) If ground of extension ... S 5 N 16
 - (c) Negligence—Absence of sufficient cause—Delay,
if can be excused ... S 5 N 16
 - (d) Negligence of adult relations—Effect ... S 5 N 12
- (xxvi) Mistake arising from negligence—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 12
- (xxvii) Mistake committed without any real excuse—If suffi-
cient cause ... S 5 N 13
- (xxviii) Mistake obvious, if can be said to be bona fide ... S 5 N 13
- (xxix) Mistake of agent
 - (a) Counsel's clerk ... S 5 N 13 F N 8, 9, 9b
 - (b) Foolish mistake in calculation of time—Effect: S 5 N 12 F N 8
 - (c) Mistake occurring even in spite of due care and
attention—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 12

Delay—Excuse of—Sufficient cause—Mistake of agent—(Contd.)

(d) Omission of pleader's name in vakalatnama by oversight—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 12
(e) When sufficient cause	S 5 N 12
(xxv) Mistake of agent bona fide—Party acting without due care and attention relying on agent—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 12
(xxvi) Mistake of Court			
(a) Copying department, delay due to—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 22; S 5 N 22, FN 4
(b) Omission to give time and place at which Vacation Judge proposed to hold sitting of Court—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 22
(c) Party misled by—Proof that he acted with due care and attention—Necessity of	S 5 N 22
(d) Party prevented from filing appeal in time by mistaken order of Court—Delay, if can be excused	S 5 N 22
(xxxii) Mistake of Court or of its officers			
(a) If sufficient cause	S 5 N 22
(b) Party misled by change of practice—If amounts to sufficient cause	S 5 N 22
(xxxiii) Mistake of fact—Bona fides, test of	S 5 N 12
(xxxiv) Mistake of fact of party or agent	S 5 N 12
(xxxv) Mistake of law			
(a) If sufficient for asking Court to exercise discretion	S 5 N 13
(b) Mistake committed bona fide—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 13
(c) Mistake of counsel not due to ignorance but to want of due care and attention—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 13
(d) Mistake proceeding from culpable negligence of lawyer—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 13
(e) Negligent advice of lawyer—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 13
(f) Party acting on mistaken advice—Right to indulgence	S 5 N 13
(g) Party acting on wrong advice of lawyer when amounts to sufficient cause	S 5 N 13
(h) Party consulting lawyers of inferior standing and little experience—Acting on wrong advice—Effect	S 5 N 13
(i) Wrong advice amounting to sufficient cause—Proof of reasonable diligence—Necessity of	S 5 N 13
(j) Wrong advice by lawyer due to want of reasonable skill on his part—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 13
(k) Wrong advice of lawyer—Every wrong advice, if amounts to sufficient cause	S 5 N 13
(l) Wrong advice of lawyer based on untrue statement of facts made by party—Acting on such advice—If sufficient cause	S 5 N 13
(m) Wrong advice of lawyer not knowing recent change in law curtailing period of limitation—If sufficient cause for delay	S 5 N 13

Delay—Excuse of—Sufficient cause—Mistake of law—(Contd.)

- (n) ... high even
... is likely
... counts to S 5 N 13
- ... sufficient cause ... S 5 N 13
- (o) Wrong advice which no legal adviser of reasonable skill would be expected to give—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 13
- (p) Wrong proceeding taken on bona fide mistake of law—Delay, if can be excused ... S 5 N 13
- (xxxvi) Mistake of lawyer—Affidavit of lawyer that it was a mistake and not bona fide—Necessity of ... S 5 N 13
- (xxxvii) Mistake of pleader due to carelessness—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 11 FN 6
- (xxxviii) Mistake which could have been averted by proper enquiry—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 12
- (xxxix) Mistake which might occur even in the most carefully conducted business—If negligent mistake ... S 5 N 12
- (xl) Negligence of agent, or negligence of party ... S 5 N 11
- (xli) Negligence of body corporate—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 10
- (xlii) Negligence of party—Cause arising from—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 10
- (xliii) Negligence of party's agent—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 11
- (xliv) Negligence of pleader ... S 5 N 11
- (xlv) Negligence of pleader — Gross negligence in valuing appeal—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 11 FN 2
- (xlv) Negligence of pleader—Mistake honest but negligent—Whether sufficient cause ... S 5 N 11
- (xlvii) Negligence of pleader, gross carelessness of—Appeal filed in wrong Court—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 11 FN 2
- (xlviii) Negligence of pleader's clerk—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 11
- (xlv) Negligence of vakil in not paying printing charges in time—Party otherwise diligent—Delay, if can be excused ... S 5 N 11 FN 4
- (i) Negligent but honest mistake—If excusable ... S 5 N 11 FN 6
- (ii) Non-availability of court-fee stamps—When amounts to sufficient cause ... S 5 N 21
- (iii) Party being a pardanashin lady—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 23
- (liii) Party being a woman or a widow and not in good circumstances—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 23
- (liv) Party misled by declaration as to holidays—Time, if can be extended ... S 5 N 24
- (iv) Poverty or want of funds—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 18
- (lvi) Practice of Court
- (a) Party misled by—Delay due to failure to give information of date of judgment—If excusable : ... S 5 N 22
- (b) Party misled by—Whether sufficient cause ... S 5 N 22
- (c) Party misled by practice of another High Court —If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 22
- (lvii) Quarrel between appellants causing delay—If sufficient cause ... S 5 N 35 FN 1
- (lviii) Question whether facts and circumstances constitute sufficient cause—If one of law ... S 5 N 38

Delay—Excuse of—Sufficient cause—(Contd.)

(lx) Subsequent decisions altering law—If ground for excusing delay	S 5 N 19
(lx) Test to see if cause is sufficient	S 5 N 6
(lvi) Threat—Mere threat used against appellant—If sufficient cause for delay	S 5 N 17
(lvii) Time taken for translating judgment—If can be excused	S 5 N 35 F N 1
(lviii) Unforeseen circumstances causing delay—When sufficient cause	S 5 N 34
(z ²¹) Sufficient cause for not filing in time to be made out	S 5
(z ²¹) Sufficient cause made out—Discretion of Court to grant or refuse to grant extension	S 5 N 2
(z ²²) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 2
(z ²³) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ²⁴) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ²⁵) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ²⁶) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ²⁷) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ²⁸) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ²⁹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³⁰) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³¹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³²) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³³) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³⁴) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³⁵) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³⁶) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³⁷) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³⁸) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ³⁹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴⁰) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴¹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴²) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴³) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴⁴) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴⁵) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴⁶) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴⁷) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴⁸) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁴⁹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵⁰) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵¹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵²) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵³) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵⁴) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵⁵) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵⁶) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵⁷) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵⁸) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁵⁹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶⁰) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶¹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶²) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶³) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶⁴) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶⁵) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶⁶) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶⁷) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶⁸) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁶⁹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷⁰) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷¹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷²) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷³) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷⁴) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷⁵) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷⁶) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷⁷) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷⁸) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁷⁹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸⁰) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸¹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸²) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸³) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸⁴) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸⁵) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸⁶) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸⁷) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸⁸) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁸⁹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹⁰) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹¹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹²) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹³) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹⁴) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹⁵) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹⁶) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹⁷) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹⁸) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ⁹⁹) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1
(z ¹⁰⁰) Sufficient cause not shown—Discretion of Court—Oppor-	...	S 5 N 3 F N 1

—More delay when limitation has not expired—Effect ...	S 3 N 40
Demand	
—What is, within Art 60 ...	A 60 N 8

Deposit

—Deposit and withdrawals of money—Account consisting of—	
Balance due on—Suit for—Limitation ...	A 85 N 9
—Deposit as security for due performance of certain act, recovery of—	
—Suit for—Limitation ...	A 120 N 13
—Deposit as security for due performance of office—Recovery of—	
Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ...	A 120 N 13
—Deposit in Court—Whether payment within Art. 99 ...	A 99 N 6
—Deposit payable at specified time—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ...	A 60 N 7
—Deposit payable on demand	
(a) Suit for—Limitation ...	A 120 N 13
(b) What is	
(i) Deposit as earnest money for purchase of property, whether one payable on demand ...	A 60 N 7
(ii) Deposit as security for due performance of certain act, whether one payable on demand ...	A 60 N 7
(iii) Deposit of money payable at specified time, whether deposit payable on demand ...	A 60 N 7
(iv) Deposit on condition that depositor should return same on happening of a future contingent event, whether deposit payable on demand ...	A 60 N 7
(v) Money paid by a person to another for joint purchase of property, whether deposit payable on demand ...	A 60 N 7
—Deposited money	
(a) Interest upon—Suit for—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for money deposited ...	A 60 N 1
(b) Money deposited with banker—Suit for—Limitation ...	A 60 N 3
—Deposited money, suit for	
(a) Against person who has placed himself in position of banker with regard to particular person—Limitation ...	A 60 N 6

Deposit—Deposited money, suit for—(Contd.)

- (b) Burden of proof as to suit being time-barred on account of demand being made beyond limitation ... A 60 N 5
- (c) Burden of proof as to whether transaction is deposit or loan ... A 60 N 5
- (d) Deposit payable at specified time but contract between depositor is to be ... A 60 N 7
- (e) ... that it shall be payable on demand for applicability of Art. 60—Limitation : ... A 60 N 7
- (f) Limitation—Starting point ... A 60 N 10
- (g) Money deposited as earnest money for purchase of property—Limitation ... A 60 N 7
- (h) Money deposited as security for due performance of certain act—Limitation ... A 60 N 7
- (i) Money deposited on terms that depositor should return equivalent sum to depositor—Limitation ... A 62 N 17
- (j) Money deposited with Nattu Kottai Chetty on thavani system—Limitation ... A 60 N 7
- (k) Scope of Art. 60 ... A 60 N 6
- (l) Sum of money kept in deposit with a particular person—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
- (m) "When demand is made"
 - (i) "Demand" by Nattu Kottai Chetty husband in whose name wife's stridhan is deposited in a firm, whether demand binding on wife so as to start time running ... A 60 N 9
 - (ii) "Demand", by whom should be made to start time running under Art. 60 ... A 60 N 9
 - (iii) "Demand", what is, to start time running under Art. 60 ... A 60 N 8
- (n) Where deposit is payable on demand—Limitation ... A 60
- Deposited money in Court as *in usum jus habentis*—Money withdrawn by person not entitled to it—Suit for such money—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
- Express trust created by—Suit for—Limitation ... A 60 N 2
- Loan
 - (a) Distinguished from deposit ... A 60 N 2
 - (b) Presumption as to, in transaction between customer and banker ... A 60 N 5
 - (c) Presumption as to, where question arises whether transaction is deposit or loan ... A 60 N 5
- Meaning of ... A 145 N 3
- Moveable property deposited—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation : ... A 49 N 2
- Property deposited—Property wrongfully detained by depositary—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 49 N 2
- Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 59 N 3
- Whether necessarily creates a trust ... A 60 N 2

Depositary

- Legal representative of—Suit against, for moveable property deposited with deceased depositary—Limitation ... A 145 N 5
- Meaning of ... A 145 N 3
- Suit against—For moveable property deposited

(a) Allegation of plaintiff as to deposit, whether sole basis for ascertaining period of limitation applicable to such suit	...	A 145 N 7
(b) Applicability of Art. 49 and Art. 145	...	A 145 N 4
(c) Limitation—Starting point	...	A 145 ; A 145 N 6
(d) Suit for redemption of pledge—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit against depositary for moveable property deposited	...	A 145 N 7

—Suit by, for possession of immovable property

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------|
| (a) Alleging that instrument under which defendant is holding property is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation | ... | A 140 N 7 |
| (b) Burden of proof in such suit | | A 140 N 9 |
| (c) By other devisee where one devisee has obtained possession and has subsequently lost it—Limitation | | A 140 N 2 |
| (d) By successor of devisee—Limitation | | A 140 N 6 |
| (e) Cause of action on which such suit is based, in whose favour must arise | | A 140 N 2 |
| (f) Cause of action which has already accrued to person from whom devisee derived his title—Limitation applicable | | A 140 N 2 |
| (g) Challenging adoption under which defendant claims to be in possession—Limitation | | A 140 N 7 |
| (h) Limitation—Starting point | | A 140 N 8 |
| (i) Who has obtained possession but has subsequently lost it | | A 140 N 2 |

_____ expiring on holiday—
 S 4 N 9

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| | S 6 N 23 |
| (b) Adopted son after attaining majority though title as adopted son disputed—If ground | S 6 N 23 FN 5 |
| (c) Disqualified proprietor whose estate is under management of Court of Wards | S 6 N 23 |
| | S 6 N 23 |
| fraud of defendant—If ground | S 6 N 23 |
| (f) Ignorance of defendant's residence | S 6 N 23 FN 6 |
| (g) Involuntary absence from country due to transportation : | S 6 N 23 FN 4 |
| ncil | S 6 N 23 FN 5 |

—I	of such person—Acknow.	S 21
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—Capacity to give discharge

- | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| (a) Capacity of one joint administrator to give discharge on behalf of all | ... | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 26 |
| (b) Capacity of one joint executor to give discharge on behalf of all | ... | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 26 |
| (c) Capacity of one joint trustee to give discharge on behalf of all | ... | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 25 |
| (d) Capacity of one of several co-heirs to give discharge | ... | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 23 |
| (e) Capacity of one of several co-mortgagees to give discharge on behalf of all | ... | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 22 |

Deposit—Deposited money, suit for—(Contd.)

- (b) Burden of proof as to suit being time-barred on account of demand being made beyond limitation ... A 60 N 5
- (c) Burden of proof as to whether transaction is deposit or loan ... A 60 N 5
- (d) Deposit payable at specified time but contract between parties showing that after period so fixed, deposit is to be regarded as payable on demand—Limitation ... A 60 N 7
- (e) Deposit, whether must be under agreement that it shall be payable on demand for applicability of Art. 60—Limitation : A 60 N 7
- (f) Limitation—Starting point ... A 60 N 10
- (g) Money deposited as earnest money for purchase of property—Limitation ... A 60 N 7
- (h) Money deposited as security for due performance of certain act—Limitation ... A 60 N 7
- (i) Money deposited on terms that depositee should return equivalent sum to depositor—Limitation ... A 62 N 17
- (j) Money deposited with Nattu Kottai Chettis on thavanai system—Limitation ... A 60 N 7
- (k) Scope of Art. 60 ... A 60 N 6
- (l) Sum of money kept in deposit with a particular person—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
- (m) "When demand is made"
 - (i) "Demand" by Nattu Kottai Chetty husband in whose name wife's stridhan is deposited in a firm, whether demand binding on wife so as to start time running ... A 60 N 9
 - (ii) "Demand", by whom should be made to start time running under Art. 60 ... A 60 N 9
 - (iii) "Demand", what is, to start time running under Art. 60 ... A 60 N 6
- (n) Where deposit is payable on demand—Limitation ... A 60
- Deposited money in Court as *in usum jus habentis*—Money withdrawn by person not entitled to it—Suit for such money—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
- Express trust created by—Suit for—Limitation ... A 60 N 2
- Loan
 - (a) Distinguished from deposit ... A 60 N 2
 - (b) Presumption as to, in transaction between customer and banker ... A 60 N 5
 - (c) Presumption as to, where question arises whether transaction is deposit or loan ... A 60 N 5
- Meaning of ... A 145 N 3
- Moveable property deposited—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation : A 49 N 2
- Property deposited—Property wrongfully detained by depositary—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 60 N 2
- Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 60 N 2
- Whether necessarily creates a trust ...

Depositary

- Legal representative of—Suit against, for moveable property deposited with deceased depositary—Limitation ... A 145 N 5
- Meaning of ... A 145 N 3
- Suit against—For moveable property deposited

Depository—Suit against, for moveable property deposited—(Contd.)

- (a) Allegation of plaintiff as to deposit, whether sole basis for
- A 145 N 7
A 145 N 4
5. A 145 N 6

property deposited A 145 N 7

Devissee

—Suit by, for possession of immovable property

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|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------|
| (a) Alleging that instrument under which defendant is holding property is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation | ... | A 140 N 7 |
| (b) Burden of proof in such suit | | A 140 N 9 |
| (c) By other devisee where one devisee has obtained possession and has subsequently lost it—Limitation | | A 140 N 2 |
| (d) By successor of devisee—Limitation | | A 140 N 6 |
| (e) Cause of action on which such suit is based, in whose favour must arise | | A 140 N 2 |
| (f) Cause of action which has already accrued to person from whom devisee derived his title—Limitation applicable | | A 140 N 2 |
| (g) Challenging adoption under which defendant claims to be in possession—Limitation | | A 140 N 7 |
| (h) Limitation—Starting point | | A 140 N 8 |
| (i) Who has obtained possession but has subsequently lost it | | A 140 N 2 |

Disability

expiring on holiday—

- | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|---------------|
| (a) Absence from country of plaintiff ... | ... | ... | S 6 N 23 |
| (b) Adopted son after attaining majority though title as adopted son disputed—If ground ... | ... | ... | S 6 N 23 FN 5 |
| (c) Disqualified proprietor whose estate is under management of Court of Wards ... | ... | ... | S 6 N 23 |
| (d) Effect of these provisions on ... | ... | ... | S 6 N 23 |
| (e) Ignorance of defendant's residence ... | ... | ... | S 6 N 23 FN 6 |
| (f) Involuntary absence from country due to transportation : | ... | ... | S 6 N 23 FN 4 |
| (h) Pendency of appeal to Privy Council ... | ... | ... | S 6 N 23 FN 5 |

—Person under—Agent duly authorized of such person—Acknow-
ledgment or payment by—Effect of ... S 21

Discharge

—Capacity to give discharge

- | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| (a) Capacity of one joint administrator to give discharge on behalf of all | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 26 |
| (b) Capacity of one joint executor to give discharge on behalf of all | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 26 |
| (c) Capacity of one joint trustee to give discharge on behalf of all | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 25 |
| (d) Capacity of one of several co-heirs to give discharge | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 23 |
| (e) Capacity of one of several co-mortgagees to give discharge on behalf of all | ... | ... | ... | S 7 N 22 |

Distress—Distress damage feasant—(Contd.)

(b) Right conferred by Cattle Trespass Act, whether similar to distress damage feasant ... A 28 N 1

(c) Under English law—Right of, whether exists in India ... A 28 N 1

—Effectuated under provisions of statutory enactments, whether seizure of moveable property under legal process within the meaning of Art. 29 ... A 28 N 1

—Excessive distress

(a) Case where excessive distress is doing act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment—Limitation ... A 28 N 1

(b) Suit for compensation

(i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 28 N 3

(ii) Where excessive distress is "misfeasance or malfeasance" within Art. 36—Limitation ... A 28 N 1

—Illegal distress

(a) Suit for compensation

(i) Against Municipal Board—Distress of plaintiff's goods, under colour of enactment—Limitation ... A 2 N 3

(ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 28 N 3

(iii) Suit for recovery of sum of money collected by distress in excess of the amount properly due—Limitation ... A 28 N 2

(iv) Where illegal distress is a "misfeasance or malfeasance" within Art. 36—Limitation ... A 28 N 1

(b) Where illegal distress is doing act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment—Limitation ... A 28 N 1

—Irregular distress

(a) Suit for compensation

(i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 28 N 3

(ii) Where irregular distress is a "misfeasance or malfeasance" within Art. 36—Limitation ... A 28 N 1

(b) Where irregular distress is "doing act alleged to be in pursuance of any enactment"—Limitation ... A 28 N 1

Distributed assets

—Distributed assets paid by executor or administrator—Refund of—Compulsion of—Suit for, under Indian Succession Act, Ss. 360 or 361—Limitation ... A 43 N 2

District Court**—Appeal to**

(a) Under Agra Tenancy Act—Appeal against decree of Revenue Court—Limitation ... A 152 N 24

(b) Under Civil P. C.

(i) Formal order not drawn up—Limitation—Starting point ... A 152 N 6

(ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 152 N 2, 3, 6

(iii) Time for such appeal, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Lim. Act ... A 152 N 8

(iv) Time occupied in prosecuting in wrong Court, whether excluded ... A 152 N 9

(v) Time, whether extended on ground that Court was closed on last day of expiry of limitation for such appeal ... A 152 N 7

Dividend

—Suit for—By shareholder—Limitation A 62 N 7

Divorce Act

—Appeal under

(a) Against decree absolute made on Original Side of High Court

—Limitation A 151 N 2

(b) Applicability of Limitation Act to such appeal ... A 151 N 2

—Petition for dissolution of marriage—Delay in presenting or prosecuting petition

(a) Objection on ground of delay will not hold good where marriage is *ab initio* void S 29 N 7

(b) Whether ground for disallowing petition S 29 N 7

—Suit for dissolution of marriage by person not governed by Divorce Act—Limitation Act applies S 29 N 7

—Suit under

... .. S 29 N 7

... .. S 29; A 151 N 2

... .. S 29 N 7

Doctrines

—Lis pendens A 10 N 15

Document

—Cancellation of

(a) Right of—Basis of A 91 N 2

(b) Suit for

(i) Based upon document—Limitation A 91 N 2

(ii) Based upon document which plaintiff attacks as invalid and illegal A 91 N 2

(iii) By third party to instrument—Limitation A 91 N 2

(iv) Limitation—Special and general provisions of A 91 N 2

(v) On ground that document is not binding on plaintiff A 91 N 2

(vi) To declare invalidity of document and to cancel it —Limitation A 91 N 3

(vii) Whether necessary before reversioner can claim relief which he wants A 91 N 4

(c) When is a person entitled to cancel a document A 91 N 3

—Creating neither mortgage nor charge—Suit upon—Limitation ... A 132 N 2

—Document issued

(a) Forgery of—Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point A 92 N 4

(b) What is A 92 N 3

—Forged document

(a) Suit for substantial relief in respect of—Limitation A 92; A 92 N 2

(b) Suit to declare forgery

(i) Attempt to enforce document against third party—Whether Art. 93 applies A 93 N 1

(ii) Declaration subversive or ancillary—Suit, whether one for declaration of forgery A 93 N 2

(iii) In respect of document attempted to be enforced —Limitation—Starting point—"Date of attempt," meaning of A 93; A 93 N 2

Document—Forged document—Suit to declare forgery—(Contd.)

- (iv) In respect of registered document—Limitation—Starting point ... A 92 N 4
- (v) Limitation ... A 92; A 92 N 2
- Hatchitta document—Suit on—Document stamped and signed by debtor containing statement of adjustment of accounts and consisting unqualified promise to pay—Limitation ... A 115 N 3
- Material alteration in document containing acknowledgment after it is given—Document, if can be relied on as saving limitation under S 19 ... S 19 N 67
- Meaning of ... A 91 N 16
- Mortgage deed—Whether specific moveable property ... A 48 N 3
- Not binding on particular person—Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 91 N 2
- Not cancelled—Suit for relief which is not inconsistent with document—Whether barred, if suit for cancellation of document is time-barred ... A 91 N 3
- Not intended to be operative—Suit by executant for possession of property sold—Limitation ... A 91 N 3
- Rectification of
- (a) Suit for—Whether suit for relief on ground of fraud ... A 95 N 10
- (b) Suit for rectification on ground of mutual mistake under Specific Relief Act, S. 31—Limitation ... A 96 N 4
- Registered document
- (a) "Registered"—Meaning of ... A 116 N 5
- (b) Rent due under—Suit for—Limitation ... A 110 N 5
- (c) Royalty under, recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 116 N 9
- (d) Sale certificate granted to purchaser in court auction under provisions of Civil P C — Fact that copy of certificate is forwarded to registering officer and duly filed, whether makes certificate a registered document ... A 10 N 11
- (e) What is — Mere attestation of deed before *kazee*, whether amounts to registered document within Art 116 ... A 116 N 5
- Setting aside of
- (a) Right of—Basis of ... A 91 N 2
- (b) Suit for
- (i) Burden of proof ... A 91 N 19
- (ii) By person not party to document for cancelling or setting it aside—Whether suit for rescission of contract ... A 114 N 1
- (iii) By third party to instrument—Limitation ... A 91 N 2
- (iv) Limitation—Starting point ... A 91, A 91 N 2, A 91 N 20
- (v) On ground of its having been obtained by undue influence—Cause of action, when arises ... S 9 N 7
- (vi) Special and general provisions of limitation ... A 91, A 91 N 2
- (vii) Suit for declaration that document is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation ... A 91 N 2
- (viii) Whether necessary before reversioner can claim relief which he wants ... A 91 N 4
- (ix) Whether time extended on ground of disability of plaintiff ... A 91 N 18
- (c) When is a person entitled to set aside document ... A 91 N 3

Dividend

—Suit for—By shareholder—Limitation A 62 N

Divorce Act

—Appeal under

(a) Against decree absolute made on Original Side of High Court
—Limitation A 151 N

(b) Applicability of Limitation Act to such appeal ... A 151 N

—Petition for dissolution of marriage—Delay in presenting or prosecuting petition

(a) Objection on ground of delay will not hold good where marriage is *ab initio* void S 29 N 7

(b) Whether ground for disallowing petition S 29 N 7

—Suit for dissolution of marriage by person not governed by Divorce Act—Limitation Act applies S 23 N 7

—Suit under

(a) Appeal from decree—Limitation applicable S 29 N 7

(b) Limitation Act, if applies S 29, A 151 N 3

(c) Provisions of Limitation Act do not apply S 23 N 7

Doctrines

—*Lis pendens* A 10 N 15

Document

—Cancellation of

(a) Right of—Basis of A 91 N 3

(b) Suit for

(i) Based upon document—Limitation A 91 N 3

(ii) Based upon document which plaintiff attacks as invalid and illegal A 91 N 3

(iii) By third party to instrument—Limitation A 91 N 3

... .. A 91 N 3

—Limitation A 91 N 3

(vi) Whether necessary before reversioner can claim relief which he wants A 91 N 4

(c) When is a person entitled to cancel a document A 91 N 3

—Creating neither mortgage nor charge—Suit upon—Limitation ... A 132 N 3

—Document issued

(a) Forgery of—Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point A 93 N 4

(b) What is A 93 N 3

—Forged document

(a) Suit for substantial relief in respect of—Limitation A 92, A 93 N 3

(b) Suit to declare forgery

(i) Attempt to enforce document against third party—Whether Art. 93 applies A 93 N 1

(ii) Declaration subservient or ancillary—Suit, whether one for declaration of forgery A 93 N 3

(iii) In respect of document attempted to be enforced—Limitation—Starting point—"Date of attempt," meaning of A 93, A 93 N 3

Document—Forged document—Suit to declare forgery—(Contd.)

(iv) In respect of registered document—Limitation—Starting point A 92 N 4

(v) Limitation A 92, A 92 N 2

—Hatchitta document—Suit on—Document stamped and signed by debtor containing statement of adjustment of accounts and consisting unqualified promise to pay—Limitation A 115 N 3

—Material alteration in document containing acknowledgment after it is given—Document, if can be relied on as saving limitation under S. 19 S 19 N 67

—Meaning of A 91 N 16

—Mortgage deed—Whether specific moveable property A 48 N 3

—Not binding on particular person—Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation A 91 N 2

—Not cancelled—Suit for relief which is not inconsistent with document—Whether barred, if suit for cancellation of document is time-barred A 91 N 3

—Not intended to be operative—Suit by executant for possession of property sold—Limitation A 91 N 3

—Rectification of

(a) Suit for—Whether suit for relief on ground of fraud A 93 N 10

(b) Suit for rectification on ground of mutual mistake under Specific Relief Act, S. 31—Limitation A 96 N 4

—Registered document

(a) "Registered"—Meaning of A 116 N 5

(b) Rent due under—Suit for—Limitation A 110 N 5

(c) Royalty under, recovery of—Suit for—Limitation A 116 N 9

(d) Sale certificate granted to purchaser in court auction under provisions of Civil P. C. — Fact that copy of certificate is forwarded to registering officer and duly filed, whether makes certificate a registered document A 10 N 11

(e) What is — Mere attestation of deed before *kazee*, whether amounts to registered document within Art 116 A 116 N 5

—Setting aside of

(a) Right of—Basis of A 91 N 2

(b) Suit for

(i) Burden of proof A 91 N 19

(ii) By person not party to document for cancelling or setting it aside—Whether suit for rescission of contract A 114 N 1

(iii) By third party to instrument—Limitation A 91 N 2

(iv) Limitation—Starting point A 91, A 91 N 2, A 91 N 20

(v) On ground of its having been obtained by undue influence—Cause of action, when arises S 9 N 7

(vi) Special and general provisions of limitation A 91, A 91 N 2

(vii) Suit for declaration that document is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation A 91 N 3

(viii) Whether necessary before reversioner can claim relief which he wants A 91 N 4

(ix) Whether time extended on ground of disability of plaintiff A 91 N 18

(c) When is a person entitled to set aside document A 91 N 3

Document—(Contd.)

—Sham or inoperative

- (a) Cancellation, whether necessary to one party to it ... A 91 N 3
 (b) Declaration that such document is sham—Suit for—Limitation ... A 91 N 3

—Suit based upon

- (a) Limitation ... A 91 N 2
 (b) Suit where plaintiff attacks particular clause as invalid and illegal—Limitation ... A 91 N 2

—Valid document

- (a) Remedy of person not party to document ... A 91 N 3
 (b) Suit by third party to declare that document is not binding on him—Limitation ... A 91 N 3
 (c) When can be cancelled by third party ... A 91 N 3
 (d) Whether can be cancelled ... A 91 N 3

—Void document

- (a) Suit to declare document void and to cancel it—Limitation : ... A 91 N 3
 (b) Third party to document—Failure of third party to declare that document is not binding on him—Effect of ... A 91 N 3
 (c) Whether must be set aside by party to it for obtaining relief which he claims ... A 91 N 3

—Voidable document

- (a) Setting aside of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 91 N 3
 (b) Whether must be set aside by one party to it before obtaining other relief which he claims ... A 91 N 3

—Whether specific moveable property ... A 48 N 3

Dower

—Claim for

- (a) Whether can be disposed of by wife by transfer or will ... A 103 N 3
 (b) Whether forms part of wife's estate and passes on her death to her heirs ... A 103 N 3

—Deferred dower

- (a) Suit for
 (i) By legal representatives of wife—Limitation—Where contract to pay dower is registered ... A 104 N 1
 (ii) By Mahomedan—Limitation ... A 104
 (iii) By Mahomedan where deferred dower becomes payable by dissolution of marriage by husband pronouncing talak and further executing talaknamah wherein he agrees to pay dower amount by monthly instalments: ... A 104 N 1
 (b) What is ... A 103 N 1
 (c) When payable ... A 104 N 1

—Deferred dower and policy of life insurance compared ... A 104 N 1

—Deferred dower in Mahomedan law—Effect of, on husband's power to dissolve marriage at will ... A 104 N 1

—Exigible dower

- (a) Meaning of ... A 103 N 2
 (b) Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ... A 103 N 2
 (c) Suit for, by legal representatives of wife—Limitation ... A 103 N 3
 (d) Suit for, by Mahomedan
 (i) Contract of dower on behalf of or in favour of minor, whether binding on guardian personally or on person for whom contract is made ... A 103 N 12

Dower—Exigible dower—Suit for, by Mahomedan—(Contd.)

- (ii) Contract of dower on behalf of or in favour of minor, whether enforceable by minor ... A 103 N 12
- (iii) Demand and refusal for portion of dower, whether sets time running also for the rest ... A 103 N 6
- (iv) Demand and refusal necessary to start time running—Meaning of such "demand and refusal"—Illustrations ... A 103 N 6
- (v) Dower in Mahomedan law—What is—Payment of *kass* or advance given to husband at the time of marriage and which is repayable to wife on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce, whether dower ... A 103 N 1
- (vi) For balance of dower debt due where wife is placed by husband in possession of property for payment of dower and upon husband's death is subsequently dispossessed by his legal representatives—Limitation ... A 103 N 9
- (vii) Husband appointed executor of wife's will whereby she bequeaths her right to dower to certain persons, whether can take advantage of limitation prescribed for suit for such dower ... A 103 N 8
- (viii) Limitation ... A 102
- (ix) Marriage under Mahomedan law, when dissolved by divorce ... A 103 N 7
- (x) Mere opposition from husband without any demand from wife, whether starts limitation running ... A 103 N 6
- A 103 N 1
- A 103 N 1
- whether suit for dower ... A 103 N 1
- (xiv) Suit on contract of dower on behalf of or in favour of minor—Limitation—Where guardian contracting is liable on express contract of suretyship ... A 103 N 12
- (xv) What is, during continuance of marriage ... A 103 N 6
- (xvi) Where claim for dower is embodied in registered contract—Limitation ... A 103 N 11
- (xvii) Where in consideration of dower debt, mortgage deed is executed by husband in favour of wife—Limitation ... A 103 N 10
- (xviii) Where marriage is dissolved by death ... A 103 N 5
- (xix) Where marriage is dissolved by divorce ... A 103 N 5
- (xx) Where suit is against husband who is executor of wife's will ... A 103 N 8
- (e) Suit for
 - (i) By wife against legal representatives of husband where husband dies without payment of dower debt—Maintainability of suit ... A 103 N 4
 - (ii) Where wife makes definite and unambiguous demand for dower ... A 103 N 5
- (f) Wife, whether must make demand for dower before institution of suit ... A 103 N 5
- Liability of husband, nature of—Husband, if trustee for dower ... S 10 N 11
- Meaning of, in Mahomedan law ... A 103 N 1
- Prompt dower—What is ... A 103 N 1

Dower—(Contd.)

—Suit for recovery

- (a) Limitation—Starting point—Suit by heirs of wife ... A 116 N 13
 (b) Suit based on registered deed—Limitation ... A 116 N 13

Drink

- Price of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 8

Easement

—Acquisition of

- (a) By custom ... S 2 C1 2 N 4
 (b) By dedication ... S 2 C1 5 N 4
 (c) By prescription
 (i) Nature of user to amount to acquisition... S 26 N 3
 (ii) Principle underlying ... S 26 N 3
 (d) Conditions ... S 26
 (e) Co-owners—One co-owner of immovable property, if can as such acquire easement for beneficial enjoyment of such property ... S 26 N 5
 (f) Easement against Crown ... S 26 N 16

Property in possession of tenant or other person with limited right—Easement, if can be acquired in respect of it ...

- (g) Easement cannot be acquired when there has been no user at all ... S 26 N 14
 (h) Easement claimed against Government—Property over which right is claimed should belong to Government at the date the easement is claimed and sued ... S 26 N 16
 (i) Easement claimed by prescription against Government—60 years' user necessary ... S 26 N 16
 (j) Easement to spread branches or roots of a tree on the neighbour's land without liability to cut—Whether can be claimed ... S 26 N 15
 (k) Enjoyment as an easement
 (i) Acts done by person claiming easement only referable to a purported character of owner—Whether can sustain subsequent claim for easement in respect of property ... S 26 N 12
 (ii) Mere fact that in litigation claimant puts forward claim of ownership which is found to be not proved—Whether conclusive as to whether right was enjoyed as easement... S 26 N 12
 (iii) Ownership of property vesting jointly in several persons—Each exclusively enjoying some portion which is undivided from the rest—One of them, if can acquire right of easement over plot held exclusively by other co-sharers ... S 26 N 12
 (iv) Unity of possession or ownership in the same person of both the tenements—Enjoyment as easement during the period of unity, if possible ... S 26 N 12
 (l) Enjoyment as of right
 (i) Constant interruptions even if not acquiesced in for a year—Whether shows that enjoyment was not as of right ... S 26 N 13

Easement—Acquisition of—Enjoyment as of right—(Contd.)

- (ii) Difference between Indian and English law as regards this requirement ... S 26 N 13
- (iii) Enjoyment begun as of right—Mere interruption for less than a year—Whether affects it ... S 26 N 13
- (iv) Enjoyment in such a manner as not to involve the admission of any obstructive right in the owner of the servient tenement—Whether enjoyment as of right ... S 26 N 13
- (v) Enjoyment must be an adverse exercise of a growing right against servient tenement ... S 26 N 13
- (vi) Meaning of ... S 26 N 13
- (vii) Permissive user, if user as of right ... S 26 N 13
- (viii) Proof of long open user—Presumption that it has been as of right, if arises ... S 26 N 13
- (ix) Test to determine if enjoyment is as of right ... S 26 N 13
- (x) User must be in the assertion of right as if claimant was true owner of the right ... S 26 N 13
- (m) Enjoyment for 20 years
 - (i) Actual user within two years next before institution of suit—Whether necessary ... S 26 N 15
 - (ii) Alteration of easement during course of enjoyment imposing additional or new burden on servient tenement—Fresh period of 20 years' enjoyment is necessary to acquire right ... S 26 N 15
 - (iii) Computation of period—Property held under or by virtue of any interest for life or any term of years exceeding three years from the granting thereof ... S 27
 - (iv) Dominant owner in enjoyment for less than 20 years—Whether gives him sufficient interest as against trespassers to maintain suit against them for relief ... S 26 N 13
 - (v) Hindu widow in enjoyment of servient tenement—Exclusion of period in favour of reversioner—When available ... S 27
 - (vi) Period must end within two years before institution of suit ... S 26 N 15
 - (vii) Persons successively in possession of dominant tenement—Periods, if can be tacked to make up statutory period ... S 26 N 15
 - (viii) Requirement of 20 years' user not applicable to easements that may be acquired by contract or custom ... S 26 N 15
 - (ix) Right to easement, if indefeasibly established by enjoyment for less than 20 years ... S 26 N 15
 - (x) Same easement must have been enjoyed for the period ... S 26 N 15
 - (xi) Same person need not have enjoyed easement for the whole of the 20 years ... S 26 N 15
 - (xii) Without interruption—"Interruption"—Meaning of... S 26
- (n) Enjoyment without interruption
 - ... S 26 N 14
 - ... S 26 N 14
 - ... S 26 N 14
 - (iv) Discontinuance of enjoyment—When amounts to interruption ... S 26 N 14

Easement—Acquisition of—Enjoyment without interruption.—(Contd.)

- (v) Dominant owner himself creating obstruction of permanent character—Act, if amounts to abandonment of right ... S 26 N 14
- (vi) Evidence of protest unaccompanied by actual obstruction—Whether sufficient to support plea of interruption ... S 26 N 14
- (vii) Exercise of right need not be continuous... S 26 N 14
- (viii) Interruption—What amounts to ... S 26 N 14
- (ix) Interruption, if confined to case of intermediate obstructions in the course of period of enjoyment for 20 years ... S 26 N 14
- (x) Interruption at the end of period of 20 years—Effect of ... S 26 N 14
- (xi) Light and air—Dominant tenement burnt down and rebuilt with windows corresponding to old windows—Temporary discontinuance of enjoyment, if an interruption ... S 26 N 14
- (xii) Mere non-user, if can show that right has been abandoned ... S 26 N 14
- (xiii) Mere non-user of an easement for a time—Whether an interruption of the enjoyment ... S 26 N 14
- (xiv) Non-user—When indicates intentional abandonment of right ... S 26 N 14
- (xv) Non-user caused by obstruction of person other than claimant himself—Whether amounts to interruption: ... S 26 N 14
- (xvi) Non-user of right—When amounts to an interruption: ... S 26 N 14
- (xvii) Non-user to amount to interruption must have effect of a prevention of the user by some person acting adversely to claimant ... S 26 N 14
- (xviii) Proof of circumstances merely negating assent on the part of servient owner to enjoyment of easement claimed—Whether sufficient to support plea of interruption ... S 26 N 14
- (n) Exclusion of period in favour of reversioner of servient tenement
 - (i) Claim should be contested within 3 years next after termination of term or interest, to claim deduction... S 27 N 1
 - (ii) Owner not determining tenancy at expiry of term and allowing tenant to hold over—Whether affects question of exclusion ... S 27 N 1
- (p) Filing of the suit enables easement to be acquired ... S 26 N 15
- (q) Grant, if can be presumed from long user independent of the Limitation Act ... S 26 N 4
- (r) Grant or other legal origin of easement, if can be presumed from long user ... S 26 N 4
- (s) History of the law of acquisition of easements in India ... S 26 N 1
- (t) Interruption of enjoyment—User prior to interruption—Whether can be added on to period subsequent to interruption ... S 26 N 15
- (u) Limited easement, if can be acquired by prescription ... S 26 N 15
- (v) Long user—Whether by itself creates right of easement ... S 26 N 3

Easement—Acquisition of—(Contd.)

- (w) Long user by grantee or covenantee openly and peaceably and without fear of interruption—Whether gives rise to presumption of grant or covenant... S 26 N 3
- (x) Modes of acquisition other than by prescription not barred... S 26 N 4
- (y) No absolute right can be acquired until right is brought in question in some suit... S 26 N 15
- (z) Open enjoyment
- (i) Actual knowledge on the part of servient owner of right enjoyed by dominant owner—Whether necessary... S 26 N 11
- (ii) Enjoyment must be of a nature from which a presumption, that the owner had knowledge and had acquiesced in the right, might be drawn... S 26 N 11
- (iii) Enjoyment which cannot be prevented — Whether raises presumption of consent or acquiescence... S 26 N 11
- (iv) "Openly" in S. 26—Meaning of... S 26 N 11
- (v) Principle of requirement that enjoyment should be open... S 26 N 11
- (vi) Reason of the requirement that user must be open... S 26 N 11
- (z¹) Peaceable enjoyment—Mere protest, if renders the enjoyment otherwise than peaceable... S 26 N 10
- (z²) "Peaceably" in S. 26—Meaning of... S 26 N 10
- (z³) Period of 20 years—How to be computed... S 26
- (z⁴) Prescription... S 26 N 3
- (z⁵) Property over which right is claimed belonging to the Crown — Enjoyment should be for 60 years... S 26
- (z⁶) Provisions for — Whether applicable to easements against Government... A 149 N 3
- (z⁷) Right in respect of sweeper's passage, if can be acquired... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z⁸) Right of fishery as *profit a prendre*, if can be acquired... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z⁹) Right of pasturage, if can be acquired... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z¹⁰) Right of privacy, if can be acquired as easement... S 2 Cl 5 N 0
- (z¹¹) Right of support, if can be acquired... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z¹²) Right of way
- (i) Enjoyment without interruption— Right of way between fixed termini—Servient owner pointing out different pathway—Whether amounts to interruption of easement... S 26 N 14
- (ii) Peaceable and open enjoyment as easement, as of right, without interruption and for 20 years—Right is acquired... S 26
- (iii) Suit for obstructing right of way—Defendants admitting obstruction but denying right of way—Proof by plaintiff that right was peaceably and openly enjoyed as an easement, as of right and without interruption —Right of plaintiff to judgment... S 26
- (iv) Whether can be acquired partly by grant and partly by prescription... S 26 N 4
- ... easement... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- ... e acquired... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- ... s acquired... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9

Easement—Acquisition of—(Contd.)

- (z¹⁷) Right to discharge smoke over another's land, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z¹⁸) Right to dry tobacco on adjacent land, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z¹⁹) Right to exercise a noxious or injurious or offensive occupation, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z²⁰) Right to fish without stint and for commercial purposes which might lead to destruction of subject-matter—Whether can be acquired as easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 6
- (z²¹) Right to go on another's land to gather fruits falling there, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z²²) Right to hold musical festival on particular land, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z²³) Right to keep a bund at a particular height, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z²⁴) Right to light and air, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z²⁵) Right to promiscuous use of the whole property by driving cattle over it in all directions—Whether can be acquired as easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 6
- (z²⁶) Right to rear fish in another's tank, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z²⁷) Right to stack manure on a certain plot, if can be acquired : ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z²⁸) Right to throw back surface water and keep it standing on another's land, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z²⁹) Right to transplant growing rice plants from another's land to one's own land, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z³⁰) Right to use land for storing, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z³¹) Right to use of water, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z³²) Right to user of watercourse, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z³³) Right to user of way, if can be acquired ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
- (z³⁴) Right to watercourse—Peaceable and open enjoyment as easement, as of right, without interruption for 20 years—Right is acquired ... S 26
- (z³⁵) Right to watercourse or to use of any water—Whether can be acquired by prescription ... S 26 N 8
- (z³⁶) Right which will destroy ordinary user of property by owner—Whether can be acquired as easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 6
- (z³⁷) Right which would prevent servient owner from making ordinary use of his property—Whether can be acquired as easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 6
- (z³⁸) Same easement
- (i) Easement for allowing sweepers to walk and clean privy a certain number of times a year—Rule requiring cleansing of privy daily—Easement if altered ... S 26 N 15
 - (ii) Growing tree cannot be enjoyed as same easement for any length of time ... S 26 N 15
 - (iii) Light received through new apertures, same or substantial part of light received through old windows—Easement, if altered ... S 26 N 15
 - (iv) Question whether same easement has been enjoyed during a particular period is one of fact ... S 26 N 15
 - (v) Same channel used to take water from tank—Water taken through different openings—Easement, if different ... S 26 N 15

Easement—Acquisition of —Same easement—(Contd.)

- (vi) Terminus of way fixed—Servient owner pointing out route from time to time—Easement, if altered ... S 26 N 15
- (z³⁹) Suit for obstructing right of way—Plaintiff showing that right was peaceably and openly enjoyed by him for 20 years—Defendant proving that plaintiff on one occasion during the 20 years asked his leave to enjoy the right—Suit should be dismissed ... S 26
- (z⁴⁰) Whether can be acquired by fluctuating body, by custom ... S 2 Cl 5 N 8
- (z⁴¹) Whether can be acquired either by owner of tenement or on his behalf by person in possession thereof ... S 26 N 5
- (z⁴²) Who can acquire ... S 26 N 5
- (i) Permanent tenure-holder, if can acquire easement against the owner or another permanent tenure-holder: S 26 N 13
- (ii) Tenant, if can acquire easement for his own benefit as against landlord ... S 26 N 13
- (iii) Tenant of owner—Whether can acquire easement for benefit of dominant tenement in his possession ... S 26 N 5
- Affirmative and negative easements—Distinction between ... S 26 N 11
- Alteration of
- (a) Building of new windows not receiving the same cones of light as were received by old windows—Easement can only be acquired by 20 years' enjoyment of light through new windows ... S 26 N 15
- (b) Easement of support—Increase in burden—Suit as to—Limitation ... A 32 N 2
- (c) Owner of dominant tenement, if can by alteration increase his right ... S 26 N 15
- “Any other easement” 10 S 26—Meaning of ... S 26 N 9
- Classes of
- (a) Affirmative and negative easements, what are ... S 2 Cl 5 N 11
- (b) Apparent and non-apparent easements, what are ... S 2 Cl 5 N 11
- (c) Continuous and discontinuous easements, what are ... S 2 Cl 5 N 11
- (d) Permanent and limited easements, what are ... S 2 Cl 5 N 11
- Customary easement—Acquisition—20 years' user not necessary ... S 26 N 15
- Definition is wider than in Easements Act ... S 2 Cl 5 N 1
- Disturbance of—Suit in respect of, when maintainable ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a
- Encroachment of—Suit as to—Limitation applicable ... A 32 N 2
- Essentials of ... S 26 N 12
- (a) Dominant and servient tenements—Necessity of ... S 2 Cl 5 N 4
- (b) Easement must be for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant tenement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 5
- Extent of
- (a) Accustomed user, if determines extent ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a
- (b) Air, easement to ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a
- (c) Light, easement of ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a
- (d) Right of way ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a
- (e) Right of way for one purpose, if can extend to any purpose whatever ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a
- (f) Right of way, if includes right to carry marriage and funeral processions ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a
- (g) Right to take river-water, if includes right to storage ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a

Easement—Extent of—(Contd.)

- (h) Support, easement of ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9a
- Extent of applicability of Easements Act and the Limitation Act ... S 26 N 2
- Extinguishment of—Unity of title of the dominant and servient estates in same person—Whether and when extinguishes easement ... S 26 N 23
- If includes all easements recognized by English law ... S 2 Cl 5 N 1
- If includes *profits a prendre* ... S 2 Cl 5 N 1
- Law applicable to, in Provinces where Easements Act does not apply ... S 26 N 2
- Law governing—Applicability of English law ... S 26 N 2
- License, distinction from ... S 2 Cl 5 N 3
- Light and air
 - (a) Enjoyment as of right without interruption for 20 years ... S 26
 - Right is acquired ...
 - (b) Fact that light from other sources exists than that which is acquired by prescription—Whether answer to suit for infringement of prescriptive right to light and air which has been established ... S 26 N 20
 - (c) Nature of easement right to light and air ... S 26 N 6
 - ... y prescription ... S 26 N 6
 - ... oyed through aperture in wall—
 - Aperture, if should belong to dominant owner ... S 26 N 6
 - Meaning of ... S 2 Cl 5
 - ... easement: ... S 2 Cl 5 N 2
 - ... S 2 Cl 5 N 4
 - ... S 2 Cl 5 N 5
 - ... S 2 Cl 5 N 10
 - (e) Exclusive right to maintain ferry on another's property, if easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 10
 - (f) Ferry, right of, if easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 4
 - ... S 2 Cl 5 N 2
 - ... S 2 Cl 5 N 2
 - ... r a man's land, if ... S 2 Cl 5 N 6
 - an easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 4
 - (j) *Profit a prendre*, if easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 4
 - (k) Projection of one's building over the land of another merely for ornamentation—Whether easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 5
 - (l) Right in gross, if easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 4
 - (m) Right must be for beneficial enjoyment of dominant tenement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 5
 - (n) Right of prospect, if easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
 - (o) Right of way independent of its being necessary for beneficial enjoyment of any dominant tenement—Whether easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 4
 - (p) Right to build, if easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 2
 - ... S 2 Cl 5 N 2
 - ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
 - ... S 2 Cl 5 N 2
 - (t) Riparian rights—Right to take all the water flowing in a natural stream to the exclusion of lower riparian owners—Whether easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 6

Easement—Meaning of—(Contd.)

- (u) Surface water, right to, if easement ... S 2 Cl 5 N 7
- (v) Whether includes all easements recognized by English law. S 2 Cl 5 N 1
- (w) Whether includes *profit a prendre* whether in gross or appurtenant ... S 2 Cl 5 N 1
- Natural rights, distinction from ... S 2 Cl 5 N 2
- Nature of
 - (a) Easement attaches to one land or building over another land and not against persons ... S 26 N 16
 - (b) Easement, if an interest in immovable property ... S 2 Cl 5 N 10
 - (c) Easement is a specific right ... S 2 Cl 5 N 7
 - (d) Easement is only a fractional right of user ... S 2 Cl 5 N 6
 - (e) Owner, if excluded from using his property ... S 2 Cl 5 N 6
 - (f) Vesting of right, if only in determinate individuals ... S 2 Cl 5 N 7
- Nature of right
 - (a) Fact that dominant owner is not inconvenienced by obstruction—Whether affects right acquired in suit ... S 26 N 20
 - (b) Right to easement established—Dominant owner making excessive user of it to which user he has not acquired a prescriptive right—Servient owner can obstruct and prevent excessive user but not rightful user ... S 26 N 20
 - (c) Right to easement established in suit—Right becomes absolute and indefeasible ... S 26 N 20
 - (d) Whether right to use property for specific purpose ... A 32 N 2
- Ownership of, acquisition by possession ... Preamble
- Plea of
 - (a) Alternative claim to ownership of servient tenement and to easement thereon—Whether can be set up by a party ... S 26 N 17
 - (b) Claim to easement by prescription—Whether can be converted by Court into one by custom ... S 26 N 17
 - (c) Claimant can only claim that his right should not be encroached upon ... S 26 N 17
 - (d) If can be taken for the first time in second appeal ... S 26 N 17
 - (e) Plea that party has been using water from a particular source from time immemorial—Whether amounts to setting up plea of an easement ... S 26 N 17
 - (f) Suit by owner of servient tenement for redress within 20 years—Claimant to easement, if can rely on plea of prescription in answer ... S 26 N 15
 - (g) Suit merely to establish right of ownership to property—Court, if can enter into and decide right to an easement over such property ... S 26 N 17
 - (h) Whether can be taken at any stage of the suit ... S 26 N 17
- Prescriptive right allowed by Act—Custom to the effect that no such right shall be acquired is not admissible ... S 26 N 21
- Presumption—Long open user of right proved—Presumption that user was as of right—Whether arises ... S 26 N 18
- Proof of
 - (a) Obstruction proved to have taken place—Onus is on person obstructed to show that he did not submit to or acquiesce in it ... S 26 N 18
 - (b) Onus is on claimant to establish all points necessary to establish easement ... S 26 N 18

Easement—(Contd.)

- Provisions as to, in Act—Whether apply to cases arising in territories to which Easements Act may for the time being extend: S 29
 - Revival of—Easement extinguished by union of dominant and servient tenements in one owner—When can be revived ... S 26 N 22
 - Right of way
 - (a) Acquisition of—Actual user without interruption, if necessary ... S 26 N 14
 - (b) Classes of rights of way ... S 26 N 7
 - (c) Person establishing right of way over another's land to go to a plot—Fact that he has another way by which he can go to the same plot—Whether affects his right to enjoy easement established ... S 26 N 20
 - (d) Right for passage of boats—Whether analogous to right of way ... S 26 N 7
 - (e) Whether can be acquired partly by grant and partly by prescription ... S 26 N 4
 - Right to watercourse
 - (a) Artificial watercourse—Right to flow or use of water must rest on some grant or arrangement proved or presumed ... S 26 N 8
 - (b) Artificial watercourse found to have been for temporary purpose and liable to variation—Grant of easement cannot be presumed from long enjoyment ... S 26 N 8
 - (c) Artificial watercourse intended to be a permanent one—Right to use of water can be acquired by prescription ... S 26 N 8
 - (d) Whether can be acquired by prescription ... S 26 N 8
 - Rights recognized as, what are ... S 2 Cl 5 N 9
 - Rights that can be acquired as easements—Right to cause river-water to flow across dominant tenement for irrigation by means of embankment erected on dominant tenement ... S 26 N 8
 - Servitudes—Origin of ... S 26 N 1
 - Servitudes under Roman Law ... S 2 Cl 5 N 1
 - Suit for—Period of 20 years should end within two years next before institution of suit ... S 26
 - Suit in respect of
 - (a) Benamidar for dominant owner—Whether can sue for removal of obstruction to access to light and air to dominant tenement ... S 26 N 19
 - (b) Parties to suit ... S 26 N 19
 - (c) Suit for declaration of right to an easement—All owners of servient tenement should be made defendants ... S 26 N 19
 - (d) Suit to remove obstruction created by one of the owners of the servient tenement—Other owners are not necessary parties ... S 26 N 19
 - (e) Water carried by drain on another's land going to third party's land—Claimant, if can sue third party to allow the water to flow to third party's land ... S 26 N 19
 - Suspension of—One estate held in fee and the other for a term of years—Unity of possession only suspends easement during the time of such unity ... S 26 N 22
 - Unity of title or possession of dominant and servient estates in same person—Effect ... S 26 N 23
- Easements Act**
- Easement under, what is ... S 2 Cl 5 N 1

Easements Act—(Contd.)

- Provinces in which Easements Act does not apply—Law regulating easement—What is ... S 26 N 2
- Section 7—Natural rights, instances of ... S 2 Cl 5 N 2
- Section 15—"Peaceable enjoyment"—Meaning of ... S 26 N 10
- Territories to which Easements Act may for the time being extend—Cases arising in—Provisions as to easement in Limitation Act do not apply ... S 29

Ejectment

- Suit for ejecting mortgagor to whom mortgagee has leased back mortgaged property—Limitation ... A 135 N 2
- Suit for ejectment by private person against another in respect of specified field which has been recorded as part of thoroughfare and *shamlat-e-deh*—Limitation ... A 146.A N 3
- Suit for ejectment of tenant
 - (a) Defendant setting up permanent tenancy—Burden of proof ... A 139 N 17
 - (b) On ground of misuse of land—Suit under Bengal Tenancy Act, S 155—Limitation ... A 143 N 2
 - (c) Suit framed in tort—Limitation ... A 143 N 2
- Suit for ejectment of transferee and restoration of property to trustee, whether suit for possession within Art 134 ... A 134 N 3
- Suit for ejectment on ground that defendant is tenant-at-will—Suit, whether one for correction of entry in Record of Rights ... A 120 N 50
- Suit for ejectment or possession and suit for rent—Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S 14 ... S 14 N 18
- Suit in Revenue Court for ejectment of defendants as tenants—Suit in Civil Court for ejecting them as trespassers—Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S 14 ... S 14 N 18

Encroachment

- By tenant on another property of landlord—Tenant, whether can acquire by prescription same rights as he had over land originally demised ... A 139 N 19
- On public way—Suit for removal—Limitation ... A 120 N 10
- On reserved land—Suit for removal—Limitation ... A 120 N 10

Endowment

- Religious endowment
 - (aa) Adverse possession—See under Adverse possession
 - (a) Debutter estate made party but not properly represented—Amendment adding proper representative—Whether addition of new party within S 22 ... S 22 N 6
 - (a¹) Exclusion of shebait from endowed property can amount to exclusion of idol from it ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (b) Manager of
 - (i) If trustee in the eye of law ... S 10 N 9
 - (ii) Is only custodian of institution ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (c) Math—Title by adverse possession, if can be obtained against math ... S 23 N 4
 - (c¹) Office of manager—Alienation of, by manager is void *ab initio* ... A 142 & 144 N 49
 - (d) Property comprised in Hindu, Buddhist or Muhammadan religious or charitable endowment—Whether property vested in trust for a specific trust ... S 10 N 25

Endowment—Religious endowment—(Contd.)

- (e) Property comprised in religious or charitable endowment, whether property vested in trust for specific purpose ... S 10
- (f) Property purchased in name of Hindu idol from funds belonging to purchaser—Purchaser, if under obligation to hold property for benefit of idol ... S 10 N 10
- (g) Shebait's—Devolution of right to sue ... S 2 Cl 8 N 6
- (g¹) Suit against alienee of property without consideration from manager, for possession—No limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- (h) Suit by manager—Limitation ... A 149 N 5
- (i) Suit by manager of endowment to recover possession of immovable property transferred by previous manager for valuable consideration—Limitation—Starting point ... A 134.ABC N 5 & N 2
- (i) Suit by manager of endowment to recover possession of moveable property sold by previous manager for valuable consideration ... A 134.ABC N 2
- (k) Suit by worshippers against *archakas* of temple for declaration that lease by them of *hundial* collections was invalid—Subsequent suit by trustee against same defendants for recovery of collections taken by them—Period of pendency of former suit cannot be excluded in computing limitation for latter suit ... S 15 N 11
- (l) Suit to set aside transfer of immovable property by manager of endowment for valuable consideration—Limitation ... A 134.ABC N 2
- (l¹) Transfer of property by manager—Succeeding manager will not get fresh starting point ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- (l²) Transfer of property by manager as owner
- (i) Time runs against institution from date of transfer ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- (ii) Transfer void *ab initio* ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- (l³) Transfer of property by manager as such—Transfer valid till set aside or till death, resignation or removal of transferor ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- (l⁴) Transfer of property by manager, without legal necessity—Transfer not void *ab initio* ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- (l⁵) Transferee from manager—Suit against, for possession—Limitation—Starting point ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- (m) Trustee of Hindu religious institution—Suit for recovery of trust property from stranger—Limitation commencing to run during lifetime of one trustee—Another trustee succeeding to office—Fresh start of limitation, if available ... S 10 N 27
- (n) *Vahivatdars* of Parsi Anjuman—Whether trustees for a specific purpose ... S 10 N 26

—Religious institution

- (a) Cannot be regarded as perpetual minor ... A 142 & 144 N 49
- (b) Of Hindus, Musalmans or Buddhists—Recognition of, as juridical person capable of holding property ... A 142 & 144 N 49

—Religious or charitable endowment

- (a) Alienation of immovable property by manager—Suit for setting aside—Limitation ... A 134.ABC N 2
- (b) Alienation of moveable property by manager—Suit for setting aside—Limitation ... A 134.ABC N 2

Endowment—Religions or charitable endowment—(Contd.)

- (c) Alienee of property — Whether acquires prescriptive title, after period of limitation for suit to recover possession from alienee ... A 134-ABC N 10
- (d) Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment—Property of—Whether alienable ... A 134-ABC N 2
- (e) Manager of—Who is, within Arts. 134-B and C... A 134-ABC N 6
- (f) Property comprised in—Whether property vested in trust for specific purpose ... S 10
- (g) Property comprised in Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist charitable or religious endowment, whether property conveyed or bequeathed in trust within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 5
- (h) Sale of moveable property, by manager — Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation ... A 48-B
- (i) Suit by manager
- (i) For recovery of possession of immovable property transferred by previous manager — Alienee, whether acquires title by prescription if suit by manager is not brought within prescribed period ... A 134-ABC N 10
- (ii) For recovery of possession of immovable property transferred by previous manager—Limitation—Starting point ... A 134-ABC N 9
- (iii) Suit by committee of management appointed by Court—Suit, whether by manager within Arts. 134-B and C ... A 134-ABC N 6
- (iv) Suit by person in possession of property for recovery thereof for benefit of institution —Suit, whether one by manager within Arts. 134-B and C ... A 134-ABC N 6
- (v) To recover possession of immovable property transferred by previous manager—Limitation — Starting point—Where transfer is *ad initio* void ... A 134-ABC N 7
- (vi) To recover possession of immovable property transferred by previous manager, against auction-purchaser—Where property is sold to execution of decree against manager—Limitation—Starting point ... A 134-ABC N 8
- (j) Suit by person interested in endowment for declaration that alienation by manager of endowment is invalid and for ejectment of transferee and restoration of property to manager—Limitation ... A 134-ABC N 4
- (k) Suit in respect of property — Limitation — Arts 134-A, 134-B, 134-C,—Retrospective effect of ... A 134-ABC N 3
- (l) Transfer of property by manager for valuable consideration—Suit for recovery by succeeding manager—Limitation—Starting point ... A 134 N 5

Enforcement

—And execution—Distinction between ... A 183 N 4

English law

—If binding on Indian Courts . . . Preamble N 16

—Principles of, applicability to Indian codified law ... Preamble N 16

English Prescription Act

—User for a particular period—Whether creates by its own force a right which was non-existent ... S 26 N 3

Equity of redemption—See under Redemption—Equity of. Estate

—Entire estate—Meaning of A 121 N 4

Evidence

—Admissibility—Declaration of intention by author of instrument
 —Whether admissible for construing the instrument ... S 19 N 33
 —Dates endorsed on certified copies—Evidentiary value of ... S 12 N 34
 —Perjured evidence—Decree obtained by, whether can be set aside... A 95 N 6
 —Secondary evidence of contents of acknowledgment—Admissibility
 of S 19 N 39

Evidence Act

—Section 23 — Acknowledgment of liability contained in letter
 marked 'without prejudice'—Admissibility of S 19 N 66
 —Section 90—Presumption under—Applicability to documents con-
 taining acknowledgment of liability S 19 N 68
 —Section 91—Acknowledgment relied on for saving limitation—
 Whether "matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a
 document" within S. 91 S 19 N 40
 —Section 92—Prohibition under—Whether applies to unilateral
 documents like acknowledgments of liability S 19 N 41
 —Section 124—Application made in, official confidence—Production
 of, if can be compelled by Court to prove acknowledgment by
 applicant S 19 N 70

Exclusion of time

—Application for execution—Exclusion under other Acts—Illustra-
 tions S 15 N 5
 —Day from which period of limitation is to be reckoned to be
 excluded S 12
 —Exclusion of day of pronouncing judgment
 (a) Date of judgment duly communicated to pleader—Pleader
 and party not present on date—Limitation for appeal,
 when commences S 12 N 6
 (b) Judge signing judgment but not pronouncing it — Party
 coming to know of fact of signing of judgment on subsequent
 date—Latter date is date of pronouncing judgment ... S 12 N 6
 S 12 N 6
 (c) Such day happening to be a holiday—Day must be excluded:
 —Exclusion of time for copies
 (a) Appeal from judgment on review—Copy of original judgment
 subject-matter of review application—Time requisite for
 obtaining—Whether can be deducted in computing period
 of limitation for appeal S 12 N 27
 (b) Appeal from orders—Time spent in obtaining not only fair
 order but also the final order to be excluded S 12 N 35
 (c) Application accompanied by insufficient deposit—Copying
 department not calling for applicant and giving information
 —Time during which copy could not be prepared due to
 deficiency—Whether can be reckoned against applicant ... S 12 N 14
 (d) Application bearing necessary court-fee stamp and addressed
 to proper officer—Time necessary for ascertaining cost of
 preparing copy—Whether time requisite for obtaining copy: ... S 12 N 14
 (e) Application for copies—Supply of folios before they are called
 for by Court—Effect of, in computing time requisite for
 obtaining copy S 12 N 16

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time for copies—(Contd.)

- (f) Application for copies by post—Date from which exclusion can be claimed ... S 12 N 9.
- (g) Application for copies, if should have been made by party himself in person for benefit of exclusion ... S 12 N 9
- (h) Application for copies made on day on which judgment is pronounced—That day, if can be excluded twice over ... S 12 N 21
- (i) Application for copies of judgment and decree—Decree not signed and hence application so far as decree is concerned returned—Subsequent application—First application, if to be treated as pending—Time from its date, if can be excluded ... S 12 N 25
- (j) Application for copies struck off and subsequently revived—Computation of period to be made as if the application had ... S 12 N 17
- ... partment render. ... S 12 N 22
- ... not to be counted
- (k) Application for leave to appeal to Privy Council—Time requisite for obtaining copies of judgment and decree—Whether can be excluded in computing period of limitation ... S 12 N 28
- (m) Copies obtained by another party or by stranger—Exclusion of time spent in obtaining—Whether can be claimed ... S 12 N 9
- (n) Copies of judgment and decree—Time taken to obtain—Whether must be deducted though such copies need not, according to rules of the High Court, accompany memo of appeal ... S 12 N 7
- (o) Copies of judgment and decree applied for on same day—Applicant, if can add on to the longer period any time within the term of the longer period ... S 12 N 13
- (p) Copies of judgment and decree obtained but not available for being filed—Another application for copies made and appeal filed with copies so obtained—Time requisite to obtain which copy to be excluded ... S 12 N 20
- (q) Copy, if should have been obtained for the purpose of the appeal or application in question ... S 12 N 9
- (r) Copy of judgment giving all necessary information—Right to exclude time taken in obtaining copy of decree also ... S 12 N 7
- (s) Court closing for vacation several days after delivery of judgment—Limitation for appeal expiring during holidays—Copy application filed on re-opening day—Appeal filed on receiving copies—Appeal, if barred ... S 12 N 24
- (t) Criminal Appeal—Time taken to obtain copies of diary orders filed with appeal—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation for appeal ... S 12 N 32
- (u) Criminal appeal by person in jail—Time taken up in forwarding applications for copies by officer in charge of jail on behalf of appellant and in transmission of such copies to jail—Whether to be excluded ... S 12 N 32
- (v) Criminal appeal or application for leave to appeal—Time taken for necessary copies to be excluded ... S 12 N 32
- (w) Day of application for copy and day on which copy is notified as ready, to be excluded ... S 12 N 10a.

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time for copies—(Contd.)

- (f) Application for copies by post—Date from which exclusion can be claimed ... S 12 N 9.
- (g) Application for copies, if should have been made by party himself in person for benefit of exclusion ... S 12 N 9
- (h) Application for copies made on day on which judgment is pronounced—That day, if can be excluded twice over ... S 12 N 21
- (i) Application for copies of judgment and decree—Decree not signed and hence application so far as decree is concerned returned—Subsequent application—First application, if to be treated as pending—Time from its date, if can be excluded ... S 12 N 25
- (j) Application for copies struck off and subsequently revived—Computation of period to be made as if the application had been subsisting ... S 12 N 17
- (k) Application for copy mislaid by copying department rendering another application necessary—Delay not to be counted against applicant ... S 12 N 22
- (l) Application for leave to appeal to Privy Council—Time requisite for obtaining copies of judgment and decree—Whether can be excluded in computing period of limitation ... S 12 N 28
- (m) Copies obtained by another party or by stranger—Exclusion of time spent in obtaining—Whether can be claimed ... S 12 N 9
- (n) Copies of judgment and decree—Time taken to obtain—Whether must be deducted though such copies need not, according to rules of the High Court, accompany memo of appeal ... S 12 N 7
- (o) Copies of judgment and decree applied for on same day—Applicant, if can add on to the longer period any time within the termini of the longer period ... S 12 N 13
- (p) Copies of judgment and decree obtained but not available for being filed—Another application for copies made and appeal filed with copies so obtained—Time requisite to obtain which copy to be excluded ... S 12 N 20
- (q) Copy, if should have been obtained for the purpose of the appeal or application in question ... S 12 N 9
- (r) Copy of judgment giving all necessary information—Right to exclude time taken in obtaining copy of decree also ... S 12 N 7
- (s) Court closing for vacation several days after delivery of judgment—Limitation for appeal expiring during holidays—Copy application filed on re-opening day—Appeal filed on receiving copies—Appeal, if barred ... S 12 N 24
- (t) Criminal Appeal—Time taken to obtain copies of diary orders filed with appeal—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation for appeal ... S 12 N 32
- (u) Criminal appeal by person in jail—Time taken up in forwarding applications for copies by officer in charge of jail on behalf of appellant and in transmission of such copies to jail—Whether to be excluded ... S 12 N 32
- (v) Criminal appeal or application for leave to appeal—Time taken for necessary copies to be excluded ... S 12 N 32
- (w) Day of application for copy and day on which copy is notified as ready, to be excluded ... S 12 N 10a.

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time for copies—(Contd.)

- (x) Day on which folios are called for and day on which they are supplied to be excluded ... S 12 N 14
- (y) Day or days immediately after date of notice for requisite folios happening to be holidays — Such days should be excluded ... S 12 N 14
- (z) Days immediately after date of notice for requisite folios happening to be holidays—Papers to be deposited on re-opening day ... S 12 N 14
- (z¹) Days immediately after date of notice for requisite folios holidays—Arrangements made for receiving folios during holidays and this fact duly notified — Applicant cannot ... S 12 N 14
- (z²) ... S 12 N 12
- (z³)
copying department—Delay in obtaining copies, if can be excluded ... S 12 N 12
- (z⁴) Delay—Time being occupied for obtaining copies of decree or judgment—Delay during same period in supplying folios in respect of the other document—Whether can be counted against appellant ... S 12 N 14
- (z⁵) Delay caused by defective application for copies—Period of exclusion—When commences ... S 12 N 12
- (z⁶) Delay caused by despatch of copies by post
 (i) Copies asked to be sent by post—Department not doing so but only posting notice on notice board that copies are ready—Party taking delivery after waiting for a reasonable time—Period between date of copy being ready and date of delivery—Whether can be deducted ... S 12 N 18
- (ii) Copies despatched to wrong address and returned—Copies re-despatched to correct address — Period between date of despatch to wrong address and date of despatch to correct address to be excluded ... S 12 N 18
- (iii) Period between date on which copy was ready and date of despatch—Whether can be excluded ... S 12 N 18
- (iv) Time taken in transmission of copies by post cannot be excluded ... S 12 N 18
- (z⁷) Delay caused by getting order varied and settled—Period, if ... S 12 N 25a
- (z⁸)
such copy ... S 12 N 19
- (z⁹) Delay caused by separate applications for copies of judgment and decree—Effect of ... S 12 N 13
- (z¹⁰) Delay in taking delivery—Time between date on which copy is ready and date on which it is actually taken delivery of —Whether can be excluded ... S 12 N 15
- (z¹¹) Delay in taking delivery of copies
 (i) Sunday or holiday succeeding day on which copies are ready—Special arrangement known to applicant made to deliver copies during holidays—Deduction of holiday, if can be claimed ... S 12 N 15

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time for copies—Delay in taking delivery of copies—(Contd.)

- (ii) Sunday or holiday succeeding day on which copies ready—Delivery taken next day—Sunday or holiday, if can be excluded ... S 12 N 15
- (iii) Under rules of Court copying establishment unable to tell exact date on which copies will be ready—Appellant not guilty of undue delay—Period between date of its being ready and date of taking delivery to be excluded ... S 12 N 15
- (z¹²) Delay in taking delivery of copy—Absence of notice or communication to party of date on which copies are ready—Delay in taking delivery, if can be counted against him ... S 12 N 15
- (z¹³) Delay necessitated in obtaining copies—When can be excused under S. 5 ... S 12 N 8
- (z¹⁴) Documents in respect of which exclusion should be made ... S 12 N 8
- (z¹⁵) Exclusion, if can be claimed between signing of decree and application for copies ... S 12 N 25
- (z¹⁶) Exclusion taken in prior infructuous proceedings—Time required to obtain copy of order in prior proceeding, if can be excluded ... S 14 N 28
- (z¹⁷) Formal and final order not necessary to be prepared—Right to deduct time taken for obtaining copy thereof if such order is actually prepared ... S 12 N 7
- (z¹⁸) Holidays intervening between dates of judgment and copy application—Party prevented from taking the necessary steps for obtaining copies—Whether time requisite for obtaining copies ... S 12 N 24
- (z¹⁹) Interval between judgment and signing of decree
- (i) Court refusing to pass decree till plaintiff complied with certain orders—Date of decree is date of final judgment—Time runs from date of passing of decree ... S 12 N 25
- (ii) Whether can be excluded as time requisite without regard to date of application for copies ... S 12 N 25
- (z²⁰) Judgment delivered during holidays—Copy application filed not on re-opening day but some days after re-opening—Holidays, if can be regarded as time requisite for obtaining copies ... S 12 N 24
- (z²¹) Judgment delivered during the time Court is closed for holidays—Copy application filed on re-opening date—Holidays, if can be regarded as time requisite for obtaining copies ... S 12 N 24
- (z²²) Judgment delivered on last day before closing of Court—Copy application made on re-opening date—Holidays, if to be regarded as time requisite for obtaining copies ... S 12 N 24
- (z²³) No delay caused by applicant after making application—Whole period between date of application and date of copy being ready to be excluded ... S 12 N 14
- (z²⁴) One common judgment in two suits—Two appeals filed against such judgment in the two suits—Copy of judgment applied for only in one suit filed with appeal on it—Time

S 12 N 26

S 12 N 29

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time for copies—(Contd.)

- (z²⁰) Rules of Court requiring application to be accompanied by deposit of cash or stamps—Delay in furnishing cash or stamps or folios—Effect of ... S 13 N 14
- (z²⁷) Party to be accompanied by ...
 accompanied by in-
 after requisition by
 Court—Time requisite for obtaining copy to be computed only from date on which deficiency was made up ... S 13 N 14
- (z²³) Rules requiring party to take definite steps to have decree drafted
 (i) Mere fact of application being made, whether entitles party to deduct all the time elapsing before date of copy being ready ... S 13 N 25
 (ii) Party delaying in making requisition or guilty of laches—Delay, if forms part of time requisite for obtaining copies ... S 13 N 25
- (z²⁹) Suit to contest award of Board of Revenue—Time spent in obtaining copy of award, whether can be excluded ... A 1 N 1
- (z³⁰) Time between date of application for copies and date of notice of requisition for stamp and folios for copies—Whether to be excluded in computing period of limitation ... S 13 N 23
- (z³¹) Time occupied in obtaining copy of award—Whether excluded in computing period of limitation for application to set aside award ... A 159 N 6
- (z³²) Time occupied in obtaining copy of decree—Whether excluded from period of limitation for appeal from decree of High Court on Original Side ... A 151 N 3
- (z³³) Time occupied in obtaining copy of decree—Whether excluded from limitation for application for leave to appeal as pauper... A 170 N 3
- (z³⁴) Time occupied in obtaining copy of decree—Whether excluded from limitation for application for leave to appeal to Privy Council ... A 179 N 4
- (z³⁵) Time occupied in obtaining copy of judgment—Whether excluded from period of limitation for appeal from decree of High Court on Original Side ... A 151 N 3
- (z³⁶) Time occupied in obtaining copy of judgment—Whether excluded from limitation for application for leave to appeal to Privy Council ... A 179 N 4
- (z³⁷) Time occupied in obtaining copy of order—Whether excluded from period of limitation for appeal from order of High Court on Original Side ... A 151 N 3
- (z³⁸) Time occupied in obtaining copy of order of dismissal for default—Whether excluded from limitation for application for setting aside dismissal ... A 163 N 10
- (z³⁹) Time occupied in obtaining copy of report of sale officer—Whether can be excluded from limitation for application to set aside execution sale ... A 166 N 17
- (z⁴⁰) Time requisite
 (i) Application made to wrong person—Time spent, if can be considered as time requisite ... S 13 N 11

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time for copies—Time requisite—(Contd.)

- (ii) Determination—Court, if has discretion—Indulgence by way of extension can be granted not under S 12 but only under S. 5 ... S 12 N 36
- (iii) Delay by the office or Court for which appellant is not responsible—Whether can be excluded as being time requisite ... S 12 N 10
- (iv) Delay caused by appellant's carelessness or negligence, if time requisite ... S 12 N 10
- (v) Period prior to application for copies cannot be regarded as time requisite ... S 12 N 24, 25
- (vi) Question what is the time requisite—How to be determined ... S 12 N 10
- (vii) Time requisite, if always the time actually spent in securing the copies ... S 12 N 10
- (z⁴¹) Time requisite for obtaining copies
 - (i) Time requisite, what is—Evidentiary value of dates endorsed on certified copies ... S 12 N 34
 - (ii) Whether available only in case of appeals, applications for leave to appeal, applications for review and applications to set aside award ... S 12 N 4
 - (iii) Whether should be continuous ... S 12 N 24
- (z⁴²) Time requisite in S. 12—Meaning of ... S 12 N 10
- Exclusion of time of defendant's absence from British India in computing limitation for suit ... S 13
- Exclusion of time of prior infructuous proceeding—Failure of prior proceeding must be due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature ... S 14 N 25
- Exclusion of time of proceeding *bona fide* in Court without jurisdiction
 - (a) Another civil proceeding—Whether includes execution proceedings in another suit ... S 14 N 12
 - (b) Another proceeding
 - (i) Administration suit—*Bona fide* prosecution by creditor of claim under deceased debtor's promissory note—Whether will be excluded in computing limitation for subsequent suit on promissory note ... S 14 N 12
 - (ii) In S. 14—Meaning of—Prior proceeding, if must have been in a different Court ... S 14 N 12
 - (iii) Institution of suit against person who is dead before its institution—Legal representatives impleaded subsequently—S 14, if applies ... S 14 N 12
 - (iv) Plaint presented in time subsequently ordered to be returned for presentation to proper Court—Case, if one of another proceeding or of continuation of prior proceeding ... S 14 N 12
 - (v) Plaint returned for presentation to proper Court for want of jurisdiction—Plaintiff abandoning part of claim and presenting it to same Court after limitation—Exclusion under S. 14, if can be claimed ... S 14 N 12
 - (vi) Suit for rent in one Court—Suit dismissed on appeal on ground that Court had no jurisdiction—Court invested with jurisdiction by that time—Fresh suit

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction—Another proceeding—(Contd.)

- instituted in same Court on same cause of action—
Plaintiff, if entitled to benefit of S. 14 ... S 14 N 13
- (vii) Time taken by creditor in filing proof of a claim in
Insolvency Court—Whether can be excluded in com-
puting limitation for suit by him on claim after
annulment of adjudication ... S 14 N 13
- (c) Application—For the same relief
- (i) Application to have *ex parte* decree set aside—Appli-
cation for execution of same decree—Reliefs are
different ... S 14 N 19
- (ii) Application to obtain execution under preliminary
decree—Whether for the same relief as subsequent
application for final decree in suit ... S 14 N 19
- (iii) Application under O. 21 R. 69, Civil P. C.—Relief is
not same as that claimable under O. 21 R. 90 ... S 14 N 19
- (iv) Relief claimed in execution application is different
from relief for preparation of final decree ... S 14 N 19
- (v) Relief for possession under sale deed—Relief for
damages or for return of purchase money in default of
possession—Reliefs are different ... S 14 N 19
- (vi) Relief of possession is different from relief of decla-
ration ... S 14 N 19
- (vii) Revision from Small Cause Court judgment—Whether
for different relief from revision from infructuous prior
appeal from previous decree of Small Cause Court in
same matter ... S 14 N 19
- (viii) Right to enforce sale and suit to set aside sale—Reliefs
are different—Right to enforce sale is not suspended: ... S 14 N 19
- (ix) Suit and application to restore suit dismissed for
default are not for same relief ... S 14 N 19
- (x) Suit for injunction restraining defendant from enter-
ing property—Subsequent execution application for
balance of decree amount against same property—
Reliefs are different ... S 14 N 19
- (d) Applications—Prior proceeding must relate to same relief—
Prior proceeding, suit for mesne profits on dispossession for
two years—Subsequent proceeding, application for mesne
profits for four years inclusive of above two years—Exclu-
sion under S. 14 will apply only in respect of relief for
mesne profits for the two years in common ... S 14 N 17
- (e) Arbitrator—Proceeding before arbitrator—Arbitrator if
should exclude time spent in prosecuting in good faith the
same claim before arbitrator without jurisdiction ... S 14 N 5
- (f) Causes of a like nature in S. 14—Meaning of—Causes for
which a withdrawal may be permitted—Whether causes of
a like nature with defect of jurisdiction ... S 14 N 8
- (g) Circumstances contemplated in S. 14—Whether may be
taken to constitute 'sufficient cause' within S. 5 ... S 14 N 5
- (h) Civil proceeding in Court
- (i) Land Registration Deputy Collector acting in matter
for decision under Ss. 28, 29 or 42, Land Registra-

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction—Civil proceeding in Court—(Contd.)

tion Act of Bihar—Whether a Court—Proceeding, if civil proceeding	S 14 N 13
(ii) Officer acting in administrative or executive capacity—Whether Court—S. 14, if applies	S 14 N 13
(iii) Proceedings before arbitrator—Whether civil proceedings in a Court	S 14 N 13
(iv) Revenue Courts, if Courts under S. 14	S 14 N 13
(v) Settlement officer or Commissioner of Board of Revenue in preparing or revising a record of rights—Whether a Court dealing with a civil proceeding	S 14 N 13
(i) Computation of period to be excluded—Date of institution and of termination to be counted	S 14
(j) Conditions under which exclusion can be claimed	S 14
(k) Defect of jurisdiction			
(i) Court having no power to make an order—Whether means that it has no jurisdiction in the matter	S 14 N 23
(ii) Court in which prior proceedings were pending erroneously thinking it had no jurisdiction—S. 14, if applies	S 14 N 25
(iii) Defect of jurisdiction may be territorial or in relation to the subject-matter	S 14 N 23
(iv) Dismissal of execution application for sale on ground that no decree under O. 34, R. 6, Civil P. C., had been obtained—Dismissal, if on account of defect of jurisdiction	S 14 N 23
(v) Prior proceedings dismissed on merits or on ground that they were misconceived—Benefit of S. 14, if available	S 14 N 22
(vi) Prior proceeding pending in wrong Court on account of mistake of Court—S. 14, if applies	S 14 N 25
(vii) Prior proceeding, plaint or application in, returned for presentation to proper Court—S. 14, if applies	S 14 N 25
(viii) That there were prior proceedings and they went against the plaintiff—Whether sufficient for applicability of S. 14	S 14 N 22
(ix) Want of jurisdiction, if can arise after institution of proceeding	S 14 N 23
(x) Whether covers defect due to laches of parties	S 14 N 23
(xi) Whether covers such mistakes as presentation and pro-	S 14 N 23
proper remedy—Institution of suit—Failure of appeal, if due to a cause of like nature	S 14 N 24
(ii) Application for transfer of decree—Dismissal on ground that it was time-barred and that judgment-debtor had no property within the local limits of Court which passed the decree—Whether covered by S. 14	S 14 N 22
(iii) Decree-holder joining, in execution petition relief, not in conformity with decree—Cause, if in the nature of defect of jurisdiction	S 14 N 24

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction—Defect of jurisdiction or other cause, etc.—(Contd.)

- (iv) Dismissal of application for execution on ground that it was not in accordance with law—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 23
- (v) Dismissal of suit on ground that plaintiff was negligent—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 23
- (vi) Dismissal on finding that allegation of discharge of a decree sought to be executed is not proved—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 23
- (vii) Dismissal on ground that alleged fraud is not proved—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 23
- (viii) Dismissal on ground that plaintiffs not being nearest reversioers were not entitled to sue—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 23
- (ix) Dismissal on ground that suit disclosed no cause of action—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 23
- (x) Dismissal on ground that claim in prior proceedings was premature—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 23
- (xi) Error of law—Proceeding by way of suit instead of making application for remedy—Whether cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (xii) Grounds of dismissal not covered by S. 14—Illustrations ... S 14 N 22
- (xiii) Inability of Court to decide on lawfulness of plaintiff's claim due to his wrongly framing his action—Whether involves cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (xiv) Misjoinder or non-joinder of person—Whether cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 26
- (xv) Mistake of party with regard to reliefs sought arising out of incompetence of his advisers—Whether cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (xvi) Other cause of a like nature—Meaning of
 - (a) Cause, if should be always one which the plaintiff could have avoided ... S 14 N 24
 - (b) Decree in a suit being vacated on ground of non-service of summons—Whether other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
 - (c) Dismissal of application for want of necessary affidavit—Whether other cause of a like nature to defect of jurisdiction ... S 14 N 24
 - (d) Dismissal of prior suit for default is not other cause of a like nature to defect of jurisdiction ... S 14 N 24
 - (e) Dismissal resulting from plaintiff's own act or from bona fide mistake of law or procedure—Whether other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
 - (f) Failure to obtain sanction necessary to try a suit relating partly to property outside jurisdiction—Whether other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
 - (g) Inability of Court to entertain former suit produced by any cause not connected with want of good faith or due diligence in plaintiff—Whether cause of a like nature to defect of jurisdiction ... S 14 N 24

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction—Defect of jurisdiction—Other cause of a like nature—(Contd.)

- (b) Misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties is not other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (c) Neglect or laches of plaintiff in stating or prosecuting his case—Whether other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (g) Non-suit of plaintiff for neglect to state the boundaries of property—Whether other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (i) Plaintiff's inability to produce a registered certificate of sale with the suit is not other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (l) Present plaintiff having claimed the relief in the prior suit in a wrong capacity—Whether other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (m) Prior proceedings being barred by existence of unvacated previous order on the matter is other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (n) Test to ascertain if cause is of like nature to defect of jurisdiction ... S 14 N 24
- (o) Want of notice required by S 80, Civil Procedure Code, is not other cause of a like nature to defect of jurisdiction ... S 14 N 24
- (p) Want of power of attorney in favour of mother who sued on behalf of her sons—Whether other cause of a like nature ... S 14 N 24
- (q) Wrong party suing—Whether other cause of a like nature within S 14 ... S 14 N 24
- (xvii) Suit dismissed on the ground that it is not sustainable on a construction of a decree—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 22
- (xviii) Suit entertained and decided on ground of *res judicata* or limitation—S 14, if applies ... S 14 N 24
- (xix) Suit entertained and decided on ground that award in question was void and not binding—S 14, if applies ... S 14 N 24
- (xx) Suit for mere declaration—Consequential relief of possession not asked for—Dismissal of suit under S 42, Specific Relief Act—Cause, if in the nature of defect of jurisdiction ... S 14 N 24
- (in) Due diligence
 - (i) Amendment of plaint—Jurisdiction becoming altered to knowledge of plaintiff after amendment—Plaint re-presented as amended to same Court—Plaintiff, if prosecuting suit with due diligence ... S 14 N 11
 - (ii) Creditor in insolvency neither opposing adjudication nor filing proof of claim—Subsequent suit on his debt—Period of pendency of insolvency proceedings, if can be deducted ... S 14 N 11
 - (iii) Fact that prior proceeding was filed on last day of limitation—Whether negatives due diligence ... S 14 N 11
 - (iv) Plaint ordered to be returned—Party, when entitled to deduction of time taken in appeal or revision against order ... S 14 N 11

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction—Due diligence—(Contd.)

- (v) Plaintiff non-suited for neglect to state boundaries of his land or to implead a necessary party—Proceedings, if carried on with due diligence ... S 14 N 11
- (vi) Proceedings struck off for default of prosecution—Whether can be said to be carried on with due diligence ... S 14 N 11
- (vii) Return of plaint for presentation to proper Court—Time during which Court holds up the case—Whether to be excluded ... S 14 N 11
- (viii) Some alone of the parties who could have prosecuted prior proceedings engaged in those proceedings—Others who did not do so, if can claim benefit of S. 14 ... S 14 N 11
- (u) Error of law
 - (i) Claim petition against attachment wrongly described as falling under O. 21 R. 58, Civil P. C., instead of Sec. 47—Decree-holder filing claim suit misled by mistake—Prosecution of claim suit and appeals therein is in good faith ... S 14 N 20
 - (ii) Prosecution of wrong proceeding induced by *bona fide* mistake—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 20
- (o) Exclusion of portion of the time
 - (i) Prosecution in good faith and with due diligence of execution of decree—Discovery that remedy was by suit and not by execution—Whole period from date of decree to date of discovery of error, if can be excluded ... S 14 N 20
 - (ii) Want of good faith or due diligence during portion of the period—Whether will deprive party of the whole period ... S 14 N 20
- (p) 'For the same relief' in S. 14—Relief claimed in application not same as was claimed in prior proceeding—Illustrations ... S 14 N 19
- (q) Good faith
 - (i) *Bona fide* ignorance of facts determining correct jurisdiction—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 20
 - (ii) *Bona fide* mistake of law, if sufficient ground for treating proceedings to be in good faith ... S 14 N 20
 - (iii) Clearly unnecessary and unsustainable action should not be taken into account ... S 14 N 20
 - (iv) Error of law, if entitles party to benefit of S. 14 ... S 14 N 20
 - (v) Honest doubt as to whether a suit lies in one Court or another—Whether covered by the expression ... S 14 N 20
 - (vi) Law clearly requiring proceeding to be instituted in Court—Party presenting it to Collector or Revenue Officer—Whether can be credited with good faith ... S 14 N 20
 - (vii) Legal adviser's mistake—When consistent with good faith ... S 14 N 20
 - (viii) Necessity of, for applicability of S. 14—Section will not apply when party is guilty of laches, negligence or inaction ... S 14 N 20
 - (ix) No clear indication in the law as to the proper procedure—Party taking proceeding believed to be open

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction—Good faith—(Contd.)

- to him—Whether can be said to be wanting in good faith ... S 14 N 20
- (x) Party acting on legal advice *bona fide* believing action to be sustainable—Fact that Court considered prior proceeding as misconceived cannot by itself negative good faith ... S 14 N 20
- (xi) Party knowingly undervaluing subject-matter of suit to suit a wrong forum—Whether consistent with good faith ... S 14 N 20
- (xii) Person not filing suit within one year from adverse order as provided in O. 21 R 63, Civil P. C.—Institution of appeal or revision from adverse order not under any mistake—Latter proceeding, if can be said to be prosecuted in good faith ... S 14 N 20
- (xiii) Plaintiff wrongly valuing suit — Plaintiff acting *bona fide*—Return of plaint for want of jurisdiction—Case, if one of good faith ... S 14 N 20
- (xiv) Prosecution of application to sue as pauper made *mala fide* as to pauperism—Whether entitles party to benefit of S. 14... S 14 N 20
- (xv) Prosecution of execution petition wrongly in Court of Subordinate Judge by negligence—Previous petitions presented in Court of Munsiff whose decree it was—Prosecution, if in good faith ... S 14 N 20
- (xvi) Question of jurisdiction being an arguable one, whether negatives good faith when party believed *bona fide* that the Court in which he instituted proceedings had jurisdiction ... S 14 N 20
- (xvii) Question whether a person has acted in good faith is one of fact ... S 14 N 21
- (xviii) Suit for possession decreed—Subsequent suit for mesne profits—Period occupied by proceeding for mesne profits by way of restitution under former decree—Whether can be deducted ... S 14 N 20
- (xix) What amounts to ... S 14 N 20
- (xx) Whether inference of good faith is reasonable or warranted by facts proved is a question of law ... S 14 N 21
- (xxi) Whether there can be *bona fide* mistake when party ought to have known the law ... S 14 N 20
- (xxii) Wrong choosing of forum due to *bona fide* mistake of counsel—Whether consistent with good faith ... S 14 N 20
- (r) Good faith and due diligence in prosecuting prior proceeding—Want of good faith and due diligence for a portion of the period—Period to be deducted ... S 14 N 29
- (s) Holidays before commencement of period taken up by proceeding, whether to be excluded ... S 14 N 7
- (t) Non-mention of claim to exclusion of time under S 14, if fatal to the suit ... S 14 N 30
- (u) Order for return of plaint made by Court—Plaint actually returned to party some time afterwards—Period of delay so caused must be deducted ... S 14 N 27

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide, etc.—(Contd.)

- (v) Order returning the plaint undergoing first and second appeals—Period till final order in appeal and of remand, if any to be deducted S 14 N 27
- (w) Other cause of a like nature in S. 14—Meaning of—Mis-joinder of parties or of causes of action—Whether cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction S 14
- (x) Period of limitation after excluding period allowed under S. 14 falling on holiday—Effect—Suit or other proceeding, if may be filed on re-opening day S 14 N 7
- (y) "Period of limitation prescribed"—Meaning of... .. S 14 N 9
- (z) Period of prosecution of such proceeding—Limitation, if suspended during that period S 14 N 4
- (z¹) Plaint ordered to be returned for presentation to proper Court—Period between date of order and date on which plaint is made ready for return to be deducted S 14 N 27
- (z²) Plaintiff himself withdrawing suit under O. 23 R. 1, Civil P. C.—S. 14, if applies S 14 N 8
- (z³) Plaintiff honestly in doubt as to in which of two Courts his suit lies—Suit instituted in one Court with due care and caution—Wrong forum — Plaint returned for presentation to proper Court—S. 14, if applicable S 14 N 8
- (z⁴) Prior proceedings in foreign Court—Exclusion, if available... .. S 14 N 6
- (z⁵) Prior proceeding pending before Court not having jurisdiction on date of second suit—Period between institution of prior suit and that of subsequent suit to be excluded S 14 N 25
- (z⁶) Prior suit decreed in first Court but dismissed in appeal on ground mentioned in S. 14—Period from institution of suit to be deducted when spent in good faith S 14 N 25
- (z⁷) Proceeding in Court of Appeal
 - (i) First Appellate Court holding against plaintiff on ground of want of jurisdiction—Whether disentitles him to claim deduction of time occupied by further appeal which was infructuous S 14 N 14
 - (ii) Plaintiff, if can deduct period occupied by the litigation till its termination in a final Court of Appeal S 14 N 15
 - (iii) Whether includes revision proceedings in the High Court—Duration of revision proceedings—Whether can be excluded under S. 14 S 14 N 14
- (z⁸) Proceedings—Same parties
 - (i) Both the proceedings must be between the same parties or their representatives S 14 N 16
 - (ii) Firm, if the same party as the individuals thereof S 14 N 16
 - (iii) Prior suit against firm — Subsequent suit against surviving partners of firm and persons in possession of deceased partner's assets—Whether against same parties S 14 N 16
 - (iv) Prior suit against Traffic Manager of Railway Company instead of the Secretary of State—Subsequent suit against Secretary of State—Parties, if same S 14 N 16
 - (v) Same person suing in different capacities—Same person suing as administratrix of one estate in one suit and of the estate of a different person in another suit—Whether by same plaintiff S 14 N 16

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide, etc.—Proceedings, same parties—(Contd.)

- (vi) Suit against persons supposed to be legal representatives of deceased debtor—Alter discovery of mistake proper legal representative brought in as defendant—Latter proceeding, if against same party as the former ... S 14 N 16
- (vii) Suit against surety under bond for payment by judgment-debtor of plaintiff—Time during which plaintiff was taking out execution against judgment-debtor under decree—Whether deductible ... S 14 N 16
- (viii) Suit by two plaintiffs—Third party impleaded as co-plaintiff—Plaint returned for presentation to proper Court—Original plaintiffs alone suing in presenting to proper Court—Time taken up by prior suit—Whether can be excluded under S. 14 ... S 14 N 16
- (ix) Two suits against same defendant but in different capacities—Whether covered by S 14 ... S 14 N 16
- (z⁹) Proceedings to which S 14 is applicable ... S 14 N 5
- (z¹⁰) Prosecuting a proceeding—Meaning of—Third party prosecuting an application to get a deed on which the decree is based set aside—Whether will save limitation running ... S 14 N 10
- ... sisting suit against him in prior suit—Plaintiff, if can be said to be prosecuting any proceeding against the other party ... S 14 N 10
- (ii) Plaintiff must have had in the prior suit interests in the nature of those of a plaintiff ... S 14 N 10
- (iii) Plaintiff obtaining *ex parte* decree in foreign Court—Subsequent suit in British Indian Court on foreign judgment—Period during which defendant was taking proceedings to have *ex parte* decree set aside—Whether can be excluded ... S 14 N 10
- (iv) Plaintiff or applicant resisting an appeal—Whether prosecuting a proceeding ... S 14
- (v) Resisting of appeal from decision in one's favour ... S 14 N 10
- (vi) Suit by executant for declaration that promissory note was discharged—Period of pendency of suit, if can be deducted in computing limitation for suit on pro-note by payee ... S 14 N 10
- (vii) Suit by trustees of mosque for removal of manager and appointment of receiver—Claim by manager for money due—Decision that money was due—Appeal by trustees—Dismissal of suit for non-joinder of other trustees—Suit by manager for money—Period of prior litigation started by trustees—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation therefor ... S 14 N 10
- (z¹²) Provisions as to—Principle of S 14 ... S 14 N 2
- (z¹³) Return of plaint—Period within which it should be presented to proper Court cannot be fixed by Court and such period cannot be deducted ... S 14 N 27
- (z¹¹) Return of plaint ordered by Court—No period after actual return can be deducted ... S 14 N 27

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide, etc.—(Contd.)

(z¹⁵) Same cause of action

- (i) Application by creditor to have debtor adjudged an insolvent—Whether on same cause of action as subsequent suit by him for decree on debt... S 14 N 18
- (ii) Application for restoration of suit dismissed for default of plaintiff — Fresh suit on alleged wrong done by defendant to plaintiff—Whether on same cause of action ... S 14 N 18
- (iii) Decree against one brother as member of a firm — Attachment—Objection by other brothers—Application for declaration that objectors were liable as partners — Application dismissed as barred — Suit for declaration of decree-holder's rights against objectors — Time occupied by application and appellate proceedings—Whether can be deducted in computing limitation for suit ... S 14 N 18
- (iv) Decree-holder attaching book-debt due to judgment-debtor and purchasing it in court auction — Subsequent suit to recover book-debt is not on same cause of action as attachment ... S 14 N 18
- (v) Mutation proceedings before revenue authority — Application to Civil Court to have award as to family rights and property, filed and decreed upon—Whether same cause of action ... S 14 N 18
- (vi) Proceeding before arbitrators based on agreement to refer to arbitration—Regular suit based on rights of parties after setting aside award—Causes of action are different ... S 14 N 18
- (vii) Separate suits for recovery of specific portions of property in hands of cosharers—Suit for partition as against all cosharers—Whether on same cause of action ... S 14 N 18
- (viii) Suit by mortgagee to recover mortgage money on ground of deprivation of security—Suit for foreclosure or sale—Whether on same cause of action ... S 14 N 18
- (ix) Suit for accounts against defendant as broker in respect of cotton transactions alone—Subsequent suit against him as commission agent in respect of other commodities also and for dividends received on behalf of plaintiff—Causes of action are different ... S 14 N 18
- (x) Suit for ejectment of defendants as tenants in Revenue Court—Suit for ejectment of defendants as trespassers in Civil Court — Whether have same cause of action ... S 14 N 18
- (xi) Suit for ejectment or possession and suit for rent have different causes of action ... S 14 N 18
- (xii) Suit for money under an agreement — Subsequent suit for the same sum on settlement of accounts—Causes of action are different ... S 14 N 18
- (xiii) Suit for rent against all defendants on *muchilika* jointly executed — Suits for rents against each defendant under separate contract by each — Whether on same cause of action ... S 14 N 18

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide, etc.—Same cause of action—(Contd.)

(xiv) Suit for second instalment on bond under the impression that first instalment was barred—Plaint returned for presentation to proper Court—Plaintiff including first instalment also in re-presenting suit—Second suit is not saved by first so far as first instalment is concerned ... S 14 N 18

(xv) Suit in British Indian Court on foreign judgment concerning promissory note—Suit on promissory note itself—Causes of action are different ... S 14 N 18

(xvi) Suit in Malabar founded on *kanom* right and suit based on *jenmi* right—Whether have same cause of action S 14 N 18

(xvii) Suit to set aside award—Suit on promissory note executed in pursuance of award—Whether on same cause of action ... S 14 N 18

(xviii) Time *bona fide* but infructuously taken in executing prior decree—Whether can be deducted under S 14 S 14 N 18

(xix) Time spent in carrying on wholly independent litigation founded on different causes of action—Whether can be excluded ... S 14 N 18

(z¹⁸) Second suit instituted in Court of proper jurisdiction—Second suit, if can be regarded as a continuation of the first suit instituted in a wrong Court ... S 14 N 3

... .. S 14 N 5

... .. S 14 N 6

reverted from get-
logous to defect of

jurisdiction—Principle of S. 14, if applicable... S 14 N 2

(z²⁰) Suit must be based on the same cause of action—Relief also must be the same ... S 14 N 17

(z²¹) Time required to obtain copy of order in prior proceedings—Whether can be excluded ... S 14 N 28

—Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in wrong Court

(a) 'Prosecuting a proceeding' in S 14—Meaning of—Plaintiff obtaining decree for possession against defendant—Defendant filing suit to have decree set aside on ground of fraud—Plaintiff, if can exclude the period of the suit in computing limitation for application by him for execution of his decree for possession ... S 14 N 10

(b) Time occupied in prosecuting in wrong Court, whether excluded from period of limitation for appeal to District Court under Civil Procedure Code... A 152 N 9

(c) Time spent—Whether can be excluded in suit for relief on ground of mistake ... A 96 N 5

—Exclusion of time on ground of defendant's ab-sence from British India

(a) Absence from British India at the time of accrual of cause of action or commencement of limitation—Exclusion, whether can be allowed ... S 13 N 4

(b) Absence from British India on several occasions—All such periods of absence should be excluded ... S 13 N 4a

(c) Absence, if gives rise to inability or disability to sue on the part of the plaintiff ... S 13 N 2

Exclusion of time—Exclusion of time on ground of defendant's absence from British India—(Contd.)

- (d) Absence of some of several defendants—Effect of ... S 13 N 5
- (e) Burden of proof ... S 13 N 8
- (f) Defendant having duly authorized agent or manager whom plaintiff could have sued—Whether disentitles plaintiff from claiming exclusion of period of defendant's absence from British India ... S 13 N 4
- (g) Defendant leaving British India after the period of limitation commenced to run—Applicability of S. 13 ... S 13 N 4
- (h) Defendant paying occasional visits to British India during absence—S. 13, if rendered inapplicable ... S 13 N 4
- (i) Exclusion, if can be claimed in respect of applications for execution ... S 13 N 3
- (j) Partnership—Suit against—Absence of some partners from British India for certain period—Period can be excluded only as against those partners ... S 13 N 5
- (k) Period during which defendant is under imprisonment in British India—Exclusion of, if can be claimed ... S 13 N 4
- (l) Period of plaintiff's own absence from British India cannot be excluded ... S 13 N 4
- (m) Period of residence not in British India—Whether can be excluded independent of any question of knowledge of that fact by the plaintiff ... S 13 N 6
- (n) Plaintiff's ignorance of defendant's residence—Whether a ground of exclusion ... S 13 N 6
- (o) Procedure—Plaintiff should specifically plead and prove strictly that defendant was absent from British India during the period ... S 13 N 8
- (p) Provisions as to
 - (i) Condition of applicability—Cause of action or transaction giving rise to it must have taken place in British India ... S 13 N 4
 - (ii) Whether affected or qualified by S. 9 ... S 13 N 2
 - (iii) Whether apply only to suits ... S 13 N 3
- (q) Question of stopping the running of time, if arises ... S 13 N 2
- (r) Suit against Secretary of State—Exclusion of time, if can be claimed ... S 13 N 4
- (s) Territories beyond British India under the administration of the Government
 - (i) Defendant's absence at Basra—Period of absence can be deducted ... S 13 N 7
 - (ii) Memoirs of—Secunderabad is under the administration of the Government of India ... S 13 N 7
- Notice of suit given in accordance with requirements of law—Period of notice to be excluded ... S 15
- Notice to State Railway under Civil P. C., S. 80—Period of notice, whether excluded in suit against carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods ... A 30 N 6
- Period of notice of suit
 - (a) Enactment for the time being in force—Meaning of—Enactment must be in force in the place in which suit is filed ... S 15 N 23
 - (b) Notice determining a tenancy—Period of notice cannot be excluded ... S 15 N 19

Exclusion of time—Period of notice of suit—(Contd.)

- (c) Notice necessary to be given by law at the time of giving it
—Notice subsequently becoming unnecessary—Period of notice, if can be deducted S 15 N 19
- (d) Notice only intended as information of the claim to defendant—Period cannot be excluded S 15 N 19
- (e) Notice required in case of only one or some of the defendants—Period of notice, if can be excluded as against others also S 15 N 20
- (f) Suit for possession instituted after 12 years of cause of action but within time by reason of exclusion of period of notice—Defendant cannot claim that title by adverse possession is perfected by suit not having been instituted within 12 years of cause of action S 15 N 21
- (g) Suit impleading Secretary of State or Public Officer unnecessarily and giving him notice of suit by mistake of law or fact—Plaintiff, if entitled to claim deduction as against private individuals against whom also suit is filed S 15 N 20
- (h) Time can be excluded only where enactment requires that notice should be given of suit before its commencement S 15 N 19
- S. 12 applies only to applications and appeals referred to in the Act... .. S 12 N 4
- S. 12 does not apply to proceedings in foreign Courts S 12 N 2
- Stay by injunction or order—What amounts to stay by injunction or order S 15 N 6
- Stay of proceedings
- (a) Adjournment of case is not stay S 15 N 14
- (b) Application for execution — Application for delivery of possession by auction-purchasers—Whether application for execution within S. 15 S 15 N 5
- (c) Application for execution
 - (i) Application for final decree in mortgage suit is not application for execution S 15 N 5
 - (ii) Application need not have been pending at date of injunction or stay or S 15 N 5
 - (iii) Time during which made owing to stay in computing limitation under Art. 181 S 15 N 5
- (d) Application for execution by transfer to another Court—Court ordering decree-holder to produce judgment in another suit before a certain day before transferring decree—Judgment in that suit passed at a much later date and hence not produced in time—Subsequent application for execution—Period of pendency of suit, if can be excluded : S 15 N 13
- (e) Application to revive an application for execution—S. 15, if makes revival application a fresh application for execution S 15 N 18
- (f) Attachment of book-debt or bond — Whether operates as injunction or stay S 15 N 12
- (g) Attachment of decree—Whether operates as injunction or stay order S 15 N 12
- (h) Decision between same parties in prior execution application as to the applicability of S. 15—Whether operates as *res judicata* S 15 N 24
- (i) Decree of first Court restored by order of remand—Injunction passed by first Court if revived S 15 N 17

Exclusion of time—Stay of proceedings—(Contd.)

(i) Execution

- (i) Absolute stay rendering decree-holder incapable of taking out any execution of the decree is contemplated by S. 15 ... S 15 N 9
- (ii) Execution consigned to record room—No order granting stay or giving time made—Whether amounts to stay of execution ... S 15 N 10
- (iii) Order for stay against one judgment-debtor alone—Whether operates as stay against other judgment-debtors ... S 15 N 9
- (iv) Order granting time to judgment-debtor to pay—Whether amounts to stay of execution ... S 15 N 10
- (v) Order staying execution also pending disposal of questions raised in pending execution petition—Whether stay of execution proceedings within S. 15 ... S 15 N 9
- (vi) Order that decree-holder should wait and not proceed against properties of judgment-debtor—Whether operates as stay of execution against surety for judgment-debtor ... S 15 N 9
- (vii) Stay in one particular mode leaving it open to decree-holder to execute in any other mode—Whether amounts to stay of execution within S. 15 ... S 15 N 9
- (viii) Stay of execution of part of the decree or as against particular property—Whether gives limitation for execution of decree as a whole ... S 15 N 9
- (k) Final decree in mortgage suit set aside on appeal against some defendants—Case ordered to be retried—Court striking off execution application against other defendants until liability of former defendants was finally settled—Order, if operates as stay of execution ... S 15 N 13
- (l) Injunction granted by first Court—Suit dismissed in first appeal for misjoinder—Case remanded for disposal on merits on second appeal—Order of remand is not tantamount to issue of injunction ... S 15 N 17
- (m) Injunction granted "pending final decision of the suit"—Effect of ... S 15 N 17
- (n) Injunction granted until decision of suit—Decision, if means final decision in the litigation by final Court of Appeal or Revision ... S 15 N 17
- (o) Injunction restraining decree-holder from executing decree for principal—Whether debars him from realizing interest ... S 15 N 9
- (p) Insolvency Court actually passing order amounting to injunction or stay—S. 15, if applies ... S 15 N 8
- (q) Insolvency, if operates as stay or injunction ... S 15 N 8
- (r) Insolvency proceedings, pendency of—Refusal of leave to creditor to file suit or application—Whether amounts to order granting injunction or stay within S. 15 ... S 15 N 8
- (s) Institution of collateral suit or proceeding, if operates as stay—Illustrations ... S 15 N 11
- (t) Institution of collateral suit or proceeding in respect of decree or its subject-matter—Whether operates as stay of execution of decree within S. 15 ... S 15 N 11

Exclusion of time—Stay of proceedings—(Contd.)

- (n) Only period during which person is actually interdicted by injunction or order will be excluded ... S 15 N 2
- (v) Order allowing execution on condition of security being furnished—Furnishing of security found impossible—Order operates as stay of execution ... S 15 N 13
- (w) Order allowing execution only on condition—Order, if operates as stay of execution ... S 15 N 13
- (x) Order of attachment prohibiting execution by anybody or accompanied by stay order—S 15, if applies ... S 15 N 12
- (y) Period of pendency of appeal from decree—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation for application for execution of decree ... S 15 N 15
- (z) Preferring of appeal, if amounts to order granting injunction or stay ... S 15 N 15
- (z¹) Principle of S. 15 ... S 15 N 2
- (z²) Revival of pending application—S. 15, if affects right to apply for revival ... S 15 N 18
- (z³) Several interrupted periods of interdiction—Party cannot exclude time during which no stay or injunction is in force : S 15 N 2
- (z⁴) Stay by agreement of parties—S 15 does not apply ... S 15 N 7
- (z⁵) Stay by injunction or order
- (i) Acceptance of a decree by Court as security for costs—Whether amounts to order staying execution of such decree ... S 15 N 6
- (ii) Order of Court for taxation of solicitor's costs against client—Whether bar to institution of suit by solicitor against client for costs ... S 15 N 6
- (iii) Order of Court must clearly operate as injunction or stay of execution ... S 15 N 6
- (iv) Order staying delivery of possession to court auction purchaser of property purchased by him—Whether amounts to injunction preventing institution of suit for mesne profits against person in wrongful possession of the property ... S 15 N 6
- (v) Parties consenting that stay order or injunction should be granted—Court passing order on such consent granting injunction or stay—Order, if covered by S. 15 ... S 15 N 7
- (vi) Period during which injunction or order is in force to be excluded ... S 15 N 6
- (vii) S 15 does not refer to disability to sue or apply except by order of Court ... S 15 N 6
- (z⁶) Stay of execution pending cross-suit by judgment-debtor against decree-holder—Injunction "until the pending suit has been decided"—Whether means until suit is finally decided ... S 15 N 17
- (z⁷) Stay or injunction in respect of execution granted by Court in a suit or proceeding—Dismissal of suit or proceeding—Stay, if terminates on such dismissal or continues during pendency of appeal in suit ... S 15 N 17
- (z⁸) Stay ordered on condition of furnishing security—Security tendered, accepted and given finally only on later date—Stay commences on date of order itself ... S 15 N 16

Exclusion of time—Stay of proceedings—(Contd.)**(j) Execution**

- (i) Absolute stay rendering decree-holder incapable of taking out any execution of the decree is contemplated by S. 15 ... S 15 N 9
- (ii) Execution consigned to record room—No order granting stay or giving time made—Whether amounts to stay of execution ... S 15 N 10
- (iii) Order for stay against one judgment-debtor alone—Whether operates as stay against other judgment-debtors ... S 15 N 9
- (iv) Order granting time to judgment-debtor to pay—Whether amounts to stay order ... S 15 N 10
- (v) Order staying execution sale pending disposal of questions raised in pending execution petition—Whether stay of execution proceedings within S. 15 ... S 15 N 9
- (vi) Order that decree-holder should wait and not proceed against properties of judgment-debtor—Whether operates as stay of execution against surety for judgment-debtor ... S 15 N 9
- (vii) Stay in one particular mode leaving it open to decree-holder to execute in any other mode—Whether amounts to stay of execution within S. 15 ... S 15 N 9
- (viii) Stay of execution of part of the decree or as against particular property—Whether leaves limitation for execution of decree as a whole ... S 15 N 9
- (k) Final decree in mortgage suit set aside in appeal against some defendants—Case ordered to be retried—Court striking off execution application against other defendants until liability of former defendants was finally settled—Order, if operates as stay of execution ... S 15 N 13
- (l) Injunction granted by first Court—Suit dismissed in first appeal for misjoinder—Case remanded for disposal on merits on second appeal—Order of remand is not tantamount to issue of injunction ... S 15 N 17
- (m) Injunction granted "pending final decision of the suit"—Effect of ... S 15 N 17
- (n) Injunction granted until decision of suit—Decision, if means final decision in the litigation by final Court of Appeal or Revision ... S 15 N 17
- (o) Injunction restraining decree-holder from executing decree for principal—Whether debars him from realizing interest ... S 15 N 9
- (p) Insolvency Court actually passing order amounting to injunction or stay—S. 15, if applies ... S 15 N 8
- (q) Insolvency, if operates as stay or injunction ... S 15 N 8
- (r) Insolvency proceedings, pendency of—Refusal of leave to creditor to file suit or application—Whether amounts to order granting injunction or stay within S. 15 ... S 15 N 8
- (s) Institution of collateral suit or proceeding, if operates as stay—Illustrations ... S 15 N 11
- (t) Institution of collateral suit or proceeding in respect of decree or its subject-matter—Whether operates as stay of execution of decree within S. 15 ... S 15 N 11

Exclusion of time—Stay of proceedings—(Contd.)

- (u) Only period during which person is actually interdicted by injunction or order will be excluded ...
- (v) Order allowing execution on condition of security being furnished—Furnishing of security found impossible—Order operates as stay of execution ...
- (w) Order allowing execution only on condition—Order, if operates as stay of execution ...
- (x) Order of attachment prohibiting execution by anybody or accompanied by stay order—S 15, if applies ..
- (y) Period of pendency of appeal from decree—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation for application for execution of decree ...
- (z) Preferring of appeal, if amounts to order granting injunction or stay ...
- (z¹) Principle of S. 15 ...
- (z²) Revival of pending application—S. 15, if affects right to apply for revival ...
- (z³) Several interrupted periods of interdiction—Party cannot exclude time during which no stay or injunction is in force :
- (z⁴) Stay by agreement of parties—S 15 does not apply ...
- (z⁵) Stay by injunction or order
 - (i) Acceptance of a decree by Court as security for costs—Whether amounts to order staying execution of such decree ...
 - (ii) Order of Court for taxation of solicitor's costs against ...
 - (iii) Order of Court must clearly operate as injunction or stay of execution ...
 - (iv) Order staying delivery of possession to court auction purchaser of property purchased by him—Whether amounts to injunction preventing institution of suit for mesne profits against person in wrongful possession of the property ...
 - (v) Parties consenting that stay order or injunction should be granted—Court passing order on such consent granting injunction or stay—Order, if covered by S. 15 ...
 - (vi) Period during which injunction or order is in force to be excluded ...
 - (vii) S. 15 does not refer to disability to sue or apply except by order of Court ...
- (z⁶) Stay of execution pending cross-suit by judgment-debtor against decree-holder—Injunction "until the pending suit has been decided"—Whether means until suit is finally decided ...
- (z⁷) Stay or injunction in respect of execution granted by Court in a suit or proceeding—Dismissal of suit or proceeding—Stay, if terminates on such dismissal or continues during pendency of appeal in suit ...
- (z⁸) Stay ordered on condition of furnishing security—Security tendered, accepted and given finally only on later date—Stay commences on date of order itself...

Exclusion of time—Stay of proceedings—(Contd.)

- (z^o) Time during which suit or application for execution is stayed by injunction or order to be excluded S 15
- Suit for possession by auction purchaser, judgment-debtor being in possession at the date of sale—Time during which proceeding for setting aside sale has been prosecuted, whether excluded ... A 138 N 2
- Suit for possession by auction purchaser, judgment-debtor being out of possession at the date of sale—Time during which proceeding for setting aside sale has been pending, whether excluded: A 137 N 2
- Suit for possession by purchaser at execution sale
- (a) Exclusion of period of pendency of proceedings to set aside sale
- (i) Application for possession under O. 21 Rr. 95 and 96 S 16 N 2
- ... is not within S. 16 S 16 N 3
- (ii) Period during which auction purchaser has been unsuccessfully prosecuting claim based on sale cannot be excluded S 16 N 3
- (iii) Proceeding—Meaning of—Sale impeached by application—S. 16, if applies S 16 N 3
- (iv) Suit for actual possession by purchaser who has obtained symbolical possession—Whether within S. 16 S 16 N 1
- (b) Exclusion of time of proceedings to set aside sale—Judgment-debtor filing suit to set aside sale on application to set it aside being dismissed—Entire time taken in such proceedings, if can be excluded S 16 N 3
- (c) Period of pendency of proceedings to set aside sale to be excluded S 16
- Suit on judgment—Time spent in prosecuting application for execution of decree, whether can be excluded A 122 N 6
- Suit to set aside act of Government officer—Time occupied in proceedings before Revenue authorities, whether excluded A 14 N 6
- Suit upon foreign judgment
- (a) Time spent in executing decree in foreign Court, whether can be excluded A 117 N 4
- (b) Time spent in prosecuting application to set aside *ex parte* decree, whether can be excluded A 117 N 4

Exclusive privilege

- Meaning of A 40 N 8
- Whether infringed is question of fact A 40 N 4

Execution

- Amount decreed in excess of amount claimed in suit—Decree becomes executable only on payment of additional court fee—Article 181 applies A 182 N 30
- And enforcement, distinction between A 183 N 4
- Appeal from decree—Time runs from date of final decree or order of Appellate Court A 182 Cl 2; A 182 N 3
- Applicability of S. 19 to applications for execution S 19 N 63
- Application by judgment-debtor for entering up part satisfaction of decree—Whether amounts to acknowledgment of liability under decree S 19 N 47
- Application by judgment-debtor for postponement or stay of sale—Whether amounts to acknowledgment of liability under decree S 19 N 47
- Application by transferee of attached decree—Whether maintainable A 182 N 71a

Execution—(Contd.)

- Application filed in time—Subsequent application to continue proceeding—Whether subject to period of limitation S 3 N 32
- Application for
 - (a) Amendment of
 - (i) Court granting time for amendment under O. 21 R. 17 sub-rule 1, Civil P. C. — Time so granted can subsequently be enlarged by Court A 182 N 86a
 - (ii) Court overlooking defects of registering application—Question whether defects can subsequently be amended depends on whether decree is or is not barred on date of application A 182 N 86a
 - (iii) Decree barred on date of amendment — Amendment whether can be allowed A 182 N 86a
 - (b) Application by Government—Limitation A 149 N 3
 - (c) Application by widow of deceased decree-holder does not enure to benefit of adopted son if widow disputes adoption: A 182 N 77
 - (d) Application for delivery of possession by auction-purchaser—Whether application for execution within S. 15 S 15 N 5
 - (e) Application for final decree in mortgage suit—Whether an application for execution S 15 N 5
 - (f) Application to obtain succession certificate is not one to execute decree A 182 N 113
 - (g) Art. 181 applies only in definite circumstances making Art. 182 inapplicable A 182 N 2
 - (h) Art. 181 cannot apply when Art. 182 is applicable A 182 N 2
 - (i) Art. 181 is residuary Article A 182 N 2
 - (j) Art. 182—Construction of
 - (i) Court should generally lean to the view that application is not barred A 182 N 2
 - (ii) Should be construed liberally and not too technically... .. A 182 N 2
 - when A 182 N 2
 - ing un- A 182 N 2
 - ted A 182 N 2
 - (l) Art. 182 is not exhaustive A 182 N 2
 - (m) Art. 182 is special Article dealing with such applications A 182 N 2
 - (n) Art. 182—Language of—Should not be strained in favour of judgment-debtor who has not paid his debt A 182 N 2
 - (o) Burden of proof —
 - (i) Applicant, whether must prove that previous application was in accordance with law A 182 N 144
 - (ii) Application prima facie within time — Opponent must show how it is not within time A 182 N 144
 - (iii) Is on applicant A 182 N 144
 - (p) Decree passed in favour of estate under Court of Wards—Court of Wards is proper person to execute decree A 182 N 75
 - (q) Defendant in partition suit can apply for execution A 182 N 73
 - (r) Delay in filing, if can be excused S 5 N 3 F N 1

Execution—Application for—(Contd.)

- (s) Every omission to comply with O. 21, Rr. 11 to 13, whether disables Court from proceeding with execution ... A 182 N 52
- (t) Exclusion of time
- (i) Application by secured creditor—Insolvency proceedings against judgment-debtor—Period of insolvency cannot be excluded ... A 182 N 5
 - (ii) Insolvency of decree-holder—Adjudication annulled—Decree-holder cannot claim exclusion of period of insolvency ... A 182 N 5
 - (iii) Insolvency of judgment-debtor—Adjudication annulled—Period from date of adjudication to date of annulment is excluded ... A 182 N 5
- (n) Execution stayed by injunction or order—Time during which proceedings are suspended to be excluded ... S 15
- (v) Institution of appeal does not operate as stay of execution within S. 15 ... S 15 N 15
- (w) Limitation
- (i) Parties cannot extend period of limitation ... A 182 N 25
 - (ii) Section 48 Civil P. C., prescribes only the maximum limit of time and not the time within which application is to be made ... A 182 N 23
 - (iii) Starting point ... A 182
 - (iv) When special or local law prescribes period different from that prescribed by Art. 182 ... A 182 N 145
- (x) Meaning of ... A 182 N 10
- (y) Period of defendant's absence from British India—Whether can be excluded ... S 13 N 3
- (z) Plaintiff obtaining decree for possession against defendant—Defendant filing suit to have decree set aside on ground of fraud—Suit resisted by plaintiff—Such person, if can exclude period of the suit in computing the limitation for an application by him for execution of his decree for possession ... S 14 N 10
- (z¹) Representative suit—Person not on record but who was represented by decree-holder on record can apply to be brought on record and to execute decree ... A 182 N 76
- (z²) Substitution or addition of new parties—Application not to be deemed to be instituted when new party added ... S 22 N 3
- (z³) Suspension of time—Immovable property of judgment-debtor under management of Collector—Limitation is suspended during such period of management ... A 182 N 6
- (z⁴) Transferee of decree can apply under S 446 Civil P. C. 1882: ... A 182 N 78
- (z⁵) What is not
- (i) Application by auction purchaser for possession ... A 182 N 16
 - (ii) Application by decree-holder for postponement of execution sale ... A 182 N 10
 - (iii) Application for ascertainment of mesne profits ... A 182 N 14
 - (iv) Application for attachment under S. 46, Civil P. C. ... A 182 N 10
 - (v) Application for final decree ... A 182 N 11
 - (a) In partition suit ... A 182 N 17
 - (b) In redemption suit ... A 182 N 13
 - (c) In suits for sale or foreclosure ... A 182 N 12

Execution—Application for—What is not—(Contd.)

(vi) Application for merely being recognized as transferee of decree ... A 182 N 10

... for ... A 182 N 15

... A 182 N 10

... A 182 N 10

... A 182 N 10

(z⁶) Withdrawal of—Effect ... A 182 N 86b

... decree—Whether suit ... S 2 Cl 10 N 1

... decree for possession barred by limi-

... shes *ipso facto* applicant's right to

property ... S 28 N 3

—Application for execution of decree of Native State in British

Indian Court—Whether governed by Indian Limitation Act: ... S 11 N 2

... Whether an applica. ... S 19

... of decretal amount

—Whether amounts to acknowledgement of liability under decree: ... S 19 N 47

—Application for revival—Whether should be made within 8 years

of removal of stay ... S 15 N 18

... between ... A 182 N 87

... without leave of ... A 182 N 54

(c) Application against discharged insolvent judgment-debtor is

not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 54

... A 182 N 72

is not one in accordance with law... ... A 182 N 54

(f) Application against legal representatives of deceased J. D.

(i) For arresting and imprisoning them — Not one in

accordance with law ... A 182 N 57

(ii) Omission of prayer to bring legal representative on re-

cord does not make application not one in accordance

with law ... A 182 N 82

(g) Application against person against whom execution could not

issue is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 54

(h) Application at time when decree is not capable of execution,

whether one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 58

(i) Application being drafted on flimsy paper does not make it

not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 72

(j) Application by agent

... A 182 N 79

(ii) Application by person on behalf of decree-holder after

decree-holder attains majority but without any power

of attorney—Subsequent ratification by decree-holder

within three years of attaining majority—Application

rendered valid from date of ratification ... A 182 N 79

Execution—Application in accordance with law—Application by agent—(Contd.)

- (iii) Application presented by person, having no power of attorney from decree-holder but power of attorney filed in Court within prescribed period—Application is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 79
- (iv) Immaterial defects in power of attorney do not render application not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 79
- (v) Mere fact that authorization such as power of attorney is not filed in Court with application does not vitiate the application ... A 182 N 79
- (k) Application by attaching decree-holder to execute attached decree is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 74
- (l) Application by decree-holder of attached decree is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 74a
- (m) Application by decree-holder on record is in accordance with law even if his interest in decree has been transferred to another ... A 182 N 73
- (n) Application by legal representative of deceased decree-holder without producing succession certificate, whether one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 69
- (o) Application by mother as guardian of minor decree-holder who was really major, is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 60
- (p) Application by stranger claiming to be representative of deceased decree-holder, whether one in accordance with law : A 182 N 77
- (q) Application by transferee of attached decree is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 74a
- (r) Application by transferee of decree
 - (i) Application by transferee claiming to be such is in accordance with law, even though assignment is not proved or recognized or found to be invalid in subsequent proceedings ... A 182 N 78
 - (ii) Assignment refused to be recognised by Court as being colourable—Application not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 78
 - (iii) Fact that transferee is benamidar does not prevent application being one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 78
 - (iv) For being recognised as transferee without any prayer for execution—Whether one in accordance with law : A 182 N 78
 - (v) Illustrative cases ... A 182 N 78
 - (vi) Person having only right against decree-holder to obtain assignment but actually not getting it—His application is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 78
 - (vii) Transfer required to be registered under law—Application by transferee under unregistered transfer
 - (a) Not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 78
 - (b) Subsequently transfer registered within prescribed time—Application is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 78
 - (viii) Transfer under oral assignment, is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 78
- (s) Application filed after institution of insolvency proceedings without leave of Insolvency Court is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 54

ention—Application in accordance with law—(Contd.)

- (t) Application for arrest of legal representatives under certain circumstances is one in accordance with law though subsequently they are not proved ... A 182 N 53
- (u) Application for execution by arrest of judgment-debtor saves time for subsequent application for execution by sale of property of judgment-debtor ... A 182 N 81a
- (v) Application for execution by attachment and sale of some property of judgment-debtor saves time for subsequent application for proceeding against other properties or against his person ... A 182 N 81a
- (w) Application for execution of conditional decrees without performing condition—Whether one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 58a
- (x) Application for mere issue of notice to judgment-debtor under O. 21, R. 22, Civil P. C., is not one in accordance with law: A 182 N 116
- (y) Application for re-arrest of judgment-debtor who has been released from detention under S. 58, Civil P. C., is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 54
- (z) Application for relief in mode not permitted by law is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 57
- (z¹) Application for removal of next friend of decree-holder and permission to execute is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 118
- (z²) Application for substitution of legal representative is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 126
- (z³) Application for transfer of decree to Court without jurisdiction is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 55b
- A 182 N 55b
- (z⁴) Application forbidden by S. 23, Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z⁵) Application in respect of person and property outside jurisdiction of Court but which were stated in application to be within jurisdiction—Application dismissed as statement was untrue—Still it is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 55a
- (z⁶) Application must ask Court to do something which by law that Court is competent to do—Competency—Meaning of : A 182 N 52
- (z⁷) Application not accompanied by certificate as required by S. 29-E, Bombay Gujarat Talukhdar's Act 1883, whether one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 59
- (z⁸) Application not accompanied by conciliator's certificate as required by Dekkhan Agriculturist's Relief Act 1879, whether one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 59
- (z¹⁰) Application praying for relief not granted by decree is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 53
- (z¹¹) Application presented by mooktear on behalf of all judgment creditors one of whom had signed it and names of others were appended by mooktear, is one in accordance with law: A 182 N 60
- (z¹²) Application signed only by pleader of party who was acquainted with facts of case, is one in accordance with law: A 182 N 60

Execution—Application in accordance with law—(Contd.)

- (z¹³) Application though wrongly describing suit to be small cause case, is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 61
- (z¹⁴) Application to be valid must be made by decree-holder or his representative ... A 182 N 73
- (z¹⁵) Application to Court having no jurisdiction is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z¹⁶) Application valid when made cannot be invalidated by subsequent act of default by decree-holder ... A 182 N 52
- (z¹⁷) Application which is barred by limitation is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 55
- (z¹⁸) Application which is unstamped, whether one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 56
- (z¹⁹) Application without payment of necessary court-fees, whether one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 56
- (z²⁰) Application for execution of decree which cannot be executed does ... A 182 N 72
- (z²¹)

latter Court to execute decree passed by former Court—
Question whether such application is in accordance with
law made to proper Court must be determined with refer-
ence to law in force in the Native State ...

A 182 N 95

- (z²²) Date of last prior application wrongly given in stating particulars of previous applications but mistake not affecting merits of application—Application not rendered one not in accordance with law ... A 182 N 65
- (z²³) Decree directing sale of property in suit—Application for attachment of it is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 57
- (z²⁴) Decree granting different reliefs—Application in respect of one or more such reliefs is one in accordance with law so as to save time for subsequent application for any relief granted by decree ... A 182 N 81a
- (z²⁵) Decree granting relief against different persons—Application in respect of one or more such persons is in accordance with law so as to save time for subsequent application against all judgment-debtors ... A 182 N 81a
- (z²⁶) Decree in mortgage suit against mortgaged property but no personal decree against mortgagor—Application by decree-holder for attachment and sale of non-mortgaged property is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 53
- (z²⁷) Decree only against father providing that loan by father not binding on sons—Application by decree-holder for execution by arrest of sons is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z²⁸) Defective vakalatnama
- (i) Agent of party giving vakalatnama not describing himself as agent—Application by vakil is not rendered thereby one not in accordance with law ... A 182 N 71
 - (ii) Application made by vakil not authorized by vakalatnama : in accordance with law ... A 182 N 71
 - (iii) Application made by vakil on authority of vakalatnama which is not signed by him : one in accordance with law : A 182 N 71

Execution—Application in accordance with law—Defective vakalatnama—
(Contd.)

- (iv) Decree-holder who has given vakalatnama dead when application presented by vakil—Application is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 71
- (v) Immaterial defects in vakalatnama do not render application by vakil not one in accordance with law: A 182 N 71
- (vi) Name of pleader wrongly mentioned—Application by him is not rendered not one in accordance with law thereby ... A 182 N 71
- (z²⁹) Effect of return, amendment and rejection—
 - (i) Application amended under provisions of O. 21, R. 17, sub-rule 1 is in accordance with law when first presented although the defect when first presented is material ... A 182 N 86a
 - (ii) Application returned by Court for not complying with requirements of O. 21, Rr. 11 to 14, Civil P. C.—Application not in accordance with law though omission immaterial ... A 182 N 86a
 - (b) Question, whether such application is in accordance with law depends on the fact whether the defect was material or formal ... A 182 N 86a
 - (iv) Defect for which application returned material — ... A 182 N 86a
 - ... ly formal— ... A 182 N 86a
 - ... returned or rejected is accepted by Court and action taken — Application is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 86a
 - (vii) Material defect in application
 - (a) Amount of decree and costs not shown—Application not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 86a
 - (b) Amount recovered in previous proceedings not correctly stated—Application not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 86a
 - (c) Decree-holder failing to comply with conditional order of Court—Application not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 86a
 - (d) List of property not filed—Application not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 86a
 - (e) Party not signing and verifying application—Application not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 86a
- (z³⁰) Failure of decree-holder to get mistake in certificate of non-satisfaction of decree corrected—Still application is in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z³¹) Failure to file copy of decree—Effect ... A 182 N 68
- (z³²) Failure to file succession certificate—Still application is in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z³³) Failure to produce encumbrance certificate — Application is still one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 69

Execution—Application in accordance with law—(Contd.)

- (z⁵³) Omission to specify the Court which passed the decree —
Effect A 182 N 72
- (z⁵⁴) Omission to state number of suit and names of parties as
required by O. 21, R. 11, Cls. (a) and (b), Civil P. C. does
invalidate the application A 182 N 61
- (z⁵⁵) Omission to state previous adjustments, whether vitiates the
... .. A 182 N 64
- A 182 N 63
- with law A 182 N 60
- (z⁵⁸) Partition between father and sons of joint family — Father
subsequently obtaining decree against stranger in respect of
joint family debt—Application by son for execution is in
accordance with law A 182 N 73
- (z⁵⁹) Plaintiff to pay certain amount into Court within certain
date under decree not doing so but applying for execution
—Application is still one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 72
- (z⁶⁰) Proceeding against wrong person as legal representative —
Whether one in accordance with law A 182 N 82
- A 182 N 52
- A 182 N 52
- A 182 N 82
- appli. A 182 N 53
- A 182 N 52
- cum. A 182 N 52
- stances of each case A 182 N 52
- (z⁶⁶) What is not—Instances A 182 N 52
- (z⁶⁷) Whether application should be a bona fide one ... A 182 N 86
- Application made in accordance with law to proper Court for exe-
cution—Time runs from date of final order passed on such appli-
cation A 182 Cl 5
- Application made to take step-in-aid of execution — Time runs
... .. A 182 Cl 5
- dy entertain and
... .. but cannot itself A 182 N 87
- (b) A
- Court is not one made to proper Court A 182 N 96
- (c) Application to Collector or Tahsildar for enforcing decision of
Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Co-
operative Societies Act, is not one to proper Court ... A 182 N 96
- A 182 N 96

Execution—Application in accordance with law—(Contd.)

- (z³⁴) Judgment-debtor arrested and released pending insolvency proceedings under Insolvency Act—Application for re-arrest is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 54
- (z³⁵) Judgment-debtor dead when application is made—Whether one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 85
- (z³⁶) Mode of assistance of Court not distinctly specified but it was clear from other circumstances—Application not rendered one not in accordance with law ... A 182 N 67
- (z³⁷) Necessary elements ... A 182 N 52
- (z³⁸) Omission to conform to any of the requirements of law in regard to particular application, whether renders it not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z³⁹) Omission to give date of execution of vakalatnama—Application by vakil is not rendered thereby one not in accordance with law ... A 182 N 71
- (z⁴⁰) Omission to give description of immovable property to be attached—Application is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 70
- (z⁴¹) Omission to give description of immovable property to be attached in subsequent application but such description given in previous application and the latter referred to in subsequent application—Subsequent application is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 70
- (z⁴²) Omission to give description of property sought to be attached or mode in which assistance of Court is sought—Application not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z⁴³) Omission to give inventory of moveable property to be attached is material defect ... A 182 N 70
- (z⁴⁴) Omission to give number of suit or date of decree—Still application is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z⁴⁵) Omission to give or error in giving date of decree as required by O. 21, R. 11, sub-r. 2 Cl. (c) does not invalidate the application ... A 181 N 62
- (z⁴⁶) Omission to give particulars of previous applications as required by O. 21, R. 11, sub-r. 2, Cl. (i) ...
 ... application rendered in accordance with law ... A 182 N 65
 ... previous applications ...
 ... will not render application one not in accordance with law ... A 182 N 65
- (z⁴⁷) C ... A 182 N 66
- (z⁴⁸) Omission to mention names of persons interested in decree does not make application not in accordance with law ... A 182 N 61
- (z⁴⁹) Omission to pray for notice to be sent under O. 21, R. 22, is not material defect ... A 182 N 72
- (z⁵⁰) Omission to produce copies ordered to be produced under Rules 187, 188, Oudh Civil Rules—Still application is one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 52
- (z⁵¹) Omission to specify assessment of land brought to sale is not material defect ... A 182 N 72
- (z⁵²) Omission to specify manner in which execution is sought—Application is not one in accordance with law ... A 182 N 67

Execution—Application to proper Court—Effect of change, etc.—(Contd.)

- (ii) Decree passed in respect of property — Subsequently area transferred to jurisdiction of another Court
 - (a) Application to latter Court is not one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 91
 - (b) Still application to original Court is one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 91
- (q) Execution beyond local jurisdiction
 - (i) Application by decree-holder to issue notice to judgment-debtor is not one to improper Court though judgment-debtor was residing outside Court's jurisdiction at that time ... A 182 N 88
 - (ii) Judgment-debtor residing outside local limits of jurisdiction—Application to Court passing decree is one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 88
 - (iii) Property outside local limits of jurisdiction—Application to Court which passed decree is one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 88
- (r) Proper Court
 - (i) Appellate Court is not proper Court ... A 182 N 105
 - (ii) Court is not a proper Court unless it has jurisdiction to execute the decree or order ... A 182 N 87
 - (iii) Court passing decree ordering it to be sent to another Court, but decree not actually sent—Court which passed decree continues to be proper Court ... A 182 N 89
 - (v) Decisions bearing on interpretation of expression "Court whose duty it is to execute decree" in O. 21, R. 2, Civil P. C., should be referred to for determining what is proper Court ... A 182 N 87
 - (vi) Definition of ... A 182 N 87
 - (vii) Definition of, in Expl. II, Art 182, refers to Court whose duty it is to execute decree or order if application in accordance with law is presented to it ... A 182 N 87
- (s) Remitting money to Superintendent of Jail for subsistence allowance for detention of judgment-debtor in jail is application to proper Court ... A 182 N 101
- (t) Suit against A—Attachment before judgment—Attachment removed on B standing surety—Suit then transferred to another Court and decreed by it—Application against surety to latter Court is not one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 98
- (u) Transfer of decree to another Court for execution
 - (i) Application by decree-holder to original Court to give him second certificate of transfer, the first being still subsisting and operative, is not one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 89
 - (ii) Application for execution or to take step-in-aid made to transferee Court any time before certificate under S. 41, Civil P. C., is sent by it or execution proceedings are withdrawn or transferred from it, is one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 90

Execution—Decree against several persons—Joint decree—Application for execution, etc.—(Contd.)

him—Still application saves limitation against other judgment-debtor ... A 182 N 136

(b) If ... —Still judg- ... A 182 N 136

(c) Saves limitation against all ... A 182 N 136

(d) Saves limitation against legal representatives of other judgment-debtors ... A 182 N 136

(e) Saves limitation against other judgment-debtors only where application is one in accordance with law and made to proper Court ... A 182 N 136

(ii) Decree on members ... A 182 N 136

(iii) If ...

judgment-debtors ... A 182 N 136

(iv) Mere fact that limitation is suspended against one joint judgment-debtor for his being adjudicated insolvent does not suspend limitation in respect of other joint judgment-debtors ... A 182 N 136

(v) Only application for execution or to take step-in-sid against joint judgment-debtor saves limitation against other joint judgment-debtors ... A 182 N 136

(vi) Suit for sale on mortgage—One of properties previously sold for arrears of revenue—Decree passed for realization of amount by sale of other properties and out of certain amount in hands of one of defendants as surplus proceeds of revenue sale—Application for execution against properties saves limitation for execution against surplus sale proceeds ... A 182 N 136

—Decree amended—Time runs from the date of amendment ... A 182 Cl 4

—Decree amount paid to decree-holder out of sale proceeds and claim satisfied—Sale set aside—Refund by decree-holder—Decree-holder, if entitled to fresh period of limitation in respect of fresh right to execute ... S 9 N 11

—Decree bearing date different from that of judgment by mistake of Court — Application within 3 years of date of decree is within time ... A 182 N 25

—Decree becoming inexecutable by reason of subsequent events—Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 31

—Decree for costs—Original suit pending in appeal—Decree-holder is not obliged to execute decree for costs until appeal is over ... A 182 N 46

—Decree for injunction—Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 29

—Decree for partition

(a) Application for execution by one of the parties to decree does not save limitation in favour of any other party ... A 182 N 140

Execution—Application to proper Court—Transfer of decree, etc.—(Contd.)

- (iii) Application to original Court to recall decree to itself
is one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 69
- (iv) Application to original Court to transfer it to another
Court is one made to proper Court ... A 182 N 69
- (v) Application to transferee Court after it has returned
the decree to original Court is not one made to proper
Court ... A 182 N 90
- (vi) Application to transferor Court before transferee
Court sending certificate of non-satisfaction—Certifi-
cate subsequently sent — Application whether made
to proper Court... A 182 N 69
- (vii) Decree ordered to be transferred—Transferee Court is
competent to receive application for execution though
it has not received copy of decree ... A 182 N 90
- (viii) Jurisdiction of transferee Court continues till it sends
certificate to original Court under S. 41, Civil P. C.,
or till execution proceedings are withdrawn or trans-
ferred from it ... A 182 N 90
- (ix) Transferee Court attaching property within its juris-
diction but before decree was returned with certifi-
cate of non-satisfaction to original Court, application
put in original Court for sale of the property—Such
application, whether made to proper Court ... A 182 N 69
- (x) Transferee Court is proper Court within Expl. II, Art.
182 ... A 182 N 90
- Attachment—Claims and objections—*See under* Attachment
- Auction-purchaser obtaining possession — Subsequent suit for
possession by auction-purchaser on subsequent cause of action—
Limitation ... A 137 N 2
- Auction purchaser realizing amount of decree for money—Execu-
tion sale set aside—Suit by decree-holder — Suit for money
realized by auction-purchaser under decree—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
- Certification—*See* Payment—Decree debt—Certification. A 182
- Certified copy of decree or order registered—Limitation is 6 years:
- Continuation of application—*See* Execution — Revival of applica-
tion.
- Creditor recovering money by levying execution against debtor—
Whether amounts to payment within S. 20 ... S 20 N 11
- Death of decree-holder leaving minor son—Execution application
on behalf of minor dismissed—Minor, if entitled to extension on
ground of minority ... S 6 N 14
- Decree against several persons
 - (a) Decree passed against several persons as legal representatives
of deceased person — Application for execution against one
saves limitation against others ... A 182 N 133
 - (b) Decree passed severally — Application for execution against
one of judgment-debtors saves limitation only against him
and not against others ... A 182 N 133
 - (c) Joint decree
 - (i) Application for execution against one of joint judg-
ment-debtors
 - (a) Decree subsequently declared inoperative against

Execution—Decree or order directing payment to be made at a certain date—
Certain date—(Contd.)

(ii) Date which can become certain only at a future time
is not certain date ... A 182 N 135

tain date ... A 182 N 135

(iv) Mortgage decree—If sale proceeds insufficient, balance
to be recovered from judgment-debtor personally and
from his other properties—Balance is not to be paid
at a certain date ... A 182 N 135

(v) Words refer to date which at the date of the decree or
order is certain ... A 182 N 135

(b) Cl. 7, Art. 182 applies only to first application for recovery—
... A 182 N 133

and
by
defendant comes within Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134

(a) Decree directing certain sum to be paid to plaintiff annually
applies ... A 182 N 135
on a cer.

tain date is such decree ... A 182 N 134

(f) Decree directing payment of money on plaintiff attaining his
majority is such a decree ... A 182 N 135

(g) Decree directing payment of money 'within' a certain period
—Whether such a decree ... A 182 N 135

(h) Decree regulating rate of interest payable thereunder with
reference to date of payment does not come within Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134

(i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 133

(j) Mortgage decree directing sale of mortgaged properties in
default of payment of mortgage money on or before a cer-
tain date is not one under Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134

(k) Order staying execution of decree till disposal of a suit be-
tween the same parties does not fall under Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134

(l) Order subsequent to decree postponing date on which pay-
ment is to be made comes within Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134

(m) Parties presenting petition stating compromise as to payment
of decretal amount in instalments—Petition directed to be
filed—Order does not come under Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134

(n) Provision in decree that decree-holder entitled to realize
portion of decretal amount on failure of judgment-debtor to
pay interest does not come within Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134

(o) Simple money decree which does not fix expressly or impliedly
any date for payment is not such a decree ... A 182 N 135

—Decree or order directing payment to be made on different dates—
Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 133

—Decree passed when there is only one decree-holder or judgment-
debtor but subsequently more than one person becoming entitled

Execution—Decree for partition—(Contd.)

- (b) Decree consisting of two parts, one in favour of plaintiffs, against defendant entitling them to have their share in property set apart and other enabling them to have partition *inter se* of such joint share on the younger of them coming of age—Joint application for execution of former part does not give fresh starting point for application by one plaintiff to execute latter part ... A 182 N 140
- (c) Decree while awarding different sharers their respective shares declaring certain property to be joint — Application for execution by one of the parties in respect of such property saves limitation in favour of all ... A 182 N 140
- Decree granting single relief—Piecemeal execution not permitted : A 182 N 81a
- Decree in favour of several persons
- (a) Decree for sum in favour of five persons, but one moiety to three of them and the other to remaining two—Action taken by one set of decree-holders does not benefit other set ... A 182 N 137
- (b) Decree passed severally — Application for execution by one of decree-holders saves limitation only in favour of applicant and not in favour of any other decree-holder ... A 182 N 137
- (c) Decree under which plaintiff is to recover certain sum from defendant and latter is entitled to obtain possession from plaintiff — Application for execution by plaintiff or defendant does not save limitation in favour of other ... A 182 N 137
- (d) Joint decree
- (i) Application for execution by any one of decree-holders saves limitation in favour of all joint decree-holders : A 182 N 137
- (ii) Application for execution by representative of one of joint decree-holders saves limitation in favour of all... A 182 N 137
- (iii) Joint decree-holder applying for execution of what he believes to be his own share — Application in accordance with law—Limitation is saved in favour of other decree-holders ... A 182 N 137
- (iv) Joint decree-holder, whether can apply for execution of what he conceives to be his own share of decree ... A 182 N 137
- Decree joint and several—Application against one judgment-debtor is step against all ... A 182 N 133
- Decree not capable of execution on date of decree but becoming capable of execution subsequently—Limitation—Starting point : A 182 N 26
- Decree not granting particular relief—Executing Court cannot grant it ... A 182 N 53
- Decree not in a form capable of execution—Art. 182 does not apply : A 182 N 11
- Decree ... in British India ... A 182 N 6
- Decree ... A 182 N 19
- Decree on condition to be performed by decree-holder — Whether one capable of immediate execution ... A 182 N 33
- Decree on which court-fee or stamp duty is payable — Limitation — Starting point ... A 182 N 30
- Decree or order directing payment to be made at a certain date
- (a) Certain date
- (i) Date need not specify exact date by year, month and day—It is enough if it is indicated in any way by the decree ... A 182 N 135

Execution—Decree or order directing payment to be made at a certain date—
 Certain date—(Contd.)

- (ii) Date which can become certain only at a future time
 is not certain date ... A 182 N 135
- (iii) Instalment decree with default clause providing entire
 amount remaining due to be payable on default of one
 or more instalments—Amount is not payable at cer-
 tain date ... A 182 N 135
- (iv) Mortgage decree—If sale proceeds insufficient, balance
 to be recovered from judgment-debtor personally and
 from his other properties—Balance is not to be paid
 at a certain date ... A 182 N 135
- (v) Words refer to date which at the date of the decree or
 order is certain ... A 182 N 135
- ... A 182 N 133
- in default certain properties to be made over to plaintiff by
 defendant comes within Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134
- ... plaintiff annually
 7 applies ... A 182 N 135
- ... lly on a cer-
 tain date is such decree ... A 182 N 134
- (f) Decree directing payment of money on plaintiff attaining his
 majority is such a decree ... A 182 N 135
- (g) Decree directing payment of money 'within' a certain period
 —Whether such a decree ... A 182 N 135
- (h) Decree regulating rate of interest payable thereon under with
 reference to date of payment does not come within Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134
- (i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 133
- (j) Mortgage decree directing sale of mortgaged properties in
 default of payment of mortgage money on or before a cer-
 tain date is not one under Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134
- (k) Order staying execution of decree till disposal of a suit be-
 tween the same parties does not fall under Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134
- (l) Order subsequent to decree postponing date on which pay-
 ment is to be made comes within Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134
- (m) Parties presenting petition stating compromise as to payment
 of decretal amount in instalments—Petition directed to be
 filed—Order does not come under Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134
- (n) Provision in decree that decree-holder entitled to realize
 portion of decretal amount on failure of judgment-debtor to
 pay interest does not come within Cl. 7 ... A 182 N 134
- (o) Simple money decree which does not fix expressly or impliedly
 any date for payment is not such a decree ... A 182 N 135
- Decree or order directing payment to be made on different dates—
 Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 133
- Decree passed when there is only one decree-holder or judgment-
 debtor but subsequently more than one person becoming entitled
 to or liable under decree

Execution—Decree passed when there is only one decree-holder, etc.—(Contd.)

- (c) Decree-holder dying—Application for execution by one of
 - all ... A 182 N 142
 - inst one of his legal representatives saves limitation against all ... A 182 N 142
- (f) Sole decree-holder transferring part of decree to another—Application for execution by transferee saves limitation for application by transferor ... A 182 N 142
- Decree partly executable at once and partly not—Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 28
- Decree partly in favour of plaintiff and partly in favour of defendant—Plaintiff applying for execution of portion in his favour—Whether acknowledges liability in favour of defendant ... S 19 N 18
- Decree partly joint and partly several against several defendants
 - (a) Decree against several persons but not joint against all in regard to any of reliefs but joint against some of them in regard to one of reliefs—Still it is decree passed "jointly" ... I, Art. 182 ... A 182 N 141
 - ns jointly and rately—Appli- cation against all judgment-debtors for execution in respect of joint relief saves time for application for separate relief : A 182 N 141
 - (c) Whether joint or several decree for purposes of second para. of Expl. I, Art. 182 ... A 182 N 141
- Decree-holder—One joint decree-holder, if can give discharge on behalf of another ... S 7 N 15
- Decree-holder directed to refund amount recovered by execution by decree passed in suit—Time runs from date of decree in such suit ... A 182 Cl 6
- Decree-holder joining in execution petition relief not in conformity with decree—Cause, if in the nature of defect of jurisdiction within S. 14 ... S 14 N 24
- Decree-holder prosecuting in good faith and with due diligence execution of decree—Discovery that his remedy was by suit and not by execution—Institution of suit—Period to be excluded ... S 14 N 29
- Delivery of possession—Order as to, in proceedings for—See under Civil P. C., O 21, Rr. 98, 99, 100 and 103.
- Effect of bar of limitation—Application not filed within time prescribed by Art. 182—Decree in order is rendered inoperative and unenforceable thereafter ... A 182 N 146
- Ex parte decree—Application to set aside dismissed—Appeal therefrom also dismissed—Limitation for execution of *ex parte* decree, from what date runs ... A 182 N 34
- Execution proceedings in another suit—Whether within the meaning of 'another civil proceeding' in S. 14 ... S 14 N 13
- Final decree—Decree, in appeal from preliminary decree filed before passing of final decree, passed after final decree—Limitation ... A 182 N 34
- Fresh starting point
 - (a) Amendment of Cl. 5, Art. 182, whether retrospective ... A 182 N 51a

Execution—Decree passed when there is only one decree-holder, etc.—(Contd.)

- ... A 182 N 143
- ... ation by one of ... A 182 N 142
- ... A 182 N 142
- ... one of his legal ... A 182 N 143
- representatives saves limitation against all ... A 182 N 143
- (f) Sole decree-holder transferring part of decree to another—
Application for execution by transferee saves limitation for
application by transferor ... A 182 N 143
- Decree partly executable at once and partly not—Limitation—
Starting point ... A 182 N 28
- Decree partly in favour of plaintiff and partly in favour of defend-
ant—Plaintiff applying for execution of portion in his favour—
Whether acknowledges liability in favour of defendant ... S 19 N 18
- Decree partly joint and partly several against several defendants
 - (a) Decree against several persons but not joint against all in
regard to any of reliefs but joint against some of them in
regard to one of reliefs — Still it is decree passed “jointly
against more persons than one” within Expl. I, Art. 182 ... A 182 N 141
 - (b) Relief granted by decree against several persons jointly and
other relief granted against one of them separately—Appli-
cation for relief : A 182 N 141
 - (c) ... and para. ... A 182 N 141
- Decree-holder—One joint decree-holder, if can give discharge on
behalf of another ... S 7 N 15
- Decree-holder directed to refund amount recovered by execution
by decree passed in suit — Time runs from date of decree in such
suit ... A 182 Cl 6
- Decree-holder joining in execution petition relief not in conformity
with decree—Cause, if in the nature of defect of jurisdiction
within S. 14 ... S 14 N 24
- Decree-holder prosecuting in good faith and with due diligence
execution of decree—Discovery that his remedy was by suit and
not by execution—Institution of suit—Period to be excluded ... S 14 N 29
- Delivery of possession—Order as to, in proceedings for—See
under Civil P. C., O. 21, Rr. 98, 99, 100 and 103.
- Effect of bar of limitation—Application not filed within time
prescribed by Art. 182—Decree or order is rendered inoperative
and unenforceable thereafter ... A 182 N 146
- Ex parte decree — Application to set aside dismissed — Appeal
therefrom also dismissed—Limitation for execution of *ex parte*
decree, from what date runs ... A 182 N 34
- Execution proceedings in another suit — Whether within the
meaning of ‘another civil proceeding’ in S. 14 ... S 14 N 12
- ... A 182 N 34
- ... A 182 N 51a

Execution—Fresh starting point—(Contd.)

- Whe. ... A 182 N 50
- (ii) Amendment made by Court without jurisdiction—No fresh starting point from date of amendment ... A 182 N 50
- (iii) Amendment to give fresh start, whether should be such that without it decree is incapable of execution: ... A 182 N 50
- (iv) "Date of amendment"—Meaning of ... A 182 N 50
- (v) Decree as framed incapable of execution—Decree amended so as to become capable of execution—Limitation runs from date of amendment ... A 182 N 50
- (vi) Execution petition filed beyond time—Decree amended subsequently—Amendment will not save application already barred ... A 182 N 50
- (vii) Furnishes fresh starting point ... A 182 N 50
- (viii) "Where a decree has been amended"—Amendment, whether includes that of verbal or clerical errors and those which do not concern execution of decree ... A 182 N 50
- (ix) Whether can be considered as review of judgment ... A 182 N 50
- (c) Appeal ... A 182 N 33
- (i) Appeal against order in execution proceedings does not give fresh start ... A 182 N 34
- (ii) Appeal against portion of decree, if saves limitation for execution of whole decree ... A 182 N 35
- (iii) Appeal dismissed on representation of pleader that he is unable to support it—Time runs from date of dismissal of appeal ... A 182 N 40
A 182 N 38
A 182 N 33
- Use of amending such decree or order ... A 182 N 34
- (vii) Appeal need not be one by which whole decree is ... A 182 N 35
- of Art. 182 applies ... A 182 N 40
- (ix) Appeal rejected before admission—Cl. 2, Art. 182 will not apply ... A 182 N 38
- (x) Appeal simply dismissed as being incompetent—Cl. 2 of Art. 182 applies ... A 182 N 40
- (xi) Appellate Court erroneously treating appeal as competent and passing decree—Limitation runs from appellate decree ... A 182 N 37
- (xii) Appellate Court holding appeal to have abated but ~~appeal to have decree confirmed~~ decree appealed ... A 182 N 41
- Court's decree already made before appellate decree passed—Time runs from appellate decree ... A 182 N 46
- (xiv) Assignee of decree is entitled to fresh start even though he is not brought on record of appeal ... A 182 N 47

Execution—Fresh starting point—Appeal—(Contd.)

- (xv) Decree against principal debtor and surety—Principal debtor alone appealing—Surety not made party—Time is saved even against surety ... A 182 N 35
- (xvi) Decree obtained only for a portion of claim—Unsuccessful appeal against portion disallowed—Time even as regards portion allowed runs from the date of appellate decree ... A 182 N 35
- (xvii) Decree passed against several defendants—One of them only appealing—Limitation against all defendants runs from date of appellate decree ... A 182 N 35
- (xviii) Decree-holder died pending appeal by judgment-debtor—Wrong person brought on record as legal representative and consent decree passed—Time for execution by true legal representative runs from date of appellate decree ... A 182 N 41
- (xix) Dismissal for default does not give fresh start ... A 182 N 42
- (xx) Irregular or incompetent appeal can save limitation under Cl. 2, Art. 182 ... A 182 N 37
- (xxi) Limitation runs from date of final decree or order of Appellate Court ... A 182 N 46
- (xxii) Order of Appellate Court declaring an appeal to have ... A 182 N 41
- (xxiii) C disposing of an appeal ... A 182 N 41
- (xxiv) Person against whom execution is sought need not be party to appeal for applicability of Cl. 2, Art. 182 ... A 182 N 35
- (xxv) Petition under S. 70 (1)(b), Punjab Courts Act, is not appeal before it is admitted ... A 182 N 33
- (xxvi) Question of limitation should not be made to depend on other question whether appeal by one of defendants or as regards part of decree imperils decree passed against other defendants or other portion of decree ... A 182 N 35
- (xxvii) Review of decree allowed—Appeal against such order—Limitation for execution of decree runs from date of final order ... A 182 N 34
- (xxviii) Revision application admitted as appeal—Order on such application gives a fresh start ... A 182 N 46
- (xxix) Suit against B and C decreed against B but dismissed against C—Appeal against dismissal without impleading B—Time against B runs from date of appellate decree ... A 182 N 35
- A 182 N 45
- e has been an applica- ... A 182 N 51a
- (i) Essentials of ... A 182 N 51a
- (ii) No application made to any Court but simply payment to decree-holder out of Court—Clause does not apply: ... A 182 N 51a
- (iv) Suit to set aside adverse order against decree-holder in a claim case—Clause does not apply ... A 182 N 51a
- (e) Application by decree-holder asking Court to do something which would have the effect of removing obstacle by judgment-debtor—Decree-holder gets fresh starting point ... A 182 N 117

Execution—Fresh starting point—(Contd.)

- (f) Application by transferee of decree—Court recognizing assignment and allowing assignee to execute gives fresh starting point ... A 182 N 78
- (g) Application by transferee of decree under unregistered transfer and decree-holder jointly saves time for later petition by transferee who has obtained second registered assignment ... A 182 N 78
- (h) Application for execution containing prayer for substitution of legal representative of judgment-debtor is sufficient to give fresh starting point even if it contains error in matter of relief ... A 182 N 126
- (i) Application for issue of notice under O. 21, R. 22, Civil P. C., does not give fresh starting point ... A 182 N 116
- (j) Application in which *batta* memo is filed must be in accordance with law to render *batta* memo an application giving fresh starting point ... A 182 N 118
- (k) *Batta* memo filed in application for removal of next friend of decree-holder and permission to execute, does not give fresh starting point ... A 182 N 118
- (l) ... A 182 N 124
- (m) operation ... A 182 N 131a
- (m¹) Execution application withdrawn — Whether gives fresh starting point ... A 182 N 86b
- (n) Execution application withdrawn without leave, dismissed — Order of dismissal is final order and gives fresh starting point of time ... A 182 N 86b
- (o) Filing of affidavit of proof of service of notice under O. 21, R. 22, Civil P. C., whether gives fresh starting point ... A 182 N 116
- (p) Final decree or order
 - (i) Meaning of ... A 182 N 40
 - (a) Order of Appellate Court declaring appeal to ... A 182 N 41
 - ... A 182 N 42
- (iv) Order returning appeal for presentation to proper Court is not ... A 182 N 40
- ... A 182 N 43
- (q) Final order
 - (i) Application returned for amendment and not re-presented—Whether must be considered to be pending till re-presented by decree-holder ... A 182 N 127
 - (ii) Decree-holder applying for execution asking for issue of notice to judgment-debtor — Order made issuing ...
 - ... final order ...
 - (iii) Final order need not be in accordance with law ... A 182 N 129
 - (iv) Final order on application appealed against — Order of Appellate Court is the final order ... A 182 N 131
 - (v) Meaning of ... A 182 N 129
 - (vi) Order must be "final" one to give fresh starting point: A 182 N 129

Execution—Fresh starting point—Final order—(Contd.) . . .

- (vii) Order returning application for amendment—Whether final order A 182 N 129
 - (viii) Order transferring decree for execution to another Court
 - (a) Date of final order is one on which certificate of transfer is handed over to decree-holder and not date on which Court directed office to prepare certificate A 182 N 130
 - (b) Is final order A 182 N 130
 - (ix) "Order," whether must be passed on merits . . . A 182 N 129
 - (x) "Order," whether need be judicial determination of matter involved in application . . . A 182 N 129
 - (xi) Petition dismissed after recording part payment — Decree-holder granting two months time — Date of final order is date of dismissal and not that at end of two months A 182 N 129
 - (xii) Petition returned for amendment and on re-presentation rejected—Order of rejection is final order . . . A 182 N 129
 - (xiii) Time runs from date of final order on application for . . . A 182 N 129
 - (xiv) h law
ed on
such application A 182 N 131
 - (r) Mere opposition by decree-holder to application by judgment-debtor does not give fresh starting point . . . A 182 N 117
 - (s) Review
 - (i) Decree reviewed at instance of some of defendants—Limitation runs from date of revised decree even against defendants who were not parties . . . A 182 N 49
 - (ii) Effect of A 182 N 48
 - (iii) Restoration of suit or appeal dismissed—Whether review of judgment A 182 N 48
 - (iv) Review granted—Order granting it appealed against—Time runs from date of decision in appeal . . . A 182 N 48
 - (v) Review in part—Time runs from date of revised decree: . . . A 182 N 49
 - (vi) Review of judgment in Art. 183, Cl. 3—Meaning . . . A 182 N 48
 - (t) execution sale
under O. 21, R. 92, Civil P. C., will not give fresh starting point A 182 N 103
 - (u) Application for particular relief ordered—Subsequent application for same relief does not give fresh starting point A 182 N 103
 - (iii) Application to Court for a purpose for which no application is necessary cannot furnish fresh starting point: A 182 N 103
 - (v) When there is previous application for execution or to take step-in-aid time runs from the date of final order on such application A 182 N 51a
- Instalment decree
- (a) Application for recovery of each instalment
 - (i) Fact that application is made after three years from date on which earlier instalments fell due does not bar application A 182 N 136

Execution—Instalment decree—Application for recovery of each instalment— (Contd.)

- (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 136
- (b) Decretal amount directed to be paid in certain instalments at certain dates—Application for enforcement of payment—Limitation ... A 182 N 136
- (c) Default clause providing decree-holder to become entitled to possession on failure of payment of one or more instalments ... A 182 N 136
- ... A 182 N 136
- ... A 182 N 136

within three years of application though application is made more than three years of earliest default ... A 182 N 136

- (d) ... A 182 N 136

final order on previous one barred even with regard to instalments falling due within three years of application ... A 182 N 136

- (b) Subsequent application made within three years of final order on prior one is within time under Cl. 5, Art. 182 ... A 182 N 136

- (c) Subsequent application must be treated as one in respect of whole decree and not of instalments: A 182 N 136

- (d) Whether time runs from earliest default ... A 182 N 136

- (ii) Application for enforcement of certain instalments which fell due within three years of application made after three years from earliest default—Whether barred if application for enforcing default clause is barred ... A 182 N 136

- (iii) Application for enforcement of payment of each instalment—Limitation—Starting point ... A 182 N 136

... A 182 N 136

—Judgment-debtor and surety

- (a) Application against one—Whether saves limitation against the other... A 182 N 139

- (b) Decree passed jointly against both
 - (i) Application against either of them saves limitation against both ... A 182 N 139

- (ii) Mere fact that decree should be executed against surety only if amount is not realized from principal debtor does not make decree not joint decree ... A 182 N 139

- (c) Steps taken against surety to enforce surety bond which do not fall under application for execution will not save limitation against judgment-debtor ... A 182 N 139

- (d) Surety after passing of decree guaranteeing payment of decretal amount—Execution application against surety—Art. 181 and not Art. 182 applies ... A 182 N 139

Execution—(Contd.)

- Knowledge of proceedings up to time of sale withheld from judgment-debtor by fraudulent concealment of proceedings by decree-holder—Judgment-debtor can invoke aid of S. 18 ... S 18 N 10
- Mortgage decree
 - (a) Combined decree against person and property—Limitation for enforcing personally ... A 182 N 27
 - (h) Decree not drawn up in form specified by O. 34, R. 7, C. P. C.—Execution of—Limitation ... A 182 N 13
- Of decree—Application for—Limitation ... A 181 N 3
- Of decrees or orders—Meaning of ... A 182 N 10
- Of mortgage decree—Attachment, if necessary ... A 11 N 18
- Particular ground relied on as reviving limitation—Ground, if should be specified in application ... S 3 N 31 F N 12
- Pendency of judgment-debtor's application to enter satisfaction of decree—Whether suspends decree-holder's cause of action for applying for execution ... S 9 N 11
- Preliminary and final decree—Time runs from date of final decree and not from date of preliminary decree ... A 182 N 25
- Relief claimed in application for execution of decree—Whether different from relief in application for preparation of final decree... S 14 N 19
- Review of judgment—Time runs from decision passed on review... A 182 Cl 3
- Revival of application
 - (a) Application for
 - (i) Execution arrested by some obstacle for which decree-holder not responsible—Time for revival runs from date when obstacle is removed ... A 182 N 143
 - (ii) Limitation
 - (a) Art. 181 and not Art. 182 applies ... A 182 N 143
 - ... A 182 N 143
 - (h) C ... hat of whom ... A 182 N 143
- (c) Court disposing of matter against decree-holder for no act or default of his—Order cannot be considered to have finally disposed of application ... A 182 N 143
- (d) Essentials
 - (i) Subsequent application must be for same relief and against same person ... A 182 N 143
 - (ii) Subsequent application must be of same nature as previous one ... A 182 N 143
- (e) Execution application must be deemed to be pending till final order judicially disposing of it is passed ... A 182 N 143
- (f) Execution application ordered to be simply filed—Fresh application is one for revival ... A 182 N 143
- (g) Execution application pending—Subsequent application is deemed to be one merely for continuation of original proceedings ... A 182 N 143
- (h) Execution application pending before Court without being dismissed—No fresh application is necessary to revive the first ... A 182 N 143

Execution—Revival of application—(Contd.)

- (i) Execution proceeding suspended by no act or default of decree-holder—Decree-holder has right to ask Court to revive and carry through execution proceeding ... A 182 N 143
- (j) Final judicial order terminating proceedings passed on application
 - (i) Application cannot be revived ... A 182 N 143
 - (ii) Subsequent application is regarded as fresh application and not one for revival or continuation of original proceeding ... A 182 N 143
- (k) Form of
 - (i) Application in form for execution can be considered to be one for revival or continuation of earlier proceeding ... A 182 N 143
 - (ii) It can be orally revived ... A 182 N 143
- (l) Order disposing execution proceeding finally, made behind back of decree-holder without giving him opportunity of being heard ... A 182 N 143
- (m) Order disposing of matter against decree-holder
 - (i) Order made at his request—Proceeding cannot be revived ... A 182 N 143
 - (ii) Order made on ground of default of decree-holder in carrying on proceedings—Proceeding cannot be revived ... A 182 N 143
 - (iii) Order made where he could not take further proceeding owing to circumstances beyond his control
 - (a) Fresh application regarded as one for revival and continuation ... A 182 N 143
 - (b) Illustrations ... A 182 N 143
- (n) Order finally disposing of proceedings subsequently turning out to be untenable, inoperative or ineffective—Proceedings can be revived ... A 182 N 143
- (o) Order striking off proceeding
 - (i) Effect depends on intention of Court in making order and construction of order ... A 182 N 143
 - (ii) If it amounts to final order, proceedings cannot be revived ... A 182 N 143
 - (iii) Order made for administrative or statistical purposes is not final disposal ... A 182 N 143
 - (iv) Order striking off proceeding 'for the present'—Order is not one finally disposing of proceeding ... A 182 N 143
- (p) Petition dismissed though attachment continued—Subsequent application is regarded as fresh application and not one for revival or continuation of original proceeding ... A 182 N 143
- (q) Principle of treating application as continuation of former one applies only where decree-holder has not been remiss ... A 182 N 143
- (r) Property sold and decree satisfied—Sale subsequently set aside at instance of judgment-debtor—Decree-holder can apply for revival of earlier proceeding ... A 182 N 143

Execution—Revival of application—(Contd.)

- (s) Question whether or not execution proceeding has been finally disposed of so as to be incapable of being revived or continued

(i) Form of order passed on application not sufficient to determine the question A 182 N 143

(ii) Is one of fact A 182 N 143

(iii) Is one of substance and not of form A 182 N 143

- (t) Revival and continuation of application—Not much differ.

enco A 182 N 143

Act, S. 158 (b)—Suit to A 120 N 31

attaining majority—Limitation A 44 N 4

Sale of property of religious or charitable endowment—Sale in execution of decree against manager—Suit against auction-purchaser—Suit for recovery of possession of endowment property—Limitation—Starting point A 134-ABC N 8

Sale proceedings, when can be set aside on ground of fraud—Instances S 18 N 10

Sale set aside by judgment-debtor—Suit by auction-purchaser for refund of purchase money—Limitation... .. A 69 N 7

Stay of—Effect : See Exclusion of time

Step-in-aid

- (a) Appeal by decree-holder against order affecting execution of decree—Whether application to take step-in-aid A 182 N 105

- (b) Application against wrong person as legal representative—Whether step-in-aid A 182 N 82

- (c) Application by decree-holder asking Court to reject objections of judgment-debtor to execution is one to take step-in-aid : A 182 N 117

- (d) Application by decree-holder for appointment of receiver is one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 112

- (e) Application by decree-holder for copy of decree is not necessarily one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 119

- (f) Application by decree-holder for copy of list of properties attached in previous execution proceedings is not one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 119

- (g) Application by decree-holder for payment out of money lying in Court as result of satisfaction or realization in execution of decree—Whether one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 123

A 182 N 119

A 182 N 112

- (i) Application by decree-holder to receive *batta* for resisting judgment-debtor's application objecting execution is one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 117

- (k) Application by decree-holder to send for certain records for resisting judgment-debtor's application objecting execution is one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 117

A 182 N 117

Execution—Step-in-aid—(Contd.)

- (m) Application by decree-holder-purchaser to receive from him poundage fee in respect of property purchased and an application to be allowed to set off purchase money against decree are not applications to take step-in-aid A 182 N 128
- (n) Application by executor of decree-holder without probate is step-in-aid A 182 N 81
- (o) Application by holder of decree A for rateable distribution of A 182 N 125
- (p) Application by holder of redemption decree to send notice to judgment-debtor asking him to withdraw money deposited in Court by former is one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 128
- (q) Application by transferee of decree under S. 232 Civil P. C. though unsuccessful is a step-in-aid A 182 N 78
- (r) Application containing prayers for execution of decree and also for matters amounting to steps-in-aid — Application though failing to be in accordance with law as one for execution is still one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 109
- (s) Application defective in material particulars as execution application contains prayers that the applicant, legal representative of decree-holder, should be permitted to proceed with A 182 N 109
- (t) Application can only be taken where either execution application is pending or decree is capable of being kept alive A 182 N 110
... .. A 182 N 110
- (iv) Application for attachment of judgment-debtor's property in execution is one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 128
- (v) Application for continuation of execution sale to secure proper attendance of bidders is one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 128
- (vi) Application for correction of decree by additional interest omitted to be mentioned in decree is one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 128
- (vii) Application for ejectment of tenant against whom decree for arrears of rent is passed, is not one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 128
- (viii) Application for execution also containing prayer for substitution of legal representative of deceased judgment-debtor — Application though not in accordance with law being one for execution is one to take a step-in-aid A 182 N 126
- (ix) Application for reconstruction of decree destroyed by fire is not one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 123
- (x) Application for revival of previous execution proceedings is one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 123
- (xi) Application for stay of proceeding pending appeal is not one to take step-in-aid A 182 N 123

Execution—Step-in-aid—Application for—(Contd.)

- (xii) Application for substituted service of notice of execution is one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 123
- (xiii) Application for substitution of legal representative of decree-holder or judgment-debtor is one to take a step-in-aid ... A 182 N 126
- (xiv) Application for summoning necessary witness in execution proceedings is one to take step-in-aid. ... A 182 N 123
- (xv) 'Application' in clause 5, of Art. 182 does not include a 'suit' ... A 182 N 104
- (xvi) Application need not be in writing unless required by Code—It may be oral ... A 182 N 103
- (xvii) Application need not necessarily be made during execution proceeding under S. 47, Civil P. C., but may be made in any proceeding affecting execution ... A 182 N 117
- (xviii) 'Application' should be liberally construed as including any document containing a request ... A 182 N 103
- (xix) Limitation ... A 182 N 2
- (xx) Mere certification by decree-holder of payment made to him is not application ... A 182 N 124
- (xxi) Must be made to Court whose duty it is to execute the decree ... A 182 N 87
- (xxii) No prescribed form ... A 182 N 103
- (xxiii) Order made by Court of such a nature that it could not have been made without application—Application would be presumed to have been made ... A 182 N 103
- (xxiv) Plaint, if can be treated as an application ... A 182 N 104
- (xxv) Presumption as to application having been made will not be made unless the application is necessary ... A 182 N 103
- (xxvi) Question whether act or proceeding amounts to application depends on facts and circumstances of case ... A 182 N 103
- (xxvii) Should be one in accordance with law and to the proper Court ... A 182 N 101
- (xxviii) Will be presumed to have been made if fact and circumstances raise such presumption ... A 182 N 103
- (u) Application for delivery of possession by decree-holder auction purchaser—Whether step-in-aid ... A 182 N 123
- (v) Application for execution containing also prayer to issue notice under O. 21, R. 22, Civil P. C.—Application so far as prayer for notice is concerned is one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 116
- (w) Application for execution of attached decree is one to take step-in-aid of execution of original decree ... A 182 N 120
- (x) Application for final decree for sale or for foreclosure under Civil P. C. (1908) not one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 111
- (y) Application for final decree in partition suit is not one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 111
- (z) Application for further transfer of decree made to transferor Court—Whether step-in-aid ... A 182 N 121
- (z¹) Application for issue of any other process in execution is one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 123
- (z²) Application for issue of notice to judgment-debtor under O. 21, R. 66 or to have a date fixed for settlement of terms of proclamation is step-in-aid ... A 182 N 116a

Execution—Step-in-aid—(Contd.)

- ... A 182 N 118
- ... A 182 N 116a
- (z⁵) Application for leave to bid—Whether a step-in-aid ... A 182 N 122
- (z⁶) Application for leave to bid coupled with request to set off purchase money against decretal amount is step-in-aid ... A 182 N 122
- (z⁷) Application for mere issue of notice to judgment-debtor under O. 21, R. 22, Civil P. G. is not one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 116
- (z⁸) Application for order absolute for foreclosure under S. 69, T. P. Act, is one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 111
- (z⁹) Application for order absolute for sale under S. 87, T. P. Act, is one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 111
- (z¹⁰) Application for postponement of execution proceedings—Whether step-in-aid—Illustrative cases ... A 182 N 115
- (z¹¹) ... to recall decree from ... A 182 N 121
- (ii) Application to transferee Court to send certificate of result of execution and to return decree to Court which passed decree is step-in-aid ... A 182 N 121
- (z¹²) Application for review of an order striking off execution case and for its restoration is one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 106
- (z¹³) Application for transfer of decree
- (i) Application against judgment-debtor who is dead is not step-in-aid ... A 182 N 121
- (ii) Application for transfer to a Court which has no jurisdiction to execute the decree is not step-in-aid ... A 182 N 121
- (z¹⁴) ... in Court—Whether ... A 182 N 107
- (z¹⁵) ... another execution ... in respect of ... A 182 N 128
- (z¹⁶) Application merely to execute decree cannot be considered as one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 109
- (z¹⁷) ... A 182 N 103
- (z¹⁸) ... in-aid ... A 182 N 128
- (z¹⁹) Application to Court of Native State to transfer decree of that Court to British Indian Court is step-in-aid ... A 182 N 101
- (z²⁰) Application to Court to receive railway charges for taking judgment-debtor to civil prison and subsistence money for his maintenance is one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 118
- (z²¹) Application to obtain succession certificate is not one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 113
- (z²²) Application to stay sale in execution but to continue attachment is one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 128
- (z²³) Application to withdraw pending execution petition with leave to institute another at some future time is not one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 128

Execution—Step-in-aid—(Contd.)

- (z⁴²) Mere swearing of affidavit proving service of notice to judgment-debtor unaccompanied by any application is not step-in-aid ... A 182 N 116a
- (z⁴³) Opposition by decree-holder to judgment-debtor's application under O. 21 R. 2, Civil P. C. is not one to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 117
- (z⁴⁴) Payment of process fee and filing of notice of sale is equivalent to application to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 118
- ... fare
step-
in-aid ... A 182 N 118a
- (u) Mere payment without application—Whether step-in-aid ... A 182 N 118a
- (z⁴⁶) Resistance by decree-holder to execution of another man's decree is not step-in-aid of execution of his own decree ... A 182 N 117
- (z⁴⁷) Re-submission of returned application after complying with order of Court for amendment is not an application for step-in-aid ... A 182 N 106a
- (z⁴⁸) Statement by decree-holder objecting to judgment-debtor's application to record satisfaction is not step-in-aid ... A 182 N 117
- (z⁴⁹) Step asked for, whether should be in aid of execution by a British Indian Court ... A 182 N 107
- (z⁵⁰) "Step in aid of execution," whether refers to execution of decree under Civil P. C. or any other law in force in British India: A 182 N 107
- (z⁵¹) Step must be one to be taken by the Court and an application should be made to the Court for that purpose A 182 N 102, 103
- (z⁵²) Step must be with reference to decree sought to be executed, not to other matters ... A 182 N 108
- (z⁵³) Step should be in furtherance of execution of decree ... A 182 N 100
- (z⁵⁴) Vakalatnama executed authorising vakil to execute decree—No further authority is required for applying to take step-in-aid ... A 182 N 71
- (z⁵⁵) What is not
- (i) Acts of party himself ... A 182 N 103
- (a) Act of accompanying process peon to identify the judgment-debtor ... A 182 N 102
- (b) Filing certain papers in Court to be kept in the record ... A 182 N 102
- (c) Getting necessary encumbrance certificate or copies of other documents ... A 182 N 102
- (ii) Certification of payment made by judgment-debtor to the decree-holder out of Court ... A 182 N 102
- (iii) Decree-holder asking for time to take out substituted service of notice ordered to be taken to judgment-debtor ... A 182 N 102
- (z⁵⁶) Whether pending execution application necessary ... A 182 N 100
- (z⁵⁷) Words "step-in-aid" must be liberally construed ... A 182 N 100
- Suit by auction-purchaser for recovery of purchase money on ground of fraud of decree-holder—Limitation ... A 95 N 9
- Suit by purchaser for possession of purchased property—Limitation—Exclusion of time of pendency of proceedings to set aside sale... S 16

Execution—Step-in-aid—(Contd.)

- Suspension of execution arising by decree-holder's omission or default—Subsequent application, if can be regarded as continuation of previous one S 15 N 18
- Suspension of execution through no act or default of decree-holder—Decree-holder, if can ask Court to revive and carry through suspended execution proceedings S 15 N 18
- Transfer of decree from one Court to another—Limitation for execution A 182 N 9

Execution proceedings

- Death of defendant during—Addition of legal representative as party—Application for—Limitation A 177 N 3
- Fraud in course of—Suit for relief in respect of such fraud—Maintainability A 95 N 9

Execution purchaser

- Who is, within Art. 180 A 160 N 3
- Application for delivery of possession—*See under* : Execution Sale
- Application for delivery of possession

Execution sale

- Application for delivery of possession
 - (a) Application within time closed for statistical purposes—
... .. A 180 N 6
 - (b) A 180 N 6
 - (c) Application within time struck off—Subsequent application beyond limitation, if maintainable A 180 N 6
 - (d) By purchaser—Limitation—Starting point: A 138 N 2; A 180, A 180 N 1; A 180 N 2; A 180 N 4 A 180 N 3
 - (e) By transferee of auction-purchaser—Limitation A 180 N 4
 - (f) Period of pendency of suit by judgment-debtor for setting aside sale, whether excluded A 180 N 5
 - (g) Whether time excluded by virtue of S. 14, Limitation Act A 180 N 5
 - (h) Whether time excluded under S. 15, Limitation Act A 180 N 5
 - (i) Whether time extended by virtue of S. 5, Limitation Act A 166 N 8
- Application to set aside on ground of judgment-debtor having no saleable interest—Limitation A 166 N 2
- Confirmation of—Application for setting aside sale within time but after confirmation, if barred A 12 N 6
- Decree modified, reversed or set aside after sale—Effect of, on auction-purchaser A 12 N 6
- Fraud committed by decree-holder in proceedings taken to bring judgment-debtor's property to sale—No fresh act of fraud proved at date of sale—Antecedent fraud, if entitles party to benefit of S. 18 S 18 N 5
- Fraud—Sale—Decree-holder not guilty of fraud but auction purchaser so guilty—Application to set aside sale—Period, if can be extended as against either S 18 N 14
- Immovable property sold
 - (a) Delivery of possession, resistance to
 - (i) Against auction-purchaser—Remedy of A 167 N 2
 - (ii) Against decree-holder—Remedy of A 167 N 2

Execution sale — Immovable property sold — Delivery of possession — Resistance to—(Contd.)

(iii) Complaint of—Application for

(a) Application converted into suit — Limitation
—Court, whether *cao* dismiss such suit on
ground that application is barred by time ... A 167 N 3

(b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 167; A 167 N 2

(c) Time, whether extended on ground of minority... A 167 N 4

(d) Where applicant has been twice resisted in deli-
very of possession ... A 167 N 2

(e) Where execution case is transferred to another
Court ... A 167 N 5

(b) Delivery of—Suit for delivery of possession by decree-holder
purchaser—Maintainability ... A 180 N 2

(c) Purchaser decree-holder—Delivery of possession—Remedies A 180 N 2

(d) Purchaser stranger—Delivery of possession—Remedies ... A 180 N 2

A 166 N 8

A 166 N 8

A 10 N 9

of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 2

Property sold belonging to person other than judgment-debtor
but who is party to suit — Application by such person for relief
in respect of such sale—Limitation ... A 166 N 8

Sale of interest of undivided member of joint Hindu family—
Nature of right acquired by purchaser ... A 180 N 2

Sale of interest of undivided member of joint Hindu family—Pur-
... A 180 N 2

A 166 N 18

A 166 N 16

to record

A 166 N 6

(ii) Applicant, when can claim benefit of S. 18, Limitation
Act ... A 166 N 18

(iii) Judgment-debtor, whether barred under Art. 166 to set
up defence in suit for possession by purchaser that sale
is voidable by him (J. D.) ... A 166 N 19

(iv) Limitation—Art. 166 and S. 18, Limitation Act ... A 166 N 18

(v) Limitation—Special and general provisions of ... A 166 N 2

A 166; A 166 N 21

A 166 N 11

A 166 N 20

(d) Application for declaration that execution sale is void—
Limitation ... A 166 N 2

... proceedings—Limitation ... A 166 N 9

... S. 47—Limitation ... A 166 N 2

... O. 21, R. 89—Provisions as to ... A 166 N 7

Execution sale—Setting aside—(Contd.)

- (b) Application within time but after confirmation of sale, if barred ... A 166 N 2
- (i) Article 166, whether governs all applications irrespective of grounds on which they are based... A 166 N 1; A 166 N 2
- (j) "Date of sale," what is ... A 166 N 21
- (k) Extension of time on ground of fraud—Burden of proof as to fraud ... A 166 N 18
- (l) Fraud antecedent to sale, whether can extend time for such application ... A 166 N 18
- (m) Fraud, when can extend time for such application ... A 166 N 18
- (n) Notice to persons affected by application to set aside sale—Limitation ... A 166 N 12
- (o) Order setting aside sale subsequently reversed—Fresh application to set aside sale—Limitation ... A 166 N 22
- (p) Right to apply to set aside sale accruing subsequent to sale—Limitation—Illustrative cases ... A 166 N 2
- (q) Suit for delivery of possession—Limitation ... S 18 N 14
- (r) Suit for delivery of possession—Limitation—S. 18, against ... S 18 N 10
- (s) Suit for delivery of possession—Limitation—S. 18, against ... A 126 N 6
- (t) Suit for delivery of possession—Limitation—S. 18, against ... A 166 N 10
- (u) Suit for, by judgment-debtor—Where auction purchaser is a bona fide stranger—Limitation ... A 12 N 6
- (v) Suit treated as proceeding under Civil P. C., S. 47—Limitation ... A 166 N 14
- (w) Suit, when maintainable ... A 12 N 5
- (x) Suit, whether lies on ground of fraud committed in course of execution proceedings... A 95 N 9
- (y) Time against whom can be extended on ground of fraud ... A 166 N 18
- (z) Time occupied in obtaining report of sale-officer, whether can be excluded ... A 166 N 17
- (z¹) Time, whether extended on ground of Court being closed on last day of limitation... A 166 N 17
- (z²) Time during which applicant has been prosecuting application to set aside sale in wrong Court, whether can be excluded... A 166 N 17
- (z³) Time during which defendant is absent from British India, whether can be excluded ... A 166 N 17
- (z⁴) Time, whether can be extended under S. 5, Limitation Act ... A 166 N 17
- (z⁵) Time, whether can be extended under S. 6, Limitation Act ... A 166 N 17
- (z⁶) Under inherent power—Limitation ... A 166 N 15
- (z⁷) Whether Court has power to extend time for such application ... A 166 N 17
- Suit for delivery of possession—Limitation ... A 180 N 2
- Void execution sale—Limitation ... A 166 N 2
- Void execution sale—Limitation ... A 166 N 2
- Void execution sale—Limitation ... A 166 N 2

Execution sale—(Contd)

—Voidable execution sale

- (a) In what way can be set aside A 166 N 2
 (b) Setting aside—Application for—Limitation A 166 N 2
 (c) What is—Illustrative cases A 166 N 2

—When complete A 166 N 21

Executor—See also Legal representative

—Acknowledgment of liability by executor—Whether binding on estate S 19 N 56

—Acknowledgment or payment by one of several executors—Whether effective against others S 21 N 15

—Application by, for execution—Time taken for obtaining probate—Whether to be excluded S 9 N 6

—Authority to give acknowledgment on behalf of estate is based on his position under the law and not the result of any contractual arrangement S 19 N 50

—Debtor, executor under creditor's will

- (a) Limitation, if suspended during continuance of administration S 9 N 5
 (b) Suit by legatee against executor for debt—Cause of action, when arises S 9 N 12

—Debtor of testator becoming executor under his will—Executor, if trustee for specific purpose in regard to such debt S 10 N 16

—If trustee for specific purpose... .. S 10 N 16

—One joint executor, if can give discharge on behalf of all S 7 N 26

—Suit against

- (a) Suit by residuary legatee for recovery of shares granted under will—Plaintiff, whether is entitled to get accounts for period of 12 years before suit A 123 N 7
 (b) Suit for accounts—Limitation A 120 N 4; A 120 N 15
 (c) Suit for accounts by legatee—Limitation A 123 N 7
 (d) Suit for legacy—Limitation A 123 N 2
 (e) Suit for share of residue bequeathed by testator—Limitation A 123 N 2
 (f) Suit for share of property of intestate—Limitation A 123 N 2
 (g) Suit to recover moneys misappropriated by executor—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 4
 (h) Suit under Legal Representatives' Suits Act—Provision of S 1 of the Act for such suit against executor A 33 to 35 N 1
 (i) Suit where executor by his own act constitutes himself, express trustee—Suit, whether exempt from bar of limitation A 123 N 8
 (j) Suit where executor is also made express trustee—Suit, whether exempt from bar of limitation A 123 N 8
 (k) Suit, whether exempt from bar of limitation A 123 N 8

—Suit by

- (a) For recovery of moneys due to him from the estate—Limitation A 120 N 4

Executor—Suit by—(Contd.)

- (b) For recovery of possession of land belonging to deceased—Beneficiaries under will substituted for executor after period of limitation—Suit, if barred by S. 22 ... S 22 N 5
- (c) Under Indian Fatal Accidents Act—Limitation ... A 21
- (d) Under Legal Representatives' Suits Act—Limitation ... A 20
- Testator bequeathing to executor properties directing him to pay out of such properties specified legacies and debts—Executor, if trustee for specific purpose ... S 10 N 16
- Whether can be sued or sue on behalf of estate before obtaining probate ... S 17 N 8
- Whether express trustee ... A 123 N 8

Exemption from limitation

- Fraud—Facts suggesting fraud of defendant—Omission expressly to stigmatize conduct as fraudulent—Plaintiff, if can rely on S. 18 ... S 3 N 31 FN 11
- Ground of—Whether should be set forth in plaint in explicit terms ... S 3 N 31
- Grounds—Minority of plaintiff, if should be pleaded: ... S 3 N 31 FN 11
- New and inconsistent ground of, if can be taken to get over limitation ... S 3 N 31 FN 9
- New ground of, if can be taken without amendment of plaint: ... S 3 N 31 FN 9
- Plea of
 - (a) If can be allowed at late stage of proceedings ... S 3 N 31
 - (b) Must appear in plaint ... S 3 N 31
 - (c) Not taken in plaint—Effect of ... S 3 N 31

Ex parte decree—See also under Decree — Ex parte decree.

- Application by judgment-debtor to set aside—Application for execution of same decree is not for same relief ... S 14 N 19
- Application to set aside—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 3
- Setting aside of — Application for—Delay in filing, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3 FN 1

Extension of time—See also under Delay—Excuse of.

- On ground of fraud—Suit for money had and received—Time, whether extended by operation of S. 18 ... A 63 N 32
- On ground of minority — Minority, whether extends period of limitation for pre-emption suit ... A 10 N 6
- Court, whether can extend time if sufficient cause is shown for not applying in time for substitution ... A 177 N 7

Extinguishment

- Right of local authority, whether extinguished if suit for possession of street or road is barred under Art. 146-A ... A 146-A N 6

Extinguishment of right to property

- Agent of owner collecting rents from tenant—Appropriation of rent for his own use asserting land to be his own—Owner's right, whether can be extinguished by reason of such assertion and appropriation ... S 28 N 2
- "Any property" in S. 28—Meaning of ... S 29 N 5
- Application for possession—S. 28 does not apply ... S 29 N 3
- "At the determination of the period" in S. 28—Meaning of ... S 28 N 2

' Extinguishment of right to property—(Contd)

—Effect of

(a) Extinguishment of title of rightful owner—Whether gives good title to the wrong-doer S 28 N 6

(b) Title acquired by operation of S. 28

(i) Person so acquiring it, if can sue for possession of property on being dispossessed of it S 28 N 6

(ii) Suit for declaration of title—Whether can be maintained by person so acquiring it S 28 N 6

(c) Title of person extinguished in favour of wrongdoer—Whether revived by that person again getting the possession S 28 N 6

—Extinguishment of right to possession — Whether and when operates retrospectively S 28 N 6

—Full period prescribed for suit for possession must expire S 28 N 2

—Land attached to office of profit as appurtenant to it—Right to office barred—Right to land also will be extinguished S 28 N 5

—*Muth* having no lawful manager during period of prescription—Whether affects operation of S. 28 S 28 N 4

—Mere fact that owner happens not to be in possession for 12 years does not extinguish his right S 28 N 2

—Nature of property referred to in S. 28 S 28 N 5

—Nature of right extinguished

(a) Mortgage — Dispossession of mortgagor by stranger who remains in adverse possession for 12 years—Only right to equity of redemption and not mortgagee's right is extinguished S 28 N 6

(b) Order under S. 145, Criminal P. C., declaring one of two parties to be entitled to and in exclusive possession of property in dispute—No suit for possession by other party filed within time limited by Art. 47—Right, whether to exclusive possession or joint possession is extinguished S 28 N 6

(c) Owner having absolute right to property—Adverse possessor claiming only limited interest—Only such limited interest is extinguished S 28 N 6

(d) Person prescribed against only a person with limited interest—Only that interest will be extinguished S 28 N 6

(e) Principal right to sue for possession extinguished under S. 28—Rights accessory thereto will also be extinguished... .. S 28 N 6

(f) Right extinguished cannot be anything more than what wrongdoer purports to prescribe for S 28 N 6

(g) Right extinguished cannot be more than what rightful owner had in the property S 28 N 6

(h) Right to claim possession destroyed—Right to claim damages incidental to it is also destroyed S 28 N 6

(i) Right to possession includes right to joint possession S 28 N 6

(j) Right to recover possession from tenant lost by failure to sue for 12 years after termination of lease—Right to recover arrears of rent for years within 12 years or for damages also lost S 28 N 6

(k) Right to sue for joint possession destroyed—Right to claim partition and recovery of share cannot be claimed S 28 N 6

Extinguishment of right to property—(Contd.)

- One of two reversioners filing suit against alienee from widow within 12 years of widow's death—Other reversioner impleaded as party defendant—Written statement by him after 12 years claiming his share also against alienee—His right is not extinguished by his failure to sue for his share within 12 years ... S 28 N 6
- Period of limitation ... S 29 N 2
- Person having right to redeem property in another's possession under a mortgage and obtain possession from him—His right cannot be extinguished until 12 years after redemption ... S 28 N 2
- Person in possession seeking to rely upon his possession as defence to suit—S. 28 does not apply ... S 28 N 2
- Person who could have sued for possession of property allowing limitation to expire—His title is destroyed ... S 28 N 6
- Person who could not or need not have sued for possession—S. 28, if applies ... S 28 N 2
- Plaintiff's property under attachment under S. 146, Criminal P. C.—His title cannot be extinguished however long attachment may continue ... S 28 N 2
- Plea of title—Plaintiff need not say that defendant has lost his title by adverse possession ... S 28 N 8
- Possession of defendant, in law possession of plaintiff—Plaintiff's right to property, if extinguished by S. 28 ... S 28 N 2
- Proceedings to which S. 28 applies ... S 28 N 3
- Property—Property must be one recognized by law to fall within S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
- Receipt of rent by one of co-mortgagors alone—Whether amounts to possession—Right to redeem by other co-mortgagor, if affected by this Section ... S 28 N 2
- Right of reversioner of Hindu widow to sue alienee for possession—Right is not extinguished by alienee continuing in possession for any period shorter than 12 years after widow's death ... S 28 N 2
- Right to a Buddhist monastery—Whether can be acquired by operation of S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
- Right to an office of profit—Whether can be acquired by operation of S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
- Right to *birt jajmani*—Whether can be acquired by operation of S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
- Right to joint possession of property extinguished—Right of survivorship incidental to it will also be lost ... S 28 N 6
- Right to levy assessment on rent-free lands—Whether can be acquired by operation of S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
- Right to maintain a projection over neighbour's land—Whether can be acquired by the operation of S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
- Right to *nankar* allowance forming part of a larger estate which has been divided and enjoyed in severalty for a long time—Whether can be acquired by operation of S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
- Right to property
 - (a) Right to redeem a usufructuary mortgage—Whether property for the purpose of S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
 - (b) Whether includes right to joint enjoyment as well as right of survivorship to property ... S 28 N 5
- Right to redemption and possession of property—Right to sue for possession, when arises ... S 28 N 2

False imprisonment—Meaning of—(Contd.)

- (d) Person wrongfully arrested and taken before Magistrate who remands him to custody—Imprisonment after remand, whether false imprisonment A 19 N 1
- When ends—Remand to custody by Court or release on bail puts an end to false imprisonment A 19 N 2
- Whether continuing wrong A 19 N 2

Fatal Accidents Act

- Proceedings under—Legal disability—Extension of time on ground of—Suit for compensation under Fatal Accidents Act—Extension, if available S 6 N 13 F N 1
- Suit under—Limitation A 21

Fee

- Fees of vakil—How recoverable A 84 N 5
- License fee—Suit for license fee payable to municipality in respect of platform erected by defendant—Limitation A 120 N 43
- Suit by vakil—Suit against President of Taluk Board—Limitation : A 84 N 2
- Suit for fee charged for issuing permission for use of municipal land—Limitation A 120 N 43

Female

- Female as trustee—Estate of—Suit by trustee in succession—Limitation A 141 N 10
- Female holding estate by inheritance under Hindu law—Decree against—Whether binding on reversionary heirs A 141 N 13
- Female in possession by contract—Estate of—Suit for—Suit by reversioner—Limitation A 141 N 10
- Female in possession as legatee—Estate of—Suit for—Suit by reversioner—Limitation A 141 N 10
- Female in possession as trespasser—Estate of—Suit for—Suit by reversioner—Limitation A 141 N 10
- Female in possession through favour—Estate of—Possession of—Suit for—Suit by reversioner—Limitation A 141 N 10
- Female limited owner
- (a) Adverse possession against—Adverse possession, whether barred against reversionary heirs A 141 N 13
- (b) Alienation by—Alienation not binding on estate—Remedies of reversioner A 141 N 12
- (c) Alienation without necessity—Alienation, whether binding on reversioner A 141 N 15
- (d) Alienation without necessity—Suit by reversioner for possession of property alienated—Limitation A 141 N 15
- (e) Estate of—Division of estate among reversioners—One reversioner getting less than his share by mistake of law—Suit by reversioner for equal share against co-reversioner on ground of mistake—Limitation A 141 N 17
- (f) Female trying to set up full title—Suit by reversioner for possession of property of female limited owner—Limitation: A 141 N 15a
- (g) Possession of—Possession, whether adverse to reversioner A 141 N 15a
- (h) Reversioner, whether barred by adverse possession against last male owner A 141 N 14
- (i) Suit by reversioner
- (i) Burden of proof in such suit A 141 N 20

Female—Female limited owner—Suit by reversioner—(Contd.)

A 141 N 22
A 141 N 21
A 141 N 19
A 141 N 15a

(j) V

—Hindu female

- (a) Moveable property of—Suit by Hindu who is entitled to possession on death of Hindu female—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 11
- (b) No one in possession at death of female—Suit for possession—Limitation ... A 141 N 12
- (c) Suit against alienee of female who is dead—Limitation ... A 141 N 12
- (d) Suit by Hindu who is entitled to possession after death of female—Limitation ... A 141; A 141 N 2
- (e) Suit by reversioner who is entitled to possession on death of female—Suit also involving declaration as to invalidity of adoption by Hindu female—Limitation ... A 141 N 16

—Mahomedan female

- (a) Immovable property of—Suit by Mahomedan who is entitled to possession on death of Mahomedan female—Suit where no one is in possession at death of female—Limitation ... A 141 N 12
- (b) Life estate of—Suit by Mahomedan who is entitled to possession on death of female—Limitation ... A 141; A 141 N 2
- (c) Moveable property of—Suit by Mahomedan who is entitled to possession on death of Mahomedan female—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 11

Firm

- Firm ceasing to be going concern—Presumption of agency of one partner to acknowledge or pay on behalf of firm does not apply : S 21 N 13
- Firm not of the character of a going mercantile concern—One partner, if can be presumed to have authority to acknowledge and make payments on behalf of firm ... S 21 N 13
- Firm to which presumption of agency of one partner to act on behalf of firm arises—Presumption will hold good only in case of acknowledgments or payments made in the course of partnership business ... S 21 N 13
- Going mercantile concern—Each partner may be presumed to have authority to acknowledge and make payment on behalf of firm ... S 21 N 13
- One partner authorized to acknowledge or pay on behalf of firm—Authority may be implied from facts and circumstances of each case ... S 21 N 13
- Partner, authority of, to acknowledge or pay on behalf of firm ... S 21 N 13
- Presumption of agency of one partner to act on behalf of others applicable to going concerns—Whether applies to dissolved partnership in regard to creditors of firm ... S 21 N 13
- Receiver of assets of firm with power to pay debts due by firm—Whether can give acknowledgment in respect of debt ... S 19 N 52
- Suit against dissolved partnership—Date of institution of suit is date of suit and not of service of summons on individual partner subsequent to suit ... S 22 N 16
- Suit against or on behalf of—Procedure for instituting suit ... S 22 N 16

Firm—(Contd.)

- Suit for dissolution—Receiver appointed for purpose of collecting outstandings and doing everything for preservation of estate—Receiver, if can acknowledge debts due by firm ... S 19 N 52
- Suit relating to
 - (a) Application for disclosure of partners—Declaration made—Partners so declared, if parties to suit from date of suit ... S 23 N 19
 - (b) Necessary parties ... S 22 N 18

Fishery

- Exclusive right to—Whether can be acquired by operation of S 28: S 28 N 5
- Right of
 - (a) Adverse possession—*See under* Adverse possession
 - (b) Whether interest in immovable property ... A 142 & 144 N 7

Food

- Price of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 8

Foreclosure

- Foreclosure of English mortgages—Suit for—Limitation. ... A 147 N 1
- Foreclosure of mortgage by deposit of title deeds—Suit for maintainability of ... A 147 N 2
- Suit for
 - (a) Enactments as to ... A 135 N 9
 - (b) Limitation ... A 135 N 9
 - (c) Limitation—Starting point ... A 132 N 3
 - (d) Suit by mortgagee—Applicability of Arts. 147 and 132 distinguished ... A 147 N 1
 - (e) Suit by mortgagee—Limitation—Starting point: A 147; A 147 N 4
 - (f) Suit by mortgagee under English mortgage—Maintainability of suit ... A 147 N 1
 - (g) Suit for foreclosure of mortgage by conditional sale without possession being given to mortgagee—Suit, whether maintainable without suit for possession of mortgaged property: A 135 N 9
 - (h) Suit, whether one to enforce payment charged upon immovable property ... A 132 N 3

Foreign bill

- Dishonoured foreign bill—Suit on—Limitation—Starting point: A 77, A 77 N 2
- Meaning of ... A 77 N 1

Foreign contract

- Suit on—Suit not barred under foreign law—Plaintiff, if can bring suit on the claim if barred in British India ... S 11 N 1
- Suit on, in British India
 - (a) Foreign law of limitation, if can be taken in defence ... S 11 N 1
 - ... rule of limitation in India: S 11; S 11 N 1
 - ... S 11; S 11 N 1

Foreign country

- Meaning of ... S 2 C 6

Foreign Court

- Meaning of ... A 117 N 3
- Proceedings in—S. 12, if applies ... S 12 N 2
- Section 14, if applies to prior proceedings in foreign Courts ... S 14 N 5

Foreign Court—(Contd.)

—What is Court in British Cantonment, whether foreign Court ...	A 117 N 3
—What is	
(a) Court in Ceylon.—Whether foreign Court	A 117 N 3
(b) Court in England and Scotland other than Privy Council,	
" " " "	A 117 N 3
(c) " " " "	A 117 N 3
(d) " " " "	A 117 N 3
(e) Privy Council, whether foreign Court	A 117 N 3
(f) Supreme Court of Mauritius, whether foreign Court ...	A 117 N 3
—Whether within the meaning of Court in S. 14	S 14 N 13

Foreign instrument

—Meaning of A 77 N 1

Foreign judgment

—“Judgment” as used in expression “foreign judgment” in Civil P. C.—Meaning of	A 117 N 3
—Judgment on claim not barred under foreign law but which would be barred under Indian law—Suit on foreign judgment in British Indian Court—Plea of limitation cannot be raised	S 11 N 1
—Meaning of	A 117 N 3
—Order of Court of Native Indian State that application was step-in-aid—British Indian Court, if can go behind the order	S 11 N 2
—Suit in British Indian Courts on foreign judgment concerning promissory note—Suit on promissory note itself—Whether on same cause of action... ..	S 14 N 18
—Suit on—Limitation	A 117
(a) Exclusion of time	
(i) Time spent in executing decree in foreign Court, whether can be excluded	A 117 N 4
(ii) Time spent in prosecuting an application to set aside <i>ex parte</i> decree, whether can be excluded	A 117 N 4
(b) Period to have <i>ex</i> led in com-puting limitation for suit by plaintiff in British Indian Court on the foreign judgment	S 14 N 10
(c) Starting point	A 117 N 4
(d) What is	A 117 N 2
(e) Where foreign judgment is appealed against and appeal is dismissed... ..	A 117 N 4
—What is	
(a) Act of state passed by foreign State in its sovereign capacity, whether foreign judgment	A 117 N 3
(b) Call order by Liquidation Court in foreign State authorizing institution of suits for recovery of sums from persons living outside jurisdiction of Court, whether foreign judgment	A 117 N 3
(c) Order under S. 12, Arbitration Act, enforcing award in England, whether foreign judgment	A 117 N 3

Foreigner

—Alien enemy—Incapacity of legal representative to institute suit within S. 17 due to being alien enemy—Effect of ... S 17 N 8

Forfeited Property Act

—Whether a special law S 29 N 6

Forfeiture

—And breach of condition—Distinguished... .. A 143 N 3

—Debt, whether forfeiture A 6 N 2

—Determination of tenancy by A 139 N 9

(a) Disclaimer of title nr breach of condition by tenant, whether by itself determines tenancy A 139 N 9

(b) Forfeiture by disclaimer in cases not governed by T. P. Act A 139 N 9

—Forfeiture by alienation—Suit for possession against alienee of tenant by landlord under S. 111, T. P. Act—Limitation: A 143 N 2; A 143 N 5

—Forfeiture by denial of landlord's title—Denial of landlord's title, when amounts to forfeiture... .. A 143 N 6

—Forfeiture of tenancy—Tenancy how forfeited A 143 N 4

—Forfeiture on remarriage of Hindu widow—Whether can be waived by reversioner A 143 N 12

—Suit for

(a) Article 6, whether applies where different period of limitation is prescribed by special or local law A 6 N 5

(b) Suit by Government—Limitation—Art. 6 and Art. 149, applicability of A 6 N 6

(c) Suit for damages caused by misconduct of defendant—Limitation A 6 N 8

(d) Suit for debt—Limitation applicable A 6 N 2

(e) Suit upon Statute, Act, Regulation or bye-law—Limitation: A 6; A 6 N 1

—Suit on ground of

(a) Illustrative cases on suit on forfeiture governed by Art. 143: A 143 N 10

(b) Limitation—Art. 139 and Art. 143 distinguished A 139 N 3

(c) Onus of proof as to forfeiture in such case A 143 N 11

(d) Suit by landlord .

(i) Against whom must the suit be filed for applicability of Art. 143 A 143 N 3

(ii) Limitation—Applicability of Art. 139 and Art. 143 A 143 N 4

(e) Suit by reversioner for possession of Hindu widow's estate on ground of forfeiture on unchastity of widow—Limitation A 143 N 9

(f) Suit by reversioner for possession of widow's estate on ground of forfeiture on remarriage of Hindu widow—Limitation A 143 N 8

(g) Suit for possession—Cases other than tenancy—Limitation: A 143 N 7

(h) Suit for possession—Limitation—Starting point: A 143; A 143 N 2; A 143 N 14

(i) Suit for possession on ground of forfeiture by denial of landlord's title—Limitation A 143 N 6

(j) Suit in tort for ejectment of tenant—Limitation A 143 N 3

(k) Suit under Bengal Tenancy Act, S. 155 for ejectment of tenant on ground of misuse of land—Limitation A 143 N 2

—Waiver of

(a) Effect of A 143 N 13

(b) What constitutes A 143 N 13

Fraud

—Allegation of one kind of fraud—Failure of proof of fraud alleged—

Another kind of fraud, if can be substituted for it S 18 N 7; A 95 N 17

—Allegations of fraud—Substantial proof necessary S 18 N 7

Fraud—(Contd.)

- Burden of proof—Fraud established—Burden shifts to person who has committed fraud to show that plaintiff had knowledge of transaction beyond period of limitation... S 18 N 7
- Court sale effected with knowledge of judgment-debtor—S. 18, when applies to proceedings to set aside sale ... S 18 N 10
- Decree obtained by—Setting aside—See under Decree.
- Dismissal of suit on ground that the alleged fraud is not proved—Whether covered by S. 14 ... S 14 N 22
- Document necessary to establish right to sue, fraudulently concealed from person having right to sue—Effect of fraud in computing limitation for suit ... S 18
- Effect of—In computing period of limitation for application to set aside execution sale ... A 166 N 18
- Execution
 - (a) Decree-holder bringing property to sale after decree—amount has been paid—Decree-holder taking steps so that no notice of sale may reach judgment-debtor—S. 18, if applies ... S 18 N 10
 - (b) Decree-holder not guilty of fraud in bringing about sale... S 18 N 14
 - (c) I
 - low value—Whether amounts to fraud ... S 18 N 10
 - (d) Knowledge of proceedings up to time of sale withheld from judgment-debtor by fraudulent concealment of proceedings S. 18... S 18 N 10
 - of sale—... S 18 N 10
 - (f) Mere under-valuation of property to be sold in sale proclamation—Whether by itself justifies inference of fraud ... S 18 N 10
 - (g) Suit brought by the fraud of decree-holder—Decree-holder ... S 18 N 14
 - (h) Suppression of notices by a deliberate contrivance—Whether amounts to fraud ... S 18 N 10
 - (i) Wilful mis-statement of value of property to be sold, in sale proclamation—Whether amounts to fraud ... S 18 N 10
- Ex parte decree obtained by—Setting aside—Suit for—Suit, whether maintainable after failure of application to set aside decree ... A 95 N 19
- Fraud and Limitation—Art. 95 and S. 18 distinguished ... A 95 N 3
- Fraud as a ground of extension of limitation
 - (a) Section 18 and Art. 95 compared ... A 95 N 3
 - (b) Suit for relief on ground of fraud—Extension of limitation by from know... A 95 N 3
- - ... S 18 N 2
 - ... S 18 N 2
- - ad for suit for ... A 95 N 9
- - setting aside execution sale ... A 95 N 9

Fraud—(Contd.)

- Fraud in regard to execution sale—Fraud of decree-holder—Recovery of purchase money on ground of—Suit by auction-purchaser—Limitation A 95 N 9
- Fraud preventing plaintiff from suing — Whether ground of exemption from limitation S 18 N 2
- Fraudulent act of concealment—Open act of party, if can be fraudulent act of concealment S 18 N 4
- Fraudulent concealment of document necessary to establish plaintiff's right S 18 N 11
- Fraudulent concealment of document
 - (a) Open extortion of documents from a party not fraudulent concealment of document S 18 N 4
 - (b) Starting point—Time runs from date when plaintiff has the means of producing it or compelling its production S 18 N 13
- Ignorance of accrual of cause of action brought about by fraud of defendant—If entitles plaintiff to extension of time S 6 N 23
- Knowledge of fraud
 - (a) Knowledge of agent whether knowledge of principal A 95 N 13
 - (b) Meaning of knowledge A 95 N 12
 - (c) Whether question of fact or law A 95 N 15
- Meaning of S 18 N 4
 - (a) Failure to give information which party is bound to give under contract—Whether fraud S 18 N 4
 - (b) Mere concealment of facts by person in fiduciary position—Whether amounts to fraud S 18 N 4
 - (c) Mere concealment of facts, whether amounts to fraud when there is no duty to disclose such facts S 18 N 4
- Money obtained by—Suit for
 - (a) Plaintiff's money in possession of third party—Defendant by fraud obtaining it from such party—Limitation A 62 N 15
 - (b) Whether one for money paid upon existing consideration which afterwards fails A 97 N 1
- Nature of suits for which benefit of S 18 is available S 18
- Person having right to sue or apply kept from knowledge of such right by fraud—Effect of, in computing limitation S 18
- Person having right to sue or apply kept from knowledge of title on which right is founded, by fraud—Effect on computation of limitation S 18
- Person seeking benefit of S. 18 must show that his right to sue or apply has been kept from his knowledge by means of the fraud S 18 N 2
- Plea of—How plea is to be set forth A 95 N 16
- Plea of fraud—Particulars of fraud should be specifically stated S 18 N 6
- Plea of, in defence—Whether such plea can be raised where a suit A 95 N 18
- effect and
- that by fraud he was kept from knowledge of his right to seek relief S 18 N 7
- S 18 N 6
- and
- S 18 N 2
- not
- co-partner before partition—Fact kept back from him at

Fraud—Postponement of starting point of limitation on ground of fraud —
(Contd.)

the time of partition on representation that debt was out-
 standing—S. 18, if applies

(c) Court must find when plaintiff got knowledge of the fraud ... S 18 N 5

(d) Document necessary to establish such right in S 18— S 18 N 13

Meaning of—Right to money, capable of being established on
 admitted facts—Document only evidence of obligation—

Whether document necessary to establish right ... S 18 N 11

(e) Fraud committed by decree-holder in bringing to sale judg-
 ment-debtor's property—Application to set aside sale on
 ground of fraud —S 18, if applies

S 18 N 8

S 18 N 8

S 18 N 4

and active

fraud in the means adopted to keep the person injured out
 of knowledge of his right

S 18 N 4

(i) Fraud must have existed at the inception of the cause of
 action

S 18 N 2

(j) Fraudulent concealment of document—Plaintiff or applicant
 must, through the fraudulent concealment, be unaware of
 existence of document

S 18 N 12

(k) Knowledge of fraud—Knowledge must be clear and definite
 knowledge of facts constituting the particular fraud and not
 mere suspicion

S 18 N 13

(l) Knowledge of fraud—Knowledge must enable person defrauded
 to seek his remedy in Court

S 18 N 13

(m) Limitation to be computed from the time when fraud became
 known to person injuriously affected by fraud

S 18 N 13

(n) Mere fact that cause of action is founded on fraud is not
 enough

S 18 N 2

(o) Negligence in pursuing means available for discovering fraud
 —Whether will start limitation running before date of actual
 knowledge

S 18 N 13

(p) Party knowing of his right to seek relief but prevented by
 fraud from exercising his right—Whether entitled to benefit
 of S. 18

S 18 N 5

(q) Person collecting debts due to deceased and concealing the
 fact from deceased's heir—S. 18, if applies

S 18 N 5

(r) Person defrauded must have been kept from knowledge of his
 right to sue or apply

S 18 N 5

(s) Person injured aware of his right to seek his relief—Whether
 entitled to benefit of S. 18

S 18 N 5

(t) Persons against whom time can be extended

S 18 N 14

(u) Principle

S 18 N 2

(v) S. 18 does not apply to complaints of criminal offences

S 18 N 3

(w) S. 18, Limitation Act and S. 26, English Real Property
 Limitation Act—Distinction between

S 18 N 13

—Pre-emption

(a) Failure to give pre-emptor notice of sale—Whether brings
 the case within S. 18

S 18 N 9

(b) Mere silence of vendor and vendee—Whether amounts to
 fraud

S 18 N 9

Fraud—Pre-emption—(Contd.)

- (c) Omission to issue notice with deliberata intention of keeping pre-emptor from knowledge of his right—Whether amounts to fraud ... S 18 N 9
- (d) Possession of property sold openly taken by vendee—Sale not kept from knowledge of vendee—S. 18 does not apply though pre-emptor may not have knowledge of sale ... S 18 N 9
- (e) Sale effected in one person's favour but really in favour of another who actively conceals that fact—Plaintiff thereby kept from knowledge of his right—S. 18, if applies ... S 18 N 9
- Presumption of—Fraud cannot be presumed until person relying on it establishes his case ... S 18 N 7
- (a) Burden of proof ... A 95 N 17
- (b) Burden of proof, when shifted on to defendant ... A 95 N 17
- (c) Case where cause of action is based on fraud and case where the cause of action is not based on fraud but the plaintiff has been kept from knowledge of his right to sue, by means of fraud, distinguished ... A 95 N 3
- (d) Execution sale—Suit by purchaser for possession—Resistance by mortgagee of judgment-debtor—Allegation by purchaser of mortgage being fraudulent—Suit, whether one on ground of fraud ... A 95 N 4
- (e) Fraud of co-sharer—Purchase of property by co-sharer by fraudulent contrivance—Suit by co-sharer who has lost the property by such contrivance—Limitation applicable ... A 95 N 10
- (f) Fraud of shewbait—Suit by successor of shewbait—Limitation—Starting point ... A 95 N 14
- (g) Illustrations ... A 95 N 4
- (h) Limitation—Nature of cases to which Art. 95 applies ... A 95 N 2
- (i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 95; A 95 N 12
- (j) Limitation—Starting point—Where suit is not governed by Art. 95 ... A 120 N 23
- (k) Meaning of words "other relief on ground of fraud" in Art. 95 ... A 95 N 10
- (l) Negligence in pursuing means available for discovering fraud, whether will start limitation running before date of actual knowledge ... A 95 N 12
- (m) Partition of joint Hindu family—Unauthorized person acting on behalf of minor—Minor member getting less share—Suit on attaining age for full share—Allegation of fraud—Suit, whether one on ground of fraud ... A 95 N 4
- (n) Plaintiff kept fraudulently from knowledge of his right to sue—Limitation ... A 95 N 3
- (o) Plaintiff not party defrauded—Suit, whether within Art. 95: ... A 95 N 2
- (p) Relief, whether includes compensation for damage caused to plaintiff by fraud practised by defendant ... A 95 N 10
- (q) Specific and general provisions—Suit to set aside execution sale on ground of fraud, whether governed by Art. 95 or Art. 12 ... A 95 N 2
- (r) Specific and general provisions as to limitation ... A 95 N 2
- (s) Suit for refund of money advanced on transfer found to be fraudulent—Limitation applicable ... A 95 N 11

Fraud—Presumption of, etc.—(Contd.)

- | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| (t) Suit for return of bonds lost or acquired by theft or dishonest misappropriation or conversion, whether suit on ground of fraud | A 95 N 4 |
| (u) Suit for rectification of deed on ground of fraud, whether such suit | A 95 N 10 |
| (v) Suit for setting aside document on ground of fraud — Limitation—Starting point | A 91 N 20 |
| (w) Suit for setting aside fraudulent sale—Suit by certified purchaser—Limitation | A 120 N 2 |
| (x) Suit for setting aside sale under Public Demands Recovery Act for fraud of purchaser, whether suit for relief on ground of fraud | A 95 N 10 |
| (y) Suit on ground of fraud—What is—Test | A 95 N 4 |
| (z) Suit to set aside decree—Limitation | A 164 N 2 |
| Suit by judgment-debtor to set aside decree against him on ground of fraud—Decree-holder cannot exclude period of pendency of suit in computing limitation for application for execution of decree ... | S 15 N 11 |

General Clauses Act

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----------|
| —Definitions in—When can be applied to Act | ... | ... | S 2 N 1 |
| —S. 3, Cl. 52—Signature—Meaning of | ... | ... | S 20 N 24 |
| —S. 10—Scope and applicability of | ... | ... | S 4 N 2 |

Good faith

- | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----------|
| —Error of judgment is different from had faith | ... | ... | S 14 N 20 |
| —Meaning of | ... | ... | S 2 Cl 7 |
| —What amounts to—Indulgence to be granted only where error is one which might be committed by reasonable and prudent man exercising due diligence and caution | ... | ... | S 14 N 20 |
| —Whether inference of good faith is reasonable or is warranted by facts proved is a question of law | ... | ... | S 14 N 21 |
| —Whether person has acted in good faith is a question of fact | ... | ... | S 14 N 21 |

Goods

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|------------------|
| —Definition of, in Sale of Goods Act—How far applicable to Limitation Act | | A 52 N 4 |
| —Delivery of—Compensation for breach of contract—Suit for—Limitation | | A 51 N 1 |
| —Goods sold—Absence of agreement to pay in kind—Suit for price of goods—Limitation | | A 52 N 3 |
| —Goods sold and delivered | | |
| (a) Suit for price of | | |
| (i) Acknowledgment, whether extends period of limitation: | | A 52 N 8 |
| (ii) Delivery of railway receipt, whether date of delivery | | A 52 N 5 |
| | | A 52 N 8 |
| | | |
| | | |
| bill given—Allegation that handis were not executed as promised, whether necessary for applicability of Art. 54 | | A 54; A 54 N 1 |
| | | A 53 N 1 |
| | | 52 N 2; A 52 N 8 |
| | | A 52 N 8 |

Goods—Goods sold and delivered—Suit for price of—(Contd.)

- (viii) Suit consisting of several claims not independent and which cannot be split up ... A 52 N 6
- (ix) Suit consisting of several distinct and independent claims which can be split up ... A 52 N 6
- (x) Suit consisting of two parts, one for price of medicines sold and other for fees for medical attendance ... A 52 N 6
- (xi) Suit for price of goods supplied to Canteen Board—Limitation ... A 52 N 6
- (xii) Suit to enforce contract that goods supplied should be repaid in kind—Limitation ... A 52 N 3
- (xiii) Suit to enforce decree debt against sons where decree for price of goods sold and delivered was obtained against father of Hindu family—Limitation ... A 52 N 2
- (xiv) Suit to recover arrears of subscription to newspaper—Limitation ... A 52 N 4
- (xv) Suit to recover price of medicines supplied—Limitation ... A 52 N 4
- (xvi) "When period of credit expires" more promise of vendor to simple transaction of sale of goods to pay price with interest, whether amounts to period of credit within Art. 53 ... A 52 N 1
- (xvii) "When period of credit expires," whether credit was intended to be given, how to find out ... A 52 N 1
- (xviii) Where account between parties can be considered to be mutual, current and open account ... A 52 N 8
- (xix) Where fixed period of credit is agreed upon—Limitation ... A 52 N 2, A 53
- (b) Purchaser entering third person's name as purchaser—Vendor getting decree for his price against third person—Suit by third person against real purchaser for decree amount—Limitation ... A 52 N 2
- Goods to be delivered—Money advanced in payment of—Suit for
 - (a) Extension of time—Acknowledgment, whether extends period of limitation ... A 51 N 4
 - (b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 51; A 51 N 1; A 51 N 4
 - (c) Money advanced under bond in payment of goods to be delivered—Goods not delivered—Limitation ... A 51 N 1
- Meaning of ... A 51 N 3; A 52 N 4
- Government**
 - Adverse possession against
 - (a) Acquisition of title
 - (i) Burden of proof ... A 149 N 9
 - (ii) Manner of ... A 149 N 9
 - (b) What constitutes ... A 149 N 9
 - Appeal by—Limitation ... A 149 N 2
 - Application by
 - (a) For execution—Limitation ... A 149 N 3
 - (b) Limitation ... A 149 N 2
 - Applicability of Bankruptcy Act to Government ... A 149 N 3
 - Applicability of Limitation Act to Government ... A 149 N 3
 - (a) Right of Government to recover court-fees under S. 309, Civil P. C., 1859, whether subject to limitation ... A 149 N 3

Government—(Contd.)

—Applicability of statutes of taxation to Government ...	A 149 N 3
—Central Government — Suit by, before Federal Court — Limitation ...	A 149, A 149 N 2
—Government joined as co-plaintiff in suit by transferee — Whether brings suit for possession of land transferred within Art. 149 ...	A 149 N 7
—Provincial Government—Suit by—Before Federal Court—Limitation ...	A 149, A 149 N 2
—Provisions for acquisition of easement, whether applicable to Government ...	A 149 N 3
—Suit against—Limitation ...	A 149 N 2
—Suit by	
(a) Illustrative cases of suit by Government within Art. 149 ...	A 149 N 4
(b) Summary suit by Government under Specific Relief Act, S. 9—Limitation ...	A 149 N 2
(c) Special or local law, whether overrides provisions of Art. 149: ...	A 149 N 10
(d) Suit by Collector under Bhagdari Act, S. 3—Limitation ...	A 149 N 3
(e) Suit by manager of religious endowment—Limitation ...	A 149 N 5
(f) Suit by person deriving title from Government — Limitation ...	A 149 N 7
(g) Suit for assessment or resumption of rent-free land — Limitation ...	A 180 N 7
—Suit on behalf of	
(a) Illustrative cases of such suits within Art. 149 ...	A 149 N 4
(b) Suit by municipality in respect of land entrusted by Government to municipality for management—Limitation ...	A 149 N 6
(c) Suit by Railway Company acting as managing agents of State railway in respect of land belonging to State railway — Limitation ...	A 149 N 4
—Transferee of—Suit against, for possession on ground that plaintiff had acquired prescriptive title against Government—Nature of proof in such suit so as to bring it under Art. 149 ...	A 149 N 7

Government of India Act

—Section 288 ...	S 1 N 1
------------------	---------

Guardian

—Alienation by—Suit for setting aside—Limitation—Applicability of Arts. 44 and 91 ...	A 91 N 5
— <i>De facto</i> female guardian of minor daughter—Alienation by—Suit for impeachment by reversioner — Limitation — Starting point ...	A 125 N 16
— <i>De facto</i> guardian of Hindu minor — Transfer by—Whether binding on minor ...	A 44 N 6
—Transfer of property by ...	A 44 N 6
—Guardian's property—Suit ...	A 126 N 5
—Guardian and Wards Act— ...	
tation of minor—Limitation ...	A 125 N 5
—Guardian of infant in possession of infant's property on latter's behalf—Whether trustee ...	S 10 N 9

Guardian—(Contd.)

- Guardian of limited female owner—Alienation by—Suit in respect of, by reversioner—Declaration that alienation is not binding on reversion—Limitation ... A 120 N 34
- Hindu mother as guardian—Alienation by, of property of minor son—Death of minor—Mother succeeding as heir—Suit by reversioner for impeaching alienation—Limitation ... A 125 N 16
- Hindu widow, natural guardian of her minor sons banding over money to her brother for benefit and education of her sons—Brother, if trustee for specific purpose ... S 10 N 13
- Knowledge of, whether can be imputed to minor ... A 127 N 16
- Natural guardian—Who is ... A 44 N 5
- Security bond executed by guardian—Suit to recover, out of properties given as security, money due by guardian—Limitation ... A 132 N 8
- Suit against
 - (a) By ward, for specific sums received by guardian—Limitation: A 62 N 25
 - (b) For specific sums received by guardian during plaintiff's minority—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- Transfer by owner of property not as the property of minor but as his own—Suit for setting aside by minor—Limitation ... A 44 N 5
- Whether agent of ward ... A 89 N 7
- Who is, within meaning of Art. 44 ... A 44 N 5

Guarantee

- Breach of contract—Suit for compensation for—Limitation ... A 65 N 4

Haqq-i-chaharam

- Suit for—Limitation ... A 62 N 30

Haqq

- Arrears of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 132 N 20
- Haqq within Art. 132—Meaning of ... A 132 N 20
- Share of—Suit for—By one co-sharer against another co-sharer who has improperly received his share of baqq—Limitation ... A 132 N 20

Heir

- Heir of deceased Mahomedan—Suit by, for recovery of his share of inheritance from co-heir—Limitation ... A 120 N 13
- Holdsip to a Hindu—Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 31
- Minor heir
 - (a) Of intestate—Suit by, for share of property—Limitation—Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act: A 123 N 13
 - (b) Of residue bequeathed—Suit by, for residue—Limitation—Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act: A 123 N 13
 - (c) To testator—Suit by, for legacy—Limitation—Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act ... A 123 N 13
- Suit by
 - (a) Against co-heir—For recovery of share of money belonging to deceased person recovered by the other heir—Limitation A 62 N 9
 - (b) Against person in possession—Limitation—Where person in possession takes out letters of administration... A 123 N 6
 - (c) Against person in wrongful possession—Limitation ... A 123 N 6
 - (d) For money drawn from bank which had been invested therein by defendant and which had belonged to deceased lady—Limitation ... A 62 N 31

Heir—Suit by—(Contd.)

(e) For moveable property—Limitation	...	A 120 N 12
(f) For possession of immovable property, by heir of Hindu or Mahomedan female who is full owner of property—Limitation	A 141 N 5
(g) For possession of property alienated by administrator without permission of Court—Limitation	...	A 91 N 12
(h) For property of intestate — Limitation—Starting point — Where under Chinese Customary law, widow of intestate has control of inheritance during her lifetime	...	A 123 N 11
(i) For share of inheritance against administrator — Limitation — Where deceased person is governed by the Indian Succession Act	A 123 N 4
—Whether bound by alienation by administrator without permission of Court	A 91 N 12

Hereditary office—See under Office.

High Court

—Appeal to

(a) From decree of Madras City Civil Court—Limitation	...	A 151 N 2
(b) From judgment of Single Judge of High Court made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Letters Patent — Limitation	A 156 N 2
(c) From order—Appeal under Civil Procedure Code—Limitation —Starting point—Where judgment is given but order is not drawn up	A 156 N 6
(d) From order of Civil Court under Criminal P. C., S 476 — Limitation	A 155 N 2
(e) From order of Madras City Civil Court—Limitation	...	A 151 N 2
(f) From order of Single Judge of High Court—Limitation	...	A 155 N 3
(g) From order of Subordinate Court refusing leave to appeal to Privy Council—Provision for such appeal—Limitation	A 153, A 153 N 1	
(h) Under Burma Courts Act, S 27—Limitation	...	A 156 N 2
(i) Under Burma Courts Act, S. 49 — Appeal from Court of Recorder, Rangoon—Limitation	A 156 N 3
(j) Under Civil Procedure Code		
(i) Appeal from decree		
(a) Amendment of decree, whether gives fresh starting point for such appeal	...	A 156 N 8
(b) Where decree is reviewed—Limitation—Starting point	A 156 N 9
(c) Where <i>ex parte</i> decree is set aside by trial Court but restored by High Court—Limitation—Starting point	A 156 N 11
(d) Where there are several decrees in same suit — Limitation—Starting point	...	A 156 N 7
(ii) Appeal, where judgment is given but order is not drawn up	A 156 N 6
	A 156 N 2
	A 156, A 156 N 5	
	tion 4,	
Limitation Act	A 156 N 12
(vi) Where party against whom decree is passed dies	...	A 156 N 10

High Court—Appeal to—(Contd.)

- (k) ... and 155 and Art. 157 ... A 155 N 1
- (l) Under Extradition Act—Limitation ... A 155 N 1
- (m) Under Land Acquisition Act, S. 54—Limitation ... A 156 N 3
- (n) Under Probate and Administration Act—Limitation ... A 156 N 3
- (o) Under Succession Act—Limitation ... A 156 N 3
- Appellate jurisdiction of—Cases decided in—Privy Council orders on—Application for execution of—Limitation ... A 183 N 7
- Calcutta High Court—Original Side Rules—R. 27, Ch. 38—Application under—Limitation ... A 181 N 2
- Chartered High Court
- (a) Award filed in, under Arbitration Act, S. 15—Application for enforcement—Limitation ... A 183 N 2
- (b) Original decree of, application for enforcement
- (i) Application for personal decree under O. 34, R. 6, Civil P. C., whether application to enforce decree within Art. 183 ... A 183 N 4
- (c) Original decree of, enforcement of ... d by High Court in ... A 183 N 6
- () ... decree of Chartered High Court transmitted for execution to Mofussil Court—Limitation ... A 183 N 2
- (ii) Articles 182 and 183 distinguished ... A 183 N 2
- (iv) Article 183, whether refers to Civil P. C., S. 48 ... A 183 N 2
- (v) Sections 6, 7 and 8, Limitation Act, whether govern Art. 183 ... A 183 N 9
- (vi) Limitation—Starting point ... A 183; A 183 N 2; A 183 N 8
- (vii) Revivor of decree—What constitutes ... A 183 N 10
- (viii) Application for enforcement of original decree—What is ... A 183 N 4
- ... to which decree is sent for execution or on character of Court which passed it... ... A 183 N 2
- (d) Original judgment of—Application for enforcement—Application by decree-holder of mortgage decree praying to add some persons as defendants and to proceed to sell property pursuant to decree, whether application to enforce judgment within Art. 183 ... A 183 N 4
- (e) Original judgment of—Enforcement of—Application for
- (i) Application for final decree in mortgage suit, whether application, to enforce preliminary decree within Art. 183 ... A 183 N 4
- (ii) Application for personal decree under Civil P. C., O. 34, R. 6, whether application to enforce judgment: ... A 183 N 4
- (iii) Application to enforce judgment—What is, within Art. 183 ... A 183 N 4
- ... d by High Court ... A 183 N 6
- ... A 183 N 2
- ... S. 48 ... A 183 N 2
- A 183, A 183 N 2; A 183 N 8

High Court—Chartered High Court—Original judgment of, etc.—(Contd.)

- (viii) Revivor of judgment—What constitutes ... A 183 N 10
- (ix) Sections 6 and 7, Limitation Act, whether govern Art. 183 ... A 183 N 9
- (x) Where applicant is legally incapacitated ... A 183 N 9
- (f) Original jurisdiction of
 - (i) Basis of ... A 162 N 4
 - (ii) Whether includes insolvency jurisdiction ... A 162 N 4
 - (iii) Whether includes matrimonial jurisdiction ... A 162 N 4
- (g) Original orders of—Application for enforcement—Application for enforcement of payment order under Companies Act, S. 164—Limitation ... A 183 N 5
- (h) Original orders of—Enforcement of—Application for
 - (i) Application to enforce order—What is, within Art. 183: by High Court in ... A 183 N 4
 - ... C., S. 48 ... A 183 N 6
 - ... A 183 N 2
 - (iv) Limitation—Starting point ... A 183, A 183 N 2, A 183 N 8
 - (v) Revivor of order—What constitutes ... A 183 N 10
 - (vi) Sections 6, 7 and 8, Limitation Act, whether govern Art. 183 ... A 183 N 9
 - (vii) Where applicant is legally incapacitated ... A 183 N 9
 - (i) What is ... A 183 N 5
- Decree absolute—Made by, decree on Original Side of High Court
- Divorce suit—Limitation ... A 151 N 2
- Decree of
 - ... A 151, A 151 N 2
 - ... Court in exercise of appellate ... A 151 N 2
 - ... A 183 N 6
- (c) Decree in appellate jurisdiction—Application for enforcement of—Limitation ... A 183 N 6
- (d) Decree in exercise of original jurisdiction—Appeal from—Limitation—Starting point ... A 151 N 3
- (e) Decree of Original Side—Appeal from—Time occupied in obtaining copy of decree, whether excluded from period of limitation prescribed for such suit ... A 151 N 3
- Definition of ... A 156 N 4
- Division Bench of
 - (a) Appeal to, from order of Single Judge of High Court under Criminal Procedure Code—Limitation ... A 155 N 3
 - (b) Appeal to, from order of Single Judge under Criminal P. C. S. 476—Whether lies—Limitation ... A 155 N 3
- Judgment of
 - (a) In appellate jurisdiction—Application for enforcement of—Limitation ... A 183 N 6
 - ... A 162, A 162 N 6
 - ... A 162 N 5
 - (iii) Where Court reviews its judgment under inherent powers—Limitation ... A 162 N 2
- Order of
 - (a) Appeal from—Limitation ... A 151; A 151 N 2
 - (b) Appeal from order of High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction—Limitation ... A 151 N 2

High Court—Order of—(Contd.)

- (c) In appellate jurisdiction—Enforcement of—Application for
—Limitation A 183 N 6
-ction—Appeal from A 151 N 3
-joint A 151 N 3
-allant in getting order appealed from varied and settled by Registrar, whether excluded: A 151 N 3
- (e) On original side—Appeal from—Time occupied in obtaining copy of order, whether excluded from period of limitation prescribed for such suit A 151 N 3
- Ordinary original civil jurisdiction of—Meaning of A 183 N 6
- Original jurisdiction of
- (a) And ordinary original civil jurisdiction of High Court—Dis-tinguished A 151 N 2
- (b) Meaning of A 151 N 2
- Original Side of
- (a) Mortgage decree in—Application for personal decree—Lim-itation A 181 N 6
- (b) Mortgage suit—Application for final decree in—Limitation: A 181 N 4
- Rangoon High Court—Judgment of—On Original Side—Appeal from, under Letters Patent, Cl. 13—Limitation—Starting point: A 151 N 3
- Rule-making powers of—If can make rules inconsistent with pro-visions of Act S 3 N 43
- Rules of—Application under, for re-admission of appeal dismissed for want of prosecution—Limitation A 169 N 2
- Single Judge of
- (a) Judgment of—Appeal from in exercise of appellate jurisdic-tion under Letters Patent—Limitation A 156 N 2
- (b) Order of
- (i) Under Criminal Procedure Code—Appeal from, to A 155 N 3
- (ii) Ur from A 155 N 3
- Limitation A 155 N 3
- (c) Whether subordinate of Division Bench A 162 N 3
- Whether has right of review in criminal cases A 129 & 129 N 4
- Hindu—Definition of** A 141 N 2
- Suit by, for possession of immovable property by Hindu entitled to A 141 N 2
- A 141 N 2
- A 141 N 2
- A 141 N 2
- A 128 & 129 N 4
- Hindu Law**
- Benares School of—Widow under—Adoption by—Adoption without express permission of her husband—Mortgage jointly with adopted son of properties inherited by widow as limited owner—Suit by reversioner for declaration that mortgage is not binding—Rever-sioner, whether must set aside adoption before he can obtain declaration A 125 N 19
- D S 7 N 20
- E A 125 N 1
- in ancestral property

Hindu law—(Contd.)

—Debts

- (a) Payment by Hindu son liable to pay his father's debt—
Sufficiency of, under S. 20 ... S 20 N 14
- (b) Time-barred debt of father—Pious obligation of son, if extends
to such debt ... S 3 N 14
- (c) Transfer by manager in consideration of time-barred debt—
Validity ... S 3 N 14

—Hindu family

- (a) Division of—Suit by some members for share of moveable
property against other members—Limitation ... A 120 N 12
- (b) Division of status effected between members of—Subsequent
suit for partition by metes and bounds and for share of
profits received by members after taking account—Limita-
tion—Starting point ... A 120 N 28
- (c) Manager of—Order passed against—Whether binds all persons
represented by manager ... A 47 N 3
- (d) Partition of
(i) Karta assigning to member a mortgage bond already
paid off—Suit by member against ex-karta for recovery
of money—Limitation ... A 62 N 7
- (ii) Portion of estate left in management of one member
—Suit against such member for accounts by other
members—Limitation ... A 69 N 8
- (e) Proved or admitted to possess joint property—Presumption
that all property possessed is joint, whether applies ... A 127 N 5
- (f) Whether presumed to be joint, till contrary is proved ... A 127 N 5

—Hindu female

- (a) Property alienated by usufructuary mortgage for necessity—
Suit by reversioner on death of Hindu female for pos-
session only—Maintainability of suit ... A 141 N 6
- (b) Whether includes Jain widow ... A 125 N 4

—Idol—Suit on behalf of—Shebait under disability—If ground for
extension of time ... S 6 N 30—Inheritance under—Female holding estate by—Decree against
—Whether binding on reversionary heirs ... A 141 N 13

—Joint family—See also Joint family.

- (a) Acknowledgment or payment by junior member of Hindu
joint family who is not the manager—Whether binds other
members of the family ... S 21 N 20
- (b) Acknowledgment or payment by manager
(i) Whether saves limitation in regard to liabilities binding
on the family ... S 21 N 20
- (ii) Whether should be expressed as made in his capacity
as manager ... S 21 N 20
- (iii) In his individual capacity—Whether binding on other
members of the family ... S 21 N 20
- (c) Acknowledgment or payment by manager or his duly autho-
rized agent in respect of liability incurred by or on behalf
of family as such—Whether can be deemed to have been
made on behalf of whole family ... S 21
- (d) Alienation by manager in consideration of time-barred debt
—Validity ... S 3 N 14

Hindu law—Joint family—(Contd.)

- (e) Cause of action accruing to one in his own individual right
—S. 7, if applies ... S 7 N 4
- (f) Coparceners—One of them alone, if can give discharge in
... S 7 N 16
- of entire family property—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- (h) Governed by Mitakshara Law—Alienation by member
- (i) Remedy of another member not party to alienation ... A 91 N 6
- (ii) Suit by another member not party to alienation to
declare that alienation is not binding on him—Limitation
... A 91 N 6
- (iii) Whether must be set aside by another member not
party to alienation before he can claim relief which
he wants ... A 91 N 6
- (i) Joint family debt realized by one member—Suit for share by
other members—Limitation ... A 62 N 9
- (j) Manager
- (i) Capacity to give discharge in regard to causes of action
in favour of family ... S 7 N 16
- (ii) Debt due to family—Right to give discharge ... S 7 N 9
- (iii) Decree in favour of joint family—Manager, if can give
valid discharge to judgment-debtor ... S 7 N 15
- (iv) Liability incurred by the act of all members of the
family—Whether same as liability incurred by
manager on behalf of family ... S 21 N 20
- (v) Mention of a debt in the schedule of debts filed by
manager in the course of proceedings for his being
adjudicated an insolvent—Admission, if binds family : ... S 21 N 20
- (vi) Suit for redemption of mortgaged property—Manager,
if can give discharge on behalf of whole family ... S 7 N 18
- (vii) Whether trustee for other members of family ... S 10 N 9
- (k) Manager of, representing family in suit—Addition of other
members—Whether amounts to addition of new parties
within S. 22 ... S 22 N 11
- (l) Manager or father of—Mortgage deed executed by, not binding
on interest of juniors or sons—Suit by mortgagee for
simple money decree—Limitation ... A 116 N 19
- (l¹) Order passed against manager under O. 21 R. 100, Civil P. C.
—Manager not filioi suit against order within limitation—
Other members also lose their right to property concerned... A 11-A N 4
- (m) Partition
- (i) Acknowledgment or payment by alleged manager after
partition—Creditor having no notice of partition—
Acknowledgment or payment, if binding on other
members ... S 21 N 20
- (ii) Certain goods remaining joint property—Money on
bonds realized after separation—Suit by separated
members to recover share of money due on bond—
Limitation ... A 62 N 9
- (n) Partition in family—Creditor having no notice of partition
—Acknowledgment or payment made by any member of the

Hindu law—Joint family—(Contd.)

- family in the ordinary course of business—Whether binding on other members of the family ... S 21 N 14
- (o) Suit by manager for rent due in respect of family property—A member of the family added after limitation as co-plaintiff—Subsequent addition, if entails dismissal of suit ... S 22 N 5
- (p) Suit by manager without stating in plaint capacity in which he is suing—Omission to state it within period of limitation, if bars suit ... S 22 N 6
- (q) Suit by member of joint family not as manager—Addition of other members—Whether amounts to addition of new parties within S. 22 ... S 22 N 11
- Joint family business—Acknowledgment or payment by any member of the family made in the course of the business—Whether can be presumed to be authorized by the other members of the family ... S 21 N 14
- Joint family firm—Right of managing member to sue in his own name without impleading other members ... S 22 N 18
- Minority and guardianship—Mother after father's death, if lawful guardian for purposes of S 21 ... S 21 N 3
- Partition
- (a) Purchase of share of member of joint family in Court auction—Suit for partition and for possession as consequential relief—Applicability of Art. 11 A ... A 11 N 9
- (b) Share of debt due to coparcener collected by another coparcener before partition—Fact kept back from him at the time of partition on representation that debt was still outstanding—S 18, if applies ... S 18 N 5
- Reversioner—See Reversioner.
- Sbebat—Minority of—Extension of time on ground of, if available ... S 6 N 30
- Son
- (a) Pious obligation of, to pay his father's debts—Suit for enforcement of
- (i) In respect of mortgage executed by father which is not binding on son—Limitation ... A 132 N 9
- (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 49
- (iii) Maintainability ... A 120 N 49
- (b) Suit against, to enforce his Hindu law liability to pay his father's promissory note debt—Limitation ... A 73 N 2
- Widow
- (a) Acknowledgment or payment by Hindu widow—Whether binds reversioners succeeding to the estate after her ... S 21 N 19
- (b) Acknowledgment or payment in respect of any liability by or by agent of widow—Validity of, as against reversioner succeeding to such liability ... S 21
- (c) Adoption by
- (i) After her dispossession by stranger—Adopted son's right to sue for possession—Whether independent of widow's right to sue for possession—Whether affected by limitation that may have run out in respect of such right ... S 9 N 10
- (ii) Suit by adopted son—Limitation ... S 2 Cl 8 N 3, 4

Hindu law—Widow—Adoption by—(Contd.)

- (iii) Suit by adopted son succeeding to estate after widow
—Disability of adopted son at the time of so succeeding—Right to extension of time ... S 6 N 19
- (iv) Suit to set aside, by reversioner—Extension of time on
ground of disability ... S 6 N 17
- (d) Alienation : *See* Alienation
- (e) Decree against
 - (i) If binds reversioner ... S 2 Cl 8 N 3
 - (ii) Obtained by collusion with third person
 - (a) Suit by reversioner for relief inconsistent with
decree—Limitation applicable ... A 95 N 8
 - (b) Whether binding on reversioner ... A 95 N 8
 - (iii) Whether binding on reversionary heirs ... A 141 N 13
- (f) Dispossession of—Death of widow—Reversioner minor—
Right to bring suit within three years of attaining majority: S 6 N 14
- (g) Dispossession of, from possession of husband's estate—Suit
for possession against stranger—Cause of action, if distinct
from cause of action of reversioner entitled to sue for
possession after her death ... S 9 N 10
- (h) Husband desiring widow to adopt a son—Whether imposes
obligation on widow to hold her husband's estate for benefit
of son to be adopted ... S 10 N 10
- (i) If represents the estate fully for purposes of limitation ... S 2 Cl 8 N 3
- (j) Minor widow—Adoption by—Adopted son succeeding to her
estate, if gets fresh period of limitation from date of adop-
tion ... S 6 N 42
- (k) Remarriage
 - (i) Forfeiture on
 - (a) Suit upon, for possession of estate inherited by
widow from husband—Suit by reversioner—
Limitation ... A 143 N 8
 - (b) Whether can be waived by reversioner ... A 143 N 19
 - (ii) Suit by reversioner — Suit for possession — Suit on
ground of remarriage of widow—Limitation ... A 141 N 9
- (l) Reversioner, if derives right to sue accrued to widow from
her as heir ... S 2 Cl 8 N 3
- (m) Reversioner succeeding to estate of — Adversus possession
commencing in lifetime of last full owner—Disability at
time of succeeding to estate, if ground for extension ... S 6 N 19
- (n) Surrender of estate by
 - (i) In favour of daughter—Death of daughter before mother
— Suit by next male reversioner for possession —
Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 9
 - (ii) To reversioner — Suit by surrenderee for possession
—Limitation ... A 141 N 9
- (o) Surrender of property by—Suit by surrenderee for posses-
sion of property alienated by widow before surrender—
Limitation ... A 141 N 9
- (p) Suit by, for recovery of money which she expends in discharge
of her husband's debts—Limitation ... A 132 N 8
- (q) Suit by reversioner succeeding to estate after widow—Dis-
ability at the time of succeeding to estate — Right to
extension of time ... S 6 N 19

Hindu law—Widow—(Contd.)

- (r) Unchastity of—Forfeiture on—Suit on ground of, for possession of widow's estate by reversioner—Limitation ... A 143 N 9
- (s) Widow giving property to member of her family by way of settlement—Such member transferring the property—Suit by presumptive reversioner in respect of transfer—Limitation ... A 125 N 14
- (t) Widow in enjoyment of servient tenement—Exclusion of period in favour of reversioner—When available ... S 27
- (u) Widow in possession—Transfer in virtue of her powers as representing estate—Transferee, if a person entitled on the determination of the interests of the widow within S. 27... S 27 N 1

Hire

- Hire of animals—Suit for—Limitation ... A 50
- Hire of boats—Suit for—Limitation ... A 50
- Hire of household furniture—Suit for—Limitation ... A 50
- Hire of vehicles—Suit for—Limitation ... A 50
- Suit for—Limitation—Residuary provision of ... A 50 N 1

History

- Of the Law of Limitation in British India ... Preamble N 2

Holiday

- Act directed to be done by decree or order of Court—Last day for doing it falling on holiday—Act to be done, if can be done on re-opening day ... S 4 N 5
- Amount to be paid into Court by certain date—Such date coming to Court vacation—Payment on re-opening day, sufficiency of ... S 4 N 2 F N 6
- Application to set aside sale—Period prescribed expiring on holiday—Presentation on re-opening day—Sufficiency of ... S 4 N 4
- Court closed
- (a) Bombay High Court, Original Side, if closed during summer vacation ... S 4 N 12
- (b) Court adjourned for recess but office open twice a week for receiving papers—Court, if closed ... S 4 N 12
- (c) Facilities for deposit not given on day in question though Court open—Court, if to be considered closed on that day ... S 4 N 12
- (d) Gazetted holiday—Judge holding Court—Court, if closed ... S 4 N 12
- (e) Notification providing for receiving plaints on certain days—Court, if closed ... S 4 N 12
- (f) Office of Court open during vacation for purpose of particular business in question—Court, if closed ... S 4 N 12
- (g) Officer authorized to receive plaints merely absent from headquarters—Court, if closed ... S 4 N 12
- (h) Practice of Court during ... S 4 N 12
- Court, if closed ... presented ... S 4 N 12
- Court closing immediately decree is passed—Copies applied for on re-opening day—Appeal preferred on date of obtaining copies—Appeal, if in time ... S 4 N 10
- 'Day that the Court re-opens', meaning of ... S 4 N 1

Holiday—(Contd.)

- Extended period computed with reference to provisions of Act, expiring on holiday — Proceeding, if can be taken on re-opening day ... S 4 N 7
- Holidays intervening between date of judgment and copy application—Computation of limitation for appeal, etc. ... S 12 N 24
- Joint operation of Ss. 4 and 14 ... S 14 N 7
- Judgment pronounced on — Exclusion of day in computing period of limitation for appeal, etc. ... S 12 N 6
- Last day not holiday—Time, if will be extended because the next day is a holiday ... S 4 N 7 F N 1
- Legal disability — Person becoming entitled to sue on holiday—Suit, if can be instituted on re-opening day ... S 4 N 9
- Limitation expiring on
 - (a) Institution on re-opening day—Principle of S. 4, if concerns computing of proscribed period of limitation ... S 4 N 2
 - (b) Plaint presented on re-opening day — Fact of Court having been closed, if should be mentioned in plaint ... S 4 N 16
 - (c) Proceeding, if may be instituted on re-opening day ... S 4
- Limitation expiring when Court closed — Court not sitting on re-opening day — Suit filed on day that Court actually re-opened, if in time ... S 4 N 12
- Limitation for application expiring on — Presentation on day set apart for motion under rules of practice, after re-opening — Sufficiency of ... S 4 N 15
- Limitation proscribed by S. 48 or O. 45, R. 7, Civil P. C., expiring on—Presentation on re-opening day—Sufficiency of ... S 4 N 3
- Payment to be made under private agreement between parties—Period expiring on holiday — If can be made on re-opening day : ... S 4 N 6
- Period after adding period of presentation of appeal or ... S 4 N 10
- Period allowed by S. 3 ... S 4 N 11
- Proper Court open on expiry of limitation — Suit filed in wrong Court on re-opening day—Effect ... S 4 N 13
- Review, court-fee for—Ninetieth day falling on holiday — Presentation on re-opening day—Court-fee payable ... S 4 N 6a
- Tender of deposit on last date — Court unable to receive it though Court not closed—If can be received next day ... S 4 N 4

Hundi—See Bill of exchange.

Husband and wife

- Adverse possession between—See : Adverse possession
- Husband or wife, if can acknowledge debts of the other ... S 19 N 63
- Refusal of conjugal rights—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 15
- Right to society of his or her spouse—Breach of obligation—Time, if begins to run at every moment of the time during which the society is withheld ... S 23 N 15

Idiot

- Disability, of — Person entitled to sue, an idiot at common law — Disability, of an idiot at common law ... S 6 N 29

Immovable property—Suit for possession of—Suit by Hindu, etc.—(Contd.)

- (iii) Female in possession not as heir but in some other way—Limitation ... A 141 N 4
- (iv) Limitation—Starting point ... A 141; A 141 N 2
- (v) Plaintiff not becoming entitled to possession immediately on death of female—Limitation ... A 141 N 6
- (vi) Who can bring such suit under Art. 141 ... A 141; A 141 N 4
- (n) Suit by person in possession without title against trespasser—Suit, whether barred if not brought within six months under Art. 3 ... A 3 N 5
- (i) Suit by transferee from Hindu or Mahomedan who is entitled to possession on death of Hindu or Mahomedan female—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 8
- (j) Suit on basis of title—Failure to prove title—Decree, if can be given subsequently under Specific Relief Act, S. 9 ... A 3 N 6
- (k) Suit under Specific Relief Act, S. 9
 - (i) Limitation ... A 3
 - (ii) Whether maintainable where defendant is maintained in possession by order under S. 145, Criminal P. C.... A 3 N 7

—Trespass upon—See under Trespass.

- What is** ... A 141 N 11
 - (a) A *hat*, whether immovable property ... A 3 N 4
 - (b) Birt dues, whether immovable property within Art. 140 ... A 140 N 7
 - (c) Decree on mortgage, whether immovable property ... A 132 N 19
 - (c¹) Grove of mahua trees ... A 148 N 17
 - (d) Growing crops, whether immovable property ... A 55 N 1
 - (e) House built on site with foundation laid in it whether, immovable property ... A 132 N 19
 - (f) Incorporeal right, whether immovable property under Specific Relief Act, S. 9 ... A 3 N 4
 - (g) Jagir income, whether immovable property: A 142 & 144 N 6; A 132 N 19
 - (g¹) Materials of standing house ... A 142 & 144 N 6
 - (h) Office of village Joshi in Bombay Presidency, whether immovable property ... A 109 N 14
 - (i) Right of fishing, whether immovable property within Specific Relief Act, S. 9 ... A 3 N 4
 - (j) Right of landlord to recover rents and profits from tenant, whether immovable property within Art. 132 ... A 132 N 19
 - (k) Right of lessee to possession of property leased, whether immovable property within Art. 109 ... A 109 N 15
 - (l) Right of usufructuary mortgagee to possession of mortgaged property, whether immovable property within Art 109: A 109 N 15
 - (m) Right of way, whether interest is immovable property within Specific Relief Act, S. 9 ... A 3 N 4
 - (m¹) Right to birt offerings ... A 142 & 144 N 6
 - (m²) Right to hereditary office ... A 142 & 144 N 6
 - (n) Right to jalkar, whether interest in immovable property ... A 3 N 4
 - A 142 & 144 N 6
 - A 142 & 144 N 6
 - A 148 N 17
 - A 142 & 144 N 6
 - A 3 N 4
 - (o) Right to recover rent, whether immovable property ... A 132 N 19
 - (p) Right to turn of worship, whether immovable property ... A 132 N 19

Immoveable property—What is—(Contd.)

- (q) Simple mortgage right in immovable property, whether immovable property ... A 132 N 19
- (r) Standing trees, whether immovable property ... A 55 N 1; A 132 N 19; A 142 & 144 N 6
- (s) Toda girashak upon inam village and right to recover arrears due in respect of that haq, whether interest in immovable property within Specific Relief Act, S. 9 ... A 3 N 4
- (t) Usufructuary mortgage right in property, whether immovable property ... A 132 N 19

—What is not

- (a) Agreement to grant lease .. A 142 & 144 N 6
- (b) Arrears of land revenue or cess ... A 142 & 144 N 6
- (c) Marriage dues payable to holder of hereditary office in templo ... A 142 & 144 N 6
- (d) Proceeds of sale of immovable property .. A 142 & 144 N 6
- (e) Right of exclusive worship .. A 142 & 144 N 6
- (f) Right to have one's name entered in revenue registers . A 142 & 144 N 6
- (g) Turn of worship ... A 142 & 144 N 6

Imprisonment, false—See False imprisonment.**Income-Tax Act**

—S. 68—Application under—Delay in filing—Excuse of S 5 N 4 FN 8

—S. 66 (3)—Application under—Time spent in obtaining copies of order passed under S. 66, sub-s. 2, whether can be deducted for computing limitation for application ... S 12 N 5, S 12 N 3 FN 3a

Incumbrance

—Avoidance of—Suit for—Who can sue to avoid, under Bengal Revenue Sales Act .. A 120 N 5

- Avoidance of, in estate sold for arrears of revenue
- (a) Burden of proof . A 121 N 6
- (b) Burden of proof that incumbrances were created subsequent to creation of estate or tenure sold, on whom lies A 121 N 2
- (c) Incumbrances, whether must be created subsequent to creation of estates or tenure sold for maintainability of suit — A 121 N 2
- (d) In what way effected, where under Provincial Rent and Revenue Act such incumbrances are voidable at the option of purchaser ... A 121 N 1
- (e) Suit for—Limitation—Starting point . . A 121, A 121 N 1, A 121 N 5
- (f) Suit, if necessary where under enactments such sales render incumbrances void . . A 121 N 1

—Meaning of ... A 121 N 2

—Property subject to—Sale of—Transaction, whether contains implied contract of indemnity by vendee in favour of vendor against incumbrances ... A 83 N 7

—What is

- (a) Claim by adverse possession acquired prior to revenue sale subject to all incumbrances, whether an incumbrance ... A 130 N 6
- (b) Adverse possession, whether and when incumbrance ... A 121 N 2
- (c) Intermediate tenure between proprietor and mukarraridar subsequent to creation of mukarrari by grant, whether incumbrance ... A 121 N 2

Incumbrance—What is—(Contd.)

- (d) Mero possession of tenant however long, whether incumbrance ... A 121 N 2
- (e) Mortgage on lands, whether incumbrance ... A 121 N 2
- (f) Perpetual allowance charged on land, whether incumbrance : A 121 N 2
- (g) Under tenure, whether incumbrance ... A 121 N 3

Indemnity

- Claim to—When can be set off ... A 83 N 14
- Contract of
- (a) Assignment of lease, whether contains implied indemnity contract on part of assignee to indemnify assignor in respect of covenants in lease ... A 83 N 6
- (b) Breach of—Compensation for—Suit for—Limitation ... A 65 N 4
- (c) Contract of indemnity implied in accommodation bill—Suit on—Limitation ... A 79 N 2
- (d) Covenant for quiet possession, whether indemnity contract : A 83 N 7
- (e) Covenant for title, whether indemnity contract ... A 83 N 7
- (f) Meaning of ... A 83 N 2
- (g) Money left in hands of vendee to pay off vendor's debt—Express contract of indemnity against loss caused by failure to pay—Suit upon such contract—Limitation ... A 83 N 7
- (h) Registered indemnity contract—Suit upon—Limitation ... A 83 N 5
- (i) Remedy of person indemnified in an indemnity contract before he is actually damaged ... A 83 N 13
- (j) Sale of property subject to incumbrances—Transaction, whether contains implied contract of indemnity by vendee in favour of vendor against incumbrances ... A 83 N 7
- (k) Suit by agent against principal to enforce obligation under S. 222, Contract Act—Limitation ... A 83 N 4
- (l) Suit by promisor against joint promisor for contribution—Limitation ... A 83 N 11
- (m) Suit by vendor against vendee for vendee's failure to pay vendor's debt as contracted and for which purchase money has been left in vendee's hands—Suit on implied contract of indemnity—Limitation—Starting point ... A 83 N 7
- (n) Suit for breach of covenant for quiet possession—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit on indemnity contract ... A 83 N 7
- (o) Suit for breach of covenant for title—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit on indemnity contract : A 83 N 7
- (p) Suit for indemnity based not on any promise actually made but on promise implied in law—Limitation ... A 82 N 2
- (q) Suit on—Limitation
- (i) Residuary provision ... A 83
- (ii) Special and express provisions ... A 79 N 2; A 83 N 1
- (iii) Special and express provisions ... A 83 N 12
- (iv) Special and express provisions ... property—A 83 N 56
- (s) Suit to enforce obligation under Contract Act, Ss. 69 and 70—Limitation ... A 83 N 3
- (t) Suit upon express indemnity contract against loss of quiet possession—Limitation ... A 83 N 7
- (u) Suit upon express indemnity contract against loss of title—Limitation ... A 83 N 7

Indemnity—Contract of—(Contd.)

- (v) Suit upon express registered indemnity contract against loss of quiet possession—Limitation A 83 N 7
- (w) Suit upon express registered indemnity contract against loss of title—Limitation A 83 N 7
- (x) Whether exists between executants of joint promissory note A 83 N 11
- Covenant for—Covenant in favour of party to an award—Whether enures for benefit of all persons claiming under him .. A 83 N 15
- Right of—Suit based on right of indemnity which surety has against principal debtor by virtue of contract of suretyship—Limitation A 81 N 2

Inherent power of Court

- Exercise of
 - (a) If governed by any period of limitation S 3 N 28
 - (b) Undue delay in invoking—Court, if can refuse to exercise ... S 3 N 28
 - (c) When definite remedy provided—If proper S 3 N 28
- Extension of time under
 - (a) Court, whether can extend time by inherent power for application for setting aside dismissal for default . A 163 N 12
 - (b) Court, whether can extend time under inherent powers for application for setting aside ex parte decree A 164 N 9
- Setting aside execution sale under—Limitation A 166 N 15

Injunction

- Compensation for wrongfully obtaining—See under Compensation.
- Interlocutory injunction—When dissolved A 42 N 4
- Mandatory injunction—Injunction ordering removal of obstruction to watercourse—Suit for—Limitation A 38 N 2
- Meaning of A 42 N 1
- Order of injunction issued against a person restraining him from building a wall—Such person building up the wall in breach of order, whether amounts to a continuing wrong S 23 N 18
- Permanent injunction
 - (a) Obtaining of, by institution of suit—Whether actionable ... A 42 N 2
 - (b) Obtaining of, whether wrongful A 42 N 3
- Stay of proceedings by injunction—Time during which proceedings are stayed to be excluded S 15
- Suit for
 - (a) For removal of beams put by defendant against plaintiff's wall—Limitation A 120 N 10
 - (b) For restraining defendant from obstructing plaintiff in the enjoyment of his office—Limitation applicable, whether
 - cession of office A 124 N 5
 - vary Art. 120 A 120 N 10
 - specific Articles, such as A 120 N 10
 - (c) To restrain lessee from interfering with lessor's right under covenant in lease to enter upon land demised and to cut and take away certain trees—Limitation A 120 N 10
- Suit for injunction restraining defendant from entering property—Subsequent application for execution of balance of decree amount against same property is for a different relief ... S 14 N 19
- Temporary injunction
 - (a) Obtaining maliciously of—Whether actionable A 42 N 2

Injunction—Temporary injunction—(Contd.)

- (b) Period during which temporary injunction remains in force A 42 N 4
 —What is—Prohibitory order under Civil P. C., O. 21, R. 46, whether injunction within Art. 42 ... A 42 N 1

Injury

- Compensation for : *See under Compensation.*

Insane person

- Property transferred by, during insanity—Suit to recover—Limitation ... A 94

Insanity

- Extension of time on ground of : *See Legal disability.*
 —Lunatic, death of, after commencement of adverse possession against him—Widow—Failure to sue within three years—Reversioner succeeding to estate, if entitled to fresh start from widow's death ... S 6 N 42
 —Meaning of ... S 6 N 27
 —Two persons jointly entitled to sue—Neither under disability at commencement of limitation—Subsequent insanity of one—Effect of ... S 7 N 7

Insolvency

- Acknowledgment of debt by its inclusion in schedule of creditors filed by insolvent—Sufficiency of, for purposes of S. 19 ... S 19 N 47
 —Application by creditor to have debtor adjudged an insolvent—Whether on the same cause of action as subsequent suit by him for decree on debt ... S 14 N 18
 —Creditor getting leave of Court, whether can proceed against proceedings ... S 15 N 8
 —Filing proof of claim—Pendency of insolvency proceedings—Whether can be deducted... S 14 N 11
 —Insolvency Court actually passing order amounting to injunction or stay—S. 15 will apply ... S 15 N 8
 —Insolvency jurisdiction
 (a) Whether included in original jurisdiction of Chartered High Courts ... A 162 N 4
 (b) Whether included in original jurisdiction of High Court ... A 151 N 2
 —Insolvency of person, if operates as bar to proceeding against him personally in absence of protection order ... S 15 N 8
 —Insolvency of plaintiff—Whether causes abatement of suit ... A 172 N 2
 —Insolvency proceeding—Sale in—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation ... A 166 N 9
 —Order of adjudication annulled under S. 37, Provincial Insolvency Act—Appointment of insolvent's property placed in charge of property—Appointed, if agent of insolvent within S. 20 ... S 20 N 19
 —Pendency of insolvency proceedings—Prevention of suit or application being filed against him is not by reason of order of Court but under the law ... S 15 N 8
 —Refusal of leave to creditor—Whether amounts to order granting injunction or stay ... S 15 N 8
 —Suit against debtor after termination of insolvency—Previous acknowledgment by Official Assignee—Whether can be relied on as saving limitation ... S 19 N 53

Insolvency—(Contd)

- Suit against Official Assignee to enforce mortgage executed by insolvent—Acknowledgment made by Official Assignee may be relied on as saving limitation ... S 19 N 53
- Suit by assignee from Official Receiver of claims to damages in favour of insolvent—Objection that claim not being assignable, plaintiff had no right to sue—Official Receiver pro forma defence ... S 22 N 29
- S ... impleaded by plaintiff within S. 22 ... S 22 N 6
- Time taken by creditor in filing a proof of claim in the Insolvency Court—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation for suit by him on claim after annulment of adjudication ... S 14 N 12

Insolvency Act

- Application under, to record adjustment or payment of decree out of Court—Limitation ... A 174 N 2

Insolvency proceedings

- Application by creditor to be brought on schedule of creditors, if governed by any period of limitation. ... S 3 N 30
- Debt not barred on date of adjudication—If provable when barred on date of proof ... S 3 N 30
- Period of pendency of, against a person—If can be deducted in calculating period of limitation for suits by or against him ... S 3 N 30

Insolvent

- Assignee of—See under Assignee.
- Defendant becoming insolvent—Procedure as to case of ... A 172 N 2

Instalment

- Decree, payable in—See under Decree.
- (a) Execution of—See Execution
- Money payable in instalments—Verbal contract for—Suit on—Limitation ... A 75 N 3

Instalment Bond—See under Bond—Instalment bond.**Instrument—See also Document**

- Foreign instrument—Meaning of ... A 77 N 1
- Inland instrument—Meaning of ... A 77 N 1
- Instrument of conditional sale—Interest upon—Whether allowable ... A 63 N 1

Insurance

- Clause in policy that if no suit is instituted within a particular period after rejection of claim by company all rights shall be forfeited—Validity ... S 3 N 21
- Insurance contract providing that lapse of six months after loss without suit or action is conclusive evidence against validity of any claim in respect of the loss—Month must be taken to be lunar month of 28 days ... S 25 N 1

Insurance policy

- Suit upon
 - (a) Sum assured payable after a certain time after loss or death is proved—Limitation ... A 86 N 2
 - (b) Sum assured payable immediately after proof of death or loss is given to or received by insurers—Limitation—Starting point ... A 86; A 86 N 1, A 86 N 3

Interest

- Charged upon mortgaged property—Payment of—Suit for—Suit, whether one for payment of money charged upon immovable property within Art. 132 ... A 132 N 13
 - Claimed as damages—Suit for—Limitation ... A 132 N 12
 - Due on contract of mortgage—Whether charge on estate ... A 132 N 13
 - In mortgage suit—Personal decree for interest accrued six years before suit—Whether can be passed although claim for personal relief as to principal is barred ... A 116 N 20
 - Meaning of ... A 63 N 2
 - On money deposited—Suit for—Limitation ... A 60 N 4
 - Over usufructuary mortgage—Suit by usufructuary mortgagee who has leased back mortgaged property to mortgagor himself—Limitation ... A 110 N 7
 - Payment of
 - (a) As such on debt or legacy before expiration of prescribed period—Starting point, if postponed ... S 20
 - (b) During vacation—Effect ... S 4 N 8
 - Right to—When arises under substantive law ... A 63
 - Suit for
 - (a) Advances of money by purchaser to seller—Breach of contract to supply goods by seller—Purchaser bringing suit to recover deposit with interest—Interest on deposit from date of breach of contract, whether can be claimed ... A 63 N 1
 - (b) Against co-mortgagor for interest for amount paid for redemption—Limitation applicable ... A 115 N 11
 - (c) Based on independent contract to pay it—Limitation ... A 63 N 1
 - (d) For recovery of interest from holder of Government promissory notes—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
 - (e) Interest alone—Whether maintainable ... A 63 N 1
 - (f) Interest charged upon immovable property—Limitation ... A 63 N 4
 - (g) Interest claimed as accessory to principal amount claimed—Limitation ... A 63 N 1
 - (h) Interest on deposit on *thavani*—Limitation ... A 63 N 5
 - (i) Interest payable annually and principal in certain number of years—Suit for interest, whether barred after 12 years from date of default ... A 132 N 12
 - (j) Interest payable under independent contract charged upon property—Limitation ... A 63 N 1
 - (k) Interest recoverable under registered contract—Limitation:
 - (i) Limitation ... A 59 N 4; A 63
 - (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 63 N 6
 - (n) Suit for principal barred—Suit for interest, whether barred where interest is accessory to principal ... A 132 N 12
 - (o) Suit for principal not barred—Suit for interest for more than 12 years before suit, whether barred where interest is accessory to principal ... A 132 N 13
 - (p) Whether barred if suit for principal is barred ... A 63 N 1
 - Upon deed of conditional sale—Whether allowable ... A 63 N 1
 - Upon hypothecation bond—Whether allowable ... A 63 N 1
- International law**
- Lex loci contractus* ... S 11 N 1

Interpretation of Statutes

- Affirmative language, if can be construed as having negative implication ... Preamble N 7 F N 1
- Composite enactment—Construction ... Preamble N 7 F N 16
- Consolidating statute—Construction ... Preamble N 7
- Construction of part — Comparison with other parts, if proper ... Preamble N 7 F N 16
- Court, function of, is to say what Legislature has said it meant ... Preamble N 7
- Directory or mandatory nature of provisions—Tests ... Preamble N 7
- Ejusdem generis* rule, applicability of ... Preamble N 7
- English and American law, if binding on Indian Courts ... Preamble N 16
- Exceptions, if can be grafted on to section universal in terms ... Preamble N 7 F N 2
- General and special provisions ... Preamble N 7
- Harmonious construction ... Preamble N 20
- Harmonious construction, necessity of ... Preamble N 7
- Illustrations, relevancy of, in construction ... Preamble N 12
- 'Includes', meaning of ... Preamble N 7 F N 1
- Intention of Legislature, what is ... Preamble N 7 F N 1
- Intention to be gathered from language ... Preamble N 7
- Judicial precedents, value of ... Preamble N 15
- Language ambiguous
 - (a) Extraneous considerations, relevancy of, in construction ... Preamble N 7
 - (b) Other statutes in *pari materia*, if can be considered ... Preamble N 7
 - (c) Previous state of the law, if can be considered ... Preamble N 8
 - (d) Scope and intention of enactment, if can be considered ... Preamble N 7
- Language clear
 - (a) Analogy of other enactments, relevancy of, in construction ... Preamble N 7
 - (b) Extraneous considerations, relevancy of ... Preamble N 7
 - (c) Giving effect to words leading to absurdity—Effect of ... Preamble N 7
 - (d) Hardship, relevancy of, in construction ... Preamble N 7
 - (e) Intention of the law, relevancy of, in construction ... Preamble N 7
 - (f) Policy of law, relevancy of, in construction ... Preamble N 7
 - (g) Previous state of law, relevancy in construction ... Preamble N 7
 - (h) Terms against general principles of law in equity, effect ... Preamble N 7
- Legislative proceedings, reference to ... Preamble N 9
- Marginal notes to Sections, reference to ... Preamble N 11
- Plain meaning, if can be controlled by considerations of convenience ... Preamble N 7 F N 7
- Policy of Act—Court, if concerned with ... Preamble N 7 F N 1
- Practice of Court not to nullify express enactment ... Preamble N 7 F N 2
- Preamble
 - (a) If controls provisions of statute ... Preamble N 1
 - (b) Object of ... Preamble N 1
- Preamble and Headings, reference to ... Preamble N 10
- Pre-existing law, relevancy in construction ... Preamble N 8
- Proviso, if extends substantive portion ... Preamble N 14
- Punctuation marks, if can be relied on ... Preamble N 13
- Reasonableness of provision, when material ... Preamble N 7 F N 2
- Retrospective operation ... Preamble N 26
- Special provision will prevail over the general A 75 N 2; A 95 N 2; A 96 N 2; A 145 N 4

Interpretation of Statutes—(Contd.)

- Statute creating a right and providing a remedy that remedy and no other is available ... A 6 N 4
- Statute not clear
 - (a) Absurd result, injustice, defeating of its object to be avoided : Preamble N 7
 - (b) Reasonable construction ... Preamble N 7
- Strict construction—Words operating in derogation of rights of subject ... Preamble N 7
- Technical terms, construction of ... Preamble N 19
- Two constructions possible—Literal construction, if should prevail : Preamble N 7 F N 13
- Two constructions possible, which should prevail ... Preamble N 7
- Two remedies provided—Construction ... Preamble N 7
- Words must be construed in primary sense ... Preamble N 7 F N 2
- Words, when to be construed in popular sense ... Preamble N 7 F N 2

Intestate

- Estate governed by Indian Succession Act—Remedy of heirs ... A 123 N 4
- Property of—Suit for share of
 - (a) Against administrator—Limitation ... A 123 N 2
 - (b) Against executor—Limitation ... A 123 N 2
 - (c) Against executor *de son tort*—Limitation ... A 123 N 2
 - (d) Against person to whom property has been bequeathed with direction to pay certain legacy—Limitation ... A 123 N 2
 - (e) Between co-heirs of person dying intestate taking as tenants-in-common—Limitation ... A 123 N 4
 - (f) By Buddhist heir against other heirs—Limitation ... A 123 N 4
 - (g) By heir against person in possession who has taken out letters of administration—Limitation ... A 123 N 6
 - (h) By heir against person in wrongful possession—Limitation : A 123 N 6
 - (i) By heir under Chioese Customary law ... A 123 N 11
 - (j) By Hindu heir against co-heirs constituting joint family for partition and possession—Limitation ... A 123 N 4
 - (k) By Muhammadan heir against other heirs—Limitation ... A 123 N 4
 - (l) Limitation ... A 123
 - (m) Limitation—Starting point ... A 123 N 11
 - (n) Suit if barred, whether bars claim for administration of estate of deceased person ... A 123 N 3
 - (o) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Lim. Act ... A 123 N 13
 - (p) Whether must be against some person legally charged with duty of distributing estate for applicability of Art. 123 ... A 123 N 2
- Suit for profits of estate—Limitation ... A 123 N 2

Irrigation Cess Act

- Suit for refund of water cess against Secretary of State—Time under S. 15, Limitation Act can be deducted ... S 29 N 3

Joint contractors

- Acknowledgment or payment by one of them—Effect of ... S 21 N 7
- Co-mortgagors, if joint contractors within S. 21 ... S 21 N 11
- Meaning of ... S 21 N 8
- (a) Co-heirs of single debtor, if joint contractors ... S 21 N 8
- (b) Contract when made not entered into by several persons jointly but by a sole contractor—Two or more persons subsequently becoming jointly liable under the contract—Such persons, if joint contractors ... S 21 N 8

Joint contractors—Meaning of—(Contd.)

- (c) Mortgagor subsequently transferring portion of equity of redemption to another—Such person becoming jointly liable with mortgagor in respect of mortgage—Mortgagor and transferee are not joint contractors ... S 21 N 8
- (d) Principal debtor and surety, if joint contractors within S. 21: S 21 N 12
- (e) Test to see if any set of persons would constitute joint contractors ... S 21 N 8
- (f) Two persons making a joint contract
- (i) Death of one of them leaving his heir—The other and the heir are joint contractors ... S 21 N 8
- (ii) Their successors are joint contractors ... S 21 N 8

—Mere fact that certain persons are related to each other as joint contractors—Whether by itself makes them agents of each other for making acknowledgment ... S 21 N 7

Joint crediturs

—Whether one can give discharge on behalf of all within the meaning of S. 7 ... S 7 N 22

Joint family—See also : Hindu law—Joint family.**—Joint family property**

- (a) Burden of proof, as to property being joint ... A 127 N 5
- (b) Partition of
- (i) Kinds of ... A 127 N 6
- (ii) Partition as division of shares, defined ... A 127 N 6
- (iii) Partition as division of shares and partition as division of title, distinguished ... A 127 N 6
- (iv) Partition as division of title, defined ... A 127 N 6
- (c) Person excluded from, share of
- (i) Absence standing by itself, whether sufficient to constitute exclusion ... A 127 N 11
- (ii) Assertion by defendant that property was separate self-acquired property, whether constitutes exclusion of plaintiff ... A 127 N 11
- (iii) "Exclusion"—What constitutes
- (a) Illustrative cases ... A 127 N 11
- (b) Question, whether of law ... A 127 N 11
- (iv) Fact that plaintiff does not ask for share, whether amounts to exclusion ... A 127 N 11
- (v) Intention to exclude, whether essential element, in exclusion ... A 127 N 11
- (vi) Mere absence of member from family, whether sufficient to establish exclusion of such member from family property ... A 127 N 11
- (vii) Mere non-participation in profits of property, whether exclusion ... A 127 N 11
- (viii) Partial exclusion, whether exclusion within Art. 127 : A 127 N 11
- (ix) Proof of quarrels between parties where parties continue to live in union after quarrels, whether proof of exclusion ... A 127 N 11
- (d) Possession of, by coparcener converted to alien faith—Nature of ... A 127 N 9
- (e) Property held by members of mapilla family in Malabar, whether joint family property ... 4

Joint family—Joint family property—(Contd.)

- (f) Property in hands of daughters, whether joint family property ... A 127 N 4
- (g) Property in hands of widows, whether joint family property: A 127 N 4
- (h) Property left by Borman Buddhist ancestor, whether joint family property ... A 127 N 4
- (i) Property left by Hindu ancestor governed by Dayabhaga School of Hindu law, whether joint family property ... A 127 N 4
- (j) Property left by Hindu ancestor governed by Mitakshara law, whether joint family property ... A 127 N 4
- (k) Property left by Mahomedan till division among members, whether joint family property ... A 127 N 4
- (l) Share in—Suit for
- (i) By assignee of interest of daughter's soo—Limitation applicable ... A 127 N 3
- (ii) By ... A 127 N 3
- (iii) By ... A 127 N 16
- (iv) By ... possession of transfer made by another member of joint family—Limitation ... A 127 N 3
- (v) By stranger against member of family—Limitation ... A 127 N 3
- (vi) Limitation—Starting point ... A 127 N 15
- (vii) Parties Mahomedans—Limitation ... A 127 N 4
- (viii) Right to property, whether gets extinguished under Sec. 28, Limitation Act, if suit is barred under Art. 127 ... A 127 N 17
- (ix) Suit to re-open partition and re-adjust shares on ground of mistake—Limitation ... A 127 N 14
- (m) Suit for share by person excluded from
- (i) Essentials of applicability of Art. 127 ... A 127 N 2
- (ii) "Exclusion"—Burden of proof as to ... A 127 N 13
- (iii) Exclusion, whether must be total or partial to start time running ... A 127 N 11
- (iv) Limitation—Starting point ... A 127; A 127 N 2
- (v) Suit by Burman Buddhist—Limitation ... A 127 N 4
- (vi) Suit by co-widow—Limitation ... A 127 N 4
- (vii) Suit by daughter praying for partition as a mode of convenient enjoyment—Limitation ... A 127 N 4
- (viii) Suit by Dayabhaga Hindu—Limitation ... A 127 N 4
- (ix) Suit for accounts of moveable property left in management of one member of family after disruption of joint status of Hindu family—Limitation ... A 127 N 6
- (x) Suit for actual possession of share by partition—Limitation ... A 127 N 13
- (xi) Suit for declaration of right to joint family property and for injunction—Whether one for share in joint family property ... A 127 N 13
- (xii) Suit for partition by heir of tenant-in-common against heir of another tenant-in-common—Limitation ... A 127 N 6
- (xiii) Suit for recovery of maintenance or arrears thereof by member of Malabar tarwad—Limitation ... A 127 N 13
- (xiv) Suit for undivided joint family property where there has been only partial partition—Limitation ... A 127 N 6
- (xv) Suit to enforce a right to share—Meaning of ... A 127 N 13

Joint family—Joint family property—Suit for share by person excluded from			
—(Contd.)			
(vi) Suit where there was division of status even with reference to properties which were not divided by metes and bounds—Limitation	A 127 N 6
—Joint Hindu family			
(a) Interest of member—Purchaser at execution sale			
(i) Nature of right acquired by such purchaser	...		A 180 N 2
(ii) Purchaser, whether can apply for delivery of possession.			A 180 N 2
(b) Manager of—Alienation of coparcenary property by—Suit for setting aside, by minor member of family—Limitation.			A 44 N 5
—Joint status			
(a) Severance of—Burden of proof as to	A 127 N 6
(b) Severance of			
(i) By conversion of coparcener to alien faith	...		A 127 N 9
(ii) How effected	A 127 N 6
—Manager of—Suit against, by member for accounts—Limitation	...		A 120 N 15
—Member of			
(a) Married daughter, whether member of joint family	...		A 127 N 3
(b) Member of Burman Buddhist family who marries, whether remains member of joint family	...		A 127 N 3
—Partition of—Suit for declaration that property in possession of father is partible after his death—Limitation	A 120 N 31
—Presumption as to possessing joint property, whether applies	...		A 127 N 5
Joint promisees			
—Suit on joint right of action—Necessary parties	S 22 N 23
Joint promisors			
—Suit for debt—Necessary parties	S 22 N 23
Judgment			
—Date of—What is	A 153 N 3
(a) Where judgment is pronounced in absence of parties or their counsels on date of which no notice has been given to them	A 153 N 3; A 156 N 5
—Enforcement of—What is	A 183 N 4
—Executable judgment—Suit upon—Maintainability	A 122 N 1
—Foreign judgment—See under : Foreign judgment.			
—Letters Patent			
(a) Whether equivalent to decree within Art. 151	...		A 151 N 3
(b) Whether equivalent to order within Art. 151	...		A 151 N 3
—Meaning of	A 122 N 3
—Review of			
(a) And amendment of judgment—Distinction between—Effects of	A 152 N 5
of	A 162 N 2
on court-fee chargeable	A 173 N 6
(ii) Application time-barred—Payment of court-fee, whether enables party to apply for review beyond period of limitation	A 173 N 6
(iii) Art. 173 and Arts. 161 and 162, distinguished	...		A 173 N 2

Judgment—Review of—Application for—(Contd.)

- (iv) Court-fee on—And limitation ... A 173 N 6
- (v) Date of decree—Amendment of decree—Effect of ... A 173 N 5
- (vi) Limitation—Starting point ... A 173; A 173 N 5
- (vii) Time, whether can be extended by virtue of S. 5, Limitation Act ... A 173 N 5
- (d) Effect of ... A 152 N 5
- (e) Judgment of High Court—*See* : High Court—Judgment of
- (f) Judgment of Small Cause Court—*See* : Court—Court of Small Causes—Judgment of
- Revivor of—What constitutes ... A 183 N 10
- Suit on
 - (a) Against whom maintainable ... A 122 N 2
 - (b) Decree for money payable by instalments—Limitation—Starting point ... A 122 N 7
 - (c) If maintainable, whether remedy by execution is available or not—English law ... A 122 N 1
 - (d) Judgment obtained in British India—Limitation; ... A 122; A 122 N 1
 - (e) Plaintiff obtaining decree for money—Refusal of execution against family property of judgment-debtor to the hands of his son—Subsequent suit by decree-holder against sons of judgment-debtor on their pious obligation to pay the decree against their father—Suit, whether one or judgment ... A 122 N 1
 - (f) Recognizance—Limitation—Starting point ... A 122 N 7
 - (g) Starting point ... A 122 N 7
- What is
 - (a) Arbitration award which is not filed into Court or incorporated in decree of Court, whether judgment within Art 122: ... A 122 N 3
 - (b) Garnishee order absolute, whether judgment within Art 122: ... A 122 N 3
 - (c) Order of High Court passed in exercise of its insolvency jurisdiction, whether judgment within Art. 122 ... A 122 N 3
 - (d) Recognizance, whether judgment within Art. 122 ... A 122 N 5
 - (e) Report of Commissioner in prior suit for dissolution and accounts of partnership accepted by the Court in awarding profits to one of the partners, whether judgment within Art 122 ... A 122 N 3
 - (f) Solenamah filed in Court and accepted by it but no decree drawn up with usual provision for execution, whether judgment within Art. 122 ... A 122 N 3
 - (g) Statement and reasons given by Judge as grounds of his decisions, whether judgment ... A 122 N 3

Judgment-debtor

- Application by
 - (a) Complaining delivery of property in excess of what has been decreed or sold—Limitation ... A 165 N 3
 - (b) Under O. 21, R. 2, (3) Civil P. O.—Limitation ... A 174; A 171 N 2
- Death of, whether gives fresh starting point for appeal from decree by legal representative ... A 156 N 10
- Judgment-debtor out of possession of property sold—Illustrative cases ... A 137 N 5
- Legal representative of—Appeal by, from decree to High Court—Limitation—Starting point ... A 156 N 10

Judgment-debtor—(Contd.)

—Meaning of

(a) Person claiming through judgment-debtor, whether judgment-debtor A 174 N 4

(b) Transferee of equity of redemption in property in suit from judgment-debtor, whether judgment-debtor .. A 174 N 4

—Suit by, against decree-holder for compensation for failure to certify payment made out of Court—Limitation—Starting point : A 115 N 6

—Surety for

(a) Whether can plead uncertified adjustment made by him ... A 174 N 4

(b) Whether can plead uncertified payment made by him .. A 174 N 4

Jurisdiction

—Original jurisdiction of High Court—See under : High Court

—Original jurisdiction of Judicial Commissioner's Court of Sind, basis of A 162 N 4

—Proceeding instituted after prescribed period of limitation—Court, if deprived of jurisdiction to try S 3 N 37

Labourer

—Meaning of A 7 N 4

Laches

—Doctrine of, as distinguished from doctrine of limitation ... Preamble N 5

Lakhiraj grants

—Assessment of—Right of Government—Whether extinguished by bar of limitation A 149 N 8

—Resumption of—Right of Government—Whether extinguished by bar of limitation A 149 N 8

Land

—Acquired by Government—Compensation for—Suit for: See under Compensation

—Definition of A 125 N 12

—Resumption of

(a) If resumable where grant of land making granteo exempt from Government revenue is void under law A 130 N 3

(b) Right of, when arises, in case of land granted to defendant for life A 130 N 3

(c) Suit for

(i) In case of land granted for personal services—Limitation—Starting point A 130 N 3

(ii) In case of lands granted for service—Limitation—Starting point A 130 N 3

(iii) In case of rent-free land for particular purpose—Limitation—Starting point A 130 N 3

(iv) Limitation—Starting point A 130 N 3

Land Acquisition Act

—Section 11 and 12—Provisions of, as to award of compensation for land acquired A 17 N 1

—Section 18

(a) Application under—Time taken to obtain copy of Collector's order—Whether can be excluded in computing limitation S 12 N 5

(b) Proceedings under—Legal disability, extension on ground of —If available S 6 N 20 F N 2

Land Acquisition Act—(Contd.)

—Section 54—Appeal under—Appeal to High Court—Limitation :	A 156 N 3
—Whether special law within the meaning of S. 29	S 29 N 6

Land Acquisition (Mines) Act

—Compensation under—Recovery of—Suit against Government—	
Limitation	A 120 N 9

Landlord—See also Landlord and tenant.

—Definition of, within Art. 139	A 139 N 4a
—Ground landlord—Dues payable to, on occasion of marriages—	
Whether rent	A 110 N 2
—Share of produce to be given to—Whether rent	A 110 N 2
—Suit against, by tenant who has acquired under S. 28, Limitation	
Act, title to property—Limitation	A 139 N 5
—Suit by	
(a) Against alienee from tenant for possession on ground of	
forfeiture incurred by alienation—Limitation	A 139 N 3
(b) Against mortgagor where usufructuary mortgagee leases back	
mortgaged property to mortgagor—Limitation	A 139 N 5
(c) Against person entering upon property under invalid lease	
but from whom owner goes on receiving rent—Limitation	
applicable, whether same as applicable to suit by landlord	
for possession from tenant	A 139 N 18
(d) Against representative of deceased tenant—Limitation	A 139 N 4b
(e) Against third person who gets into possession of property	
and claims to hold adversely both to landlord and tenant—	
Limitation	A 140 N 5
(f) By principal on termination of lease in favour of agent—	
Limitation	A 139 N 4
(g) By successor of limited holder—Limitation applicable, whe-	
ther same as applicable to suit by landlord for recovery	
from tenant	A 139 N 4a
(h) For possession against third party who has dispossessed	
tenant—Limitation	A 140 N 5
(i) For recovery of possession from tenant—Limitation—Appli-	
cability of Arts. 139 and 140	A 140 N 5
(j) For removal of trees wrongfully planted by a person—Limi-	
tation	A 120 N 10
(k) To recover possession from tenant	A 139, A 139 N 2
(i) Art. 139 and Art. 144 distinguished	A 139 N 2
(ii) Essentials of applicability of Art. 139	A 139 N 2
(iii) Limitation—Starting point	A 139 N 2
(iv) On determination of tenancy	
(a) Art. 139 and Special or Local Act... ..	A 139 N 15
(b) Burden of proof	A 139 N 20
(c) By whom maintainable	A 139 N 4a
(d) Defendant, whether can plead in the alternative	
both tenancy and bar of limitation	A 139 N 21
(e) When the tenancy is determined—Illustrative	
cases	A 139 N 5a
(f) Where there is renewal of tenancy—Limitation	
—Starting point	A 139 N 6

Landlord—Suit by—To recover possession from tenant—On determination of tenancy—(Contd.)

- (g) Tenants' right to property is extinguished under S. 28 if suit for possession is barred under Art. 139 ... A 139 N 11
- (v) On ground of forfeiture and determination of tenancy—Limitation ... A 143 N 2, A 143 N 4
- (vi) On ground of forfeiture or breach of condition—Art. 139 and Art. 143 distinguished ... A 139 N 3
- (vii) Suit for rent by landlord, whether maintainable if suit for possession is barred under Art. 139 ... A 139 N 11

Landlord and tenant

- Adverse possession—See Adverse possession
- Dispossession of tenant—Dispossession, if can be set up in defence to suit for rent ... S 3 N 15
- Landlord under Madras Local Boards Act liable to pay Government cess—Tenant liable to landlord for sums so paid—Suit by landlord against tenant for recovery of sums paid as Government cess—Limitation ... A 61 N 10
- Mutt, tenant of temple—Same person trustee for temple and mutt—Another person becoming trustee of temple alone—Whether gets fresh cause of action for recovery of rent as part of the temple property in the hands of the ex-trustee ... S 9 N 12
- Payment of premium by tenant to landlord prohibited by Bombay Rent Act—Claim for refund—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- Relationship of
- (a) How arises ... A 110 N 2
- (b) Relationship between khot and his tenant, whether one of landlord and tenant ... A 139 N 4
- (c) Tenant entering on property in void lease—Owner receiving rent from tenant—Relationship of landlord and tenant, whether created between parties ... A 139 N 18
- (d) Whether essential for suit for rent ... A 110 N 2
- Right of landlord to assess rent—Whether barred by mere non-payment of rent by tenant where land is not rent-free and relationship of landlord and tenant exists ... A 130 N 1
- Right to recover possession of land from tenant lost by failure to sue for 12 years after termination of lease—Right to recover arrears of rent for years within the 12 years or to recover ... S 28 N 6
- ... to landlord, an idiot—Death ...
- ... rual of right to sue—Idiocy continuing till death—Representative, if entitled to extension of time ... S 8 Illus 3
- Suit by landlord
- (a) Against sub-tenant of tenant for ejectment—Tenant impleaded after period of limitation—Whole suit, if becomes barred. ... S 22 N 5
- (b) For contribution for payment of Government cess, portion of which tenant is bound to contribute—Limitation ... A 120 N 25
- (c) For ejectment—On ground that defendant is tenant-at-will—Suit, whether one for correction of entry in record of rights ... A 120 N 50
- (c') For ejectment of trespasser for putting lessee in possession—Whether maintainable ... A 142 & 144 N 86

Landlord and tenant—Suit by landlord—(Contd.)

- (d) For possession on allegation that tenancy had determined—
Dismissal of suit — Subsequent suit for rent—Cause of
action for suit, if affected by suit for possession ... S 9 N 11
- (e) For recovery of drainage charges payable by tenant under
Bengal Drainage Act—Limitation ... A 116 N 1
- (f) Tenant dispossessed during continuance of lease—Suit by
landlord for possession against trespasser — Limitation—
Starting point ... A 142 & 144 N 86
- (g) Trespasser already in possession at commencement of lease
—Suit against trespasser—Landlord is not entitled to fresh
period of limitation from termination of lease : A 142 & 144 N 86
- Suits between—Necessary parties ... S 23 N 22
- Tenant, if can acquire by prescription any easement against his
landlord ... S 26 N 13
- Tenant, if can acquire easement for benefit of dominant tenement
in his possession and landlord thus gains prescriptive right ... S 26 N 5

Land Registration Act

- Whether precludes declaratory suit for rights ... A 14 N 2

Lease

- Assignment of—Whether contains implied indemnity contract on
part of assignee to indemnify assignor in respect of covenants in
lease ... A 63 N 8
- Assignor of — Suit by, against assignee on implied promise on
part of assignee to indemnify assignor in respect of covenants in
lease—Limitation—Starting point ... A 63 N 8
- By usufructuary mortgagee—Rights of parties ... A 110 N 8
- Contract of—When held as registered within Art. 116 ... A 110 N 5
- Covenant for quiet possession—Lessee not put in possession—
Covenant for quiet possession, if can be availed of by lessee ... S 23 N 7
- Failure of lessee to plant certain trees within the time fixed in the
contract, whether a continuing breach of the contract ... S 23 N 11
- Lessee — Suit against, by lessor to restrain lessee from inter-
fering with lessor's right under covenant in lease to enter upon
land demised and to cut and take away trees—Limitation ... A 120 N 10
- Lessor—Whether claimant of lessee ... A 47 N 4
- Lessor's failure to deliver possession at commencement of term—
Whether a continuing breach of covenant for quiet possession ... S 23 N 7
- Of immovable property—By revenue authorities for arrears of
Government revenue—Setting aside — Suit for, against Govern-
ment—Limitation ... A 15
- Of jaghir—Expiry of lease—Lessee collecting rents after expiry—
Suit by lessor to recover from lessee amounts so collected—Limi-
tation ... A 62 N 31
- Permanent lease—Whether transferred within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 1
- Perpetual lease—Whether alienation ... A 125 N 13
- Registered lease deed
 - (a) Rent due under—Suit for—Limitation ... A 116 N 8
 - (b) Suit on—Limitation—Applicability of Art. 116 and Art. 110 ... A 116 N 1
- Void lease—Possession under—Nature of ... A 139 N 18
- Whether transfer for valuable consideration ... A 134-ABC N 7
- Whether transferable interest ... A 139 N 4b

Lease—(Contd.)

- Zarpeshgi lease—Lease deed registered—Rent duo under—Suit for
 —Limitation A 116 N 8

Legacy

- And share in residue bequeathed—Distinguished, under English law A 123 N 9
- Charged on property—Suit to enforce charge—Limitation ... A 123 N 9
- Meaning of A 123 N 9
- Refund of—Suit for—Under Indian Succession Act, S 360 or S. 361—Limitation A 43, A 43 N 2
- Right to sue for, accruing during minority—Period within which suit should be brought S 8 Illus 1
- Suit for
- (a) Against administrator—Limitation A 123 N 2
 - (b) Against executor—Limitation A 123 N 2
 - (c) Against executor de son tort—Limitation A 123 N 2
 - (d) Against person to whom property has been bequeathed with direction to pay certain legacy—Limitation A 123 N 2
 - (e) By heir against person in possession who has taken out letters of administration—Limitation A 123 N 6
 - (f) By heir against person in wrongful possession—Limitation: A 123 N 6
 - (g) By legatee against debtor for debt duo to testator given as legacy—Whether one for legacy A 123 N 9
 - (h) For annuity granted by testator—Limitation A 123 N 9
- estate A 123 N 9
- estate of A 123 N 3
- A 123 N 9
- deceased person A 123 N 8
- (m) Limitation—Starting point A 62 N 16, A 123, A 123 N 11
- (n) Mere direction by testator that executor shall have powers of management during minority of legatee, whether postpones starting point A 123 N 11
- (o) Part payment of legacy by person liable to pay legacy, whether gives fresh period of limitation A 123 N 12
- (p) Payment of interest as such on legacy by person liable to pay legacy, whether starts fresh period of limitation A 123 N 12
- (q) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act A 123 N 13
- (r) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act, in case of minor heir of deceased person who dies without claiming his share in estate A 123 N 13
- (s) "When legacy becomes payable"—Legacy, when becomes payable A 123 N 11
- (t) When legacy is payable annually A 123 N 11
- (u) Whether must be against some person legally charged with duty of paying legacy for applicability of Art. 123 A 123 N 2
- To minor—When deliverable A 123 N 13
- What is—Residuary share in property bequeathed, whether legacy: A 123 N 9
- When becomes payable A 123 N 11

Legal disability

- See also Minority, Infancy, Idiocy.

Legal disability—(Contd.)

- Absence of person capable of suing — Distinction between cases where plaintiff is under legal disability and cases where there is no person capable of suing ... S 6 N 3
- Cessation of—Extension after—Date on which disability ceases, if to be excluded ... S 6 N 31
- Cessation of —Extension of time after—Limit of ... S 6 N 31
- Collection of individuals—Time when last of the persons under disability ceasing to be so—Whether time when disability of persons entitled to sue comes to end ... S 6 N 7
- Competency to sue at commencement of limitation — Reversioner under Punjab Customary Law not competent to sue at the time of commencement of limitation — Extension of time on ground of disability, if available ... S 6 N 18
- Death of person under
 - (a) Death after cessation of disability but before expiry of extended period — Legal representative, if gets fresh start of limitation from death of his predecessor ... S 6 N 42
 - (b) Death before cessation of disability — Legal representative, when gets fresh start of limitation ... S 6 N 42
- Disability and inability—Distinction between ... S 9 N 4
- Disability arising after limitation has begun to run — Disability existing at time from which fresh period of limitation is to be computed under S. 19—Extension of period of limitation ... S 9 N 3
- Disability at time of accrual of right — Reversioner succeeding to estate after Hindu widow—Disability at time of so succeeding — Extension of time, if available ... S 6 N 19
- Disability of one of several plaintiffs or applicants
 - (a) All persons jointly entitled to sue under disability — Extension of time, if available ... S 7 N 3
 - (b) Capacity to give discharge on behalf of all
 - (i) One joint administrator, if can give discharge on behalf of all ... S 7 N 25
 - (ii) One joint trustee, if can give discharge on behalf of all: ... S 7 N 25
 - (iii) One of several executors, if can give discharge on behalf of all ... S 7 N 26
 - S 7 N 24
 - S 7 N 27
 - (c) Capacity to give discharge on behalf of all within S. 7
 - (i) Persons aggrieved by the same tortious act—One of them, if can give discharge on behalf of all ... S 7 N 23
 - (ii) Whether one co-mortgagee can give discharge on behalf of all ... S 7 N 22
 - (iii) Whether one joint creditor can give discharge on behalf of all ... S 7 N 22
 - (iv) Whether one of several co-heirs can give discharge on behalf of all ... S 7 N 21
 - (d) Co-heirs, whether persons jointly entitled to sue within S. 7 ... S 7 N 23
 - (e) Dayabhaga family, members of—Limitation, when begins to run against all—One member, if can give discharge in regard to causes of action accruing in favour of members of the family ... S 7 N 20

Legal disability—Disability of one of several plaintiffs or applicants—(Contd.)	
(f) Disability, if should exist at the time from which limitation is to be reckoned	S 7 N 7
... -holders—Effect of ...	S 7 N 6
... mt his concurrence—	S 7
(i) Discharge not capable of being given without his concurrence	S 7 N 1
...	S 7
(j) ...	S 7 N 23
... ies	S 7 N 22
... ies	S 7 N 22
(l) Extension of time on ground of—Test to determine if extension available	S 7 N 2
(m) "Is under any disability" in S 7—Meaning of...	S 7 N 7
(n) Joint creditors, whether persons jointly entitled to sue within S. 7	S 7 N 22
(o) Joint trustees, if jointly entitled to sue within the meaning of S 7	S 7 N 25
(p) Jointly entitled	
(i) Matter giving separate rights to persons to sue for the same relief—Persons, if jointly entitled	S 7 N 4
(ii) Meaning of	S 7 N 4
(iii) Substantive right of the parties, if should be joint for extension of time	S 7 N 4
(q) Lu ...	per.
...	S 7 N 8
(a) Competency of one joint decree-holder to give discharge on behalf of all—Effect of	S 7 N 15
(b) 'Give discharge,' meaning of	S 7 N 9
(c) Such discharge, when can be given	S 7 N 10
(ii) Discharge not capable of being given without concurrence of person under disability—One of several plaintiffs under disability—Effect of	S 7 N 14
(iii) 'Give discharge,' meaning of...	S 7 N 17
(iv) Guardian, joint decree-holder with minor—Capacity to give discharge	S 7 N 15
(v) Kainavan and adult male members of tarwad, if can give discharge in respect of causes of action accruing in favour of the whole tarwad	S 7 N 21
(vi) Mahomedan co-heirs—Decree passed jointly in favour of all co-heirs—One, if can give discharge on behalf of all	S 7 N 15
(r) Limitation, when ...	S 7 N 11
no such discha	S 7 N 11
(s) More than one	
—Extension of time, if available	S 7 N 3
(t) Partners, whether persons jointly entitled to sue within S. 7:	S 7 N 24
(u) Persons aggrieved by the same tortious act—Whether persons jointly entitled to sue within S. 7	S 7 N 28
(v) Provisions as to—Applicability to applications for execution:	S 7 N 5

Legal disability—Disability of one of several plaintiffs or applicants—(Contd.)

(w) Provisions as to

- (i) Applicability to cases in which substantive right is not joint but cause of action is joint

S 7 N 4

S 7 N 4

S 7 N 4

position of tenants-in-

common

S 7 N 4

- (x) Right to sue vested jointly in minor and adult—Capacity to give discharge—Adult, if can give discharge without concurrence of minor's guardian

S 7 N 29

- (y) Suit by Hindu reversioner challenging alienation by widow—Limitation, when begins to run

S 7 N 21a

- (z) Suit by Hindu reversioners challenging alienation or adoption by widow

S 6 N 17

- (z¹) Suit by wards constituting members of Hindu joint family to set aside alienation by guardian—Limitation

S 7 N 19

- (z²) Suit to set aside collateral's alienation by reversioner under Punjab Customary Law—Limitation, when begins to run

S 7 N 21b

- (z³) Tenants-in-common—Suit by, for mesne profits—Tenants-in-common, whether persons jointly entitled to sue for possession within S. 7

S 7 N 27

S 7 N 19

S 7 N 19

- (z⁴) "Time will not run" in S. 7—Meaning of

- (z⁵) When ground for extension of time

- Disability of plaintiff—Defendant's absence from British India—Whether disability or inability within S. 9

S 9 N 3, 4

- Disability or inability to sue in S. 9

- (a) Disability, if confined to minority, insanity and idiocy

S 9 N 4

- (b) Inability to sue, if includes cases where the inability refers to an application

S 9 N 4

S 9 N 4

- (c) Meaning of

- (d) Plaintiff, alien, being prevented from suing on account of outbreak of war between his mother country and Great Britain—Whether disability within S. 9

S 9 N 4

- Disability subsequently supervening—Whether stops running of limitation

S 9 N 3

- Disability to sue or apply arising from circumstances other than order of Court—Whether amounts to stay by injunction or order within S. 15

S 15 N 6

- Disability to sue or apply arising from existence of agreement between parties that suit or execution should not be instituted or proceeded with—Whether amounts to stay by injunction or order within S. 15

S 15 N 7

S 6 Cl 2

- Double or successive disabilities—Effect of

- Effect of, on limitation—Whether proceeding must be filed within three years of cessation of disability in all cases

S 8 N 4

S 6 N 29

- Evidence as to

S 6 N 6

- make an application

S 6 N 8

in S. 6—Meaning of

- Extension of time

S 6 N 2

- (a) Conditions under which extension can be given

S 6 N 1

- (b) Disability, when should exist

Legal disability—(Contd.)**—Extension of time on ground of**

- (a) Alienation of joint family property
 - (i) Pre-existing coparcener dying—After-born coparcener, if can sue within three years from date on which deceased would have attained majority if he had lived ... S 6 N 16 FN 5
 - (ii) Suit by coparcener who was minor at time of alienation ... S 6 N 16
 - (iii) Suit for possession against alienee by after-born coparcener ... S 6 N 16
- (b) Appeal—Extension, if available for ... S 6 N 13
- (c) Application for bringing on record legal representatives—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 13
- (d) Application for execution—Application for revival of previous execution proceeding struck off for non default of decree-holder—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 13 FN 2
- (e) Application for final decree in mortgage suit — Extension, if available ... S 6 N 13
- (f) Application for leave to appeal—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 13
- (g) Application for personal decree against mortgagor under O. 34, R. G, Civil P. C.—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 13
- ... Extension, if available ... S 6 N 13
- ... suit nr appeal dismissed for ... S 6 N 13
- (j) Application to file an award—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 13
- (k) Application to set aside ex parte decree — Extension, if available ... S 6 N 13
- (l) Cause of action same for person becoming entitled to sue—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 14
- (m) Extension when not available—Ordinary period of limitation itself continuing for three or more years from cessation of disability—Extension, if available ... S 8 N 4
- (n) Limitation — Maximum limit up to which time can be extended ... S 8, S 8 N 4
- (o) Nature of — If available to person deriving right to sue from person under disability ... S 6 N 32
- (p) Period extended, if "period prescribed" for suit or application. ... S 6 N 41
- (q) Period fixed by Court—If can be extended ... S 6 N 22
- (r) Period fixed by S. 48, Civil P. C.—If can be extended ... S 6 N 21
- (s) Person entitled not under disability but suit or application for benefit of one under disability—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 8
- (t) Person entitled to sue under disability — Suit for benefit of person not under disability—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 8
- (u) Persons entitled to — Person deriving right to sue from person under disability—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 32
- (v) Persons to whom extension available
 - (i) Limitation beginning to run against one—Another becoming entitled to sue on same cause of action—Disability of such person at time of his becoming so entitled—If ground for extension ... S 6 N 14
 - (ii) Persons should be entitled to sue nr apply for execution at commencement of limitation ... S 6 N 14

Legal disability—Extension of time on ground of—Persons to whom extension available—(Contd.)

- (iii) Person who becomes entitled to sue or apply subsequent to commencement of limitation ... S 6 N 14
- (w) Privilege, if confined to proceedings instituted after cessation of disability ... S 6 N 33
- (x) Proceedings for which extension available ... S 6 N 13
- (y) Provisions as to applicability to cases where one of several persons is under disability ... S 6 N 8
- (z) Suit by after-born member of Hindu joint family to set aside alienation of joint family property ... S 6 N 16
- (z¹) Suit by member of Hindu joint family challenging alienation of joint family property ... S 6 N 16
- (z²) Suit or proceeding for which limitation is prescribed by special or local law—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 20
- (z³) Whether applies to legal persons ... S 6 N 6
- (z⁴) Whether available to unincorporated collection of individuals: ... S 6 N 7
- (z⁵) Whether can be granted apart from statute on general principles of equity ... S 6 N 20
- Extension of time under
 - (a) Cause of action different—Distinct cause of action accruing to person entitled to sue—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 14
 - (b) Period of limitation prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code—Extension, if available ... S 6 N 20
- Fresh start of limitation in favour of person deriving right to sue from another—Disability, if ground for extension of time ... S 6 N 14
- Hindu idol—If a perpetual minor for purposes of limitation ... S 6 N 30
- Incapacity to sue—Distinction between ... S 6 N 3
- Insanity—Extension on ground of—Insanity of decree-holder after passing of decree—Right to extension of time ... S 6 N 15
- Kinds of ... S 6 N 9
- (a) Affording ground for extension—Married women, state of being ... S 6 N 23
- Legal representative, disability of
 - (a) Death of person originally entitled to sue after cessation of disability—Disability of legal representative at time of death—If ground for extending time in his favour ... S 6 N 44
 - (b) Death of person under disability before cessation of disability—Legal representative under disability at time of death—Whether entitled to compute limitation from cessation of his disability ... S 6 N 44
- Limitation, postponement of
 - (a) Person entering into possession in assertion of title hostile to that of person under disability—Limitation, if postponed till cessation of disability ... S 6 N 32
 - (b) Right to sue accruing to person under disability in respect of property—Transfer of property—Limitation against assignee, when commences ... S 6 N 33
- Meaning of ... S 6 N 3, 23, 24, 27, 29
- (a) Absence of defendant from British India, whether plaintiff's disability or inability to sue ... S 13 N 2
- (b) Distinction between legal disability and incapacity to sue ... S 6 N 3
- (c) Married women, if persons under disability ... S 6 N 1

Legal disability—Meaning of—(Contd.)

- (d) Person under legal disability—Whether person incapable of instituting a suit within S. 17 ... S 6 N 3
- Minority—Minority of Hindu reversioner, if ground for extending limitation for suit by him challenging alienation or adoption by widow ... S 6 N 17
- Minority, lunacy and idiocy, whether the only grounds on which time can be extended ... S 6 N 23
- Onus of proof as to ... S 6 N 29
- Person under
 - (a) Administrator, appointment of, to estate of—Effect ... S 6 N 3, 37
 - (b) Disability continuing up to death of person—Effect ... S 6, S 6 N 1
 - (c) Guardian, existence of—Effect—Extension of time, if not available ... S 6 N 35
 - (d) Limitation, running of, against—If prevented ... S 6 N 32
 - (e) Representative of ... S 6; S 6 N 1
 - (f) ... S 6, S 6 N 1
 - (i) Extension of limitation—Proceeding for which extension available ... S 6 N 1
 - (ii) Extension of limitation, when available—Point of time at which disability should exist ... S 6 N 1
 - (iii) Limitation ... S 6
 - (iv) Scope of provisions as to ... S 6 N 2
 - (v) Simultaneous disabilities, effect ... S 6 N 1
 - (vi) Successive disabilities, effect ... S 6 N 1
 - (g) Proceeding instituted by guardian during continuance of disability—Right to extension, if lost ... S 6 N 35
- Plaintiff under disability at time of acknowledgment—Whether entitled to benefit of S. 6 also ... S 19 N 37
- Pleadings
 - (a) Pleiot, if should show ground on which exemption is claimed ... S 6 N 29
 - (b) Reliance on saving provisions somehow apparent on face of plaint—Sufficiency of ... S 6 N 29
- Provisions as to
 - (a) Proceedings to which they apply
 - (i) Applicability to applications—Retrospective effect of S. 6 ... S 6 N 4
 - (ii) Extension of time on ground of—If applies to all applications ... S 6 N 4
 - (b) Whether apply to suits for pre-emption ... S 8, S 8 N 2, 3
- Right to sue accruing to estate of deceased person—Absence of person entitled to institute suit in respect of right to sue—Limitation, when begins to run ... S 6 N 3
- Several persons entitled to sue on a cause of action—One entitled to special privilege of extension on ground of disability—Effect on others ... S 6 N 16
- Subsequent disability—Whether stops limitation where once time has begun to run ... S 9
- Supervening disability
 - (a) Alienation by Hindu grandfather—Suit by grandson to set aside—Minority of grandson, if ground for extension of time ... S 6 N 15 F N 1

Legal disability—Supervening disability—(Contd.)

- (b) Disability, if should exist at the time from which period of limitation is to be reckoned ... S 6 N 15
- (c) Insanity of decree-holder after decree passed—Right to extension of time ... S 6 N 15
- (d) Reversioner—Limitation beginning to run against reversioner who subsequently becomes entitled to sue—Disability of, at the time of his becoming entitled to sue—Whether ground for extension of time ... S 6 N 17

Legal injury

- Act of defendant itself constituting legal injury—S. 24 does not apply ... S 24 N 1
- One person throwing sulphuric acid on the face of another—Latter losing his eyes after some time—Act of former constituting legal injury—S. 24 does not apply ... S 24 N 1
- S. 24 applies only where act of defendant does not of itself constitute a legal injury ... S 24 N 1

Legal practitioner

- Negligence of, when actionable ... A 90 N 2

Legal Practitioners Act

- S. 29—Promissory note unenforceable under—Suit on original cause of action—Promissory note, if can be used as acknowledgment ... S 10 N 64

Legal process

- What is ... A 29 N 4

Legal representative

- Addition as party of—Application for
- (a) One representative applying within time—Another, whether can be brought on record afterwards ... A 176 N 7
- (b) Two rival claimants seeking to be brought on record—Limitation—Starting point ... A 176 N 7
- Application by
- (a) For setting aside dismissal for default of deceased plaintiff's appearance—Limitation—Starting point ... A 163 N 4
- (b) To set aside *ex parte* decree against legal representative of defendant—Limitation ... A 161 N 4
- Application for substitution of—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 3
- Bringing on record of—Application for
- (a) Application to bring on record legal representative of deceased against whom decree of Privy Council is passed after death—Limitation ... A 181 N 13
- (b) Application to bring on record legal representatives of deceased person who was not defendant or respondent on date of death—Limitation ... A 181 N 13
- Cause of action accruing to estate of deceased person—Legal representative alien enemy—When becomes capable of instituting suit ... S 17 N 8
- Meaning of ... S 6 N 43; A 176 N 3; A 177 N 6
- Of deceased agent—Suit against
- (a) By principal for accounts due from deceased agent—Maintainability—Limitation ... A 89 N 10
- (b) For neglect or misconduct of agent—Maintainability. ... A 90 N 3

Legal representative—(Contd.)

—Of deceased appellant—Addition as party of—Application for

- (a) Absence of such application—Abatement of appeal—Legal representative, whether can apply to set aside abatement... A 176 N 6
- (b) Application after expiry of limitation—Whether can be treated as application for setting aside abatement ... A 176 N 6
- (c) Application for substitution in appeal against order in execution—Limitation ... A 176 N 2
- (d) Application for substitution not made in course of appeal—Limitation ... A 176 N 2
- (e) Application made in execution proceedings—Limitation ... A 176 N 2
- (f) Limitation—Starting point ... A 176, A 176 N 2, A 176 N 5
- (g) Onus of proof ... A 176 N 4
- (h) Provision for ... A 176 N 2
- (i) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Limitation Act... A 176 N 6
- (j) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act... A 176 N 6
- A 176 N 2
- 1 for default . A 176 N 2
- A 176 N 2
- (n) Where deceased is assessee in proceedings under Income-tax Act, S 66 (2)—Limitation ... A 176 N 2

—Of deceased defendant—Addition as party of—Application for

- (a) Absence of such application where defendant dies after preliminary but before final decree, whether causes abatement . A 177 N 5
- (b) Court, whether can extend time ... A 177 N 7
- (c) Failure of application—Abatement—Application to set aside—Court whether can extend time ... A 177 N 7
- (d) In appeal against orders in execution—Limitation ... A 177 N 4
- (e) In application for leave to appeal to Privy Council ... A 177 N 2
- (f) In application for leave to sue in *forma pauperis*—Limitation ... A 177 N 3
- A 177 N 8
- A 177, A 177 N 2
- whether can be treated as A 177 N 7
- one to set aside abatement ... A 177 N 7
- (j) One of joint representatives of deceased brought on record in time—Bringing other representatives on record after limitation—Whether barred ... A 177 N 7
- (k) Provision for ... A 177 N 2
- (l) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Limitation Act ... A 177 N 7
- (m) Time, whether can be extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act ... A 177 N 7
- (n) Where defendant dies after decree—Limitation ... A 177 N 3
- (o) Where defendant is dead before institution of suit but whose name appears as defendant in suit ... A 177 N 5
- Of deceased depository—Suit against, for moveable property deposited with deceased—Limitation ... A 145 N 5
- Of deceased judgment-debtor — See Judgment-debtor — Legal representative of
- Of deceased plaintiff—Addition as party of—Application for
- (a) Absence of application
- (i) Abatement of suit—Legal representative, whether can apply to set aside abatement ... A 176 N 6

Legal representative—Of deceased plaintiff, addition as party of, application for—Absence of application—(Contd.)

- (ii) Where plaintiff dies after preliminary but before final decree—Whether causes abatement ... A 177 N 5
- (b) Application after expiry of limitation—Whether can be setting aside abatement ... A 176 N 6
- ... A 176; A 176 N 2; A 176 N 5
- ... ngs—Limitation ... A 176 N 2
- (e) Not made in course of suit—Limitation ... A 176 N 2
- (f) One representative applying within time—Another if can be brought on record afterwards ... A 176 N 7
- (g) Onus of proof ... A 176 N 4
- (h) Provision for ... A 176 N 2
- (i) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Limitation Act: A 176 N 6
- (j) Where deceased is an assessee in proceeding under Income-tax Act, S. 66, sub-s. 2—Limitation ... A 176 N 2
- (k) Where deceased is applicant for leave to appeal—Limitation: A 176 N 2
- (l) Where plaintiff dies after decree—Limitation ... A 176 N 2
- (m) Where there are two rival claimants seeking to be brought on record—Limitation—Starting point ... A 176 N 7
- Of deceased pawnee—Suit against, for moveable property pawned with deceased—Limitation ... A 145 N 5
- Of deceased principal—Suit by, against agent for accounts due to deceased—Limitation ... A 89 N 11
- Of deceased respondent—Addition as party of—Application for
 - (a) Court, whether can extend time ... A 177 N 7
 - (b) Failure of application—Abatement—Application to set aside abatement—Limitation—Court, whether can extend time
 - ... A 177 N 7
 - ... A 177 N 4
 - ... A 177 N 2
 - ... is—Limitation ... A 177 N 2
 - (f) In application under Companies Act for balance of contribution—Limitation ... A 177 N 2
 - (g) In execution proceedings—Limitation ... A 177 N 3
 - (h) In second appeal—Limitation ... A 177 N 2
 - (i) Limitation ... A 177; A 177 N 2
 - (j) Made after expiry of limitation—Whether can be treated as one to set aside abatement ... A 177 N 7
 - (k) One of joint representatives of deceased brought on record in time—Bringing other representatives on record after limitation—Whether barred ... A 177 N 7
 - (l) Provision for ... A 177 N 2
 - (m) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 5, Limitation Act: A 177 N 7
 - (n) Time, whether can be extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act ... A 177 N 7
 - (o) Where respondent is dead before institution of appeal but whose name appears as respondent in appeal ... A 177 N 2
- Proceedings by—Cause of action accruing to estate of deceased person—Limitation ... S 6 N 3
- Suit against, under Legal Representatives' Suits Act ... A 35
- (a) Limitation ... A 33 to 35 N 1
- (b) Provision of ...

Legal representative—(Contd.)**—Suit by**

- (a) Capacity to institute suit necessary for starting of limitation when cause of action accrues to estate of deceased person S 17 N 6
- (b) Capacity to sue or be sued on behalf of estate, meaning of S 17 N 6
- (c) S 17 N 6
- (ii) Limitation S 17
- (d) For wrong committed during lifetime of deceased person—Limitation A 20

—Whether can continue application to set aside *ex parte* decree made by deceased defendant A 164 N 4

—Who is—Transferee of property *inter vivos*, if legal representative S 6 N 43

Legal Representatives' Suits Act

—Section 1 and Succession Act, S. 306 compared A 20 N 1

—Suit under—Limitation A 20

Legatee

—Female as—Suit for estate of, by reversioner—Limitation A 141 N 10

—Suit by, for possession of property alienated by executor—Limitation A 91 N 12

Lessee

—Order against lessee—Whether binding on lessor A 47 N 4

—Repairs of tank by lessee for his benefit—Other lessee incidentally benefited—Suit for contribution—Limitation A 120 N 25

Lessor

—Profits received by—Suit for, by lessee dispossessed by lessor—Limitation A 109 N 7

—Suit by

(a) Against lessee for breach of contract for not paying portion of rent to superior landlord or creditor of lessor—Limitation A 115 N 3

(b) For value of trees cut down by lessee

(i) Breach of contract not to cut trees, whether essential for suit within Art. 108 A 108 N 1

(ii) Claim of landlord under Malabar Law that value of trees cut down by *kanom* tenant should be debited against tenant's claim for improvement A 108 N 1

(iii) Limitation—Starting point A 108, A 108 N 2

(iv) Suit by landlord for compensation for removal of trees cut where tenant is entitled to cut trees but not to remove them A 108 N 1

Letters of administration

—Grant of S 6 N 3

while administration con-

tinues S 9 N 5

(ii) Suit for recovery of debt—Running of time for suit, if suspended while administration continues S 9

(c) Whether determination of right of inheritance A 124 N 10

Letters Patent

- Clause 26—Certificate under, of Advocate-General—Limitation : A 162 N 2
- 'Judgment'—Order allowing appeal or application to be filed beyond time—If judgment ... S 5 N 41
- Rules framed by High Court under—Whether special laws ... S 29 N 6
- Whether constitutes special or local law ... S 29 N 6

Letters Patent Appeals

- Applicability of S. 12 ... S 12 N 5
- Delay in filing—Excuse of ... S 5 N 4

Libel

- Compensation for—Suit for
 - (a) Cause of action—In case of re-publication ... A 24 N 1
 - (b) Exclusion of plaintiff from civil rights—Limitation ... A 24 N 1
 - (c) In respect of allegation by defendant in written information laid before Magistrate that plaintiff is a woman of no character—Limitation ... A 24 N 1
 - (d) In respect of written statement to police containing imputation of having committed dacoity or other offences against plaintiff—Limitation ... A 24 N 1
 - (e) Limitation—Starting point ... A 24; A 24 N 1
 - (f) Several plaintiffs instituting suit within prescribed period—Subsequent amendment of plaint by striking out names of all plaintiffs except one—Whether renders suit time-barred: A 24 N 1
 - (g) Suit for defamation against police officer submitting report in compliance with order of Magistrate—Applicability of Art. 2 and Art. 24 ... A 24 N 1
 - (h) Suit, whether maintainable where there is no publication ... A 24 N 1

License

- Meaning of ... S 2 Cl 5 N 3

Licensee

- Profits received by, after period of license — Whether wrongfully received ... A 109 N 2a

Lien

- Against property—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 80 N 1
- Of Vendor
 - (a) Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 132 N 7
 - (b) Vendor leaving with vendee purchase money for payment of mortgage—Vendor, if has lien ... A 132 N 7

Life-estate

- Remainderman
 - (a) Cause of action accruing in lifetime of last full owner — Intervention of life-interest, if interrupts running of limitation ... S 9 N 10
 - (b) Suit by, for possession of estate—Remainderman, if gets fresh cause of action on termination of life-interest ... S 9 N 10

Limitation

- And defence—Limitation, whether bars defence ... A 166 N 19
- Bar of
 - (a) Court's power to relieve litigant from ... S 3 N 3

Limitation—Bar of—(Contd.)

- (b) Effect — Defence not barred — Plea of fraud not barred in defence, though suit for relief on ground of fraud may be time-barred A 95 N 18
- (c) Exemption from
- (i) Drawing out funds standing to credit of suit directed to be paid to a party, whether exempt from bar of limitation A 181 N 2 F N 4
- (ii) Suit against executor, whether and when exempt from bar of limitation A 123 N 8

—Cause of action

- (a) Accruing in favour of one person—Another thereafter becoming entitled to sue on same cause of action—Latter, if entitled to fresh period of limitation from the time he becomes so entitled S 9 N 10
- (b) Recurring cause of action—Suit against constructive trustee, based on breach of constructive trust — Every fresh breach S 10 N 28
- aspect of S 9 N 10
- by dif. S 9 N 9
- ferent periods of limitation S 9 N 9
- (c) When arises—Illustrations S 9 N 7, 8, 9

—Cause of action accruing to estate of deceased person

- (a) Administrator, suit by — Limitation cannot begin to run before grant of letters of administration S 17 N 8
- (b) "Capable of instituting a suit" in S 17 — Meaning of—Probate or succession certificate not capable of being obtained—Effect of S 17 N 8
- (c) Cause of action accruing before death of person — S. 17 will not apply S 17 N 4
- (d) Cause of action arising after coming into existence of legal representative—Limitation, if begins to run from time of coming into existence of legal representative S 17 N 6
- (e) Cause of action existing in favour of or against estate of deceased person as a result of death of such person—S 17, if applies S 17 N 4
- (f) Computation of period of limitation S 17
- (g) Death of creditor on day when debt becomes due — Starting point of limitation, if postponed S 17 N 5
- (h) Deceased person being Hindu, Mahomedan, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain or Indian Christian
- (i) Executor, if can institute suit before grant of probate S 17 N 8
- (ii) Fact that decree cannot be passed in suit for recovery of debt due to estate before grant of succession certificate—Whether bars institution of suit S 17 N 8
- (iii) Suit, if can be brought on behalf of or against estate before grant of letters of administration S 17 N 8
- (i) Executor—Suit by or against—Limitation, if postponed till probate is obtained S 17 N 8
- (j) Legal representative must be competent to sue on the particular cause which is in question S 17 N 8

Limitation—Cause of action accruing to estate of deceased person—(Contd.)

- (k) Letters of administration granted only to portion of estate—
Cause of action relating to such portion—Limitation will be
postponed till grant of letters of administration in respect
of it ... S 17 N 8
- (l) Limitation to be postponed till there is some one who can
sue or be sued on behalf of estate ... S 17 N 2
- (m) Pre-emption, suit for—Starting point, if postponed S 17; S 17 N 2
- (n) Provisions as to
- (i) Exceptions in regard to certain suits ... S 17
 - (ii) Principle of S. 17 ... S 17 N 2
 - (iii) Section 17 applies only to suits and applications ... S 17 N 2

- ... S 17 N 6
- ... pable of instituting ... S 17 N 8
- (p) Suit for possession of hereditary office — Starting point, if
postponed ... S 17; S 17 N 2
- (q) Suit for possession of immovable property—Starting point, if
postponed ... S 17; S 17 N 2

—Cause of action accruing to or against estate of deceased person—
Capacity to sue, meaning of ... S 17 N 8

- Computation of
- (a) Acknowledgment in respect of cause of action — Day of
acknowledgment to be excluded ... S 13 N 3
 - (b) Exclusion of date of judgment and time requisite for obtain-
ing copy of decree, etc. ... S 13 N 2
 - (c) Exclusion of time—What periods to be excluded ... Ss 12 to 16
 - (d) Exclusion of time of defendant's absence from British India: ... S 13
 - (e) Exclusion of time of proceeding *bona fide* in Court without
jurisdiction ... S 14
 - (f) Exclusion of time requisite for obtaining copies ... S 13
 - (g) Mode of—First day to be excluded ... S 13
 - (h) Period of notice of suit given in accordance with require-
ments of law to be excluded ... S 15

- ... to sue ... S 18 N 13
- ... S 6 N 13
- (i) Time to be computed from date of cause of action—Date on
which cause of action arises to be excluded ... S 13 N 3

- Defence of
- (a) Court, if bound to raise and decide *suo motu* ... S 3 N 3
 - (b) Non-setting up of—Effect ... S 3

- Doctrine of
- ... Preamble N 6
 - ... Preamble N 6
 - ... Preamble N 17

- Exceptions
- (a) Acknowledgment of liability in writing—Fresh period of
limitation to be computed from time when acknowledgment
signed ... S 19
 - (b) Burden of proof ... S 20 N 35
 - (c) Burden of proof of facts bringing case within exceptions ... S 18 N 7

Limitation—Exceptions—(Contd.)

- (d) Continuing breaches of contracts and continuing wrongs independent of contract—Fresh period begins to run at every moment of time during which breach or wrong continues. S 23
- (e) Exception should be construed liberally S 19 N 11
- (f) Indulgence shown to suitors—Court is bound to give full effect to language in which that indulgence is conceded . . . S 13 N 4
- (g) Payment of interest as such or of part payment of principal of debt or legacy S 20
- (h) Person having right to sue kept by fraud from knowledge of right S 18
- (i) Person seeking exception on ground of fraud must specifically state particulars thereof S 18 N 6
- (j) Plaintiff stating ground on which exemption from bar is claimed—Plaintiff, if can at the hearing rely on different ground of exemption S 19 N 77
- (k) Plaintiff's ignorance of his right to sue, whether postpones running of limitation S 18 N 4
- (l) Pleadings—Exception to be specifically pleaded S 14 N 30
- (m) Suits against express trustees and their representatives . . . S 10
- (n) Suit for possession by execution purchaser—Exclusion of time of pendency of proceedings to set aside execution sale: . . . S 16

—Exceptions to bar of

- (a) Classified S 6 N 2
- (b) General S 9 N 6
- (c) Illustrations S 9 N 6
- (d) Legal disability—See Legal disability.
- (e) On ground of fraud—Suit for relief on ground of fraud—Whether exception applies A 95 N 8
- (f) Pendency of litigation between two claimants to an estate—Whether sufficient cause for delay in institution of suit for enforcement of right on behalf of or against estate . . . S 9 N 1
- (g) Principle S 9 N 2

—Exemption from

- (a) Case falling within reason of recognized exceptions, if sufficient S 3 N 3
- (b) Declaratory suit, whether exempt from limitation . . . A 120 N 31
- (c) Equitable considerations or hardship, if ground for granting . . S 3 N 3
- (d) The Crown as such, if entitled to S 3 N 3

—Extension of

- (a) Grounds
- (i) Defendant bound by plea of acquiescence S 3 N 3
- (ii) S 3 N 3
- (iii) S 3 N 3
- (iv) S 3 N 3
- (v) Mere mistake on plaintiff's part as to date of cause of action, if ground S 3 N 3
- (vi) Plaintiff prevented from suing in time by some arrangement or negotiation, if ground S 3 N 3
- (vii) Time taken in obtaining permission of Government under S 86, Civil P. C., if ground S 3 N 3

Limitation—Extension of—(Contd.)

(b) Limitation, if can be extended by agreement of parties ...	S 15 N 7
—General	
(a) Admission of parties or counsel on point of limitation, if binding ...	S 3 N 21
(b) Agreement curtailing period of limitation provided in Act—Validity ...	S 3 N 24
(c) Agreement not to plead limitation—Validity ...	S 3 N 24
(d) Agreement to extend period of limitation—Validity ...	S 3 N 24
...	S 3 N 18
...	S 32; S 9 N 14
(g) Applicability of Act	
(i) Arbitration proceedings ...	S 3 N 27
(ii) Insolvency proceedings ...	S 3 N 30
(iii) Set-off and counter-claim ...	S 3 N 29
(h) Burden of proof — Plaintiff to prove suit instituted within time ...	S 3 N 38
(i) Cause of action	
(i) Accruing after starting point specified in Article—Effect ...	S 9 N 8
(ii) Fusion of interests of debtor and creditor—Effect of : ...	S 9 N 12
(iii) Where cause of action has not arisen limitation cannot begin to run ...	S 9 N 7
(j) Cause of action same, limitation same ...	S 2 Cl 8 N 1
(k) Concurrent remedies, limitation for ...	S 3 N 41
(l) Conversion of proceedings—Effect... ...	S 3 N 33a
(m) Court closed when limitation expires — Presentation on reopening day—Sufficiency ...	S 4
(o) Defence — Substantive right or in alternative that suit is barred, if can be pleaded ...	S 3 N 16
(o) Determination of Article	
(i) Facts found differing from those alleged—Limitation, how determined ...	S 3 N 8
(ii) How determined... ...	S 3 N 8
(iii) Nature of claim to be decided with reference to substance of claim ...	S 3 N 8
(p) Determination of period — Decree of Native State Court transferred to British Indian Court—Application for execution to latter Court—Limitation ...	S 3 N 8
(q) Duty of Court	
... limitation ...	S 3 N 16
... statement — ...	S 3 N 16
... dismissed : ...	S 3 N 9
... Court, if ...	S 3 N 16
... motu ...	S 3 N 16
(v) Question of limitation one of law — Court, if bound to raise it <i>suo motu</i> ...	S 3 N 16
(vi) Question of limitation raising issues of fact not arising from plaint—Failure of defendant to raise—Court, if should allow question to be raised ...	S 3 N 16

Limitation—General—Duty of Court—(Contd.)

- (vii) Suit barred—Limitation not set up as defence — Suit,
if to be dismissed ... S 3 N 10
- (viii) To dismiss time-barred proceedings ... S 3
- (r) Effect of bar
- (i) Limitation bars remedy but does not destroy right
... Preamble N 27; S 3 N 14
- (ii) Several debts owed — Payment, if can be adjusted
towards time-barred debt ... S 3 N 14
- (iii) Suit for recovery of debt barred — Debtor paying to
creditor—Amount, if can be claimed back ... S 3 N 14
- (iv) Suit to enforce right barred — Defence based on right,
if barred ... S 3 N 14
- (v) Time-barred debt, if valid consideration for transfer of
property ... S 3 N 14
- (vi) Time-barred debt of Hindu father—Son, if under
pious obligation to pay ... S 3 N 14
- (vii) Time-barred debt, undertaking to pay, if binding ... S 3 N 14
- (s) Estoppel—There can be no estoppel against statute ... S 3 N 25
- (t) Extension of time — Successful party should not be lightly
deprived of vested right ... S 5 N 7
- (u) Limitation does not bar defence ... S 3 N 15
- (v) Limitation which runs against one person affects those who
claim through him ... S 2 Cl 8 N 1
- (w) New plea as to, when can be raised... S 3 N 17
- (x) Plaint returned for re-presentation—Re-presentation, if only
continuation of suit—Limitation, if affected ... S 3 N 32
- (y) Plea of
- (i) Abandonment of—Effect ... S 3 N 17, 22
- (ii) Doctrine of res judicata, if applies ... S 3 N 19
- (iii) Waiver of—Effect ... S 3 N 23
- (z) Power of Court—S. 3, if fetters power of Court to allow suit
to be withdrawn ... S 3 N 9
- (z¹) Principle allowing presentation on re-opening day when
period expires on holiday—Whether alters or modifies length
of prescribed period ... S 4 N 7
- (z²) Repeal of statute—Effect of ... S 9 N 15
- (z³) Right barred under existing law—Subsequent coming into
force of enactment providing longer period of limitation for
similar cases—Barred right, if revives ... S 6 N 4
- (z⁴) Separate and independent period of limitation applies to each
distinct cause of action ... S 9 N 2
- Institution of suit, appeal or application after period proscribed by
First Schedule of Act—Effect ... S 3, S 3 N 1
- Law governing—*Lex fori* ... S 11 N 1
- Law of
- (a) Alteration during pendency of proceeding ... Preamble N 26
- (b) If affects substantive rights of parties ... Preamble N 3
- (c) If creates obligation to sue where none exists ... Preamble N 26
- (d) Reason and object of ... Preamble N 4
- Period prescribed
- (a) Meaning of expression ... S 14 N 9, S 15 N 3
- (b) Twelve years' period under Civil P. C., S. 48, whether period
prescribed within meaning of Limitation Act ... S 15 N 3; S 18 N 15

Limitation—(Contd.)

- Personal actions—Limitation bars only remedy and does not extinguish right itself S 28 N 1
 - Plea of
 - (a) Defendant succeeding on technical plea—Whether will be considered in passing order as to costs S 3 N 39
 - (b) If technical S 3 N 39
 - Residuary Article of, for suit for which no limitation is provided elsewhere in first schedule—Art. 120 A 120
 - Starting point
 - (a) Knowledge of facts giving rise to cause of action, whether necessary to start time running A 120 N 3
 - (b) Postponement of
 - (i) Cause of action accruing to estate of deceased person ... S 17 N 2
 - (ii) Payment of interest as such or part payment of principal—Fresh period to be computed from time of payment S 20
 - Statutes of—Retrospective effect S 6 N 4
 - Suit for dispossession—Right barred by limitation—Effect is extinction of owner's title in favour of party in possession ... S 28 N 1, 2
 - Suit for possession—Law of limitation is law of prescription ... S 28 N 1
 - Suit for possession of property—Bar of remedy extinguishes right : S 28 N 1
 - Suspension of
 - (a) Agreement to refer dispute to arbitration—Whether puts an end to cause of action S 9 N 13
 - (b) Cause of action satisfied or discharged
 - (i) Limitation, stopping of, in regard to such cause of action S 9 N 11
 - (ii) Nullified by subsequent events—Plaintiff entitled to fresh period in respect of such cause of action ... S 9 N 11
 - (c) Defendant absent from British India not at commencement of limitation but subsequently—Plaintiff, if entitled to the exclusion of time under S. 13 S 9 N 3
 - (d) Fraud of defendant committed after start of limitation—Delay due to such fraud—Whether running of time is interrupted S 18 N 2
 - (e) If can be suspended on ground of principles outside the Act : S 14 N 4
 - (f) Initial disability or inability to sue—Whether will prevent running of limitation S 9 N 3
 - (g) Limitation beginning to run—Subsequent disability, or inability to sue, if can stop running of time S 9
 - (h) Principles S 9 N 2
 - (i) Prosecution of proceeding *bona fide* in Court without jurisdiction—Limitation, if suspended during period of such proceeding S 14 N 4
- Limitation Act (9 of 1908)
- Amendments of Act of 1908 Preamble N 1 F N 6
 - Applicability
 - (a) Act applies only to institution of suits and has no application to defence set up by defendant A 12 N 3
 - (b) Application for execution of decree of Native Indian State in British Indian Court—Law applicable S 11 N 2
 - (c) Application not falling under any of the Articles Preamble N 31

Limitation Act—Applicability—(Contd.)

(d) Application to Collector in land acquisition matter	Preamble N 31
(e) Arbitrations	Preamble N 35
(f) Criminal proceedings	Preamble N 32
(g) <i>Damdapat</i> , rule of—If affected	Preamble N 33
(h) Extent and applicability of general provisions of the Act to periods prescribed by special or local laws	S 29 N 1
... ..	Preamble N 31
... ..	Preamble N 36

... .. not governed by	
Divorce Act—Act, if applies	S 29 N 7

(l) Suits instituted in British India on contracts entered into in a foreign country	S 11, S 11 N 1
(m) To appeals from decrees in suits under Divorce Act ...	S 29 N 7, A 151 N 2
(n) To suits under Divorce Act	S 29 N 7; A 151 N 2
... ..	A 154 N 1
... ..	A 28 N 1,
... ..	A 107 N 2, A 135 N 4

—Commencement of operation	S 1
-----------------------------------	-----

—'Consolidate and amend', meaning of	Preamble N 29
---------------------------------------------	---------------

—Extent of operation	S 1
-----------------------------	-----

—History of	Preamble N 2
--------------------	--------------

—If exhaustive	Preamble N 30
-----------------------	---------------

—Interpretation of	
--------------------	--

(a) Acts in <i>pari materia</i> , if can be considered	Preamble N 18
(b) Article applicable—Test to find	Preamble N 24
(c) Articles in Sch. 1 must be read subject to S. 23	S 23 N 1
(d) Articles, meaning of other Articles, if can be relied on	Preamble N 22
(e) Civil Procedure Code, if aid in construction	Preamble N 18
(f) Columns of Schedule to be read together	Preamble N 25
(g) Construction in favour of right to sue	Preamble N 21
(h) Exceptions to bar of limitation—Must be construed liberally	S 19 N 11
(i) Exceptions to statute—Mode of interpretation—Full effect to be given to exceptions	S 13 N 4

(j) Harmonious and consistent construction of provisions, necessity of	Preamble N 20
(k) More than one provision applicable—Effect of	Preamble N 24

(l) Repugnancy between a particular Article and S. 23—Article will not prevail	S 23 N 1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------

(m) Residuary Article, applicability of	Preamble N 23
------------------------------------------------	---------------

(n) Retrospective effect	
--------------------------	--

(i) Repeal of statute, effect of	S 9 N 15
-----------------------------------------	----------

(ii) Retrospective effect of S. 10, para. 2	S 10 N 25
----------------------------------------------------	-----------

(o) Retrospective operation	Preamble N 26
------------------------------------	---------------

(p) Sections, if control Articles	Preamble N 22
------------------------------------------	---------------

(q) Special Article and general Article—Which prevails	Preamble N 24
--------------------------------------------------------	---------------

(r) Technical terms, cognate or contemporary enactments, if can be referred to	Preamble N 19
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------

—Object of	
------------	--

(a) If creates or defines cause of action	S 3 N 2
--------------------------------------------------	---------

(b) If only interposes bar to enforce existing right	S 3 N 2
-------------------------------------------------------------	---------

—Operation of	
---------------	--

(a) Custom, if can override positive provisions of Act	S 26 N 21
---------------------------------------------------------------	-----------

Limitation Act—Operation of—(Contd.)

(b) If affects S. 25, Contract Act	S 29
(c) Postponement, object of	S 1 N 2
—Provisions of—Whether affected by Court-fees Act	A 173 N 6
—Repealed enactment			
(a) Prior Act keeping alive provisions of earlier Act repealed—			
Earlier Act, if kept in force	Preamble N 26
(b) Suit barred under	Preamble N 26
(c) Suit in time under—Shorter term under now Act	Preamble N 26
(d) Suit in time under old Act but barred by now Act which comes into force at once	Preamble N 26
(e) Suit in time under old Act but barred under now Act—New Act coming into force in future	Preamble N 26
—Retrospective effect	S 6 N 4
(a) Amending Act introducing shorter period	Preamble N 26
—Scope of	Preamble N 3

Liquidator

—Suit by—For money due in respect of unpaid calls—Limitation where case is not governed by Art. 112	...	A 120 N 30; A 112 N 2
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	-----------------------

Lis pendens

—Doctrine of—Whether applies to pre-emption suits	...	A 10 N 15
---------------------------------------------------	-----	-----------

Loans

—Advance of		
(a) And sale of goods—Account consisting of advances of loan on one side and sale of goods on the other—Balance due on such account—Suit for—Limitation	...	A 85 N 8
(b) Repayments in discharge of—Balance due on—Suit for—Limitation	...	A 85 N 4
—And agency—Account consisting of advances of loan on one side and agency on the other—Balance due on such account—Suit for—Limitation	...	A 85 N 5
—And deposit		
(a) Distinguished	...	A 60 N 2
(b) Presumption as to, in transaction between customer and banker	...	A 60 N 5
(c) Presumption as to, where question arises whether transaction is loan or deposit	...	A 60 N 5
—By each party to the other—Account consisting of—Balance due on—Suit on—Limitation	...	A 85 N 10
—Interest on, whether loan	...	A 59 N 4
—Necessary parties to	...	A 59 N 3
(a) Same person acting as agent to two principals and using money of one for benefit of another—Whether gives rise to loan	...	A 59 N 3
—Recovery of—Suit for, against debtor personally—Limitation	...	A 120 N 41; A 57 N 1

Local authority

—Suit by, for possession of road or street		
(a) Essentials of applicability of Art. 116A	...	A 116A N 2
(b) For possession of Crown lands entrusted to local authority for management—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit by local authority for possession of road...	...	A 116 N 1

Local authority—Suit by, for possession of road or street—(Contd.)

- (c) Limitation A 146A
- (d) Right of municipality, if extinguished by virtue of S. 28, if suit for possession is barred under Art. 146A ... A 146A N 6
- (e) Road, whether must be formed by local authority on lands belonging to or acquired by it in proprietary right for applicability of Art. 146A to such suit ... A 146A N 4
- (f) Suit by private person for ejecting another private person from field which has been recorded as part of thoroughfare and shamilat-i-deh—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit by local authority for possession of road... A 146A N 3

—What is — Local Government, whether local authority within Art. 146A A 146A N 3

Local Government

—Suit by—Limitation A 146A N 3

Lodging

—Price of—Suit for

- (a) Limitation—Starting point A 9, A 9 N 2
- (b) Suit for rent from tenant—Limitation A 9 N 1

Lunatic

—Acknowledgment or payment by guardian of insane person — Effect of S 21 N 4

Madras City Civil Court

—Decree or order of—Appeal from, to High Court—Limitation ... A 151 N 2

Madras Estates Land Act

—Suit for rent under

- (a) Limitation, A 110 N 5
- (b) Suit based on registered lease deed—Whether special period of limitation under Madras Estates Land Act overrides provisions of Limitation Act for suit for compensation for breach of registered contract A 116 N 8

—Section 179—Suit for declaration of plaintiff's right upon entry made in Record of Rights

- (a) Denial by defendant of plaintiff's title before date of entry to plaintiff's knowledge—Whether bars plaintiff's suit for declaration of right A 120 N 50
- (b) Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 50

Madras High Court Original Side Rules

—Rule 356—Power of Single Judge sitting in admission Court to excuse delay in filing appeal whether from Original Side or mofussil Court S 5 N 46

Mahomedan

—Suit by Mahomedan entitled to possession on death of Mahomedan female

- (a) Cause of action—When accrues A 141 N 2
- (b) Essentials of applicability of Art. 141 A 141 N 2
- (c) Limitation—Starting point A 141, A 141 N 2

—Suit for share of wife's property in possession of another sharer

- Limitation A 127 N 4

Limitation Act—Operation of—(Contd.)

(b) If affects S. 25, Contract Act	S 29
(c) Postponement, object of	S 1 N 2
—Provisions of—Whether affected by Court-fees Act	A 173 N 6
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(a) Prior Act keeping alive provisions of earlier Act repealed—				
Earlier Act, if kept in force	Preamble N 26
(b) Suit barred under	Preamble N 26
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(d) Suit in time under old Act but barred by new Act which comes into force at once	Preamble N 26
(e) Suit in time under old Act but barred under new Act—New Act coming into force in future	Preamble N 26
—Retrospective effect	S 6 N 4
(a) Amending Act introducing shorter period	Preamble N 26
—Scope of	Preamble N 3

Liquidator

—Suit by—For money due in respect of unpaid calls—Limitation where case is not governed by Art. 112	...	A 120 N 30; A 112 N 2
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—Doctrine of—Whether applies to pro-emption suits	...	A 10 N 15
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—Advance of		
(a) And sale of goods—Account consisting of advances of loan on one side and sale of goods on the other—Balance due on such account—Suit for—Limitation	...	A 85 N 8
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—By each party to the other—Account consisting of—Balance due on—Suit on—Limitation	...	A 85 N 10
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(a) Same person acting as agent to two principals and using money of one for benefit of another—Whether gives rise to loan	...	A 59 N 3
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(a) Essentials of applicability of Art. 116A	...	A 116A N 2
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Local authority—Suit by, for possession of road or street—(Contd.)

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—What is — Local Government, whether local authority within Art. 146A A 146A N 3

Local Government

—Suit by—Limitation A 146A N 3

Lodging

- Price of—Suit for
 (a) Limitation—Starting point A 9, A 9 N 2
 (b) Suit for rent from tenant—Limitation A 9 N 1

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 (b) Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 50

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 (b) Essentials of applicability of Art. 141 A 141 N 2
 (c) Limitation—Starting point A 141, A 141 N 2
 —Suit for share of wife's property in possession of another sharer
 —Limitation A 127 N 4

Mahomedan Law

—Co-heirs

- (a) Acknowledgment by one of the co-heirs—Whether saves limitation as against any other co-heir ... S 21 N 10
- (b) Decree passed jointly in favour of several co-heirs—One of them, if can give discharge in respect of decree on behalf of all ... S 7 N 15
- (c) Each co-heir, if bound to pay only a proportionate share of debt of the deceased ... S 21 N 10
- (d) Payment by one co-heir—Whether saves limitation against other heirs, under S. 20 ... S 21 N 10
- (e) Suit by one co-heir to recover debt due to estate of deceased — Other co-heir added after period of limitation—Whole suit, if becomes barred ... S 22 N 5
- (f) Whether joint contractors within the meaning of S. 21 ... S 21 N 10
- (g) Whether persons jointly entitled to sue within S. 7 ... S 7 N 23

—Dower—See Dower.

—Head of Mahomedan family—Whether can make acknowledgment or payment on behalf of whole family ... S 21 N 22

—Religious or charitable endowment — Property comprised in— Whether property vested in trust for specific purpose ... S 10

Maintenance

—Allowance charged on immovable property—Enforcement of— Suit for—Limitation ... A 122 N 8

—Arrears of—Suit for

- (a) By Hindu ... A 129
- (b) By Hindu widow—Limitation applicable ... A 122 N 8
- (c) Grant of arrears, whether matter within discretion of Court ... A 128 & 129 N 5
- (d) Limitation—Starting point ... A 128 & 129 N 3
- (e) When can be claimed ... A 128 & 129 N 6
- (f) Wrongful withholding of maintenance—Whether necessary for maintaining claim to arrears of maintenance ... A 128 & 129 N 5

—Right to

- (a) Suit by junior member of Malabar tarwad — Limitation applicable ... A 128 & 129 N 6
- (b) Suit for declaration by Hindu—Limitation ... A 129
- (c) Whether extinguished, if suit for maintenance is barred under Arts. 128 and 129 ... A 128 & 129 N 7

—Suit for

- (a) Burden of proof ... A 128 & 129 N 7
- (b) By Hindu—"By a Hindu"—Meaning of ... A 128 & 129 N 4
- (c) By Mahomedan—Limitation ... A 128 & 129 N 4
- (d) By member of Malabar tarwad—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for share in joint family property ... A 127 N 13
- (e) By stranger to family—Limitation ... A 128 & 129 N 4
- (f) Decree, whether can be passed for future maintenance ... A 128 & 129 N 6
- (g) Limitation—Starting point ... A 128 & 129 N 7
- (h) Maintenance allowance granted by testator—Limitation ... A 123 N 9
- (i) Maintenance made a charge on immovable property—Suit to enforce charge—Limitation ... A 128 & 129 N 2
- (j) Suit based on contract—Limitation ... A 128 & 129 N 2

Maintenance—(Contd.)

—Suit to enforce maintenance—Whether suit for possession within	
S. 28 	S 28 N 3

Malabar Law

— <i>Devassom</i> —Hereditary <i>samudayari</i> —Whether can acquire prescriptive title against <i>uralans</i> A 124 N 14 F N 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------

Kanom

- (a) Claim by landlord against kanomdar that value of trees cut down by latter should be debited against his claim for improvement—Whether claim for value of trees cut down within Art 108 ... A 108 N 1
- (b) Right of landlord under—Right to deduct arrears of rent from amount payable by landlord on redemption of *kanom*—Right, whether affected by limitation under Art. 110 ... A 110 N 8
- (c) Suit founded on kanom right—Suit based on *jenmi* right—Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14 ... S 14 N 18
- (d) Suit to recover property demised on *kanom*—*Jenmi*, if can deduct arrears of rent from *kanom* amount when suit would have been barred ... S 3 N 14 F N 11

— <i>Stani</i> —Suit by, for recovery of <i>Devassom</i> and its properties—Limitation 	A 124 N 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------

— <i>Stani</i> of Malabar <i>Devassom</i> —Devolution of right to sue:	S 2 Cl 8 N 6 F N 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------

Tarwad

- (a) Acknowledgment or payment by manager in respect of liabilities binding on tarwad—Whether binds whole tarwad ... S 21 N 21
- (b) Arrears of maintenance due and payable to junior member—Suit by auction-purchaser or assignee, under private treaty for such arrears—Limitation ... A 120 N 28
- (c) Different branches of—Suit between, for recovery of shares of one branch becoming extinct—Limitation ... A 123 N 4
- (d) *Karnavan*—Alienation by
 - (i) Suit by junior member for declaration that alienation is not binding on tarwad—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 36
 - (ii) Suit by member of tarwad for recovery of property alienated—Limitation A 91 N 8
 - (iii) Suit by member of tarwad to declare that alienation is not binding on him—Limitation A 91 N 8
 - (iv) Suit by minor for setting aside—Limitation A 44 N 5
- (e) *Karnavan* and adult male members—Capacity to give discharge in respect of causes of action accruing in favour of tarwad S 7 N 21
- (f) Money belonging to tarwad received by junior member—Suit by *karnavan* for recovery—Limitation A 63 N 31
- (g) Suit by member for maintenance or arrears thereof—Limitation A 127 N 13

Malfeasance

—Compensation for—*See under Compensation.*

—Meaning of 	A 36 N 1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------

Malicious prosecution

—And false imprisonment, distinction between 	A 19 N 1
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Malicious prosecution—(Contd.)**—Compensation for—Suit for**

- (a) Against joint tortfeasors—Suit barred against one, whether barred against all ... A 23 N 6
- (b) Against Municipality—Limitation—Applicability of Art. 2 and Art. 23 ... A 23 N 7
- (c) Against Municipality by person who was prosecuted by Municipality for alleged infringement of some provision of Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act—Limitation ... A 23 N 7
- (d) Against police officer—Limitation ... A 23 N 2
- (e) Damage which is the gist of such suit—Nature of ... A 23 N 1
- (f) Limitation ... A 23
 - (i) Starting point — "When prosecution is otherwise terminated"—Prosecution, when and how terminates in order to start time running ... A 23 N 7
 - (ii) Starting point, where case prosecuted is one in which plaintiff is acquitted ... A 23 N 3
 - (iii) Starting point, where order of discharge is set aside by District Magistrate under Criminal P. C., S. 437 but High Court in revision sets aside order of District Magistrate on ground that order of trial Court is really one of acquittal ... A 23 N 3
 - (iv) Starting point, where proceedings complained of terminated in acquittal of plaintiff ... A 23 N 1
 - (v) Starting point, where revision petition has been presented against acquittal of plaintiff in prosecution complained of ... A 23 N 3
- (g) Proof that proceedings complained of terminated in plaintiff's favour—Whether essential for maintainability of suit for malicious prosecution ... A 23 N 1
- (h) Suit for damages for malicious prosecution in case of laying of information before police—Maintainability ... A 23 N 4

- Meaning of ... A 19 N 1
- Whether actionable wrong ... A 23 N 1

Malkana**—Arrears of—Suit for**

- (a) Limitation ... A 132 N 20
- (b) Where plaintiff does not seek to enforce charge on land—Limitation ... A 115 N 5

- Meaning of ... A 132 N 20

- Right of—Whether immovable property within Art. 141 ... A 141 N 11

—Right to

- (a) Suit for declaration—Limitation ... A 120 N 39
- (b) Suit for declaration against rival claimant—Limitation ... A 131 N 4

Mamlatdars' Courts Act**—Order under, respecting possession of immovable property**

- (a) Jurisdiction to pass such order ... A 47 N 5
- (b) Order, when within Art. 47 ... A 47 N 6
- (c) Suit for recovery
 - (i) Art. 17, Limitation Act, and local or special law, applicability of ... A 47 N 8
 - (ii) By person bound by order—Limitation ... A 47

Namlatdars Courts Act—Order under, respecting possession of immovable property—Suit for recovery—(Contd.)

(iii) By person claiming under one bound by order—When maintainable	A 47 N 4
(iv) "Date of final order"—What is	A 47 N 9
(v) Defendant not party to suit in which order was passed—Effect of	A 47 N 3a
(vi) Essentially one in ejectment	A 47 N 1
(vii) Essentials of applicability of Art. 47	A 47 N 2
(viii) Limitation—Starting point	A 47 N 9
(ix) Person not bound by order, whether must bring such suit within limitation prescribed by Art 47	A 47 N 3
(x) Person's right to property, whether extinguished by his failure to sue within limitation under Art. 47 if his possession has not been disturbed by order	A 47 N 10
(xi) Person's right to property, whether extinguished by virtue of S. 28 by failure to bring such suit within three years under Art. 47	A 47 N 10
(xii) Plaintiff, when can bring such suit within Art 47	A 47 N 3
(xiii) Plaintiff, whether must have existing right to sue in ejectment on date of order for applicability of Art. 47	A 47 N 2
(xiv) Recovery of property—Meaning of	A 47 N 7
(xv) Such suit and suit under Specific Relief Act, S. 9, distinguished	A 47 N 2
(d) Suit for setting aside—Limitation	A 14 N 5
(e) When binding on a person	A 47 N 3

Marriage

—Dissolution of—Suit for

(a) Suit not governed by Indian Divorce Act—Limitation— Starting point	A 120 N 47
(b) Suit under Indian Divorce Act—Limitation Act, whether applies	A 120 N 47

Martial Law Ordinance

—	..	S 5 N 4
—	apply ..	S 29 N 5
—	..	S 29 N 3

Matrimony

—Matrimonial jurisdiction

(a) Whether included in original jurisdiction of Chartered High Courts	..	A 162 N 4
(b) Whether included in original jurisdiction of High Court	..	A 151 N 2

Maxims

— <i>Actio personalis moritur cum persona</i> (A personal right of action dies with the person)	S 9 C 18 N 2
— <i>Actus curiae neminem gravabit</i> (An act of the Court shall prejudice no man)	S 4 N 2, S 5 N 22, A 166 N 7, A 182 N 25
— <i>Certum est quod certum reddi potest</i> (That is certain which can be rendered certain)	A 113 N 7
— <i>Cessante ratione legis cessante lex</i> (The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself ceases)	S 12 N 7
— <i>Contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio</i> (Prescription does not run against a party under disability or who is unable to act)	A 141 N 2

Maxims—(Contd.)

- Expressum facit cessare tacitum* (What is expressed makes what is silent to cease) ... A 149 N 3
- Generalia specialibus non derogant* (General words do not derogate from special) ... S 14 N 8; S 29 N 3; A 2 N 3; A 61 N 2
- Ignorantia juris hand excusat* (Ignorance of law does not excuse): A 96 N 3
- Ignorantia legis neminem excusat* (Ignorance of law excuses no one) ... A 96 N 3
- Interest reipublica ut sit finis litium* (It concerns the State that there be an end to law suits) ... S 23 N 7
- Lex no cogit ad impossibilia* (The law forces not to impossibilities) ... S 4 N 2
- Nec vi nec clam nec precario* (Neither by force nor clandestinely nor by permission, i. e. peaceably, openly and as of right) ... S 26 N 3
- Nulleim tempus aut occurrit regi* (No time or place affects the King or the rights of the Crown) ... A 149 N 3
- Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus* (He who receives the advantage ought to suffer the burden) ... A 99 N 3
- Sic uteri tuo ut alienum non laedas* (Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another) ... S 2 Cl 5 N 1
- 'Tantum prescriptum quantum possessum'* ... A 142 & 144 N 53

Mesne profits

- Ascertainment of
- (a) Application for
- (i) Limitation ... A 181 N 17
- (ii) Not an application for execution ... A 183 N 14
- (b) Application for, after award of such profits — Limitation —
- Starting point ... A 109 N 11
- (c) Application for, in Madras High Court—Limitation ... A 181 N 17
- (d) Claim for ascertainment, whether limited to profits within three years before date of application ... A 109 N 11
- Claim for
- (a) Asked in suit for recovery of possession — How far maintainable ... A 109 N 10
- (b) Claim not put forth in suit for recovery of possession in first instance—Subsequent amendment by prayer—Effect of ... A 109 N 10
- Future mesne profits
- (a) Decree silent as to period for which it can be claimed—
- Claim for such profits after three years of decree — Applicant referred to fresh suit — Limitation applicable for such suit ... A 109 N 11
- (b) Period for which such profits can be granted ... A 109 N 11
- Suit for
- (a) Against person in wrongful possession of property — Order staying delivery of possession in court auction purchaser of same property purchased by him — Whether amounts to injunction preventing institution of suit ... S 16 N 6
- (b) Cause of action, if suspended by institution by plaintiff of a suit for possession ... S 9 N 11
- (c) Discharge—Manager of joint Hindu family—Capacity of, to give discharge ... S 7 N 16
- (d) For period between date of institution of suit and date of obtaining ejectment decree against defendant

Mesne profits—Suit for—(Contd.)

receiving no profits during such period — Claim for mesne profits, whether essentially one for damages for trespass upon immovable property

A 39 N 3

(e) Mesne profits wrongfully received by defendant—Limitation:

A 120 N 2

(f) Period during which prior suit by plaintiff for possession was pending—Whether can be excluded in computing period of limitation

S 9 N 6

(g) Profits *pendente lite* and also future mesne profits from date of decree up to delivery of possession not granted by Court—Subsequent suit for such profits, if barred — Limitation :

A 109 N 10

(h) Purchaser at execution sale put in possession — Sale set aside on ground of fraud—Suit by judgment-debtor against purchaser for mesne profits—Article applicable for suit ...

S 9 N 8

—Suit for possession decreed, — Subsequent suit for mesne profits as profits by way for restitution is

S 14 N 20

Minor

—Acknowledgment by minor—Whether available against him ...

S 19 N 69

—Acknowledgment or payment by *de facto* guardian of minor who is not his legal guardian—Whether binding on minor under S. 21:

S 21 N 3

—Acknowledgment or payment by guardian after ward's death—Whether binding on ward's estate

S 21 N 3

—Acknowledgment or payment by guardian of minor on his behalf—Whether binding on minor

S 21 N 3

—Acknowledgment or payment by guardian of minor — Whether effective irrespective of the question of its being for minor's benefit

S 21 N 3

—Acknowledgment or payment by lawful guardian — Natural guardian of minor, if lawful guardian

S 21 N 3

—Age of majority

(a) Capacity to act in matters of marriage, dower, divorce and adoption—Majority, when attained

S 6 N 24

(b) Guardian appointed for person or property of minor or Court of Wards assuming superintendence over his property—Age of majority, when attained

S 6 N 24

(c) When attained

S 6 N 24

—Alienation by minor as major

(a) Suit for possession of property alienated after attaining majority—Limitation

A 91 N 15

(b) Whether binding against minor

A 91 N 15

—Alienation of minor's property by guardian—Failure to sue to set aside alienation within time prescribed—Whether extinguishes his right to the property

S 28 N 3

—Appeal by or against—When preferred

S 3 N 6

—Assignee from—Whether can claim extension of time on ground of disability of assignor

S 6 N 40

—Certificate of guardianship granted to two persons jointly—Acknowledgment by one of them alone—Whether and when binding on minor

S 21 N 3

Maxims—(Contd.)

- Expressum facit cessare tacitum* (What is expressed makes what is silent to cease) ... A 149 N 3
- Generalia specialibus non derogant* (General words do not derogate from special) ... S 14 N 8, S 29 N 3; A 2 N 3; A 61 N 2
- Ignorantia juris hand excusat* (Ignorance of law does not excuse): A 96 N 3
- Ignorantia legis neminem excusat* (Ignorance of law excuses no one) ... A 96 N 3
- Interest republicæ ut sit finis litium* (It concerns the State that there be an end to law suits) ... S 23 N 7
- Lex no cogit ad impossibilia* (The law forces not to impossibilities) ... S 4 N 2
- Nec vi nec clam nec precario* (Neither by force nor clandestinely nor by permission, i. e. peaceably, openly and as of right) ... S 26 N 3
- Nulleim tempus aut occurrit regi* (No time or place affects the King or the rights of the Crown) ... A 149 N 3
- Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus* (He who receives the advantage ought to suffer the burden) ... A 99 N 3
- Sic uteris tuo ut alienum non laedas* (Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another) ... S 2 Cl 5 N 1
- Tantum prescriptum quantum possessum* ... A 142 & 144 N 53

Mesne profits

- Ascertainment of
- (a) Application for
- (i) Limitation ... A 181 N 17
- (ii) Not an application for execution ... A 182 N 14
- (b) Application for, after award of such profits — Limitation — Starting point ... A 109 N 11
- (c) Application for, in Madras High Court—Limitation ... A 181 N 17
- (d) Claim for ascertainment, whether limited to profits within three years before date of application ... A 109 N 11
- Claim for
- (a) Asked in suit for recovery of possession — How far maintainable ... A 109 N 10
- (b) Claim not put forth in suit for recovery of possession in first instance—Subsequent amendment by prayer—Effect of ... A 109 N 10
- Future mesne profits
- (a) Decree silent as to period for which it can be claimed—Claim for such profits after three years of decree — Applicant referred to fresh suit — Limitation applicable for such suit ... A 109 N 11
- (b) Period for which such profits can be granted ... A 109 N 11
- Suit for
- (a) Against person in wrongful possession of property — Order staying delivery of possession to court auction purchaser of same property purchased by him — Whether amounts to injunction preventing institution of suit ... S 15 N 6
- (b) Cause of action, if suspended by institution by plaintiff of a suit for possession ... S 9 N 11
- (c) Discharge—Manager of joint Hindu family—Capacity of, to give discharge ... S 7 N 16
- (d) For period between date of institution of suit and date of obtaining ejectment decree against defendant — Defendant

Minor—(Contd.)

- Right to sue vested jointly in minor and adult—Guardian for minor appointed by Court—Adult, if can give discharge without concurrence of guardian S 7 N 29
- Suit against—Minor wrongly described as major and impleaded as defendant—Subsequent discovery of mistake and appointment of guardian—Minor is a party from the very beginning notwithstanding the defect of non-representation S 22 N 8
- Suit by
- (a) After attaining majority, for profits of immovable property received by defendant—Limitation—S. 6, Limitation Act, whether applies A 109 N 9
 - (b) Against guardian for specific sums received by guardian during plaintiff's minority—Limitation A 120 N 2
 - (c) For Limitation A 110 N 13
 - (i) Where special enactment prescribes special period of limitation A 110 N 13
 - (d) For impeaching alienation by limited female owner—Right of minor to bring such suit under Punjab Customary Law where major reversioners omit to sue within period of limitation A 125 N 7
 - (e) For legacy—Limitation—Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act A 123 N 13
 - (f) For setting aside sale of equity of redemption by guardian and for possession of property redeemed by purchaser of equity of redemption—Limitation A 134 N 11
 - (g) For share in joint family property—Limitation—Starting point A 127 N 16
 - (h) For share of property of intestate—Limitation—Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act A 123 N 13
 - (i) Heir dying without claiming his share—Suit by minor heir of such heir—Limitation—Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act A 123 N 13
 - (j) Minor suing as major by *bona fide* mistake
 - (i) Application for amendment of mistake—Whether can be allowed when made beyond time S 22 N 8
 - (ii) Minor attaining majority—Whether can be allowed to continue suit S 22 N 8
- Who is S 6 N 24
- Minority
- Effect of—Minority, if negatives knowledge S 6 N 26
- Extension of time on ground of
- (a) Cause of action different—Hindu widow succeeded by minor reversioner—Suit for possession—Extension, if available S 6 N 14
 - (b) Cause of action same—Father dying without suing—Minor son, if entitled to extension of time S 6 N 14
 - (c) Time for application for leave to appeal as pauper, whether extended on ground of minority A 170 N 5
- Period from which disability counts—Child in womb S 6 N 25

Money—Charged upon immovable property—Suit for payment of—(Contd.)

- | | | | | |
|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|------------|
| (vi) | Art. 132 and special or local law for such suits, applicability of | ... | ... | A 132 N 2 |
| (vii) | By Hindu widow for arrears of maintenance | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| (viii) | By principal to enforce charge on immovable property created to secure moneys which might be found due | ... | ... | A 132 N 3 |
| | .. | ... | ... | A 132 N 4 |
| | —Effect of | ... | ... | A 132 N 26 |
| | 132 ... | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| | y sued for becomes | ... | ... | A 132 N 23 |
| (xiii) | Limitation | ... | ... | |
| | (a) Mortgagee, whether gets fresh cause of action where conveyance of portion of mortgaged property in discharge of claim under mortgage turns out to be inoperative | ... | ... | A 132 N 25 |
| | (b) Starting point—Where mortgage is for term certain with default clause | ... | ... | A 132 N 24 |
| | (c) Time, whether suspended by mortgaged property becoming submerged under water | ... | ... | A 132 N 25 |
| (xiv) | Suit comprising both claim to enforce charge upon immovable property and claim to enforce personal covenant in mortgaged document—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 2 |
| (xv) | Suit for payment of interest charged upon mortgaged property—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 12 |
| (xvi) | Suit to enforce payment of money charged by document on immovable property—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| (xvii) | Suit to enforce vendor's lien—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 7 |
| (xviii) | Suit to recover <i>kattubadi</i> —Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| (xix) | Suit to recover money due on mortgage by deposit of title deeds—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 22 |
| (xx) | Subsequent suit against person interested not made party to prior mortgage suit—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 16 |
| (xxi) | What is | | | |
| | (a) Suit by Hindu widow for recovery of money which she expended in discharge of her husband's debt | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| | (b) Suit by mortgagee against third person who has received money due to mortgagee from mortgagor | ... | ... | A 132 N 11 |
| | (c) Suit by one co-sharer in <i>vatan</i> against another co-sharer who has received improperly plaintiff's share of <i>haqq</i> s | ... | ... | A 132 N 20 |
| | (d) Suit by vendee of property for recovery of moneys paid by him as per directions in sale deed on such sale deed being set aside | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| | (e) Suit for foreclosure—Suit, whether one to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property | ... | ... | A 132 N 3 |
| | (f) Suit for money paid by trustee out of his own pocket for purposes of trust | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |

Money—Charged upon Immovable property—Suit for payment of— What is— (Contd.)

(g) Suit for redemption—Whether one to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property A 132 N 3

(h) Suit for sale—Whether one to enforce payment charged upon immovable property A 132 N 3

(i) Suit for share of mortgage money received by co-owner of property who has mortgaged the same and received the mortgage money A 132 N 8

—Collected by defendant as subscription A 62 N 7

—Deposited

(a) Deposit, whether must be under agreement that it shall be payable on demand for applicability of Art. 60 A 60 N 7

(b) On terms that depositor should return equivalent sum to depositor—Limitation A 62 N 17

(c) Suit for

(i) Against person who has placed himself in position of banker with regard to particular person—Limitation : A 60 N 6

(ii) Limitation—Starting point A 60 N 10

(iii) Limitation, where money is deposited under agreement that it shall be payable on demand A 60

(iv) Money deposited as earnest money for purchase of property—Limitation A 60 N 7

(v) Money deposited as security for due performance of certain act—Limitation A 60 N 7

(vi) Money deposited in Court in *usum jus habentis* and withdrawn by person not entitled to it—Suit for such money—Limitation A 62 N 31 F N 1

(vii) Money deposited on terms that depositor should return equivalent sum to depositor—Limitation A 62 N 17

(viii) Money deposited with Nattukottai Chetties on *thavanas* system—Limitation A 60 N 7

(ix) Money kept in deposit with a particular person — Limitation A 62 N 31

(x) Money payable at specified time but contract between parties showing that after period so fixed, deposit is to be regarded as payable on demand—Limitation A 60 N 7

(xi) Scope of Art. 60 A 60 N 6

(xii) When demand is made

(a) "Demand" by Nattukottai Chetty husband in whose name wife's Stridhan is deposited in a firm, whether demand binding on wife so as to start time running A 60 N 9

(b) "Demand" by whom should be made, to start time running A 60 N 9

(c) 'Demand' what is, to start time running under Art. 60 A 60 N 8

(xiii) With banker—Suit for—Limitation A 60 N 3

—Due under statutory liability—Suit for—Limitation A 120 N 43

—Government securities, whether money, within Art. 57 A 57 N 6

—Grain, whether money A 57 N 6

Money—Charged upon immovable property—Suit for payment of—(Contd.)

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|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|------------|
| (vi) | Art. 132 and special or local law for such suits, applicability of | ... | ... | A 132 N 2 |
| (vii) | By Hindu widow for arrears of maintenance | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| (viii) | By principal to enforce charge on immovable property created to secure moneys which might be found due from agent on taking accounts | ... | ... | A 132 N 3 |
| | | ... | ... | A 132 N 4 |
| | | ... | ... | A 132 N 26 |
| | | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| | due" | ... | becomes | A 132 N 23 |
| (xiii) | Limitation | | | |
| | (a) Mortgagee, whether gets fresh cause of action where conveyance of portion of mortgaged property in discharge of claim under mortgage turns out to be inoperative | ... | ... | A 132 N 25 |
| | (b) Starting point—Where mortgage is for term certain with default clause | ... | ... | A 132 N 24 |
| | (c) Time, whether suspended by mortgaged property becoming submerged under water | ... | ... | A 132 N 25 |
| (xiv) | Suit comprising both claim to enforce charge upon immovable property and claim to enforce personal covenant in mortgaged document—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 2 |
| (xv) | Suit for payment of interest charged upon mortgaged property—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 19 |
| (xvi) | Suit to enforce payment of money charged by document on immovable property—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| (xvii) | Suit to enforce vendor's lien—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 7 |
| (xviii) | Suit to recover <i>kattubadi</i> —Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| (xix) | Suit to recover money due on mortgage by deposit of title deeds—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 22 |
| (xx) | Subsequent suit against person interested not made party to prior mortgage suit—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 16 |
| (xxi) | What is | | | |
| | (a) Suit by Hindu widow for recovery of money which she expended in discharge of her husband's debt | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| | (b) Suit by mortgagee against third person who has received money due to mortgagee from mortgagor | ... | ... | A 132 N 11 |
| | (c) Suit by one co-sharer in vatan against another co-sharer who has received improperly plaintiff's share of <i>haqq</i> s | ... | ... | A 132 N 20 |
| | (d) Suit by vendee of property for recovery of moneys paid by him as per directions in sale deed on such sale deed being set aside | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |
| | (e) Suit for foreclosure—Suit, whether one to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property | ... | ... | A 132 N 3 |
| | (f) Suit for money paid by trustee out of his own pocket for purposes of trust | ... | ... | A 132 N 8 |

Money—Charged upon immovable property—Suit for payment of— What is—
(Contd.)

- (g) Suit for redemption—Whether one to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property A 132 N 3
- (h) Suit for sale—Whether one to enforce payment charged upon immovable property ... A 132 N 3
- (i) Suit for share of mortgage money received by co-owner of property who has mortgaged the same and received the mortgage money ... A 132 N 8

—Collected by defendant as subscription A 62 N 7

—Deposited

- (a) Deposit, whether must be under agreement that it shall be payable on demand for applicability of Art. 60 ... A 60 N 7
- (b) On terms that depositor should return equivalent sum to depositor—Limitation A 62 N 17
- (c) Suit for
- (i) Against person who has placed himself in position of banker with regard to particular person—Limitation : A 60 N 6
- (ii) Limitation—Starting point A 60 N 10
- (iii) Limitation, where money is deposited under agreement that it shall be payable on demand A 60
- (iv) Money deposited as earnest money for purchase of property—Limitation A 60 N 7
- (v) Money deposited as security for due performance of certain act—Limitation A 60 N 7
- (vi) Money deposited in Court in *usum jus habentis* and withdrawn by person not entitled to it—Suit for such money—Limitation A 62 N 31 FN 1
- (vii) Money deposited on terms that depositor should return equivalent sum to depositor—Limitation .. A 62 N 17
- (viii) Money deposited with Nattukottai Chetties on *thavanas* system—Limitation A 60 N 7
- (ix) Money kept in deposit with a particular person — Limitation A 62 N 31
- (x) Money payable at specified time but contract between parties showing that after period so fixed, deposit is to be regarded as payable on demand—Limitation ... A 60 N 7
- (xi) Scope of Art. 60 A 60 N 6
- (xii) When demand is made

- (a) "Demand" by Nattukottai Chetty husband in whose name wife's Stridhan is deposited in a firm, whether demand binding on wife so as to start time running A 60 N 9
- (b) "Demand" by whom should be made, to start time running A 60 N 9
- (c) "Demand" what is, to start time running under Art. 60 A 60 N 8

(xiii) With banker—Suit for—Limitation A 60 N 3

—Due under statutory liability—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 43

—Government securities, whether money, within Art. 57 ... A 57 N 6

—Grain, whether money A 57 N 6

Money—(Contd.)

—Had and received

- (a) Money received by defendant for plaintiff's use at the time of receipt—What is—Illustrative cases ... A 62 N 7
- (b) Privity of contract—Whether necessary to constitute receipt of money by defendant—Receipt for plaintiff's use—Indian law ... A 62 N 2
- (c) Suit for
 - (i) Against benamidar, receiving money belonging to real owner—Limitation ... A 62 N 24
 - (ii) Against trustee—Suit for account of trust property and recovery of dues—Limitation ... A 62 N 4
 - (iii) Based on allegation that defendant ought to have received certain sum of money on plaintiff's behalf—Limitation ... A 62 N 6
 - (iv) By auction purchaser for refund of purchase money on sale of patni taluk for arrears of rent being set aside—Limitation ... A 62 N 20
 - (v) By consignor for surplus sale proceeds of goods sold by Railway Company under Railways Act, S. 56—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
 - (vi) By Karnavan of Malabar Tarwad for money belonging to Tarwad and received by junior member—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
 - (vii) By one cosharer against another cosharer who has received former's share of money due—Limitation : ... A 62 N 9
 - (viii) By principal against agent for balance due out of moneys received by agent after deducting all legitimate expenses and allowances—Limitation ... A 62 N 10
 - (ix) By principal against agent for money received by agent for principal under circumstances which make it agent's duty to pay over to principal immediately money is received—Limitation ... A 62 N 10
 - (x) By principal against legal representative of deceased agent for money received by deceased agent for use of principal—Limitation ... A 62 N 11
 - (xi) By real owner against benamidar for money received by latter upon mortgage bond in his name—Limitation ... A 62 N 24
 - (xii) By real owner against decree-holder for money wrongly attached in execution of decree and paid over to decree-holder—Limitation ... A 62 N 27
 - (xiii) By ward against guardian for specific sums received by latter—Limitation ... A 62 N 25
 - (xiv) Defendant drawing money invested by him in bank and which belonged to deceased lady—Suit for recovery of money by plaintiff who is heir-at-law—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
 - (xv) Essential conditions for applicability of Art. 62 ... A 62 N 2
 - (xvi) For arrears of rent realized by person not entitled to it—Limitation ... A 110 N 3
 - (xvii) For haqq-i-chaharam—Limitation ... A 62 N 30
 - (xviii) For money received by defendant for use of plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest—Limitation ... A 62 N 8

Money—Had and received—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (xix) For recovery of money received by defendant as offerings for shrine A 62 N 29
- (xx) For money realized—Limitation A 120 N 2
- (xxi) For rent received by defendant in kind A 62 N 6
- (xxii) For specific sums received by guardian during plaintiff's minority—Limitation A 120 N 2
- (xxiii) For sums due to plaintiff out of collections from village A 62 N 31
- (xxiv) Illustrative cases of, governed by Art. 62 A 62 N 31
- (xxv) Judgment-debtor paying certain sums under decree to decree-holder — Application by judgment-debtor for certificate of satisfaction rejected—Suit by judgment-debtor for recovery of money paid to decree-holder—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for money had and received A 62 N 31
- (xxvi) Land purchased by A — Sale of land for arrears of revenue — Surplus sale proceeds paid to B, original owner—Suit by A against B for surplus sale proceeds—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for money had and received A 62 N 21
- (xxvii) Limitation A 62; A 62 N 2
- (a) Art. 62 applies whether liability of defendant arises under statute or under general principles of law A 62 N 2
- (b) For suit not falling under Art. 62 A 120 N 26
- (c) Illustrative cases governed by residuary Art 120. A 120 N 14
- (d) Starting point A 62 N 32
- (xxviii) Money, whether must have been received for plaintiff's use at the time of receipt for applicability of Art. 62 A 62 N 7
- (xxix) Nature of, under English Law A 62 N 2
- (xxx) Partition of joint Hindu family — Karta assigning to member a mortgage bond already paid off — Suit by member against ex-karta for recovery of money — Limitation A 62 N 7
- (xxxi) Payment of premium by tenant to landlord — Such premium prohibited by Bombay Rent Act—Claim for refund of premium paid—Limitation A 120 N 2
- (xxxii) Plaintiff entitled to receive under terms of a will, certain amount as maintenance from income of certain properties in hands of defendant—Limitation A 62 N 16
- (xxxiii) Plaintiff entitled to sue either for money had and received or for some other relief to which shorter period of limitation is applicable—Plaintiff, whether can be compelled to sue for relief to which shorter period of limitation is applicable A 62 N 2
- (xxxiv) Succession certificate obtained by brother of deceased — Money realized — Suit by widow of deceased for recovery of money—Limitation A 62 N 9

Money—Had and received—Suit for—(Contd.)

(xxxv) Sum of money due from A to B—C receives money in circumstances rendering such receipt one for use of B—Suit by B against C for money had and received, whether barred if suit for recovery by B against A is barred by limitation ...	A 62 N 2
(xxxvi) Time, whether extended by operation of S. 18 ...	A 62 N 32
(xxxvii) To recover from defendant, as soon and legal representative of plaintiff's late pleader money, received by latter for payment to plaintiff—Limitation ...	A 62 N 6
(xxxviii) Whether one in nature of suit for damages or compensation ...	A 62 N 2
(d) Test to determine whether money is received for plaintiff's use ...	A 62 N 2
(e) What is ...	A 62 N 6
(i) Illustrative cases ...	A 62 N 2
(ii) Money had and received by defendant's predecessor-in-interest, whether money had and received by defendant ...	A 62 N 6
(iii) Money paid by plaintiff to defendant under void agreement, whether money had and received ...	A 62 N 2
(iv) Money received by defendant's agent, whether money had and received by defendant ...	A 62 N 6
(v) Money which defendant compelled plaintiff to pay and to which defendant is not entitled ...	A 62 N 2
—Immovable property converted into — Whether immovable property ...	A 141 N 11
—Invested on <i>thavanas</i> transactions—Suit for—Limitation ...	A 115 N 3
—Lent—Suit for	
(a) Limitation ...	A 57
(i) Arts. 57 and 59, distinguished ...	A 57 N 1
(ii) General and specific provisions of ...	A 57 N 1
(iii) Starting point — Where lender has given cheque for money ...	A 58 N 1
(iv) Where lender draws his own cheque and gives it to borrower ...	A 58 N 1
(v) Where lender transfers to borrower cheque drawn by another person and endorsed in his favour by payee ...	A 58 N 1
(vi) Where money is lent under agreement that it shall be payable on demand — "On demand" — Meaning of ...	A 59; A 59 N 6; A 59 N 8
(h) On money dealings ...	A 57 N 7
(c) Stipulation to pay interest, whether makes difference in applicability of Art. 59 ...	A 59 N 7
(d) Where loan is on agreement that it is repayable on future date—Limitation ...	A 57 N 5
—Meaning of ...	A 51 N 2
—Obtained by defendant from third party who had obtained it by fraud practised upon plaintiff ...	A 62 N 15
—Paid as consideration where transfer of property is void — Limitation ...	A 62 N 5
—Paid by plaintiff for defendant	
(as) General and special provisions of limitation ...	A 51 N 1

Money—Paid by plaintiff for defendant—(Contd.)

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|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------|
| (a) Money paid to third person for defendant — When recoverable from defendant under substantive law | ... | A 61 N 5 |
| (b) Question under what circumstances money paid for defendant can be recovered by plaintiff, is one of substantive law | | A 61 N 2 |
| (c) Question whether payment to third person was for defendant is one of fact | | A 61 N 5 |
| (d) Suit for | | |
| (i) A depositing money with B to be paid to C — Failure of depositee to pay—Depositor paying to C— Suit by depositor against depositee—Limitation | ... | A 61 N 8 |
| (ii) A taking over B's liability and subsequently paying it— Suit by A against B for reimbursement—Limitation | ... | A 61 N 9 |
| (iii) By person interested in property, paying off charge liable to be paid by defendant—Limitation | .. | A 61 N 7 |
| (iv) By receiver to recover money spent for estate | ... | A 61 N 14 |
| (v) By succeeding trustee of temple against previous trustee for recovery of sum taken by latter for litigation purposes during trusteeship—Limitation | . | A 61 N 8 |
| (vi) Paid for defendant and creating money charge on property | | A 61 N 17 |
| (vii) For reimbursement for fine paid by plaintiff for misuse of land by defendant | | A 61 N 18 |
| (viii) Limitation | | A 61 |
| (a) Applicability of general Art. 61 where any special Article applies to the case | | A 61 N 2 |
| (b) General and special provisions of | | A 61 N 2 |
| (c) Starting point | | A 61 N 18 |
| (i) Where plaintiff has made several payments to meet a particular liability of defendant | | A 61 N 18 |
| (ix) Onus of proof | | A 61 N 19 |
| (x) Where defendant has contracted to pay the money to plaintiff | | A 61 N 5 |
| (xi) Where money has been deposited into Court for purpose of being paid to defendant | | A 61 N 4 |
| (xii) Where money is paid for defendant by third person against plaintiff's will | | A 61 N 3 |
| (xiii) Where plaintiff, being interested in such payment, has paid it for defendant | | A 61 N 5 |
| (xiv) Where plaintiff has been forced to make involuntary payment | | A 61 N 3 |
| (xv) Where plaintiff has made the payment for defendant not intending to do so gratuitously and defendant has enjoyed benefit thereof | | A 61 N 5 |
| (xvi) Where plaintiff is in justice and equity entitled to recover the amount | | A 61 N 5 |
| (xvii) Where plaintiff pays money to third person to whom defendant is not liable—Limitation | | A 61 N 5 |

Money—Paid by plaintiff for defendant—(Contd.)

(a) What is

- (i) *A*, in possession of property adjudged to him by competent Court pays off charge on property—*B* subsequently decided on appeal to be owner of property—Payment by *A*, whether payment for *B* within Art. 61 ... A 61 N 5
- (ii) Allegation by *A* that he is lawful heir to deceased person—Payment by *A* of deceased person's debts—*B* subsequently found to be true heir—Payment by *A*, whether payment for *B* within Art. 61 ... A 61 N 5
- (iii) Mere fact that defendant or his property is liable to pay to third person on date on which plaintiff pays to such third person, whether necessarily shows that payment was for defendant ... A 61 N 5
- (iv) Money paid by agent for liabilities incurred for principal, whether money paid for defendant within Art. 61: ... A 61 N 15
- (v) Money paid to third person to whom defendant is not liable, whether money paid for defendant ... A 61 N 5
- (vi) Money spent by receiver for purposes of estate, whether money paid for defendant within Art. 61 ... A 61 N 14
- (vii) Payment by one co-partner of common liability, whether payment for other co-partners within Art. 61 ... A 61 N 6
- (viii) Payment by one of two joint owners of tenure to save estate from sale for arrears of revenue and rent, whether payment for other joint owner ... A 61 N 6
- (ix) Payment in excess of his share by one of several persons jointly liable, whether payment for other persons liable ... A 61 N 6
- Paid by reason of fraud of third party ... A 97 N 1
- Paid for joint purchase—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 89 N 3
- Paid in consideration of voidable transfer without possession—
Limitation ... A 97 N 8
- ... A 62 N 29
- ... A 97 N 4
- Contract Act ... A 97 N 4
- (b) Consideration which afterwards fails
 - (i) Illustrative cases ... A 97 N 4
 - (ii) Meaning of ... A 97 N 4
 - (a) Whether means failure of total consideration ... A 97 N 4
- (c) Essentials of applicability of Art. 97 ... A 97 N 1
- (d) Existing consideration
 - (i) Agreement discovered to be void, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 11a
 - (ii) Consideration which is at the time of payment void in law, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 3
 - (iii) Executed consideration, what is ... A 97 N 4
 - (iv) Executory consideration
 - (a) What is ... A 97 N 4, 11
 - (b) When can be said to fail ... A 97 N 11
 - (v) Mortgage of property under attachment, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 3
 - (vi) Mortgage void but upon which mortgagee receives interest, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 3

Money—Paid on existing consideration—Existing consideration—(Contd.)

- (vii) Possession given under a void promise to transfer, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 3
- (viii) Sham sale deed, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 3
- (ix) Void transfer with delivery of possession, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 3; A 97 N 7
- (x) Voidable transfer with possession given, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 9
- (xi) Voidable transfer without possession, whether existing consideration ... A 97 N 8
- (e) Limitation ... A 62 N 13; A 97
 - (i) Extension of—Period, whether extended to six years in cases falling within both Art. 97 and Art. 116 ... A 97 N 2
 - (ii) Starting point ... A 97 N 5
 - (a) Money paid on void transfer with delivery of possession—Illustrative cases ... A 97 N 7
 - (b) Suit on contract which fails through Court of law refusing to enforce its specific performance ... A 97 N 11
 - (c) Suit on failure of executory consideration—Illustrative cases ... A 97 N 11
 - (d) Where Appellate Court confirms decision of first Court deciding transfer void in case of voidable transfer without possession ... A 97 N 8
 - (e) Where first Court decides transfer void and second Court reverses it which in its turn is reversed by High Court in case of voidable transfer without possession ... A 97 N 8
 - (f) Where in execution of decree by third person with paramount title against plaintiff, such third party is formally put in possession of property purchased by a plaintiff ... A 97 N 7
 - (g) Whether can be postponed by reason of the fact that decision of first Court is confirmed by Appellate Court where such decision is the failure of consideration ... A 97 N 11
- (f) Money not paid in pursuance of any contract between the parties—Suit for, whether suit within Art 97 ... A 97 N 1
- (g) Money paid
 - (i) Adjustment of mutual claim, whether payment of money ... A 97 N 2
 - (ii) Debt retained in part payment of money payable by creditor—Whether there is payment in such cases ... A 97 N 2
- (h) Money paid upon registered mortgage but mortgaged property subsequently sold for payment of municipal taxes free of mortgage—Limitation ... A 97 N 10
- (i) Money paid upon registered mortgage but mortgaged property subsequently sold for payment of municipal taxes free of mortgage—Limitation of existing ... A 97 N 1
- (j) Money paid upon registered mortgage but mortgaged property subsequently sold for payment of municipal taxes free of mortgage—Limitation of existing ... A 97 N 11
- (k) Right to recover such money, basis of ... A 97 N 1
- (l) Suit for, distinguished from one for damages or compensation ... A 97 N 2
- (m) Suit for mortgage money under S. 68, T. P. Act, if one based on failure of consideration ... A 97 N 10

Money—(Contd.)

—Paid on void transfer with delivery of possession—Remedies of person paying money	A 97 N 7
—Paid on void transfer without possession—Remedies of person paying money	A 97 N 6
—Paid on voidable transfer with possession—Limitation—Starting point—Illustrative cases	A 97 N 9
—Paid on voidable transfer without possession—Limitation—Starting point	A 97 N 8
—Paid to witness—Money paid as <i>batta</i> and travelling expenses—Failure of witness to attend in pursuance of summons served on him—Suit for recovery of money paid—Limitation	A 62 N 31
—Paid under agreement void <i>ab initio</i> —Limitation	A 62 N 12
—Paid under decree which is afterwards set aside or reversed	A 62 N 18
—Paid under mistake—Suit for—Limitation	A 62 N 14; A 96 N 4
—Paid under protest				
(a) Suit in respect of money paid in satisfaction of claim for arrears of revenue				
(i) Limitation				
(a) Applicability of Art. 16 and Madras Revenue Recovery Act, S. 59	A 16 N 5
(b) Applicability of Art. 16, essentials of	A 16; A 16 N 2
(c) Starting point	A 16 N 4
(ii) Under Madras Compulsory Labour Act, S. 6—Limitation	A 16 N 5
(iii) Under Madras Revenue Recovery Act, S. 52—Limitation	A 16 N 5
(b) Suit in respect of money paid on account of demands recoverable as arrears of revenue—Limitation	A 16
(c) What is	A 16 N 3
—Paid upon agreement discovered to be void—Limitation—Starting point	A 97 N 11a
—Paid upon void consideration—Limitation—Starting point	A 97 N 11a
—Payable in instalments—Verbal contract for—Suit on—Limitation	A 75 N 3
—Payment of				
(a) Meaning of	A 61 N 3
(b) What is—Giving of security to pay, whether payment	A 61 N 3
—Purchase money				
(a) Suit for refund by auction purchaser—See Auction purchaser.				
(b) Suit for refund for default of vendor—See Vendor and vendee.				
—Receipt of—What is				
(a) Receipt of paddy, whether receipt of money	A 62 N 6
(b) Receipt of rent in kind, whether receipt of money	A 51 N 2
—What is	A 89 N 6
—Whether moveable property	A 29 N 5
—Whether moveable property within Art. 29	A 145 N 2
—Whether moveable property within Art. 145	A 48 N 3
—Whether specific moveable property	
—Wrongly attached under decree and paid over to decree-holder—Suit by real owner—Limitation	A 62 N 27

Mortgage

—Acknowledgment

- (a) By judgment-debtor in respect of mortgage on property—
Whether binding on auction-purchaser ... S 19 N 34
- (b) By mortgagor, after he has parted with his entire interest
in equity of redemption and when not personally liable—
Whether can be used against transferee of equity of
redemption as acknowledgment by person through whom
transferee derives liability ... S 19 N 25
- (c) Entry in settlement record that certain property is under a
mortgage—When can be used as acknowledgment of liabi-
lity in respect of mortgage ... S 19 N 49
- (d) Mortgagee obtaining decree for possession and delivery
thereof—Mortgagee giving receipt acknowledging that he
has received delivery of possession as directed by decree—
Decree stating that claim of decree-holder was based on
mortgage—Receipt, if contains acknowledgment of liability
with respect to mortgage so as to save limitation for suit
for redemption of mortgage ... S 19 N 16
- (e) Mortgagor granting mortgage with possession to stranger—
Stranger allowing revenue payable on land to fall into
arrears—Property sold for arrears of revenue—Stranger
purchasing property at revenue sale—Acknowledgment by
mortgagor in regard to first mortgage—Whether binding on
stranger ... S 19 N 34
- (f) Mortgagor signing entry in account book of mortgagee—
Mortgagee also signing entry as scribe—Latter if thereby
acknowledges liability on his part ... S 19 N 31

—Admission of mortgage

- (a) Admission of existence of mortgage by person on whom mort-
gage right devolves subsequently—Whether can be used as
acknowledgment against transferee of the right from such
person ... S 19 N 25
- (b) Whether amounts to admission of mortgagee's right to pos-
session of mortgaged property under terms of the mortgage: S 19 N 27

—Assignment of

- (a) Assignment *ab initio* void—Assignee receiving money on
bond—Suit by assignor for recovery of money so received
—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
- (b) Assignment by mortgagee—Mortgagee thereafter receiving
mortgage money in fraud of assignee—Suit by assignee for
money received by mortgagee—Limitation ... A 62 N 31

—By conditional sale

- (a) Foreclosure of—Enactments as to ... A 135 N 9
- (b) Suit for possession by mortgagee—Limitation ... A 135 N 9
- (c) Suit for possession by mortgagee not entitled to possession—
Limitation ... A 135 N 2

—Co-mortgagees

- (a) Acknowledgment by joint mortgagee—Whether saves limi-
tation for suit for redemption ... S 21 N 16
- (b) Death of one of two co-mortgagees—Acknowledgment by
survivor—Sufficiency of, to keep alive right of redemption S 21 N 16

Mortgage—Co-mortgagees—(Contd.)

- (c) Mortgagee right partitioned and each co-mortgagee in separate possession of a portion of the mortgaged property—Acknowledgment by one co-mortgagee—Whether can be used in suit for redemption of the particular share in his enjoyment S 21 N 16
- (d) Mortgagee right vested in several persons jointly—Suit by one of them without impleading others—Suit must be dismissed S 22 N 17
- (e) Payment made to one of several joint mortgagees—Sufficiency of, for purposes of S. 20 S 21 N 6
- (f) Statement by one mortgagee that money due on mortgage remained unpaid—Equity of redemption subsequently becoming vested in him—Suit by other mortgagee for recovery of his share of mortgage money—Statement, if can be used as acknowledgment of liability to save limitation for suit S 19 N 33
- (g) Suit by one co-sharer on the mortgage—Decree passed in favour of all co-sharers—Suit for contribution in respect of costs incurred in suit on mortgage—Limitation A 61 N 12
- (h) Suit for contribution against other co-mortgagee by a co-mortgagee who pays off mortgage—Limitation—Starting point A 132 N 10
- (i) Whether agent of another co-mortgagee A 89 N 7
- (j) Whether one can give discharge on behalf of all within the meaning of S. 7 S 7 N 22

—Co-mortgagors

- (a) Acknowledgment by one co-mortgagor—Whether saves limitation as against other co-mortgagors S 21 N 11
- (b) Mortgagor transferring portion of equity of redemption to another—Mortgagor and transferee, if joint contractors within the meaning of S. 21 S 21 N 8
- (c) Payment by one, if saves limitation against the others S 21 N 11
- (d) Redemption by co-mortgagor—Suit by other co-mortgagors for their shares of property—Limitation—Starting point : A 148 N 3
- (e) Suit for contribution against co-mortgagor by a co-mortgagor paying off mortgage—Limitation... .. A 132 N 10
- (f) Suit for interest against co-mortgagor for amount paid for redemption—Limitation A 115 N 14
- (g) Suit for share of mortgage money received by defendant mortgagor on the allegation that mortgaged property was undivided ancestral property in which plaintiff had a right—S. 20 does not apply S. 20 N 4
- (h) Suit for share of mortgage money received by co-owner of property who had mortgaged it and received the whole of mortgage money—Limitation A 132 N 8

—English mortgage

- (a) Suit for foreclosure
- (i) Limitation A 147 N 1
- (ii) Maintainability of suit A 147 N 1
- (b) Suit for sale—Limitation A 147 N 1

—Equitable mortgage

- (a) Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation A 147 N 2
- (b) Suit by mortgagor for document deposited after redemption

Mortgage—Equitable mortgage—(Contd.)

- | | | | |
|------------------------------------------|-----|-----|------------|
| of mortgage—Limitation—Starting point | ... | ... | A 49 N 9 |
| (c) Suit for foreclosure—Maintainability | ... | ... | A 147 N 2 |
| (d) Suit for money due—Limitation | ... | ... | A 132 N 22 |
| (e) Suit for sale—Limitation | ... | ... | A 147 N 2 |
- Final decree
- | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------|-----------|
| (a) Application for— <i>See also under Decree</i> —Final decree. | | | |
| (i) Is not one for execution of preliminary decree | ... | A 182 N 12, 13 | |
| (ii) Whether can be saved from bar of limitation by acknowledgment under S. 19 | ... | S 19 N 17 | |
| (b) Preliminary decree in favour of mortgagee—Subsequent passing of decree against both mortgagor and mortgagee in suit by third person negating mortgagor's title — Reversal of decree in appeal — Mortgagee's claim for final decree—Mortgagee, if entitled to fresh period from appellate decree... | | S 9 N 11 | |
| (c) Preliminary mortgage decree obtained by mortgagee—Subsequent suit by third party against mortgagor and mortgagee for declaration that hypotheca did not belong to mortgagor but to him—Dismissal of suit — Period of pendency of suit cannot be excluded in computing limitation for mortgagee's application for final decree | ... | ... | S 15 N 11 |
- Foreclosure
- | | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------|
| (a) Decree for, in mortgage suit—Application for—Limitation | ... | A 181 N 4 |
| (b) Invalid foreclosure proceedings—Effect | ... | A 148 N 6 |
| (c) Irregular proceedings under Bengal Regulation 17 of 1806—Suit by mortgagor for redemption—Limitation | ... | A 148 N 11 |
| (d) Mortgagee issuing notice of foreclosure under Bengal Regulation 17 of 1806 — No further proceedings after year of | | A 148 N 11 |
| | | A 148 N 6 |
- mortgagor
- | | | | |
|-----|-----|-----|------------|
| ... | ... | ... | A 148 N 11 |
|-----|-----|-----|------------|
- Foreclosure or sale
- | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----------|
| (a) Suit by mortgagee to recover mortgage money on ground of deprivation of security by wrongful act of mortgagor—Suit by mortgagee for foreclosure or sale — Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14 | ... | S 14 N 18 |
| (b) Suit for—Limitation—Applicability of Arts. 147 and 132 | ... | A 132 N 2 |
- Foreclosure, suit for—Limitation
- | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------------|
| (a) Applicability of Arts. 147 and 132 distinguished | ... | A 147 N 1 |
| (b) Starting point | ... | A 132 N 3; A 147 N 4 |
- Interest
- | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------|
| (a) Mortgage document containing personal covenant to pay principal and interest secured by mortgage — Suit on personal covenant to pay principal time-barred — Suit to enforce personally payment of interest falling due within six years of suit instituted within twelve years of date when mortgage money fell due—Limitation | ... | A 132 N 12 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------|

Mortgage—Co-mortgagees—(Contd.)

- (c) Mortgagee right partitioned and each co-mortgagee in separate possession of a portion of the mortgaged property—Acknowledgment by one co-mortgagee—Whether can be used in suit for redemption of the particular share in his enjoyment S 21 N 16
- (d) Mortgagee right vested in several persons jointly—Suit by one of them without impleading others—Suit must be dismissed S 22 N 17
- (e) Payment made to one of several joint mortgagees—Sufficiency of, for purposes of S. 20 S 21 N 6
- (f) Statement by one mortgagee that money due on mortgage remained unpaid—Equity of redemption subsequently becoming vested in him—Suit by other mortgagee for recovery of his share of mortgage money—Statement, if can be used as acknowledgment of liability to save limitation for suit S 19 N 33
- (g) Suit by one co-sharer on the mortgage—Decree passed in favour of all co-sharers—Suit for contribution in respect of costs incurred in suit on mortgage—Limitation A 61 N 12
- (h) Suit for contribution against other co-mortgagee by a co-mortgagee who pays off mortgage—Limitation—Starting point A 132 N 13
A 89 N 7
- (i) Whether agent of another co-mortgagee S 7 N 22
- (j) Whether one can give discharge on behalf of all within the meaning of S. 7

—Co-mortgagors

- (a) Acknowledgment by one co-mortgagor—Whether saves limitation as against other co-mortgagors S 21 N 11
- (b) Mortgagor transferring portion of equity of redemption to another—Mortgagor and transferee, if joint contractors within the meaning of S. 21 S 21 N 8
S 21 N 11
- (c) Payment by one, if saves limitation against the others
- (d) Redemption by co-mortgagor—Suit by other co-mortgagors for their shares of property—Limitation—Starting point : A 148 N 3
- (e) Suit for contribution against co-mortgagor by a co-mortgagor paying off mortgage—Limitation... .. A 132 N 10
- (f) Suit for interest against co-mortgagor for amount paid for redemption—Limitation A 115 N 14
- (g) Suit for share of mortgage money received by defendant mortgagor on the allegation that mortgaged property was undivided ancestral property in which plaintiff had a right—S. 20 does not apply S. 20 N 4
- (h) Suit for share of mortgage money received by co-owner of property who had mortgaged it and received the whole of mortgage money—Limitation A 132 N 8

—English mortgage

- (a) A 147 N 1
... .. A 147 N 1
... .. A 147 N 1
- (h) Suit for sale—Limitation

—Equitable mortgage

- (a) Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation A 147 N 2
- (b) Suit by mortgagor for document deposited after redemption

Mortgage—Equitable mortgage—(Contd.)

of mortgage—Limitation—Starting point	A 49 N 9
(c) Suit for foreclosure—Maintainability	A 147 N 2
(d) Suit for money due—Limitation	A 132 N 22
(e) Suit for sale—Limitation	A 147 N 2

—Final decree

(a) Application for—See also under Decree—Final decree.			
(i) Is not one for execution of preliminary decree	...	A 182 N 12, 13	
(ii) Whether can be saved from bar of limitation by acknowledgment under S. 19	...	S 19 N 17	
(b) Preliminary decree in favour of mortgagee—Subsequent passing of decree against both mortgagor and mortgagee in suit by third person negating mortgagor's title — Reversal of decree in appeal — Mortgagee's claim for final decree—Mortgagee, if entitled to fresh period from appellate decree...		S 9 N 11	
(c) Preliminary mortgage decree obtained by mortgagee—Subsequent suit by third party against mortgagor and mortgagee for declaration that hypotheca did not belong to mortgagor but to him—Dismissal of suit — Period of pendency of suit cannot be excluded in computing limitation for mortgagee's application for final decree	S 15 N 11

—Foreclosure

(a) Decree for, in mortgage suit—Application for—Limitation	...	A 181 N 4
(b) Invalid foreclosure proceedings—Effect	...	A 148 N 6
(c) Irregular proceedings under Bengal Regulation 17 of 1806—Suit by mortgagor for redemption—Limitation	...	A 148 N 11
(d) Mortgagee issuing notice of foreclosure under Bengal Regulation 17 of 1806 — No further proceedings after year of	...	A 148 N 11
(e) D	...	A 148 N 6
(f) F	...	

mortgagor	A 148 N 11
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—Foreclosure or sale

(a) Suit by mortgagee to recover mortgage money on ground of deprivation of security by wrongful act of mortgagor—Suit by mortgagee for foreclosure or sale — Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14	...	S 14 N 18
(b) Suit for—Limitation—Applicability of Arts. 147 and 132	...	A 132 N 2
—Foreclosure, suit for—Limitation	...	A 147
(a) Applicability of Arts. 147 and 132 distinguished	...	A 147 N 1
(b) Starting point	...	A 132 N 3; A 147 N 4

—Interest

(a) Mortgage document containing personal covenant to pay principal and interest secured by mortgage — Suit on personal covenant to pay principal time-barred — Suit to enforce personally payment of interest falling due within six years of suit instituted within twelve years of date when mortgage money fell due—Limitation	...	A 132 N 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----	------------

Mortgage—Interest—(Contd.)

- (b) No provision for payment of interest after date fixed for payment of principal — *Post diem* interest — Non-payment, if continuing breach of contract to pay ... S 23 N 8
A 132 N 12
- (c) Suit for—Limitation ... A 132 N 12
- (d) Whether charge on mortgaged property ... A 132 N 12
- Invalid under Tenancy laws — Whether can be used as acknowledgment of liability in suit on original cause of action ... S 19 N 71
- Meaning of, within Art. 147 ... A 147 N 3
- Mortgage decree—Execution of—Attachment, if necessary ... A 11 N 18
- Mortgage decree in Original Side of High Court — Application for personal decree—Limitation ... A 181 N 6
- Mortgage deed — Default clause in mortgage deed providing, on failure of mortgagor to pay within certain term mortgagee should become absolute owner—Effect ... A 148 N 7
- Mortgagee
- (a) Dispossession of mortgagor by stranger who remains in adverse possession for 12 years — Only right in equity of redemption and not that of mortgagee is extinguished ... S 28 N 6
A 141 N 11
- (b) Interest of—Whether immovable property within Art. 141: ... A 147 N 3
- (c) Meaning of ...
- (d) Mortgage of property after mortgagor is ousted from property by stranger—Mortgagee, if has independent cause of action against stranger ... S 9 N 7
- (e) Mortgage of trust property from express trustee with notice of trust — Mortgagee receiving interest from trustee—Mortgagee, if constructive trustee for beneficiary in regard to interest received by him ... S 10 N 7
- (e') Mortgagee from ratanadar continuing in possession after ratanadar's death — Title acquired by mortgagee by adverse possession against successors, whether that of mortgagee : ... A 148 N 9
- (f) Mortgagee getting into possession of mortgaged property—Mortgagee subsequently dispossessed by mortgagor—Suit for possession by mortgagee—Limitation ... A 135 N 2
- (g) Mortgagee in possession after satisfaction of mortgage—Whether trustee ... S 2 Cl 11 N 3; S 10 N 14
- (h) Mortgagee of occupancy holding—Structure put up by, without landlord's consent—Suit for removal—Limitation ... A 120 N 10
- (i) Partial failure of consideration for mortgage — Possession of mortgagee under mortgage is as mortgagee within meaning of Art. 148 ... A 148 N 2
- (j) Person voluntarily paying off mortgage and getting possession — His possession is not that of mortgagee within Art. 148 ... A 148 N 2
- (k) Possession of
- (i) Continuance in possession by mortgagee after expiry of mortgage is in character of mortgagee and not under claim of full ownership ... A 148 N 4
- (ii) Decree of Settlement Court declaring mortgagee to be owner of property changes character of mortgagee's possession ... A 148 N 4
- (iii) Default clause in mortgage deed providing mortgagee to become absolute owner on failure of mortgagor to

Mortgage—Mortgagee—Possession of—(Contd.)

- pay within fixed term—Mortgagee's possession is only that of mortgagee even on default ... A 148 N 7
- (iv) Default clause in mortgage deed providing mortgagee to become absolute owner on failure of mortgagor to pay within fixed term — Mortgagor consenting it to become so from certain date — Mortgagee's possession will become that of full owner from such date .. A 148 N 7
- (v) Default clause in mortgage deed providing mortgagee to take possession in his own right on failure of mortgagor to pay within certain date — Mortgagee taking possession — His possession is in assertion of full ownership ... A 148 N 7
- (vi) Fact that decree for redemption is obtained against mortgagee does not change character of his possession as mortgagee ... A 148 N 10
- (vii) Enclosure decree passed against mortgagor — Extension of time for payment on condition that possession should be delivered to mortgagee till payment — Possession of mortgagee is that of absolute owner from expiry of extended term ... A 148 N 4
- (viii) Mere contract to sell equity of redemption in favour of usufructuary mortgagee does not alter character of possession of mortgagee ... A 148 N 5
- (ix) Mere fact that mortgage is discharged out of usufruct or otherwise does not change character of mortgagee's possession though he continues in possession after discharge ... A 148 N 4
- (x) Mere order in mutation proceedings entering mortgagee's name as proprietor does not change character of mortgagee's possession ... A 148 N 4
- (xi) Mortgagee allowing Government revenue to fall into arrears and purchasing property himself at sale for arrears—His possession continues to be that of mortgagee ... A 148 N 4
- (xii) Mortgagee cannot by merely asserting for 12 years that mortgage was for larger amount prescribe to hold as mortgagee for larger amount ... A 148 N 4
- (xiii) Mortgagee entering into possession as mortgagee cannot convert nature of possession into that of full owner by merely asserting absolute title ... A 148 N 4
- (xiv) Mortgagee having power of sale out of Court purchases property himself at sale—Mortgagee's possession after sale is that of mortgagee ... A 148 N 4
- (xv) Mortgagee in possession as such—Subsequent proceedings for foreclosure turning out invalid—Mortgagee's possession does not become that of full owner ... A 148 N 6
- (xvi) Mortgagee not entitled to possession under mortgage, taking possession under foreclosure proceedings which are invalid — His possession is not as mortgagee but under claim of ownership ... A 148 N 6
- (xvii) Mortgagee obtaining transfer of equity of redemption from third party unauthorized — Mortgagee's possession is not affected by transfer ... A 148 N 5

Mortgage—Mortgagee—Possession of—(Contd.)

- (xviii) Mortgagee taking possession as mortgagee but wrongfully—His possession is only as mortgagee ... A 148 N 4
- (xix) Mortgagor's claim in prior suit to declare mortgage bad does not enable mortgagee to prescribe to the mortgaged property from date of mortgage ... A 148 N 4
- (xx) One of co-mortgagors transferring equity of redemption ... A 148 N 5

payment—No proceedings taken by mortgagee for final decree on default of payment—Mortgagee entering into possession as owner—His possession is adverse ... A 148 N 4

- (i) Purchase by, of property in contravention of O. 34, R. 14, Civil P. C.

(i) Effect ... A 148 N 8

(ii) Sale does not relieve mortgagee of his obligations as mortgagee ... A 148 N 8

(iii) Sale not void but only liable to be set aside at instance of mortgagor ... A 148 N 8

(iv) Sale set aside by mortgagor by proper application—Parties continue as mortgagor and mortgagee ... A 148 N 8

(m) Suit against

(i) Mortgagee in possession of mortgaged property without title—Article 148 inapplicable ... A 148 N 4

(ii) Mortgagee taking possession under default clause—Suit against him for recovery of property—Art. 148 inapplicable ... A 148 N 7

(iii) To recover possession of mortgaged property—Limitation ... A 148

(n) Suit against third person for recovery of money received by him from mortgagor and which was due to mortgagee—Limitation ... A 132 N 11

(o) Suit by mortgagee against trespasser, whether barred by fact that trespasser has perfected his title against mortgagor : ... A 132 N 17

(p) Suit by mortgagee and purchase of property in execution—Dispossession of mortgagor and property in possession of stranger at time of execution sale—Mortgagee's suit for possession against stranger—Cause of action, when arises : ... S 9 N 7

(q) Suit to eject mortgagee on ground that mortgage is invalid—Limitation ... A 120 N 4

(r) Suit to enforce against purchaser of mortgaged property an undertaking to pay mortgage amount—Maintainability of suit ... A 116 N 2

(s) Who is, within meaning of Art 134—Illustrative cases ... A 134 N 13

—Mortgagor

(a) Failure of mortgagee to pay off mortgagor's debts for which purpose certain sum was left in mortgagee's hands—Mortgagor himself compelled to pay off debts—Subsequent suit ... A 61 N 8

... prior mortgagee—
... for compensation ... A 116 N 22

Mortgage—Mortgagor—(Contd.)

- (c) Personal liability of — Whether is destroyed by fact that payment of amount is collaterally secured by the mortgage: A 116 N 19
- (d) Sale of portion of property mortgaged—Mortgagor afterwards stating that mortgage is undischarged —Statement, if binding on vendee ... S 19 N 35
- (e) Suit by mortgagor to recover possession of property from transferee of mortgagee—Transferee obtaining possession not on date of transfer but subsequently—Limitation, if runs from date of transfer ... S 9 N 8
- (f) Surplus collections received by mortgagee—Suit by mortgagor after satisfaction of decree
 - (i) Limitation ... A 105
 - (a) Applicability of Art. 105 and Art. 109 ... A 109 N 6
 - (b) Starting point ... A 105 N 1, 4
 - (c) Where liberty to file fresh suit for accounts or profits is given in prior suit for redemption ... A 105 N 2
 - (d) Where mortgagor has re-entered into possession without suit for redemption ... A 105 N 2
 - (ii) Maintainability of suit ... A 105 N 2
 - (iii) Suit for compensation for trees wrongfully cut by mortgagee, whether suit for collections made by mortgagee ... A 105 N 3
 - (iv) Suit for redemption together with claim for surplus profits—Such claim, whether barred—Limitation ... A 105 N 2
 - (v) Suit, whether barred by prior suit for redemption ... A 105 N 2
 - (vi) Surplus collections, meaning of ... A 105 N 3

—Personal decree

- (aa) Application for—Not one for execution ... A 182 N 15
- (a) Mortgage not binding on sons of mortgagor—Mortgage containing indemnity clause—Suit for personal decree against sons of deceased mortgagor against assets of mortgagor in sons' hands—Whether lies ... A 116 N 20
- (b) Mortgagee combining claim against mortgaged property and for personal decree—Limitation applicable ... S 3 N 4
- (c) Suit for
 - (i) If lies when personal remedy barred at the date of ... S 3 N 14
 - ... } N 20, A 132 N 18
 - ... A 116 N 21
 - ... nita-
 - ... tion—Starting point ... A 120 N 52

—Personal remedy—Whether destroyed by fact that payment of amount is secured collaterally by the mortgage ... A 116 N 19

- T ... A 134 N 17
- (b) Good faith of transferee, whether must be proved ... A 134 N 10
- (c) Limitation—Starting point ... A 134; A 134 N 1; A 134 N 12; A 135 N 16
- (d) Mortgage, if should be one with possession ... A 134 N 14
- (e) Mortgagee transferring mortgaged property but subsequently getting retransfer ... A 134 N 15

Mortgage—Possession of mortgaged property, etc.—(Contd.)

- (f) Mortgagor's estate in hands of limited owner at the time of transfer by mortgagee—Suit for possession by person succeeding to estate on termination of limited estate—Limitation A 134 N 19
- (g) Nature of transfer within Art. 134
- (i) Burden of proof as to A 134 N 11
- (ii) Sub-mortgage, whether transfer A 134 N 11
- (iii) Transfer, whether must purport to be a sale A 134 N 11
- (h) Object of prescribing short period of limitation for such suit: A 134 N 2
- (i) Proof of subsisting mortgage at the time of transfer and transfer by mortgagee essential for applicability of Art. 134—Illustrative cases A 134 N 13
- (j) Property mortgaged by mortgagee A 134 N 1
- (k) Property nominally transferred A 134 N 8
- (l) Property permanently leased by mortgagee A 134 N 1
- (m) Right to sue barred under previous Acts, whether revived under amended Act A 134 N 16
- (n) Subsequent knowledge on part of transferee of transferor's limited rights, whether will prevent time running in favour of transferee A 134 N 10
- (o) Suit against representative of transferee—Limitation A 134 N 3
- (p) Suit for possession against transferee of auction-purchaser in court sale of mortgaged property—Limitation A 134 N 9
- (q) Transferee getting possession subsequent to transfer A 130 N 12
- (r) When transfer becomes known to plaintiff—Burden of proof as to date of plaintiff's knowledge A 134 N 16

—Possession of immovable property mortgaged

- (a) Suit, against whom maintainable A 135 N 5
- (b) Suit by mortgagee
- (i) Applicability of Art. 135 and Art. 146 to such suit A 146 N 2
- (ii) Before Court established by Royal Charter—Limitation—Starting point A 146 N 3
- (iii) For ejecting mortgagor to whom mortgaged property has been leased back—Limitation A 135 N 3
- (iv) Instituted in Court not established by Royal Charter—Limitation A 135; A 135 N 2
- (v) Limitation—Starting point A 135; A 135 N 2; A 135 N 7
- (vi) To enforce stipulation in instrument of mortgage that mortgagor should give possession to mortgagee—Limitation A 135 N 4
- (vii) Where mortgage instrument recites that possession has been given to mortgagee—Limitation A 135 N 4
- (viii) Where mortgagee is entitled to possession only upon foreclosure A 135 N 2
- (ix) Where mortgagee gets possession under mortgage but is subsequently dispossessed by mortgagor—Limitation A 135 N 2

—Prior and subsequent

- (a) After subsequent mortgage, mortgagor stating that prior mortgage remains undischarged—Whether binding on subsequent mortgagee 8 19 N 35

Mortgage—Prior and subsequent—(Contd.)

- (b) Prior mortgagee in possession, whether can set up his mortgage as shield against subsequent mortgagee suing on his mortgage A 182 N 26
- (c) Right of subsequent mortgagee to sue for recovery of money under his mortgage barred by limitation — Whether he can sue for redemption of prior mortgage A 132 N 26

—Puisne mortgagee

- (a) Puisne mortgagee paying off prior mortgagee—Suit by puisne mortgagee against mortgagor to recover amounts paid to prior mortgagee personally from mortgagor — Limitation : A 61 N 7
- (b) Suit for redemption and possession against prior mortgagee and mortgagor—Limitation A 135 N 6

—Redemption

- (a) Acknowledgment by mortgagee of mortgage and of his liability to be redeemed—Whether may be contained in deed of sub-mortgage or other document executed in favour of a third person 8 19 N 46
- (b) Person having right to redeem property in possession of another under mortgage and obtain possession—Right to sue for possession—When arises S 28 N 2
- (c) Redemption of portion of mortgage—Whether allowed under the law 8 21 N 18

—Redemption, equity of

- (a) Adverse possession of—*See under* Adverse possession.
- (b) Invalid transfer of, to mortgagee—Effect : A 142 & 144 N 28; A 148 N 5
- (c) Oral sale of—Suit for pre-emption A 10 N 1
- (d) Sale of—Whether alienation A 120 N 34
- (e) A 148 N 5
- (f) A 148 N 5
- against mortgagee for possession of mortgaged property — Limitation A 148 N 5
- (g) Under usufructuary mortgage, sold in execution of decree against mortgagor — Suit by purchaser for redemption and possession — Suit is governed by Art. 148 and not by Art. 137 A 148 N 22
- (h) Whether can be conferred by way of remainder A 140 N 3

- but bears—Suc. A 148 N 4
- (b) What is A 148 N 1a
- (c) When accrues A 148 N 18

- (i) Mortgage deed providing that if mortgage money is paid in month of any Jeth within ten years the mortgage would be redeemed but on failure within 10 years mortgagee would become absolute owner — Right to redeem, whether accrues in first Jeth succeeding date of mortgage A 148 N 18
- (ii) Mortgage deed providing that mortgagee should retain possession and realize profits and that land was to be released if mortgagor repaid money — No date for redemption fixed — Redemption does not accrue till mortgagee gets possession A 148 N 18

Mortgage—Redemption, right of—When accrues—(Contd.)

- (iii) No date fixed in mortgage deed for payment of mortgage money—Right to redeem accrues on execution of deed A 148 N 18
- (iv) Time fixed for redemption in mortgage deed very long—Right of redemption cannot arise before, unless clause amounts to be a clog on equity of redemption: A 148 N 18

—Redemption, suit for

- (a) Accession to mortgaged property — Suit by mortgagor for accession—Art. 148 inapplicable ... A 148 N, 16
- (b) Admission of mortgage by son of mortgagee when he has no interest in mortgage right — Son inheriting mortgage right which subsequently passes to another—Suit for redemption against such person—Acknowledgment by son of original mortgagee—Whether can be relied on ... S 19 N 34
- (c) Against mortgagee's assignee—Art. 148, whether applies ... A 148 N 19
- (c¹) Application by mortgagor for allowing him to make payment—Whether one in execution of preliminary decree ... A 182 N 13
- (d) Application for final decree under O. 34 R. 8, Civil P. C.—Limitation ... A 181 N 5
- (e) Burden of proof ... A 148 N 23
- (f) By mortgagor who has previously abandoned the land—Suit brought within prescribed period—Maintainability ... A 148 N 12
- (g) By prior mortgagee to enforce his mortgage without impleading puisne mortgagee—Suit thereafter by puisne mortgagee to redeem prior mortgage—Art. 148, whether will apply ... A 148 N 21
- (h) By puisne mortgagee—Suit by him on his mortgage without impleading prior mortgagee — Puisne mortgagee himself purchasing mortgaged property—Suit by puisne mortgagee to redeem prior mortgage—Art. 148 applies ... A 148 N 21
- (i) By puisne mortgagee to redeem prior mortgage—Art. 148 applies ... A 148 N 21
- (j) By representatives of deceased mortgagor bound by a sale—Suit, whether really one for setting aside sale ... A 12 N 2
- (k) By reversioner of Hindu female who alienated property by usufructuary mortgage for necessity—Limitation ... A 141 N 6
- (l) Decree for redemption obtained against mortgagee — Second suit for redemption—Limitation ... A 148 N 10
- (m) Dispute regarding amount due referred to arbitration—Decision of arbitrators that mortgagees should be in possession for certain number of years—Suit for redemption by enforcing award—Limitation ... A 148 N 14
- (n) Equity of redemption transferred by person alleged to be adopted son of mortgagor after latter's death — Adoption ... A 148 N 5
- ... of redemption to side within three years of attaining majority — He cannot redeem it within longer period conferred by Art. 148 ... A 148 N 5
- (p) In case of *lekha mukhi* mortgage in Punjab — Limitation — Starting point ... A 148 N 18
- (q) Interest of mortgagee vesting in Hindu widow — Transfer of mortgagee interest by widow to person in whom is vested the equity of redemption — Transfer set aside on widow's

Mortgage—Redemption, suit for—(Contd.)

- death—Suit for redemption — Period during which mortgagee's interest vested in plaintiff, whether can be deducted — Plaintiff, if gets fresh cause of action ... S 9 N 12
- (r) Laches of mortgagor in not enforcing his alleged rights for many years — Whether evidence against existence of those rights ... A 148 N 24
- (s) Limitation
 (i) Art. 148 applies to all mortgages ... A 148 N 2
 (ii) Starting point ... A 148; A 148 N 18
- (t) Manager of joint Hindu family, if can give discharge in regard to suit on behalf of whole family ... S 7 N 18
- (u) Mortgage amount paid off but mortgagee in possession—Suit for possession by mortgagor is not suit for redemption ... A 148 N 1a
- (v) Mortgage in favour of joint Hindu family — Suit, if can be rendered time-barred as against all members of family by discharge given by manager ... S 7 N 18
- (w) Mortgago with possession of rights in land which later were commuted into fixed money allowance to be paid from Government treasury — Mortgagee receiving payments and giving to Government receipts signed by him as mortgagee — Receipts, if acknowledgments to save limitation for suit for redemption ... S 19 N 46
- (x) Mortgage without possession — Provision in mortgage that if amount due not paid by end of certain year mortgagee should take possession as absolute owner—Possession taken by mortgagee — Suit for redemption by mortgagor after 60 years from the date for payment—Suit barred ... A 148 N 19
- (y) Mortgagee authorized to pay himself out of usufruct—Mortgage discharged before expiry of term — Suit by mortgagor for recovery of possession on discharge — Limitation—Starting point ... A 148 N 18
- (z) Mortgagee, if can claim mortgage money from plaintiff in redemption suit, even if suit for money would be barred ... S 3 N 15
- (z¹) Mortgagee in possession as such — Subsequent invalid proceedings for foreclosure — Suit against mortgagee for recovery of property—Limitation ... A 148 N 6
- (z²) Mortgagee purchasing property in contravention of O. 34 R. 14, Civil P. C.
 (i) Sale not set aside by mortgagor within prescribed period — Mortgagor cannot sue to redeem ignoring sale ... A 148 N 8
 (ii) Sale set aside by mortgagor — Suit by mortgagor for redemption—Limitation ... A 148 N 8
- (z³) Mortgagor's covenant to pay other debts also—Mortgagee, if can defend suit by claiming such debts although suit to enforce them is barred ... S 3 N 15
- (z⁴) Of properties sold for pre-existing mortgage 12 years before suit—Maintainability ... A 126 N 10
- (z⁵) One of co-mortgagors transferring equity of redemption to mortgagee—Suit by other co-mortgagors—Limitation ... A 148 N 5
- (z⁶) Person made to sign document by misrepresentation that it is mortgage deed while in fact it is sale deed—Suit by such person for redemption on ground that sale is void—Limitation ... A 148 N 14

Mortgage—Redemption, suit for—(Contd.)

- (z⁷) Section 20 does not apply ... S 20 N 4
- (z⁸) Special or local law—Advantage of S. 6, Oudh Estates Act—
 —When can be taken ... A 148 N 26
- (z⁹) Special or local law—Mortgagor may redeem before expiry of
 term under Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (17 of 1879): ... A 148 N 26
- (z¹⁰) Suit barred—Mortgagee becomes owner of property ... A 148 N 25
- (z¹¹) Suit containing also claim for surplus profits—Such claim,
 whether barred by suit for redemption ... A 105 N 2
- (z¹²) Transfer for consideration by mortgagee professing himself
 to be owner
 (i) Right to redeem arising after mortgagor coming to
 know of transfer by mortgagee—Applicability of
 Art. 134 ... A 148 N 19
 ... right
 to redeem has not accrued ... A 148 N 19
 (c) Suit is one for possession on redemption of mort-
 gage ... A 148 N 19
 (d) Transferor contending that suit is governed by
 Art. 134—Burden of proof ... A 148 N 19
- (z¹³) Trespasser dispossessing usufructuary mortgagee—Suit
 against trespasser for redemption—Art. 148 applies ... A 142 & 144 N 85
- (z¹⁴) Upon dismissal of mortgagor's application for redemption
 under Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act—Limitation: ... A 148 N 2
- (z¹⁵) Usufructuary mortgage by Hindu of joint family property—
 Subsequently equity of redemption also sold to mortgagee—
 Suit to set aside sale by sons not brought within 12 years
 under Art. 126—Suit to redeem under Art. 148 not main-
 tainable ... A 148 N 20
- (z¹⁶) Whether bars subsequent suit for accounts or surplus profits
 against mortgagee ... A 105 N 2
- (z¹⁷) Whether one for possession within Art. 137 ... A 137 N 3
- (z¹⁸) Whether one to enforce payment of money charged on
 immovable property ... A 132 N 3
- (z¹⁹) Whether one to recover possession within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 3
- (z²⁰) Whether suit in respect of property under S. 19 ... S 19 N 16
- Renewal of
 (a) If gives fresh cause of action ... S 19 N 36
 (b) Mortgagee, if entitled to priority over intermediate mort-
 ... S 19 N 36
 ... A 132 N 15
 ... A 120 N 13
- Simple mortgage
 (a) Mortgagor leasing property to son of simple mortgagee—
 Lessee authorized to pay rents to simple mortgagee—
 Receipt of rent, if amounts to payment of interest and
 principal as provided in lease ... S 20 N 28
 (b) Suit for sale of mortgaged property—Limitation ... A 135 N 2
- Subrogation
 (a) Person paying off mortgage in *bona fide* belief that he is
 entitled to equity of redemption is subrogated to right of
 mortgagee ... A 148 N 2

Mortgage—Subrogation—(Contd.)

- (b) Person paying off time-barred mortgage, whether gets any right ... A 132 N 14 F N 2
- (c) Person subrogated to rights of puisne mortgagee suing to enforce mortgage—Whether may set up prior mortgage as shield when suit to enforce barred ... S 3 N 15
- (d) Stranger paying off usufructuary mortgage—Whether subrogated to rights of mortgagee ... A 142 & 144 N 85
- (e) Suit for enforcement
 - (i) Decree obtained on mortgage at the time of payment
 - Limitation—Starting point ... A 132 N 14
 - (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 132 N 14

—Suit for mortgage money

- (a) Claim to recover mortgage amount under S. 68, Transfer of Property Act—S. 20, if applies ... S 20 N 4
- (b) Fraudulent mortgage of sir lands—Limitation ... A 116 N 22
- (c) Limitation ... A 62 N 7
- (d) Money paid upon registered mortgage but mortgaged property subsequently sold for payment of municipal taxes free of mortgage—Limitation ... A 97 N 10
- (e) Mortgage for term certain with default clause—Limitation—Starting point ... A 132 N 24
- (f) On ground that mortgagee has been defrauded by defendant and made to enter into mortgage transaction—Whether suit for breach of contract ... A 116 N 1
- (g) Out of surplus sale proceeds paid to mortgagor where mortgaged property is sold for arrears of revenue—Limitation... A 62 N 21

—Suit for profits

- (a) Mortgage by insolvent — Mortgage annulled by Insolvency Court—Application by official assignee for rents and profits from mortgagee, whether equivalent to suit for profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 12

—Suit for sale

- (a) Limitation
 - (i) Applicability of Art. 147 and Art. 132, distinguished... A 147 N 1
 - (ii) Starting point ... A 147; A 147 N 4
- (b) Whether suit for possession within S. 28 ... S 28 N 3

—Suit to enforce

- (a) Against substituted security—Limitation ... A 132 N 11
- (b) Claim by mortgagee disallowed under Civil P. O., O 21 R. 62—Subsequent suit to enforce mortgage—Limitation ... A 132 N 27
- (c) Limitation — Applicability of Art. 132 and Art. 147 distinguished ... A 147 N 1
- (d) Mortgage executed by Hindu father—Suit against father or his sons—Limitation ... A 132 N 9
- (e) Mortgage of turn of worship—Limitation ... A 120 N 41
- (f) Mortgage to secure loan in kind—Limitation A 116 N 22; A 132 N 21
- (g) Suit to enforce personal liability barred, if precludes suit to enforce mortgage ... S 3 N 14

—Suit to enforce lien—Not one to enforce right to possession and not governed by Art. 11-A ... A 11-A N 9

—Suit to set aside—Mortgage of joint family property by Hindu father—Suit by son to set aside—Limitation ... A 148 N 20

Mortgage—(Contd.)

—Suit upon

- (a) Accrual of mortgagee's cause of action for suit to enforce mortgage—Cause of action, if affected by fact that mortgaged property is submerged under water ... S 9 N 11
- (b) Extension of time—Mortgagee directed to pay mortgage amount immediately to holder of decree against mortgagor and obtain receipt—Mortgagee paying the money into Court more than a year thereafter—Payment, if has the effect of extending time ... S 20 N 18
- (c) Joinder of parties—Principles governing ... S 22 N 17
- (d) Limitation
 - (i) Starting point—Mortgagee, whether gets fresh cause of action where conveyance of portion of mortgaged property in discharge of claim under mortgage subsequently turns out to be inoperative ... A 132 N 25
 - (ii) Suspension of—Time, if suspended by mortgaged property becoming submerged under water ... A 132 N 25
- (e) Mortgage executed by deceased Hindu father—Mortgage binding on son—Suit against son—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- (f) Necessary parties not joined—No objection taken to non-joinder—Effect of ... S 22 N 25
- (g) Person interested not made party to suit—Subsequent suit against such person—Limitation—Starting point ... A 132 N 16
- (h) Suit barred by limitation—Right of mortgagee, whether extinguished by operation of S. 28, Limitation Act ... A 132 N 26

—Usufructuary mortgage

- (a) Equity of redemption—Whether can be adversely possessed ... A 142 & 144 N 7
- (b) Mortgage satisfied out of usufruct—Possession taken by one of co-mortgagors—Suit by other co-mortgagors is not governed by Art. 148 ... A 148 N 3
- (c) Right to redeem
 - (i) Whether admits of physical possession ... A 10 N 7
 - (ii) Whether property for the purposes of S. 28 ... S 28 N 5
- (d) Suit by mortgagee
 - (i) Covenant in mortgage deed that mortgage money is recoverable in case of default on part of mortgagor in delivering possession—Suit for mortgage money—Limitation ... A 116 N 22
 - (ii) For enforcing stipulation in mortgage instrument to give him possession—Limitation ... A 135 N 4
 - (iii) For equity of redemption—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
 - (iv) For mesne profits during period he was kept out of possession—Limitation ... A 116 N 23
 - (v) For mortgage money on failure of mortgagor to deliver possession—Limitation ... A 62 N 7
 - (vi) For profits during dispossession by mortgagor—Limitation ... A 109 N 6
 - (vii) For refund of money advanced on ground that property was already mortgaged with possession—Limitation : ... A 116 N 22
 - (viii) For rent of mortgaged property leased back to mortgagor himself—Limitation ... A 110 N 7

Mortgage—Usufructuary mortgage—Suit by mortgagee—(Contd.)

(ix) Mortgage of watan lands—Death of mortgagor—Suit

A 116 N 22

(x) N

superior title created by mortgagor—Suit for mortgage money—Limitation—Starting point ...

A 116 N 22

(e) Suit by mortgagor for recovery of mortgage money—Limitation ...

A 116 N 22

(f) Suit for redemption—Nature of ...

A 148 N 1a

—Usufructuary mortgagee

(a) Covenant in mortgage deed that mortgagee should pay Government revenue—Default by mortgagee—Portion of mortgaged properties sold for arrears of revenue—Suit by mortgagor against mortgagee for compensation—Limitation:

A 116 N 22

(b) Failure of mortgagee to give back possession—Whether a continuing breach of contract ...

S 23 N 9

(c) Lease by—Rights of parties ...

A 110 N 7

(d) Lease by mortgagee to mortgagor for two years with agreement to charge lease amount on mortgaged property—After two years, mortgagor becoming tenant from year to year by mortgagee accepting rent—Subsequent suit by mortgagee for rent—Limitation ...

A 110 N 7

(e) Lease to third person by mortgagee—Mortgage redeemed by mortgagor—Suit by mortgagor for rent from lessee, whether maintainable ...

A 110 N 7

(f) Mortgagee dispossessed by mortgagor—Suit by mortgagee for profits received by mortgagor—Limitation ...

A 109 N 6

(g) Mortgagee's duty to account for rent and profits in redemption suit even if separate suit for same would have been barred ...

S 3 N 14

(h) Receipt of rents and profits by mortgagee—Whether amounts to payment for purposes of S. 20 ...

S 20 N 28

(i) Suit for redemption—Usufructuary mortgagee also holding simple mortgage—Whether he can in defence to suit for redemption of usufructuary mortgage claim that simple mortgage should also be redeemed ...

A 132 N 26

—Void mortgage

(a) Person entering into possession under void mortgage—Before 12 years, property sold to him under void sale deed—His possession from date of sale becomes that of owner ...

A 148 N 9

(b) Suit on

(i) Mortgagee entering into possession under void mortgage—Suit by mortgagor against mortgagee as trespasser for recovery

(a) Art. 148 inapplicable ...

A 148 N 9

(b) Limitation—Starting point ...

A 148 N 9

(ii) Person entering into possession under void mortgage—Suit against him after 12 years for recovery of property—Limitation ...

A 148 N 9

(c) Title acquired by—Person entering into possession under void mortgage can only prescribe for mortgagee's title ...

A 148 N 9

—Whether alienation within Art. 125 ...

A 125 N 13

—Whether transfer for valuable consideration within Art. 134-B:

A 134ABC N 7

Motion

—Notice of—Whether application for limitation purposes ... A 183 N 3

Moveable property

—Attachment of, in execution of decree—Moveable property put in custody of sapurdar—Objection to attachment—Court upholding objection—Suit by objector for recovery—Limitation ... A 143 N 3

—Conveyed or bequeathed in trust—Afterwards bought for valuable consideration—Recovery of—Suit for

(a) By beneficiary to recover trust property pledged with hawk
—Limitation applicable ... A 48A N 3

(b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 48A; A 48A N 1

—Deposited

(a) Afterwards bought from depositary—Recovery of, from purchaser—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ... A 48A N 1

(b) Suit for

(i) Against depositary

(a) Allegation of plaintiff, whether sole basis for ascertaining period of limitation applicable to such suit ... A 145 N 7

(b) For redemption of pledge—Limitation... ... A 145 N 7

(ii) Against legal representative of deceased depositary—Limitation ... A 145 N 5

(iii) Applicability of Art. 49 and Art. 145 ... A 145 N 4

(iv) Limitation—Starting point ... A 49 N 2; A 145; 145 N 6

—Meaning of, within Art. 145 ... A 145 N 2

—Partition and possession of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 38

—Pawnee—See under Pawnee.

—Possession of—Suit for

(a) By Hindu or Mahomedan who is entitled to possession on death of Hindu or Mahomedan female—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 11

(b) Cases governed by residuary Art. 120 ... A 120 N 11

—Recovery of—Suit for

(a) By reversioner—See under Reversioner.

(b) Limitation—Applicability of Art. 49 and Art. 145 ... A 145 N 4

—Seizure of, under legal process—Suit for compensation—Limitation ... A 28 N 1

—Specific moveable property

(a) Acquired by misappropriation or conversion—Suit for

(i) Conversion of property, whether must have been dis-
posed of ... A 48 N 6
... A 48; A 48 N 9

... still be in possession of defendants for applicability of Art. 48 ... A 48 N 11

(iv) Plaintiff, whether must have right in possession of property claimed, for applicability of Art. 48 ... A 48 N 2

(b) Acquired by theft—Suit for

(i) For value of such property as damages—Limitation ... A 48 N 5

(ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 48; A 48 N 5; A 48 N 9

(iii) Moveable property, whether must still be in possession of defendants for applicability of Art. 48 ... A 48 N 11

(iv) Plaintiff, whether must have right in possession of property claimed for applicability of Art. 48 ... A 48 N 2

Moveable property—Specific moveable property—(Contd.)**(c) Conversion of—Suit for compensation**

(i) Successive conversions by more than one person—

Limitation—Starting point ... A 49 N 11

(ii) Successive conversions by same person—Limitation—

Starting point ... A 49 N 10

(d) Cost—Suit for

(i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 48; A 48 N 4; A 48 N 9

(ii) Moveable property, whether must still be in possession of defendants for applicability of Art. 48 ...

A 48 N 11

(iii) Plaintiff, whether must have right to possession of property for applicability of Art. 48 ...

A 48 N 2

(e) Injury to

(i) Suit by mortgagee for compensation for depreciation of mortgage security through acts of stranger—Limitation ...

A 49 N 7

(ii) Suit for — Where plaintiff's vessel was injured by collision with defendant's vessel—Limitation ...

A 49 N 7

(iii) What is, within Art. 49 ...

A 49 N 7

—Limitation: A 49 N 4

property—Limitation ... to moveable ...

A 49 N 2

(ii) Where possession of owner is unlawful—Limitation: ...

A 49 N 4

(g) Reliefs in respect of—Suit for — Limitation — Art. 48 and Art. 49, distinguished ...

A 48 N 2

(h) Suit for

(i) For title deeds deposited with mortgagee after mortgage has been redeemed—Limitation—Starting point ...

A 49 N 9

(ii) General and specific provisions of limitation ...

A 49 N 2

(iii) Limitation ...

A 49

(iv) Where defendant is not in possession or control of property claimed—Limitation ...

A 49 N 4

(v) Where property deposited is wrongfully detained by depository—Limitation ...

A 49 N 2

(i) What is ...

A 48 N 3

(i) Books, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(ii) Fixtures, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(iii) Government promissory notes, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(iv) Huts, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(v) Idol of Thakur, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(vi) Money, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(vii) Mortgage deeds, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(viii) Property which becomes moveable only by act of defendant, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(ix) Share certificates, whether specific moveable property: ...

A 48 N 3

(x) Share in specific moveable property, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(xi) Standing crops, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(xii) Standing trees, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 3

(xiii) Title deeds of property, whether specific moveable property ...

A 48 N 2

Moveable property—Specific moveable property—(Contd.)

(j) Wrongful taking, injury or detention of—Compensation for	
(i) Meaning of	A 49 N 5
(ii) Suit for	
(a) Burden of proof as to "wrongful taking"	A 49 N 6
(b) Limitation	A 49
(k) Wrongful taking or detention of—Compensation for—Suit for	
(i) Applicability of Art. 48 and Art. 49—Distinction between	A 48 N 7
(ii) Limitation—Starting point	A 48; A 48 N 9
(iii) Moveable property, whether must still be in possession of defendants for applicability of Art. 48	A 48 N 11
(iv) Plaintiff whether must have right to possession of property claimed for applicability of Art. 48	A 48 N 2
(v) Where defendant merely causes deprivation of possession of property in hands of plaintiff but does not himself take or detain property—Limitation	A 48 N 7
(vi) Where plaintiff has no right to possession of property at the time of the wrongful taking or detention—Limitation	A 48 N 9
(l) Wrongfully taking or detaining—What is	A 48 N 7
—Trespass upon—Compensation for—Limitation	A 89 N 2
—What is	
(a) Debt, whether moveable property within Art. 29	A 29 N 5
(b) Money, whether moveable property within Art. 29	A 29 N 5
(c) Standing crops, whether moveable property	A 29 N 5
—Whether includes money	A 89 N 6
—Wrongful seizure of	
(a) Attachment of standing crops, whether seizure of moveable property within meaning of Art. 29	A 29 N 5
(b) Attachment of third person's property; whether actionable without proof of malice	A 29 N 3
(c) Attachment of third person's property, whether wrongful seizure within Art. 29	A 29 N 2
(d) Compensation for—Suit for	
(i) Actual seizure, whether necessary for maintainability of suit	A 29 N 3
(ii) Applicability of Arts 29, 29 and 36	A 29 N 1
(iii) Compensation claimed—Form of	A 29 N 6
(iv) Dismissal of suit, whether bars another under O. 21, R 63, Civil P. C., with claim for damages for wrongful seizure as relief consequent to declaration prayed for	A 29 N 8
(v) Limitation—Starting point	A 29 N 8
(vi) Suit for recovery of amount taken by defendant from Government treasury, whether one for compensation for wrongful seizure of moveable property	A 29 N 6
(vii) Suit for seizure of standing crops belonging to plaintiff	
—Limitation	A 29 N 5
(viii) Time during which property remains in <i>custodia legis</i> , whether excluded	A 29 N 8
(ix) Time spent in prosecuting claim petition in attaching Court, whether excluded	A 29 N 8

Moveable property—Wrongful seizure of—Compensation for, suit for —			
<i>(Contd.)</i>			
(x) Time spent in suit under Civil P. C., O 21, R. 63, whether excluded	A 29 N 8
(e) What is—Illustrative cases	A 29 N 2
(f) Whether means actual handling of property by person seizing it	A 29 N 3
—Wrongful seizure of, under legal process			
(a) Compensation for—Suit for			
(i) Art. 11 and Art. 29 distinguished	A 11 N 10
(ii) Limitation	A 29
(b) Distraint effected by landlord under provisions of Agra Tenancy Act, whether seizure under legal process	A 29 N 4
Mukhtear			
—Smt by, for costs—Limitation	A 84 N 2
Municipality			
—Adverso possession against—In respect of drains on sides of public street—What amounts to	A 146A N 5
—Suit against—For refund of money legally collected but wrongfully refused to be refunded—Limitation	A 62 N 7
—Suit by			
(a) In respect of land entrusted to municipality by Government for management—Limitation	A 149 N 6
(b) Limitation	A 149 N 6
Mutation			
—Of name in revenue register—Suit to compel—Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 50
Mutawalli			
—Office of—Suit for possession—Limitation	A 120 N 33
Native Prince			
—Suit against—Permission of Government—Time taken for obtaining permission—Whether can be excluded in computing period of limitation	S 9 N 6
Neglect			
—Of agent			
(a) Suit for, by principal—Limitation—Starting point ...	A 90, A 90 N 1;	...	A 90 N 4
(b) What amounts to	A 90 N 2
(c) When actionable	A 90 N 2
—Of deceased agent—Suit for, against legal representative—Maintainability	A 90 N 5
—Of legal practitioner—When actionable	A 90 N 2
—Suit for			
(a) Against director of company—Limitation	A 90 N 3
(b) Against lambardar—Limitation	A 90 N 3
Negligence			
—See under Delay, excuse of—Sufficient cause—Negligence.			
—Dismissal of suit on ground that plaintiff was negligent—Whether entitles him to benefit of S. 14	S 14 N 22
—Of pleader or clerk—Party suffering from—Liability in damages :			S 5 N 11
Negotiable Instrument			
—Shahjog hundi if a negotiable instrument	S 2 Cl 2 N 1

Negotiable Instruments Act

—Words "bill of exchange" as defined in ... S 2 Cl 2 N 1

Non-feasance

—Compensation for—Suit for

- (a) Against trustee—Limitation ... A 36 N 8
 - (b) Applicability of general Art. 36 to cases falling under other specific Articles ... A 36 N 1
 - (c) Application under Indian Companies Act, S. 244 — Limitation ... A 36 N 1
 - (d) For recovery of specific property—Limitation ... A 36 N 3
 - (e) In case of recurring cause of action—Limitation — Starting point ... A 36 N 4
 - (f) In respect of non-feasance independent of contract — Limitation ... A 36; A 36 N 1
 - (g) In respect of non-feasance not independent of contract—Illustrative cases ... A 36 N 2
 - (h) In respect of wrongs independent of contract — Illustrative cases within Art. 36 ... A 36 N 7
 - (i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 36 N 4
 - (j) Whether modified in cases governed by Limitation Act, S. 24 ... A 36 N 4
- Meaning of ... A 36 N 1

Notice

- Giving of—What is ... A 158 N 4
- Of motion—Whether application for limitation purposes ... A 183 N 3

Nuisance

- Causing of nuisance by throwing latrine water through a hole in the wall—Whether a continuing wrong... S 23 N 18

Office

- Annual payments attached to—Right to — Whether barred where right to office is lost ... A 131 N 2
- Hereditary office
 - (a) Dwaris of temple—Emoluments of—Does payable as — Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 40
 - (b) Holder of—Money due to plaintiff as — Suit for moneys as marriage dues—Limitation ... A 120 N 39

... necessary for
... A 124 N 6
... A 124 N 2

- (iii) Suit against office-holder, whether dies his successor also ... A 124 N 15
- (iv) By Malabar stani for possession of Devaswom and its properties — Limitation ... A 124 N 2
- (v) Decree against shebait — Decree-holder in execution purchasing share of profits of shebait — Inability of decree-holder being non-Brahmin to hold office of shebait—Suit by reversioner of defendant shebait for declaration of his right to receive share of profits of shebait—Limitation ... A 124 N 5
- (vi) Decree that person in possession of office has no title thereto, whether interrupts running of time in favour of such person ... A 124 N 6

Office—Hereditary office—Possession of, suit for—(Contd.)

- (vii) Defendant obtaining letters of administration as heir to office — Whether can plead limitation against real heir A 124 N 10
- (viii) Defendant, whether entitled to tack on possession of independent trespasser to that of his own in establishing plea of prescription A 124 N 7
- (ix) Defendant, whether entitled to tack on the adverse possession of predecessor to that of his own in establishing plea of prescription A 124 N 7
- (x) For declaration of plaintiff's right to office and for possession—Limitation A 124 N 5
- (xi) For declaration of plaintiff's title to office and for recovery of emoluments thereof—Limitation A 124 N 5
- (xii) For declaration that plaintiff is entitled to office—Limitation A 124 N 5
- (xiii) For directing defendants to produce their accounts of office—Limitation A 124 N 5
- (xiv) Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 33; A 124; A 124 N 2; A 124 N 13
- (xv) Office and property attached thereto — Suit based on title by adoption—Limitation A 124 N 12
- (xvi) Office of trustee—Limitation A 124 N 2
- (xvii) Office or property attached to office — Limitation Act, S. 10, whether applies A 124 N 11
- (xviii) Office-holder, whether entitled to possession of property, where only right to share of revenues of property and not right to its possession, is attached to office A 124 N 11
- (xix) Permissive possession of office of defendant—Whether adverse possession essential for applicability of Art. 124 A 124 N 6
- (xx) Profits, where right to receive profits is attached to hereditary office— Suit, whether barred if right to office is barred A 124 N 11
- (xxi) Property attached to office—Suit, whether barred if right to possession of office is barred A 124 N 11
- (xxii) Restraining defendant from obstructing plaintiff in the enjoyment of his office—Limitation A 124 N 5
- (xxiii) Right to office extinguished by virtue of S. 28, Limitation Act, whether revived subsequently by re-entry into possession A 124 N 14
- (xxiv) Right to office, whether becomes extinguished under S. 28, Limitation Act, where suit for possession of office is barred A 124 N 14
- (xxv) Time, whether will run where there is no person competent to sue A 124 N 13
- (d) Right to sue for, accruing during insanity — Recovery from insanity within six years of accrual of right to sue—Extension of time, if available S 8 Illus 2
- (e) Suit for possession of—Starting point of limitation—Whether postponed when cause of action accrues to estate of deceased person S 17, S 17 N 2

Office—Hereditary Office—(Contd.)

(i) What is	A 124 N 4
(i) Entirely new office created for first time, whether hereditary	A 124 N 9
(ii) Maharku Vatan, whether hereditary office	A 124 N 4
(iii) Membership of Devasthanam Committee appointed by Government under Religious Endowments Act, whether hereditary office	A 124 N 4
(iv) Office of karnam, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(v) Office of Malabar etanom, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(vi) Office of monigar, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(vii) Office of mutawalli of wakf, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(viii) Office of Pandarasannidhis, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(ix) Office of Samudayi of Hindu temple in Malabar, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(x) Office of shebait, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(xi) Office, succession to which is by nomination or appointment, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(xii) Testator after appointing two persons as trustees directing that after their office should become hereditary—Such office, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
—Hereditary officers—Devolution of right to sue	S 2 Cl 8 N 6
—Holder of—Removal of—Suit for				
(a) Defendant sought to be removed on ground of change of religious views—Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 33
(b) Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 33
—Non-hereditary office				
(a) Possession of—Suit for				
(i) Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 33
(ii) Limitation applicable to suit for possession of hereditary office	A 124 N 2
(iii) Office and lands attached to it—Limitation	A 120 N 33
(iv) Right of owner, whether barred by S. 28, Lim. Act, if suit is not brought within prescribed time	A 120 N 33
(b) Suit for office of Mutawalli—Limitation	A 120 N 33
—Possession of				
(a) What is				
(i) Performance of duties of office without receipts of profits therefrom, whether possession of office	A 124 N 8
(ii) Receipts of profits without performance of duties of office, whether possession of office	A 124 N 8
(b) When possessed	A 124 N 8
—Religious office—Cause of action accruing to holder of religious office as such—Succeeding holder, if entitled to fresh period of limitation	S 9 N 10
—What is	A 124 N 3
Officer				
—Of Government—Who is, within Art. 14	A 14 N 5
Order				
—Date of, what is	A 151 N 3
—Declaring plaintiff's right to payment of money from defendant—Enforcement of—Suit upon—Where no provision is made for execution of order—Maintainability—Limitation...	A 122 N 1

Order—(Contd.)

- Directing heir to produce certificate of heirship before payment of money claimed could be made—Subsequent suit by heir for recovery of money—Limitation A 14 N 2
- Ex parte* order
 - (a) In execution—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
 - (b) Of adjudication of insolvent—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
 - (c) Under Civil P. C., O. 21, R. 50, sub-r. 2—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
 - (d) Under Civil P. C., S. 152—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
 - (e) Under Companies Act, S. 150—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation ... A 164 N 2
- 'Judgment' in Letters Patent, whether equivalent to order within Art. 151 A 151 N 3
- Granting certificate of heirship on strength of alleged will—Whether must be set aside by person suing recipient of certificate for recovery of property of deceased on ground that he was intestate heir A 13 N 1
- In proceeding other than suit—What is A 13 N 2
 - (a) Order on application by Official Receiver to release properties attached before judgment in suit, whether order in proceeding other than suit A 13 N 2
 - (b) Order in dispute initiated by application, whether order in proceeding other than suit A 13 N 2
 - (c) Order in execution proceeding in a suit, whether order in proceeding other than suit A 13 N 2
 - (d) Order on application under Civil P. C., O. 21 R. 89, whether order in proceeding other than suit A 13 N 2
- Necessary to be set aside—Plaintiff framing suit in different manner—Whether can evade limitation applicable to suit for setting aside act or order A 14 N 2
- Not binding on plaintiff—Illustrative cases A 14 N 2
- Not necessary to be set aside—Prayer by plaintiff for setting aside order—Effect of A 14 N 2
- Of Civil Court
 - A 13 N 4
 - ... without setting aside order—Limitation A 13 N 1
 - (m) Test to find out whether suit is one for setting aside order A 13 N 1
 - (b) When needs to be set aside A 13 N 1
- Of Civil Court in proceeding other than suit—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation A 13
- Of Collector dismissing application by mortgagor for redeeming mortgage under Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act—Subsequent suit under S. 12 of same Act for redeeming mortgage—Limitation A 14 N 2
- Of Government officer
 - (a) Illustrative cases where it is not necessary for plaintiff to set aside order A 14 N 2

Office—Hereditary Office—(Contd.)

(f) What is	A 124 N 4
(i) Entirely new office created for first time, whether hereditary	A 124 N 9
(ii) Mabarki Vatan, whether hereditary office	A 124 N 4
(iii) Membership of Devasthanam Committee appointed by Government under Religious Endowments Act, whether hereditary office	A 124 N 4
(iv) Office of karnam, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(v) Office of Malabar stanom, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(vi) Office of monigar, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(vii) Office of mutawalli of wakt, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(viii) Office of Pandarasannidhis, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(ix) Office of Samndayi of Hindu temple in Malabar, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(x) Office of shebait, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(xi) Office, succession to which is by nomination or appointment, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
(xii) Testator appointing two persons as trustees directing that after their office should become hereditary—Such office, whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
—Hereditary officers—Devolution of right to sue	S 2 C 18 N 6
—Holder of—Removal of—Suit for				
(a) Defendant sought to be removed on ground of change of religious views—Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 33
(b) Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 33
—Non-hereditary office				
(a) Possession of—Suit for				
(i) Limitation—Starting point	A 120 N 33
(ii) Limitation applicable to suit for possession of hereditary office	A 124 N 2
(iii) Office and lands attached to it—Limitation	A 120 N 33
(iv) Right of owner, whether barred by S. 28, Lim. Act, if suit is not brought within prescribed time	A 120 N 33
(b) Suit for office of Mutawalli—Limitation	A 120 N 33
—Possession of				
(a) What is				
(i) Performance of duties of office without receipts of profits therefrom, whether possession of office	A 124 N 8
(ii) Receipts of profits without performance of duties of office, whether possession of office	A 124 N 8
(b) When possessed	A 124 N 8
—Religious office—Cause of action accruing to holder of religious office as such—Succeeding holder, if entitled to fresh period of limitation	S 9 N 10
—What is	A 124 N 3
Officer				
—Of Government—Who is, within Art. 14	A 14 N 5
Order				
—Date of, what is	A 151 N 3
—Declaring plaintiff's right to payment of money from defendant—Enforcement of—Suit upon—Where no provision is made for execution of order—Maintainability—Limitation...	A 122 N 1

Order—(Contd.)

- Directing heir to produce certificate of heirship before payment of money claimed could be made—Subsequent suit by heir for recovery of money—Limitation A 14 N 2
- Ex parte* order
 - (a) In execution—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation .. A 164 N 2
 - (b) Of adjudication of insolvent—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation .. A 164 N 2
 - (c) Under Civil P C, O. 21, R. 50, sub-r 2—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation .. A 164 N 2
 - (d) Under Civil P C., S. 152—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation .. A 164 N 2
 - (e) Under Companies Act, S. 150—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation .. A 164 N 2
- 'Judgment' in Letters Patent, whether equivalent to order within Art. 151 .. A 151 N 3
- Granting certificate of heirship on strength of alleged will—Whether must be set aside by person suing recipient of certificate for recovery of property of deceased on ground that he was intestate heir .. A 18 N 1
- In proceeding other than suit—What is .. A 18 N 2
 - (a) Order on application by Official Receiver to release properties attached before judgment in suit, whether order in proceeding other than suit .. A 18 N 2
 - (b) Order in dispute initiated by application, whether order in proceeding other than suit .. A 18 N 2
 - (c) Order in execution proceeding in a suit, whether order in .. A 18 N 2
 - C, O. 21 R 89, whether .. A 18 N 2
- Necessary to be set aside—Plaintiff framing suit in different manner—Whether can evade limitation applicable to suit for setting aside act or order .. A 14 N 2
- Not binding on plaintiff—Illustrative cases .. A 14 N 2
- Not necessary to be set aside—Prayer by plaintiff for setting aside order—Effect of .. A 14 N 2
- Of Civil Court
 - (a) Setting aside—Suit for
 - (i) Limitation—Starting point .. A 13 N 4
 - (ii) Suit for relief which plaintiff can seek without setting aside order—Limitation .. A 13 N 1
 - (iii) Test to find out whether suit is one for setting aside order .. A 13 N 1
 - (b) When needs be set aside .. A 13 N 1
- Of Civil Court in proceeding other than suit—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation .. A 13
- Of Collector dismissing application by mortgagor for redeeming mortgage under Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act—Subsequent suit under S. 12 of same Act for redeeming mortgage—Limitation .. A 14 N 2
- Of Government officer
 - (a) Illustrative cases where it is not necessary for plaintiff to set aside order .. A 14 N 2

Order—Of Government Officer—(Contd.)

- (b) Setting aside—Suit for
 - (i) Illustrative cases of orders not governed by Art. 14 ... A 14 N 3
 - (ii) In respect of merely executive order—Limitation applicable ... A 14 N 4
 - (iii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 14 N 6
 - (iv) Order, whether must be binding on plaintiff for applicability of Art. 14 ... A 14 N 2
 - (v) Residuary provision of limitation ... A 14
 - (vi) "Setting aside," whether implies order binding upon plaintiff until and unless it is set aside ... A 14 N 2
 - (vii) Time occupied in proceedings before revenue authorities, whether excluded ... A 14 N 6
- (c) When is nullity ... A 14 N 3
- (d) When need not be set aside ... A 14 N 3
- Of Insolvency Court leaving open question of title to properties —
- Suit for declaration of title to properties—Limitation ... A 13 N 1
- Of Privy Council—
- (a) Limitation ... A 183 N 7
- (b) Art. 183, whether refers to Civil P. C., S. 48 ... A 183 N 2
- (c) For restitution as a result of order of Privy Council—Limitation ... A 183 N 4
- (d) Limitation—Starting point ... A 183; A 183 N 2; A 183 N 8
- (e) Order of Privy Council—What is within Art. 183 ... A 183 N 7
- (f) Revivor of order—What constitutes ... A 183 N 10
- (g) Ss. 6, 7 and 8, Lim. Act, whether govern Art. 183 ... A 183 N 9
- (h) Where applicant is legally incapacitated ... A 183 N 9
- Of revenue officer
- (a) Disallowing petition for registering petitioner's name as owner —Subsequent suit by petitioner for declaration of his rights —Limitation ... A 14 N 2
- (b) Rejecting application for partition of *Shamilat*—Subsequent suit for declaration of plaintiff's right to proportionate share of *Shamilat*—Limitation ... A 14 N 2
- Order for confirmation of Court sale—Application for—Limitation ... A 181 N 2
- Passed against person in private capacity — Whether binding on him in representative capacity ... A 47 N 3
- Passed against person in representative capacity—Whether binding on all persons so represented ... A 47 N 3
- Passed by High Court in its insolvency jurisdiction—Enforcement of—Suit for—Maintainability—Limitation ... A 122 N 1
- Passed in favour of a person—Whether can be said to be binding on him ... A 47 N 3
- Passed without jurisdiction—Whether binding on anyone ... A 47 N 3
- Person bound by, claiming under—Person when can be said to claim under one bound by order ... A 47 N 4
- Revivor of—What constitutes ... A 183 N 10
- Setting aside
- (a) Suit for
 - (i) Order under S. 310-A, Civil P. C., 1882, setting aside sale in execution—Limitation ... A 120 N 2

Order—Setting aside—Suit for—(Contd.)

(ii) To declare appointment of person as member of temple committee under Act 20 of 1863 by order of District Magistrate invalid and for injunction restraining him from performing duties of committee member—Whether really one for setting aside order . . . A 13 N 1

(iii) Where relief asked for is on the strength of and in conformity with order—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for setting aside act or order . . . A 14 N 2

(b) Where necessary—Order null and void as made without jurisdiction, whether must be set aside . . . A 14 N 2

(c) Where not necessary—Illustrative cases . . . A 14 N 2

—Ultra vires orders—Examples of . . . A 14 N 3

—When binds a person . . . A 47 N 3

—Whether rendered null by irregularity not occasioning failure of justice . . . A 47 N 5

Ordinance 2 of 1932

—Whether special law within the meaning of S. 29 . . . S 29 N 6

Oudh Civil Digest

—Paragraph 389—Application for copy accompanied by insufficient deposit—Deficiency made up after requisition by office—Time requisite for obtaining copy to be calculated only from date on which deficiency was made up . . . S 12 N 14

Oudh Rent Act

—Section 108—Application under—Delay in filing—Excuse of . . . S 5 N 4

Ouster

—Co-owner—See Adverse possession—Co-owners.

Paper Currency Act

—Section 26—Promissory note executed in lieu of prior debt, failing as contravening S. 26—Suit on original cause of action—Promissory note, if can be used as acknowledgment of liability . . . S 19 N 64

Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act

—Parsi woman suing for divorce—Age of majority, when attained : S'6 N 24

Parties—See also Party.

—Addition of parties after limitation—Effect—Bar of suit as against parties added—Illustrations . . . S 22 N 6

—Meaning of . . . A 168 N 4

—Person, if becomes party only on service of summons on him . . . S 22 N 6

—Substitution or addition of new party after institution of suit—Suit, when will be deemed to be instituted as regards such party. S 22; A 19 N 2

Partition

—Application for final decree—Not an application for execution . . . A 182 N 17

—Decree for—Execution of—See under Execution.

—Of cash—Suit for—Limitation . . . A 120 N 12

—Of family business—Suit for—Limitation . . . A 120 N 38

—Partition and possession of moveable property—Limitation . . . A 120 N 38

—Partition suit—Final decree in, application for—Limitation . . . A 181 N 16

—Re-opening of—Suit for, on ground of mistake—Limitation . . . A 127 N 14

Partition—(Contd.)

- Right to sue for joint possession extinguished by operation of S. 28
- Right to claim partition and recovery of share also lost ... S 28 N 6
- Suit for—Plaintiff claiming sum in addition to proper share on account of matters in respect of which suit would have been barred—Claim, if can be decreed ... S 3 N 14 FN 13
- Suit in respect of—By minor, to question partition, where minor had been represented by mother—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 38
- Suit to set aside—Discharge—Manager of joint Hindu family—Capacity of, to give discharge ... S 7 N 16

Partner

- Co-partner—Payment of common liability by one co-partner in excess of share—Whether payment for other co-partners within Art. 61 ... A 61 N 6
- Sub-partner—Sub-partner liable to partner only in main partnership
- Suit against, by partner in main partnership, for contribution of share of losses sustained by partner in main partnership—Limitation ... A 61 N 10
- Suit by
 - (a) Against co-partners for contribution for amount paid under decree for debt contracted in his name for partnership business under agreement of partners—Whether one for contribution for payment by plaintiff of whole or more than his share of amount due under joint decree ... A 99 N 2
 - (b) Against manager of firm, for moveable property received by manager—Limitation ... A 89 N 3
 - (c) Against sub-partner, for loss sustained by partner in main partnership—Limitation ... A 120 N 27
 - (d) For accounts without prayer for dissolution of partnership—Limitation ... A 120 N 27
- Whether agent of another partner ... A 89 N 7

Partnership—See also under Partner.

- Accounts
 - (a) Suit for—Accounts of other partnerships, if can be gone into even if suit for such accounts be barred ... S 3 N 14 FN 13
 - (b) Suit on adjusted accounts which entitles plaintiff to sue by virtue of adjustment—Limitation ... A 115 N 3
- Death of one partner—Cause of action accruing in favour of his representatives to sue other partners for account—S. 17, if applies ... S 17 N 4
- Debt due to firm—Partner's capacity to give discharge in respect of it ... S 7 N 9
- Debt due to stranger from firm—Letter by son of one partner advertising to debt and promising to pay it—On father's death, son becoming one of the persons liable to pay debt—Suit for debt—Son's statement when he had no interest in firm can be used against him as acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 33
- Dissolution
 - (a) Arrangement that share of one in commission earned should be recovered by the other and held for him—Trust for specific purpose, if created ... S 10 N 13

Partnership—Dissolution—(Contd.)**(b) Suit for**

(i) Claim in time when made, not adjudicated within three years—Claim, if rendered bad against partner.

ship assets S 3 N 14 F N 13

(ii) Limitation A 120 N 27

(iii) Whether one for rescission of contract A 114 N 1

—Dissolution and accounts of—Suit for—Whether suit for accounts of dissolved partnership A 106 N 4

—Dissolved partnership

(a) Question when partnership is dissolved, whether binding in second appeal A 106 N 15

(b) Question whether and when partnership has been dissolved, how decided A 106 N 13

(c) Suit for accounts—*See under Accounts.*

(d) Suit for winding up dissolved partnership, whether suit for accounts of dissolved partnership A 106 N 4

—Existing partnership

(a) Dissolution of—Suit for—Limitation A 120 N 2

(b) Relief on basis of—Suit for—Suit in substance one for account and share of dissolved partnership—Whether can be treated as one for account and share of dissolved partnership A 106 N 2

—Firm

(a) Prior suit against firm—Subsequent suit against surviving partners of firm and persons in possession of deceased partner's assets—Whether both against same parties for purposes of S. 14 S 14 N 16

(b) Whether the same party as the individuals thereof for the purposes of S. 14 S 14 N 16

—Meaning of A 106 N 3

(a) Family business carried on by Hindu family, if partnership: A 106 N 3

—Partners under disability at the commencement of limitation—

Whether entitled to additional period of limitation S 7 N 13

—Partners, whether persons jointly entitled to sue within S. 7 S 7 N 24

—Partnership suit—Final decree in—Application for—Limitation A 161 N 16

—Share in partnership of ginning factory, whether immovable property within Art 141 A 141 N 11

—Suit against—Some partners absent from British India for a certain period—Plaintiff can exclude period of their absence only as against them S 13 N 5

—Suit by one partner against another partner for partnership accounts without impleading third partner—Third partner added after period of limitation—Whole suit, if becomes barred S 22 N 5

—Suit to establish plaintiff's right as partner and for accounts—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 27

—Whether one partner can give discharge on behalf of all partners S 7 N 24

—Whether one partner has authority to pay on behalf of firm S 21 N 13

Partnership Act

—Section 45—"Acts done" after death of partner—Whether include acknowledgments of liability and part payments or payment of interest S 21 N 13

Party—*See also* Parties.

- Addition of—Application by person to get himself added as party to suit under Civil P. C., O. 22 R. (10)—Limitation ... A 181 N 20
- Necessary party, addition of
 - (a) Application for—Limitation ... A 181 N 20
 - (b) Power of—Whether can be exercised by Court *suo motu* ... A 181 N 20
 - (c) Power of Court to add party and duty of Court to dismiss suit against that party on ground of limitation, distinguished: A 181 N 20

Patni

- Sale for arrears of rent—Sale set aside by decree—Suit by purchaser against landlord for refund of money paid—Cause of action, if affected by fact that decree is appealed against and confirmed in appeal ... S 9 N 11
- Sale of patni taluq for arrears of rent
 - (a) Incumbrances in—Avoidance of
 - (i) Mere fact of purchaser creating a patni himself, whether sufficient to show that option has been exercised where under Provincial Rent and Revenue Acts such incumbrances are voidable at the option of purchaser: A 121 N 1
 - (ii) Suit for
 - (a) Burden of proof ... A 121 N 2; A 121 N 5
 - (b) Incumbrances to be avoided, whether must be created subsequent to creation of estate or tenure sold, for maintainability of suit ... A 121 N 2
 - (c) Limitation—Starting point: A 121; A 121 N 1; A 121 N 5
 - (b) Sale set aside—Suit by auction purchaser for refund of purchase money—Limitation ... A 62 N 20
 - (c) Sale set aside for irregularity—Suit by landlord for the same arrears
 - (i) Landlord, if entitled to fresh period of limitation ... S 9 N 11
 - (ii) Limitation for suit, if runs from date of setting aside of sale ... S 9 N 5
 - (d) Surplus sale proceeds paid to one of the owners—Subsequent setting aside of sale and restoration in appeal—Whether affects running of limitation in respect of share of other owners in sale proceeds ... S 9 N 11
 - (e) Under-tenures in—Avoidance of
 - (i) Mere fact of purchaser creating a patni himself, whether sufficient to show that option has been exercised where under Provincial Rent and Revenue Acts such under-tenures are voidable at the option of purchaser: A 121 N 1
 - (ii) Suit for
 - (a) Burden of proof ... A 121 N 2; A 121 N 6
 - (b) Limitation—Starting point: A 121; A 121 N 1; A 121 N 6
 - (c) Under-tenures to be avoided, whether must be created subsequent to creation of estate or tenure sold, for maintainability of suit ... A 121 N 2
- Sale of, set aside for irregularity—Suit by zamindar against patnidar for rent—Cause of action for, when arises ... S 9 N 7

Patnidar

- Suit by—For possession of chaukidari chakran lands transferred by Government to zamindar—Limitation ... A 113 N 3

Pauper

- Appeal as—*See also under Appeal.*
- Appeal as—Subsequent acquisition of property and payment of court-fee—Delay, if due to sufficient cause ... S 5 N 29 F N 1
- Appeal by—Institution of—What constitutes ... S 3 N 12
- Application for leave to appeal as pauper—If governed by S. 13 ... S 12 N 4
- Leave to appeal as—Application for—Delay in filing, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3
- Prosecution of application to sue as pauper made *mala fide* as to pauperism—Whether entitles party to benefit of S. 14 ... S 14 N 20
- Suit by—Institution of
 - (a) Leave to sue as pauper refused—Suit, when instituted ... S 3 N 12
 - (b) What constitutes ... S 3 N 12

Pawnee

- Legal representative of—*See under Legal representative.*
- Purchaser of moveable property from—Suit against, for recovery
 - Limitation—Starting point ... A 48.A N 1
- Suit against, for moveable property pawned
 - (a) Allegation of plaintiff as to deposit, whether sole basis for ascertaining period of limitation applicable to such suit—Limitation ... A 145 N 7
 - (b) Applicability of Art. 49 and Art. 145 ... A 145 N 4
 - (c) Limitation—Starting point ... A 145; A 145 N 6
 - (d) Suit for redemption of pledge—Limitation ... A 145 N 7

Payment

- After dissolution of partnership, by partner who has been authorized to wind up the business—Whether binding on ex partners ... S 21 N 13
- Agent duly authorized
 - (a) Exercise of authority need not be obligatory ... S 20 N 18
 - (b) Meaning of—Whether includes authority given by law as well as by act of parties ... S 20 N 18
- And acknowledgment—Distinction between ... S 21 N 6
- Authority to make
 - (a) Authority need not be special one in respect of loan in question ... S 20 N 18
 - (b) Authority specific only to pay towards principal—Agent has no authority to pay for interest ... S 20 N 18
 - (c) Authority to pay includes authority to make endorsement for payment made ... S 20 N 18
 - (d) Authority to pay total amount due under bond—Whether includes authority to pay interest also or to make part payment ... S 20 N 18
- Authorization need not have been made with reference to particular payment in question ... S 21 N 6
- Authorization of a member of any of the groups mentioned in S. 21 to pay on behalf of others may be express or implied and may be general or special ... S 21 N 6
- Burden of proof
 - (a) Payment made by person other than debtor—Plaintiff must show that he was agent duly authorized by debtor to make payment ... S 20 N 35

Payment—Burden of proof—(Contd.)

- (b) Plaintiff claiming extension must show that payment was made with intention of paying it for interest or part of principal ... S 20 N 35
- (c) Plaintiff claiming extension must show that payment was of such a nature as would extend limitation under S. 20 ... S 20 N 35
- By adjustment of account—Sufficiency of, for payment within S. 20 ... S 20 N 11
- By agent
 - (a) "Agent duly authorized in this behalf" in S. 20—Meaning of ... S 21
 - (b) Court, if can be regarded as agent of party for purpose of S. 20 ... S 20 N 18
 - (c) In excess of authority
 - (i) Mortgagee asked to pay off debt due by mortgagor to another—Mortgagee merely making part payment two years thereafter—Payment, if in excess of authority; S 20 N 18
 - (ii) Mortgagee directed to pay mortgage amount immediately to holder of decree against mortgagor and obtain receipt—Mortgagee paying the money into Court more than a year thereafter—Payment, if has the effect of extending time ... S 20 N 18
 - (iii) Vendee asked to pay debt due by vendor—Vendee making only part payment—Payment, if has effect of extending time ... S 20 N 18
 - (iv) Whether extends time under S. 20 ... S 20 N 18
 - (d) Made by quondam agent after death of principal—Whether gives fresh start of limitation ... S 20 N 18
 - (e) Of Hindu widow—Whether valid as against reversioner succeeding to her ... S 21
 - (f) Of mortgagor making payment after a portion of the mortgaged property had been sold by mortgagor—Payment, if saves limitation as against purchaser from mortgagor ... S 21 N 6
 - (g) Order of adjudication annulled under S. 37, Provincial Insolvency Act—Appointee of insolvent's property placed in charge of property—Appointee, if agent of insolvent ... S 20 N 18
 - (h) Person making payment must be agent of person liable to pay at time of payment ... S 20 N 18
- By cheque
 - (a) Cheque received as payment—Date for purpose of giving fresh start is date on which cheque is given... S 20 N 11
 - (b) Cheque signed by debtor given as payment—Sufficiency of, for S. 20 ... S 20 N 24
 - (c) When constitutes payment ... S 20 N 11
- By Court of Wards—Authority to make payment so as to save limitation is statutory and not as guardian of ward ... S 21 N 5
- By debtor, if must be an appropriation by debtor ... S 20 N 5
- By debtor without specification—Creditor appropriating it towards interest—Payment, if amounts to payment of interest as such within S. 20 ... S 20 N 5
- By debtor without specification as to whether it is to be appropriated for interest or for principal—Right of creditor to appropriate it for interest or for principal at his option ... S 20 N 5

Payment—(Contd.)

- By *de facto* guardian of minor who is not his legal guardian—
Whether binding on minor under S. 21 S 21 N 3
- By ex-partner after dissolution of partnership in respect of debt
which was a partnership debt—Whether binds other ex-partners. S 21 N 13
- By guardian
 - (a) After ward's death—Whether binding on ward's estate S 21 N 3
 - (b) Continuing in management of ward's property after ward
attains majority—Whether saves limitation S 21 N 3
 - (c) Of insane person—Before a person is appointed guardian of
an insane person he is not his lawful guardian within S. 21: S 21 N 4
 - (d) Of minor—Whether binding on him S 21 N 3
 - (e) Order appointing interim guardian requiring that he must
take permission of Court before making payment — Pay-
ment made by him without such permission cannot save
limitation... S 21 N 3
 - (f) Payment must be made by lawful guardian for purposes of
S. 21 S 21 N 3
 - (g) Whether effective irrespective of the question of its being for
minor's benefit S 21 N 3
- By head of Mubammadan family, whether binds the whole
family S 21 N 22
- By Hindu widow—Whether binding on reversioners succeeding to
estate after her S 21 N 19
- By junior member of Hindu joint family — Whether binds other
members S 21 N 20
- By labour—Sufficiency of, for S. 20 S 20 N 11
- By lawful guardian—'Lawful guardian' in S. 21—Meaning of S 21 N 3
- By manager of Hindu joint family
 - (a) Family joint when liability was incurred—Family divided at
time of payment by alleged manager—Payment, if binding
on other members of family S 21 N 20
 - (b) In respect of liability incurred by members of the family in
their individual capacity — Manager, if can make payments
on behalf of other members of the family S 21 N 20
 - (c) Whether saves limitation in regard to liability binding on
family S 21 N 20
 - (d) Whether should be expressed as made in his capacity as
manager S 21 N 20
- By manager of Hindu joint family after partition—Creditor having
no notice of partition—Payment, if binding on other members of
family S 21 N 20
- By manager of Hindu joint family in his individual capacity—
Whether binding on other members of family S 21 N 20
- By manager of Malabar tarwad in respect of liabilities binding on
tarwad—Whether binds whole tarwad S 21 N 21
- By member of joint Hindu family carrying on business, made in
the course of the business — Whether can be presumed to be
authorized by other members of the family S 21 N 14
- By member of joint Hindu family in the ordinary course of busi-
ness after partition in family—Creditor having no notice of parti-
tion—Payment, if binding on other members of family S 21 N 14
- By money order—Debtor writing in conpon that amount should be
credited to debt—Sufficiency of, for S. 20 S 20 N 24

Payment—(Contd.)

- By mortgagor — Mortgagee sub-mortgaging property to another—
 Payment by mortgagor to sub-mortgagee — Whether saves limitation for suit by sub-mortgagee against mortgagor and mortgagee S 21 N 11
- By one co-mortgagor
 - (a) Limitation is not saved as against others as regards personal liability and liability in respect of share in mortgaged property S 21 N 11
 - (b) Limitation is saved as against particular co-mortgagor making payment S 21 N 11
 - (c) Such co-mortgagor's share will be liable for the whole mortgage debt and not merely for a proportionate part of it S 21 N 11
 - (d) Whether saves limitation as against other co-mortgagors S 21 N 11
- By one joint-debtor—Such person compelled to pay more than his share of joint debt—Whether can sue other co-debtors for contribution S 21 N 7
- By one member of any of the groups mentioned in S. 21—Limitation will not be saved as against other members not only with regard to their personal liability but also with regard to their liability in respect of property S 21 N 6
- By one of several executors—Whether effective against the others: S 21 N 15
- By one of several joint contractors
 - (a) Debt common to all — Payment, if saves limitation against the others S 21 N 7
 - (b) Limitation will be saved as against him and those claiming under him S 21 N 7
 - (c) Such joint contractor authorized by another joint contractor to make payment
 - (i) Authorization need not be express and may be inferred from conduct of the joint contractors S 21 N 7
 - (ii) Limitation, if saved against latter S 21 N 7
- By one of several joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees—Effect of S 21
- By one of several joint judgment-debtors
 - (a) Decree passed against them in their capacity as joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees—Payment saves limitation only against judgment-debtor making payment S 21 N 17
 - (b) Whether saves limitation as against all judgment-debtors S 21 N 17
- By one of several persons jointly liable in respect of a mortgage—Whether operates against all of them S 21 N 6
- By one partner authorized by other partners to pay — Whether saves limitation against other partners S 21 N 13
- By one partner in a going mercantile concern
 - (a) Firm, if bound S 21 N 13
 - (b) Presumption of agency of such partner on behalf of firm will apply only if payment be made in the course of the partnership business S 21 N 13
- By partner in respect of partnership debt after dissolution of firm of which creditor has no notice—Whether binds estate of deceased partner S 21 N 13

Payment—(Contd.)

- By partner of dissolved partnership authorized to collect and pay debts of partnership—Payment in respect of such debt—Whether binding on other ex-partners ... S 21 N 13
- By pleader—Whether gives fresh starting point of limitation ... S 20 N 21
- By principal debtor—Whether saves limitation as against surety : S 21 N 12
- By receiver
 - (e) Powers of receiver limited to collecting outstandings and doing all things necessary for preservation of estate—Receiver, if he has authority to keep debt alive by acknowledgment. S 20 N 22
 - (b) Receiver authorized to pay interest on debts — Payment, if keeps debt alive ... S 20 N 22
 - (c) Whether gives fresh starting point of limitation ... S 20 N 22
- By surety, whether saves limitation as against principal debtor ... S 21 N 12
- Categories mentioned in S. 21 are exhaustive ... S 21 N 6
- Certification of, by decree-holder under O. 21 R. 2, Civil P. C. — Limitation ... A 181 N 18
- Debt—Meaning of ... S 20 N 29
- Debt common to all persons liable — Payment by one of them—When operates against other persons liable to pay it ... S 21 N 6
- Debt not common to all but a distinct debt owed by each — Payment by one, if and when operates against others ... S 21 N 6
- Debtor not expressly making any statement as to whether it is for interest or towards principal — Intention of debtor, how ascertained : ... S 20 N 6
- Decree—If includes preliminary decree for sale ... S 20 N 29
- Decree debt
 - (a) Certification
 - (i) Date of payment for purpose of S 20 is date of actual payment and not of certification .. S 20 N 30
 - (ii) Limitation for certification .. S 20 N 30
 - (iii) Non-certification before execution petition — Whether obstacle to application of S 20 .. S 20 N 30
 - (b) Payment for interest towards preliminary decree — Time for application for final decree, if extended .. S 20 N 29
 - (c) Payment towards decree debt made out of Court—Whether can be recognized ... S 20 N 30
- Deposit in Court, whether payment .. A 99 N 6
- Effect of payment of interest as such or of part payment of principal of debt or legacy .. S 20
- Endorsement of—Unregistered endorsement—Admissibility of, to prove discharge .. S 20 N 34
- Enforcement of
 - (a) Suit for foreclosure, whether one to enforce payment .. A 132 N 3
 - (b) Suit for possession, whether one to enforce payment .. A 132 N 3
 - (c) Suit for redemption, whether one to enforce payment .. A 132 N 3
 - (d) Suit for sale, whether one to enforce payment ... A 132 N 2
- For interest — No interest payable under document — Subsequent agreement between parties for payment of interest — Payment made for interest will extend time .. S 20 N 6
- For interest or for principal—Evidence alunde to show that payment was treated at the time of payment to be for interest or for principal—Admissibility of .. S 20 N 24

Payment—(Contd.)

- For part of principal or for interest as such in handwriting of person liable to pay — Whether saves limitation when words "without prejudice" are added S 20 N 9
- For principal
- (a) Debtor, if should have intended to pay the amount as part payment of principal S 20 N 5
 - (b) Payment by debtor to creditor to whom he owed several debts—Creditor appropriating it to part of principal of one of them—Payment, if can be considered to be payment for that debt S 20 N 5
 - (c) Payment must be of part of the principal S 20 N 5
 - (d) Payment of part of amount due accompanied by statement that it was in full discharge of debt, if saves limitation S 20 N 5
- Handwriting
- (a) Acknowledgment of payment under Art. 183 need not be made in the handwriting or in a writing signed by person making the payment S 20 N 37
 - (b) Appropriation of payment to principal need not appear in handwriting S 20 N 24
 - (c) Cheque signed by debtor given as payment — Fact of payment, if appears in handwriting of debtor S 20 N 24
 - (d) Debtor sending money order to creditor and writing in coupon that amount should be credited to debt — Fact of payment, if appears in handwriting of debtor S 20 N 24
 - (e) Decree-holder certifying payment for interest made by judgment-debtor — Whether extends time in favour of decree-holder S 20 N 24
 - (f) Fact of payment must appear in handwriting of or in writing signed by person making payment S 20 N 24
 - (g) Fact that payment was part payment—Whether should appear in handwriting of person making payment S 20 N 24
 - (h) Illiterate person making mark below entry of fact of payment to handwriting of third person—Whether sufficient for purpose of S. 20 S 20 N 24
 - (i) It is only for purposes of S. 20 that payment should be in handwriting, etc., of person making it S 20 N 24
 - (j) Mere endorsement of handi by debtor in favour of creditor — Whether sufficient to give fresh starting point of limitation S 20 N 24
 - (k) One person making payment and another under former's authority making entry of payment — Whether gives fresh starting point of limitation S 20 N 24
 - (l) Only the fact of payment need appear in handwriting of person making payment S 20 N 24
 - (m) Part payment made and endorsed by judgment-debtor on decree—Whether gives fresh starting point of limitation S 20 N 24
 - (n) Part payment of principal must appear in handwriting of person making payment S 20 N 24
 - (o) Payment and writing acknowledging it need not be simultaneous S 20 N 25
 - (p) Payment written by one person and signed by person making payment—Sufficiency of S 20 N 24

Payment—Handwriting—(Contd.)

- (q) Scribe usually writing the payment and signing it on behalf of illiterate person making payment who touches the pen—Writing, if can be regarded as being signed by him ... S 20 N 24
- (r) Writing evidencing fact of payment subscribed to by mark of illiterate person making payment — Whether writing signed by him within the meaning of S. 20 ... S 20 N 24
- In kind—Party alleging such payment must prove there was agreement between parties that payment should be in kind ... S 20 N 11
- Ineffective for purposes of Art. 183 — Fresh period of limitation, if can run from the date of payment under S 20 ... S 20 N 37
- Intention of debtor
 - (a) Evidence aliunde, if can be let in to show debtor's intention when making payment ... S 20 N 6
 - (b) Fact that interest was due and amount paid was less than interest—Whether shows intention to pay for interest ... S 20 N 6
 - (c) In paying interest or principal—How ascertained ... S 20 N 6
 - (d) Mere fact of creditor appropriating amount for interest—Whether sufficient to show intention of debtor ... S 20 N 6
 - (e) Some acknowledgment or evidence leading to inference that debtor intended that amount should be appropriated in a particular manner is necessary ... S 20 N 6
- Liability affected by payment
 - (a) Nature of ... S 20 N 31
 - (b) Part payment of principal due on bond—Whether gives fresh starting point in respect of claim for damages for non-payment of principal ... S 20 N 31
 - (c) Payment by mortgagor towards mortgage debt — Mortgagee itself and not merely personal liability is kept alive ... S 20 N 31
- Liability incurred by or on behalf of Hindu undivided family as such — Payment by manager or his agent—Whether can be deemed to have been made on behalf of whole family ... S 21
- Made to one of several joint mortgagees — Sufficiency of, for purposes of S 20 ... S 21 N 6
- Meaning of ... A 61 N 3, A 83 N 12, A 99 N 5
- Mere incurring of pecuniary obligation in shape of bond or promissory note, whether payment within meaning of Art 99 ... A 99 N 5
- Method of appropriation determined at the outset by express contract—Specific appropriation on the occasion of each payment, if necessary ... S 20 N 6
- Money need not belong to the person paying ... S 20 N 12
- More than one person jointly liable to pay debt
 - (a) Payment by any one of such persons—Limitation, if saved also as against other joint debtors ... S 21 N 6
 - (b) Payment may be made by any one of such persons ... S 21 N 6
- Mortgagee in possession
 - (a) Assignee of mortgage rights and of equity of redemption in possession and receiving rents and profits—Receipt, if can be considered to be receipt by mortgagee as such ... S 20 N 28
 - (b) Mere receipt of rents and profits by mortgagee not in possession—S. 20 will not apply ... S 20 N 28
 - (c) Mortgage, if should be a usufructuary one for S 20 sub-section 2 to apply ... S 20 N 28

Payment—Mortgagee in possession—(Contd.)

- (d) Mortgage of vatan land with possession—Mortgage deed containing also personal covenant—Death of mortgagor and dispossession of mortgagee under Vatan Act—Suit for money due on mortgage under personal covenant from son of deceased mortgagor—Receipt of produce up to death of mortgagor—Whether by mortgagee as such ... S 20 N 23
- (e) Person in possession of land under invalid deed of usufructuary mortgage—Receipt of rents and profits by him, if in the capacity of mortgagee ... S 20 N 23
- (f) Receipt of rents and profits must be by mortgagee as such: ... S 20 N 23
- (g) Receipt of rents or produce by mortgagee in possession—Whether amounts to payment within S. 20 ... S 20 N 23
- (h) Receipts of rents or profits amounting to payment—Such payment, if subject to conditions as to handwriting and signature ... S 20 N 23
- (i) Simple mortgagee obtaining possession from mortgagor in pursuance of invalid agreement of sale—Receipt of rents and profits—If in the capacity of mortgagee as such ... S 20 N 23
- (j) Usufructuary mortgage providing that mortgagee shall pay Government revenue and appropriate balance of rents and profits towards interest—Mortgagee leasing it back to mortgagor and directing him to pay Government revenue and pay balance to him—Revenue paid by mortgagor must be treated as rent received by landlord within S. 20 ... S 20 N 23
- (k) Usufructuary mortgagee receiving rents and profits after passing of decree for sale in his favour—Receipt, if by mortgagee as such ... S 20 N 23
- (l) Usufructuary mortgagee to take usufruct for interest—Receipt of usufruct will be payment only in respect of that mortgage ... S 20 N 23
- Must be before expiration of prescribed period—Payment made after such period will not save limitation ... S 20 N 10
- Nature of business of firm such that payment of interest or part payment is a thing done in the usual course of the business—Authorization to pay to one partner by other partners may be presumed ... S 21 N 13
- No interest payable under document—Payment by debtor not referring to any interest—Payment must be regarded as part payment of principal ... S 20 N 5
- Not satisfying requirements of S. 20 but satisfying requirements of Art. 182—Date of payment will be starting point under Art. 183: ... S 20 N 37
- Of debt or legacy—S. 20 applies to secured and unsecured debts: ... S 20 N 4
- Of decree, out of Court—Application for notice as to recording of satisfaction
- (a) Bar of limitation—Effect of ... A 174 N 8
- (b) Certification by decree-holder—Limitation ... A 174 N 2
- (c) Certification by decree-holder under Civil P. C., O. 21 R. 2 sub-rule 1—Limitation ... A 174 N 3
- (d) Dismissal of application for default—Fresh application, if maintainable ... A 174 N 4
- (e) Fraud of decree-holder keeping judgment-debtor from exercising his right to make such application—Remedies of judgment-debtor ... A 174 N 7

Payment—Of decree, out of Court, etc.—(Contd.)

- (f) Limitation—Starting point ... A 174, A 174 N 2; A 174 N 6
- (g) Nature of such application within Art. 174 ... A 174 N 4
- (h) O. 21 R. 2, Civil P. C., whether limited to money-decree ... A 174 N 2
- (i) Provision for ... A 174 N 2
- (j) Statement of objection put in by judgment-debtor in answer to application by decree-holder for execution, whether amounts to application for recording of payment ... A 174 N 4
- (k) Surety for judgment-debtor, whether can plead uncertified payment made by him ... A 174 N 4
- (l) Time, whether can be extended by consent of parties ... A 174 N 6
- (m) Time, whether can be extended on ground that fraud of decree-holder has kept judgment-debtor from exercising his right to apply under Civil P. C., O. 21, R. 2, sub-r. 2 ... A 174 N 7
- (n) Under Insolvency Act—Limitation ... A 174 N 2
- (o) Under O. 21 R. 2, sub-r. 2, Civil P. C., whether maintainable before decree is formally drawn up ... A 174 N 6
- (p) Where payment is made not by judgment-debtor but by stranger—Limitation ... A 174 N 2
- (q) Who can make such application within Art. 174 ... A 174 N 4

—Of interest

- (a) Addition of interest to principal—When amounts to payment of interest ... S 20 N 11
- (b) Debtor making payment without making any specification—Creditor appropriating it for interest—Payment, if can be treated as payment of interest as such or as part payment of principal ... S 20 N 5
- (c) Debtor must have intended that payment should be for interest ... S 20 N 5
- (d) Guardian continuing in management of ward's property after ward attained majority—Guardian paying interest on subsisting debts—Payment, if saves limitation ... S 21 N 3
- (e) Interest includes part of interest due ... S 20 N 7
- (f) Payment must be for interest as such to give fresh period of limitation ... S 20 N 5
- (g) Question whether payment was of interest as such is one of fact to be determined from facts and circumstances ... S 20 N 6

—Of interest as such

- (a) Debtor, if must expressly specify at the time of payment that it was for interest ... S 20 N 6
- (b) Determining factor is intention of debtor in making payment and not that of creditor in appropriating it ... S 20 N 5
- (c) Mere fact that money paid is less than interest due—Whether sufficient in itself to make it payment of interest as such ... S 20 N 6
- (d) Mortgage deed providing that any money paid by mortgagor should be first credited for interest due and balance for principal—Payment made without specification when interest is due—Payment, if can be treated as one for interest as such ... S 20 N 6
- (e) No interest payable at all under document—Payment by debtor without specification—Whether can be regarded as one for interest ... S 20 N 6

Payment—Of interest as such—(Contd.)

- (f) Payment expressed to be made for principal and interest generally
 - (i) Exact amount of interest need not be specified ... S 20 N 8
 - (ii) Whether payment of interest as such ... S 20 N 8
- (g) Sum paid in discharge of debt more than principal amount—Excess over principal must be deemed to have been paid for interest as such ... S 20 N 6
- Of interest as such and payment of principal—Effect of—Distinction ... S 20 N 5
- Of interest as such or of part of principal
 - (a) Fresh period to be computed from date of payment ... S 20 N 23
 - (b) Provisions as to—Principle of English law, if applicable ... S 20 N 2
- Of interest as such or part of principal accompanied by refusal to pay balance—Whether gives fresh starting point of limitation for recovering debt ... S 20 N 2
- Payment of interest as such or part of principal and acknowledgment of liability—Distinction between Ss. 19 and 20 ... S 20 N 3
- Of interest as such or part of principal giving fresh starting point
 - (a) Against whom operates ... S 20 N 3
 - (b) Fresh period—Computation of ... S 20 N 23
 - (c) Principle underlying provision ... S 20 N 2
 - (d) Proceedings to which provisions apply ... S 20 N 4
 - (e) Provision applies only to suits on debts and legacies ... S 20 N 3
 - (f) Provisions as to—Whether apply to cases falling within Art 75 ... S 20 N 36
- Of interest as such or part of principal in respect of debt—Payment implies admission of a right and an acknowledgment of the corresponding liability ... S 20 N 2
- Of principal—Payment should be of part only of principal to give fresh period of limitation ... S 20 N 5
- Overpayment—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 62 N 28
- Part payment of principal
 - (a) Admission that a larger amount is due at the time of part payment is implied ... S 20 N 2
 - (b) Fact that there was a debt and that debt exceeded amount paid—Whether can be proved aforesaid to show part payment of principal ... S 20 N 24
- Part payment of principal not fulfilling requirements of S. 20—Whether can operate as acknowledgment of liability ... S 20 N 3
- Part payment or payment of interest by one of the heirs of a deceased Muhammadan debtor—Whether saves limitation against other heirs also ... S 21 N 10
- Person making payment
 - (a) Meaning of—Whether means person who physically hands over the money ... S 20 N 27
 - (b) One person sending money by his servant or by post—It is not the servant or the postman who makes the payment but person sending it ... S 20 N 27
- Person making payment having the authority of the other members of the group to which he belongs, to make payment—Payment will bind other members also ... S 21 N 6
- Person who can keep alive right which is not time-barred, by payment ... S 21 N 2

Payment—(Contd.)

- Question, what a sum of money was paid for
 - (a) Is one of fact ... S 20 N 32
 - (b) Whether can be allowed for the first time in second appeal : S 20 N 33
- Requirements of, under Art. 183 ... S 20 N 37
- S. 21, if operates as exception or explanation to S. 20 ... S 21 N 6
- Signature
 - (a) Defendant signing his name—Subsequently another person without consulting person making payment or authorization writing the endorsement over the signature—Such writing and signature will not save limitation ... S 20 N 26
 - (b) Must have reference to acknowledgment of payment ... S 20 N 26
- To be made before expiration of the prescribed period
 - (a) Prescribed period—Meaning of ... S 20 N 10
 - (b) Prescribed period does not mean period within which suit or application may be filed by reference to S. 4 of Act ... S 20 N 10
 - (c) Prescribed period is not period fixed by contract between parties ...
 - (d) Prescribed period is not period fixed by other enactment such as S. 48, Civil P. C. ...
- What amounts to, within Art. 82 ...
- What constitutes
 - (a) Addition of interest to principal—When becomes payment for interest ...
 - (b) Continuance in service of servant to whom wages have been advanced—Whether amounts to payment of interest ...
 - (c) Creditor levying execution against debtor and recovering money—Whether amounts to payment within S. 20 ...
 - (d) Creditor receiving money for debt due, neither from debtor nor his agent but from a source independent of volition of debtor—Whether amounts to payment within S. 20 ...
 - (e) Fictitious entry of payment in handwriting of debtor—Whether amounts to payment within S. 20 ...
 - (f) Giving of cheque and its receipt by creditor—Whether constitutes payment ...
 - (g) Money, if should actually pass, to constitute payment ...
 - (h) Payment, if can be made in kind ...
 - (i) Payment, if should be in cash or currency ...
 - (j) Payment made by judgment-debtor in obedience to order of Court—Whether payment within S. 20 ...
 - (k) Payment may be made in any form but there must be something tantamount to payment ...
 - (l) Payment must be for admitted debt ...
 - (m) Payment must be of such a nature that it would be an answer in a suit brought by plaintiff to recover the amount of debt—Whether amounts to payment by pledgor ...
 - (n) Pledgee of jewels selling jewels and appropriating amount to debt—Whether amounts to payment by pledgor ...
 - (o) Promissory note, if may be given by way of payment ...
- What is
 - (a) Giving of security to pay, whether payment ...
 - (b) Involuntary payment, whether payment within Art. 61 ...
 - (c) Mere incurring of pecuniary obligation in shape of promissory note, whether payment ...

Payment—(Contd.)

—Who must make

(a) Agent duly authorized

- (i) *Burmese married couple working land together — Husband having to pay rent of land temporarily incapacitated from paying it by his being in jail— Wife cultivating land and paying rent — Wife must be taken to have authority to act for both and make payments* S 20 N 1
- (ii) *Elder brother allowed to act on behalf of younger brothers in matters of executing mortgages, etc.— Whether necessarily means elder brother has authority to make payment so as to save limitation against the others* S 20 N 1
- (iii) *Evidence to show authority on the part of one to make payment on behalf of the other—Necessity of* ... S 20 N 1
- (iv) *Fact that payment of money by one person enures to the benefit of others—Whether constitutes authorization to him to make the payment on their behalf:* S 20 N 1
- (v) *Meaning of* S 20 N 1
- (vi) *No formal or express authorization is required under S. 20* S 20 N 1
- (vii) *One of the persons liable to pay debt making payment —Fact that others are present at time of payment, whether makes the payment necessarily one by him on behalf of others* S 20 N 1
- (viii) *Question whether person making payment is an agent duly authorized is one of fact* S 20 N 1
- (b) *Money paid by stranger to contract under which it was paid to person entitled to receive it—Whether amounts to payment within S. 20* S 20 N 1
- (c) *Payment by Hindu son, of debt incurred by father—Whether sufficient under S. 20* S 20 N 1
- (d) *Payment must be made by person liable to pay a debt or by his duly authorized agent* S 20 N 1
- (e) *Payment of rent in respect of part of mortgaged property to mortgagee by tenant of mortgagor without having been asked by mortgagor to do so—Whether amounts to payment within S. 20* S 20 N 1
- (f) *Payment under Art. 183 need not be made by person liable or his agent* S 20 N 37
- (g) *Person liable*
 - (i) *Person should be liable under the contract of debt* ... S 20 N 14
 - (ii) *Whether includes purchaser of mortgaged property or puisne mortgagee* S 20 N 14
- (h) *Person liable to pay—Meaning of* S 20 N 14
- (i) *Person paying need not be personally liable* S 20 N 14

—Writing

- (a) *Acknowledgment of payment in written statement filed in suit—Whether can be called in aid for the purpose of S. 20* S 20 N 25
- (b) *Acknowledgment of payment signed before suit is commenced—Sufficiency of* S 20 N 25

Payment—Writing—(Contd.)

- (c) Payment made within time fixed—Whether extends time when acknowledgment made after such period ... S 20 N 25
- Will bind not only person by whom or by whose agent it is made but also those claiming under him ... S 21 N 6
- Without specification—No other indication as to intention of debtor—Creditor not making appropriation for principal or interest—Payment, if to be regarded as part payment of principal which would save time ... S 20 N 5
- Without specification when several debts due—Creditor, if entitled to appropriate it for principal of all debts so as to save limitation for all ... S 20 N 5

Penal actions

- Meaning of, under English law ... A 6 N 1
- Popular or *qui tam* actions—Meaning of, under English law ... A 6 N 1

Penalty

- Debt, whether penalty ... A 6 N 2
- Suit for—Upon Statute, Act, Regulation or Bye-law
 - (a) Art. 6, whether applies where different period of limitation is prescribed by special or local law ... A 6 N 5
 - (b) By Government—Limitation—Art. 6 and Art. 149 ... A 6 N 6
 - (c) Limitation ... A 6
 - (d) Suit for damages caused by misconduct of defendant—Limitation ... A 6 N 3
 - (e) Suit for debt—Limitation ... A 6 N 2
 - (f) Suit for penalty is a bond—Limitation ... A 6 N 1
 - (g) Where penalties imposed are recoverable as if they are arrears of revenue—Maintainability ... A 6 N 4

Perversion

- Of property to other purposes—Suit as to—*See under* Property
- Perversion of, to other purposes.

Plaint

- Rejection of—Conclusion that suit has been instituted after time based on allegations in plaint—Rejection is proper procedure ... S 3 N 35

Plaintiff

- Ghatwal, whether claims through his father as predecessor within S. 2 ... A 142 & 144 N 8
- Joint plaintiffs—Death of one plaintiff—Right to sue, whether survives to surviving plaintiff ... A 176 N 2
- Meaning of ... S 2 Cl 8, A 91 N 17
- Whether includes any person from whom plaintiff derives right to sue ... A 109 N 15
- Whether includes appellant ... A 176 N 2

Plea

- Fraud, plea of—How to be set forth ... A 95 N 16

Pleader

- Mistake of—*See under* Delay, excuse of—Sufficient cause—Mistake
- Mistake of agent
- Suit by, for costs—Limitation ... A 84 N 2

Pleader and client

- Admission by pleader in the course of his duties on behalf of client
- Whether binds client as acknowledgment of liability ... S 19 N 51

Pleader and client—(Contd.)

—Negligence of pleader—Effect of S 5 N 11

Pleadings

—Acknowledgment of liability relied on to save limitation for suit—

Fact must be stated in plaint S 19 N 77

—Fact of Court having been closed, if should be mentioned in plaint: S 4 N 16

—Failure to plead exemption under S. 14 — Whether fatal to the suit S 14 N 30

—Party pleading fraud as ground of exemption from limitation — Particulars thereof should be specifically stated S 18 N 6

—Plaint stating ground on which exemption from bar is claimed— Plaintiff, if can rely at the hearing, on a different ground of exemption S 19 N 77

—Plaintiff pleading title — He need not say that defendant has lost his title by adverse possession S 28 N 8

—Plea of adverse possession—See under Adverse possession.

—Suit *prima facie* barred — Plaintiff must state in plaint reasons why suit is in time S 20 N 35

—Waiver, whether can be gathered from pleading A 75 N 17

Pledge

—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation A 57 N 4

—Of moveable property —Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 41

—Redemption of—Suit for—Limitation A 145 N 7

Policy

—Insurance policy—Suit on

(a) Limitation—Starting point — Where sum assured is payable immediately after proof of death or loss has been given to or received by insurers A 86; A 86 N 1; A 86 N 3

(b) Where sum insured is payable after a certain time after loss or death is proved—Limitation A 86 N 2

Possession

—Abandonment of, by true owner

(a) Land consisting of scanty cultivable area recovered from time to time from river—Not paying to owners to work it — Failure to cultivate does not raise presumption that land is abandoned A 143 & 144 N 73

(b) Local circumstances and conditions must be looked into: A 143 & 144 N 73

(c) Property of value not taken up or kept up for long time— No explanation for neglect by true owner — Presumption is that owner abandoned his rights A 143 & 144 N 73

—Acts alleged whether referable to right of possession or right of easement depend upon facts and circumstances of particular case A 143 & 144 N 53

—Actual possession

(a) In case of rival claimants, person having title is deemed in law to be in actual possession A 143 & 144 N 11

(b) Meaning of A 10 N 7

(c) Neither proof of title nor adjudication on question of title is proof of actual possession A 143 & 144 N 53

(d) Of part is possession of whole in case of rightful owner: A 143 & 144 N 13

(e) Of whole property, by trespasser—Illustrations A 143 & 144 N 13

Possession—Actnal possession—(Contd.)

- (f) Of whole property, by trespasser — What constitutes, depends on circumstances of each case ... A 142 & 144 N 12
- Adverse possession—*See also* Adverse possession.
 - (a) Acquisition of tenancy right by ... A 139 N 14
 - (b) Against life tenant — Whether bars reversioner or remainderman succeeding to estate on death of life tenant ... A 140 N 2
 - (c) Claim by adverse possessor whose title has not ripened to property attached
 - (i) Claim allowed—Suit by decree-holder to set aside order allowing claim—Suit within limitation but after ripening of title of adverse possessor, if maintainable ... A 11 N 2a
 - (ii) Dismissal of claim—Suit to establish right to property comprised in order dismissing claim—Suit within limitation but after title by adverse possession has ripened—Adverse possessor, whether can rely upon fact that subsequent to date of order title by adverse possession has ripened into full ownership ... A 11 N 2a
 - (d) Of office
 - (i) Person in — Extent of interest to which such person can prescribe ... A 124 N 6
 - (ii) Person in possession as trustee, if can get prescriptive right to hereditary trusteeship ... A 124 N 6
 - (e) Of tenant
 - (i) Denial of landlord's title, whether makes possession of tenant during tenancy adverse to landlord ... A 139 N 12
 - (ii) Non-payment of rent, whether makes possession of tenant during tenancy adverse to landlord ... A 139 N 12
 - (f) Possession of independent trespasser, whether can be tacked on to that of another in plea of prescription ... A 124 N 7
 - (g) Possession of tenant after determination of lease, whether adverse ... A 139 N 13
 - (h) Possession of tenant holding over after determination of tenancy, whether adverse to landlord ... A 139 N 2
 - (i) Question whether defendant's possession has been adverse to plaintiff is one of fact ... A 124 N 6
- As reversioners—Persons entitled to—Who are ... A 125 N 3
- Assumption as to — Where possession may be either lawful or unlawful ... A 127 N 11
- Based on award—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 42
- Constructive possession
 - (a) Meaning of ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (b) Secret adoption by Hindu widow without knowledge of the person in possession — Adopted son is not in constructive possession through such person ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (c) Whether depends upon user ... A 142 & 144 N 11
- Corpus possessionis
 - (a) Nature of requisite possession varies with nature of subject ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (b) What constitutes, in case of corporeal property ... A 142 & 144 N 11
 - (c) What constitutes, in case of incorporeal property ... A 142 & 144 N 11
- Declaration and confirmation of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- Degrees of ... A 3 N 3

Possession—(Contd.)

—Delivery of—Application for—By execution purchaser—See under Execution sale.

—Delivery of—Order for

- | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----------|
| (a) Whether decree for possession | ... | ... | ... | A 180 N 6 |
| (b) Whether kept alive by periodical applications | ... | ... | ... | A 180 N 6 |

—Dispossession—See under Dispossession.

—Dispossession and discontinuance of

- | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----------------|
| (a) Distinguished | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (b) Essential features common to both | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (c) Illustrative cases | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |

—Dispossession or discontinuance of

- | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|------------------|
| (a) Assertion of under-proprietary title by tenant does not amount to dispossession | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (b) By adoptive mother—Whether one by adopted son | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 8 |
| (c) Court of Wards alienating ward's property—Possession obtained by alienee, whether amounts to discontinuance by ward | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (d) Decree of Settlement Court giving mortgagees proprietary possession of property is dispossession of mortgagors | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (e) 'Discontinuance'—Meaning of | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (f) Dismissal by revenue authorities of application for registration of names—Dispossession cannot be inferred | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (g) Essentials of—Actual possession of plaintiff is necessary—Constructive possession is not sufficient | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 14 |
| (h) Intention if necessary to determine whether there has been discontinuance | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (i) Meaning of | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 2 |
| (j) Mere collecting cattle or fixing pegs or erecting platform on land by defendant, whether sufficient to constitute dispossession of owner | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (k) Mere fact that plaintiffs are unable to show overt acts of ownership within 12 years does not amount to discontinuance | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 35 |
| (l) Mere paper dispossession by mutation of names does not amount to dispossession | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (m) Mere planting of trees on another's land without denial of owner's right—Whether amounts to dispossession | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (n) Owner obtaining possession under decree of Court—Subsequent dispossession due to reversal of decree, whether gives cause of action to him so as to reckon limitation from such dispossession | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 90 |
| (o) Possession by feave and license of owner does not amount to dispossession or discontinuance of possession of owner | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (p) Possession of guardian tifi ward attains majority does not amount to dispossession or discontinuance by minor | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (q) Prevention of proprietor from collecting rent from tenants amounts to dispossession | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 9 |
| (r) Suit based on | | | | |
| (i) Actual date of dispossession need not be proved | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 87 |
| (ii) Limitation—Starting point | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 90 |
| (a) A leaving village and settling elsewhere—Suit by A's heirs—Date of dispossession or discontinuance is date when A left village | ... | ... | ... | A 142 & 144 N 90 |

Possession—Dispossession or discontinuance of — Suit based on—Limitation, starting point—(Contd)

- (b) After first dispossession owner getting back possession—Owner again dispossessed for second time —Time runs from second dispossession A 142 & 144 N 90
- (c) Last full owner dispossessed—Subsequent interposition of widow's estate—Time runs from date of dispossession A 142 & 144 N 90
- (d) Subsequent transaction between defendants does not give fresh starting point A 142 & 144 N 90
- (e) Wakf property transferred by *takiadar* —Transferee building on such land—Suit by Muslim community — Time runs from date of building and not from death of *takiadar* A 142 & 144 N 90
- (f) Zamindari property sold for arrears of revenue—Purchaser put into possession — Subsequently fresh grant of zamindari on purchaser by Government—Suit by zamindar—Starting point is the date of original dispossession and not subsequent grant A 142 & 144 N 90
- (iii) Onus of proof
 - (a) Onus is on plaintiff A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (b) Plaintiff proving dispossession or discontinuance within 12 years—Defendant must prove better title A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (c) Proof of proprietary title in plaintiff will not shift onus on to the defendant A 142 & 144 N 87
- (iv) Suit will be barred even if independent trespassers have continuously kept plaintiff out of possession for 12 years after his dispossession A 142 & 144 N 92
- (v) What plaintiff must prove A 142 & 144 N 87
- (s) Trespasser after dispossessing plaintiff goes out of possession —After interval another trespasser gets into possession — Latter trespass operates as fresh dispossession A 142 & 144 N 92
- (t) Trespasser after dispossessing plaintiff, himself dispossessed by second trespasser — Subsequent dispossession of first trespasser is not dispossession of owner A 142 & 144 N 92
- (u) What constitutes—Essential elements—Illustrative cases: A 142 & 144 N 9

—Evidence of

- (a) Entries in revenue registers A 142 & 144 N 96
- (b) May be oral or documentary A 142 & 144 N 96
- (c) Mere assertion in written statement is not sufficient to show possession A 142 & 144 N 11
- (d) Mere demarcation of land in survey map as in a person's possession is no evidence A 142 & 144 N 96
- (e) Payment of revenue A 142 & 144 N 96
- (f) Realization of rents A 142 & 144 N 96
- (g) Thak maps A 142 & 144 N 96
- (h) What is A 142 & 144 N 96

—From agent—Recovery of—Suit for, by principal on termination of lease in favour of agent—Limitation A 139 N 4

—Heritable and transferable right A 142 & 144 N 4

—In execution of decree subsequently set aside—Possession, whether wrongful A 120 N 23

Possession—(Contd.)

- In fact—What constitutes—Necessary elements ... A 142 & 144 N 11
- Judgment-debtor in possession—Possession of third party under fraudulent and collusive transfer by judgment-debtor, whether possession of judgment-debtor within Art. 133 ... A 133 N 6
- Juridical possession—What is—Possession in a representative capacity, whether juridical possession ... A 3 N 3
- Meaning of ... A 3 N 3
- Must be assumed to be lawful ... A 142 & 144 N 18
- Of agents, servants, etc.—Nature of ... A 142 & 144 N 57
- Of co-owner
 - (a) One co-owner in exclusive possession—Consent decree establishing right of other as co-owner—Possession of former becomes possession of all co-owners ... A 142 & 144 N 35
 - (b) One co-owner leasing his share to another—After termination of lease the possession of latter is on behalf of both: ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- Of hereditary office—Suit for—*See under Office—Hereditary office.*
- Of immovable mortgaged property—Suit for—Limitation—Where such suit is instituted in Court established by Royal Charter ... A 135 N 2
- Of immovable property
 - (a) Recovery of—Provisions for, under Specific Relief Act ... A 3 N 2
 - (b) Suit for
 - ... suit ... A 146 N 4
 - ... property of adop- ... A 141 N 3
 - tive mother—Limitation ... A 141 N 7
- (iv) By auction purchaser
 - (a) Auction purchaser being delivered symbolic possession—Subsequent suit by him for actual possession—Limitation—Starting point ... A 133 N 8
 - (b) Auction-purchaser, whether can sue for possession without setting aside order in favour of defendant under O. 21, R. 29, Civil P. C. ... A 137 N 2
 - (c) For possession—In execution of mortgage decree—Limitation ... A 137 N 2
 - (d) Judgment-debtor being in possession
 - (i) Amicable settlement under which judgment-debtor continues to be in possession of property as auction-purchaser's licensee—Subsequent suit for possession by auction-purchaser—Limitation ... A 133 N 7
 - (ii) Auction-purchaser of equity of redemption under a mortgage—Auction-purchaser's right to equity if extinguished by virtue of S. 25, Lim. Act, if he did not obtain symbolic possession of property within 12 years of confirmation of sale ... A 139 N 3
 - (iii) Auction-purchaser's never having obtained possession under sale, whether essential condition for applicability of Art. 133 ... A 133 N 7
 - (iv) Burden of proof as to whether judgment-debtor was in possession or not ... A 133 N 11

- Possession — Of immovable property — Suit for — By auction purchaser —
Judgment-debtor being in possession—(Contd.)
- (v) Limitation—Starting point ... A 138; A 138 N 2;
A 138 N 10
 - (vi) Resistance by person in possession, whether
necessary for applicability of Art. 138 ... A 138 N 4
 - (vii) Suit, against whom maintainable ... A 138 N 9
 - (viii) Suit for possession alleging that transfer
from judgment-debtor under which defen-
dant claims to be in possession is fraudulent
and collusive—Suit, whether one for posses-
sion within Art. 138 ... A 138 N 4
 - (ix) Suit for recovery of possession which is lost
after having been obtained—Limitation ... A 138 N 7
 - (x) Suit, whether restricted to possession of
land ... A 138 N 3
 - (xi) Time during which proceedings for setting
aside sale have been prosecuted, whether
excluded ... A 138 N 2
 - (e) Judgment-debtor out of possession
 - (i) Against whom maintainable ... A 137 N 2
 - (ii) Burden of proof ... A 137 N 8
 - (iii) By auction-purchaser having once obtained
possession on subsequent cause of action—
Limitation ... A 137 N 2
 - (iv) By decree-holder purchaser—Limitation ... A 137 N 4
 - (v) Suit for actual possession after effective
symbolic possession has been delivered to
auction-purchaser — Limitation—Starting
point ... A 137 N 7
 - (vi) Time during which proceedings for setting
aside sale have been pending, whether can be
excluded ... A 137 N 2
 - (vii) When judgment-debtor is first entitled to
possession—Illustrative cases ... A 137 N 6
 - (viii) Where property is in possession of mortgagee
of judgment-debtor ... A 137 N 5
 - (ix) Who can sue for such possession ... A 137 N 4
 - (f) Whether barred if application for possession is time-
barred ... A 138 N 2
 - (v) By heir of Hindu or Muhammadan female who is full
owner of property—Limitation ... A 141 N 5
 - (vi) By Muhammadan or Hindu entitled to possession on
death of female
 - (a) By reversioner in whose favour property is sur-
rendered by female, for possession of property
alienated prior to surrender—Limitation ... A 141 N 9
 - (b) Cause of action—When accrues ... A 141 N 2
 - (c) Essentials of applicability of Art. 141 ... A 141 N 2
 - (d) For construction of will or codicil — Limitation: ... A 141 N 3
 - (e) For declaration of right to property—Limitation: ... A 141 N 3
 - (f) For property reserved to herself by female after
surrendering the rest to reversioner—Limitation: ... A 141 N 9
 - (g) Limitation—Starting point ... A 141; A 141 N 2

Possession—Of immovable property—Suit for—By Muhammadan or Hindu, etc.—(Contd.)

- (h) Trustees in succession for estate of female trustee—Limitation ... A 141 N 10
- (i) Where female is in possession not by reason of her being entitled by law to succeed to limited estate but in some other capacity—Limitation: A 141 N 10
- (j) Where female was in possession not as heir but in some other way—Limitation applicable ... A 141 N 4
- (k) Where no one is in possession at the death of the female—Limitation ... A 141 N 12
- (l) Where plaintiff does not become entitled to possession immediately on death of female—Limitation ... A 141 N 6
- (m) Who can bring such suit under Art. 141 ... A 141 N 4
- (vii) By purchaser at private sale—Limitation—Starting point ... A 136; A 136 N 2
- (viii) By son adopted by last male owner for his property—Limitation ... A 141 N 7
- (ix) By transferee from Hindu or Muhammadan who is entitled to possession on death of Hindu or Muhammadan female—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 8
- (x) For possession after establishment of title when adverse order under S. 332, Civil P. C., 1882, is made against plaintiff—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- (xi) For possession of estate of female who is in possession as legatee—Limitation ... A 141 N 10
- (xii) For possession of estate of female who is in possession as trespasser—Limitation ... A 141 N 10
- (xiii) For possession of estate of female who is in possession by contract—Limitation ... A 141 N 10
- (xiv) For possession of estate of female who is in possession by favour—Limitation ... A 141 N 10
- (xv) For property reserved to herself by female owner for maintenance after surrendering the rest to reversioner—Limitation ... A 141 N 9
- (xvi) Founded on breach of contract in writing registered—Limitation ... A 116 N 1
- (xvii) In substance one for account and share of dissolved partnership—Limitation ... A 106 N 2
- (xviii) On ground of breach of condition—Limitation A 143; A 143 N 2
- (xix) On ground of forfeiture—Limitation ... A 143; A 143 N 2
- (xx) Starting point of limitation—Whether postponed when cause of action accrues to estate of deceased person: S 17; S 17 N 2
- (c) Suit for recovery
 - (i) By person in possession without title dispossessed by trespasser—Whether barred under Art. 3 if brought after 6 months ... A 3 N 5
 - (ii) On basis of title—Failure to prove title—Decree, if can be given subsequently under Specific Relief Act, S. 9: A 3 N 6
 - (iii) On ground of possession before dispossession
 - (a) Landlord, whether can bring such suit under

Possession—Of immovable property—Suit for recovery—On ground of possession before dispossession—(Contd.)

- Specific Relief Act, S. 9, when his tenant is dis-
possessed A 3 N 3
- (b) Partial dispossession, whether entitles plaintiff to
bring such suit under Specific Relief Act, S. 9 : A 3 N 3
- (iv) On ground of possession of plaintiff before he was dis-
possessed—Limitation A 3 N 2
- (v) Summary remedy on ground of possession before dis-
possession under Specific Relief Act, S. 9, if not
availed, whether precludes other remedies ... A 3 N 2
- (vi) Under Specific Relief Act, S. 9
- (a) Limitation A 3
- (b) Whether maintainable where defendant is main-
tained in possession by order under S 145, Cri-
minal P. C. A 3 N 7
- (d) Whether includes possession of column of space above surface
ad infinitum A 39 N 6
- (e) Whether includes possession of underlying strata also ... A 39 N 5
- Of joint property and of property separately held, distinguished. A 142 & 144 N 35
- Of mortgaged property—Suit for, against transferee of mortgagee
for valuable consideration—*See under Mortgage—Possession of*
mortgaged property.
- Of moveable property—Suit for
- (a) By Hindu or Muhammadan entitled to possession on death
of Hindu or Muhammadan female—Limitation—Starting
point A 141 N 11
- (b) Limitation—Cases governed by residuary Art 120 ... A 120 N 12
- Of one *uralan* is possession of all A 142 & 144 N 35
- Of stranger claiming to be fractional owner is adverse to real owner
—Principle that possession of one co-owner is possession of all
does not apply A 142 & 144 N 35
- Of transferee of co-shehait—Not adverse to other co-shehairs un-
less it amounts to ouster A 142 & 144 N 35
- Of trust property—Suit for, against transferee of trustee for
valuable consideration—*See under Trust—Trust property—Pos-
session of.*
- Order of Collector dispossessing tenant as mortgagee—Subsequent
suit for possession as occupancy tenant—Limitation ... A 14 N 2
- Permissive possession
- (a) Defendant let into possession during minority of plaintiff—
Suit by plaintiff 17 years after attaining majority—Plaintiff
entitled to succeed if defendant failed to show change in
character of possession more than 12 years before suit A 142 & 144 N 56
- (b) Document granting permission invalid—Possession still per-
missive A 142 & 144 N 56
- (c) Instances of A 142 & 144 N 56
- (d) Of office, whether adverse A 124 N 6
- (e) Person in—Suit against—Limitation A 142 & 144 N 56
- (f) Possession at start adverse—It cannot by subsequent events
become permissive A 142 & 144 N 56
- (g) Possession need not be express but may be implied from
facts and circumstances of the case A 142 & 144 N 56

Possession—Permissive possession—(Contd.)

- (b) Possession of Muhammadan widow under arrangement is permissive A 142 & 144 N 56
- (i) Possession proved to be permissive in origin
- (i) Clear and affirmative evidence is required to establish change in character of possession ... A 142 & 144 N 56
 - (ii) Mere fact of long user by permissive occupant not sufficient to alter character of possession ... A 142 & 144 N 56
 - (iii) Onus of proving when and how it became adverse is on permissive occupant A 142 & 144 N 56
 - (iv) There must be open and explicit disavowal and disclaimer to the knowledge of owner, to establish change in character of possession ... A 142 & 144 N 56
- (j) Presumption as to
- (i) Possession of portion of property shown to be permissive—Possession of other portions presumed to be permissive in absence of evidence to the contrary: A 142 & 144 N 56
 - (ii) Possession proved to be permissive in origin is presumed to continue to be so unless something occurs to make it adverse A 142 & 144 N 56
- (k) Question, one of fact A 142 & 144 N 56
- (l) *Sub-letting by permissive occupant amounts to denial of title* A 142 & 144 N 56
- (m) Tenant occupying adjoining land of zamindar for purposes ancillary to agriculture—Tenant's possession is with implied permission A 142 & 144 N 56

—Physical possession

- (a) In case of minerals—Removal of small quantity of minerals from here and there will not constitute physical possession of whole mineral field A 142 & 144 N 54
- (b) In case of minerals physical possession is necessarily partial: A 142 & 144 N 54
- (c) Mere erection of boundary pillars does not amount to physical possession A 142 & 144 N 53
- (d) Property sold admitting physical possession
- (i) "Admit of physical possession," meaning of A 10 N 7; A 10 N 8
 - (ii) Equity of redemption in usufructually mortgaged property, whether admits of physical possession ... A 10 N 7
 - (iii) Land in possession of trespasser, whether admits of physical possession A 10 N 7
 - (iv) Property admitting of physical possession but not under the sale, whether property not admitting of physical possession A 10 N 8
 - (v) Property leased, sold with stipulation that sale was to take place after termination of lease—Whether property admitting of physical possession A 10 N 7
 - (vi) Property that has been leased—Whether admits of physical possession A 10 N 7
 - (vii) Undivided share in property, whether admits of physical possession A 10 N 7
- (e) Property sold not admitting of physical possession—Illustrations A 10 N 7

— Possession follows title
(a) Evidence unsatisfactory on both sides—Still presumption can be drawn	A 142 & 144 N 15
(b) Nature of presumption	A 142 & 144 N 15
(c) Presumption not confined to particular lands or to particular circumstances	A 142 & 144 N 15
(d) Presumption, when to be drawn	A 142 & 144 N 15
— Possession of house is possession of site	A 142 & 144 N 13
— Possessory title—Suit based on				
(a) Against person other than true owner—Limitation	A 142 & 144 N 4
(b) Apart from S 9, Specific Relief Act—Maintainability	A 142 & 144 N 4
(c) Burden of proof	A 142 & 144 N 4
— Presumption as to— Possession of part does not infer possession of whole	A 142 & 144 N 54
— Presumption of ownership from possession	A 142 & 144 N 4
— Question, one of fact	A 142 & 144 N 98
— Quiet possession				
(a) Covenant for—Breach of—Suit for—Limitation	A 83 N 7
(b) Covenant for quiet possession, whether contract of indemnity:	A 83 N 7
			of—Suit for	A 83 N 7
— Limitation	A 83 N 7
— Right of—Nature	A 142 & 144 N 4
— Suit for				
(a) Against person claiming to be in possession in right of adoption				
(i) Limitation	A 118 N 2
(ii) Whether barred if suit for declaration of invalidity of adoption is barred	A 118 N 2
			of possession and dispossession	
			dispossession does not render	
			(iii) Suit framed as if there was no dispossession—Art. 142, whether can be avoided	A 142 & 144 N 2
(a ²) Articles 142 and 144 apply only to suit for possession	A 142 & 144 N 3
(a ³) Based on possessory title	A 142 & 144 N 4
(a ⁴) Based on previous possession—Suit under Specific Relief Act and suit for recovery of property comprised in order under Criminal P C, or Mamlatdar's Courts Act, respecting possession of immovable property, distinguished	A 47 N 2
(a ⁵) Based on proprietary title	A 142 & 144 N 5
(b) By auction-purchaser for possession alleging that transfer from judgment-debtor under which defendant claims to be in possession is fraudulent and collusive—Whether one for possession within Art. 138	A 138 N 4
(b ¹) By co-sharer—Co-sharer in separate possession of common property dispossessed by another co-sharer—Onus on plaintiff to prove dispossession within 12 years of suit	A 142 & 144 N 35

Possession—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (c) By heir for possession of property alienated by administrator without permission of Court—Limitation ... A 91 N 12
- (d) By Hindu ward for possession of property alienated by *de facto* guardian—Limitation ... A 44 N 6
- (e) By legatee for possession of property alienated by executor—Limitation ... A 91 N 13
- (f) By minor on ground that sale was vitiated by fraud and collusion on part of his guardian—Whether one for setting aside sale ... A 12 N 2
- (g) By patnidar
- (i) For possession of *chaukidari chakran* lands transferred by Government to zamindar—Limitation ... A 113 N 3
- (ii) To recover possession of *chaukidari chakran* lands which have been resumed and settled with zamindar by Government—Limitation—Starting point A 142 & 144 N 90
- (h) By person deriving title from Government—Suit for possession of land purchased from Government—Suit against person in adverse possession against Government—Limitation : A 149 N 7
- (i) By transferees of Government for land transferred by Government—Joining Government as co-plaintiff, whether brings case within Art. 149 ... A 149 N 7
- (j) By trustees in succession for property in trusteeship of female—Limitation ... A 141 N 10
- (k) By ward in respect of property transferred by guardian—Suit where alienee is in possession of property by virtue of the transfer—Limitation ... A 44 N 2
- (l) Declaratory suit, whether one for possession A 185 N 3
- (1st) Defendant impleaded in time but claims his share of suit property in written statement submitted 12 years after cause of action—Claim not barred ... A 142 & 144 N 91
- (1st) Defendant made party after expiry of limitation—Suit barred as against him ... A 142 & 144 N 91
- (m) Distinguished from one for specific performance by giving possession ... A 113 N 3
- (m¹) Falling under Art. 144
- (i) Possession after suit cannot be reckoned in computing period of defendant's adverse possession A 142 & 144 N 90
- (ii) Question when possession of defendant becomes adverse to plaintiff, is one of fact ... A 142 & 144 N 90
- (iii) Starting point—Time runs from date when possession of defendant becomes adverse to plaintiff A 142 & 144 N 90
- (n) For one-half share of property purchased jointly by plaintiff and defendant and for accounts of profits—Limitation ... A 89 N 3
- (o) For property alienated by mahant of Math—Suit by succeeding mahant—Limitation ... A 91 N 10
- (p) For property alienated by minor as major—Suit by minor on attaining majority—Limitation ... A 91 N 15
- (q) For property alienated by trustee of temple—Suit by succeeding trustee—Limitation ... A 91 N 10
- (r) For share in property alleged to have been partnership property, whether barred if suit for accounts of dissolved partnership is barred on that date ... A 106 N 5

Possession—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (s) For property sold in execution—Maintainability—Provisions of Civil P. C. as to ... A 138 N 2
- (t) For property of which plaintiff has executed sale deed in favour of defendant—Allegation that deed is nominal and not intended to be operative—Limitation ... A 91 N 3
- (t¹) Limitation
- (i) Art. 142, whether confined to suit for possession on ground of possessory title or whether applicable to all cases of dispossession ... A 142 & 144 N 5
 - (ii) Art. 144 is only residuary ... A 142 & 144 N 2
 - (in) Plaintiff alleging defendant's possession to be permissive but not proving it—Defendant denying such allegation—Art. 142 applies ... A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (iv) Special or local law prescribing limitation different from that in Limitation Act—Period prescribed in former will apply ... A 142 & 144 N 100
- (t²) Nature of
- (i) Contemplated by Art. 144 ... A 142 & 144 N 5
 - (ii) Substance and not form of relief claimed, that determines character of suit ... A 142 & 144 N 3
 - (iii) Such suit, whether invariably means one for actual physical possession ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (t³) Not specially provided for—Limitation ... A 144
- (t⁴) On dispossession otherwise than in due course of law—Even as against true owner—Limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 4
- A 143 N 14
- A 143 N 18
- (u¹) Onus of proof
- (i) Judgment *not inter partes* does not alter burden of proof as between rival claimants ... A 142 & 144 N 88
 - (ii) Plaintiff must prove better title ... A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (iii) Plaintiff must prove subsisting title ... A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (iv) Plaintiff must succeed on strength of his title and not on weakness of defendant's case ... A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (v) Plaintiff proving ownership of property and also that defendant's entry not in contravention of his title—Onus is shifted to defendant to prove adverse possession ... A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (vi) Prior possession is proof of better title as against subsequent possessor without title ... A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (vii) Proprietary title is better than possessory title ... A 142 & 144 N 87
 - (viii) Question of onus immaterial when evidence is let in on both sides ... A 142 & 144 N 89
- (u²) Plaintiff in possession and defendant entering on property under right derived from plaintiff—Limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 2
- (u³) Plaintiff not in possession at all but getting title to it while defendant in lawful possession—Limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 2
- (u⁴) Possession given under benami document—Suit for possession by executant against *benamidar*—Art. 144 applies ... A 142 & 144 N 60
- (u⁵) Possession given under void document—Suit by transferor for possession—Art. 142 and not Art. 144 applies ... A 142 & 144 N 60
- (u⁶) Prayer in such case—Nature of ... A 142 & 144 N 3

Possession—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (v) Relief involving negating decree obtained by defendant—
Limitation A 95 N 6
- (v¹) Scope of Art. 144 wider than that of Art. 142: A 142 & 144 N 7
- (w) Suit based on title—Limitation A 113 N 3
- (x) Suit based on title and suit for specific performance of contract by giving possession—Distinction between—Illustrative cases A 113 N 3
- (y) Suit for payment of certain sum of money and in default of payment, for possession, whether one for possession within Art. 137 A 137 N 3
- (z) Suit for possession of property—S. 20 does not apply ... S 20 N 4
- (z¹) Suit for redemption of property, whether one for possession within Art. 137 A 137 N 3
- (z²) Suit for setting aside void transfer barred—Still suit for possession of property transferred can be brought: A 142 & 144 N 60
- (z³) Suit for setting aside voidable transfer barred—Suit for possession of property transferred is also barred: A 142 & 144 N 60
- (z⁴) Suit where defendant's entry on property is consistent with title of plaintiff or permissive—Limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (z⁵) Test for applicability of Art. 142 A 142 & 144 N 2
- (z⁶) Under Art. 142—Defendant must be in possession at the date of suit A 142 & 144 N 10
- (z⁷) Upon plaintiff's dispossession, by purchaser where sale is null and void—Limitation A 12 N 1
- (z⁸) What is
- (i) Alienation by manager—Suit for possession by minor co-parceners on attaining majority ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (ii) Alienation by one heir not binding on another—Suit by latter against alienee for possession ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (iii) Dispossession by public servant—Suit for possession: A 142 & 144 N 3
- (iv) Possession must be the primary relief asked for: A 142 & 144 N 3
- (v) Suit by *aliyasanthana* family to recover property alienated by *ejman* A 142 & 144 N 3
- (vi) Suit by co-parcener for possession of property sold by other co-parcener A 142 & 144 N 3
- (vii) Suit by owner for possession of his wall deliberately encroached upon and built upon by defendant: A 142 & 144 N 3
- (viii) Suit by plaintiff claiming as trustee of mutt and as such entitled to possession, praying that he be entitled to collect rents and profits from receiver appointed by Court A 142 & 144 N 3
- (ix) Suit by worshippers of Thakurdwar for ejectment of transferee and restoration of property to trustee, whether suit for possession within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 3
- (x) Suit for declaration that pathway was public pathway and for injunction to remove obstruction thereto: A 142 & 144 N 3
- (xi) Suit for ejectment of non-proprietor in the Punjab from site A 142 & 144 N 3
- (xii) Suit for possession and cancellation of document, where plaintiff not bound to ask for such cancellation: A 142 & 144 N 3
- (xiii) Suit for possession and mesne profits and for correction of entry in Record of Rights A 142 & 144 N 3

Possession—Suit for—What is—(Contd.)

- (xiv) Suit for possession of land on declaration of plaintiff's right thereto on basis of award ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (xv) Suit for possession with ancillary prayer for removal of trees ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (xvi) Suit for redemption, whether suit to recover possession within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 3
- (xvii) Suit for removal of beams constructed by defendant, to overhang plaintiff's land ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (xviii) Void transfer of minor's property — Suit by minor for possession after setting aside transfer ... A 142 & 144 N 3

(x⁹) What is not

- (i) Property contracted to be transferred — Suit for recovery ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (ii) Suit for damages for trespass ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (iii) Suit for declaration of title is not one for possession ... A 142 & 144 N 87
- (iv) Suit for mere declaration of right to property : A 142 & 144 N 3
- (v) Suit for possession of office which is not hereditary: A 142 & 144 N 3
- (vi) Suit for possession of property alienated by plaintiff's guardian during minority ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (vii) Suit for pre-emption and consequential prayer for possession ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (viii) Suit for redemption of usufructuary mortgage with consequential prayer for possession ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (ix) Suit to set aside sale on ground of fraud and undue influence, with consequential relief for possession: A 142 & 144 N 3
- (x) Suit where plaintiff does not himself seek possession but asks to place third party in possession ... A 142 & 144 N 3

(z¹⁰) What plaintiff must prove to claim benefit of Art 144 : A 142 & 144 N 87

(z¹¹) Where plaintiff has to establish validity of adoption as basis of his claim to possession—Limitation ... A 119 N 2

(z¹²) Where possession cannot be sued for without first obtaining some other relief as condition precedent—Suit, whether can be treated as one for possession ... A 136 N 2

(z¹³) Where possession cannot be sued for without first setting aside a certain order of Court—Suit for possession, whether barred if suit for setting aside order is time-barred ... A 136 N 2

—Suit for confirmation of, by declaration of title — Plaintiff must prove possession and title ... A 142 & 144 N 87

—Taking possession—Meaning of, within Art. 126 ... A 126 N 8

—Termination of

(a) What acts of defendant are sufficient to establish termination must be judged from the circumstances and nature of property involved in each case ... A 142 & 144 N 9

(b) What constitutes ... A 142 & 144 N 9

—Under invalid transactions—Whether adverse—*See under* Adverse possession.

—Under transfer which subsequently becomes invalid — *See under* Adverse possession.

—Under void lease—Nature of ... A 139 N 18

—Vendor out of possession—Meaning of ... A 136 N 3

Possession—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (v) Relief involving negating decree obtained by defendant—
Limitation A 95 N 6
- (v¹) Scope of Art. 144 wider than that of Art. 142: A 142 & 144 N 7
- (w) Suit based on title—Limitation A 113 N 3
- (x) Suit based on title and suit for specific performance of contract by giving possession—Distinction between—Illustrative cases A 113 N 3
- (y) Suit for payment of certain sum of money and in default of payment, for possession, whether one for possession within Art. 137 A 137 N 3
- (z) Suit for possession of property—S. 20 does not apply ... S 20 N 4
- (z¹) Suit for redemption of property, whether one for possession within Art. 137 A 137 N 3
- (z²) Suit for setting aside void transfer barred—Still suit for possession of property transferred can be brought: A 142 & 144 N 60
- (z³) Suit for setting aside voidable transfer barred—Suit for possession of property transferred is also barred: A 142 & 144 N 60
- (z⁴) Suit where defendant's entry on property is consistent with title of plaintiff or permissive—Limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 2
- (z⁵) Test for applicability of Art 142 A 142 & 144 N 2
- (z⁶) Under Art. 142—Defendant must be in possession at the date of suit A 142 & 144 N 10
- (z⁷) Upon plaintiff's dispossession, by purchaser where sale is null and void—Limitation A 12 N 1
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 - (i) Alienation by manager—Suit for possession by minor co-parceners on attaining majority ... A 142 & 144 N 3
 - (ii) Alienation by one heir not binding on another—Suit by latter against alienee for possession ... A 142 & 144 N 3
 - (iii) Dispossession by public servant—Suit for possession: A 142 & 144 N 3
 - (iv) Possession must be the primary relief asked for: A 142 & 144 N 3
 - (v) Suit by *aliyasanthana* family to recover property alienated by *ejaman* A 142 & 144 N 3
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 - (ix) Suit by worshippers of Thakurdwar for ejectment of transferor and restoration of property to trustee, whether suit for possession within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 3
 - (x) Suit for declaration that pathway was public pathway and for injunction to remove obstruction thereto: A 142 & 144 N 3
 - (xi) Suit for ejectment of non-proprietor in the Punjab from site A 142 & 144 N 3
 - (xii) Suit for possession and cancellation of document, where plaintiff not bound to ask for such cancellation: A 142 & 144 N 3
 - (xiii) Suit for possession and mesne profits and for correction of entry in Record of Rights A 142 & 144 N 3

Possession—Suit for—What is—(Contd.)

- (xiv) Suit for possession of land on declaration of plaintiff's right thereto on basis of award ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (xv) Suit for possession with ancillary prayer for removal of trees ... A 142 & 144 N 3
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- (xvii) Suit for removal of beams constructed by defendant, to overhang plaintiff's land ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (xviii) Void transfer of minor's property — Suit by minor for possession after setting aside transfer ... A 142 & 144 N 3

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- (v) Suit for possession of office which is not hereditary: A 142 & 144 N 3
- (vi) Suit for possession of property alienated by plaintiff's guardian during minority ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (vii) Suit for pre-emption and consequential prayer for possession ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (viii) Suit for redemption of usufructuary mortgage with consequential prayer for possession ... A 142 & 144 N 3
- (ix) Suit to set aside sale on ground of fraud and undue influence, with consequential relief for possession A 142 & 144 N 3
- (x) Suit where plaintiff does not himself seek possession but asks to place third party in possession A 142 & 144 N 3

(z¹⁰) What plaintiff must prove to claim benefit of Art 144 : A 142 & 144 N 87(z¹¹) Where plaintiff has to establish validity of adoption as basis of his claim to possession—Limitation ... A 119 N 2(z¹²) Where possession cannot be sued for without first obtaining some other relief as condition precedent—Suit, whether can be treated as one for possession ... A 136 N 2(z¹³) Where possession cannot be sued for without first setting aside a certain order of Court—Suit for possession, whether barred if suit for setting aside order is time-barred ... A 136 N 2

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(a) What acts of defendant are sufficient to establish termination must be judged from the circumstances and nature of property involved in each case ... A 142 & 144 N 9

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—Under transfer which subsequently becomes invalid — See under Adverse possession

—Under void lease—Nature of ... A 139 N 18

—Vendor out of possession—Meaning of ... A 136 N 3

Possession—(Contd.)**—What is**

- (a) Owner of diluviated land, whether deemed to be in possession of the land A 142 & 144 N 11
- (b) Owner of land who has parted with surface rights, whether deemed to be in possession of subsoil A 142 & 144 N 11
- (c) Possession in fact and possession in law distinguished : A 142 & 144 N 11

—Wrongful possession

- (a) Possession of tenant after determination of lease, whether wrongful A 139 N 13
- (b) What is
 - (i) Obstruction to auction-purchaser taking possession removed by order of Court and possession delivered—Suit by obstructor successful—Possession of purchaser pending suit, whether wrongful A 109 N 8
 - (ii) Possession of mortgagee where mortgage is void or invalid against mortgagor, whether wrongful A 109 N 6
 - (iii) Possession of person under decree subsequently set aside, whether wrongful A 109 N 8

Power of attorney

- Want of, in favour of mother suing on behalf of her sons—Whether other cause of a like nature to defect of jurisdiction within S. 14; S 14 N 24

Pre-emption

- Acknowledgment by vendee of mortgage on property — Whether binding on pre-emptor S 19 N 34
- Application for pre-emption under S. 26 and S. 188, Bengal Tenancy Act, by some only of the co-sharers entitled to pre-empt—All co-sharers not impleaded as parties—Effect S 22 N 20
- Contract for—Whether subject to rule against perpetuities enacted in S. 14, T. P. Act A 10 N 6
- Decree for pre-emption fixing period for plaintiff's depositing amount in Court—Time requisite in obtaining copy of order cannot be excluded... .. S 12 N 4
- Failure to give pre-emptor notice of sale — Whether brings a case within S. 18 S 18 N 9
- Fraud—Sale effected in favour of one person but really in favour of another who actively conceals such fact — Plaintiff thereby kept from knowledge of his right—S. 18, if applies S 18 N 9
- Ground of—For setting aside sale—Limitation—Starting point A 12 N 10
- Mere silence of vendor and vendee — Whether amounts to fraud within S. 18 S 18 N 9
- Notice to pre-emptor — Omission to issue notice with deliberate intention of keeping him from knowledge of his right — Whether amounts to fraud S 18 N 9
- Plaintiff having right of pre-emption in possession at time of sale —Subsequent dispossession of plaintiff by vendee — Cause of action for plaintiff's suit for possession, when arises S 9 N 7
- Possession of property sold, openly taken by vendee immediately after sale — Sale not kept from knowledge of vendee — Transaction, if amounts to fraud within S. 18 where pre-emptor may not have knowledge of sale S 18 N 9

Pre-emption—(Contd.)

—Right of

(a) Based on contract

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|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------|
| (i) Contractual obligation annexed to the ownership of property is within meaning of S. 10, T. P. Act | ... | A 10 N 5 |
| (ii) Whether enforceable against transferee with notice or gratuitous transferee | ... | A 10 N 5 |
| (iii) Whether subject to rule against perpetuity in S. 14, T. P. Act | ... | A 10 N 5 |

(b) Enforcement of—Suit for

- | | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|----------------|
| (i) Against purchaser whose purchase has given rise to right of pre-emption—Limitation | ... | A 10 N 1 |
| (ii) Against transferee of purchaser whose purchase has given rise to right of pre-emption — Nature of such suit—Limitation | ... | A 10 N 1 |
| (iii) Burden of proof | ... | A 10 N 12 |
| (iv) Decree for pre-emption—Effect of | ... | A 10 N 2 |
| (v) Doctrine of lis pendens, whether applies | ... | A 10 N 15 |
| (vi) Filed one year after transfer to vendee but within one year after transfer to transferee of vendee—Whether barred | ... | A 10 N 14 |
| (vii) Governed by Punjab Pre-emption Act, S. 30—Limitation | ... | A 10 N 13 |
| (viii) In respect of contract to sell | ... | A 10 N 1 |
| (ix) In respect of execution sales—Limitation | ... | A 10 N 9 |
| (x) In respect of mortgage by conditional sale becoming 'sale' on foreclosure | | |
| (a) Limitation—Starting point | ... | A 10 N 9 |
| (b) Where case is governed by Punjab Pre-emption Act, S. 30 | ... | A 10 N 9 |
| (c) When property does not admit of physical possession | ... | A 10 N 9 |
| (xi) In respect of mortgage, sale or lease pre-empted — Limitation | ... | A 10 N 1 |
| (xii) In respect of sale—Oral sale of intangible interest | ... | A 10 N 1 |
| (xiii) In respect of sale to different persons where there is distinct specification of shares of each and their prices—Limitation | ... | A 10 N 14 |
| (xiv) In respect of valid sale of property not admitting of physical possession and not evidenced by any registered instrument—Limitation | ... | A 10 N 1 |
| (xv) Limitation—Starting point | ... | A 10, A 10 N 6 |
| (xvi) Minority, whether ground for extending period of limitation for pre-emption suit | ... | A 10 N 6 |
| (xvii) Necessary parties | | |
| (a) Where before institution of suit, vendee had transferred his right to others, decree, whether could be enforced against transferees who were not impleaded as parties in the suit against vendee | ... | A 10 N 14 |
| (b) Where sale is joint sale in favour of several persons | ... | A 10 N 14 |
| (xviii) Parties to suit | ... | A 10 N 14 |
| (xix) Plea of limitation, value of | ... | A 10 N 16 |

Pre-emption—Right of—Enforcement of, suit for—(Contd.)

- (xx) Principle underlying the fixing of starting point for such suit as date of delivery of physical possession or registration of instrument of sale ... A 10 N 1
- (xxi) Rival pro-emptor added as party to suit ... A 10 N 14
- (xxii) Setting aside sale by person who has no authority to sell except under certain conditions—Limitation ... A 10 N 13
- (xxiii) To enforce contract, which among several other items, includes recognition of right of pre-emption—Limitation ... A 10 N 13
- (xxiv) To enforce pre-emption right founded on special contract—Limitation ... A 10 N 5
- (xxv) Transferee of vendee—Limitation ... A 10 N 14
- (xxvi) When instrument of sale is registered
 - (a) Provisions of Registration Act, S. 60 as to ... A 10 N 11
 - (b) Sale certificate granted to purchaser in court auction under provisions of Civil Procedure Code, whether registered instrument so as to start limitation ... A 10 N 11
- (xxvii) "When purchaser takes physical possession of property sold"
 - (a) "Physical possession"—Meaning of A 10 N 7; A 10 N 8
 - (b) Physical possession, whether equivalent to symbolic possession ... A 10 N 7
 - (c) Possession, whether must have been taken under the sale contract ... A 10 N 8
 - of physical possession ... A 10 N 9
 - (e) Property, when admits of physical possession and when not—Illustrations ... A 10 N 7
 - (f) Prospective purchaser taking possession from prospective vendor under convenient arrangement and sale deed executed subsequently—Whether takes possession under the sale so as to start limitation ... A 10 N 8
 - (g) Purchaser of property already in his possession as lessee or mortgagee, whether can take possession under the sale so as to start limitation ... A 10 N 8
- (xxviii) Where fraud of vendor and vendee keeps pro-emptor in ignorance of his right ... A 10 N 6
- (xxix) Where necessary party is minor and is made party within time but for whom guardian ad litem is appointed after limitation ... A 10 N 14
- (xxx) Where part of property is taken possession of on one date and other part on later date ... A 10 N 10
- (xxxi) Where part of property sold is not capable of physical possession ... A 10 N 10
- (xxxii) Where part of property sold is not capable of physical possession and there is also no registered sale evidencing sale ... A 10 N 10
- (xxxiii) Where pre-emption right is in respect of foreclosure of mortgage ... A 10 N 13

Pre-emption—Right of—Enforcement of, suit for—(Contd.)

(xxxiv) Where pre-emption right is in respect of lease—Limitation	A 10 N 13
(xxxv) Where pre-emption right is recognized even where contract to sale has been entered into—Limitation ...	A 10 N 1
(xxxvi) Where property does not admit of physical possession at date of sale and there is no registered instrument also	A 10 N 6
(xxxvii) Where special or local law prescribes period of limitation different to that prescribed by Art. 10, Limitation Act	A 10 N 13
(xxxviii) Where subject of sale admits of physical possession ...	A 10 N 10
(xxxix) Where subject of sale admits of physical possession but no possession can be taken under the sale—Limitation	A 10 N 13
(xl) Where subject of sale does not admit of physical possession and there is either no instrument of sale or instrument of sale is unregistered document ...	A 10 N 13
(x) decree is	A 10 N 9
(i) Founded on law	A 10 N 3
of British India	A 10 N 3
(iii) Recognition of, in Mahomedan law	A 10 N 3
(d) Founded on special contract—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation	A 10 N 5
(e) Meaning of	A 10 N 2
(f) Plea of, in defence	A 10 N 17
of pre-emption	A 10 N 3
parts of India	A 10 N 4
... ..	A 10 N 4
(j) Sale giving rise to	
(i) Mere error in instrument of sale, whether alters nature of transaction so as to affect pre-emption right ...	A 10 N 9
(ii) Mortgage by conditional sale becoming on foreclosure "sale," whether sale giving rise to pre-emption right: ...	A 10 N 9
(iii) Nature of	
(a) Sale, whether must be complete	A 10 N 9
(b) Sale, whether must be in actual form a deed of sale	A 10 N 9
(c) Vendor executing deed of gift in order to defraud pre-emptor—Gift deed, whether sale giving rise to pre-emption right within Art. 10 ...	A 10 N 9
(iv) Subsequent agreement between parties, whether can convert what is out and on sale into any other transaction so as to take away pre-emption right ...	A 10 N 9
(k) Whether arises in execution sale	A 10 N 9
(l) Whether arises upon transfer effected by decree ...	A 10 N 9
—Suit for	
(a) By one pre-emptor against another pre-emptor, on ground that plaintiff has superior right of pre-emption and that decree obtained by other pre-emptor is based on fraud—Limitation	A 120 N 5

Pre-emption—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (b) In respect of mortgaged property—Mortgage containing covenant that on default of payment within certain time mortgage would become a sale absolute—Foreclosure decree obtained on such mortgage—Limitation ... A 120 N 5
- (c) Legal disability of person entitled to sue—Whether extends period of limitation ... S 8; S 8 N 2, 3
- (d) Limitation—Suit not falling under Art. 10 ... A 120 N 5
- (e) Necessary parties ... S 22 N 20
- (f) Person under disability, suit by—Limitation ... S 6 N 1
- (g) When cause of action accrues to estate of deceased person — Starting point of limitation, if postponed ... S 17; S 17 N 2
- (h) Whether suit for possession within S. 28 ... S 28 N 3

Pre-emptor

- Of mortgaged property — Suit against, for payment of money charged upon mortgaged property—Limitation ... A 132 N 2

Premia, recovery of

- Suit for—By assured—Limitation ... A 87

Prescription

- Law of
 - (a) Meaning of ... Preamble N 3
 - (b) Reason and object of ... Preamble N 4
- Plea of
 - (a) Defendant, whether entitled to tack on possession of independent trespassor to that of his own, in plea of prescription ... A 124 N 7
 - (b) Suit for possession of office—Defendant, whether entitled to tack on adverse possession of his predecessor to that of his own in establishing his plea of prescription ... A 124 N 7

Prescriptive title

- Acquisition of—Person entitled to sue under disability—Right, if can be extinguished before expiry of extended period ... S 6 N 34

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act

- Chapter 7
 - (a) Order under—Whether must be set aside prior to suit for title ... A 13 N 1
 - (b) Proceedings under—Whether suit ... A 13 N 2
 - (c) Suit to recover property after proceedings under — Art. 11-A not applicable ... A 11-A N 8
- Section 28
 - (a) Order under—Nature of ... A 11 N 20
 - (b) Provisions of ... A 11 N 20
 - (c) Suit by person against whom order is passed
 - (i) Art. 11 and Art. 29 distinguished ... A 11 N 10
 - (ii) Failure to bring within limitation — See also under 'Claim' and 'Attachment.'
 - (a) Attaching decree-holder, whether can move after limitation Insolvency Court to annul transfer which is subject of claim proceedings where judgment debtor has been subsequently declared insolvent ... A 11 N 3

Presidency Small Cause Courts Act — S. 28 — Suit by person against whom order is passed — Failure to bring within limitation—(Contd.)

- (b) Effect on right of claimant in respect of stranger not party to claim proceedings ... A 11 N 3
- (c) Stranger not party to claim proceedings, whether can set up such failure as bar to action against him ... A 11 N 3
- (iii) Limitation ... A 11; A 11 N 2
- (iv) Relief which can be prayed for in such suit—Nature of: A 11 N 9
- (v) Suit barred under other Article—Suit, whether maintainable under Art. 11 ... A 11 N 2
- (vi) Suit based on cause of action which accrues subsequent to date of order—Limitation ... A 11 N 2a
- (vii) Where order is against minor ... A 11 N 5
- (viii) Who can bring such suit within Art. 11 ... A 11 N 4

Presidency Towns Insolvency Act

- S. 7—Application under—For rents and profits received by mortgagee where mortgage by insolvent was annulled, whether equivalent to suit for profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 12
- Section 8—Review under—Application for—Limitation ... A 162 N 3

Price

- Meaning of ... A 52 N 3

Principal and agent

- Acknowledgment of liability by duly authorized agent ... S 19 N 50
- Agent employed jointly by more than one principal—Agent, whether bound to account separately ... A 89 N 21
- Agent, if trustee for principal in respect of latter's money that may come into his hands ... S 10 N 11
- Agent in making payment exceeding his authority or doing something not actually covered by his authority—Whether can bind principal so as to give the creditor benefit of S. 20 ... S. 20 N 18
- Agent of two principals—Use by agent of money belonging to one principal for benefit of another—Suit by former principal against latter for recovery of such money—Limitation ... A 120 N 19
- Arbitration and award in respect of disputes—Payment made by agent in satisfaction of principal's claim—Proceedings set aside on ground of fraud—Money refunded by principal—Suit by principal to enforce original liability to account—Plaintiff, if entitled to fresh cause of action on former proceedings being set aside ... S 9 N 11
- Knowledge of agent, whether knowledge of principal ... A 95 N 13
- Liability of agent to principal ... A 89 N 2
- Person merely in possession on behalf of another as manager or agent—Whether trustee for him ... S 10 N 9
- Relationship of joint purchasers of property, whether one of principal and agent ... A 89 N 2
- Suit by principal against agent
 - (a) For accounts—See under Accounts
 - (b) For accounts and to enforce charge on immovable property created to secure moneys which might be found due from agent in taking accounts—Limitation ... A 132 N 3

Principal and agent—Suit by principal against agent—(Contd.)

- (c) For moveable property received by agent and not accounted for
 - (i) Applicability of Art. 89 and Art. 115 ... A 89 N 3
 - (ii) Limitation ... A 89; A 89 N 2
 - (iii) Where there is express agreement to account—Limitation ... A 89 N 3
- (d) For neglect or misconduct—Limitation ... A 90; A 90 N 1
- (e) For possession—On termination of lease in favour of agent—Limitation ... A 139 N 4
- (f) For recovery of account papers—Limitation ... A 120 N 19
- (g) For recovery of moneys spent by agent in course of agency—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- (h) For recovery of sums misappropriated by agent—Limitation:
 - (i) For specific sum found due from agent after taking of accounts—Limitation ... A 89 N 2
 - (j) To enforce charge on immovable property created to secure moneys which might be found due from agent—Limitation: ... A 89 N 2

Principal and surety

- Acknowledgment or payment by one—Whether will save limitation against the other ... S 21 N 12
- Debts of principal debtor and surety, if distinct for purposes of S. 20 ... S 21 N 12
- Relationship of—Basis of—Whether created by law ... A 81 N 2
- Suit against surety under bond for payment by judgment-debtor of plaintiff—Time during which the plaintiff was taking out execution against judgment-debtor under decree—Whether can be deducted under S. 14 ... S 14 N 16
- Whether joint contractors within S. 21 ... S 21 N 12

Private person

- Meaning of, within Art. 149 ... A 149 N 11

Privilege

- Exclusive privilege—Infringement of—Suit for compensation
 - (a) Limitation—Starting point ... A 40, A 40 N 5
 - (b) Suit for injunction restraining defendant from making infringement—Whether one for compensation for infringement within Art. 40 ... A 40 N 1

Privy Council

- Appeal to—*See under Appeal.*
- Decree of—*See under Decree.*
- New plea as to limitation, if can be raised for the first time ... S 3 N 17
- Order of—Enforcement of—Application for—*See under Order.*

Probate

- Acknowledgment of liability by executor before grant of probate—Whether binding on estate ... S 19 N 56
- Application for probate—Objection that applicant is debtor to estate of deceased—Reply by applicant admitting his liability—Whether amounts to sufficient acknowledgment under S. 19 ... S 19 N 47
- Contested proceedings for grant of probate—Whether suits ... S 2 C 10 N 1

Probate and Administration Act

- Appeal under—To High Court—Limitation ... A 155 N 3

Procedure

—Law governing—*Lex fori* S 11 N 1

Proceedings

—Conversion of—Limitation applicable, how determined ... S 3 N 33a
 —Other than suit—What aro A 13 N 2
 —To which Act applies Preamble
 —Valid presentation—What is S 4 N 14

Profits

—Of immovable property—Meaning of A 109 N 13
 —Of immovable property sold up to date of sale—Who can recover such profits A 109 N 15
 —Of land—Share of—Suit for—On registered agreement entitling plaintiff to sue for such share—Limitation A 116 N 8
 —Of property of intestate—Suit for—Limitation A 123 N 2
 —Received by co-owner—Suit for, by other co-owner—Limitation A 120 N 28
 —Suit for
 (a) Attachment of lands under S. 146, Criminal P. C.—Suits filed to establish rights of parties—Withdrawal of profits of attached property deposited in Court by defendant during pendency of suits—Subsequent compromise to the effect that attached lands should belong to plaintiff—Suit by plaintiff against defendant for profits withdrawn—Limitation A 120 N 28
 (b) By co-sharer against other co-sharer—Whether one for compensation for breach of contract A 115 N 1
 (c) Fields given to defendant in satisfaction of debt—Implied promise to pay surplus profit to plaintiff—Suit for profit—Limitation A 62 N 28
 (d) Limitation—For suit not governed by Art 109 A 120 N 28
 (e) On registered agreement—Limitation A 116 N 8
 (f) Profits of business carried on by two brothers and subsequently wound up—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 28
 (g) Profits of immovable property wrongfully received by defendants
 (i) Applicability of Art. 109, essentials of A 109 N 2
 (ii) Application for rents and profits from mortgagee where mortgage by insolvent is annulled by Insolvency Court—Limitation A 109 N 12
 (iii) Application for restitution—Limitation A 109 N 17
 (iv) Award of such profits—Subsequent application for ascertainment
 (a) Claim for ascertainment, whether limited to profits within three years before date of application A 109 N 11
 (b) Limitation—Starting point A 109 N 11
 (v) "Belonging to the plaintiff" in Art. 109—Meaning of : A 109 N 15
 (vi) By *cestus que trust* against trustee *de son tort*—Limitation A 109 N 5
 (vii) By co-owner against trespasser—Co-owner, whether can recover whole profits without making other co-owners parties A 109 N 15
 (viii) By co-owner for his share of profits—Limitation A 109 N 3

Profits — Suit for — Profits of immovable property wrongfully received by defendants—(Contd.)

- (ix) By co-sharer for share of his profits accruing after cessation of co-ownership—Limitation ... A 109 N 3
- (x) By co-sharer for share of his profits accruing after decree for partition and before its execution ... A 109 N 3
- (xi) By co-sharer of joint Mitakshara family excluded from enjoyment of family property for account of profits received by members in possession, whether suit for profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 4
- (xii) By losses disposed of by lessor—Limitation ... A 109 N 7
- (xiii) By member of Hindu family governed by Dayabhaga law for share of profits—Limitation ... A 109 N 4
- (xiv) By member of Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law for profits of undivided property after division in status—Limitation ... A 109 N 4
- (xv) By minor after attaining majority—Limitation—(S. 8, whether applies) where minor is one of several persons entitled to sue for mesne profits and discharge can be given without concurrence of such minor ... A 109 N 9
- (xvi) By mortgagee disposed of by mortgagor—Limitation: A 109 N 6
- (xvii) By mortgagor against usufructuary mortgagee for collections received by the latter after satisfaction of mortgage—Limitation ... A 109 N 6
- (xviii) By mortgagor against usufructuary mortgagee for collections received by the latter where mortgagor's rights are put an end to before regaining possession—Limitation ... A 109 N 6
- (xix) By vendor for profits up to date of sale—Limitation: A 109 N 15
- (xx) Distinguished from suit for damages to personal property ... A 109 N 13
- (xxi) For mesne profits—When governed by Art. 109 ... A 109 N 9
- (xxii) For rent received by co-sharer where co-sharer is also the tenant—Limitation ... A 109 N 13
- (xxiii) Limitation ... A 109; A 109 N 16
- (xxiv) Limitation, starting point, in case of crops ... A 109 N 16
- (xxv) Plaintiff's disability to maintain suit at time of receipt of profits owing to existence of decree against him, effect of ... A 109 N 16
- (xxvi) Profits received by alienee of father where alienation is set aside at the instance of his son except as to share of father—Limitation ... A 109 N 3
- (xxvii) Profits received by alienee of Hindu widow where certain portion of alienation is set aside—Limitation ... A 109 N 3
- (xxviii) Profits received by defendant during possession under decree or order of Court subsequently set aside—Maintainability of suit ... A 109 N 8
- (xxix) Profits referred to, in Art. 109, whether identical with mesne profits ... A 109 N 2
- (xxx) Suit for damages for trespass—Whether suit for profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 13
- (xxxi) Suit for profits received by defendant during possession acquired prior to decree for possession, whether suit for profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 8

Profits — Suit for — Profits of immovable property wrongfully received by defendants—(Contd.)

- (xxxii) Suit for profits received by defendant during possession under decree or order of Court subsequently set aside, whether suit for profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 8
- (xxxiii) Suit for profits received by mortgagee where mortgage is void or invalid against plaintiff, whether suit for profits wrongfully received—Illustrative cases ... A 109 N 8
- (xxxiV) Suit for profits wrongfully received by defendant and ... A 109 N 2
- ... red by ... A 109 N 14
- ... Pre. ... A 109 N 14

—Wrongfully received

- (a) Meaning of ... A 109 N 2a
- (b) Profits received by alienee of father where alienation is set aside at the instance of his sons except as to share of father, whether profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 3
- (c) Profits received by alienee of Hindu widow after her death, where alienation is set aside, whether wrongful profits ... A 109 N 2a
- (d) Profits received by alienee of Hindu widow where certain portion of alienation is set aside by reversioners, after widow's death—Profits of the whole property, whether wrongful ... A 109 N 3
- (e) Profits received by defendant while in possession under decree or order of Court which is subsequently set aside on appeal or in separate suit, whether wrongfully received ... A 109 N 2a
- (f) Profits received by licensee after expiry of period of license, whether wrongful profits ... A 109 N 2a
- (g) Profits received by mortgagee where mortgage is void or invalid against mortgagor, whether wrongful profits ... A 109 N 6
- (h) Profits received by person possessing under decree subsequently set aside, whether wrongful ... A 109 N 8
- (i) Profits received by purchaser in the event of the sale being set aside, whether profits wrongfully received ... A 109 N 2a
- (j) Profits received by trespasser, whether wrongful profits ... A 109 N 2a

Profits a prendre

—In gross, what is ... S 2 Cl 5 N 12

Promise

—Breach of—Compensation for—*See under Compensation.*

Promisor

—Joint promisor—Suit by, for contribution—*See under Contribution.*

Promissory note

- By Hindu, bearing native date only and payable four months after date—Limitation for suit on note how to be computed ... S 25
- Debt due on—Surety for—Suit against—Limitation ... A 73 N 2
- Debt incurred on, by father—Son's liability to pay such debt—Suit to enforce—Limitation ... A 120 N 49
- Endorser of—Suit against—Limitation ... A 73 N 2
- For pre-existing debt—Whether can be used as acknowledgment of liability in suit on original cause of action ... S 19 N 61

Promissory note—(Contd.)

- Given in lieu of earlier debt—Debtor giving receipt acknowledging receipt of sum sama day—Acknowledgment, if can be relied on in suit on original cause of action, such suit being brought on account of promissory note being unenforceable... S 19 N 29
- Giving of promissory note—Whether constitutes payment within S. 20 ... S 20 N 11
- Government promissory note—Interest on—Recovery of—Suit against holder—Limitation... A 120 N 2
- Maturity of—Method of calculating ... A 69 N 2
- Meaning of ... S 2 Cl 9
- (a) Government war bond payable at a particular place, if promissory note ... S 2 Cl 9 N 1
- New promissory note executed in lieu of earlier one—Endorsement on back of earlier note to the effect that in its stead new note was executed—Suit on old note, new note not being sufficiently stamped—Endorsement, if can be relied on as acknowledgment to save limitation ... S 19 N 29
- Not payable on demand—When falls due... A 69 N 2
- Payable a stated number of days or months after date or sight—Mode of calculating maturity ... A 72 N 1
- Payable after demand—Meaning of ... A 72 N 1
- Payable after sight—Meaning of ... A 72 N 1
- “Payable at any time within six years on demand”—Suit on—Limitation ... A 120 N 17
- Payable at fixed time
 - (a) Evidence of contract fixing period of payment, whether admissible in cases where note is silent on the point ... A 69 N 3
 - (b) Suit on—Limitation ... A 69
 - (c) Where note fixes a date, evidence showing that terms of contract are different, whether admissible ... A 69 N 3
- Payable at fixed time after date—Stipulation as to period of payment, whether must be embodied in the note itself to constitute promissory note payable at fixed time ... A 69 N 3
- Payable at fixed time after demand—Suit on—Limitation—Starting point ... A 72, A 72 N 1
- Payable at fixed time after sight—Suit on—Limitation ... A 72
- Payable at specified period after date and at specified place—Suit on—Limitation... A 80 N 1
- Payable at two places—Whether can be presented at either place A 71 N 1
- Payable by instalment
 - (a) Suit on
 - (i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 74; A 74 N 2
 - (ii) Special and general provisions of limitation ... A 75 N 2
 - (iii) Where on default whole amount is payable on demand—Limitation—Starting point ... A 75 N 9
 - (iv) Where there is a default clause—Limitation ... A 75
 - (v) Where there is a default clause but there has been no default—Limitation ... A 75 N 6
 - (vi) Where there is no default clause—Limitation ... A 75 N 5
 - (b) What is ... A 75 N 4
 - (c) With a default clause—Suit on
 - (i) Art. 75 and S. 20 ... A 75 N 23

Promissory note—Payable by instalment—With a default clause, suit on —
(Contd.)

- (ii) Burden of proof as to waiver of default clause which postpones starting point to fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver A 75 N 16
- (iii) Default clause, if penalty within Contract Act, S. 74 A 75 N 19
- (iv) Default, what amounts to within Art. 75 A 75 N 6
- (v) Demand of overdue instalment, whether waiver of default clause so as to start time running from fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver A 75 N 12
- (vi) Essentials of applicability of Art. 75 A 75 N 2
- (vii) Limitation—Starting point A 75, A 75 N 10
- (viii) Part payment of instalment or payment generally towards account, whether waiver of default clause so as to start time running from fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver A 75 N 13
- (ix) Provision of, in Punjab Loans Limitation Act A 75 N 22
- (x) Verbal contract under which money is payable by instalments—Limitation A 75 N 3
- (xi) Waiver of default clause, whether can be gathered from pleadings A 75 N 17
- (xii) Waiver of one default, whether bars suit on second default A 75 N 18
- (xiii) What constitutes waiver of default so as to start time running from fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver A 75 N 11
- (xiv) Where default has been waived and fresh default has not occurred—Limitation A 75 N 7
- (xv) Where there is not only a default clause but where the promisee also has option to demand payment—Limitation—Starting point—English law A 75 N 8

—Payable on demand

- (a) Meaning of. A 73 N 3
- (b) Suit on
 - (i) Art. 73 and Art. 70, distinguished A 73 N 3
 - (ii) Computation of time—Day on which note is executed, whether excluded A 73 N 5
 - (iii) Limitation—Starting point A 73 N 1.
 - (iv) Where application to bank for loan mentions six months as period of payment and defendant subsequently executes promissory note payable on demand—Limitation A 73 N 4
 - (v) Where note is accompanied by writing restraining or postponing right to sue A 73 N 4, A 80 N 1
 - (vi) Where note is not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing right to sue A 73
 - (vii) Where subsequent to date of pro-note payable on demand there is agreement to make no demand till certain period—Limitation A 73 N 4
 - (viii) Where there is mere expectation that demand will not be made for certain period—Limitation A 73 N 4
 - (ix) Where there is oral agreement to postpone date of payment—Limitation A 73 N 4

Promissory note—(Contd.)

—Given in lieu of earlier debt—Debtor giving receipt acknowledging

- S 19 N 29
- Giving of promissory note — whether constitutes payment within
S. 20 S 20 N 11
- Government promissory note—Interest on — Recovery of — Suit
against holder—Limitation... .. A 120 N 3
- Maturity of—Method of calculating A 69 N 2
- Meaning of S 2 Cl 9
- (a) Government war bond payable at a particular place, if pro-
missory note S 2 Cl 9 N 1
- New promissory note executed in lieu of earlier one—Endorsement
on back of earlier note to the effect that in its stead new note
was executed — Suit on old note, new note not being sufficiently
stamped—Endorsement, if can be relied on as acknowledgment
to save limitation S 19 N 29
- Not payable on demand—When falls due... .. A 69 N 2
- Payable a stated number of days or months after date or sight —
Mode of calculating maturity A 72 N 1
- Payable after demand—Meaning of... .. A 72 N 1
- Payable after sight—Meaning of A 72 N 1
- “Payable at any time within six years on demand” — Suit on —
Limitation A 120 N 17
- Payable at fixed time
- (a) Evidence of contract fixing period of payment, whether admis-
sible in cases where note is silent on the point A 69 N 3
- (b) Suit on—Limitation A 69
- (c) Where note fixes a date, evidence showing that terms of con-
tract are different, whether admissible A 69 N 3
- Payable at fixed time after date—Stipulation as to period of pay-
ment, whether must be embodied in the note itself to constitute
promissory note payable at fixed time A 69 N 3
- Payable at fixed time after demand—Suit on—Limitation—Start-
ing point A 72; A 72 N 1
- Payable at fixed time after sight—Suit on—Limitation A 72
- Payable at specified period after date and at specified place — Suit
on—Limitation... .. A 60 N 1
- Payable at two places—Whether can be presented at either place
A 71 N 1
- Payable by instalment
- (a) Suit on
- (i) Limitation—Starting point A 74; A 74 N 2
- (ii) Special and general provisions of limitation A 75 N 2
- (iii) Where on default whole amount is payable on demand
—Limitation—Starting point A 75 N 9
- (iv) Where there is a default clause—Limitation A 75
- (v) Where there is a default clause but there has been no
default—Limitation A 75 N 6
- (vi) Where there is no default clause—Limitation A 75 N 5
- (b) What is A 75 N 4
- (c) With no default clause—Suit on
- (i) Art. 75 and S. 20 A 75 N 23

Promissory note—Payable by instalment—With a default clause, suit on —
(Contd.)

(ii) Burden of proof as to waiver of default clause which postpones starting point to fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver . . .	A 75 N 16
(iii) Default clause, if penalty within Contract Act, S. 74 . . .	A 75 N 19
(iv) Default, what amounts to within Art. 75 . . .	A 75 N 6
(v) Demand of overdue instalment, whether waiver of default clause so as to start time running from fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver . . .	A 75 N 12
(vi) Essentials of applicability of Art. 75 . . .	A 75 N 2
(vii) Limitation—Starting point . . .	A 75, A 75 N 10
(viii) Part payment of instalment or payment generally towards account, whether waiver of default clause so as to start time running from fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver . . .	A 75 N 13
(ix) Provision of, in Punjab Loans Limitation Act . . .	A 75 N 22
(x) Verbal contract under which money is payable by instalments—Limitation . . .	A 75 N 3
(xi) Waiver of default clause, whether can be gathered from pleadings . . .	A 75 N 17
(xii) Waiver of one default, whether bars suit on second default . . .	A 75 N 18
(xiii) What constitutes waiver of default so as to start time running from fresh default in respect of which there is no waiver . . .	A 75 N 11
(xiv) Where default has been waived and fresh default has not occurred—Limitation . . .	A 75 N 7
(xv) Where there is not only a default clause but where the promisee also has option to demand payment—Limitation—Starting point—English law . . .	A 75 N 8

—Payable on demand

(a) Meaning of . . .	A 73 N 3
(b) Suit on . . .	
(i) Art. 73 and Art. 70, distinguished . . .	A 73 N 3
(ii) Computation of time—Day on which note is executed, whether excluded . . .	A 73 N 5
(iii) Limitation—Starting point . . .	A 73 N 1
(iv) Where application to bank for loan mentions six months as period of payment and defendant subsequently executes promissory note payable on demand—Limitation . . .	A 73 N 4
(v) Where note is accompanied by writing restraining or postponing right to sue . . .	A 73 N 4, A 80 N 1
(vi) Where note is not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing right to sue . . .	A 73
(vii) Where subsequent to date of pro-note payable on demand there is agreement to make no demand till certain period—Limitation . . .	A 73 N 4
(viii) Where there is mere expectation that demand will not be made for certain period—Limitation . . .	A 73 N 4
(ix) Where there is oral agreement to postpone date of payment—Limitation . . .	A 73 N 4

Promissory note—Payable on demand—(Contd.)

(c) What is

- (i) Promissory note on which no time is fixed, whether promissory note payable on demand ... A 73 N 3
- (ii) Promissory note payable at sight, whether promissory note payable on demand ... A 73 N 3
- Suit based on—Limitation ... A 69 N 1
- Suit by executant for declaration that note was discharged and unenforceable—Period of pendency of suit—Whether can be deducted in computing limitation for suit on pro-note by the payee ... S 14 N 10
- Suit by promisee against one of the legal representatives of executant for money decree against assets of executant in his hands—Defendant in possession of only a portion of the assets—Persons in possession of other portions of assets impleaded after limitation—Suit as against them, if barred ... S 22 N 11
- Suit on
 - (a) Against Hindu son to enforce his Hindu law liability to pay his father's promissory note debt—Limitation ... A 73 N 2
 - (b) Illustrative cases governed by Art. 80 ... A 80 N 1
 - (c) Limitation—Starting point ... A 69 N 2
 - (d) Note given by maker to third person to be delivered to payee after happening of certain event—Limitation—Starting point ... A 76; A 76 N 1
 - (e) Residuary provision of limitation ... A 80; A 80 N 1
- Summary suit on—Maintainability—Limitation ... A 69 N 1

Property

—Immovable property

- (a) Attachment of—*See under Attachment.*
- (b) Lease of—*See under Lease.*
- (c) Transfer of—*See under Transfer.*

—Joint family property — Share in — Suit for — *See under Joint family.*

—Lien against—Suit for enforcement of—Limitation... A 60 N 1

—Mortgaged property—Sale proceeds of—Suit for recovery of—Limitation ... A 120 N 12

—Moveable property—*See under Moveable property.*

—Of deceased person—Share of—Suit for—By person claiming as heir—Limitation ... A 120 N 12

—Of intestate—Share of—Suit for—*See under Intestate.*

—Perversion of, to other purposes

- (a) By person who, having right to use property for specific purposes, perverts it to other purposes—Illustrative cases of such perversion ... A 32 N 4

(b) Suit as to

- (i) Against person who having right to use property for specific purposes, perverts it to other purposes

(a) Limitation—Starting point ... A 32 N 5

(b) "Right to use property for specific purposes"—What is ... A 32 N 2

(c) Whether limitation will avail only if plaintiff is also entitled to relief in equity ... A 32 N 7

Property—Perversion of, to other purposes—Suit as to—(Contd)

- (ii) Applicability of Art. 32, whether depends on kind of relief asked for in such suits ... A 32 N 1
- (iii) Based upon perversion as to right of easement—Limitation ... A 32 N 2
- (iv) By co-sharer in respect of perversion by other sharer of joint property which is intended to be used for specific purposes—Limitation ... A 32 N 3
- (v) In respect of conversion by defendant of public graveyard into grove—Limitation ... A 32 N 2
- (vi) In respect of defendants' erecting "tharas" on public road in abadi village—Limitation ... A 32 N 2
- (vii) Kind of relief that may be asked for in such suit, whether necessary consideration for applicability of Art. 32 ... A 32 N 1
- (viii) Limitation ... A 32
- (ix) Not based on perversion as cause of action—Limitation ... A 32 N 1
- (x) When perversion first becomes known to person injured thereby—Burden of proof as to knowledge of plaintiff where perversion took place two years before suit ... A 32 N 6
- (xi) Where defendant has no right at all to property or to make any use of it—Limitation ... A 32 N 2
- (xii) Where defendant has only license to use property for certain purposes—Limitation ... A 32 N 2

—Recovery of—Suit for

- (a) What is ... A 47 N 7
- (b) Whether one for compensation ... A 36 N 3

Prosecution

- Malicious prosecution—And false imprisonment, distinguished ... A 19 N 1
- Meaning of, within Art 23 ... A 23 N 4
- When and how terminates ... A 23 N 5
- When commences ... A 23 N 4

Provincial Insolvency Act

- Application under—Limitation ... A 181 N 22
- S. 22—Application under—Exclusion of time under S. 12, Limitation Act, if can be made ... S 12 N 5
- S. 53—Period of two years referred to in — Whether 'period of limitation prescribed' ... S 14 N 9
- S. 68—Application under
 - (a) Section 4 of Limitation Act applies. ... S 29 N 3
 - (b) Section 22 of Limitation Act, if applies ... S 22 N 4
- Section 78
 - (a) Appeals and applications under—Delay in filing—Excuse of ... S 5 N 4
 - (b) Exclusion of period of pendency of insolvency proceedings ... S 15 N 8
- Section 78, sub-s 2—Period in computing which time is deducted under—Whether period prescribed within S 19, Limitation Act ... S 19 N 12
- Whether a special law ... S 29 N 6

Provincial Small Cause Court

- Powers of—Whether has power to order attachment before judgment of immovable property ... A 11 N 19

Public

—Adverse possession by or against—See Adverse possession.

Public Demands Recovery Act

—Sale under—Setting aside—Suit for—On ground of fraud of purchaser—Limitation A 95 N 10

Punjab Courts Act

—Section 40 (2)—Proceedings under—Legal disability, extension on ground of—If available S 6 N 20 F N 2

Punjab Customary Law

—Alienation—Suit by reversioner—Next reversioner under disability at time of alienation—Right to extension on ground of disability when remote reversioners are not under disability S 6 N 18
 —Alienation of ancestral property—Suit by reversioner born after alienation—Extension of time, if available S 6 N 18
 —Reversioner—Suit to set aside alienation by collateral—Disability of one of the reversioners—Effect of, on limitation for suit ... S 7 N 21b

Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act

—When applies to suit by reversioner to declare that alienation made by female is not binding on reversion—Limitation ... A 123 N 17

Purchase

—Joint purchase—Money paid for—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation A 89 N 3
 —Purchase money—Refund of, suit for—In enforcement of conditions of sale for refund of purchase money in respect of deficiency in extent of land sold—Limitation A 63 N 1

Purchaser

—At execution sale—Meaning of—Within Art. 180 A 180 N 3
 —At sale in execution of decree—Who is—Decree-holder purchaser, whether purchaser at sale in execution of decree A 187 N 4
 —Meaning of A 48-A N 3
 —Who is
 (a) Assignee of purchaser, whether purchaser within Art. 138 ... A 138 N 5
 (b) Within Art. 138 A 138 N 5

Purdanashin lady

—Appeal by, delay in filing—Delay, if can be excused S 5 N 25

Railway

—Suit against Railway Company
 (a) By consignee—For surplus sale proceeds of goods sold under Railways Act, S. 56—Limitation A 62 N 31
 (b) Defendants described as agents of the company instead of the company—Amendment by giving correct name—Whether amounts to addition of new party within S. 22 S 22 N 10
 —Suit by Railway Company acting as managing agents of State Railway in respect of land belonging to State Railway—Limitation A 149 N 3
 —Suit for compensation by consignee of goods against Railway for non-delivery of goods—Letter written by Railway Company informing consignee that goods are lying at a particular place and consignee's instructions are awaited—Letter, if amounts to acknowledgment of liability S 19 N 18

Railways Act

- Section 77—Notice under, of claims to refunds of overcharges and compensation for losses ... A 30 N 6

Rangoon Rent Act

- Section 18—Application under—Delay in filing—Excuse of ... S 5 N 4

Rangoon Small Cause Court Rules

- Rule 101—Art. 159, Limitation Act—Applicability of, to application for leave to appear and defend in summary suit under Civil P. C. ... A 159 N 4

Receiver

- Appointed by Court
- (a) Of disputed property—Whether agent of successful party ... A 89 N 7
 - (b) When can make acknowledgment on behalf of party of whose property he is receiver ... S 19 N 52
 - (c) Whether trustee ... S 10 N 9
- Appointment of ... S 19 N 52:
- (a) Suit for—By reversioner against limited owner—Limitation: A 120 N 34
 - (b) To estate of person under disability—Suit by Receiver—Right to extension of time, if available ... S 6 N 39
- Authority to acknowledge debts is derived from order of Court ... S 19 N 50
- Defendant appointed by private arrangement between parties to collect income of joint property to be handed over to successful party in the end—Trust, if created ... S 10 N 11
- Of assets of firm with power to pay debts due by firm—Whether of limitation .. S 19 N 52

.. A 172, A 172 N 1, A 172 N 3

... A 172 N 2

(iii) Time, whether extended by virtue of S 5, Lim. Act ... A 172 N 3

(b) For setting aside dismissal of suit

(i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 172, A 172 N 1, A 172 N 3

(ii) Provision for ... A 172 N 2

(iii) Time, whether extended by virtue of S 5, Lim. Act ... A 172 N 3

—Payment by—When sufficient for the purpose of S. 20 .. S 20 N 22

—Suit by

(a) Against heirs to estate for reimbursement of cost incurred in filing suit on behalf of estate—Limitation ... A 82 N 2

(b) To recover money spent for estate—Limitation ... A 61 N 14

Recognizance

—Meaning of ... A 122 N 5

—What is—Bond executed under Criminal P. C., whether recognizance A 122 N 5

—Whether judgment, within meaning of Art. 122 ... A 122 N 5

Record of Rights

—Entry in

(a) Correction of—Suit for

(i) Cause of action, when arises ... A 120 N 50

(ii) Limitation ... A 120 N 50

Record of Rights—Entry in—Correction of, suit for—(Contd.)

(iii) Suit for ejectment on ground that defendant is tenant at will—Whether one for correction of entry in record of rights ... A 120 N 50

(b) Declaration as to—Suit for

(i) By person as to entry in Record of Rights under Punjab Land Revenue Act—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 50

(ii) Cause of action, when arises... A 120 N 50

(iii) Limitation ... A 120 N 50

(c) Incorrectness of—Suit for declaration—Limitation—Where Record of Rights is prepared under Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act ... A 120 N 50

(d) Person against whom entry has been made, whether bound to sue for declaration as to incorrectness of entry under Bengal Tenancy Act, S. 111-A ... A 120 N 50

(e) Person aggrieved by—Remedy of, under Punjab Land Revenue Act, S. 45 ... A 120 N 50

(f) Plaintiff dissatisfied with—Suit for declaration of plaintiff's right—Suit under Madras Estates Land Act, S. 179—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 50

(g) Whether final ... A 14 N 2

—Whether creates or extinguishes rights ... A 131 N 7

Redemption

—See under Mortgage. ...

Refund

—Application for, under C. P. C., S. 47 for refund of money recovered in execution by decree-holder in excess of his dues—Limitation: A 181 N 10

—Of assets wrongly paid to defendant under S. 73 of C. P. C.—Suit for—Limitation ... A 62 N 26

—Of purchase money, application for under C. P. C., O. 21 R. 93—By auction purchaser—Limitation—Starting point ... A 181 N 11

Registered

—Meaning of ... A 116 N 5

—Registered contract—See under: Contract—Registered contract.

Registration Act

—Section 60—Provisions of ... A 10 N 11

—Section 77—Suit under—Legal disability, extension on ground of—If available ... S 6 N 20 F N 2

—Whether special law ... S 29 N 6

—Whether special law within S. 29 ... S 29 N 6

Relief

—Application for same relief—Meaning of—Illustrations ... S 14 N 19

Religious endowments

—See under Endowments.

Remainder

—Whether necessarily dependent on life estate ... A 140 N 4

Remainderman

—Definition of ... A 110 N 3

—Possession of one remainderman—Whether possession on behalf of all ... A 140 N 2

Remainderman—(Contd.)

- Suit by
- (a) For possession against, representatives of life tenants continuing in possession—Limitation ... A 140 N 2
- (b) For possession of immovable property
- (i) Alleging that instrument under which defendant is holding property is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation ... A 140 N 7
- (ii) Based on cause of action which has already accrued to person from whom remainderman derived his title—Limitation ... A 140 N 2
- (iii) By other remaindermen where one remainderman has obtained possession and has subsequently lost it—Limitation ... A 140 N 2
- (iv) By successor of remainderman—Limitation ... A 140 N 6
- (v) Cause of action on which such suit is based, in whose favour must arise ... A 140 N 2
- (vi) Challenging adoption under which defendant claims to be in possession—Limitation ... A 140 N 7
- (vii) Limitation—Starting point .. A 140, A 140 N 2; A 140 N 8
- (viii) Where remainderman had obtained possession but subsequently lost it—Limitation ... A 140 N 2

Remand

- New plea as to limitation—Point not raised before Appellate Court, if can be raised on remand ... S 3 N 17 F N 15

Rent

—Arrears of

- (a) Meaning of ... A 110 N 11
- (b) Patni taluq sold for—Incumbrance in — Avoidance of — Suit for—See under Patni taluq
- (c) Suit for
- (i) Against surety for lessee — Limitation — Starting point ... A 110 N 10
- (ii) Against surety who has joined in execution of kabuliyaat and the same has been registered—Limitation ... A 110 N 10
- (iii) Against tenant holding over — Claim of landlord, when one for rent ... A 110 N 4
- (iv) Against tenant holding over after expiry of registered lease deed for rent for period of holding over — Limitation ... A 116 N 8
- (v) By co-sharer for contribution for share of rents received by another co-sharer — Whether suit for arrears of rent ... A 110 N 3
- (vi) By landlord for rent against tenant where expired lease is renewed by acceptance of rent—Limitation ... A 110 N 4
- (vii) By lessor to recover rent from assignee of lessee—Limitation ... A 110 N 5
- (viii) By minor after attaining majority — S. 6, Limitation Act, whether applies ... A 110 N 13
- (ix) By minor after attaining majority—S. 6, Limitation Act, whether applies where special enactment prescribes special period of limitation ... A 110 N 13
- (x) By minor who is co-owner of property with an adult who can give valid discharge for rent—Limitation .. A 110 N 13

Rent—Arrears of—Suit for—(Contd.)

- (xi) For amount payable not to landlord but to third person, whether suit for rent ... A 110 N 2
- (xii) For arrears of rent realized from tenant by person not entitled to it—Whether suit for arrears of rent ... A 110 N 3
- (xiii) For damages for use and occupation against person not tenant of plaintiff—Limitation ... A 110 N 2
- (xiv) For rent before it accrues due—Limitation ... A 110 N 9
- (xv) For rent due under registered lease deed
 - (a) Applicability of Art. 116 and Art. 110 ... A 116 N 1
 - (b) Limitation ... A 116 N 8
- (xvi) For rent due under registered patta tendered by landlord but not accepted by tenant, whether suit for rent due under registered instrument ... A 110 N 5
- (xvii) For rent due under registered zarpushgi lease deed—Limitation ... A 116 N 8
- (xviii) Lease by usufructuary mortgagee to third person—Mortgage redeemed by mortgagor—Suit by mortgagor for rent from lessee, whether maintainable ... A 107 N 7
- ... applicable to ... A 110; A 110 N 11
- ... A 131 N 3
- (xxi) Mortgaged property leased back to mortgagor by usufructuary mortgagee for two years—Agreement to charge lease amount on mortgaged property for two years—Mortgagor becoming tenant from year to year by mortgagee accepting rent after expiry of two years—Subsequent suit by mortgagee for rent—Limitation ... A 110 N 7
- (xxii) Rent due under registered instrument—Limitation ... A 110 N 6
- (xxiii) Right of landlord under Malabar kanom tenuro to deduct arrears of rent due to him from amount payable by him on redemption of kanom—Whether affected by limitation applicable to suits for arrears of rent ... A 110 N 8
- (xxiv) Where local or special law prescribes a special period of limitation for such suits ... A 110 N 6
- (xxv) Where provincial Tenancy Acts provide statutory charge over tenure of tenant for arrears of rent ... A 110 N 6
- (xxvi) Whether time is extended by application of S. 19, Limitation Act ... A 110 N 13
- Assessment of—Right of—Whether barred by mere non-payment of rent by tenant where land is not rent-free and relationship of landlord and tenant exists ... A 130 N 1
- Commutation of—Setting aside—Suit for—By manager of Hindu temple—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
- Government rent and under-proprietary rent payable by transferee under registered maintenance deed to transferor—Suit for—Limitation ... A 116 N 24
- Non-payment of
 - (a) By tenant
 - (i) Whether bars landlord's right to assess fair rent where land is not rent-free and relationship of landlord and tenant exists ... A 130 N 1

Rent—Non-payment of—By tenant—(Contd.)

- (ii) Whether makes possession of tenant during tenancy adverse to landlord ... A 139 N 12
- (b) By tenants for 12 years—Effect of ... A 110 N 14
- Recovery of—Suit for—By landlord—Whether maintainable if suit for possession by landlord is barred under Art. 139 ... A 139 N 11
- Rent-free land
 - (a) Assessment of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 130
 - (b) Assessment or resumption of—Suit for
 - (i) Assessment of land liable to be assessed—Limitation : A 130 N 1
 - (ii) Bar under Art. 130—Effect of ... A 130 N 5
 - (iii) By Government for resumption or assessment—Limitation ... A 130 N 7
 - (iv) Decree declaring certain lands liable to resumption and assessment in prior suit between parties, whether gives new starting point for subsequent suit for actual assessment ... A 130 N 2
 - (v) Limitation—Starting point ... A 130 N 2; A 130 N 4
 - (vi) Mere recognition of plaintiff's right to resumption contained in *wajib-ul-urz*, whether gives plaintiff new starting point ... A 130 N 2
 - (vii) Succession of plaintiff to person in whose favour cause of action for resumption or assessment has arisen, whether gives new starting point to plaintiff ... A 130 N 2
 - (viii) Whether one for possession within S. 28, Limitation Act ... A 130 N 5
 - (c) Resumption of—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point ... A 130 N 3
- Suit for
 - (a) Against all defendants on *mushilika* jointly executed by them—Suit for rent against each defendant under separate contract by each—Whether on same cause of action for purposes of S. 14 ... S 14 N 18
 - (b) Limitation ... A 9 N 1
 - (c) Under Bengal Tenancy Act—Limitation ... A 132 N 2
 - (d) Under Berar Alienated Villages Tenancy Law—Limitation : A 132 N 2
- What is
 - (a) Adjustment between lessor and lessee fixing certain amount due for rent and lessee undertaking to pay it to superior proprietor of lessor—Whether rent ... A 110 N 2
 - (b) Amount due by co-tenant as contribution to other co-tenant in respect of rent of landlord—Amount, whether rent ... A 110 N 2
 - (c) Examples ... A 110 N 2
- When becomes arrear ... A 110 N 11

Representative suit

—Added party already constructively party to suit—S. 22 if applies: S 22 N 5

Resoission

—Of contract—*See under Contract.*

—Of leave to sue—Application for—Limitation ... A 181 N 14

Residue

—Bequeathed by testator

- (a) Share of — Residuary share, whether legacy — Distinction between, under English law ... A 123 N 9
- (b) Suit for share
 - (i) Against administrator—Limitation ... A 123 N 2

Restraint

- And imprisonment, distinguished A 19 N 1
 —Wrongful restraint—Meaning of A 19 N 1

Resumption

- Resumption of rent-free land—Suit for—*See under* Rent.

Revenue

—Arrears of

- (a) And demand recoverable as such arrears—Distinguished ... A 12 N 8
 (b) Demands recoverable as arrears of revenue—What are A 16 N 2, N 2a
 (c) Estate sold for—Statutory obligations of Government to pay over surplus to owner—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation A 62 N 7
 (d) Property sold for
 (i) Interest of defaulter sold for debts recoverable as if they were arrears of land revenue—Difference between A 12 N 8
 (ii) Remedy of owner A 12 N 8
 (e) Sale for
 (i) Surplus sale proceeds on—Suit for—Limitation ... A 62 N 21
 (ii) Surplus sale proceeds paid to wrong person—Suit by real owner against payee—Limitation ... A 62 N 21
 (f) Sale of mortgaged property for—Surplus sale proceeds paid to mortgagor—Suit by mortgagee to recover mortgage money out of surplus sale proceeds—Limitation ... A 62 N 21
 (g) What are, under Madras Revenue Recovery Act, Ss. 3 and 4: A 12 N 8
 —Assessed on land—Suit for—Limitation A 120 N 29
 —Mittadar's dues, whether revenue within meaning of Art. 99 ... A 99 N 2
 —Revenue agent—Suit by, for costs—Limitation A 84 N 2
 —Revenue register—Name in—Mutation of—Suit to compel—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 50

Revenue Courts

- Revenue Court—Whether Civil Court within meaning of Art. 182: A 182 N 19
 —Whether Courts under S. 14. S 14 N 13

Revenue sale law

- Sale under—When becomes final and conclusive A 131 N 6

Reversion

- Whether necessarily dependent on life estate A 140 N 4

Reversioner

- Cause of action accruing in the lifetime of last full owner—Running of time, if interrupted by intervention of widow's estate—Reversioner succeeding widow—If entitled to fresh period of limitation from date of his succeeding to estate S 9 N 10
 —Definition of, within Art. 140 A 140 N 4
 — rever-
 S 14 N 23
 your of
 reversioner—When available S 27
 —If derives right to sue which has accrued to Hindu widow from her as her heir... .. S 2 C 18 N 3
 —Of female holding estate by inheritance under Hindu law—Whether bound by decree against female A 141 N 13

Residue—Bequeathed by testator—Suit for share—(Contd.)

(ii) Against executor

(a) Executor, whether liable to render accounts for 12 years before suit in aid by residuary legatee to recover his share granted under the will ...

A 123 N 7

(b) Limitation A 123 N 2

(iii) Against executor *de son tort*—Limitation ... A 123 N 2

(iv) Against person to whom property has been bequeathed with direction to pay certain legacy—Limitation ... A 123 N 2

(v) By heir against person in possession who has taken out letters of administration—Limitation ... A 123 N 6

(vi) By heir against person in wrongful possession—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for legacy or distributable share of estate ... A 123 N 6

(vii) If barred, whether bars claim for administration of estate of deceased person ... A 123 N 3

(viii) Legacy entailing administration of testator's estate—Limitation ... A 123 N 3

(ix) Limitation—Starting point ... A 123; A 123 N 11

(x) Recovery of moveable property held for some intervening time by Hindu widow—Limitation ... A 123 N 5

(xi) Time, whether extended by virtue of S. 6, Limitation Act ... A 123 N 18

... .. ally charged if Art. 123 ... A 123 N 2

(c) A 123 N 10

Res judicata

—Applicability to decision of question of limitation ... S 3 N 19

—Decision between same parties in prior execution application as to question of limitation, if can be ... S 15 N 24

— be in time—Decision, if can be reopened in subsequent application ... S 3 N 19

—Limitation—Test to see if question of limitation is res judicata ... S 3 N 19

Respondent

—Legal representative of—*See under* Legal representative.

Restitution

—Application for

(a) As result of order of Privy Council—Limitation ... A 183 N 4

(b) Under Civil P. C., S. 144

(i) Application dismissed or properly disposed of—Second application out of time, if maintainable ... A 181 N 7

(ii) Application stayed and consigned to record room—Second application out of time if barred ... A 181 N 7

(iii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 181 N 7

Restitution of conjugal rights

—Suit for

(a) Applicability of S. 23 read with Art. 120 ... S 23 N 15

(b) Cause of action, whether continuing one within S. 23, Limitation Act ... A 120 N 46

(c) Limitation ... A 120 N 46

(d) Whether suit for possession within S. 23 ... S 28 N 3

Restraint

- And imprisonment, distinguished A 19 N 1
 —Wrongful restraint—Meaning of A 19 N 1

Resumption

- Resumption of rent-free land—Suit for—*See under* Rent.

Revenue

—Arrears of

- (a) And demand recoverable as such arrears—Distinguished ... A 12 N 8
 (b) Demands recoverable as arrears of revenue—What are A 16 N 2, N 2a
 (c) Estate sold for—Statutory obligations of Government to pay over surplus to owner—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation A 62 N 7
 (d) Property sold for
 (i) Interest of defaulter sold for debts recoverable as if they were arrears of land revenue—Difference between A 12 N 8
 (ii) Remedy of owner A 12 N 8
 (e) Sale for
 (i) Surplus sale proceeds on—Suit for—Limitation ... A 62 N 21
 (ii) Surplus sale proceeds paid to wrong person—Suit by real owner against payee—Limitation ... A 62 N 21
 (f) Sale of mortgaged property for—Surplus sale proceeds paid to mortgagor—Suit by mortgagee to recover mortgage money out of surplus sale proceeds—Limitation ... A 62 N 21
 (g) What are, under Madras Revenue Recovery Act, Ss. 3 and 4. A 12 N 8
 —Assessed on land—Suit for—Limitation A 120 N 29
 —Mittadar's dues, whether revenue within meaning of Art. 99 ... A 99 N 2
 —Revenue agent—Suit by, for costs—Limitation ... A 84 N 2
 —Revenue register—Name in—Mutation of—Suit to compel—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 50

Revenue Courts

- Revenue Court—Whether Civil Court within meaning of Art. 182 A 182 N 19
 —Whether Courts under S. 14 S 14 N 13

Revenue sale law

- Sale under—When becomes final and conclusive A 121 N 5

Reversion

- Whether necessarily dependent on life estate A 140 N 4

Reversioner

- Cause of action accruing in the lifetime of last full owner—Running of time, if interrupted by intervention of widow's estate—Reversioner succeeding widow—If entitled to fresh period of limitation from date of his succeeding to estate S 9 N 10
 —Definition of, within Art. 140 A 140 N 4
 — rever-
 S 14 N 22
 — your of
 reversioner—When available S 27
 —If derives right to sue which has accrued to Hindu widow from her as her heir. S 2 Cl 8 N 3
 —Of female holding estate by inheritance under Hindu law—Whether bound by decree against female A 141 N 13

Reversioner—(Contd.)

- Of female limited owner
 - (a) Female making alienation which is not binding on estate—Remedies of reversioner ... A 141 N 12
 - (b) Whether barred by adverse possession against female limited owner ... A 141 N 13
 - (c) Whether barred by adverse possession against last male owner: A 141 N 14
- Of Hindu widow—Whether bound by decree against Hindu widow: A 141 N 13
- Of sonless proprietor in the Punjab—Whether must set aside alienation before he can claim relief he wants ... A 91 N 11
- One reversioner, if derives right to sue from another ... S 2 Cl 8 N 5
- Possession of one reversioner—Whether possession on behalf of all reversioners ... A 140 N 2
- Property surrendered in favour of by limited owner—Alienation of surrendered property by limited owner prior to surrender—Reversioner whether gets immediately right to property surrendered ... A 141 N 9
- Remedies of—In case of alienation by limited female owner ... A 125 N 2
- Remote reversioner—Suit by
 - (a) For declaration that alienation by Hindu widow is not binding on reversioners—Limitation ... A 120 N 31; A 120 N 34
 - (b) For declaration that alienation by limited owner is not binding on reversion—Suit after death of limited owner—Limitation ... A 120 N 34
 - (c) For declaration that transaction by the limited owner not amounting to alienation of land is not binding on reversion—Limitation ... A 120 N 34
 - (d) To declare alienation by Hindu or Mahomedan female void except for her life or until remarriage—Limitation ... A 125 N 3
 - (e) To impeach alienation by limited female owner—Maintainability of suit—Limitation ... A 125 N 8
- Right of—To challenge alienation made by limited female owner—Recognition and purpose of such right ... A 125 N 6
- Servient tenement held under or by virtue of any interest for life or for any term of years exceeding three years from the granting thereof—Effect on computation of 20 years' period for acquisition of easement ... S 27
- Suit by
 - (a) Against widow—For recovery of moveable property held for some intervening time by her—Limitation ... A 123 N 5
 - (b) After death of widow who has let out validly property to a tenant at will—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 6
 - (c) By one reversioner against alienee from widow within 12 years of widow's death—Other reversioner impleaded as party defendant—Latter filing written statement after 12 years claiming his share also against alienee—His right, if extinguished by his not filing suit for his share within 12 years ... S 28 N 6
 - (d) By reversioners after death of widow of testator for construction of his will and declaration of plaintiffs' rights—Suit cannot be barred as long as right in property in respect of which declaration is sought is a subsisting and continuing right ... S 23 N 4

Reversioner—Suit by—(Contd.)

- (e) Challenging alienation or adoption by Hindu widow — Each reversioner, if entitled to independent period of limitation : S 9 N 10
- (f) C A 11 N 2a
- testator—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 34
- (i) For declaration that alienation by *de facto* guardian of minor daughter is not binding on reversion—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 21
- (j) For declaration that alienation by female guardian of minor's property is void—Limitation A 125 N 16
- (k) For declaration that alienation by limited female owner is not binding on reversion
- (i) Each reversioner, whether has separate cause of action. A 120 N 34
- (ii) Further alienation by alienee, whether furnishes further cause of action A 120 N 34
- (iii) Limitation — Starting point — Cases governed by Art. 120 A 120 N 34
- (l) For declaration that alienation by limited female owner, who is in possession of life estate by virtue of bequest, grant or transfer *inter vivos* is not binding on him—Limitation . . . A 120 N 34
- (m) For declaration that alienation by limited owner by way of death of female A 125 N 15
- property subse- A 125 N 15
- quent to the mortgage A 125 N 15
- (n) For declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid—Limitation—Starting point A 118 N 8
- (o) For declaration that decree fraudulently obtained against Hindu widow is not binding on reversion — Limitation — Starting point A 120 N 34
- (p) For impeaching alienation by Hindu mother of minor son's property where by subsequent death of minor mother herself becomes heir—Limitation A 125 N 16
- (q) For impeaching alienation by Hindu widow
- (i) Cause of action, whether one in case of all reversioners: A 125 N 7
- (ii) If next reversioner fails to bring such suit cause of action, if revived in favour of one who is since born : A 125 N 7
- (r) For impeaching alienation by Hindu widow—Nature of suit : A 125 N 7
- (s) For impeaching alienation by limited female owner—Right of minor to bring such suit under Punjab Customary Law where major reversioners omit to sue within period of limitation A 125 N 7
- (t) For possession
- (i) Against representatives of life tenant continuing in possession—Limitation A 140 N 2
- (ii) Challenging adoption under which defendant claims to be in possession—Limitation A 140 N 7
- (iii) Where adverse possession commenced to run against last male owner—Limitation A 141 N 4

Reversioner—Suit by—For possession—(Contd.)

- (iv) Where female had tried to set up full title by assertions of such right ... A 141 N 15a
- (u) For possession of estate of last male owner
 - (i) Suit resisted by person alleging himself to be adopted son of last male owner — Adoption found as a fact to be by widow to herself—Reversioner, whether embarrassed by widow's adoption of defendant ... A 118 N 2
 - (ii) Suit resisted by person found to be adopted by widow of last male owner to herself — Reversioner, whether can recover estate without disturbing adoption ... A 118 N 2
- (v) For possession of estate surrendered by Hindu widow in favour of daughter who dies before surrenderer—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 9
- (w) For possession of estate surrendered to him by Hindu widow—Limitation ... A 141 N 9
- (x) For possession of female's estate
 - (i) Also involving declaration as to invalidity of adoption by female—Limitation ... A 141 N 16
 - (ii) Applicability of Art. 141 and any special or local law prescribing limitation for such suit ... A 141 N 22
 - (iii) Burden of proof ... A 141 N 20
 - (iv) Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 21
 - (v) On ground of mistake—Limitation ... A 141 N 17
 - (vi) Time, whether suspended on ground of legal disability: A 141 N 19
- (y) For possession of female's estate acquired by trespass ... A 141 N 10
- (z) For possession of Hindu widow's estate
 - (i) On ground of forfeiture on remarriage—Limitation ... A 143 N 8
 - (ii) On ground of forfeiture on unchastity—Limitation ... A 143 N 9
- (z¹) For possession of immovable property
 - (i) Burden of proof ... A 140 N 9
 - (ii) By other reversioner where one reversioner has obtained possession and has subsequently lost it—Limitation... A 140 N 2
 - (iii) By reversioner who has obtained possession but has subsequently lost it—Limitation ... A 140 N 2
 - (iv) By successor of reversioner—Limitation... A 140 N 6
 - (v) Cause of action already accrued to person from whom reversioner derived his title—Limitation ... A 140 N 2
 - (vi) Cause of action on which such suit is based, in whose favour must arise ... A 140 N 2
 - (vii) Illustrative cases within Art. 140 ... A 140 N 4
 - (viii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 140; A 140 N 2; A 140 N 8
 - (ix) Of Hindu female — Against aliened from female—Limitation ... A 141 N 12
 - (x) On death of Hindu or Mohamedan female
 - (a) Cause of action—When arises ... A 141 N 2
 - (b) Essentials of—Applicability of Art. 141 ... A 141 N 2
 - (c) For declaration of right to property—Limitation ... A 141 N 3
 - (d) Limitation... A 141; A 141 N 2
 - (xi) On ground of re-marriage of Hindu widow—Limitation ... A 141 N 9
- (z²) For possession of property alienated by female by usufructuary mortgage for necessity — On death of female — Maintainability of suit ... A 141 N 6

Reversioner—Suit by—(Contd.)

- (z³) For possession of property alienated by female limited owner without necessity A 141 N 15
- (z⁴) For possession of property alienated by sonless proprietor in Punjab—Limitation A 91 N 11
- (z⁵) For possession of property let out validly by widow to tenant-at-will—Limitation—Starting point A 141 N 6
- (z⁶) For possession of property purchased by last male owner where neither he nor his widow was in possession A 141 N 14
- (z⁷) For possession of property surrendered by limited owner—Against alienee from limited owner prior to surrender—Limitation A 141 N 9
- (z⁸) For property reserved to herself for maintenance by limited female owner after surrendering the rest to reversioner—Limitation A 141 N 9
- (z⁹) For recovery of immovable property on death of Hindu widow—Limitation A 123 N 5
- (z¹⁰) For recovery of moveable property on death of Hindu widow—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 12
- (z¹¹) For recovery of property from alienee of widow—Whether suit for rescission of contract A 114 N 1
- (z¹²) For redemption of usufructuary mortgage made by last male owner and which is transferred by mortgagee, during widow's lifetime to third person—Limitation A 141 N 18
- (z¹³) For setting aside alienation by widow—Death of reversioner pending suit—Declaration of abatement by Court—Application by next reversioner to continue suit—Whether can be treated as one under Civil P. C., O. 1 R. 1 and within Art. 181, Limitation Act A 171 N 2
- (z¹⁴) In respect of transfer of property by member of family to whom limited owner has given such property by way of family settlement—Limitation A 125 N 14
- (z¹⁵) Reversioner getting less than his share by mistake of law—Suit by reversioner against co-reversioner for equal share—Limitation A 141 N 17
- (z¹⁶) To challenge alienation by widow—One reversioner minor—Adult reversioner not filing suit—Suit by minor within three years of attaining majority but more than 12 years after alienation—Suit, if barred S 7 N 21a
- (z¹⁷) To challenge alienation or adoption by widow
- (i) Minor reversioner, right of, to extended period of limitation on ground of minority S 6 N 17
- (ii) Whether bar of limitation against one reversioner affects others S 6 N 17
- (z¹⁸) male void—Applica- A 125 N 3
- (ii) Except for her life or until remarriage—Alienation, nature of, competent to attract Art. 195 A 125 N 13
- (iii) Limitation—Starting point A 125, A 125 N 2, A 125 N 18
- (iv) Relief in declaratory suit which is time-barred, whether can be obtained A 125 N 19
- (v) Time, whether extended by virtue of S 18, Limitation Act... .. A 125 N 18

Reversioner—Suit by—To declare alienation by Hindn or Mahomedan female void—(Contd.)

- (vi) Under Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act ... A 125 N 17
- (vii) Where possession of female is by virtue of a right irrespective of her being a Hindn or Mohomedan ... A 125 N 5
- (viii) Who may bring such suit within Art. 125 ... A 125 N 9
- (z¹⁹) To declare alienation by Hindu widow void—Suit where on death of Hindu female property is to go absolutely to another female and plaintiff is reversinner to widow alienating property—Maintainability of suit ... A 125 N 3
- Transferee from—Suit by, for possession—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 8
- Whether bound by alienation by female limited owner for necessity ... A 141 N 16
- Whether bound by alienation by female limited owner without necessity ... A 141 N 15
- Whether bound by compromise in nature of family arrangement entered into by limited heir ... A 125 N 13
- Whether bound to set aside alienation by widow before claiming relief which he wants ... A 91 N 4
- Whether bound to sue for declaration during lifetime of female that her alienation is void ... A 125 N 2
- Whether can waive forfeiture on remarriage of Hindu widow ... A 143 N 12
- Which persons are entitled to possession ... A 125 N 3

Review

- “... there is suff. be set aside: S 5 N 36
- “... A 173 N 3
- And appeal, distinguished ... A 173 N 3
- Application for
 - (a) Day of judgment and time requisite for obtaining copy of decree, sentence or order sought to be reviewed and copy of judgment to be excluded ... S 12
 - (b) Delay in filing, excuse of ... S 5
 - (c) Dismissal for default—Application for order of restoration—See under Civil Procedure Code.
 - (d) Extension of time—Subsequent decision having effect of modifying law or practice—If ground for extending time ... S 5 N 19
 - (e) Filing of, on 90th day, 89th day being holiday—Full stamp, if can be excused ... S 5 N 5
 - (f) Time for copies of decree and judgment sought to be reviewed to be excluded ... S 12 N 29
 - (g) Time requisite for obtaining both copy of judgment and of decree should be excluded ... S 12 N 8
 - (h) Time taken to obtain copies of judgment and decree—Whether limitation though copy ... S 12 N 7
- C. ... holiday—Presentation on ... S 4 N 6a
- Grounds for
 - (a) Bar of limitation clear on facts found—Court's failure to notice such bar—If ground for review ... S 3 N 44

Review—Grounds for—(Contd.)

- (b) Judgment not stating that certain aspects of question of limitation were considered—If ground for review ... S 3 N 44
- Maintainability of, in regard to question of limitation ... S 3 N 44
- Meaning of—Within Art. 162 ... A 162 N 3
- Of judgment—See under Judgment.

Revision

- Application for
 - (a) Against order of inferior Criminal Court—Limitation ... A 181 N 23
 - (b) Appeal, treatment as—When proper ... S 5 N 30
 - (c) Time spent in obtaining copy of order sought to be revised
 - Whether can be excluded from period fixed by practice of High Court for filing such petitions ... S 12 N 4
 - (d) Whether subject to any period of limitation ... S 3 N 26
- Application made after undue delay—High Court will refuse to interfere ... S 3 N 26
- Competency of—Order refusing to excuse delay ... S 5 N 39
- Court of—If can review finding on question of limitation ... S 3 N 43 F N 3
- Failure to dismiss time-barred proceeding—Revision, if lies ... S 3 N 43
- From judgment of Small Cause Court—Revision from infructuous prior appeal from previous decree of Small Cause Court in same matter—Reliefs are not same ... S 14 N 19
- Maintainability of
 - (a) Erroneous application of wrong Article of Act—Revision, if lies ... S 3 N 43 F N 3
 - (b) Erroneous decision on question of law in connexion with limitation ... S 3 N 43
 - (c) Error in decision of question of limitation—If ground for revision of decision of Small Cause Court ... S 3 N 43
 - (d) On question of limitation ... S 3 N 43
 - (e) Refusal or failure of Court to decide material question of limitation—If ground for revision ... S 3 N 43
- Powers of High Court—Extent of ... S 3 N 43
- Revision application
 - (a) Whether appeal ... A 177 N 2
 - (b) Whether subject to abatement ... A 177 N 2
 - (c) Whether suit ... A 177 N 2

Right

- Declaration of—Suit for—Suit for declaration of right of public highway and for removal of obstruction—Limitation ... A 120 N 2
- Meaning of ... S 23 N 1
- Of ferry—Violation of, by setting up another ferry—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 14
- Of way—Obstruction to—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 13
- Of worship—Suit to establish—Limitation ... A 120 N 48
- Periodically recurring right—What is
 - (a) Claim to get manibam or annual allowance from and out of revenue collection of village, whether such right ... A 131 N 5
 - (b) Customary right to remission of rent, whether such right : ... A 131 N 5
 - (c) Exclusive and perpetual right of worship, whether such right ... A 131 N 6
 - (d) Palla or right to worship idol in turn, whether such right ... A 131 N 6

Right—Periodically recurring right, what is—(Contd.)

- (e) Payment of dhara or assessment or customary rent to inamdar, whether such right ... A 131 N 5
- (f) Right to adima allowance, whether such right ... A 131 N 5
- (g) Right to graze cattle in certain forests, whether such right: A 131 N 5
- (h) Right to levy taluqdari dues from defendant, whether such right ... A 131 N 5
- (i) Right to maintenance, whether such right ... A 131 N 8
- (j) Right to malikana, whether such right ... A 131 N 5
- (k) Right to receive Lawajama or Deshmukhi, whether such right ... A 131 N 5
- (l) Right to recover dasturat, whether such right ... A 131 N 5
- (m) Right to share in offerings to temple, whether such right ... A 131 N 5
- Possession of—Consists in exercise of the right ... A 142 & 144 N 11
- Recurring right
- (a) Establishment of—Suit for ... A 131; A 131 N 2
- (i) Against co-sharer or rival claimant of right—Limitation applicable ... A 131 N 4
- (ii) Burden of proof ... A 131 N 9
- (iii) By holder of hereditary office of Karnam to establish right to annual payment as rsum—Limitation ... A 131 N 5
- (iv) For declaration of right to moiety of offerings made at shrine of Muhammadan saint—Limitation ... A 131 N 5
- (v) For declaration of right to periodical payments as well as for recovery of arrears thereof—Limitation ... A 131 N 3
- (vi) For declaration of title to malikana allowance against rival claimant—Limitation ... A 131 N 4
- (vii) For declaration that plaintiff is liable to pay a certain sum periodically to defendant and not the higher sum claimed by him—Limitation—Starting point ... A 131 N 5
- (viii) For declaration that plaintiff is not liable in respect of periodical right claimed by defendant against him—Limitation ... A 131 N 5
- (ix) For declaration that plaintiff is not liable to pay water cess to Government—Limitation ... A 131 N 5
- (x) For recovery of arrears of payments periodically due—Limitation ... A 131 N 3
- (xi) For recovery of rent—Limitation ... A 131 N 3
- (xii) For recovery of wages—Limitation ... A 131 N 3
- (xiii) Landlord not suing for possession within twelve years of termination of lease—Suit to recover arrears of periodical payments, whether barred ... A 131 N 3
- (xiv) Limitation—Starting point ... A 131 N 9
- (xv) Prayer for consequential relief in such suit, whether necessary for applicability of Art. 131 ... A 131 N 3
- A 131 N 3
- A 131 N 3
- barred under Art. 131, suit for arrears of periodical payments, whether will be time-barred ... A 131 N 3
- (xviii) To establish plaintiff's right as mutawalli of mosque and as such to all yeomiah allowance received by rival claimants—Limitation ... A 131 N 5 F N 5

Right—Recurring right—Establishment of, suit for—(Contd.)

(xix) To establish plaintiff's right to enhance rent, etc.— Limitation	A 131 N 7
(xx) To establish plaintiff's right under certain lease to hold land as permanent tenant at fixed annual rent—Limita- tion	A 131 N 5
(xxi) To establish right to burial fees—Limitation—Starting point	A 131 N 5
(xxii) When plaintiff is first refused enjoyment of his right— Refusal, what constitutes	A 131 N 9
(xxiii) Whether maintainable where right depends on some other right which is extinguished under S. 28 ...	A 131 N 2
(b) Suit for declaration of—Limitation	A 102 N 3
(c) Suit for sums due by reason of	
(i) Limitation	A 102 N 3
(ii) Where sums sought to be recovered are wages—Limi- tation	A 102 N 3

Right to sue

—Arising in representative capacity can be enforced by person on whom such representative capacity devolves	S 2 Cl 8 N 2
—Construction of Act in favour of right	Preamble N 20
—Devolution of	S 2 Cl 4 N 1
—In respect of any particular interest—Enforceability by persons becoming entitled to it	S 2 Cl 8 N 2
—In suits based on wrong	A 120 N 3
—Meaning of	A 120 N 3
—Right of action existing at time of death survives to and against persons representing his estate	S 2 Cl 8 N 2
—Right to sue accrued in favour of a person in representative capa- city—Whether would be derived by person on whom represen- tative capacity devolves afterwards	S 2 Cl 8 N 2; A 124 N 15
—When accrues in suits for administration	A 120 N 3
—When accrues in suits for partition	A 120 N 3
—When arises	A 120 N 3
—Whether means first right to sue	A 120 N 3

Road

—Meaning of	A 146-A N 4
—Public road—Meaning of	A 146-A N 4

Royalty

—Minimum royalty reserved by landlords in case of mining lease— Whether rent	A 110 N 2
—Recovery of—Suit for—Suit based on registered deed—Limitation:	A 116 N 9

Salary

—And wages—Distinguished	A 7 N 2
—Employee drawing advances against salary—Balance due on such account—Suit for—Limitation	A 85 N 4
—Suit for—Salary payable to plaintiff but wrongfully retained by hatwara ameen—Suit against ameen—Limitation...	A 62 N 31

Sale

- By mortgagee—Mortgagee having power of sale out of Court purchasing property himself at the sale—Sale is void ... A 148 N 4
- By person who has no authority to sell except under certain conditions—Validity of sale ... A 10 N 13
- By revenue officer
 - (a) Sale within jurisdiction—Setting aside—Suit for—Mere irregularities in procedure whether can be allowed to be raised in setting it aside after period of limitation provided by Art. 12 ... A 12 N 8
 - (b) Setting aside—Suit for
 - (i) Limitation—Special and local provision of ... A 12 N 8
 - (ii) Where sale is without jurisdiction—Limitation ... A 12 N 8
- Conditional sale—Instrument of—Interest upon—Whether allowable ... A 63 N 1
- Court sale
 - (a) Application for order of confirmation—Limitation ... A 181 N 2
 - (b) Setting aside—Suit for—On ground of mistake—Limitation: ... A 96 N 2
- Decree for, in mortgage suit—Application for—Limitation ... A 181 N 4
- For arrears of public demand—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation
 - (a) Where sale is not void ... A 120 N 7
 - (b) Where sale is void ... A 120 N 7
- For arrears of rent of patni taluq—Interest passed to purchaser—Nature of ... A 121 N 1
- For arrears of revenue—Interest passed to purchaser—Nature of: ... A 121 N 1
- Fraudulent sale
 - (a) Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
 - (b) Setting aside—Suit for—By certified purchaser—Limitation: ... A 120 N 2
- Giving rise to pre-emption right—*See under* Pre-emption.
- In English mortgages—Suit for—By mortgagee—Limitation: ... A 147 N 1
- In insolvency proceedings—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation ... A 166 N 9
- To mortgage by deposit of title deeds—Suit for—Limitation ... A 147 N 2
- Negotiation of—Whether particular business, within Art. 84 ... A 84 N 3
- Not binding on person—Illustrative cases ... A 12 N 1
- Null and void
 - (a) Plaintiff dispossessed by purchaser—Suit for possession—Limitation ... A 12 N 1
 - (b) Remedies of person in respect of ... A 12 N 1
 - (c) Setting aside—Suit for—Whether will be regarded as one for declaration that sale is not binding on plaintiff ... A 12 N 1
- Of equity of redemption, whether alienation ... A 120 N 34
- Of goods
 - (a) Account consisting of each party selling goods to the other—Balance due on—Suit for—Limitation ... A 85 N 7
 - (b) Account consisting of sale of goods on one side and advance of loan on the other—Balance due on such account—Suit for—Limitation ... A 85 N 8
 - (c) Account consisting of sale of goods on one hand and payments of price on the other—Balance due on such account—Suit for—Limitation ... A 85 N 6

Sale—(Contd.)

- Of Government paper—By bank holding Government paper in trust for plaintiff—Suit for recovery of sale proceeds against bank—Limitation A 62 N 31
- Of house, whether sale of land A 120 N 34
- Of mortgaged property—By limited owner—Impeachment of—Suit for—By reversioner—Starting point—Limitation ... A 125 N 15
- Of property subject to incumbrances—Transaction, whether contains implied contract of indemnity by vendee in favour of vendor against incumbrances A 83 N 7
- Restraining of—Suit for—Upon application by decree-holder for sale of tenure in which third person is interested—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 31
- Revenue sale—For arrears of revenue subject to all incumbrances—Adverse possession acquired prior to such sale, whether an incumbrance A 130 N 6
- Right to enforce—Relief for, is different from that for suit to set it aside S 14 N 19
- Sale certificate—Application for—Under Civil P. C., O. 21, R. 94—Limitation A 161 N 21
- Setting aside
 - (a) Application for—Dismissal of application and confirmation of sale—Auction purchaser, if gets fresh right to apply for delivery of possession and fresh period in respect of such application S 9 N 11
 - (b) Meaning of A 12 N 2
 - (c) Suit for
 - (i) F A 12 N 2
 - (ii) By representatives of deceased mortgagor bound by sale, for redemption—Whether one for setting aside sale A 12 N 2
 - (iii) Defence of invalid sale, whether barred even if suit to set aside sale was barred at the time A 12 N 3
 - (iv) For setting aside invalid sale of joint share and for possession—Limitation A 123 N 6
 - (v) For setting aside sale by person who has no authority to sell except under certain conditions—Limitation : A 10 N 13
 - (vi) In respect of sale by Collector under Madras Estates Land Act, S. 118—Limitation A 12 N 7
 - (vii) In respect of sale for arrears of Government revenue or any demand recoverable as such
 - (a) Limitation—Starting point ... A 12; A 12 N 10
 - (b) Where sale is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation A 12 N 1
 - (viii) In respect of sale in execution of decree of Civil Court
 - (a) Limitation—Starting point ... A 12; A 12 N 10
 - (b) Where sale is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation A 12 N 1
 - (ix) In respect of sale in pursuance of certificate under Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act
 - (a) Limitation A 12 N 7

Sale—Setting aside—Suit for—In respect of sale in pursuance of certificate under Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act—(Contd.)

- (b) Plaintiff, whether must sue within Art. 12 to set aside sale where it is a nullity ... A 12 N 7
- (x) In respect of sale in pursuance of decree or order of Collector or other revenue officer
 - (a) Limitation ... A 12
 - (b) Where sale is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation ... A 12 N 1
- (xi) In respect of sale of patni taluq sold for current arrears of rent
 - (a) Limitation—Starting point ... A 12; A 12 N 10
 - (b) Where sale is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation ... A 12 N 1
- (xii) In respect of sale under Rent Recovery Act—Limitation ... A 12 N 7
- (xiii) On ground of fraud—Limitation ... A 12 N 4
- (xiv) On ground of pre-emption—Limitation—Starting point ... A 12 N 10
- (xv) Test to find out whether suit is one for setting aside sale: ... A 12 N 2
- (xvi) Where sale is a nullity—Limitation ... A 12 N 8
- (d) Who can set aside sale ... A 12 N 1
- Suit for, by mortgagee
 - (a) Articles 147 and 182 distinguished ... A 147 N 1
 - (b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 147; A 147 N 4
- Suit for possession—Rights under contract, if can be set up in defence to suit when suit for specific performance is barred ... S 3 N 15
- Surplus sale proceeds
 - (a) Share of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
 - (b) Suit for—By consignor for surplus sale proceeds of goods sold under Railways Act, S. 56—Limitation ... A 62 N 31
- Under Bengal Patni Regulation, S. 14—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation ... A 12 N 9
- Under Bengal Tenancy Act, S. 173—Setting aside—Application for—Limitation ... A 166 N 10
- Under Madras Revenue Recovery Act—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation ... A 12 N 8
- Valid and binding as between parties to decree—Whether can be set aside by third person ... A 12 N 1
- When becomes final, under Revenue Sale Law ... A 121 N 6

Seaman

—Wages of—Suit for—*See under Wages—Seaman's wages.*

Second appeal

- Finding as to the time requisite for obtaining copies—Finding of fact—Whether can be questioned in second appeal ... S 13 N 33
- New plea as to limitation, if can be raised ... S 3 N 17
- Plea of prescriptive right with regard to easement—Whether can be taken for the first time in second appeal ... S 26 N 17
- Question of fact—Question whether money was paid for interest as such or for part payment of principal cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal ... S 20 N 33
- Question of law—Question whether facts and circumstances constitute sufficient cause, if can be raised in second appeal ... S 6 N 38

Secretary of State

- Impleading of Secretary of State unnecessarily under mistake of law or fact—Period of notice of emt, if can be deducted as against private individuals also defendants in suit ... S 15 N 20
- Prior suit against Traffic Manager of Railway Company instead of Secretary of State—Subsequent suit against Secretary of State
 - Whether against same parties for purposes of S. 14 ... S 14 N 16
- Suit against—Exclusion under S. 13, if available ... S 13 N 4
- Sunt by—Before Federal Court—Limitation ... A 149; A 149 N 2

Security

- Depreciation of—Compensation for—Suit for—Limitation ... A 132 N 11
- Substituted security
 - (a) Suit against—For payment of mortgage money—Limitation: A 132 N 11
 - (b) What is ... A 132 N 11

Seduction

- Of daughter—Whether *per se* actionable ... A 26 N 1
- Of servant—Whether *per se* actionable ... A 26 N 1

Service

- Loss of—Compensation for—Suit for—In respect of loss of service occasioned by seduction of plaintiff's servant or daughter — Limitation—Starting point ... A 26; A 26 N 1

Set-off

- Acknowledgment of liability, if can be coupled with claim of set-off: S 19 N 45
- Limitation—Date with reference to which test is applied ... S 3 N 29
- When can be claimed ... S 3 N 29

Settlement

- Father executing settlement deed giving properties to son and directing him to pay an amount to settlor's daughters—Trust for specific purpose, if created in favour of daughters ... S 10 N 13

Share

- Distributive share—What is ... A 123 N 10
- In joint family property—Suit for—*See under* Joint family property —Share in—Suit for.
- In partnership of ginning factory — Whether immovable property within Art. 141 ... A 141 N 11
- Of moveable property—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 11
- Of property—Suit for — Suit for share of property of intestate — *See under* Intestate.
- Of residue bequeathed by testator—*See under* Residue — Residue bequeathed by testator.
- Suit for—Suit for possession of one half share of property purchased jointly by plaintiff and defendant and for accounts of profits—
 - Limitation ... A 89 N 2
- Undivided share in property sold — Whether admits of physical possession ... A 10 N 7

Shareholder

- Suit by
 - (a) For dividend—Limitation ... A 62 N 7
 - (b) For recovery of arrears of dividend—Limitation ... A 120 N 30

Shebait

- Decree obtained against—Whether successors are bound by decree: A 95 N 7

Shebait—(Contd.)

—Fraud of—Suit by successor in respect of — Limitation—Starting point	A 95 N 13
—Office of					
(a) Possession of—Suit for—Limitation	A 120 N 2
(b) Whether hereditary	A 124 N 4
—Suit by—For idol, or consecrated portrait and valuables belonging to it—Limitation	A 49 N 2
—Suit by successor—For setting aside decree obtained by fraud against predecessor—Limitation applicable	A 95 N 7

Shrine

—Offerings for—Money received as — Suit for — Against recipient on behalf of shrine—Limitation	A 62 N 29
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Signature

—Good and valid signature—What is within Art. 64	A 64 N 10
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Sikh Gurdwaras Act

—S. 28—Suit under—S. 4, Limitation Act, applies	S 29 N 3
-------------------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	----------

Slander

—Compensation for—Suit for					
(a) English law—How far applicable in India	A 25 N 1
(b) Limitation—Starting point	A 25; A 25 N 1
—Meaning of	A 25 N 1
—Slander <i>per se</i> , when actionable under English law	A 25 N 1

Solicitor

—Costs—Order of Court for taxation of solicitor's costs against client					
—Whether bars institution of suit by solicitor against client for costs	S 15 N 6
—Money deposited with solicitor intending to vest ownership with him—Trust for specific purpose, if created	S 10 N 18

Special or local law

—Applicability of S. 12 to cases under	S 12 N 5
—English Statute not in force in British India but which may have to be administered in particular cases — Whether special or local law	S 29 N 6
—“Expressly excluded,” in S. 29, sub.s. 2—Meaning of	S 29 N 4
—Law must be in force in British India	S 29 N 6
—Letters Patent, if constitute special or local law	S 29 N 6
—Limitation prescribed by—Exclusion of time under S. 12 — Whether available	S 12 N 2
—Local law—Meaning of	S 29 N 6
—Not prescribing period of limitation for a particular application —	S 29 N 3
—I				—prescribed by	S 29 N 3
				—prescribing must	S 29 N 3
				—period prescribed	S 19 N 13
—I				—within S. 19	S 29
—Period prescribed by, different from period prescribed by Act — Effect of.	S 29
—Provision of period different from period prescribed by Sch. 1 of Act—Provisions of Limitation Act will not apply except to the extent expressly specified in S. 29	S 29 N 3

Special or local law—(Contd.)

- Provision of period of limitation for suit, appeal, or application —
Applicability of Ss 4, 9 to 18 and 22 of Act ... S 29 N 3
- Provisions of Limitation Act other than Ss. 4, 9 to 18 and 22,
Limitation Act — Whether can be made applicable by express
reference ... S 29 N 5
- Rules framed under Letters Patent by High Court — Whether
special laws ... S 29 N 6
- Special law
 - (a) Expression to be understood only in a relative sense ... S 29 N 6
 - (b) Meaning of ... S 29 N 6
- Special provision of, under Bengal Tenancy Act, C. P. Tenancy Act
and Madras Estates Act — Whether overrides the provisions of
Limitation Act for suit for compensation for breach of registered
contract ... A 116 N 8
- Waiver of question of limitation under—Whether permissible ... S 29 N 3

Specific performance

- Of contract
 - (a) Suit to enforce
 - (i) Illustrative cases ... A 113 N 2
 - (ii) Limitation ... A 113
 - (b) What is ... A 113 N 2
- Suit for specific performance of award—Limitation—Cases governed
by residuary Art. 120 ... A 120 N 42
- Suit for specific performance of contract to sell—Necessary parties ... S 22 N 2a

Specific Relief Act

- S. 9—Suit under
 - (a) By Government—Limitation ... A 149 N 2
 - (b) Landlord, whether can bring such suit when his tenant is
dispossessed ... A 3 N 3
 - (c) Limitation ... A 3; A 3 N 2
 - (d) On title—Failure to prove title—Decree, whether can be
given subsequently under Specific Relief Act, S. 9 ... A 3 N 6
 - (e) Partial dispossession, whether entitles plaintiff to bring such
suit ... A 3 N 3
 - (f) Remedy under Specific Relief Act, when available ... A 3 N 3
 - (g) Whether maintainable where defendant is maintained in pos-
session by order under S. 145, Criminal P. C. ... A 3 N 7
- Sections 10 and 11—Suit under—Limitation ... A 49 N 4
- Section 42—Provisions of ... A 125 N 2

Statute of Westminster

- Effect of, on law of easements in England ... S 26 N 3

Street

- Meaning of ... A 146-A N 4
- Possession of—Suit for — By local authority — See under Local
authority.

Submerged land

- Presumption is that owner is in possession ... A 142 & 144 N 15
- Re-formed—Suit for possession
 - (a) By true owner—Burden of proof ... A 142 & 144 N 70
 - (b) Cases where flooding seasonal and cases where submergence
lasting several years—Difference ... A 142 & 144 N 70

Submerged land—Re-formed, suit for possession—(Contd.)

- (c) Lands under water for few days every year without interfering with their use—Presumption of constructive possession in true owner, whether arises ... A 142 & 144 N 70
- (d) Person acquiring title by adverse possession to land re-formed—Land again submerged and again re-formed—Title will be that of person acquiring title by adverse possession: A 142 & 144 N 70
- (e) Plaintiff must prove ownership before submersion: A 142 & 144 N 87
- (f) Re-formed land capable of being identified—Owner is entitled to it ... A 142 & 144 N 70
- (g) True owner not in possession before submersion but having subsisting title—Constructive possession during submersion is in true owner ... A 142 & 144 N 70
- (h) Wrongdoer in possession before submersion—Suit for possession by true owner within 12 years of re-formation—True owner can recover possession ... A 142 & 144 N 70

Subrogation—See under Mortgage.**Substitution or addition of new parties**

- Added party constructively party to suit—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 5
- Addition made by Appellate Court in appeal from order of lower Court refusing to make the addition—Addition, when to be deemed to be effected ... S 22 N 5
- Addition of necessary party after period of limitation—Whether entails dismissal of suit ... S 22 N 5
- Addition of new defendant—Suit barred against him on such addition—Suit must be dismissed as against him ... S 22 N 5
- Addition of new ground of right or liability—Illustrations ... S 22 N 6
- Addition of party after period of limitation—Whether affects the suit against other defendants already on record ... S 22 N 5
- Addition of party whose name has been struck off
 - (a) Names struck out by *bona fide* mistake—Restoration of names will relate back to original date ... S 22 N 6
 - (b) Suit against sons for compensation for tort of their deceased father—Names of sons struck off from plaint and administrator impleaded—Sons again impleaded by subsequent order—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6
 - (c) Whether amounts to addition of new party within S. 22 ... S 22 N 6
- Addition of persons already represented in suit—Whether amounts to addition of new parties ... S 22 N 6
- Addition or alteration on ground of right or liability
 - (a) Claim originally made as being entitled through father—Amendment of plaint by making claim as being entitled through uncle—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6
 - (b) Defendants originally impleaded as members of joint family sought to be made liable in the alternative as partners—Whether amounts to addition or substitution of new parties ... S 22 N 6
 - (c) Party impleaded as trustee sought to be made liable personally—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6
 - (d) Person claiming in one's own right seeking to amend plaint by claiming as legal representative—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6
 - (a) Son originally impleaded as heir of father subsequently sought to be placed on record as executor under father's will—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6

Substitution or addition of new parties—Addition or alteration on ground of right or liability—(Contd.)

- (f) Suit in personal capacity
 - (i) Amendment of description of plaintiff as managing director of a company—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6
 - (ii) Description of plaintiff amended as administrator of estate—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6
- (g) Suit on promissory note signed by defendant on his own behalf and as guardian of minor—Relief against property of minor in defendant's hands—Amendment asking for personal relief against the defendant—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6
- After institution of suit—Suit will be, as regards him, deemed to be instituted when he was made party ... S 22
- Amendment only altering or adding to ground or basis of right or liability of parties already on record—No change in persons of parties—Whether amounts to addition of new parties ... S 22 N 6
- Appellate Court adding a person as party to appeal who was not party in the suit—S. 22, if applies to such addition ... S 22 N 4
- Assignment or devolution
 - (a) Assignee from successful claimant under O. 21 R. 58, Civil P. C., taking the transfer before suit by defeated decreeholder—Whether assignee during pendency of suit ... S 22 N 28
 - (b) Assignment must be from a person already a party to suit: ... S 22 N 28
 - (c) Meaning of ... S 22 N 28
- Benamidar impleaded in time—Real owner impleaded after limitation—Benamidar acting as real owner and benami relationship known only subsequently—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 6
- Change or devolution of interest in pending suit—Whether a case of addition or substitution of party within S. 22 ... S 22 N 7
- Constructive party—Suit by manager of joint Hindu family for rent due in respect of family property—Subsequent addition of members of family—Whether addition of new party within S. 22: ... S 22 N 5
- Court of its own motion ordering addition of party—S. 22, if applies ... S 22 N 5
- “Deemed to have been instituted” in S. 22—Meaning of ... S 22 N 14
- Discretion of Court in rejecting application for addition or substitution of assignees on ground of laches—Whether interfered with by S. 22, sub-s. 2 ... S 22 N 27
- Final order impleading person as party made on revision or appeal—Addition, when takes effect ... S 22 N 26
- Firm
 - (a) Disclosure of partners' names in suit relating to firm—Omission of a partner's name from such declaration—Fresh declaration after expiry of limitation—Such partner, if newly added party within S. 22 ... S 22 N 19
 - (b) Partnership reconstituted—Suit by it in respect of contract with old firm—Substitution of old firm after limitation—Whether substitution of a new party ... S 22 N 18
 - (c) Suit by one partner for dissolution of partnership or for accounts—One or more of other partners or one or more of legal representatives of deceased partner not impleaded within time—Whole suit, if must fail ... S 22 N 19

Substitution or addition of new parties—(Contd.)

- Fresh parties merely added for safeguarding rights subsisting as the same interest
of institution of,
eration of general
- provisions of Limitation Act S 22 N 13
- Joint promisees—Suit by one only of such promisees—Other promisees not made parties—Suit to be dismissed S 22 N 17
- Minor—Circumstances under which addition of minor in appeal will be addition of new party S 22 N 8
- Misdescription
- (a) Amendment by giving correct description is not addition of new party—Illustrations S 22 N 10
- (b) Company in liquidation sued as official liquidator of the company instead of the company in liquidation—Amendment by giving correct description, whether amounts to addition of new party S 22 N 10
- (c) Defendant sued in his individual capacity—Plaintiff denying title of the idol whose shebait he was—Addition of idol as party defendant—Whether addition of a new party S 22 N 10
- (d) Omission of name of temple in cause title—Amendment by giving correct description—Whether addition of new party S 22 N 10
- (e) Person intended to be impleaded not as a matter of fact impleaded—Omission to implead due to *bona fide* mistake—Whether a case of misdescription S 22 N 10
- (f) Plaintiff in suit by District Board described as "Chairman of District Board" instead of "District Board"—Amendment by giving correct description is not addition of new party S 22 N 10
- (g) Plaintiff suing on behalf of idol describing himself as shebait in body of plaint—Omission to describe himself as shebait in cause title—Amendment by giving correct description—Whether addition of a new party... .. S 22 N 10
- (h) Plaintiff's company already on record—Person suing on his behalf not making it clear in what capacity he sued—Amendment by giving correct description—Whether amounts to addition of new party... .. S 22 N 10
- (i) Suit against foreign firms which had been dissolved to plaintiff's knowledge—Impleading of partners in British India after limitation on filing suit not maintainable against foreign firms—Whether a case of misdescription S 22 N 10
- (j) Suit against Municipal Committee—Committee by mistake made to be represented by its Secretary instead of President—Amendment by giving correct description—Whether amounts to addition of new party... .. S 22 N 10
- (k) Suit against Railway Company—Defendant described as Agent of Railway company instead of Railway company—Amendment by giving correct description—Whether amounts to addition of new party S 22 N 10
- (l) Suit for dissolution of partnership and for accounts—Defendant described as firm by *bona fide* mistake—Amendment by giving correct description—Whether addition of new party S 22 N 10
- (m) What amounts to S 22 N 10

Substitution or addition of new parties—(Contd.)

—Mortgage suit

- (a) Failure to implead all persons interested in equity of redemption
 - (i) Addition of such persons after limitation has expired against them—Whether necessitates dismissal of suit : S 22 N 17
 - (ii) Suit, if a duly constituted one S 22 N 17
- (b) Joinder of parties in—Principles governing S 22 N 17
- (c) Mortgagee right vested in several persons jointly
 - (i) One of them alone cannot enforce mortgage without impleading others as parties S 22 N 17
 - (ii) Suit by one without impleading others — Addition of others after limitation—Whole suit must be dismissed : S 22 N 17
- (d) Parties on record representing in law absent persons interested in mortgage right or equity of redemption — Subsequent addition of such persons — Whether amounts to addition of new parties S 22 N 17

—Necessary parties

- (a) Agreement to sell property to a certain person—Subsequent sale to third party having notice of prior agreement — Suit for specific performance by former—Latter impleaded more than three years after breach of contract—Suit, if barred... S 22 N 21a
- (b) Firm—Intention to implead firm clear — Misdescription in cause title is immaterial S 22 N 18
- (c) In suits relating to firms S 22 N 18
- (d) Necessary party not added in time — Suit must be dismissed in its entirety S 22 N 15
- (e) Single individual trading under the name and style of a firm — Suit with firm name and not individual as party—Death of individual before suit—Suit is a nullity S 22 N 18
- (f) Suit for ejectment of sub-tenant's sub-tenant — Former not impleaded in time—Whole suit, if fails S 22 N 22
- (g) Suit in the name of firm by one of its members as its agent—Other partners made co-plaintiffs after limitation—Whether amounts to addition of new parties S 22 N 18
- (h) Suit by landlord against sub-tenant of tenant for ejectment without impleading tenant—Tenant made party after period of limitation—Whole suit, if becomes barred S 22 N 5
- (i) Suit by one of several joint promisees without impleading other joint promisees — Such joint promisees added after limitation—Whole suit, if becomes barred S 22 N 5
- (j) Suit by one of two heirs of a deceased Mohamedan to recover debt due to estate — Other heir added after period of limitation—Whole suit, if becomes barred S 22 N 5
- (k) Suit to recover debt due to joint promisees—One or more of them impleaded after limitation—Whole suit must fail ... S 22 N 23

—Necessary party—Who is S 22 N 16

—New party

- (a) Daughter claiming under will suing to recover properties

S 22 N 6

Substitution or addition of new parties—New party—(Contd.)

- (b) Debutter estate made party but not properly represented — Amendment adding proper representative — Whether addition of new party S 22 N 6
- (c) Erroneous supposition by *bona fide* mistake that plaintiff should be represented in a particular way—Plaintiff subsequently permitted to rectify mistake and appear personally —Whether amounts to addition of new party ... S 22 N 6
- (d) Estate or person not properly represented in suit—Addition of proper representative—Effect of S 22 N 6
- (e) Major by *bona fide* mistake impleaded as minor plaintiff—Institution of suit by his parent as next friend — Amendment after limitation to recognize him as major—Whether amounts to addition of new party... .. S 22 N 8
- (f) Minor neither party plaintiff nor party defendant—Addition of minor after limitation will be addition of a new party ... S 22 N 8
- (g) Minor suing as major by *bona fide* mistake
 - (i) Application for amendment of mistake made beyond time—Whether can be allowed S 22 N 8
 - (ii) Minor attaining majority—Whether can be allowed to continue suit S 22 N 8
- (h) Minor wrongly described as major and impleaded in suit—Subsequent discovery of mistake and guardian appointed for him—Minor, if a new party within S. 22 S 22 N 8
- (i) Suit for recovery of money due on mortgage by widow of mortgagee as administratrix of estate of mortgagee for benefit of his sons — Subsequent discovery that period of her appointment as administratrix had expired before suit — Prayer that sons should be added as plaintiffs—Addition, if of new parties S 22 N 6
- (j) Suit on promissory note impleading widow of executant as legal representative — Subsequent discovery that son and not widow was legal representative—Impleading of son—If addition of new party S 22 N 6
- New plaintiff substituted for plaintiff already on record after expiry of limitation for suit—Suit must be dismissed S 22 N 6
- New relief claimed by party
 - (a) New party allowed to put forward new facts on which to rest the case—Such amendment, if within S. 22 ... S 22 N 9
 - (b) Party on record allowed to set up new facts or new cause of action—Whether amounts to adding a new party ... S 22 N 9
- Non-joinder
 - (a) Of necessary parties
 - (i) Defendant's failure to object to — Decree in favour of plaintiff, if can be passed S 22 N 25
 - (ii) Objection as to—Objection raised at late stage—Effect of S 22 N 25
 - (b) Of proper and of necessary parties—Failure to object to, at proper stage—Distinction as to effect S 22 N 25
 - (c) Of proper but not necessary parties—Objection raised at late stage—Effect of S 22 N 25
- Object of S. 22 S 22 N 2
- Original party having no right to sue—Addition of person having such right—Whether amounts to addition of new party ... S 22 N 6

Substitution or addition of new parties—(Contd.)**—Parties in representative character**

- (a) Manager of joint Hindu family, party to suit—Addition of other members—Whether amounts to addition of new parties within S. 22 S 22 N 11
- (b) Person already properly represented on record by another—Subsequent addition of name in plaint is not addition of new party S 22 N 10
- (c) Person who had not obtained letters of administration necessary to sue in representative character instituting suit—Impleading of person with such letters after limitation—Suit, if barred S 22 N 11
- (d) Representation should be valid and perfected at the time of suit, to fall within S. 22 S 22 N 11
- (e) Suit by member of joint family and not by manager—Addition of other members amounts to addition of new parties S 22 N 11
- (f) Suit by promisee against one of legal representatives of the executant for decree against assets of executant in his hands—Such defendant in possession only of a portion of such assets—Persons in possession of other portions of assets impleaded after period of limitation—Suit as against such persons, if barred S 22 N 11
- (g) Suit by trustee or heir of idol suing as executor or administrator of estate—Joinder of beneficiaries—Whether amounts to addition of new parties S 22 N 11

—Party once discharged and subsequently reinstated—Whether party only from date of reinstatement S 22 N 5

—Person added as party on application made for the purpose—Addition, when takes effect S 22 N 5, S 22 N 26

—Person intended to be sued described correctly—Plaintiff finding subsequently that such person was not liable to answer his claim—Whether a case of misdescription S 22 N 10

—Persons whose right to sue or he sued has already become barred—Whether can be added or substituted as parties to an action S 22 N 13

—Plaintiff not entitled to relief against newly added defendant and not claiming any—Relief claimed against existing defendants capable of being granted independently—Addition of new parties after limitation—Whether affects suit as against existing defendants S 22 N 15

—Pre-emption suit—All vendees not made parties in time—Whole suit, when fails S 22 N 20

—Proceedings against newly added defendants—When can be deemed to have begun S 22 N 26

—Proper but not necessary party added after limitation—Suit as against other defendants, if becomes barred S 22 N 5

—Proper party

- (a) It is not necessary that any relief should be asked against him S 22 N 16
- (b) Newly added party not necessary party but only proper party—Limitation, if can be claimed in respect of entire suit S 22 N 15
- (c) Newly added party only proper party—Question of limitation, if arises as regards him S 22 N 15
- (d) Object of adding proper parties S 22 N 16

Substitution or addition of new parties—Suit or appeal by or against dead person—(Contd.)

- (e) Legal representatives necessary parties to suit—Their addition after period of limitation—Whether will entail dismissal of whole suit ... S 22 N 12
- (f) Legal representatives proper but not necessary parties—Suit ... S 22 N 12
- (g) ... suit proceeded with ... S 23 N 12
- (h) Whether can be amended by bringing legal representatives of such deceased person on record ... S 22 N 12
- Transferee during suit acquiring interest in subject-matter of suit in conflict with rights of plaintiff—Whether can plead limitation on the ground that suit should be deemed to have been instituted against him only on date he was unpleaded ... S 22 N 27
- Transposition of parties
- (a) Court has discretion to refuse to allow transposition where by doing so a valuable right of the defendant would be affected ... S 22 N 29
- (b) Date of suit is date of its institution as regards party transposed ... S 22 N 29
- (c) Defendant transposed as plaintiff, whether a new plaintiff ... S 22 N 29
- (d) Plaintiff claim enhanced by transposition—Whether ground against operation of S. 22, sub-s. 2 ... S 22 N 29
- (e) Promissory note in name of benamidar—Suit by beneficial owner on note making benamidar a defendant—Benamidar, if can be allowed to be transposed as plaintiff ... S 22 N 29
- (f) Question of limitation, if arises in a case of transposition ... S 22 N 29
- (g) Rule as to
- (i) If subject to any qualifications ... S 22 N 29
- (ii) Whether can be availed of only where plaintiff and defendant to be transposed have joint cause of action ... S 22 N 29
- (iii) Whether extends to case of transposition of defendant or the only rightful plaintiff when original plaintiff has no right to sue at all ... S 22 N 29
- (h) Section 22, if applies ... S 22 N 5
- (i) Suit by assignee from Official Receiver of claims to damages in favour of insolvent—Objection that claims not being assignable plaintiff had no right to sue—Official Receiver, *pro forma* defendant, if can be transposed as rightful plaintiff after limitation ... S 22 N 29
- (j) Suit by eight annas sharer for his share of rent making other sharer a defendant—Transposition of latter as plaintiff—His share of rent also, if can be claimed in suit ... S 22 N 29
- (k) Transposition of person from category of defendant to that of plaintiff—Transposition having effect of bringing on record new plaintiff with cause of action and relief entirely different from that in original plaint—Whether saved by S. 22, sub-s. 2 ... S 22 N 29
- (l) Value of suit exceeding jurisdiction of Court on transposition—Court should return plaint to be presented to proper Court : ... S 22 N 29
- (m) Whether amounts to addition or substitution of parties ... S 22 N 7
- “When he was so made a party” in S. 22—Meaning of ... S 22 N 26

Succession Act

- Appeal under, to High Court—Limitation ... A 156 N 3
- Sections 295, 296—Proceedings under—Whether suits ... S 2 Cl 10 N 1
- Sections 360 or 361—Suit under, to compel refund of legacy or distributed assets—Limitation ... A 43, A 43 N 2

Successive wrongs

- Fact that party has not availed himself of earlier cause of action, whether prevents him from availing himself of a later one ... S 23 N 20
- Meaning of ... S 23 N 20
- Person appropriating for himself without any right daily surplus income from offerings made to temple—Suit by shebait, ten years after he had begun to do so, for declaration that plaintiff was entitled to the income—Fresh actionable wrong, if committed on each occasion income was received and wrongfully appropriated : S 23 N 20
- Plaintiff's suit for perpetual injunction restraining defendant from discharging rain water on the roof of plaintiff's shop through a parnala—Plaintiff, if gets fresh cause of action on each occasion defendant so discharges rain water ... S 23 N 20

Suit

- By insolvent—Dismissal of—Provision for ... A 172 N 2
- Claims in, independent and capable of being split up—Must be regarded as a separate suit as regards each claim ... S 2 Cl 10 N 1
- Conversion of, into execution application—Limitation, how computed ... S 3 N 33a
- Declaratory suit
 - (a) Adjudication by civil Court deciding against defendant—Subsequent denial of plaintiff's title, whether gives fresh cause of action ... A 120 N 31
 - (b) By adopted son to impeach alienation by adoptive mother before adoption—Suit, whether one for declaration ... A 125 N 3
 - (c) By creditor of ancestor or testator against alienee from devisee or heir for declaration that alienation is void and for consequential relief—Limitation ... A 120 N 44
 - (d) By donor to declare gift invalid—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
 - (e) By junior member of Malabar tarwad for declaration that alienation by Karnavan is not binding on tarwad—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 36
 - (f) By landlord against tenant after order of Revenue Court cancelling notice of ejectment—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 31
 - (g) By reversioner : *See under* ... A 120 N 31
 - are—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
 - (j) For declaration brought after testator's death that mutation in favour of defendant is wrong and does not affect rights of plaintiff—Limitation—Whether Limitation Act, Art. 120 or Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, Art. 1, applies ... A 120 N 31
 - (k) For declaration of heirship to a Hindu—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 31
 - (l) For declaration of plaintiff's right to office and for possession—Limitation ... A 124 N 5

Suit—Declaratory suit—(Contd.)

- (m) For declaration of plaintiff's right to receive *yeomiah* allowance—Limitation A 120 N 39
- (n) For declaration of plaintiff's title to office and for recovery of emoluments thereof—Limitation A 124 N 5
- (o) For declaration of proprietary rights in land under C. P. Land Revenue Act, S. 88—Limitation A 120 N 31
- (p) For declaration of right as to property attached under Criminal P. C.—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 11
- (q) For declaration of right to graze cattle over certain lands—Burden of proof A 120 N 31
- (r) For declaration of right to immovable property—Suit by Hindu or Mahomedan who is entitled to possession on death of limited owner—When maintainable—Limitation A 141 N 3
- (s) For declaration of right to joint family property—Maintainability A 127 N 13
- (t) For declaration of title, plaintiff being in possession of land regarding which declaration is required—Limitation, statute of, whether does not apply A 120 N 31
- (u) For declaration of title to property A 120 N 31
- (v) For declaration on ground of pre-decree compromise that decree-holder is barred from executing decree—Limitation : A 120 N 31
- (w) For declaration that alleged will is forgery—Limitation A 120 N 20
- (x) For declaration that allotment by Collector under Bengal Estates Partition Act is not legally valid—Limitation A 120 N 31
- (y) For declaration that decree is not binding on plaintiff—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 22
- (z) For declaration that defendant has fraudulently procured entry of his name in revenue records and that plaintiff alone is entitled to succeed to property—Limitation A 120 N 23
- (z¹) For declaration that execution sale in contravention of Bengal Tenancy Act, S. 158, is illegal and inoperative—Limitation A 120 N 31
- (z²) For declaration that Government has no right to collect water cess—Limitation—Starting point A 120 N 31
- (z³) For declaration that mortgage executed by trustee of temple property is fraudulent and not binding on temple—Limitation A 120 N 23
- (z⁴) For declaration that plaintiff is entitled to office—Limitation A 124 N 5
- (z⁵) For declaration that property in possession of father is partible after his death—Limitation A 120 N 31
- (z⁶) For declaration that property is not liable to attachment—Limitation A 120 N 31
- (z⁷) For declaration that sale by trustee is invalid—Suit, whether one for possession within Art. 134 A 134 N 3
- (z⁸) For declaration that sale is fraudulent—Limitation A 120 N 31
- (z⁹) For setting aside will—Limitation A 120 N 31
- (z¹⁰) Limitation
- (i) For suit not governed by Articles 11, 11-A, 92, 93, 118, 119, 125 A 120 N 31
- (ii) Starting point A 120 N 31

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 - (f) By landlord against tenant after order of Revenue Court cancelling notice of ejectment—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 31
 - (g) By reversioner : See under Reversioner
 - (h) Denial by defendant of plaintiff's right—What is, competent to start time running—Illustrative cases ... A 120 N 31
 - (i) For ascertaining what the titles of parties over lands in mahal are—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
 - (j) For declaration brought after testator's death that mutation in favour of defendant is wrong and does not affect rights of plaintiff—Limitation—Whether Limitation Act, Art. 120 or Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, Art. 1, applies ... A 120 N 31
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- (u) For declaration of title to property A 120 N 31
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- (z⁹) For setting aside will—Limitation A 120 N 31
- (z¹⁰) Limitation
- (i) For suit not governed by Articles 11, 11-A, 92, 93, 118, 119, 125 A 120 N 31
- (ii) Starting point A 120 N 31

Suit—Declaratory suit—(Contd.)

- (z¹¹) Plaintiff holding occupancy land—Application by plaintiff to Collector under Bombay Land Revenue Code, S. 63, for grant of occupancy of the land on ground that land is alluvial—Collector disposing of the land to another person holding that land is not alluvial—Suit by plaintiff for declaration that order is null and void—Limitation ... A 120 N 8
- (z¹²) Plaintiff seeking further relief than mere declaration—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- (z¹³) Relief in declaratory suit dependent upon another relief which is time barred, whether can be obtained ... A 125 N 19
- (z¹⁴) Successive denials of plaintiff's right—Whether furnish successive causes of action ... A 120 N 31
- (z¹⁵) Time, whether runs from date of plaintiff's knowledge of denial of defendant's right ... A 120 N 31
- (z¹⁶) To declare plaintiff's rights—Anything in Land Registration Act, whether precludes declaratory suit ... A 14 N 2
- (z¹⁷) To declare that appointment of member of Temple Committee under Act 20 of 1863 by order of District Judge was invalid and for injunction to restrain him from performing duties of committee member—Suit, whether really one for setting aside order ... A 13 N 1
- (z¹⁸) To declare that defendant is not son of a particular person—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- (z¹⁹) To declare that defendants are not permanent tenants of a field and that order of revenue officer that defendants are such tenants is incorrect—Limitation ... A 120 N 8
- (z²⁰) To declare that forfeiture of plaintiff's lands attached for arrears of revenue under Bombay Land Revenue Code was illegal—Limitation ... A 15 N 1
- (z²¹) To have Municipal election declared void and contrary to law—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- (z²²) To impeach, whether necessary in respect of act void or illegal from its very inception ... A 125 N 19
- (z²³) Under Bengal Tenancy Act, S. 111-A
 (i) For declaration that plaintiff is lakbiraj raiyat and not liable to pay rent—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 50
 (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 50
- (z²⁴) Where other unnecessary, superfluous or premature reliefs are also asked—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- (z²⁵) Where suit which really is one for declaration is framed as one for possession—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- (z²⁶) Whether one for possession ... A 135 N 3
- (z²⁷) Whether suit is one for mere declaration or for other relief, how to ascertain ... A 120 N 31
- Dismissal for default—Restoration—Suit, if only continuation of old suit ... S 3 N 32
- Dismissal of
 (a) On ground of limitation ... S 3 N 35
 (b) Setting aside—Application for, by assignee or receiver of insolvent
 ... A 172, A 172 N 1; A 172 N 3
 ... A 172 N 2
 ... virtue of S. 5, Lim. Act ... A 172 N 3

Suit—(Contd.)

- For compensation for act not actionable without special damage
- (a) Act done by local authority in pursuance of statutory powers
—Starting point under Art. 2 will be postponed to the time when injury results ... S 24 N 1
 - (b) Action for slander, whether within S. 24 ... S 24 N 1
 - (c) Application under S. 235, Companies Act, for compensation for misfeasance of directors—S. 24, if applies ... S 24 N 1
 - (d) Effect of S. 24 on Art. 36 ... S 24 N 1
 - (e) Limitation to be computed from the time when the injury results ... S 24
 - (f) One person entrusting money with another to be paid by the latter to the former's mortgagee—Failure to pay within a reasonable time—Cause of action for compensation arises when damages are suffered ... S 24 N 2
 - (g) Owner of sub-soil digging coal without causing any immediate apparent injury to surface—Surface ultimately subsiding—Suit by owner of surface—Limitation runs from time of subsidence ... S 24
 - (h) Plaintiff's trap falling against road gravel heaped owing to wrongful omission of defendant District Board—Plaintiff injuring himself and having to get his leg amputated subsequently—Suit for damages—S. 24 does not apply ... S 24 N 1
 - S 24 N 2
 - S 24 N 3
 - ults ... S 24 N 5
 - misfeasance ... S 24 N 1
 - ences ... A 102 N 3
- For declaration of recurring right—Limitation ... A 8
- For price of food or drink sold by keeper of hotel, tavern or lodging house—Limitation ... A 8
- For price of lodging
- (a) Cause of action, when price becomes payable ... A 9 N 1
 - (b) Distinguished from suit for rent ... A 9 N 1; A 110
 - (c) Limitation ... A 9 N 1
- For recovery of gharwara dues—Limitation ... A 120 N 39
- For wages—See under Wages.
- Institution of
- (a) After expiry of period of limitation—Effect ... S 3
 - (b) After time—Delay, if can be excused ... S 5 N 3 F N 1
 - (c) By pauper, when effected ... S 3
 - of ... S 3 N 5
 - institution ... S 3 N 5
 - (f) Delay in filing certificate under Pensions Act—Effect ... S 3 N 5
 - (g) Plaintiff re-presented in another Court—Effect ... S 3 N 5
 - (h) Presentation of plaintiff by duly authorized person—Necessity of ... S 3 N 5
 - (i) Presentation of plaintiff in manner prescribed by Civil Procedure Code—Necessity of ... S 3 N 5
 - (j) Presentation of plaintiff in Court having no jurisdiction—Effect ... S 3 N 5
 - (k) Presentation of plaintiff with insufficient court-fee, if valid ... S 3 N 5

Surety

- Co-surety—Right of contribution between—Basis of ... A 82 N 1
- For debt due on promissory note—Suit against—Limitation ... A 73 N 2
- For instalment bond with default clause—Suit against—Limitation ...
- Starting point ... A 75 N 14
- For judgment-debtor ...
- (a) Whether can plead uncertified adjustment made by him ... A 174 N 4
- (b) Whether can plead uncertified payment made by him ... A 174 N 4
- In respect of mortgage debt ...
- (a) Payment by surety to creditor ...
- (i) Remedies of surety in respect of principal debtor ... A 81 N 6
- (ii) Suit by surety to enforce promise to indemnify implied by virtue of Contract Act, S. 145—Limitation ... A 81 N 6
- (iii) Suit by surety to enforce rights under Contract Act, S. 145—Limitation ... A 81 N 6
- Joint promisor of promissory note, whether surety for the other .. A 81 N 2
- Liability of ...
- (a) Extent of ... A 110 N 10
- (b) Suit to enforce, against surety who has guaranteed payment of amount borrowed by debtor—Limitation ... A 115 N 3
- (c) Where lessee continues in possession after expiry of lease for fixed term ... A 110 N 10
- Meaning of ... A 81 N 2
- Of mortgagor—Suit against—Whether one to enforce payment of money charged on immovable property within Art. 132 ... A 132 N 13
- Rights of ...
- (a) Against co-surety before payment by surety in excess of his share of debt due ... A 82 N 2
- (b) When creditor's rights against principal debtor is barred by limitation ... A 81 N 4
- Suit against ...
- (a) By creditor—Limitation ... A 83 N 10
- (b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 57 N 2
- (c) Whether barred merely by reason that principal debt is barred under Art. 59 ... A 59 N 3
- (d) Whether one on the loan ... A 59 N 3
- Suit by ...
- (a) Against co-surety and creditor where plaintiff is threatened by creditor with action for more than his share of debt due—Suit to obtain order upon co-surety to pay his proportion to creditor—Limitation ... A 82 N 2
- (b) Against co-surety for contribution—Limitation ... A 82; A 82 N 1
- (c) Against principal debtor ...
- (i) By surety who does not himself pay the creditor but is compelled to make contribution to co-surety who has paid the creditor—Limitation ... A 81 N 3
- (ii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 81; A 81 N 5
- (iii) To enforce rights which surety acquires under Contract Act, S. 140, by paying to creditor—Limitation: ... A 81 N 1

Tax

- House tax—Suit for, by municipality—Limitation ... A 120 N 43
- Latrine tax—Suit for, by municipality—Limitation ... A 120 N 43
- Money due as—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 43

Surety

- Co-surety—Right of contribution between—Basis of . . . A 82 N 1
- For debt due on promissory note—Suit against—Limitation . . . A 73 N 2
- For instalment bond with default clause—Suit against—Limitation . . .
- Starting point . . . A 75 N 14
- For judgment-debtor . . .
- (a) Whether can plead uncertified adjustment made by him . . . A 174 N 4
- (b) Whether can plead uncertified payment made by him . . . A 174 N 4
- In respect of mortgage debt . . .
- (a) Payment by surety to creditor . . .
- (i) Remedies of surety in respect of principal debtor . . . A 81 N 6
- (ii) Suit by surety to enforce promise to indemnify implied by virtue of Contract Act, S. 145—Limitation . . . A 81 N 6
- (iii) Suit by surety to enforce rights under Contract Act, S. 145—Limitation . . . A 81 N 6
- Joint promisor of promissory note, whether surety for the other . . . A 81 N 2
- Liability of . . .
- (a) Extent of . . . A 110 N 10
- (b) Suit to enforce, against surety who has guaranteed payment of amount borrowed by debtor—Limitation . . . A 115 N 3
- (c) Where lessee continues in possession after expiry of lease for fixed term . . . A 110 N 10
- Meaning of . . . A 81 N 2
- Of mortgagor—Suit against—Whether one to enforce payment of money charged on immovable property within Art. 132 . . . A 132 N 13
- Rights of . . .
- (a) Against co-surety before payment by surety in excess of his share of debt due . . . A 82 N 2
- (b) When creditor's rights against principal debtor is barred by limitation . . . A 81 N 4
- Suit against . . .
- (a) By creditor—Limitation . . . A 83 N 10
- (b) Limitation—Starting point . . . A 57 N 2
- (c) Whether barred merely by reason that principal debt is barred under Art. 59 . . . A 59 N 3
- (d) Whether one on the loan . . . A 59 N 3
- Suit by . . .
- (a) Against co-surety and creditor where plaintiff is threatened by creditor with action for more than his share of debt due—Suit to obtain order upon co-surety to pay his proportion to creditor—Limitation . . . A 82 N 2
- (b) Against co-surety for contribution—Limitation . . . A 82; A 82 N 1
- (c) Against principal debtor . . .
- (i) By surety who does not himself pay the creditor but is compelled to make contribution to co-surety who has paid the creditor—Limitation . . . A 81 N 3
- (ii) Limitation—Starting point . . . A 81; A 81 N 5
- (iii) To enforce rights which surety acquires under Contract Act, S. 140, by paying to creditor—Limitation: . . . A 81 N 1

Tax

- House tax—Suit for, by municipality—Limitation . . . A 120 N 43
- Latrine tax—Suit for, by municipality—Limitation . . . A 120 N 43
- Money'due as—Suit for—Limitation . . . A 120 N 43

Tax—(Contd.)

—Profession tax under Town Improvements Act—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation	A 120 N 43
—Property tax—Recovery of—Limitation—Under Madras District Municipalities Act	A 132 N 2
—Statutes of—Government, whether exempt from statutes of taxes...	A 149 N 3
—Taxes illegally collected—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation—Special Art. 16 and general Art. 62, applicability of	A 62 N 23
—Terminal tax—Recovery of—Suit for, by Municipality—Limitation	A 120 N 43

Tenancy

—Determination of				
(a) By abandonment	A 139 N 10
(b) By forfeiture	A 139 N 9
(c) By notice to quit	A 139 N 7
(d) By surrender	A 139 N 8
(e) Modes of—Illustrative cases	A 139 N 5a
—Forfeiture of—Tenancy how forfeited	A 143 N 4
—Permanent tenancy				
(a) Determination of—Mode of	A 139 N 17
(b) Plea of, in suit for ejectment—Burden of proof	A 139 N 17
—Tenancy at will—Determination of—Mode of	A 139 N 16
—Tenancy by sufferance				
(a) Claim of landlord against tenant, when one for rent	A 110 N 4
(b) What is	A 110 N 4
—Tenancy for term of years—Determination of—Modes of	A 139 N 6
—Tenancy right—Whether can be acquired by adverse possession	A 139 N 14

Tenant—See also Landlord and tenant.

—Acquiring title to property under S. 28, Limitation Act—Suit by, against landlord for possession—Limitation	A 139 N 5
—Acquisition of higher right by—Tenant after determination of tenancy claiming to be permanent tenant—Whether can acquire right of full owner after 12 years	A 139 N 11
—Alienation of—Suit against, by landlord for possession				
(a) On determination of tenancy by forfeiture by alienation—Suit under T. P. Act, S. 111—Limitation	A 143 N 5
(b) On ground of breach of condition of non-alienation—Limitation	A 143 N 2; A 143 N 5
(c) On ground of forfeiture by alienation—Limitation	A 143 N 2; A 143 N 5
—Encroachment by				
(a) On adjoining land belonging to third party—Benefit of encroachment, who receives	A 139 N 19
(b) On adjoining property of third party—Tenant, whether liable to pay additional rent after adverse possession for statutory period	A 139 N 19
(c) On landlord's property—Tenant, whether acquires by prescription same rights of tenancy as he had over lands originally demised	A 139 N 19
(d) On other property of landlord				
(i) Tenant, whether can acquire by prescription higher title over land encroached than he had over land originally demised	A 139 N 19
(ii) Tenant, whether can prescribe to hold encroached land without additional liability for rent	A 139 N 19

Tenant—(Contd.)

- Misuse of land by, contrary to terms of *kabuliyat*—Misuse, whether perversion of property by person who having right to use property for specific purposes, perverts it to other purposes ... A 32 N 4
- Possession of
 - (a) Nature of, after determination of tenancy ... A 139 N 13
 - (b) Nature of, during tenancy ... A 139 N 12
 - (c) Possession of tenant holding over after determination of tenancy, whether adverse to landlord ... A 139 N 2
- Sub-tenant required to pay to landlord rent payable by tenant—Failure of sub-tenant to pay—Tenant paying off rent—Suit by tenant against sub-tenant for re-imbursement—Limitation ... A 61 N 10
- Suit against, by landlord : *See under Landlord.* ...
- Tenant-at-will
 - (a) And trespasser, distinguished ... A 139 N 16
 - (b) Possession of—Nature of ... A 139 N 16
- Tenants-in-common : *See also under Co-sharers.*
 - (a) Heir of—Suit by, for partition against heir of another tenant-in-common—Limitation ... A 127 N 6
 - (b) Suit by, against another tenant-in-common for recovery of money received by latter in excess of his share—Limitation; ... A 120 N 23
- Whether can acquire during tenancy any title by prescription adverse to that of landlord and inconsistent with real legal relation between them ... A 139 N 12
- Who is
 - (a) Representative of deceased life tenant, whether tenant ... A 139 N 4b
 - (b) Within Art. 139 ... A 139 N 4b

Tenure

- Meaning of ... A 121 N 3
- Tenure holder—Meaning of ... A 121 N 3

Thavanal

- Deposit on—Interest upon—Limitation ... A 63 N 5
- Money invested on—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 115 N 3

Title

- Acquisition of
 - (a) By adverse possession against Government
 - (i) Burden of proof ... A 149 N 9
 - (ii) Manner of ... A 149 N 9
 - (b) By possession ... Preamble
- Covenant for
 - (a) Breach of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 67 N 7
 - (b) Whether contract of indemnity ... A 83 N 7
- Declaration of—Suit for—Plaintiff in possession of land regarding which declaration is required—Limitation—Statute of, whether does not apply ... A 120 N 31
- Denial of landlord's title
 - (a) Forfeiture by—Suit for possession on ground of—Limitation : ... A 143 N 6
 - (b) When amounts to forfeiture ... A 143 N 6
 - (c) Whether makes tenant's possession during tenancy adverse to landlord ... A 139 N 12
- Loss of—Indemnity against
 - (a) Express covenant for—Breach of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 63 N 7

Title—Loss of, indemnity against—(Contd.)

- (b) Express registered covenant for—Breach of—Suit for—
—Limitation ... A 83 N 7
- Of parties over lands in mahal—Ascertainment of—Suit for
—Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- Suit for ...
- (a) In respect of properties relating to which order of Insolvency
Court left open question of title—Order, whether must be
set aside prior to suit for title ... A 13 N 1
- (b) Prior order passed under Presidency Small Cause Courts
Act, Chap. 7, whether decision or order on question of title
which must be set aside before suing for title ... A 13 N 1
- To property—Declaration of—Suit for ...
- (a) Government through its officers asserting claim to property
—Limitation ... A 120 N 6
- (b) Limitation ... A 120 N 31
- To property in *custodia legis*—Declaration of—Suit for—Liml.
tation—Starting point ... A 120 N 3

Tort

- Continuing wrong—Fresh period of limitation begins to run at
every moment of time during which wrong continues ... S 23
- False imprisonment: *See*—False imprisonment
- Joint tortfeasors—Suit against ...
- (a) Limitation ... A 19 N 8
- (b) Nature of suit—Whether action for compensation for con-
spiracy to cause damage is proper remedy ... A 19 N 8
- Malicious abuse of process and false imprisonment, distinction
between ... A 19 N 1
- Malicious prosecution: *See* Malicious Prosecution.
- ... 1 ... S 7 N 28
- ... 7 ... S 7 N 28
- Several persons entitled to sue in respect of tort done to them
jointly—Necessary parties to suit for damages ... S 22 N 24
- Suit founded upon—Limitation, whether same as limitation
applicable to suit founded upon contract ... A 116 N 1
- Suit in, for ejection of tenant—Limitation ... A 143 N 2
- Wrongful restraint: *See* Wrongful restraint

Trade-mark

- Infringement of ...
- (a) Suit for restraining defendant from—Limitation—Starting
point ... A 120 N 10
- (b) Whether a continuing wrong so long as infringement conti-
nues ... S 23 N 18

Transactions

- Voidable transactions—Illustrations ... A 97 N 8

Transfer

- By mahant of math—Whether binding on succeeding mahants ... A 91 N 10
- By trustee of temple—Whether binding on succeeding trustees ... A 91 N 10
- For valuable consideration ...
- (a) Lease, whether transfer for valuable consideration within
Art. 134-B ... A 134ABO N 7
- (b) Mortgage, whether transfer for valuable consideration: ... A 134ABO N 7

Transfer—(Contd.)

- Fraudulent and collusive transfer by judgment-debtor—Possession of transferee, whether possession of judgment-debtor ... A 138 N 6
- Fraudulent transfer—Suit for refund of money advanced on such transfer—Limitation applicable ... A 95 N 11
- In fraud of creditor—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation ... A 95 N 8a; A 120 N 23
- Nominal transfer, whether transfer within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 8
- Of immovable property by revenue authorities for arrears of Government revenue—Setting aside—Suit for, against Government—Limitation ... A 15
- Of property
 - (a) By
 - ... Buddhist ... A 44 N 6
 - law ... A 44 N 6
 - (iii) Whether binding on minor under Hindu law ... A 44 N 6
 - (iv) Whether binding on minor under Mahomedan law ... A 44 N 6
 - (b) By guardian
 - (i) Minor having no present interest in property—Suit in respect of, by ward—Limitation ... A 44 N 4
 - (ii) Not as the property of minor but as his own—Setting aside, suit for—By minor—Limitation ... A 44 N 5
 - (iii) Transfer binding on ward unless and until set aside—Illustrations ... A 44 N 3
 - (iv) Transfer not binding on ward—Illustrations ... A 44 N 3
 - (c) By person other than guardian—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation ... A 44 N 5
 - (d) Transfer ab initio void or otherwise not binding on plaintiff—Whether need and can be set aside—Remedies of plaintiff: ... A 44 N 2
 - (e) Void transfer
 - (i) Consideration paid in respect of—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 62 N 5
 - (ii) What is ... A 44 N 3
 - (f) When can be set aside... A 44 N 2
- Void in law—Delivery of possession of property transferred in return of money payment—Such transfer, whether existing consideration in suit for recovery of money paid on existing consideration which afterwards fails ... A 97 N 3
- Void promise to transfer property in return of money payment—Possession of property under such promise, whether existing consideration in suit for money paid on existing consideration which afterwards fails ... A 97 N 3
- Void transfer with delivery of possession—Money paid on
 - (a) Remedies of person paying such money ... A 97 N 7
 - (b) Suit for
 - (i) Limitation—Starting point ... A 97 N 7
 - (ii) Where in execution of decree by third person with paramount title against plaintiff, such third person is formally put in possession of property purchased by plaintiff—Limitation—Starting point ... A 97 N 7
- Void transfer without possession—Money paid on—Remedies ... A 97 N 6

Transfer—(Contd.)

—Voidable transfer

- (a) With possession—Money paid on—Suit for—Limitation—
Starting point—Illustrative cases ... A 97 N 9
- (b) Without possession—Money paid on—Suit for ... A 97 N 8
- ... Court ... A 97 N 8
- ... joint... A 97 N 8
- () ... second ...
- ... Court reverses it which in its turn is reversed by High Court—Limitation—Starting point ... A 97 N 8
- (iv) Whether one for money paid on existing consideration which afterwards fails ... A 97 N 8

Transfer of Property Act

—Section 53

- (a) Alienation voidable under—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation ... A 91 N 14
- (b) Suit under, by creditor defrauded by transfer—Limitation ... A 95 N 8a
- S. 60—Provision of, as to accrual of right of redemption before amendment of the Section by Act 20 of 1929 ... A 148 N 18
- S. 62—Provision of, as to right of redemption ... A 148 N 18
- S. 68—Suit under, for recovery of money—Limitation ... A 82 N 7
- S. 92—Effect of amendment of S. 92 by Act 20 of 1929 ... A 148 N 8
- Section 111—Forfeiture by tenant under—Determination of tenancy upon—Suit on, for possession—Limitation ... A 143 N 2; A 143 N 4
- Section 119—Suit under, for possession, on ground of breach of condition—Limitation ... A 143 N 13

Transferee

- From Hindu or Muhammadan entitled to possession on death of Hindu or Muhammadan female—Suit by, for possession—Limitation—Starting point ... A 141 N 8
- Of execution purchaser—Application by, for delivery of possession—Limitation ... A 180 N 8
- Of Government—Suit against, for possession on ground that plaintiff had acquired prescriptive title against Government—Nature of proof so as to bring case under Art. 149 ... A 149 N 7

Trees

—Price of—Suit for

- (a) For possession of tree standing on defendant's land which defendant has sold to plaintiff—Limitation applicable, whether same as applicable to suit for price of trees ... A 55 N 1
- (b) Limitation—Where no fixed period of credit is agreed upon : ... A 55
- (c) Whether one for price of goods sold and delivered ... A 55 N 1
- Standing trees—Whether immovable property ... A 55 N 1

Trespass

- Each act of trespass, if gives new cause of action for proceeding to restrain trespass ... S 23 N 20
- Meaning of ... A 39 N 2
- On property to possession of which another has exclusive right—Trespass, if a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 16
- Throwing of stones or building a wall or planting posts or rails on another's land and leaving them there—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 16

Trespass—(Contd.)**—Upon immovable property****(a) Compensation for—Suit for**

- (i) Against person carrying away crops on plaintiff's lands and converting them to his use—Suit based upon conversion or trespass—Limitation ... A 39 N 7
- (ii) For damages for mischief which trespasser commits after entering on the land—Limitation ... A 39 N 2
- (iii) For mesne profits for period between date of institution of suit and date of obtaining ejectment decree against defendant—Defendant receiving no profits during such period—Claim for mesne profits, whether essentially one for damages for trespass upon immovable property ... A 39 N 3
- (iv) In absence of proof of plaintiff's possession being disturbed—Maintainability ... A 39 N 4
- (v) Limitation—Starting point ... A 39; A 39 N 11
- (vi) Owner of adjoining coal mine taking coal from under plaintiff's land—Relief claimed in respect of coal taken and utilized or in respect of trespass—Limitation: A 39 N 5

(b) Entry above surface of land, whether in itself actionable trespass ... A 39 N 6**(c) Entry beneath surface, whether actionable trespass ... A 39 N 6****(d) Placing things on land, whether trespass ... A 39 N 6****(e) Re-entry by owner****(i) Liability of owner, where re-entry is forcible ... A 39 N 8****(ii) Liability of owner, where re-entry is peaceful ... A 39 N 8****(f) Seizure of well, whether trespass ... A 39 N 9****(g) What is ... A 39 N 4****—Upon moveable property—Compensation for—Suit for—Limitation ... A 39 N 2****—Upon person—Compensation for—Suit for—Limitation ... A 39 N 2****—Whether continuing wrong ... A 39 N 9****Trespasser****—And tenant-at-will, distinguished ... A 139 N 16****Trust****—Breach of****(a) Suit for damages for breach of trust in management of trust property—Limitation ... A 120 N 4****(b) Suit to make good loss out of general estate of deceased trustee****(i) Article 98 and S. 10 distinguished—Whether S. 10 prevails over Art. 98 where suit is covered by both : A 98 N 1****(ii) Joint family properties of father and sons which pass by survivorship to sons, whether general estate ... A 98 N 3****(iii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 98; A 98 N 1; A 98 N 4****(iv) "Loss"—Meaning of ... A 98 N 2****(v) Suit against sons to recover loss from joint family property, whether suit within meaning of Art. 98 ... A 98 N 3****—By operation of law—Whether trust for specific purpose within S. 10 ... S 10 N 7****—Cestui que trust—Suit by, for recovery of possession of trust property against transferee of trustee for valuable consideration—See under Trust.**

Trust—(Contd.)

—Constructive trust

(a) Money which ought to be received by one, received by another—Latter only constructive trustee for former . . . S 10 N 7

(b) Partition between two persons—Debt due from stranger allotted to one—Debt received by the other—Latter constructive trustee for former . . . S 10 N 7

(c) Whether trust for specific purpose within S. 10 . . . S 10 N 7

—Creation of . . . S 2 Cl 11 N 1

—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation . . . A 120 N 4

—Execution of—All trustees, if must join in execution of trust . . . S 7 N 25

—Express trust

(a) Created by deposit—Suit for—Limitation . . . A 60 N 2

(b) Deposit of money with person standing in fiduciary relation—Intention to vest ownership in depositor—Trust for specific purpose, if created . . . S 10 N 18

(c) Deposit of specific moveable property with another for specific purpose—Understanding that it must be returned to depositor in specie—Depositor, if trustee for specific purpose . . . S 10 N 19

(d) East India Company entering into agreement with creditors of Native Raj to pay them debts—Properties of Raj taken over by company—Agreement to set apart sufficient portion of revenue for payment of debts—Arrangement, if creates trust for specific purpose . . . S 10 N 13

(e) Executor, if trustee for specific purpose . . . S 10 N 16

(f) Form of—No particular form necessary to create it . . . S 10 N 8

(g) Illustrations . . . S 10 N 11, 13

(b) Meaning of . . . S 10 N 7

(i) Alleged trustee must be owner of property to which trust relates—Illustrations . . . S 10 N 9

(ii) Bridegroom's father making over money at time of betrothal to be kept by the bride's father as fund constituting her dowry—Trust for specific purpose, if created . . . S 10 N 13

(iii) Deposit of money by one person with another—Latter constituted owner of money and entitled to use it subject to liability of returning an equivalent sum to depositor—Transaction, if amounts to trust . . . S 10 N 18

(iv) Mortgagee in possession after mortgage has been discharged, if express trustee . . . S 10 N 14

(v) Obligation arising by operation of law, whether express trust . . . S 10 N 11

(vi) Obligation based on confidence raised by implication of law—Whether express trust . . . S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

... .. S 10 N 11

(i) One person handing over money to another to carry on money-lending business in his own name but for former's . . . S 10 N 13

... .. S 10 N 13

... .. S 10 N 13

Trust—Express trust—(Contd.)

- (k) Person to whom letters of administration to estate are granted—Whether a trustee for a specific purpose . . . S 10 N 16
- (l) Property specifically transferred to person to be held by him in trust for idol or religious institution—Trust for specific purpose, if constituted . . . S 10 N 25
- (m) Suit against express trustees—Limitation—English law . . . S 10 N 1
- (n) Suit against express trustees and their representatives
- (i) By one co-trustee against another—Whether within S. 10 . . . S 10 N 24
- (ii) By present trustee against a past trustee—Whether within S. 10 . . . S 10 N 24
- (iii) Limitation . . . S 10
- (iv) Plaintiff, if must be a beneficiary under the trust for benefit of provisions of S. 10 . . . S 10 N 24
- (v) Provisions of S. 10—Persons entitled to benefit of . . . S 10 N 24
- (vi) Total exemption from limitation . . . S 10 N 3
- (o) Suit against legal representative of trustee for following in his hands trust property or its proceeds or for an account of such property or proceeds—Limitation . . . S 10 N 3
- (p) Suit against legal representatives and assigns—Assignment for valuable consideration—Meaning of
- (i) Gift of temple property in consideration of services to be performed—Whether assignment for consideration . . . S 10 N 21
- (ii) Whether includes mortgage, lease, exchange and purchase in execution . . . S 10 N 21
- (q) Suit for following trust property—"Following trust property"—Meaning of . . . S 10 N 22
- (r) Transfer of property by one to another without declaring trust but without intending transfer should be for his benefit—Latter, if express trustee . . . S 10 N 7
- (s) Transfer of property by trustee—Limitation—S. 10 and Art. 134 to 134-C, distinguished . . . A 134 N 6
- (t) Transferee of trust property—Suit against—S. 10, applicability of . . . S 10 N 21
- (u) Trust for specific purpose—Meaning of . . . S 10 N 7
- (i) Failure or avoidance of trust and resulting trust in favour of another—Such trust, if for specific purpose . . . S 10 N 7
- (ii) Person purchasing property contracted to be sold to another, with notice of contract—Trust arising by operation of law—Whether trust for a specific purpose . . . S 10 N 7
- (iii) Purposes specified in instrument not adequate to exhaust property transferred in trust—Trust in respect of the balance, if a trust for a specific purpose : . . . S 10 N 7
- Invalid trust—Government promissory notes conveyed on—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation—Starting point . . . A 120 N 4
- Legal representative in S. 10, if refers to person succeeding to deceased trustee's office as trustee . . . S 10 N 20
- Meaning of . . . S 2 Cl 11 N 1
- (a) If confined to express trusts . . . S 2 Cl 11 N 1
- (b) Shebait of idol, mahant of mutt and dharmakarta of temple—Whether trustees within S. 10 . . . S 10 N 6

Trust—Meaning of—(Contd.)

- (c) Trust created but duly revoked—Whether trust within S. 10 ... S 10 N 6
- (d) 'Trust' in S. 10, meaning of ... S 10 N 6
- (e) Trustee himself partly entitled to benefit of trust—Transaction, if a trust ... S 10 N 8
- (f) Under Limitation Act ... A 134 N 4
- One person transferring property to another in trust for himself for purpose of discharging his debts—Transferee, if under obligation to hold estate for benefit of transferor's creditors ... S 10 N 10
- Owner of property must be under obligation to hold it for another's benefit ... S 10 N 10
- Right to manage—Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
- Subject of
 - (a) Limited interest in property—Whether can be subject of a trust ... S 10 N 4
 - (b) Mere right to possession—Whether may be subject of trust : S 10 N 5
- Suit by trustees of mosque against manager for his removal—Manager making claim for money due to him—Court finding money was due to him—Payment of part of the dues—Appeal by trustees—Suit dismissed for non-joinder of other trustees—Manager's suit for recovery of balance due—Period of the prior litigation started by trustees, whether can be excluded in computing period of limitation therefor ... S 14 N 10
- Suit for accounts—Whether suit is one for following trust property within S. 10 ... S 10 N 23
- Suit for following trust property
 - (a) Suit against trustee for remuneration for services rendered by plaintiff in connexion with the purposes of the trust—Whether within S. 10 ... S 10 N 22
 - (b) Suit by plaintiff as third person against trustee for recovery of monies due to plaintiff out of trust funds—S. 10, if applies ... S 10 N 22
 - (c) Suit for accounts against trustee, whether suit within S. 10 : S 10 N 23
 - (d) Suit for charging certain properties with certain alleged specific trust—Whether within S. 10 ... S 10 N 23
 - (e) Suit for removal of trustee and appointment of fresh trustees—S. 10, if applies ... S 10 N 23
 - (f) Suit to recover from trustee trust property misappropriated by him—Whether within S. 10 ... S 10 N 23
 - (g) T ... S 10 N 22
- (h) Trust properties not removed for purposes of the trust—Suit to establish plaintiff's right to office of trustee—S. 10, if applies ... S 10 N 22
- Suit for recovery of trust property from strangers who have acquired possession by dispossessing trustees—Limitation ... S 10 N 27
- Trust property
 - (a) Alienation of—Invalidity of—Suit for declaration—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
 - (b) Alliance of—Suit against, for possession—Limitation ... A 124 N 2

Trust—Trust property—(Contd.)

- (c) Consisting of sum of money—Recovery of—Suit for, by trustee against legal representatives of co-trustee—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
- (d) Mortgage of—Suit to eject mortgagee on ground that mortgage is invalid—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
- (e) Pledged with Bank—Recovery of—Suit for, by beneficiary—Limitation ... A 48-A N 3
- A 134 N 3
- A 134 N 12
- (in) For declaration that sale by trustee is invalid—Suit, whether one for possession within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 1
- (iv) For possession against auction purchaser in court sale of trust property—Limitation ... A 134 N 9
- A 134 N 5
- A 134 N 7
- Limitation ... A 134 N 1
- (viii) For possession of property nominally transferred—Suit, whether competent to attract operation of Art. 134: ... A 134 N 8
- (ix) For possession of property permanently leased by trustee—Limitation applicable, whether same applicable to suit for possession of trust property transferred for valuable consideration ... A 134 N 1
- (x) Good faith of transferee, whether must be proved ... A 134 N 10
- (xi) Limitation—Starting point: A 134, A 134 N 1; A 134 N 12, A 134 N 16
- (xii) Object of prescribing short period of limitation for such suit ... A 134 N 2
- (xiii) Right to sue barred under previous Acts, whether revived under amended Act ... A 134 N 16
- (xiv) Subsequent knowledge on part of transferee of transferor's right, whether will prevent time running in favour of transferee ... A 134 N 10
- (xv) "When transfer becomes known to plaintiff"—Burden ... A 134 N 16
- ... property is ... A 134 N 2
- ... A 60 N 2

Trustee**—Assignee from, for consideration—Suit against**

- (a) Applicability of S. 10, Limitation Act ... A 142 & 144 N 47
- (b) Limitation ... A 142 & 144 N 47

—Constructive trustee

- (a) Benamidar, if constructive trustee ... S 10 N 15
- (b) Constructive trustee purporting to be in possession of property on behalf of person for whose benefit he is constructive trustee—Suit for possession against constructive trustee—Limitation, when begins ... S 10 N 29

Trustee—Constructive trustee—(Contd.)

- (c) Debtor of testator becoming executor under his will—Whether a constructive trustee ... S 10 N 16
- (d) Suit against, based on breach of constructive trust — Every fresh breach gives new cause of action for suit ... S 10 N 28
- Co. trustee—Suit by ...
- (a) To enforce claim for contribution against estate of deceased trustee ...
- (i) Limitation—Starting point... A 100; A 100 N 2
- (ii) Right of contribution — Basis of—When arises ... A 100 N 1
- (iii) Where one trustee is less guilty than another and has to refund the loss—Limitation ... A 100 N 1
- (b) To enforce claim for contribution against living trustee — Limitation ... A 100 N 1
- Co. trustees — Co. trustees entitled to manage trust by rotation — One trustee managing trust to the exclusion of others — Possession of such trustee, whether adverse to co-trustees excluded from management of trust ... A 124 N 9
- Devolution of right to sue ... S 2 Cl 8 N 6
- Express trustee—Who is—Executor, whether express trustee ... A 123 N 8
- Female trustee—Estate of—Possession of — Suit for, by trustee in succession—Limitation ... A 141 N 10
- Husband appointed executor of wife's will by which she bequeaths her right to dower to certain persons, whether trustee in respect of such dower debt ... A 103 N 8
- Joint trustees—One joint trustee, if can give discharge on behalf of all joint trustees ... S 7 N 25
- Lambardar is not a trustee for co-sharers ... A 142 & 144 N 35
- Liable to account for an account and ascertainment of dues—Equitable claim against—Limitation ... A 62 N 9
- Meaning of ... S 2 Cl 11
- (a) Benamidar, if trustee ... S 2 Cl 11
- (b) Mortgagee remaining in possession after mortgage has been satisfied, if trustee ... S 2 Cl 11; S 2 Cl 11 N 3
- (c) Wrongdoer in possession without title, if trustee: S 2 Cl 11; S 2 Cl 11 N 4
- Money of, spent for purposes of trust—Suit for—Limitation ... A 132 N 8
- Of temple ...
- (a) Office of, falling vacant—Temple properties taken possession of by strangers during interval until appointment of new trustee—Cause of action of new trustee to recover properties—When arises ... S 9 N 7
- (b) Transfer by—Whether binding on succeeding trustees ... A 91 N 10
- Office of—Suit for possession of—Limitation ...
- (a) Where office is hereditary ... A 124 N 2
- (b) Where office is non-hereditary ... A 124 N 2
- Omission of trustee to collect moneys due to trust—Loss sustained by trust—Suit against trustee to make good the loss—Limitation —Starting point ... A 120 N 4
- Owner of mere right to possession—When can be a trustee ... S 10 N 5
- Person in possession as—Whether can prescribe to hereditary trusteeship ... A 124 N 6
- Person in possession having no right to possession but in possession merely as manager or agent of another—Whether trustee ... S 10 N 5

Trustee—(Contd.)

- Religious endowment—Manager of, not a trustee in the strict sense: A 142 & 144 N 49
 - Succeeding trustee—Whether bound by order respecting trust property against preceding trustee ... A 47 N 4a
 - Suit against
 - (a) Based upon malfeasance—Limitation ... A 36 N 8
 - (b) Based upon misfeasance—Limitation ... A 36 N 8
 - (c) Based upon nonfeasance—Limitation ... A 36 N 8
 - (d) By succeeding trustee for sum taken for litigation expenses—Limitation ... A 61 N 3
 - (e) For accounts of trust property and recovery of dues—Limitation ... A 62 N 4
 - (f) Where trustee is liable in equity to account for a particular fund—Limitation—Starting point ... A 120 N 4
 - Suit by
 - (a) Against legal representatives of co-trustee—For recovery of trust property consisting of sum of money—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
 - (b) For monies due to trustee—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
 - (c) For recovery of certain sum of money from former trustee taken by him from trustee—Limitation ... A 120 N 4
 - Transferee of—Auction purchaser in Court sale of trust property, whether transferee of trustee for valuable consideration ... A 134 N 9
 - Trustee *de son tort*
 - (a) Meaning of ... S 10 N 17
 - (b) Suit against—By *cestui que trust* for profits—Limitation ... A 109 N 5
 - (c) Whether trustee for specific purpose ... S 10 N 17
 - Trustee for specific purpose—Family arrangement—Arrangement that a sum of money should be placed with a person to discharge debts of one member and pay balance to him—Hundi given to that person and cashed—Such person, if trustee for specific purpose ... S 10 N 13
- Under-tenures**
- Avoidance of—Suit for — Who can sue under Bengal Revenue Sales Act ... A 121 N 5
 - In estates sold for arrears of revenue—Avoidance of
 - (a) In what way effected, where under Provincial Rent and Revenue Acts such under-tenures are voidable at the option of purchaser ... A 121 N 1
 - (b) Suit for
 - (i) Burden of proof of ... A 121 N 6
 - (ii) Burden of proof that under-tenures were created subsequent to creation of estate or tenure sold, on whom lics... A 121 N 2
 - of suit ... A 121 N 2
 - (v) Suit, if necessary where under-enactments such sales render under-tenures void ... A 121 N 1
 - Whether incumbrance ... A 121 N 3
- U. P. Court of Wards Act**
- S. 52—Period got after deducting time under—Whether period prescribed within S. 19, Limitation Act ... S 19 N 12

U. P. Land Revenue Act

—Section 111—Suit under—S. 4, Limitation Act applies ... S 29 N 3

Yakil

—Application by, for costs

(a) Under Civil P. C.—Limitation ... A 84 N 4

(b) Under rules of High Court ... A 84 N 4

—Fees of—How recoverable ... A 84 N 5

—Suit by

(a) For costs

(i) Against other party according to provision of consent
decree—Limitation ... A 120 N 18

(ii) Against opposite party—Limitation ... A 84 N 2

(iii) Limitation—Starting point ... A 84; A 84 N 2; A 84 N 7

(iv) Where there is express agreement as to time when
costs are to be paid—Limitation ... A 84 N 2

(b) For fees and costs—Against President of Taluk Board—Limitation ... A 84 N 2

Valuable consideration

—Annual rent, whether valuable consideration ... A 134 N 1

—Gift in return of services rendered, whether valuable consideration
within Art. 134 ... A 134 N 7

—Land exchanged for another, whether valuable consideration within
Art. 134 ... A 134 N 7

Vatan

—Alienation by vatandar without sanction of Government—Assessment levied on such alienated vatan property—Whether rent ... A 110 N 3

—Maharki vatan—Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 120 N 2

—Mortgage of—Mortgage of vatan property by vatandar is valid
during his lifetime but not binding on successors ... A 148 N 9

Vendor and purchaser—See Vendor and vendee.

Vendor and Vendee

—Breach of covenant for title—Whether a continuing wrong ... S 23 N 6

—Covenant for quiet possession

(a) Meaning of ... S 23 N 7

(b) Possession given and covenantee subsequently dispossessed
—Breach of contract, if a continuing one so long as cove-
nantee remains out of possession ... S 23 N 7

(c) Possession not given in the first instance to covenantee —
Covenantee, if can sue upon the covenant ... S 23 N 7

—Devolution of right to sue ... S 2 C 18 N 7

—Ejectment suit by vendor — Wrong description of property, if can
be pleaded when suit for rectification of deed is barred ... S 3 N 15

—Failure of vendee to pay off mortgage debt as undertaken—Vendor
losing property—Suit by vendor for damages — Limitation —
Starting point ... A 83 N 7

—Lien of vendor

(a) Enforcement of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 132 N 7

(b) Vendor leaving with vendee purchase money for payment of
mortgage—Vendor, if has lien ... A 132 N 7

—Money left in hands of vendee to pay off vendor's debt

(a) Express contract of indemnity against loss caused by failure
to pay—Suit upon such contract—Limitation ... A 83 N 7

Vendor and vendee—Money left in hands of vendee to pay off vendor's debt—
(Contd.)

- (b) Express registered contract of indemnity against loss caused by failure to pay—Suit upon such contract—Limitation: A 83 N 7
- Money paid for sham sale deed, whether money paid on existing consideration in suit for money paid on existing consideration which afterwards fails A 97 N 3
- Right of vendor
- (a) To recover unpaid purchase money personally from purchaser —Basis of A 111 N 2
- (b) To unpaid purchase money by enforcing statutory charge on property sold—Limitation A 111 N 2
- Sale of immovable property
- (a) A sold half property to B but continued in possession under a rent note executed by B—A holding over after expiry and selling whole property to C—Suit by B for joint possession against C—Limitation A 142 & 144 N 52a
- (b) Property in possession of third party at date of sale—Vendor subsequently obtains possession — Vendor's possession becomes adverse against vendee from date when vendor gets possession A 142 & 144 N 52a
- (c) Vendee is entitled to possession when conveyance has been duly effected even though purchase money has not been paid A 142 & 144 N 56a
- (d) Vendor continuing in possession—Remedy of vendee: A 142 & 144 N 56a
- (e) Vendor continuing in possession—Suit by vendee for possession—Limitation A 142 & 144 N 52a
- Suit by vendee
- (a) For breach of covenant in sale deed to put vendee in possession—Limitation A 116 N 16
- (b) For compensation for breach of express or implied covenant of title in sale deed
- (i) Limitation A 116 N 16
- (ii) Where from inception of sale vendor has no title to convey and vendee has never been put in possession —Limitation—Starting point A 116 N 16
- (iii) Where title is known to be imperfect and vendee is Starting point A 116 N 15
- (e) For compensation under S. 65, Contract Act—Limitation: A 116 N 17
- (d) For possession of immovable property — When vendor was out of possession—"When vendor was out of possession," meaning of A 136 N 3
- (a) For possession of property sold by reversioner—During lifetime of widow
- (i) For possession or for refund of purchase money—Limitation A 116 N 17
- (ii) Suit after widow's death—Maintainability A 116 N 17
- (f) For possession of property sold by reversioner of Hindu A 136 N 6
- A 132 N 8

Vendor and vendee—Suit by vendee—(Contd.)

- (b) For refund of purchase money in respect of deficiency in extent of land sold, by enforcing conditions of sale ... A 65 N 1
- (i) To recover value of deficiency in property comprised in sale deed based upon covenant in registered sale deed—Limitation ... A 116 N 15

—Suit by vendor

- (a) Against vendee—On ground of vendee's failure to pay vendor's debts as contracted and for which purchase money is left in vendee's hands
- (i) Suit for compensation for breach of contract—Limitation ... A 83 N 7; A 116 N 15
- (ii) Suit on implied contract of indemnity—Limitation—Starting point ... A 83 N 7
- (b) For damages against vendee who has undertaken to pay mortgagee of vendor but fails to pay the same with result that vendor is damaged—Limitation ... A 120 N 51
- (c) For personal payment of unpaid purchase money
- (i) For amount agreed to be paid by joint owner of property as part of adjustment in allotting the shares in a partition—Limitation ... A 111 N 2
- (ii) Limitation ... A 111; A 133 N 7
- (iii) Right to enforce personal remedy based on expressed stipulation in registered sale deed—Limitation—Illustrative cases ... A 111 N 2
- (iv) Sale of minor's property by guardian—Vendee agreeing to keep purchase money in trust till minor attains majority—Death of minor before attaining majority—Suit by reversioner against vendee for recovery of amount—Suit whether for unpaid purchase money or for return of money after trust in respect of it is exhausted ... A 111 N 2
- (v) To enforce charge on property sold for unpaid purchase money—Limitation ... A 111 N 2
- (vi) Unpaid purchase money—Whether includes purchase money retained by vendee for payment to vendor's mortgagee ... A 111 N 4
- (d) For purchase money—Vendor previously refusing it before sub-registrar before whom it was tendered by vendee according to covenant in sale deed—Suit, whether one on breach of contract ... A 116 N 1
- (e) For refund of money left with vendee for paying off mortgage—Limitation ... A 132 N 7
- (f) To enforce vendor's lien for unpaid purchase money—Claim for personal decree in such suit—Limitation ... A 116 N 23
- (g) To recover peishkash paid by vendor after execution of sale deed under which vendee is bound to pay the same—Limitation ... A 116 N 15

—Suit for dispossession of vendee of occupancy rights when sale is made without landlord's written consent—Limitation ... A 120 N 2

Vendor and vendee—(Contd.)

- Vendee at private sale—Suit by, for possession of immovable property ... A 136 N 4
 ... A 136 N 4
- starting point ... A 136 N 6
 (m) Limitation—Starting point ... A 136, A 136 N 2, A 136 N 6
 (iv) Suit by purchaser from Government—Limitation ... A 136 N 4;
 A 136 N 6
- Vendee bound to pay charge on property sold — Failure of vendee to pay — Vendor paying off charge — Suit by vendor for reimbursement against vendee—Limitation ... A 61 N 7
- Vendee covenanting to pay vendor's debts—Failure of vendee to pay debts—Creditor attaching vendor's rights—Creditor, whether can enforce covenant under sale deed ... A 116 N 15
- Vendee in execution sale—Suit by—For possession of immovable property — Judgment debtor being out of possession at date of sale—Limitation ... A 137
- Vendee of Government—Suit by—For possession against person in adverse possession against Government—Limitation ... A 149 N 7
- Vendee required to pay off vendor's incumbrances—Failure of ... A 61 N 8
- to return to vendor surplus after payment to mortgagee — Suit by vendor for such surplus—Limitation—Starting point ... A 116 N 15
- “Vendor out of possession”—Meaning of ... A 136 N 3
- Vendor receiving sale price from third person but compelled to refund the same—Subsequent suit by vendor against vendee for sale price—Limitation ... A 120 N 51
- Whether includes vendor's transferee of the rights to purchase money ... A 111 N 3
- Wages**
- And salary—Distinguished ... A 7 N 2
- Claim for—Set-off, of such claim ... A 102 N 6
- Meaning of ... A 7 N 2; A 102 N 4
- (a) Emoluments attached to hereditary office, whether wages ... A 7 N 2
- (b) payment to arhaka of temple, whether wages ... A 7 N 2
- Of artisan—Suit for
- (a) “Artisan”—Meaning of ... A 7 N 5
- (b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 7, A 7 N 1; A 7 N 6
- Of household servant—Suit for
- (a) “Household servant”—Meaning of ... A 7 N 3
- (b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 7, A 7 N 1; A 7 N 6
- Of labourer—Suit for
- (a) “Labourer”—Meaning of ... A 7 N 4
- (b) Limitation—Starting point ... A 7; A 7 N 1; A 7 N 6
- Seaman's wages — Suit for
- (a) In Civil Court where claim exceeds Rs 500—Limitation ... A 101 N 3
- (b) In Court of Small Causes where claim is less than Rs. 500 —Limitation ... A 101 N 3
- (c) Limitation—Starting point ... A 7 N 1; A 101; A 101 N 4
- (d) Remedies of seaman in respect of wages ... A 101 N 3

Wages—Seaman's wages, suit for—(Contd.)

- (e) Right to seaman's wages—What is ... A 101 N 2
- (f) "Seaman"—Meaning of ... A 101 N 1
- Servants' wages as debt—Suit upon—Limitation—Acknowledgment by debtor within period prescribed by Art. 7, effect of ... A 7 N 2
- Suit for
 - (a) By archaka for emoluments of office—Limitation ... A 102 N 3
 - (b) By archaka of temple against temple trustee for perquisites received by trustee from third persons and to which plaintiff is entitled—Suit, whether one for wages ... A 7 N 2
 - (c) By bisardar i. e. watchman who is paid by share of crops he watches—Limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - (d) By cook—Limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - (e) By engineer—Limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - (f) By goldsmith to recover price of making ornaments—Limitation ... A 7 N 2
 - (g) By motor driver—Limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - (h) By one Government servant against another for recovery of sum of public money received by defendant for disbursement to plaintiff—Suit, whether one for wages ... A 7 N 2
 - (i) By person employed to help dealer in sale of goods—Limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - (j) By villago carpenter—Limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - (k) By weighman employed to work at a shop—Limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - (l) By wet-nurse—Limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - (m) For declaration of recurring right—Limitation ... A 102 N 3
 - (n) General and special provisions of limitation ... A 102 N 2
 - ... s applicable to suit to ... A 7 N 6; A 102 N 5
 - (q) Residuary provision of—Limitation ... A 131 N 3
 - (r) Parties to suit ... A 7 N 1; A 102
 - (s) Promise to ... action ... A 7 N 2
 - (t) Suit for ... servant of third person ... A 7 N 6
 - (u) Wages due by reason of recurring right—Limitation—Applicability of Art. 102 and Art. 131 ... A 102 N 2
 - (v) Wages of household servants, artisans and labourers—Limitation ... A 102 N 3

Waiver

- Burden of proof as to ... A 75 N 16
- Of forfeiture
 - (a) Effect of ... A 143 N 12
 - (b) What constitutes ... A 143 N 12
- Question of—Whether one of fact ... A 75 N 15
- What constitutes, within Art. 75 ... A 75 N 11
- What is
 - (a) Demand of overdue instalment, whether waiver within Art. 75 ... A 75 N 13
 - (b) Part payment of instalment or payment generally towards account, whether waiver within Art. 75 ... A 75 N 13
- Whether can be gathered from pleadings ... A 75 N 17
- Wajih-ul-arz**
 - Entries in—If can override law of limitation ... S 3 N 24

Ward

—Assignee of—Whether can sue to set aside transfer of property by guardian	A 44 N 7
—Burmese Buddhist ward—Property of—Transfer by de facto guardian—Whether binding on ward	A 44 N 6
—Indian Christian ward—Property of—Transfer by de facto guardian—Whether binding on ward	A 44 N 6
—Legal representative of—Suit by for setting aside transfer of property by guardian—Limitation	A 44 N 7
—Muhammadan ward—Property of—Transfer by de facto guardian—Whether binding on ward	A 44 N 6
—Property of					
(a) Transfer by guardian					
(i) Instances of such transfer which are binding on ward unless and until transfer is set aside	A 44 N 3
(ii) Setting aside—Suit for—By assignee of ward					
(a) Where ward joins as co-plaintiff—Maintainability	A 44 N 7
(b) Whether maintainable	A 44 N 7
(iii) Transfer void and hence not binding on ward—What is	A 44 N 3
(iv) Ward continuing in possession notwithstanding transfer—Transferee suing ward for possession—Ward, whether can resist suit on ground of transfer being liable to be set aside at his instance even if such suit by him may be time-barred at that date	A 44 N 2
(b) Transfer by person other than guardian—Setting aside—Suit for—Limitation	A 44 N 5
—Remedies of—In respect of transfer of property by guardian ab initio void	A 44 N 2
—Suit by					
(a) Against guardian					
(i) For account of profits made by guardian during plaintiff's minority—Limitation	A 120 N 15
(ii) For specific sums received by guardian—Limitation	A 62 N 25
(b) For possession of property alienated by de facto guardian—Limitation	A 44 N 6
(c) For possession of property alienated by guardian—Where alienee is in possession of property by virtue of transfer					
(i) Limitation	A 44 N 2
(ii) Suit for possession not brought within limitation prescribed by Art. 44—Ward's right to property itself, whether extinguished under S. 28	A 44 N 2
(d) For redemption of property—On ground that alleged sale by guardian is only a mortgage—Limitation	A 44 N 2
(e) To set aside decree based on compromise entered into by guardian	
(i) Limitation	A 44 N 4
(ii) Where decree involves transfer of property—Limitation	A 44 N 4
(f) To set aside transaction by guardian which is not a transfer of property—Limitation	A 44 N 4
(g) To set aside transfer of property by guardian					
(i) Burden of proof as to suit being in time	A 44 N 8

Ward—Suit by—To set aside transfer of property by guardian—(Contd.)

- (ii) In respect of transfer ab initio void or otherwise not binding on plaintiff—Limitation ... A 44 N 2
- (iii) In respect of transfer binding on ward till it is set aside—Limitation ... A 44 N 3
- (iv) Suit by minor member of joint Hindu family for setting aside transfer by manager—Limitation ... A 44 N 5
- (v) Suit by minor member of Malabar tarwad for setting aside alienation by Karnavan of tarwad property—Limitation ... A 44 N 5
- (vi) Suit on ward's attaining majority—Limitation ... A 44
- (vii) Where possession is not transferred to alienee—Limitation ... A 44 N 4
- (viii) Where transfer is by de facto Hindu guardian—Limitation ... A 44 N 6
- (ix) Where transfer is made not as the property of minor but as that of guardian himself—Limitation ... A 44 N 5

Waste

- Apprehended waste—Restraining of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 41 N 1
- Compensation for—Suit for—Limitation ... A 41 N 1
- Meaning of ... A 41 N 2
- Permissive waste—Restraining of—Suit for—Limitation ... A 41 N 2
- Restraining of—Suit for
 - (a) Common instance of such suit ... A 41 N 1
 - ... A 41 N 1; A 41 N 3
 - ... A 41 N 3
 - ... whe. ... A 41 N 1
- (e) Waste, whether must have been committed for applicability of Art. 41 ... A 41 N 1

Waste lands

- Mere assertion of hostile title to land by third person is not sufficient to disturb true owner ... A 142 & 144 N 11
- Presumption as to—Rebuttal of—Acts necessary ... A 142 & 144 N 96
- Presumption in Canara is that it belongs to Government : ... A 142 & 144 N 96
- Presumption in possession follows title ... A 142 & 144 N 15

Waste Lands (Claims) Act

- S. 5—Suit under—To contest award of Board of Revenue—Limitation ... A 1; A 1 N 1

Watercourse

- Diversion of—Compensation for—Suit for
 - (a) Limitation—Starting point ... A 38; A 38 N 3
 - (b) Period in respect of which compensation can be recovered ... A 38 N 3
 - (c) Where diversion is a continuing wrong—Limitation—Starting point ... A 38 N 3
- Obstruction to
 - ... A 37; A 37 N 3
 - ... continuing one—Limitation—
 - Starting point ... A 37 N 3
 - (b) Injunction to restrain—Suit for—Limitation ... A 37 N 2; A 38 N 2
 - (c) Removal of—Suit for—Limitation... ... A 38 N 2

—Obstruction to watercourse and in flow of water—Whether a continuing wrong	S 23 N 12
—Rights as to—Declaration of—Suit for—Limitation..	A 37 N 2, A 38 N 2	

—Obstruction to—Compensation for—Suit for				
(a) Limitation—Starting point		A 37, A 37 N 3
(b) Where obstruction is a continuing one—Limitation—Start-				
ing point	A 37 N 3

Will			
—Acknowledgment contained in will—Whether sufficient for purposes of S. 19	S 19 N 46
—Avoidance of—Suit for—On ground that it is voidable transaction—Limitation	A 120 N 20
—Concocted will—Whether document issued within Art 92	A 92 N 3
—	A 120 N 21; A 141 N 3
—	n not cited

—Suit in respect of—For declaration that alleged will is forgery—	...	A 164 N 2
Limitation	A 120 N 20
—Whether document within Art. 91	A 91 N 16

—Accounts stated—Meaning of	A 61 N 2
—"Act" includes illegal omissions	S 24 N 4
—Actual possession—Meaning of	A 10 N 7
—"Adoption"—What is, within Art. 118	A 118 N 3
—Alienation—Meaning of	A 125 N 13
—"Alleged to be"—Meaning of, under Art. 2	A 2 N 6
—	A 69 N 1
—	A 30 N 2
—	A 21 N 1
—"Civil proceeding" in S. 14—Meaning of	S 14 N 13
—Common carrier—Meaning of	A 30 N 2
—Conditional bond—Meaning of	A 68 N 1
—Copyright—Meaning of	A 40 N 2
—	A 3 N 3
—	S 14 N 13
—	S 20
—	A 21 N 1
—Defendant—Definition of	A 124 N 7
—"Disability or inability to sue" in S. 9—Meaning of	S 9 N 4
—Distrain—Meaning of	A 23 N 1
—Distress—Meaning of	A 23 N 1
—"Doing" includes "doing in improper manner"	A 2 N 4
—Domestic servant—Meaning of	A 7 N 3
—"Enactment in force"—Meaning of, in Art. 2	A 2 N 7
—Entire estate—Meaning of	A 121 N 4
—"Execute" in Expl. 2, Art. 182 includes power to entertain application	A 182 N 57
—False imprisonment—Meaning of	A 19 N 1
—"Final decree or order" in Art. 182—Meaning of	A 182 N 40

Words and phrases—(Contd.)

— "Final order"—Final, meaning of	A 182 N 129
— "Give discharge"—Meaning of	S 7 N 9
— Good faith—Meaning of	S 14 N 20
— "Growing in, or attached to or subsisting on the land of another", in S. 2, cl. 5—Meaning of	S 2 Cl 5 N 12
— Guardian—Who is, within Art. 44	A 44 N 5
— 'Hindu or Mahomedan'—Meaning of, in Art. 141	A 141 N 4
— Hiring—Meaning of	A 50 N 1
— 'Hotel'—Meaning of	A 8 N 1
— Household servant—Meaning of	A 7 N 3
— Illegal distress—Meaning of	A 23 N 1
— 'Immovable property'—Meaning of	A 3 N 4 ; A 15 N 1
— Includes—Meaning of	S 2 N 1
— Incorporated body—Meaning of	S 6 N 6
— Injunction—Meaning of	A 42 N 1
— Injury—Meaning of, within Art. 22	A 22 N 2
— Injury in S. 24 includes legal injury	S 24 N 3
— Interest—Meaning of	S 20 N 7 ; A 63 N 2
— 'Labourer'—Meaning of, in Art. 7	A 7 N 4
— Land—Definition of	A 125 N 12
—	S 2 Cl 5 N 12
—	tion in accordance with law"	A 182 N 52
—	—Meaning of	S 10 N 20
—	A 24 N 1
— Local law—Meaning of	S 29 N 6
— 'Lodger'—Meaning of	A 9 N 1
— 'Lodging house'—Meaning of	A 8 N 1
— Means and includes—Meaning of	S 2 N 1
— Month—Meaning of	S 25 N 1
— 'Mortgages' in Art. 148 — Term includes any person having acquired rights of mortgagees	A 148 N 2
— Moveable property—Meaning of	A 29 N 5
— Officer of Government—Who is, within Art. 14	A 14 N 5
— "On demand"—Meaning of, in Art. 59	A 59 N 6
— Order in Art. 12, Cl. (b)—Meaning of	A 12 N 7
— "Order," in Limitation Act must be taken to have same meaning as in Civil P. C., unless sufficient reasons to contrary	A 182 N 129
— 'Order'—Meaning of, in Art. 182	A 182 N 21, 129
— Partnership—Meaning of	A 106 N 3
— Payable—Meaning of, in Art. 57	A 57 N 5
— "Penal actions"—Meaning of, under English law	A 6 N 1
— "Period of limitation prescribed for any suit etc.," in S. 4— Meaning of	S 4 N 2 FN 1
— "Period of limitation prescribed therefor by Sch. 1," in S. 3— Meaning of	S 3 N 8
— Period prescribed—Meaning of	S 14 N 9
— "Period prescribed" in S. 19—Meaning of	S 19 N 12
— Person—Meaning of	S 6 N 6, 7, 8
—	A 131 N 9
—	A 142 & 144 N 8
—	Art. 3—Meaning of	A 3 N 3
—	S 4 N 11
—	S 15 N 3

Words and phrases—(Contd.)

—Private person—Meaning of, within Art. 149	A 149 N 11
—'Proper Court'—Meaning of	A 182 Expl 2
—	A 23 N 4
—	S 6 N 12
—	A 122 N 5
—	under Registration Act :	A 182 N 24	
—Remainderman—Definition of	A 140 N 3
—Representative—Who is, within Art. 21	A 21 N 1
—Right of pre-emption—Meaning of	A 10 N 2
—Right to sue—Meaning of	S 2 Cl 8 N 2
—'Right to use property'—Meaning of	A 32 N 2
—Seaman—Meaning of	A 101 N 1
—Servant—Meaning of	A 7 N 3
—Service—Meaning of, within Art. 26	A 26 N 1
—'Setting aside a sale'—Meaning of	A 12 N 2
—Sign—Meaning of	S 19 N 31
—Signed in S. 19—Meaning of	S 19
—Single bond—Meaning of	A 66 N 2
—Specific injury in S. 24—Meaning of	S 24 N 3
—Special law—Meaning of	S 29 N 6
—'Subject to the provisions of Ss. 4 to 25' in S. 3—Meaning of	S 3 N 3
—Suit—Meaning of—Whether includes appeal	S 14 N 6
—'Suit or application' in S. 18—Meaning of—Complaint of criminal offence, if included	S 18 N 3
—'Tavern'—Meaning of	A 8 N 1
—Technical—Meaning of	S 3 N 39
—Tennre—Meaning of	A 121 N 3
—Tenure-holder—Meaning of	A 121 N 3
—Thavani—Meaning of	A 53 N 1
—The Court, if means proper Court	S 4 N 13
—'Time requisite' in S. 12—Meaning of	S 12 N 10
—To induce a breach of contract—Meaning of	A 27 N 1
—Trespass—Meaning of	A 39 N 2
—Trust for specific purpose—Meaning of	S 10 N 7
—Trust in S. 10—Meaning of	S 10 N 6
—'Under legal process'—Meaning of	A 29 N 4
—'Under the same Code' in Art. 166—Meaning of	A 166 N 3
—'Vested' in S. 10—Meaning of	S 10 N 5
—Wages—Meaning of	A 7 N 2
—Waiver—What constitutes within Art. 75	A 75 N 11
—'Without prejudice'—Meaning of	S 19 N 66
—Wrongful restraint—Meaning of	A 19 N 1
—Wrongful seizure—Meaning of, within Art. 29	...	A 29 N 2; A 29 N 3	
—Year—Meaning of	S 25 N 1

Work

—Price of work done—Suit for			
(a) Essential condition for applicability of Art. 56	A 56 N 1
(b) Illustrative cases governed by Art. 56	A 56 N 1
(c) Limitation—Starting point	...	A 56; A 56 N 4	
(d) Suit for recovery of fees due for medical attendance, whether suit for price of work done	A 56 N 1
(e) Where no time has been fixed for payment	A 56 N 3
(f) Where suit consists of several claims	A 56 N 1

Work—Price of work done, suit for—(Contd.)

- (g) Where work done is expressly stated to be payable at the end of each agricultural year ... A 56 N 3
- (h) Work done at the request of defendant as agent, whether work done at the request of defendant within Art. 56 ... A 56 N 2
- (i) Work, whether must have been done at defendant's request for applicability of Art. 56 ... A 56 N 2

Workmen's Compensation Act**—Proceedings under**

- (a) Applicability of provisions of Limitation Act ... A 22 N 1
- (b) Whether suit within Art. 22 ... A 22 N 1

Worship

- Right of—Suit for exclusive right of worship—Limitation** ... A 120 N 48
- Performance of — Right to—Whether can be acquired by prescription** ... A 124 N 15

Wrong

- Committed during lifetime of deceased person—Suit for**
- (a) Provision for ... A 20 N 1
- (b) Under Legal Representatives' Suits Act—Limitation ... A 20
- Continuing wrong**
- (a) False imprisonment, whether continuing wrong... A 19 N 3
- (b) Wrongful seizure, whether continuing wrong ... A 29 N 8

Wrongful detention

- Of property—Possession of bailee after expiry of period for which goods were bailed to him, when becomes wrongful detention** ... A 49 N 8

Wrongful restraint

- And false imprisonment, distinction between** ... A 19 N 1
- Meaning of .** ... A 19 N 1

Wrongful seizure

- Compensation for—Suit for**
- (a) On ground of injury caused by injunction wrongfully obtained, whether one for wrongful seizure within Art. 29 ... A 29 N 7
- (b) On ground of irregular conduct of sale resulting in damages, whether one for wrongful seizure within Art. 29 ... A 29 N 7
- (c) Suit for damages on ground of fraud, whether one for wrongful seizure within Art. 29 ... A 29 N 7
- (d) Suit for recovery of amount wrongfully taken by defendant from Government treasury under legal process, whether one for compensation for wrongful seizure within Art. 29 ... A 29 N 6
- (e) Suit for specific property seized, whether one for compensation for wrongful seizure ... A 29 N 5
- Of moveable property—see under Moveable property.**
- Of moveable property under legal process — Compensation for : See under Moveable property.**
- Under legal process — What is — Distraint effected by landlord under provisions of Agra Tenancy Act, whether wrongful seizure under legal process** ... A 29 N 4
- Zar-ir-chnharum—Recovery of—Suit for—Limitation** ... A 120 N 39

A. I. R. 1933 Peshawar 61 at 82.

"The law on the subject is lucidly summed up in Chitaley's Commentary on Civil Procedure Code, Vol. 1, p. 182, and is stated as follows: 'A party . . . them.'"

A. I. R. 1934 Allahabad 253 at 255.

"... the reason being that no one can have vested right in forms of procedure. The subject is discussed in Chitaley's Civil Procedure Code, Vol. 1, pp. 4 and 5."

A. I. R. 1934 Peshawar 40 at 42.

"The argument is based on Chitaley's Commentary, 1933 Edition, p. 1898 under O 21, R. 15 of the Code, which is supported by *Gopendra Krishna v. Moti Lal*, A. I. R. 1929 Cal. 559."

A. I. R. 1934 Peshawar 67 at 61.

"These conflicting views are noted on pp. 746 and 747 of Chitaley's Civil Procedure Code."

A. I. R. 1934 Peshawar 94 at 95.

"He (D. J.) quotes from Chitaley as follows: 'All co-promisees . . . as parties.'"

"I have no disagreement with this statement of the law, but in the present case the defendant is not a promisee, but a promisor. A further passage from Chitaley is cited by the learned Additional District Judge to the following effect:

'Where several . . . of suits.'

"That statement of law applies to the facts of the present case."

A. I. R. 1936 Allahabad 811 at 813.

"The ruling cases on this point are collected and noted in Chitaley's Civil Procedure Code, Vol. 3, p. 2318, 2nd Edn."

A. I. R. 1936 Nagpur 228 at 230 =

I. L. R. 1937 Nag. 230 at 233.

"The point is well summed up at pages 2469 and 2470 of Chitaley and Rao's Code of Criminal Procedure, Vol. 3, and the learned authors rightly point out that the view of the High Courts, excepting Rangoon, is consistent with the principles underlying sub-section 3 of the section."

A. I. R. 1936 Peshawar 37 at 37.

"Counsel for the appellants quotes from Chitaley's Commentary to the effect that where the question of costs has been referred to the arbitrator, or where the whole matter in dispute has been referred to the arbitrator, the arbitrator has authority to award costs in the award."

A. I. R. 1936 Peshawar 209 at 210.

"We have been referred to Note (under S. 48 in Chitaley's Commentary on the Civil Procedure Code where the distinction between a fresh application and an application in continuation of a previous application is illustrated."

A. I. R. 1937 Allahabad 82 at 87.

"The balance of authority seems to be that an Appellate Court has no power and it is to interfere to the prejudice of a person who was a party to a suit, but who was not impleaded in the appeal: vide "Code of Civil Procedure," Chitaley & Ananjei Rao Vol. 3, pp. 3003-3004 (1st Edn). I am therefore, of opinion that defendants 2 ought not to have been impleaded."

A. I. R. 1937 Calcutta 222 at 224.

"On this point there is a considerable mass of case law which will be found set out in Chitaley's Commentary on the Civil Procedure Code."

A. I. R. 1937 Lahore 41 at 49 =

I. L. R. 1937 Lah. 11 at 33.

"I find it stated in Chitaley and Ananjei Rao's Code of Civil Procedure that this section (i. e., S. 80) like S. 79 enacts only a rule of procedure. With this view I agree."

A. I. R. 1937 Nagpur 60 at 53 =

I. L. R. 1937 Nag. 277 at 264.

"The learned authors of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned authors favour the view of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts which is in accordance with the view expressed above."

I. R. 1937 Nagpur 216 at 217 =
L. R. 1938 Nag. 280 at 282.

Chitaley and Rao's Civil Procedure Edn. 2, p. 2094 under O. 22, R. 1, it asked :

in the first Court, the
either party."

agrees with these remarks which apply to a dismissal of the suit in L. It is further remarked on the authority of 34 Mad loc. cit. that the appeal cannot be continued even in respect of or other relief which are merely ancillary to the main reliefs. Accordingly in the contention of the respondent."

I. R. 1937 Nagpur 268 at 269 =
L. R. 1937 Nag. 319 at 320.

appears that the weight of authority favours of the view that the Appellate has such powers. The dissentients that view are limited to the High Court of Allahabad and Rangoon and the Court of Oudh : See also Chitaley and Rao's Code of Civil Procedure, Vol. I, 12."

I. R. 1937 Oudh 481 at 483 =
L. R. 13 Luck. 860 at 868 & 668.

essers. Chitaley and Annaji Rao in Commentary on the Code express the view that the present cl. (d) of R. 5 33 gives effect to the view taken in all Bench decision of the Allahabad Court reported in 7 All 661, and other

I. R. 1937 Peshawar 13 at 15.

in this connexion we may quote the following Note No. 4 from Mr. Chitaley's Commentary under R. 53 which is as follows : "Other decrees. — A decree this rule."

I. R. 1937 Peshawar 41 at 41.

in p. 1480 of Mr. Chitaley's Commentary on the Civil Procedure Code (1) it is noted that 'where a plaint is filed on the reopening date after the holidays and the period of limitation expired during the holidays, the fact that the ground of exemption under S. 4,

Limitation Act, was not specifically mentioned in the plaint will not entail the dismissal of the suit inasmuch as the Court is bound to take judicial notice of the holidays.' This note is supported by reference to rulings in Nagpur, Lahore, Madras and Calcutta Courts, though a Calcutta ruling to contrary is also noted. The proposition as stated appears to me to be correct."

A. I. R. 1937 Peshawar 81 at 81.

"Learned counsel has been unable to show me any decided case in which action of that nature amounts to a public nuisance, and the commentary in Chitaley's Civil Procedure Code certainly indicates the contrary."

A. I. R. 1937 Rangoon 391 at 392.

"The learned authors of the Code of Criminal Procedure by Chitaley and Annaji Rao, Edn. 1, Vol. 1, at p. 200 say : 'Thus an ... Provision.'

"I agree with this view."

A. I. R. 1938 Calcutta 287 at 289 & 290 =
L. L. R. (1938) 1 Cal. 53 at 58 and 60.

"In the Note to Messrs. Chitaley and Annaji Rao's Code of Civil Procedure, at p. 1388, I find the following comment : 'The first parties.'

"The learned authors of Chitaley and Annaji Rao's Code of Civil Procedure in the paragraph to which I have already referred, appear to me to sum up in a few words the substance of the decisions."

A. I. R. 1938 Calcutta 730 at 733 =
L. L. R. (1939) 1 Cal. 112 at 120.

"The expression 'other cause of a like nature' has been the subject of various decisions, most of which will be found mentioned in Chitaley's Limitation Act (1938), pp. 567 to 572."

A. I. R. 1938 Lahore 220 at 222.

"(The amended Rule will be found printed at pp. 252-3 of Chitaley's Code of Civil Procedure, Edn 2)"

A. I. R. 1938 Lahore 345 at 346.

"The learned counsel for the present respondents also quoted A. I. R. 1932 All. 446, A. I. R. 1933 All. 264 (a judgment by a Full Bench, one member of which was the present Hon'ble Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court) and the remarks in the Commentary of Mr. Chitaley's Criminal Procedure Code, Vol. 1, p. 676."

A. I. R. 1938 Nagpur 122 at 123.

"It was assumed by the Taxing Judge (Bose J.) in his order of reference that the present case was similar because he assumed that there was no difference for these purposes between a plaint and a memorandum of appeal. This we think is wrong although there are a larger number of rulings collected at p. 44 of Vol. 1 of Chitaley's Civil Procedure Code which take that view."

**A. I. R. 1938 Oudh 45 at 47 and 48 =
I. L. R. 13 Luck. 689 at 693 and 695.**

"The learned counsel (for appellant) maintained that that case stands aforesaid, and he has pointed out to us that in the Commentary on the Civil Procedure Code by Chitaley and Annaji Rao this case is submitted to have been wrongly decided: vide the Commentary, Vol. 1, (Edo. 2) p. 478, (Note 9, P. N. 4).

"In my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant must be accepted."

**A. I. R. 1938 Oudh 146 at 147 =
I. L. R. 14 Luck. 116 at 118.**

"As has been pointed out in Chitaley's discussion of this matter in his Notes to S. 115 at pages 924 and 925 of Vol. 1, Edn. 2 of the Civil P. C., the Allahabad view originally depended on a distinction between cases in which the application had been rejected and cases where it had been accepted."

A. I. R. 1938 Peshawar 4 at 6.

"The general result of this conflict has been clearly set out in Note No. 9 of the commentary on that Rule in Chitaley's Code

of Civil Procedure and, virtually all the cases which have been referred to in the course of that Note have been cited before us as well as some other rulings in addition."

A. I. R. 1939 Lahore 356 at 357.

"As pointed out in A. I. R. 1921 Lah 369 and A. I. R. 1928 All. 236 the absence of a shifting balance is not decisive: see also cases collected in Chitaley's Limitation Act, Vol. 2, p. 1362 *et seq.*"

A. I. R. 1939 Oudh 86 at 89.

"According to Chitaley, (Civil Procedure Code) Vol. 1, p. 517, Note 7:

'A debt debt.'

A. I. R. 1939 Oudh 116 at 117 =**I. L. R. 14 Luck. 538 at 544.**

"A reference to the Notes to O. 40, R. 1

in the latest edition of Katju and Das's Code of Civil Procedure makes it quite clear that there is no such principle as the one suggested by learned counsel."

A. I. R. 1939 Oudh 284 at 285 =**I. L. R. 13 Luck. 19 at 23.**

"I take the following passage based on various rulings from p. 701 of Chitaley's Commentary on the Code of Criminal Procedure: 'On the making of an Section 517'."

A. I. R. 1940 Allahabad 263 at 265.

"In Chitaley's Criminal Procedure Code, Vol. 1, p. 797, the learned commentators say: 'It is Evidence Act.' I agree with their conclusion."

A. I. R. 1940 Peshawar 24 at 25.

"At Note 10 to O. 21, R. 15 of Chitaley's Civil Procedure Code the following comments are made as regards the right of appeal against an order made under O. 21, R. 15:

'The question whether of the non applicant decree-holder.'"